Preface

The 44th Annual Conference of the Association for Consumer Research (ACR) was held at the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, October 3-6, 2013. This volume reports the presentations made in special sessions, competitive paper sessions, working paper session, roundtables and film festival.

The conference theme was “Making a Difference” and was inspired by Chicago, a bold city that is constantly reinventing itself through its architecture, restaurants, arts, nightlife, and music. Our hope was to channel this vibrancy into the conference in order to allow participants to discover, or re-discover, the joy of research that makes a difference. The conference attracted over 1230 participants, 104 special session proposals (51% accepted), 484 competitive papers (43% accepted), 254 working papers (64% accepted), 7 roundtables (100% accepted) and 13 films (81% accepted).

In keeping with the spirit of the conference, we introduced several inaugural events and innovations to further enhance the academic content of our program. These included:

- The keynote address, “David & Goliath” by Malcolm Gladwell. Over 1200 members attended and everyone received a complimentary copy of his newly released book
- The Mid-Career Mentorship Program, to connect mid-career faculty with senior mentors
- Perspectives Sessions, to integrate knowledge in specific research areas
- Workshops, to provide hands-on skills in research tools and methods
- Thematic organization of working papers into mini-sessions

All the academic and entertainment events made up for an energising experience.

We thank our generous donors, especially our schools, the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, USA, the London Business School, UK, and the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada. Roger Martin, former Dean of Rotman, introduced us to Malcolm Gladwell and then flew in to open Malcom’s keynote speech. Thank you so much. Also supporting us was the American Marketing Association, the Journal of Consumer Psychology, the Journal of Marketing Research, and the Marketing Science Institute, and, from industry, Qualtrics, CBSIG, Fizz, and BrandOpus.

Many wonderful people worked tirelessly to help us. We thank our Program Committee, Competitive Paper Review Board Members, Competitive Paper Reviewers, Working Paper Reviewers, and Film Reviewers. Special thanks to Leonard Lee and Wendy Liu (Working Paper Chairs), Anirban Mukhopadhyay and David Wooten (Forums Chairs), Marylouise Caldwell and Paul Henry (Film Festival Chairs), Derek Rucker and Jaideep Sengupta (Doctoral Symposium Chairs), Nilhi Agrawal and Jonathan Levav (Mid-Career Mentorship Program Chairs), and Kelly Goldsmith, Tom Meyvis, Leif Nelson, Joachim Vosgerau (Entertainment Committee). David Bell, Robert Meyer, Keith Niedermeier, and Americus Reed II (Brand Inequity band members) and Ashesh Mukherjee (DJ Ash) rocked our closing gala at House of Blues. Special thanks also to ACR Executive Director Rajiv Vaidyanathan, Conference Manager Paula Rigling, website guru Aleksey Cherfas, Membership Executive Manager Praveen Aggarwal, Communication Executive Ekant Veer, administrative assistants Elisabeth Hajicek, Laura Nagle, Shira Conradi, Eliza Badoi, and Aaron Christen.

Our final thank you to colleagues who advised us throughout the year and helped in countless ways, to everyone who made our program stellar by submitting their best research, and to Angela Y. Lee, President ACR 2013, for this wonderful opportunity to organize the ACR conference.

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Consumption Addiction: A Research Agenda of the Progression from Adaptive to Maladaptive Categories of Consumption Behaviors

Dante M. Pirouz, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Ingrid M. Martin, California State University, Long Beach, USA
Michael A. Kamins, SUNY-Stony Brook, USA
Hieu Nguyen, California State University Long Beach, USA
Wendy Attaya Boland, American University, USA
Margaret Brucks, University of Arizona, USA
Paul Connell, City University London, UK
June Cotte, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Samantha Cross, Iowa State University, USA
Stephanie Feiereisen, City University London, UK
David Glen Mick, University of Virginia, USA
Ann Mirabito, Baylor, USA
Vanessa Perry, The George Washington University, USA
Justine Rapp, University of San Diego, USA
Cristel-Antonia Russell, American University, USA
Maura Scott, Florida State University, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Stacey Finkelstein, Baruch College, USA

Best Practices for Behavioral Lab & Subject Pool Management

Christina Brown, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA
Lillian Chen, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France
Pierre Chandon, INSEAD, France
Diego Costa Pinto, Reims Management School, France
Kristin Diehl, University of Southern California, USA
John Galvin, Harvard Business School, USA
Miranda R. Goode, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Joseph K. Goodman, Washington University in St Louis, USA
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA
Chase Harrison, Harvard Business School, USA
Douglas Hausknecht, University of Akron, USA
Marcia Herter, Reims Management School, France
Amber Holden, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, USA
Jeff Lees, Columbia Business School, USA
Gina S. Mohr, College of Business, Colorado State University, USA
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA
Melvin Prince, Southern Connecticut State University, USA
Dan Rice, E.J. Ourso College of Business, Louisiana State University, USA
Patricia Rossi, Reims Management School, France
Aaron M. Sackett, University of St. Thomas, USA
Sridhar Samu, India School of Business, Hyderabad, India
Karen H. Smith, Texas State University, Texas, USA
Rebecca White, University of Chicago, USA
Alan Malter, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Cameron McClure, Columbia Business School, USA
Making a Difference in Different Ways: Unleashing the Power of Collaborative Research Teams to Enhance Consumer Well-being

Meryl P. Gardner, University of Delaware, USA
Minita Sanghvi, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, USA
Julie L. Ozanne, Virginia Tech, USA
Laurel Anderson, Arizona State University, USA
Alan Andreasen, Georgetown University, USA
Eric Arnould, University of Bath, UK
Stacey Baker, University of Wyoming, USA
Julia Bayuk, University of Delaware, USA
Merrie Brucks, University of Arizona, USA
Paul Connell, City University London, UK
Brennan Davis, Baylor University, USA
Benet DeBerry-Spence, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Alexander (Sasha) Fedorikhin, Indiana University, USA
Gavan J. Fitzsimons, Duke University, USA
Curt Haugtvedt, Ohio State University, USA
Ronald Paul Hill, Villanova University, USA
Deborah Roedder-John, University of Minnesota, USA
Michael A. Kamins, SUNY-Stony Brook, USA
Carol Kaufman-Scarborough, Rutgers University, USA
Panam Anand Keller, Dartmouth College, USA
Jun Yong Kim, Hanyang University, Republic of Korea
Aradhna Krishna, University of Michigan, USA
Craig Lefebvre, RTI International and University of South Florida, USA
Daniele Mathras, Arizona State University, USA
David Glen Mick, University of Virginia, USA
Stephanie Oneto, University of Wyoming, USA
Connie Pechmann, UC at Irvine, USA
Vanessa Perry, The George Washington University, USA
Mark Peterson, University of Wyoming, USA
Norbert Schwarz, University of Michigan, USA
Linda Scott, University of Oxford, UK
Clifford J. Shultz, II, Loyola University Chicago, USA
Laurel Steinfield, University of Oxford, UK
Harish Sujan, Tulane University, USA
Ekant Veer, University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Madhu Viswanathan, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

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Mediation, Contrasts, & LISREL
Dawn Iacobucci, Vanderbilt University, USA

Designing QUALTRICS Studies
Bryce Winkelman, Qualtrics, USA

How to Make a Good Consumer Research Video
Russell Belk, York University, Canada
Marylouise Caldwell, University of Sydney, Australia
Paul Henry, University of Sydney, Australia

Journal of Consumer Research New Reviewer Training
Rashmi Adaval, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Jim Burroughs, University of Virginia, USA

Journal of Consumer Research Advanced Reviewer Training
Darren W. Dahl, University of British Columbia, Canada
Eileen Fischer, York University, Canada

Stephen Spiller, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
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Benjamin Boeuf, HEC Montreal, Canada
François A. Carrillat, HEC Montreal, Canada
Alain d'Astous, HEC Montreal, Canada

01-B: The Role of Social Context on Attitudes Towards Product Placement in Children’s Films
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Nikoleta Siamagka, University of Reading, UK
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Evelyn Derera, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Francesca Evans, UK

01-C: The Role of Emotional Intelligence as a Moderator of the Effectiveness of Advertising Disclaimers on Digitally Enhanced Images
Paula Peter, San Diego State University, USA
Steven Shyne, San Diego State University, USA
Anjala Krishen, University of Nevada Las Vegas, USA

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Yeuseung Kim, DePaul University, USA
Hye Jin Yoon, Southern Methodist University, USA

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Seung (Seung-Chul) Yoo, Loyola University Chicago, USA
Eunji Cho, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA

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Keith Coulter, Clark University, USA
Anne Roggeveen, Babson College, USA
Dhruv Grewal, Babson College, USA

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Maggie Wenjing Liu, Tsinghua University, China
Lijun Zhang, Peking University, China
Hean Tat Keh, University of Queensland, Australia

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Hye Jin Yoon, Southern Methodist University, USA
Yeuseung Kim, DePaul University, USA

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Mehdi Akhgari, University of Manitoba, Canada
Hamed Aghakhani, University of Manitoba, Canada
Kelley Main, University of Manitoba, Canada

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Seung Hwan (Mark) Lee, Colorado State University, USA
Jeff D. Rotman, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Andrew W. Perkins, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada

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Joohyung Park, University of South Carolina, USA
Sejin Ha, University of Tennessee, USA

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David L. Alexander, University of St. Thomas, USA
John Sailors, University of St. Thomas, USA

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Xiaobing Song, Dalian University of Technology, China
Feifei Huang, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Xiuping Li, National University of Singapore, Singapore
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Inga Wobker, Zeppelin University, Germany
Isabella Maria Kopton, Zeppelin University, Germany
Peter Kenning, Zeppelin University, Germany

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Kivy Weeks, University of Connecticut, USA

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Hua (Olivia) Lian, University of Alberta, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada

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Annie Chen, University of Westminster, UK
Norman Peng, University of Westminster, UK

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Gaëlle Moal-Ulvoas, France Business School, France

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Jaeyeon Chung, Columbia University, USA
Donald R. Lehmann, Columbia University, USA

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Yunhui Huang, Nanjing University, China

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Aditi Grover, Plymouth State University, USA
Phil Ramsey, University of New Hampshire, USA
Jeff Foreman, Penn State Harrisburg University, USA

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Kelly Cowart, Grand Valley State University, USA
Carolyn Massiah, University of Central Florida, USA
Kevin Lehnert, Grand Valley State University, USA

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Sarah Roche, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
David H. Silvera, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

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Matthew Philp, Queen's University, Canada
Andrew T. Stephen, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Laurence Ashworth, Queen's University, Canada

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Sadia Yaqub Khan, Cardiff University, UK
Mirella Yani-de-Soriano, Cardiff University, UK

04-C: Let Me Skip the Ads! Revisiting Reactance Theory in an Advertising Context

Yoo Jin Song, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Brittany Duff, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

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Leslie Koppenhafer, University of Oregon, USA

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Pingping Qiu, Monash University, Australia
Fang Wan, University of Manitoba, Canada
Amitava Chattopadhyay, INSEAD, Singapore

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Shona Bettany, University of Westminster, UK
Ben Kerrane, University of Manchester, UK
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<td>Sunmee Baeck, Pukyong National University, Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Eun Mi Lee, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA</td>
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<td>Ozge Yucel-Aybat, Pennsylvania State University-Harrisburg, USA</td>
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<td>Seung Kyoon Shin, University of Rhode Island, USA</td>
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<td>Hillary Leonard, University of Rhode Island, USA</td>
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<td>Jill Sundie, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA</td>
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<td>Bianca Grohmann, Concordia University, Canada</td>
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Joseph W. Chang, Vancouver Island University, Canada
Yung-Chien Lou, National Chengchi University, Taiwan
You Lin, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan

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Theo Lieven, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland

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Yoo Jin Song, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Zongyuan Wang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
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Tin Lam, Vietnam National University, Vietnam

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Bettina Lis, University of Mainz, Germany
Sabine Einwiller, University of Mainz, Germany

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Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA

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Hajar Fatemi, McGill University, Canada
Laurette Dubé, McGill University, Canada

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Ceren Ekebas-Turedi, Old Dominion University, USA
Leona Tam, University of Wollongong, Australia

