Introduction: League of Nations and United Nations interventions in post-imperial crises and conflicts

The introduction places the essays in this special issue in the context of recent studies by social scientists and historians on foreign interventions, international conflict management, and global governance. It defines the key terms used in the case studies and discusses the various dimensions of what constitutes “success” in foreign interventions carried out by international organizations in post-imperial/post-colonial contexts. The introduction then assesses the seven case studies examined in the five essays in this special issue. These span the period from the early 1920s to the late 1970s, cover parts of Europe, the Middle East, central Africa, and Asia, and range from financial reconstruction and fundamental education programmes to refugee resettlement, peacekeeping, and military intervention. Despite the large variety of historical contexts and forms of intervention, the introduction identifies several common challenges that League of Nations and United Nations officials faced as they sought to influence the outcome of a domestic crisis or conflict. These challenges include not only practical issues such as lack of local knowledge or budgetary constraints, but also the persistence of patronizing attitudes, secrecy, competition with other external interveners, and, crucially, a mismatch between the interests of the international interveners and the populations affected. The introduction then assesses the main strategies the League of Nations and United Nations interveners used to overcome these challenges. It demonstrates that they frequently overstepped their mandates, ventured into legal grey zones, adopted covert strategies of intervention, or avoided meaningful action while settling on safer and allegedly apolitical and “impartial” humanitarian aid. The final section discusses the mixed historical record of foreign interventions and international conflict management and the severe risks both of failure and of inaction. It concludes by offering some tentative historical “lessons” or reflection points that may stimulate current debates among social scientists and practitioners working in international organizations.