Abstract
This paper explores the effectiveness of financial management tools in regulating the use of resources by arm’s length bodies (ALBs) in a period of fiscal stress. The paper presents research undertaken into the implementation of a new financial management tool for ALBs in the UK since the 2008 financial crisis. Drawing on conflict ambiguity theory, the paper shows how the effectiveness of such tools is affected by deep-rooted tensions implicit within arm’s length governance. This gives rise to micro-level conflict over the means of achieving fiscal regulation, underpinned by macro-level ambiguity over the logic of governance pursued by the government.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 362-378 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Financial Accountability and Management |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 1 Jul 2016 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 2016 |
Bibliographical note
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Tonkiss, K. (2016). Delegation in hard times: the financial management of arm's length bodies in the UK. Financial Accountability and Management, 32(3), 362-378. , which has been published in final form at DOI: 10.1111/faam.12089. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.Keywords
- ambiguity
- arm's length bodies
- control
- independence
- quangos