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Rhiannon MacDonnell, Cass Business School, City University London, UK

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Xiaoye Chen, North Central College, USA
Rong Huang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
Laurette Dubé, McGill University, Canada

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Sukhyun Kim, Samsung SDS, Republic of Korea
Kiwan Park, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea
Y. Jin Youn, Northwestern University, USA

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Mehdi Tanzeeb Hossain, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Zhiyong Yang, University of Texas at Arlington, USA

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Frank May, University of South Carolina, USA
Ashwani Monga, University of South Carolina, USA

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Katina Kulow, University of South Carolina, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA

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Canice M.C. Kwan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

08-E: The Importance of Different Information in Donation Requests: An Eye-Tracking Analysis
Janet Kleber, University of Vienna, Austria
Sophie Süßenbach, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
Stephan Dickert, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
Arnd Florack, University of Vienna, Austria
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Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
Stefanie Robinson, North Carolina State University, USA

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Nara Youn, Hongik University, Republic of Korea
Chang Yeop Shin, Hongik University, Republic of Korea
Myungwoo Nam, Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea

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Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada

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Y. Jin Youn, Northwestern University, USA
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Ze Wang, University of Central Florida, USA

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James Hutton, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA

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Andong Cheng, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Margaret G. Meloy, Pennsylvania State University, USA

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Mazen Jaber, Saginaw Valley State University, USA
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Danny Weathers, Clemson University, USA

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Michelle Nelson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Brittany Duff, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Da Zheng, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
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Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Emiko Amano, Kanto-Gakuin University, Japan
Evelyn Derera, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
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Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Ziska Fields, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

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Mishaal Maikoo, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Debbie Vigar-Ellis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

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Zhiyong Yang, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Ahmad Jamal, Cardiff University, UK
Rong Huang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China

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Lambrianos Nikiforidis, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Ashley Rae, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Kristina M. Durante, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

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Burak Tunca, University of Agder, Norway
Sigurd V. Troye, Norwegian School of Economics, Norway

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Pierre-Yann Dolbec, York University, Canada


Wei-Fen Chen, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

11-C: Experiential Purchases Foster Social Connectedness

Amit Kumar, Cornell University, USA
Thomas Mann, Cornell University, USA
Thomas D. Gilovich, Cornell University, USA

11-D: Interpreting Financial Consumption Experiences: The Case of British-Muslims

Ahmad Jamal, Cardiff University, UK
Akmal Hanuk, Islamic Banking and Finance Institute, UK
Omer Rana, Cardiff University, UK

11-E: Protections Against Agent Opportunism: Customer Assumptions and Marketplace Realities

Gulnur Tumbat, San Francisco State University, USA
Kent Grayson, Northwestern University, USA

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Daniel Sheehan, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Sara Dommer, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA

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Tifani Wiyanto, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Edwina Luck, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Shane Mathews, Queensland University of Technology, Australia

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Anja Simms, University of Wollongong, Australia
Ulrike Gretzel, University of Wollongong, Australia
Andrew Whelan, University of Wollongong, Australia


Milan Pickl Bermejo, ESCP Europe, France
Marcelo V. Nepomuceno, ESCP Europe, France

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Lingjiang Tu, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Yinlong Zhang, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
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Ravi Shanmugam, Santa Clara University, USA

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Y. Jin Youn, Northwestern University, USA
Kelly Goldsmith, Northwestern University, USA
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Andrew Smith, York University, Canada
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31-E: The Effect of Interpersonal Influences on Social Networking Site’s Users.
Noelia Sanchez-Casado, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
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Author Index
This year we come together to Chicago for ACR 2013. The theme of this year’s conference is “Making a Difference.”

The vision of the co-chairs when they were planning this conference was that we would be coming together to make a difference. But what does that mean? I think we all know what difference means. But it is one thing to know what it stands for, and another to try to explain it. So like what everyone does these days, I went online and looked up the word “difference” and found multiple definitions:

- The quality that makes one person or thing unlike another
- Something that people do not agree about – a disagreement, quarrel, dispute or controversy
- A point or way in which people or things are not the same
- A noticeable change or effect

Most of you would agree that “a noticeable change or effect” is what the co-chairs have in mind. But I also think that we could make a bigger difference as a field by leveraging our differences. Diversity is a good thing.

But is diversity really a good thing? Or is it just a politically correct stance to take? We all know the saying – birds of a feather flock together. Similar words of wisdom have been expressed by ancient philosophers starting with Aristotle (1934): “people love those who are like themselves” and Plato (1968) “similarity begets friendship;” as well as in Chinese proverbs: “the same kind gathers (物以類聚).”

Research as early as almost 100 years ago showed that school children who shared similar demographic characteristics such as age, sex, race or ethnicity were more likely to form playgroups or become good friends. We all know intuitively, as well as from research, that similarity attracts. People or things that are similar to us are aesthetically more pleasing. Similarity helps reduce uncertainty; and that is another reason why we like things that are familiar – as demonstrated by the robust mere exposure effect. Similarity facilitates communication; we can more easily communicate with others who share a common knowledge base, similar beliefs, or tastes. Similarity also engenders social cohesiveness. We can achieve greater consensus with people who are similar to us, and that makes us like them even more. It’s an upward spiral.

Is similarity favored in academia? Does similarity work the same way in academia with finding co-authors? I did a mini survey with a small group of people from my cohort who were AMA Doctoral Consortium Fellows or MSI Young Scholars. I asked them to describe their most favorite co-author, what they thought of their co-author when they first met, and now. Not surprisingly, their attitude toward their favorite co-author grew over time. But the impression that they think alike and are not very different remained stable (Figure 1).

I also asked them to tell me where they met. The data suggest that favorite co-authors are likely ones who have the same training or share the same workplace culture (Figure 2).

In 1845, Samuel Morse sent the first electronic message “What had God wrought” from Washington DC to Baltimore, and declared putting an end to what he refers to as the “tyranny of distance.” But it seems that even with the internet, email, and the dropbox that many of us use, the tyranny of distance still rules. And the conclusion one might draw from this very biased sample that “similarity attracts” provides more evidence to the “30-foot rule” phenomenon which says that people are most likely to work with others whose offices are within 30 feet of their own.

But while homophily is evident, there is also a need for heterophily – “love of the different.” A co-author who is identical to us offers zero complementarity. There are good reasons that we like differences. Putting two different things together gives special ad-
vantage – a term known as hybrid vigor (heterosis). We see this advantage in the plant kingdom, such as the tea rose, or the rutabaga; we also see this advantage in the animal kingdom, like the Savannah cat. And amongst people, working with someone who is different from us sparks creativity, even when what makes them different is that they are wrong!

I would like to describe a free association study that researchers from Berkeley conducted. They asked subjects to freely associate with the word “blue” – and the most common answer is “sky”. But in another condition, they added another task before this free association task. They showed subjects and a confederate color patches and asked them to name the color. When the confederate sees the blue color patch and calls out “blue,” the free association is still “sky”. But when the confederate sees the blue color patch and says “green,” the free association became more interesting; participants might say blue jazz, or blueberry pie.

So just being different could lead to good outcomes. But what about difference as in “something that people do not agree about – a disagreement, quarrel, dispute or controversy?” How can disagreement or quarrel lead to something good?

Let me tell you something about Alex Osborn. He is the founder of BBDO, one of the major ad agencies with offices in many cities around the world, including Chicago. He is also the author of “Your Creative Power” published in 1948. What made this book so special was Chapter 33 – “How to organize a squad to create ideas.” According to Osborn, people should get together and use the brain to storm a creative problem; that is, they come together and engage in a “brainstorm”. And brainstorming was central to BBDO’s success. At one of these brainstorming sessions, ten advertising executives were reported to have generated a total of 87 ideas for a new drugstore in 90 minutes, at the rate of almost one idea per minute. The most important rule that they had to follow, one that distinguishes brainstorming from other types of group activity, was there should be NO criticism, and NO negative comments. The idea is that if people are worried that their ideas might be ridiculed, the whole process would fall apart. So the gist of the instruction was - “Forget quality. Aim for quantity.” Brainstorming was an instant hit and Osborn became an influential business guru.

Now business guru may know how to make money, but most of them don’t know how to do good research. More than 50 years later, in 2004, the same researchers from Berkeley conducted another study that took place in two countries – US and France. Fifty-two teams of 5 female undergrads each were given 20 minutes to come up with as many solutions as possible to reduce traffic congestion in the San Francisco Bay Area. At the same time, six teams of male undergrads and 15 teams of female undergrads were tasked with solving a similar traffic congestion problem in Paris. The teams in each country were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. All participants were told: “most research and advice suggest that the best way to come up with good solutions is to come up with many solutions. Freewheeling is welcome; don’t be afraid to say anything that comes to mind.” Then participants in the brainstorming condition were given the standard brainstorming instruction: “However, in addition, most studies suggest that you should rule out criticism. You should NOT criticize anyone else’s ideas.” And those in the debate condition were told: “However, in addition, most studies suggest that you should debate and even criticize each other’s ideas.” And participants in the control condition were not given any further instruction.

The results were quite surprising. The brainstorming group performed only slightly better than the no instructions control group. The debate group was by far the most creative, generating 20% more ideas than the other two groups. This study shows that ideas are not inhibited by debates and criticisms; but are instead stimulated by them.

Other evidence also suggests when people who think differently come together, good things happen. A study examining what makes Broadway musicals successful shows that the best teams were those with a mix of old and new talents and relationships. West Side Story is a good example. It had really famous producers and directors and choreographers like Jerome Robbins, Leonard Bernstein, Arthur Laurents. It also had a 25-year old lyricist who had never worked on Broadway musical before – his name? Stephen Sondheim.

What I would like to advocate is that different ways of thinking can enrich research – there is a yin-yang complementarity. Let’s consider promotion and prevention focus. Both are essential for survival, and yet seldom can we adopt both orientations at the same time. Wouldn’t it be nice if someone has what we lack watching our back? It’s the same with abstract/concrete thinking, or analytical/holistic thinking. I’m sure you could come up with more examples.

So having a diverse team of researchers does have distinct pros and cons – while the team may lose out on social cohesiveness, they win big on creativity, innovativeness, and impact! Let me share with you the results of a paper published in Science a few years ago on research productivity and impact (Wuchty, Jones & Uzzi 2007). The authors examined web of science data on 19.9 million papers and 2.1 million worldwide patents published between 1945 and 2006 and found that teams increasingly dominate solo authors in the production of knowledge. Team efforts in research are on the rise across virtually all fields—science and engineering, social sciences, patents, except in arts and humanities where it is fairly stable. Teams also produce more highly cited research than individuals, with this team advantage increasing over time. The most frequently cited studies used to be the product of a lone genius, like Einstein, or Darwin. This is no longer the case. Today, papers by multiple authors receive more than twice as many citations as single-authored papers. And within teams, the diversity advantage continues: between-school collaborations have a significant advantage over within-school collaborations in terms of high impact papers. That is, UBC-Duke collaboration trumps UBC-UBC collaboration or Duke-Duke collaboration. And it is not just cross-school collaborations getting more citations, cross-border or international collaborations also receive more citations than within-nation collaborations.

What we are observing with these cross-school or international collaborations may be similar to what happens to a particular plant species - cucurbita pepo. The scallop squash, pumpkin, zucchini, these are all different varieties of the same species. Different farmers grow it for different characteristics they value – so after 7000 years, we have many different varieties from the same species. By the same token, we may start with one idea, and different researchers with different interests will take that idea into different directions, and we end up having a much richer set of findings for that construct, each with its unique contributions.

You may ask: where do ideas come from? Maybe we could take a lesson from Steve Jobs. When he was running Pixar, he thought the headquarters must have an airy atrium. But an airy atrium is not enough. He also thought “everyone has to run into each other.” So he needed to force people to go to the atrium. He started with mailboxes, then meeting rooms, cafeteria, coffee bar, gift shop… they were all in the atrium. He also had the only set of bathrooms in the entire building there, although he was later forced to compromise and had a second set of bathrooms elsewhere.

By now, we know all the ingredients for high impact work… different people, from different schools, preferably from different countries, a space for people to run into each other, time and venue
to listen, chat, debate, and to share personal experience. And when we put all the ingredients together, that’s ACR2013 in Chicago!

