Social and asocial learning in collective action problems: the rise and fall of socially-beneficial behaviour

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The allocation of common-pool resources is an important topic in technical and socio-Technical systems, and when left unmanaged, such systems often collapse to highly unequal and unsustainable outcomes. Recent work has highlighted a role for electronic institutions in managing such resources, to ensure socially-beneficial outcomes in the long term. However, open self-organising multi-Agent systems often involve agents that learn behaviours in order to meet their goals. In this paper we explore the interplay between institutional features and forms of social and asocial learning employed by self-interested agents. We show that, while recent results have associated social learning with sustainability, this is sensitive to the form of social learning used. We show that more realistic models that combine social and asocial learning are more likely to lead to unsustainable institutions and anti-social outcomes. However, a key role for pardons in the sanction mechanism of the institution is identified, which allows for tolerance of a range of behaviours associated with ongoing learning, including complacency and exploration.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017
PublisherIEEE
Pages91-96
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509065585
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 12 Oct 2017
Event2nd IEEE International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017 - Tucson, United States
Duration: 18 Sep 201722 Sep 2017

Conference

Conference2nd IEEE International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017
CountryUnited States
CityTucson
Period18/09/1722/09/17

Fingerprint

Multi agent systems
Sustainable development

Bibliographical note

© 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works

Keywords

  • common-pool resources
  • electronic institutions
  • social learning

Cite this

Lewis, P. R., & Ekart, A. (2017). Social and asocial learning in collective action problems: the rise and fall of socially-beneficial behaviour. In Proceedings - 2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017 (pp. 91-96). [8064102] IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/FAS-W.2017.126
Lewis, Peter R. ; Ekart, Aniko. / Social and asocial learning in collective action problems : the rise and fall of socially-beneficial behaviour. Proceedings - 2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017. IEEE, 2017. pp. 91-96
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Lewis, PR & Ekart, A 2017, Social and asocial learning in collective action problems: the rise and fall of socially-beneficial behaviour. in Proceedings - 2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017., 8064102, IEEE, pp. 91-96, 2nd IEEE International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017, Tucson, United States, 18/09/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/FAS-W.2017.126

Social and asocial learning in collective action problems : the rise and fall of socially-beneficial behaviour. / Lewis, Peter R.; Ekart, Aniko.

Proceedings - 2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017. IEEE, 2017. p. 91-96 8064102.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Lewis PR, Ekart A. Social and asocial learning in collective action problems: the rise and fall of socially-beneficial behaviour. In Proceedings - 2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems, FAS*W 2017. IEEE. 2017. p. 91-96. 8064102 https://doi.org/10.1109/FAS-W.2017.126