Charity registration and reporting: a cross-Jurisdictional and theoretical analysis of regulatory impact

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Abstract

Increasingly governments worldwide regulate charities, seeking to restrict the number of organizations claiming taxation exemptions, reduce abuse of state support and fraud. Under public interest theory governments may increase philanthropy through public trust and confidence in charities. Under public choice theory regulators will maximize political returns, ‘manage’ charity-government relationships, and avoid regulatory capture.
Phillips and Smith (2014) suggest that charities’ regulatory regimes should coalesce, despite jurisdictional diversity. We analyse charity regulatory regimes against underlining theories of regulation, and assess regulatory costs and benefits. Thus regulators can reduce regulatory inefficiency, and balance accountability and transparency demands with charities’ abilities to deliver.

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Carolyn J. Cordery

Person: Academic

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  • CHARITY REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

    Rights statement: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

    Accepted author manuscript, 492 KB, PDF-document

    Embargo ends: 6/04/19

Details

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages21
JournalPublic Management Review
VolumeEarly online
Early online date6 Oct 2017
DOIs
StateE-pub ahead of print - 6 Oct 2017

Bibliographic note

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

    Keywords

  • Charity accountability, Regulatory costs, Regulatory theory

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Employable Graduates; Exploitable Research

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