Let’s take a look at the membership of ACR. In 1973, ACR had 411 members from 8 different countries (Canada 25, Denmark 1, Finland 1, France 2, Germany 1, Japan 1, Norway 3, USA 3). Then membership went up to 789 members from 19 countries in 1983 (Australia 8, Brazil 2, Canada 53, Denmark 3, Finland 3, France 6, Germany 15, Greece 1, Japan 4, Netherlands 7, Norway 3, Saudi Arabia 1, Spain 2, Sweden 2, Switzerland 3, United Kingdom 3, USA 672, Yugoslavia 1), 1549 members from 33 countries in 1994 (Australia 28, Austria 3, Bahrain 1, Belgium 3, Brazil 3, Canada 78, Denmark 8, Finland 11, France 15, Germany 21, Hong Kong 3, India 1, Israel 3, Italy 2, Japan 16, Korea 11, Netherlands 22, New Zealand 2, N Ireland 1, Norway 2, Poland 1, Portugal 1, Saudi Arabia 2, Scotland 1, Singapore 8, South Africa 1, Spain 5, Sweden 4, Taiwan 3, Thailand 1, Turkey 4, UK 17, USA 1278). And this year in 2013, we have 1668 members from 51 countries (Table 1)—a diverse group of individuals, all with a shared goal.

I am proud to say that the profile of my co-authors looks somewhat like the ACR membership profile: 31 from North America, 10 from Asia, 2 from Australia, 2 from Europe, and 4 from the Middle East. They are the people who have taught me how to think differently to make a difference. I am thankful to every one of them.

Here’s what I would like all of you to do. Before Saturday is over, talk to at least 3 people whom you did not know prior to this conference. You may find a collaborator for some exciting new research that you could submit to a new outlet.

Speaking of new outlet, let me take this opportunity to make an exciting announcement: The ACR Board has voted yesterday to launch a new journal. It is official. This decision was based on the findings and recommendations of three taskforces and many meetings and deliberate discussions. The focus of the ACR journal (name to be determined) is on substantive contributions. The issues will be themed—like special issues. Some of them will include commentaries. There are a lot of details that need to be ironed out, but please stay tuned for further announcements.

Before I leave this podium, I would like to acknowledge and express my gratitude to three special people who have made a difference in my life. In their different ways, they have guided me, supported me, and inspired me. Without them, I would not have been here today speaking to you. They are Andy Mitchell, my advisor, and Brian Sternthal and Alice Tybout, my colleagues at Northwestern. I thank them.

And I thank all of you. Have a great conference!

Table 1: ACR Membership in 2013

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4 / Making a Difference
2013 ACR Fellows Address

Paper #1: Choice Architecture, Public Policy and Consumer Research
Eric J. Johnson, Columbia University, USA

Itamar Simonson, Stanford University, USA

Paper #1: Choice Architecture, Public Policy and Consumer Research

The dictionary definition of a fellow includes: “a member of a learned society.” Well, wow, what a learned society that I am joining. It has a history dating to the first large scale models of the field, in John Howard, distinguished colleagues like Paul Green, Peter Wright, Russ Belk, Sid Levy, Joe Alba and others, and includes friends like Jim Bettman, Hal Kassarjian, John Lynch and now Itamar Simonson. I am deeply and truly honored to join this company.

I am also the fourth fellow from Columbia. This is neat, not only because we have twice as many as any other school, but also because it reflects a central merit of the school: a culture where doing research is valued above other things, something strongly advocated by my predecessors, like John Howard, and by my good friends and role models, Morris Holbrooke and Don Lehman.

I thought I would spend my time today looking backwards briefly, but as anyone who knows me well, I am more motivated by looking forward. I will divide this talk into two sections, the first I’ll call an “an unabashedly sentimental 5 minutes of thanks”, and in the remainder of the talk I will address something more forward looking, talking about how Choice Architecture can make consumer research more relevant.

For purposes of publication in the Proceedings, I’ve moved the gratitude section to an appendix, not because saying thank you is unimportant, but to let readers more interested in the future – as opposed to my idiosyncratic past – an easy entrance.

Consumer Research Should Matter More

As the economist David Laibson has observed, there is a council of economic advisors, but no Council of Psychological or Consumer Researchers. Yet if you study consumption you are obviously studying an important part of the economy:

- Consumers’ decisions about mortgages helped lead to the worldwide 2008 financial crisis, yet their decisions were only of interest to consumer researchers in retrospect. Very little work looks at one of the most important choices that consumers make.
- Every day consumers make decisions about consumption that will exacerbate or mitigate climate change, including purchasing cars, houses, and appliances which, in the aggregate, will determine the amount of greenhouse gases released. Influencing these choices could have a major impact upon the future.
- While the information technology issues surrounding the launch of the health exchange may dominate short-term headlines, there is a more lasting and important question about the ability of people to select the right policy. Explicit in using a market to facilitate choice is the idea that people will be able to choose the health insurance protection that will best fit their needs. People with interests in consumer behavior should be integral players in the design of the new marketplaces that are part of the Affordable Care Act, but so far have had very limited roles. Similar questions surround any government intervention that utilizes consumer choice, like Medicare Part D, a multi-billion dollar program providing subsidized prescription drug coverage to seniors.

Yet these topics are not prominent in the consumer research literature, and the voice of consumer researchers is not a major part of the discussion for any of these important debates. One could say that we are at best on the sidelines, or perhaps, to use an analogy, sitting at the kid’s table at the public policy family gathering.

There are many diagnoses and potential cures. In this short talk, I will concentrate on one route to having influence on these important issues: Thinking hard and in a non-superficial way about how the options presented to people affect their choices. The phrase commonly used, and it’s a brilliant coining by Dick Thaler and Cass Sunstein, is choice architecture.

Choice architecture is ubiquitous and inevitable: Either by accident or design every choice situation is presented in such a way that can influence choice. For example, I noticed that the conference organizers knew this and preselected the vegetarian option for us during this conference. And Sunstein and Thaler make this point in Nudge, using their ‘Cafeteria’ example: There is no neutral choice architecture. So, simply put, choice architecture is the set of decisions we make about what, how, and when options are presented to the decision-maker. It is important to realize that everyone, from a parent asking a child to go to bed, to a government presenting options to its citizens, is a choice architect. Remember, whenever you draft choice stimuli for an experiment, you are a practicing choice architect.

Let me describe some of the goals of choice architecture. These are ideas generated by a wonderful collections of colleagues at the 8th Invitational Choice Symposium published in a piece in Marketing Letters (Johnson et al., 2012). Choice architecture can:

- Make decisions easier.
- Make decisions more accurate reflections of consumers’ preferences.
- Help consumers construct preferences to make more accurate hedonic forecasts.
- Make better tradeoffs between individual and societal goals.
- By improving consumers’ decisions, make markets more competitive and efficient.

Now notice that only the fourth goal – that is making better tradeoffs between individual and societal goals – has anything to do with nudging. The simple fact of the matter is that there are no No-Choice architecture options. Just as every building has a design,
even a haphazard one, every choice has its own design. And just as the goal of architecture is not to control people’s behavior, but to produce a functional and aesthetically pleasant building, the goal of choice architecture is, for the most part, these first three goals.

Now that we have clarified that, let me suggest the challenges and benefits of incorporating choice architecture into the mainstream of consumer research.

These issues help address one critique, one our reviewers often raise:

What is new about this? After all, don’t most choice studies in consumer research try to change choices? What’s so special about that?

I would argue that choice architecture represents a fascinating blend of theoretical and applied issues, and that application helps focus theory on places it might have the most impact, which is in the world and not in our journals.

Let me illustrate the relationship between application and theory with three examples of important questions that central to choice architecture and that raise important and interesting theoretical connections.

What are the dynamics of Choice Architecture?

If choice architecture can change preferences, even in directions that are desired by the decision-maker, how long do those changes last? This is fundamental both theoretically and practically. It speaks to the enduring nature of value change and the relationship between preferences and behavior. Itamar Simonson, Jonathan Levav, and On Amir have explored this question and have different perspectives on this issue and obviously more work is being done in this area. However, early work on mere-measurement with Vicki Morwitz (Morwitz, Johnson, & Schmittlein, 1993) showed that measuring intentions changed behavior over a period of 6 months. Other work by Imai, Goldstein, Gürwitz and Gollwitzer (Imai, Goldstein, & Göritz, 2007) looks at changes in voting intentions and its effect on voting, and shows a wear out of a few weeks. Understanding when and why such effects decay will shed light on the fundamental nature of preferences.

Practically, if an intervention just has a short-term effect, and the decision is made often, then the intervention might wear out. Domains with this property include food consumption and saving decisions. Brian Wansink claims we make over a hundred decisions every time we pull out our wallet. I do worry that some interventions, like mindsets and priming, have strong effects, but are unlikely to be lasting. To the extent we want to influence reality, we need to consider these dynamics.

I think that in some cases we have been lucky: We have looked at areas where decision is made once, and tends to stick. This seems to be the case where the consideration of the decision is not particularly pleasant, for example Organ Donation, or retirement savings. But the relationship between the temporal nature of interventions, their effects on preferences and subsequent choice deserves much more theoretical consideration.

Are people aware of the effects of choice architecture?

There is a really theoretically important issue here about meta-cognition: Do people realize the effects of choice architecture? Do they attribute the effects of an intervention, such as a default, correctly, to the presence of the default, or do they attribute the choice they made to their own preferences? How much do they know about how well they have made choices in the absence of an intervention? Do they believe that the choice environment improved or worsened their choices? Theoretically, we don’t know much about this, but it is worrisome. We do know that people are likely to adapt to whatever they chose and that suggests they are unlikely to learn.

Let me give you a brief example from some work we have done looking at how well people can make choices on the health exchanges generated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

This work (Johnson, Hassin, Baker, Baiger, & Treur, 2013) shows that people have great difficulty choosing a cost effective health plan. Figure 1 shows the results of later experiments. The first bar, labeled Ex. 5, shows the performance of a set of Columbia MBA students. They do relatively well, choosing the most cost effective plan about 75% of the time (as shown by the ascending blue bar) and making an average mistake of about a $100 dollars (as shown by the descending blue bar). However, even when we teach people the meaning of arcane terms like deductible and co-payment, ordinary people do not do well. As you can see in the next bar, they are making serious mistakes, choosing the most cost effective policy less than half the time, and making mistakes that average over $500. Now we have tried several things to help people make better choices and have succeeded in doing so: The subsequent bars correspond to treatments in the study: providing significant incentives (which help very little), providing a summary of costs (termed a calculator), preselecting the best option as the default, or combining defaults and calculators. Obviously, these help, and in the paper, we explain how these savings can amount to billions of dollars.

But how well do people appreciate the effects of these choice architecture interventions? If they understood that calculators and defaults improved their choice, this would be very good news for choice architects: People would be drawn to web sites and vendors that helped them make better choices and avoid those that used unhelpful choice architecture. Public policies that improved their decisions would be supported. We have only started examining the question, but the results are discouraging. When given an incentive, which they should have in reality as these health plan decisions have real consequences, people worked harder and were more confident of their choices than in the default condition, but the reality, as can be seen in incentive bar in the figure, is that they did not do better. Providing defaults and calculators did not improve confidence even though the combination makes them as effective decision-makers as the Columbia MBA’s, as can be seen if you compare the first and last bars in figure 1.

From a practical perspective this has implications that are moral, ethical, and political. If people are unaware of the effects of a default, should they be warned of these effects? Who is responsible if a decision maker makes a wrong choice? These questions, focus-
ing on the relationship between choice architecture and awareness of choice quality seems a conceptually interesting and practically important question for future research.

**Who is helped and is anyone hurt?**

The concept of nudging seems seductive, but it hides the value of the first three functions of choice architecture that we have discussed, and raises important questions. We have been lucky that most of the ‘winning’ examples of choice architecture are in cases where the intervention helps almost everyone. Most people want to increase their savings rate but don’t, most want to become organ donors, but can’t bring themselves to think about their demise.

