Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies: choosing between theories of harm?

Stephen Davies, Matthew Olczak

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European
merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy).This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore premerger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)83-99
Number of pages17
JournalReview of industrial organization
Issue number2
Early online date24 Jul 2010
Publication statusPublished - 2010


Bibliographical note

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  • collective dominance
  • coordinated effects
  • merger remedies
  • single dominance
  • tacit collusion

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