Charity registration and reporting: a cross-Jurisdictional and theoretical analysis of regulatory impact

Carolyn J. Cordery, Masayuki Deguchi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Increasingly governments worldwide regulate charities, seeking to restrict the number of organizations claiming taxation exemptions, reduce abuse of state support and fraud. Under public interest theory governments may increase philanthropy through public trust and confidence in charities. Under public choice theory regulators will maximize political returns, ‘manage’ charity-government relationships, and avoid regulatory capture.
Phillips and Smith (2014) suggest that charities’ regulatory regimes should coalesce, despite jurisdictional diversity. We analyse charity regulatory regimes against underlining theories of regulation, and assess regulatory costs and benefits. Thus regulators can reduce regulatory inefficiency, and balance accountability and transparency demands with charities’ abilities to deliver.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1332-1352
Number of pages21
JournalPublic Management Review
Issue number9
Early online date6 Oct 2017
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Bibliographical note

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Funding: JSPS KAKENHI: [Grant Number 15K12993].


  • Charity accountability
  • Regulatory costs
  • Regulatory theory


Dive into the research topics of 'Charity registration and reporting: a cross-Jurisdictional and theoretical analysis of regulatory impact'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this