But people differ along two important dimensions: They have differing tastes and beliefs, and different sets of cognitive skills. Not everyone wants the same health insurance policy, not everyone wants the same kind of retirement plan. One concept that Dan Goldstein and I have talked about is that of ‘smart’ defaults (Goldstein, Johnson, Herrmann, & Heitmann, 2008). Instead of assigning people into a one-size-fits-all default, with a little bit of intelligence, you can default people into what you think is the best choice for them. They are still free to choose something different, but you have gotten them closer to an answer that should be right. Yet, again, questions about awareness of these effects come to mind.

Also, how do we identify these individual differences in cognitive ability or other determinants of the way we make decisions? This is not just as simple as incorporating individual difference variables to show moderation. I’m thinking of identifying the big effects in the real world, and looking at how different people are helped or hurt by different choice designs.

I’ll illustrate with an example from our lab’s current research. We are all getting older: a depressing consequence is that this means we lose our ability to process information quickly, an effect that has been termed by Salthouse and colleagues ‘cognitive collapse’ (Salthouse, 2010). The youngsters in this room have almost a full standard deviation of advantage on fluid intelligence, commonly measured by tasks like Ravens Progressive Matrices and the like. (Don’t get too smug; this is going to happen to you. Fluid intelligence peaks at 20). The good news for older people like myself is that we are improving in what is called crystallized intelligence, knowledge about the world. 60 year olds are much better crossword puzzle solvers than 20 year olds. Ye Li, Elke Weber and colleagues (Li, Baldassi, Johnson, & Weber, 2013) have been examining these effects on financial decisions across the life span. The basic result is that older people made decisions that are often better than those made by younger people, but they make them in different ways, relying on their knowledge of the world and not their brilliantly speedy ability to process new information. This suggests something very important: That the young and old have very different needs when it comes to providing information: That providing fewer alternatives might be more beneficial to elders than to the young, because it reduces the load on their fluid intelligence. In contrast, the young might benefit more from ‘just-in-time’ education about financial facts.

This suggests a different view of the role of individual differences in research; that we should not be concerned with those variables that are ‘theoretically’ interesting, but those that account for great variance in the real world.

**How to be relevant**

What are the benefits of consumer research? Why should we try to share what we know? I am absolutely convinced that we have quite a bit to offer, and despite the growth of the field and its great promise, it is underappreciated in many ways, not least of which is its influence on public policy. To illustrate in an area of significant concern for me, look at consumer finance. The nascent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has an Office of Research whose mission is to understand consumer behavior in the service of evidence-based regulation. You might ask how many consumer behavior researchers or psychologists work for the office. The answer is one, and she started last week.

I’ll modestly suggest focusing on some of the issues I have discussed, so focusing on choice architecture in general might bridge the gap between policy and our research. Finally, to increase impact, let me suggest three things:

**A focus on the field**

Field experiments are undervalued. A couple of years ago, at a preconference panel on having research with impact, I asked the panel about field research. The response was, to be polite, mixed, with many people saying things like: “there are always confounds in field research.” Well the simple reality is that there are always what John Lynch (Lynch, 1982) has called ‘background variables’ and that these confounds and background variables are a big part of reality.

Choice architecture research, more than others, needs to be done in the field, with the relevant population, with dependent variables that look like the actual choice, what Harrison and List (Harrison & List, 2004) call ‘framed field studies’.

This may sound like an impossible task, and I can imagine junior investigators, worried about tenure, asking ‘Who is that crazy man up there?’

Consider, however, that:

- Many real decisions are made on-line, that websites are used for many important policy decisions, like deciding when to collect social security, which health plan to pick, or what funds to select for a retirement portfolio.
- On-line participants, particularly if they come from the appropriate population can lend credibility to the research that will increase its impact.
- Field experimentation doesn’t mean field, it can mean on-line environments, and the world, more generally, is starting to look a lot like the lab.
- And by the way, if you are clever, you can establish causality in the field, even without controlling the manipulation, through instrumental variable regression.

One more observation: companies are running experiments now; it is part of what might be called making business more evidence-based, much like Moneyball made baseball more evidence-based. They get it. So we should take advantage of it too. The opportunities for field experimentation are many.

**Worry about the size of the effect, the importance of the effect and not the elegance of the interaction**

Often, we are satisfied with the fact that our results are statistically significant, and less sensitive to the effects of sample size. These effects tend to be less replicable and less likely to have impact, since, by definition, they suggest that applying the findings is tricky business. Contrast this to results that have several mediators, all of which pull in the same direction, making the results robust. A good example of this might be no-action defaults, which have at least three causes (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011).

**Translate the results into numbers**

It’s one thing to report a difference in means, it’s quite another to talk about dollars. In our work on the health exchanges, we could, and do, present the results as a percentage increase in performance.
But there is another measure. We can look at the size of the error in dollars represented by each decision, the descending bars in the figure. This dollar number, put in context, can be very persuasive. To say that choice architecture can reduce the errors made by consumers from $533 dollars to $77 is more concrete and vivid. Note that this simply applies principles that are part of the accepted wisdom in other fields about concreteness and vividness. But there is another trick: You can look at how those errors might scale up. Under the assumption that 20 million people will be buying insurance on the exchanges, that mistake multiplies, becoming, in the aggregate 9.12 billion dollars a year. Now that might get a policy maker’s attention. Incidentally, some of the state exchanges are including calculators and other decision aids.

**Conclusion**

In closing, let me say that I am profoundly optimistic about the field.

- First, we are larger, more diverse and if the Flynn effect (Flynn, 1998) means anything the next generation is brighter (by several IQ points) than the preceding one.
- Second, the world is more interested and accepting of the social sciences and particularly input from decision research. This is true in both policy and business as witnessed by the Behavioral Insights team in Britain and its nascent equivalent in the US. The idea of a randomized control trial is rapidly gaining acceptance in business worldwide, and we can encourage that trend by incorporating a concern for experimentation into our teaching. Moreover, doing this will create research opportunities.
- Finally, the set of tools and toys you have is astounding. For those of us who started when surveys and punch-cards were mainstays, the alternatives are now staggering: Ubiquitous computing, eye-tracking in the supermarket – in fact, the super market is now your computer. It’s time to abandon the survey: The lab is becoming reality. I envy the possibilities that you face.

Thanks for listening.

**Appendix: The Unabashedly Sentimental 5 Minutes.**

Now as I said, anyone who knows me well, knows that I don’t look backwards a lot. To quote research terms invented by a friend and other decision aids. Appendix: The Unabashedly Sentimental 5 Minutes.

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take it: John was simply too valuable to them. Not long afterwards, John and I were developing production systems of strategies. Soon Jim Bettman joined us on this project. I felt a little like a rookie on the all-star team, but I was nonetheless amazingly comfortable: Our interaction was about the ideas, not egos. As a last bit of nostalgia, I remember that Jim and John would walk through the Fuqua School running our computer simulations on the administrator's IBM PCs inserting floppy disks at night and retrieving them in the morning. Little did they know they were inventing clustered computing.

In German you refer to your dissertation advisor as your doctor vater or doctor father, so while Jay played that role for me, Jim and John were my uncles, or since I’m from New Jersey, and have spent a lot of time in places used to film episodes of “The Sopranos”, perhaps they were my godfathers.

Along the way, each of these folks saw something and said something that was encouraging, that made me feel that I could do something useful, that I had an interesting idea. This is in strong contrast to the kind of feedback we get so often from reviewers, or that we give each other in questions at conferences. Writing this, I come to feel that I’ve fallen short on this dimension, and hope we all realize how valuable this kind of encouragement can be. As Don Lehman said in his fellows address, it is important. Pass it on.

REFERENCES


A primary goal of “Behavioral Decision Theory” (BDT), including the significant part of BDT research published in marketing journals, has been to introduce an alternative to economic, normative decision theory. More precisely, while not offering a comprehensive alternative decision theory, much of BDT has been devoted to showing that key assumptions underlying economic theory are violated and are inconsistent with the way decisions are actually made. BDT research consisted largely of “effects,” many of which involved demonstrations of preference reversals. BDT research tended to have certain unique characteristics, including (a) avoiding “grand theories,” such as those characterized by boxes and arrows; instead, BDT research led to some general conclusions such as the notion of the construction of preferences; (b) minimal, as required use of mediation analyses; (c) a preference for choice and behavior as dependent measures as opposed to ratings; (d) the introduction of various distinct effects, which are then appropriately named. Researchers have also tried to understand what underlies these effects and their moderators/boundaries. The consumer BDT community has been particularly diverse in terms of the educational background of researchers, many of whom have also been important contributors to the broader Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) field.

Consumers’ BDT researchers have made important contributions to the consumer behavior literature and the broader JDM field. Although we have not conducted a systematic analysis, compared to other consumer research topics, it appears that BDT research published in marketing journals has had large impact on research in non-marketing fields as well as on quantitative researchers in marketing.

The primary objective of BDT has been largely accomplished – BDT research has persuasively demonstrated that the assumption of value maximization and, more broadly, assumptions underlying normative theories of decision making, are violated in systematic ways (such as various context and task effects). Accordingly, this is a good time to reevaluate possible directions for “ex-BDT” consumer researchers. Although each person will make his/her own choices, having a discussion about areas that present promising opportunities and might benefit from the skills and tendencies of consumer BDT researchers may help shape the direction of this large community.

A default option is to just let the chips fall where they may. As further demonstrations of violations of the assumptions economics are becoming less significant as contributions to the literature, various other topics have emerged. Though lacking one common purpose, they address a variety of interesting questions. In general, consumer JDM researchers have paid greater attention in recent years to topics that have particular implications for society, such as decisions concerning health, the environment, financial matters, and ethics. Consumer JDM researchers have also studied currently popular topics in psychology, such as embodiment. And long-standing topics such as intertemporal preferences and moderators of previously demonstrated effects have continued to be examined.

An important, emerging area for consumer JDM researchers is consumer decision making as a reflection and driver of the evolving information environment (Internet, etc.). The current information-rich, socially intensive environment can potentially fundamentally change many aspects of consumer behavior and marketing. Simonson and Rosen (2014) discuss the broad implications of a shift from relative evaluations to absolute evaluations of product quality. Briefly, in an age when consumers can readily obtain rather accurate...
information (based on reviews, demonstrations, and other information services) that allows them to predict experience quality, they are less dependent on relative comparisons. For example, consumers’ product quality predictions are less likely to be driven by comparing the options in front of them (i.e., the local context), by prior brand evaluations, or based on prices and countries-of-origin. The current information environment might also change other aspects of consumer behavior such as basic purchase processes, adoption of innovation, and customer satisfaction.

Compared to the previous BDT field, this emerging area of research is less focused on anomalies and preference reversals. It calls for greater emphasis on external validity. Moreover, in addition to controlled experiments, studying consumer decision making in the new environment will involve greater reliance on secondary data. This may require researchers to improve their econometrics skills and/or collaborate to a greater extent with empirical quantitative researchers in marketing.

Such a shift of focus raises other challenges. Because it is more marketing-focused than the previous more general purpose BDT/JDM field, it will require a greater commitment to marketing and consumer-specific research than the consumer BDT community has been accustomed to. Moreover, the general JDM community may find consumer-focused work of less interest. Considering that many researchers in the consumer BDT have strong ties to the psychology and general JDM field, it is unclear if they will be receptive to this direction.

REFERENCE
Special Session Summaries

Consumer Behavior under Severe Restriction:
A Look at Differences between Affluent and Impoverished People
Chair: Ronald Paul Hill, Villanova University, USA

Paper #1: Poverty and Materialism: Are Impoverished Children More Materialistic Than Affluent Children?
Lan Nguyen Chaplin, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Debbie Roedder John, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #2: Profiles of Consumer Saving: Societal Conditions and Individual Aspirations
Kelly D. Martin, Colorado State University, USA
Ronald Paul Hill, Villanova University, USA

Paper #3: Consumer Negotiation and Acquisition at the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid: The Case of Women Market Traders
José Antonio Rosa, University of Wyoming, USA
Madhu Viswanathan, University of Illinois, USA
Shikha Upadhyaya, University of Wyoming, USA
Srinivas Venugopal, University of Illinois, USA
Susan Dewey, University of Wisconsin, USA

Paper #4: Moral Identity and Competition in a Working Class Neighborhood
Bige Saatcioglu, Ozyegin University, Turkey
Julie L. Ozanne, Virginia Tech, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

The field of consumer behavior has a lengthy history of examination of the processes and nuances associated with the acquisition, consumption, and dispossession of goods and services. From its very inception as an academic field, substantive domains and methodologies have been explicitly interdisciplinary and include economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, as well as other fields. However, despite this broad reach, most investigations have concentrated their attention on a rather small percentage of the entire world population and geographic locations (Martin and Hill 2012), emphasizing relatively elite portions of the economically developed west. Yet we assume our research is generalizable to the entirety of humankind.

