Known unknowns: How much financial misconduct is detected and deterred?

John Ashton*, Tim Burnett, Ivan Diaz-rainey, Peter Ormosi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Have financial businesses changed their behaviour in the aftermath of global financial crisis? We address this question by introducing a new and more parsimonious method to quantify the level of financial misconduct and apply this to financial offences between 2004 and 2016. This exercise allows us to investigate whether Capture-Recapture methods can be deployed to handle problems of partial observability and how they compare to previous methods set out to achieve the same goal. In our two stage approach, first, we estimate the rate at which offending businesses are detected, then we look at how the number of detected offenders changed after 2010, and use these two layers of information to make inferences on the deterrent effect of financial regulation. Our results offer evidence that a drop in the number of detected offences post-global financial crisis was driven largely by improved deterrence.
Original languageEnglish
Article number101389
JournalJournal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
Volume74
Early online date21 Jul 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2021

Bibliographical note

© 2021, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

  • Misconduct behaviour
  • Misconduct risk
  • Regulatory punishments
  • Partial observability
  • Capture-Recapture
  • Deterrence

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