Abstract
This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European
merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy).This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore premerger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.
merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy).This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore premerger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 83-99 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Review of industrial organization |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 24 Jul 2010 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Bibliographical note
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comKeywords
- collective dominance
- coordinated effects
- merger remedies
- single dominance
- tacit collusion