This situation raises several distinct possibilities that have implications for consumer theory development. First, the 85 percent of the human population that has received only limited attention by scholars has the same needs and wants as the predominantly western elite consumers because of widespread exposure to media and other sources of information associated with the larger consumer culture (Alden et al. 1999). If this proposition is true, differences are a matter of scale rather than perspective or process. Such worthy research has influenced the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid movement in business that a multi-billion persons market exists, which requires similar products in smaller, more affordable portions and sizes (Prahalad and Hart 2002).

A second possibility is that the majority of consumers on our planet is truly distinct and demands all new ways of conceptualizing how they navigate their material world (Hill and Gaines 2007). Under this paradigmatic approach, cultural distinctions and individual differences may be so influential that a failure to take them into account leads to inappropriate theory and practice (for a fuller discussion see Okazaki and Taylor 2010). A third approach that is adopted in this session proposal suggests that restriction associated with impoverishment supersedes most other factors and has a diverse impact upon consumer behavior. For instance, Hill, Martin, and Chaplin (2012) looked at consumption restriction, social comparison, and life satisfaction, finding that social comparisons are more powerful determinants of life satisfaction for people in poorer, developing societies than for people in affluent societies. Specifically, compared to their affluent counterparts, impoverished consumers experience greater decreases in life satisfaction when their access to goods and services is lower than others within their societies.

As a consequence of these and other results (Martin and Hill 2012), we propose a special session that presents four novel contexts where findings compare more affluent with more impoverished consumption environments and reveal the importance of poverty in our understanding of consumer behavior. The first examines how materialism manifests among poor children; the second looks at saving behavior in developing nations; the third studies consumer negotiation and acquisition processes in subsistence marketplaces, and the fourth presents working class consumer behavior in mobile-home parks. The central question asked in each of these new data sets is: Do impoverished consumers behave differently or the same when compared to more affluent counterparts?

Poverty and Materialism: Are Impoverished Children More Materialistic Than Affluent Children?

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Our research is the first to examine consumer values for children and adolescents from impoverished backgrounds. In study 1, we found that older adolescents (ages 16-17) from impoverished families are more materialistic than adolescents from affluent backgrounds. In study 2, we found that differences in materialism among income groups emerge at the onset of early adolescence (ages 12-13). Prior to this stage, younger children (ages 8-11) from impoverished families exhibit a similar level of materialism as younger children from more affluent families. Across both studies, higher levels of materialism among impoverished adolescents is associated with low self-esteem, which has been identified as one of the negative impacts on youngsters living in families experiencing economic hardship. Below, we discuss the implications and contributions of these findings for consumer research on (1) poverty and materialism, and (2) young consumers and materialism.

The last decade has seen a resurgence of interest in issues related to consumers living in poverty as well as bottom-of-the-pyramid consumers in less developed countries (Martin and Hill 2012; Prahalad 2005; Viswanathan, Rosa, and Ruth 2010). However, even with this renewed interest, little is known about the role that material goods, consumption values, and desires for material wealth play in the lives of those living in poverty.

A na"ive assumption would be that consumers living in poverty are focused on obtaining the bare necessities, leaving little room for strivings for material wealth and status. However, a recent study by Hill, Martin, and Chaplin (2012) questions this assumption. Using data across 38 countries, they show that social comparisons of mate-
rial wealth are more important for life satisfaction of consumers living in poorer developing nations versus consumers living in affluent Western nations. This work reveals that access to goods and services in the marketplace plays an even more important role in poverty-stricken societies. Our results show the same patterns for young consumers (adolescents) living in poverty within an affluent Western nation. Further research comparing these levels of analysis—poor versus affluent nations and poor versus affluent consumers within nations—may provide additional insights into the role of poverty in aspirations for material wealth.

The connection between poverty and materialism opens up several new areas for study. One topic of great importance is the effects of materialism on the well-being of consumers living in poverty. Higher levels of materialism are associated with a variety of negative consequences, such as lower life satisfaction, less successful interpersonal relationships, and less generosity toward others (Kasser 2002, 2005). Could higher levels of materialism exact an even greater toll on poor consumers? Believing that happiness and a more satisfying life depends on accumulating material wealth, which is beyond their grasp, individuals living in poverty may experience much greater negative consequences of materialism than the general population.

Preliminary data gathered during the course of our research lends credence to this view. In each of our two studies, we asked participants how happy they were on a scale from 1 to 5. Younger children from impoverished and more affluent families had similar levels of happiness (8-9 year-olds: 4.08 vs. 4.10; 10-11 year-olds: 4.07 vs. 4.22; all p > .50). Note that these children also had similar levels of materialism. However, adolescents from impoverished families were less happy than adolescents from more affluent families (12-13 year-olds: M = 3.21 vs. 3.64, t(1, 44) = 2.24, p = .01; 16-17 year-olds: M = 2.90 vs. 3.91, t(1, 48) = 4.57, p < .01). Recall that for both age groups, impoverished adolescents were also more materialistic than their affluent peers.

Another important consequence of materialism among impoverished adolescents may be a connection between materialism and juvenile delinquency. Our research shows that adolescents from impoverished families are more materialistic, yet they have fewer resources to fulfill their strivings for money and material goods. Crime provides one of few paths to material wealth. The link between materialism and crime among adolescents from poor neighborhoods is suggested by Ozanne, Hill, and Wright (1998) in their study of juvenile delinquents (ages 12-17) incarcerated for robbery, auto theft, and selling illegal drugs. These juveniles placed a high degree of importance on possessions and money as a way to obtain a sense of power and status among their peers. Possessions—such as cars, clothes, and guns—were seen as important to having the right image when “hanging out with friends” and competing for the attention of young women. Although crimes were sometimes committed for fun and excitement, many were committed to obtain money to spend on items to impress others and provide status among their peers.

Profiles of Consumer Saving: Societal Conditions and Individual Aspirations

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

We were interested in capturing the nuances of consumer saving behavior worldwide, among individuals in nations across a range of poverty and restriction. To do so we conducted two research investigations examining different facets of the poverty-saving relationship. Given the nascent stage of research in these areas, we proposed two different research questions to look at societal and individual influences on consumer saving. In our first investigation, we used multilevel methods and analyses to understand how conditions of poverty and inequality at the societal level influenced individual saving likelihood. Using a broad worldwide sample and controlling for additional national and personal factors previously linked to saving, we found that societal poverty significantly influenced individual saving occurrence. Echoing research that highlights the resourcefulness and determination of the world’s poorest citizens (Collins et al. 2009), we found that in conditions of greater poverty, saving likelihood also was greater. We were unable to confirm the impact of inequality on saving (versus spending), as inequality had no significant effect on these behaviors among consumers in our sample.

In our second investigation, we extracted two more narrow and focused samples of consumers in nations with the highest poverty and in nations with the lowest poverty, according to United Nations classifications. In each, we applied latent class nominal binary regression analysis to distinguish consumer profiles and understand the manner in which aspirations influence saving. As described above, we found differences among the consumers within each sample, as well as across the two samples. Specifically, theoretical perspectives of goal contents theory and the role of aspirations fit the high poverty sample well, demonstrating how both intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations influence saving for different profiles of consumers. The findings for the low poverty/high affluence sample were in stark contrast, where a large number of consumers were not at all influenced by aspirations. When intrinsic or extrinsic aspirations were influential, they acted to promote spending rather than saving among these consumers.

Our findings challenge conventional wisdom about saving, and extend marketing and economics scholarship. Research involving materialism or conspicuous consumption accurately portrays the angst of consumers living in post-modern societies where identities are dependent on what we have and how it is displayed socially (Rindfleisch, Burroughs, and Wong 2007). Nonetheless, seven billion inhabitants live in diverse material environments characterized by varying levels of poverty, affluence, and equality. To suggest that these contexts may lead to similar beliefs, aspirations, and behaviors is fraught with difficulties, especially if investigations concentrate on the most impoverished people in the poorest developing nations (Hill, Felice, and Ainscough 2007). Our findings echo limited but emerging scholarship that examines large-scale samples of such populations and finds significant disparities in individual psychological interpretations as a result of societal poverty (Martin and Hill 2012).

The idea that consumers with less material access and goods might get caught up in the same needs and desires as their more affluent counterparts is a valid assumption as long as the context is a material world where the basic necessities of life are widely available (Martin and Hill 2012). When or if they are not, such as in subsistence marketplaces, heuristics employed in consumption versus saving may vary greatly, resulting in radically different behaviors for (potentially) radically different reasons. Consider our finding that greater poverty in the least developed parts of the world leads to increased saving. This outcome is not consistent with what happens in Western countries with more abundant marketplaces (Berger and Ward 2010), or in experimental settings with consumers who face restrictions for short time periods (Ordabayeva and Chandon 2011). Yet an alternative logic is revealed that suggests the poorest citizens may recognize their lives are in greatest jeopardy in times of low to no resources, and saving during more abundant times could be viewed as necessary for basic survival (Collins et al. 2009).
Yet even these relationships are not so simple. As shown recently by Martin and Hill (2012), self-determination influences individual life satisfaction of BOP consumers. The present study moves significantly beyond their basic conceptualization of psychological need fulfillment to investigate nuances that enhance this theoretical paradigm; namely goal contents theory. Examination of consumer goals and aspirations is not new, as evidenced by the stream of work described in the paper’s conceptual development. Although the findings of past research on goals are significant, we do see substantial value for life goals and aspirations as a differentiator of saving behavior between citizens in poor versus affluent nations. In particular, our finding that different forms of aspirations lead to greater saving in impoverished societies—but may have the opposite effect in wealthy countries—is theoretically compelling. Collectively, results suggest unique ways of understanding what it means to seek personal fulfillment and social status via consumer behavior if poverty abounds or if affluence abounds. Likewise, our results highlight the extent of these disparities and their relative importance across nations.

Expectations derived from goal contents theory are that intrinsic (Kasser and Ryan 1996) and extrinsic (Deci and Ryan 1985) aspirations help explain saving behavior. Yet again, we find important differences between the developed and developing worlds. For example, in the most impoverished societies, the vast majority of consumers experience one or the other form of aspirations, leading to increased saving. For individuals whose aspirations or goals are intrinsic in nature, greater numbers of children imply that they may be responding to desires to support their families’ growing needs and promote their safety, security, and well-being. Such broader life goals also may be self-actualizing. For individuals whose aspirations are extrinsic in nature, low education and income levels may make them susceptible to negative social comparisons (Hill, Martin, and Chaplin 2012). Accordingly, financial, material, and success oriented goals may promote saving behaviors as a means to a desired end of status and other recognition. Future research could probe the characteristics and goal contents of high poverty consumers to understand how aspirations influence other important outcomes and aspects of their lives.

Consumer Negotiation and Acquisition at the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid: The Case of Women Market Traders

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Fresh food markets, whether centrally organized by governments or ad hoc in nature, provide the world’s market traders, the vast majority of whom are women, with a critical source of income. Simultaneously, these markets serve a critical social function by making possible the efficient aggregation and redistribution of foods to needy populations, and providing economically and ecologically sustainable alternatives to imported foods that have higher economic and environmental costs. Women market traders play a critical role in consumer access to fresh and low cost agricultural products. In addition, in some countries their market entrance fees serve as a significant source of local government revenue. Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Australasia, however, women traders are frequently dismissed as marginal, unskilled, and unimportant.

Women market traders make substantial contributions to local and national economies by connecting consumers with agricultural producers, adding to local government funding, and sustaining countless households and communities. Their importance and contributions must be understood and acknowledged.

