Differentiated Regulation: the case of charities

Carolyn J. Cordery, Dalice Sim, Tony van Zijl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The increasing number and influence of charities in the economy, evidence of mismanagement and the need for information for policymaking are all reasons for establishing charity regulators. Public interest and public choice theories explain charity regulation which aims to increase public trust and confidence in charities (and thus increase voluntarism and philanthropy) and to limit tax benefits to specific organisations and donors. Nevertheless, regulation is resource intensive, and growing pressure on government budgets requires efficiencies to be found. This study proposes regulation differentiated according to charities' main resource providers, to reduce costs and focus regulatory effort, and provides a feasible segmentation.
Original languageEnglish
Article number10.1111/acfi.12131
Pages (from-to)131-164
JournalAccounting and Finance
Volume57
Issue number1
Early online date1 Mar 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2017

Bibliographical note

Copyright © 2017 by John Wiley & Sons. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Differentiated Regulation: the case of charities Cordery, C. J., Sim, D. & van Zijl, T. 1 Mar 2017 In : Accounting and Finance. 57, 1, p. 131-164 10.1111/acfi.12131], which has been published in final form at [http://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12131]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

Keywords

  • Charity regulation;
  • Regulation efficiency
  • Differentiated regulation; Non-profit organisations;

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