Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems

Peter R. Lewis, Paul Marrow, Xin Yao

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers. Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe. Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.

LanguageEnglish
Title of host publicationParallel Problem Solving from Nature - PPSN X
Subtitle of host publication10th international conference Dortmund, Germany, September 13-17, 2008 proceedings
Place of PublicationBerlin (DE)
PublisherSpringer
Pages1071-1080
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-540-87700-4
ISBN (Print)3-540-87699-5, 978-3-540-87699-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Event10th International Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature - Dortmund, Germany
Duration: 13 Sep 200817 Sep 2008

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume5199
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference10th International Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature
Abbreviated titlePPSN-X
CountryGermany
CityDortmund
Period13/09/0817/09/08

Fingerprint

Resource Allocation
Decentralized
Resource allocation
Load Balancing
Market Equilibrium
Coevolution
Nash Equilibrium
Demonstrations
Charge
Resources
Demonstrate
Market

Keywords

  • co-evolution
  • decentralised systems
  • load-balancing
  • market-based control
  • self-interested agents

Cite this

Lewis, P. R., Marrow, P., & Yao, X. (2008). Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems. In Parallel Problem Solving from Nature - PPSN X: 10th international conference Dortmund, Germany, September 13-17, 2008 proceedings (pp. 1071-1080). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 5199). Berlin (DE): Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87700-4_106
Lewis, Peter R. ; Marrow, Paul ; Yao, Xin. / Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems. Parallel Problem Solving from Nature - PPSN X: 10th international conference Dortmund, Germany, September 13-17, 2008 proceedings. Berlin (DE) : Springer, 2008. pp. 1071-1080 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).
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Lewis, PR, Marrow, P & Yao, X 2008, Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems. in Parallel Problem Solving from Nature - PPSN X: 10th international conference Dortmund, Germany, September 13-17, 2008 proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5199, Springer, Berlin (DE), pp. 1071-1080, 10th International Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature, Dortmund, Germany, 13/09/08. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87700-4_106

Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems. / Lewis, Peter R.; Marrow, Paul; Yao, Xin.

Parallel Problem Solving from Nature - PPSN X: 10th international conference Dortmund, Germany, September 13-17, 2008 proceedings. Berlin (DE) : Springer, 2008. p. 1071-1080 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 5199).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Lewis PR, Marrow P, Yao X. Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems. In Parallel Problem Solving from Nature - PPSN X: 10th international conference Dortmund, Germany, September 13-17, 2008 proceedings. Berlin (DE): Springer. 2008. p. 1071-1080. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87700-4_106