Women market traders in subsistence economies work in fragile socioeconomic and political environments. In some countries (e.g., Fiji), repeated military coups have led to policy instability that places additional pressure on market systems and social networks to preserve order and process, even when the rule of law is absent or unpredictable. In other countries (e.g., Tanzania), it has been economic shocks due to political upheaval in neighboring states that have introduced uncertainty into the market, and it has once again fallen to market traders to adjust and endure. In addition, markets are complicated by religious and ethnic diversity that constrains interaction between social groups, and by persistent pressure from civic leader to foster a sense of national identity that neutralizes such barriers. In environments made unpredictable by conflicting agendas at multiple levels, we study how women market traders create sustainable, multiethnic distribution networks that make markets possible and feed urban and rural residents while financing town and city operations.

In many emerging economies, residents engage in semi-subistence agriculture to meet household food needs, but those who live in towns or urban areas rely upon fresh produce markets. Due to their popularity, and patronage by most urban residents, municipal markets are some of the few places where social interaction between individuals from different ethnic groups is normal and expected, and among traders such interethnic alliances constitute a critical aspect of their work. Key topics in this research are how capitalist markets create, reinforce, and subvert ethnic differences in a politically fraught environment, and the role of feminized market trade labor in these processes.

The research also explores how social justice and sustainable business practices come together in subsistence markets through women traders. It explores at a micro-level, for example, women’s critical roles in creating and maintaining food security in the midst of climate change. Food security, broadly defined as people’s abilities to access affordable and nutritious products, is a concern throughout the world. In Fiji, for example, climate change is a clear and present danger to sustainable livelihoods. Soil salinization caused by rising ocean levels is having widespread impact on crop production, and its influence is palpable in market trading activity. In Tanzania, it is record high temperatures and extreme weather events that are affecting growing seasons and food availability, with similar effects in local produce markets.

At the level of women traders, our research shows that they negotiate difficult circumstances and emerging problems created by climate change to make trade possible in spite of increasingly volatile supply and quality. The research further documents some of the labor environment challenges faced by women market traders and their innovative solutions to such challenges. Women market traders work long hours in conditions commonly seen as inadequate, unsanitary, and hazardous. They battle second-class status, pricing and access inequities, and the persistent threat of assault in order to fulfill market duties, and through impressive and creative management of their meager resources and distribution networks they preserve sufficient dignity to function. Their innovativeness and persistence are impressive, and worthy of being understood and emulated.

Moral Identity and Competition in a Working Class Neighborhood

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

An enduring finding in consumption communities and sociological research is that consumers socially stratify themselves (Veblen 1994/1899). Bourdieu (1977, 1984) theorizes society as made up of overlapping social fields where people compete for social dis-
tinction by employing economic, cultural, and social resources. In particular, the cultural capital of the working classes is conceptu-
ized as subordinate to the cultural capital of higher classes. The working classes lack resources so they create a culture of necessity where they develop a taste for the practical, passively accept popular culture, and are united in their conformity. Recent empirical work using survey data similarly portrays working class culture as deficit where poor consumers have little education, do not read books or attend cultural events, and have few preferences beyond consuming commercialized popular culture and visiting fast food restaurants (Bennett et al. 2009). Consumer researchers have extended this work on status consumption, challenging some of the initial assumptions and stressing the importance of consumption practices (Holt 1998; Ustuner and Holt 2007, 2010).

But the cultural capital prized within different social groups may be more nuanced and localized particularly when consumers have few resources. In a study of rural firefighters, they value their country competence, which is an embodied skill set that allows them to face life-and-death decisions; as members of the pickup-truck crowd, they see themselves as superior to the pretentious suburban Buick crowd (Desmond 2006). Consistent with other researchers who question the centrality of taste in status competition (Lamont 2000), we examine how moral dispositions guide the consumption practices of the working poor. Based on an ethnographic study and forty interviews in a mobile home park, we examine the home consumption practices of consumers in this marginalized and resource constrained environment.

Our research finds that different visions of morality lie at the heart of status negotiation for the working poor. Specifically, the trailer park residents’ moral habitus shapes their evaluations of themselves and their neighbors, as well as their preferences, perceived capacities, hopes, and dreams. Habitus is a set of unconscious and enduring dispositions that are acquired in childhood and provide an implicit sense of how the world works and one’s place in this world (Bourdieu 1984). Habitus is a forgotten history that is transferred to new contexts and helps explain why people reproduce existing social structures (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). This study extends this notion of habitus empirically to explore the moral habituses or dispositions that guide a working class neighborhood.

Five groups emerged in our study—Nesters, Reluctant Emigrants, Community Builders, Homesteaders, and Outscasts. Nesters enact a disciplined moral self that is based on hard work; they are critical of their neighbors who they see as lazy and instead align with middle class consumers. Reluctant Emigrants enact a caring moral self where family is privileged; yet they view the park as a hostile and chaotic place from which to escape. Community Builders affirm a communal self and work on projects to enhance the well-being of their neighborhood. Homesteaders are resigned to life in the park, which they see as a good place for poor people to live because they can leverage social support; their moral identity is fatalistic and they adopt a live-and-let-live approach. Finally, the Outsiders perform a spectacular self that is characterized by practices that are defiant and rule breaking.

The diversity of class habituses guided by different moral dispositions can explain the levels and intensity of class consciousness and agency within a social class. Why is class structure stable? Why do few working-class protests occur despite growing social inequalities? Part of this answer may lie in the co-existence of competing moral habituses within the same social class. For example, the Community Builders criticize the structural disadvantages facing the poor yet mobilize to take constructive actions. However, the Homesteaders are more passive and fatalistic. Within the trailer park, these two groups interact socially more than any other groups. Yet given their differing moral dispositions, they do not work together in solidarity. Given the even greater differences among the other groups, class solidarity is unlikely. Nesters gain status by distancing themselves from the other trailer park residents, and consume symbolically to enact a middle class lifestyle. The Reluctant Emigrants see trailer life as a negative symbol of poverty and thus invest little energy in their home practices and seek to escape the community. All of these groups differ from the Outscasts for whom the home has little meaning except as a safe place to enact subcultural capital.

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How Audience Factors Influence Word-of-Mouth
Chair: Alexandra Barasch, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #1: Broadcasting and Narrowcasting: How Audience Size Impacts What People Share
Alexandra Barasch, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Jonah Berger, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #2: Compensatory Communication: Consumer Knowledge Discrepancies and Knowledge Signaling in Word-of-Mouth
Grant Packard, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
David B. Wooten, University of Michigan, USA

Paper #3: Using Incentives to Encourage Word-of-Mouth Transmissions That Lead To Fast Information Diffusion
Andrew T. Stephen, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Donald R. Lehmann, Columbia University, USA

Paper #4: Answering Why: Action and Reaction Explanations in Word of Mouth
Sarah G. Moore, University of Alberta, Canada

SESSION OVERVIEW
How does the audience shape word of mouth? What audience characteristics influence what and how people communicate? Most research on word-of-mouth has focused on its consequences, or how it influences choice, diffusion, and sales (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Chintagunta, Gopinath, and Venkataraman 2010). However, relatively little attention has been paid to the processes underlying interpersonal communication, particularly how the recipient impacts what people talk about and share. The four papers in this session illustrate how various aspects of the audience might motivate the speaker to share different types of content, use different linguistic styles, or pass on product information in the face of incentives or knowledge discrepancies. All four presentations are working papers with at least four studies completed.

Barasch and Berger investigate how the mere number of people with whom consumers communicate impacts what people share through shifting sharer focus. They find that talking to a group leads people to focus on the audience and share self-presentational content, while talking to one person leads people to focus on the audience and share useful content. Packard and Wooten examine how consumers compensate for knowledge deficiencies by sharing product information with psychologically close (but not distant) audiences. That is, people engage in compensatory self-enhancement with audiences that have self-concept relevance (i.e., friends) by sending close others positive signals of their consumer knowledge.

Stephen and Lehmann examine the use of incentives to encourage transmission of product information to higher-connectivity friends (i.e., social hubs). Moreover, the authors show that this mechanism of incentives based on positive externalities (increasing value with more audience members) can lead to faster information diffusion. Finally, Moore shows that the use of different explanations in WOM is determined by what speakers think would be most useful or helpful for their audience, such that they use more action explanations for utilitarian experiences and more reaction explanations for hedonic experiences.

Communication requires more than one party; indeed, people cannot share things without an audience. Together, these papers highlight the diverse ways in which the audience shapes what and how people communicate. Given the widespread applicability of the issues discussed, the session should attract researchers interested not only in word-of-mouth, communication, and persuasion, but also self-presentation, utilitarian vs. hedonic experiences, and self-other trade-offs. In the spirit of the conference theme of “Making a Difference,” we hope that the practical implications of each presentation (how to improve social interactions, share more valuable content, or design effective WOM campaigns), and the diverse approaches to studying the audience’s influence on word-of-mouth, will generate a lively and fruitful discussion.

Broadcasting and Narrowcasting: How Audience Size Impacts What People Share

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Does the mere number of people with whom consumers communicate impact what they talk about and share? Some conversations involve communicating with just one person (narrowcasting), whereas others involve communicating with many people (broadcasting). We suggest that audience size will impact communication by shifting the relative influence of two fundamental word-of-mouth drivers: self-presentation and helping others.

People disproportionately attend to their own opinions and interests (Kruger 1999), and it is intrinsically rewarding to talk about the self (Tamir and Mitchell 2012). Indeed, self-disclosure is the most common topic in human conversation (Emler 1990). Given that considering others requires time, effort, and motivation (Epley et al. 2004), broadcasting should do little to move people from their natural tendency for self-focus, which should boost self-presentation because people automatically associate themselves with favorable attributes (Paulhus and Levitt 1987).

Narrowcasting, however, should mitigate egocentrism and encourage people to focus on others. Thinking about a specific other makes others more concrete and promotes recognition of a person’s distinct identity (Alicke and Govorun 2005). Sharing with just one other person should make the audience more vivid, increasing the attention he or she receives. By increasing other-focus, narrowcasting should facilitate consideration of the audience member’s perspective, which should in turn encourage people to “tune” their messages (Higgins 1999) and share useful content.

Thus, we suggest that broadcasting will lead people to share more self-presenting content (because of increased self-focus), while narrowcasting will lead people to share content that is more useful (because of increased other-focus). The current research tests the causal impact of audience size by manipulating it directly across four experiments.

In Study 1, we gave participants a list of imaginary events and asked them to write a short description of their day for one person (narrowcasting) or a group of people (broadcasting). Since people often self-present through distancing the self from negative personal experiences (Sedikides 1993), we predicted and found that broadcasting led people to share fewer negative events ($r(90)=-2.50, p=.01$) and reframe the negative events they mentioned in a positive light ($r(90)=-2.16, p<.04$).

In Study 2, we controlled for audience closeness by asking participants to have short, real conversations with other students in the lab, either a single partner (narrowcasting) or a small group (broadcasting). Then, we had 2 coders rate the conversations for negativity ($r=.9$). Building on Study 1, we found that broadcasting reduced negativity ($t(179)=-2.73, p<.01$). Further, as a preliminary test of self-focus and other-focus, we found that broadcasting increased the
usage of first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, me, π(179)=2.14, p<.03), while narrowcasting increased the usage of second-person pronouns (e.g., you, π(179)=3.38, p<.01).

Study 3 tested the underlying mechanism behind these effects. In addition to manipulating audience size, we asked half the participants to list the name(s) of the people with whom they are sharing, which should have a similar effect as narrowcasting by boosting other-focus and moderating the effect of audience size. Respondents were asked how likely they would be to share 8 useful items (e.g., “A coupon for a discount”), or 15 self-presentation items that were either acquisitive or protective (“Just got a good/bad grade on a test”). Because people are more motivated to avoid bad impressions than to pursue good ones (Baumeister et al. 2001), we expect the impact on self-presentation to reveal itself primarily in the avoidance of looking bad (protective self-presentation) rather than the approach of looking good (acquisitive self-presentation).

