Non-compliance is an expected outcome in norm-governed multi-agent systems, justifying the specification of monitoring, enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms. However, the simplistic assumption is that the violated norm is 'right' and the violating agent is 'wrong'. More complex situations involve selective common-sense non-application of a sanction (the principled violation of policy), situations where the norm is 'right' but those applying it are wrong, and situations where the norm itself is 'wrong'. In complex organisations, the iron law of oligarchy implies that these latter situations will arise and will need to be identified, but cannot be addressed by conventional sanctioning mechanisms that focus on individual violation with respect to supposedly infallible norms and/or norm enforcers. In this paper, we investigate the role of collective disobedience as a transformative mechanism for rule-or ruler-change, through the integration of the principled violation of policy, interactional justice and social learning. Our experiments provide evidence that the inclusion of formal mechanisms for pardoning and reformation enable agents to identify unfairness and displace an oligarchic clique through a process of revolution.