Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates

Sajid M. Chaudhry, Stefanie Kleimeier

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrower and syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear when arrangers have an information advantage over other syndicate participants. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)116-126
JournalJournal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
Volume38
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2015

Bibliographical note

© 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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