An ANOVA revealed a significant Audience Size x Other-focus interaction on usefulness (F(1,138)=5.65, p<.03), as well as an Audience Size x Other-focus x Self-presentation interaction, such that the effect on protective self-presentation was significant (F(1,178)=6.90, p<.01), but the effect on acquisitive self-presentation was not (F<1, p>.9). As predicted, when participants did not list others’ names, narrowcasting boosted the sharing of useful content and broadcasting decreased willingness to share things that would make participants look bad. When participants listed names of the people with whom they were sharing, however, these differences disappeared. Making the audience more concrete had an analogous effect to narrowcasting, supporting the notion that audience size effects are driven by changes in sharer focus.

Study 4 tested this mechanism more directly. Respondents were randomly assigned according to a 2 (Audience size: narrow vs. broad) x 4 (Content type) between-within-subjects design. We simultaneously manipulated the usefulness and self-presenting nature of the content, asking participants how likely they would be to share each type of content and how much they were thinking about the self versus the audience (sharer focus).

As expected, people were always more willing to share useful content, but this tendency was stronger when people were narrowcasting (F(1,141)=6.94, p<.01). Similarly, people were always more willing to share content that made them look good rather than bad, but this tendency was stronger when broadcasting (F(1,141)=23.97, p<.001). Consistent with our previous results, while audience size did not impact participants willingness to share content that made them look good, broadcasting did reduce participants willingness to share content that made them look bad. The effects of audience size on self-presentation and usefulness were both mediated by sharer focus (95% CI[.03,.65]; 95% CI[-.39,-.03]).

By demonstrating the impact of audience size on communication and by articulating the underlying role of sender vs. receiver focus, this research integrates work on the drivers of word-of-mouth, interpersonal communication, and the role of sharer focus.

REFERENCES


Compensatory Communication: Consumer Knowledge Discrepancies and Knowledge Signaling in Word-of-Mouth

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People who believe they are knowledgeable about products tend to share this knowledge more with others. This tenet is central to research on word-of-mouth motivation (e.g. Engel et al. 1969; Feick and Price 1987; Wojnicki and Godes 2012) and consistent with Gricean maxims—those who believe they are more knowledgeable should make an appropriately weighted ‘conversational contribution’ by sharing their knowledge more with others (Grice 1991). A prediction that follows from this research is that a perceived shortcoming in consumer knowledge should constrain a person’s motivation to share product information.

While recognizing this possibility, we predict that perceived deficiencies in consumer knowledge sometimes lead to an increase rather than a decrease in word-of-mouth transmission. Why might this occur? Subjective consumer knowledge has been defined as what or how much a person thinks she presently knows about products (Park et al. 1994). Extending this definition, we propose that consumer knowledge consequences may be linked not only to a person’s beliefs about their present-state attributes or “actual self,” but also the “ideal self” they desire to be in the same domain (Markus and Wurf 1987).

A discrepancy between a person’s perception of their actual and ideal consumer knowledge (a knowledge discrepancy) may have significant behavioral consequences (Baumeister 1982). A common response to self-discrepancies is compensatory self-enhancement, whereby people work to promote more favorable impressions of themselves with self-concept relevant audiences (e.g. Swann et al. 1989). Building on prior research on compensatory self-enhancement (e.g. Rucker and Galinsky 2008) and self-concept motivation...
in word-of-mouth (e.g. Berger and Schwartz 2011), we predict that the desire to produce compensatory signals of higher consumer knowledge sometimes leads knowledge discrepant individuals to share more (rather than less) product information. Four studies test our compensatory communication hypothesis.

Study 1 examined how a measured knowledge discrepancy impacts consumers’ motivations to share product opinions with audiences that differ in self-concept relevance. The relevance of social relations with psychologically close individuals (i.e. friends) make them a primary target of self-enhancement, while distant (i.e. anonymous) others are likely to hold less self-concept relevance (Baumeister 1982; Tesser and Campbell 1982). Participants in this study (and all that follow) were told they would be testing the “Share” button feature of an online retailer, through which product reviews can be transmitted to either known or anonymous others. Our analysis revealed that given a psychologically close (but not distant) audience, a knowledge discrepancy increases the number of product reviews people intend to write and how many people they wished to share their reviews with during the study.

Study 2 explored the core effect using a manipulated rather than measured knowledge discrepancy, and tested for moderation by lay beliefs in the self-enhancement benefit of sharing word-of-mouth information (Hennig-Thurau et al 2004). A knowledge discrepancy in music was manipulated adapting an existing method (e.g. Higgins et al 1986). Three items captured lay beliefs in the self-enhancement benefit of sharing product knowledge. Analysis revealed that the effect of a knowledge discrepancy on the intention to write and share music reviews was greater for participants with higher beliefs in the self-enhancing benefits of sharing word-of-mouth.

Study 3 examined the effect in a different product category (movies) and with different dependent variables. Specifically, we analyzed the content of participant-written reviews using measures consistent with attempted audience impression management. We predicted that review content shared by participants with high (vs. low) knowledge discrepancies would indicate greater effort to write the review, include more self-centered content, utilize more complex language, and be more positive about the product (Schlenker 1980; Walther 2007). After the discrepancy manipulation, participants were to share their opinion about the last movie they had seen via email with a self-concept relevant audience. Multivariate ANOVA using 11 content-based measures supported all four predictions linking the compensatory communication effect to self-presentation in general or social displays of knowledge in particular.

In Study 4, we tested whether the compensatory communication effect was mediated by the negative emotion (dejection) found in prior examinations of actual:ideal self-discrepancies (e.g. Higgins 1987; Higgins et al. 1986). This study also provided an additional robustness test by examining discrepancies in consumer knowledge at a general as opposed to a category-specific level. A discrepancy in generalized consumer knowledge was manipulated using the same method as Studies 2-3 (except for dropping the product category name). Participants were then invited to share their knowledge about books, music or movies with a self-concept relevant audience in a manner identical to Study 2. The core compensatory communication effect was again replicated for both the number of reviews written and review sharing. Bootstrap analysis confirmed that the specific emotion linked by prior research to actual:ideal self-discrepancies mediated the effect of a knowledge discrepancy on intentions to transmit word-of-mouth.

By identifying the motivational power of knowledge discrepancies, this research contributes a more nuanced understanding of how knowledge beliefs and audience factors motivate word-of-mouth transmission. We hope this research stimulates new inquiries leveraging a more dynamic conception of consumer knowledge, shedding new light on the link between these beliefs and consumer attitudes and behaviors.

REFERENCES


Using Incentives to Encourage Word-of-Mouth Transmissions That Lead To Fast Information Diffusion

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Unlike traditional advertising campaigns or sales promotions, word-of-mouth (WOM) marketing relies on consumer-to-consumer interactions to spread awareness, generate interest, and drive sales. Importantly, not only do marketers hope for positive WOM, they hope it spreads rapidly. Fast information diffusion is important in many marketing situations, particularly in competitive environments and when firms have limited timeframes in which to achieve objectives.

According to prior research, the best way to speed up WOM-based information diffusion is for firms to target consumers who are highly connected (i.e., social hubs). Extant research shows that once information (or a product) is passed on by a social hub diffusion speeds up because these WOM transmitters have access to more people than “normal” consumers (Goldenberg et al. 2009; Hinz et al. 2011). However, directly targeting social hubs is not always possible because they are, by definition, relatively limited in number. Further, outside of public online social networks such as Twitter, it is difficult to identify these types of consumers. In light of these problems, it may often infeasible for marketers to base WOM marketing campaigns on directly targeting hubs.

The current research investigates an approach to WOM marketing that circumvents these concerns by not directly targeting higher-connectivity consumers. Instead, the proposed approach is based on targeting “normal” consumers who do not have abnormally high levels of connectivity and finding ways to encourage them to share the information with their high-connectivity “hub” friends. Five studies show that this can be achieved through the use of incentive mechanisms that increase the probability that a targeted consumer will transmit relevant information via WOM to a receiver friend who has a higher degree of social connectivity. We show that this leads to faster information diffusion. Our central hypothesis is that incentives based on positive externalities will increase the likelihood that a WOM-transmitting consumer will select a receiver with higher connectivity. When a piece of information has a positive externality, the value of the information to those who possess it increases with the number of others who possess it. For example, a positive-externality incentive would increase the amount of discount a transmitter received on a purchase if they spread WOM to more people. Conversely, a no-externality incentive would be fixed and not vary with the number of people who received WOM. Transmitting to more socially connected friends makes sense to a consumer who is presented with a positive-externality-based incentive because if their well-connected friend passes on the information more people will hear about it.

Study 1 tested this hypothesis by examining whether a positive-externality-based incentive increases the connectivity of a selected WOM receiver compared to a no-externality incentive in the context of a discount coupon for Amazon.com. In the positive-externality condition participants would receive a 50% discount only if the coupon was shared and redeemed by at least 7,500 people over three days. In the no-externality condition this requirement was removed. We found that participants were significantly more likely to transmit the offer information to a high-connectivity friend in the positive-externality condition than in the no-externality condition ($p < .001$).

Study 2 considered WOM transmissions in an online review advice-giving context. Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) “workers” who wrote reviews of AMT were asked to nominate a person with whom these reviews would be shared, and indicate how socially connected their chosen receivers were. In the positive-externality condition a bonus payment was given if their reviews were shared over 100 times over a week. In addition to externality (positive vs. none) we manipulated how much effort participants put into the review-writing task (higher/longer task vs. lower/shorter task). We found that nominated receivers had higher connectivity ratings when a positive-externality incentive was used, but only when participants put in higher effort (i.e., were more intrinsically motivated). Thus, positive-externality incentives only work when transmitters are also sufficiently intrinsically motivated to see information spread among others.

Studies 3 and 4 were field experiments designed to replicate results from studies 1 and 2 in different contexts and with actual WOM transmissions. Study 3 used a context where transmitters did not stand to personally benefit from information diffusion. Instead, a third-party charitable organization stood to benefit by receiving a sizeable donation if participants’ actual WOM transmissions generated a large enough number of visits to the charity’s website in a specified period of time. Study 4 involved a social media startup that tried to recruit new users with messages designed to elicit a positive-externality or not. Both field experiments replicated the results from studies 1 and 2.

Study 5 sought to identify the macro-level outcomes of positive- versus no-externality incentives for WOM transmissions on information diffusion speed in a social network using simulations. The simulation experiment demonstrated that, as theorized, as the probability of transmitting to a higher-connectivity receiver increases, diffusion speed also increases.

Overall, these five studies demonstrate that positive information externalities can be successfully used to increase the likelihood that regular WOM-transmitting consumers will select their higher-connectivity friends as receivers and that this does indeed lead to faster diffusion processes at the macro level.

REFERENCES


Answering Why: Action and Reaction Explanations in Word of Mouth

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Word of mouth (WOM), where consumers share information about experiences with others, is an everyday occurrence that strongly influences consumers (Arndt 1967) and firms (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). However, prior work has overlooked a key component of WOM: its content. While prior work has focused on valence (Richins 1983), content is key to understanding the impact of WOM (Godes et al. 2005), as demonstrated in recent work (Schellekens et al. 2009; Moore 2012). The current paper focuses on when and why individuals use particular WOM content. We investigate explaining language as one important type of content; individuals often explain events and experiences, to reduce uncertainty and manage future utility (Gilbert, Wilson, and Mayzlin 2003). Prior work shows that the act of explaining influences consumers’ evaluations of their experiences. Due to their primarily emotional nature, explaining dampens evaluations of hedonic experiences, but, due to their primarily cognitive nature, explaining polarizes
evaluations of utilitarian experiences (Moore 2012). We extend this work by examining the role of two types of explanations—action and reaction explanations (Malle 2006)—in WOM. Action explanations outline why consumers chose experiences or behaved in certain ways (e.g., I bought the cookies for a friend). Reaction explanations outline why consumers felt the way a certain way about experiences (e.g., I liked the cookies because they were chewy). While prior work has identified actor/observer differences in using these types of explanations (Malle 2004), we focus on explanations in a WOM context.

We posit that explanation type in WOM may not be predicted by actor/observer differences—since the audience is salient, the use of different explanations may instead be determined by what speakers think would be most helpful for their audience (Grice 1957). This, in turn, may be determined by product type. For utilitarian experiences, which are instrumental and goal-oriented (cognitive), action explanations might be more useful and therefore more common; for hedonic experiences, which are affective and sensory (emotional; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000), reaction explanations might be more useful and therefore more common. Further, we posit that providing these explanations will impact speakers (Moore 2012), such that for utilitarian experiences, only action explanations will polarize evaluations, but for hedonic experiences, only reaction explanations will dampen evaluations. We examine these predictions in seven studies.

