Monitoring Mechanisms, Managerial Incentives, Investment Distortion Costs, and Derivatives Usage

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

View graph of relations Save citation

Authors

Research units

Abstract

We relate derivatives usage to the level of corporate governance/monitoring mechanisms, managerial incentives and investment decisions of UK firms. We find evidence to suggest that the monitoring environment, e.g., board size, influences the use of both currency and interest rate derivatives usage. Managerial compensation also influences derivatives usage. Investment decisions are affected by the governance and
managerial compensation of firms, which in turn impact on derivatives usage. We find a strong tendency for UK firms to reduce derivatives usage in situations where derivatives usage should be increased. There is limited evidence that firms use hedging substitutes to avoid monitoring from external capital markets.

Request a copy

Request a copy

Documents

  • Monitoring mechanisms, managerial incentives, investment distortion costs, and

    Rights statement: © 2017, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

    Accepted author manuscript, 1002 KB, PDF-document

    Embargo ends: 24/12/19

    Licence: CC BY-NC-ND Show licence

Details

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)93-141
JournalBritish Accounting Review
Volume50
Issue number1
Early online date24 Dec 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2018

Bibliographic note

© 2017, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

    Keywords

  • Corporate hedging, corporate governance (CG), agency problem, under/overinvestment, logistic regression

Employable Graduates; Exploitable Research

Copy the text from this field...