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Bundling and downstream entry

  • Firat Inceoglu*
  • , Xingyi Liu
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

We investigate the incentives of an upstream producer to enter the downstream market where the alternative is to sell via a downstream platform who offers all products as a bundle. When consumers can multihome, following entry the producer faces increased downstream competition but benefits from greater price setting flexibility. We show that entry becomes relatively more profitable if the products are closer substitutes or the correlation between product valuations is weaker. Our results have important implications on recent developments in industries such as video and music streaming.
Original languageEnglish
Article number101160
Number of pages14
JournalInformation Economics and Policy
Volume72
Early online date29 Jan 2026
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2026

Bibliographical note

© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

Data Access Statement

No data was used for the research described in the article.

Keywords

  • Bundling
  • Entry
  • Multihoming

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