Relational incentive policies in cross-border interfirm relationships

Claude Obadia, David I. Gilliland

Research output: Unpublished contribution to conferenceAbstract

Abstract

How an exporter can effectively craft a distributor agreement that encourages its network of foreign distributors to respond in pro-relational ways? This is an important issue as previous research has shown that relationship quality was linked to export performance. However, research failed to propose managerial tools that allowed exporters to foster relational phenomena in cross-border relationships. In this study, we suggest that exporters can influence importers' attitudes and behaviors with relational incentives policies. We also show that the impact of these policies is impervious to the noise, i.e., psychic distance and information asymmetry, that characterizes international business relationships. Our hypotheses are tested via structural equations modeling with data from a sample of French exporters.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 30 Jun 2010
Event51st annual meeting of the Academy of International Business - San Diego, United States
Duration: 27 Jun 201030 Jun 2010

Other

Other51st annual meeting of the Academy of International Business
Abbreviated titleAIB 2009
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period27/06/1030/06/10
Other"Knowledge Development and Exchange in International Business Networks"

Bibliographical note

Abstract published in Proceedings of the 51st annual meeting of the Academy of International Business, Torben Pedersen and Tunga Kiyak (eds.) pp. 187-188 available on http://aib.msu.edu/events/2009/AIB_2009_Proceedings.pdf

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