Abstract
We study the effects of revenue and investment cost uncertainty, as well non- preemption duopoly competition, on the timing of investments in two complementary inputs, where either spillover-knowledge is allowed or proprietary-knowledge holds. We find that the ex-ante and ex-post revenue market shares play a very important role in firms’ behavior. When competition is considered, the leader’s behavior departs from that of the monopolist firm of Smith (Ind Corp Change 14:639–650, 2005). The leader is justified in following the conventional wisdom (i.e., synchronous investments are more likely), whereas, the follower’s behavior departs from that of the conventional wisdom (i.e., asynchronous investments are more likely).
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 319–355 |
| Number of pages | 37 |
| Journal | Annals of Operations Research |
| Volume | 271 |
| Early online date | 12 Jan 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2018 |
Bibliographical note
© The Author(s) 2018. This article is an open access publication. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.Funding: Fundação Para a Ciência e a Tecnologia.
Keywords
- Complementary investments
- Duopoly
- Uncertainty
- Investment analysis
- Real option game
- Non-preemption