Abstract
The increasing number and influence of charities in the economy, evidence of mismanagement and the need for information for policymaking are all reasons for establishing charity regulators. Public interest and public choice theories explain charity regulation which aims to increase public trust and confidence in charities (and thus increase voluntarism and philanthropy) and to limit tax benefits to specific organisations and donors. Nevertheless, regulation is resource intensive, and growing pressure on government budgets requires efficiencies to be found. This study proposes regulation differentiated according to charities' main resource providers, to reduce costs and focus regulatory effort, and provides a feasible segmentation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 10.1111/acfi.12131 |
| Pages (from-to) | 131-164 |
| Journal | Accounting and Finance |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 1 Mar 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2017 |
Bibliographical note
Copyright © 2017 by John Wiley & Sons. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Differentiated Regulation: the case of charities Cordery, C. J., Sim, D. & van Zijl, T. 1 Mar 2017 In : Accounting and Finance. 57, 1, p. 131-164 10.1111/acfi.12131], which has been published in final form at [http://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12131]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.Keywords
- Charity regulation;
- Regulation efficiency
- Differentiated regulation; Non-profit organisations;