Abstract
ASEAN members have a mixed record of success at balancing external threats. During the Cold War, member states cooperated to contain Vietnamese aggression after its occupation of Cambodia. This success has not extended to the South China Sea, where ASEAN claimant states have failed to generate a united response to China’s violation of maritime sovereignty. What explains ASEAN member state’s mixed record of success at balancing external threats? This article outlines the factors that impact state ability to mobilize ASEAN to balance against a common threat. Through an examination of state capabilities, state allies, and institutional constraints, the paper demonstrates the important role of the target state for institutional balancing. In doing so, it presents an original contribution to both neorealist and institutional realist theory.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 149-167 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Asian Security |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 6 Jul 2025 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Copyright © 2025 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which thisarticle has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.