A Stackelberg Game for Empty Container Sharing under a Carbon Tax Policy

In the container shipping industry, container sharing between different shipping carriers have been considered as an effective way to reduce the movements of empty containers. Meanwhile, due to rising concerns about climate change and global warming, governments propose to levy the carbon emission tax that may suppress the demands for container shipping. This research develops a Stackelberg game model to investigate how container sharing in the maritime industry may be affected by the carbon tax imposed by governments. In the game, as the leader, the government’s decision isto maximise social benefit by setting up the best carbon tax rate; while, as the followers, shipping carriers aim to design a mechanism of sharing containers to achieve container supply chain coordination under the government’s carbon tax rate. It has been found that the carbon tax can affect carriers’ profits positively or negatively and thus it is the dominant factor affecting the system coordination. However, even if the government introduces a carbon tax rate, a revenue sharing contract still can make a container sharing supply chain coordinated as long as the parameter in the contract is appropriately set.