In study 1, we tested audience preferences for different types of explanations. We provided individuals with constructed reviews that varied in valence (positive or negative), product type (pretested as hedonic or utilitarian), and explanation type (action, reaction, or none). Participants rated reaction explanations as more helpful for hedonic (restaurant) reviews and action explanations as more helpful for utilitarian (USB stick) reviews.

We next examined whether speakers (reviewers) were sensitive to these preferences. In study 2, we collected 200 Amazon.com reviews. We collected fiction and non-fiction book reviews to represent hedonic and utilitarian products (confirmed in a pre-test), and coded each review for its proportion of reaction and action explanations. More action than reaction explanations were provided for non-fiction (utilitarian) books (e.g., I bought this because it was a best seller), while more reaction than action explanations were provided for fiction (hedonic) books (e.g., I loved this book because it was well-written).

In study 3, we replicated this finding in the lab. Individuals recalled a recent utilitarian or hedonic purchase that was positive or negative. They imagined writing an online review or a diary entry, and rated how likely they were to include sentences that provided certain types of explanations can impact speakers’ evaluations of their own purchases.

REFERENCES
When the Choosing Gets Rough: Exploring Incidental Factors that Increase Choice Difficulty

Chair: Jordan Etkin, Duke University, USA
Jennifer Savary, Yale University, USA

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Paper #1: When Being Happy Makes Choosing Harder
Jordan Etkin, Duke University, USA
Anastasiya Pocheptsova, University of Maryland, USA

Paper #2: The Cognitive and Behavioral Consequences of Considering Low-Fit Brand Extensions
Kelly Goldsmith, Northwestern University, USA
Ryan Hamilton, Emory University, USA

Paper #3: Distractions: Friend or Foe in the Pursuit of Conscious and Nonconscious Goals?
Eunice Kim Cho, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Andrew Mitchell, University of Toronto, Canada
Ravi Dhar, Yale University, USA

Paper #4: The Positive Consequences of Conflict on Decision Making: When a Conflict Mindset Facilitates Choice
Jennifer Savary, Yale University, USA
Tali Kleinman, New York University, USA
Ran Hassan, The Hebrew University, Israel
Ravi Dhar, Yale University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Much research has investigated how consumers make difficult choices (Luce 1998, Nowlis, Dhar and Simonson 2010). To date, choice difficulty is generally considered a fixed property of the choice set, determined by the configuration of alternatives and attribute values. Choices with many alternatives, for instance, are considered more difficult than those with less alternatives (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), and choices between alignable attributes are considered easier than choices between non-alignable attributes (Zhang and Markman 2001). More recent research has begun to explore the notion that choosing from the same choice set can be perceived as more or less difficult based on consumer or situation-specific characteristics (Schrif et al. 2011; Sela and Berger 2012). The papers in this session further this line of inquiry by examining incidental factors that affect choice difficulty and consequently choice incidence.

Paper 1 (Etkin and Pocheptsova) will open the discussion by exploring effects incidental positive mood on choice difficulty. While prior research has emphasized the benefits of positive mood for a wide range of outcomes, this research shows positive mood can actually make choice seem more difficult. The authors demonstrate that when choice evokes tradeoffs, positive mood increases perceived differences between choice options, which increases choice difficulty and the incidence of deferral.

Consumers’ experience of choice difficulty also depends on the amount of cognitive effort expended prior to choice. Paper 2 (Goldsmith and Hamilton) shows that evaluating low (vs. high) fit brand extensions prior to choice actually decreases the incidence of deferral. The authors argue that reconciling low (vs. high) fit brand extensions requires more cognitive resources and promotes a more abstract style of thinking, thereby decreasing decision difficulty. Together with the results from paper 1, these findings expand understanding of how factors incidental to choice can nevertheless impact experiences of difficulty.

Papers 3 and 4 further enrich our understanding of how incidental factors influence choice difficulty by exploring novel pathways through which such difficulty may be resolved. Paper 3 (Cho et al.) explores the impact of distractions on choice difficulty. The authors show being distracted while making a choice increases the likelihood that consumers choose consistently with their conscious focal goal. Distractions bolster the importance of the focal goal, thereby increasing adherence. Paper 4 (Danilowitz et al.) illustrates a final counter-intuitive relationship between incidental states and difficult decisions. Whereas previous literature has largely argued that feelings of conflict are associated with increased choice difficulty and greater choice deferral, this paper suggests that priming incidental conflict instead decreases choice deferral. The authors show priming conflict increases the systematic processing of choice information, which allows people to directly confront conflict and results in increased choice.

Together, four papers offer novel and surprising insights into how incidental factors influence consumers’ experience of choice difficulty and choice deferral. In doing so, these papers demonstrate a series of important effects that will be of interest to a wide range of ACR attendees, including those interested in choice, mood, resource depletion, brands, and goals.

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When Being Happy Makes Choice Harder

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Being in a positive mood confers a wide range of benefits on consumers. Positive affect enhances creativity (Isen et al. 1985), promotes self-control (Aspinwall 1998; Ragunathan and Trope 2002), and generally leads to successful outcomes (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005). Based on these findings, one might expect positive mood to have beneficial impact on choice processes. In contrast, we propose that positive mood will at times make choice more difficult, increasing the incidence of choice deferral.

We base our propositions on prior work showing that positive mood increases context dependence, or adoption of situation-specific processing cues (Murray et al. 1990; Hunsinger, et al. 2011; Showers and Canter 1985). Although positive mood has been primarily shown to enhance focus on inter-item similarities (Isen and Daubman 1984; Iyengar et al. 1985; Lee and Streithal 1999), in situations that cue consumers to focus on differences, positive mood instead increases perceived inter-item differences (Murray et al. 1999; Shower and Canter 1985). For example, Murray et al. (1990) demonstrated that participants in a positive mood identified more similarities between items when prompted to focus on similarities, but also identified more differences when prompted to focus on differences.

We posit that when choice involves tradeoffs, positive mood will spontaneously lead consumers to focus on differences between choice options. When consumers are faced with tradeoffs, they engage in comparison processes aimed at resolving this conflict (Brenner et al. 1999; Gilbert et al. 1995; Tversky 1977). Though choice options may be compared in terms of similarity or dissimilarity (Gati and Tversky 1984; Medin et al. 1993; Tversky 1977), an emphasis on unique or different features is the norm (Brenner et al. 1999; Dhar and Sherman 1996). We thus expect a differences cue to be salient when consumers make choices that involve tradeoffs. Positive mood, then, should lead consumers to more readily adopt these differences focus, increasing their perceptions of differences between choice options. Perceiving more differences between choice options, in turn, increases choice difficulty by making inter-item...
comparisons more difficult (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). As a result, we expect positive mood will increase consumers’ perceptions of choice difficulty for choices with tradeoffs, making them more likely to defer choice entirely.

We test our propositions in four studies. In a pilot study, we used a word-prime task to manipulate positive vs. neutral mood (adapted from Pyun and Isen 2011) and presented participants with a set of three physician options, designed in such a way as to require tradeoffs when making a choice (adapted from Schrift, et al. 2011). Half of participants chose a physician option while the remaining half rated the attractiveness of each physician option. Next, we asked all participants to rate their perceptions of differences between the three physician options [1-7]. As we predicted, positive mood increased perceived differences between the physician options when participants were confronted with tradeoffs (i.e., they had to make a choice; $M_{pos} = 4.89$, $M_{neg} = 4.26$; $F(1, 78) = 3.31, p = .07$), but not when they merely rated the options ($M_{pos} = 4.48$, $M_{neg} = 4.75$; $F < 1$). Consistent with prior findings, this reversal suggests in the absence of a cue to focus on differences, positive mood spontaneously leads individuals to focus on similarities.

Study 1 uses a different tradeoff manipulation to provide further support for our propositions. We manipulated positive vs. negative mood using pre-tested video clips and then asked participants to imagine they were taking a trip for work or for pleasure. We constructed a set of flight options such that choosing required tradeoffs (i.e., the trip was for pleasure but not for work). As expected, being in a positive mood increased perceived differences between the flight options when choosing required tradeoffs (i.e., when the trip was for fun; $M_{pos} = 4.80$, $M_{neg} = 4.26$; $F(1, 156) = 4.70$, $p < .05$), but decreased perceived differences when choosing did not require tradeoffs (i.e., the trip was for work; $M_{pos} = 4.33$, $M_{neg} = 4.88$; $F(1, 156) = 5.04$, $p < .05$).

Studies 2 and 3 extend our investigation by considering consequences of focusing on differences between choice options. In study 2 we manipulated mood as in the pilot study and asked participants to choose a task they would like to complete for pay. In one set (no tradeoffs), there was an asymmetrically dominating task option, whereas in the other set (tradeoffs required), there was not (adapted from Sela and Berger 2012). We measured participants’ interest in deferring on a 7-point scale. As predicted, being in a positive mood increased interest in deferral when choosing required tradeoffs ($M_{pos} = 5.02$, $M_{neg} = 4.20$; $F(1, 180) = 3.87$, $p = .05$). The opposite occurred when participants chose from the set that did not require tradeoffs ($M_{pos} = 3.73$, $M_{neg} = 4.54$; $F(1, 180) = 4.02$, $p < .05$).

Study 3 replicated our findings in a field study. We intercepted students at a University food court, administered a word-prime task to manipulate positive vs. neutral mood and the extension, these effects do not occur. We provide convergent dependent measures, we argue that what makes the effect of low fit condition ($\text{low fit}$) spent less time on the task than those in the high-fit condition ($\text{high fit}$)? Although one could argue that offering a wider array of brand extensions only benefits consumers by way of increasing variety (Kahne $$epon, 2000$), we test this prediction across a series of experiments. For example, in Experiment 1 all participants evaluated a series of brand extensions, which were either high in fit (e.g., Crest gum) or low in fit (e.g., Mrs. Field’s BBQ sauce) with the parent brand. Next all participants were given an unsolvable puzzle, as persistence on impossible tasks has previously been used to test depletion effects (Wan and Sternthal 2008). In line with our predictions, participants exerted less effort on the task (showing more depletion) after evaluating the low-fit brand extensions. Those in the low-fit condition spent less time on the task than those in the high-fit condition ($M_{low fit} = 174$ seconds vs. $M_{high fit} = 376$ seconds; $p < .05$). In subsequent experiments, we demonstrate boundary conditions for this effect that provide support for our process. Specifically, we show that when consumers are not motivated to reconcile the brand and the extension, these effects do not occur. We provide convergent evidence for the observed depletion effect by showing that decision confidence also erodes after consumers evaluate low-fit brand extensions (Hamilton et al. 2010; scale: 1–not at all confident to 9–extremely confident; $M_{low fit} = 5.9$ vs. $M_{high fit} = 6.5$; $p < .05$).

Having demonstrated that evaluating low-fit extensions leads to self-regulatory depletion across a series of experiments with convergent dependent measures, we argue that what makes the effect of evaluating low-fit brand extensions on self-regulatory depletion particularly interesting is that the same manipulation can also promote more abstract processing, a factor often shown to counteracts deple-
tion effects (e.g., Wan and Agrawal 2011). We base this prediction on findings from construal level theory, which demonstrate that higher-level, more abstract construals allow consumers to find connections between disparate stimuli (e.g., Trope and Liberman 2003). We add to this work by testing if this effect is bi-directional. Specifically, in Experiment 5 we explore if prompting consumers to find connections between disparate stimuli (e.g., by evaluating low-fit brand extensions) promotes more abstract construals. We have participants evaluate a series of extensions that are either high or low in fit, then having them complete a task traditionally used to assess differences in levels of construal (a modified behavioral identification task; Meyvis, Goldsmith and Dhar 2012). We find that those who first evaluated low-fit brand extensions were significantly more likely to identify behaviors in abstract terms than those who first evaluated high-fit extensions ($M_{low-fit}=5.6$ vs. $M_{high-fit}=4.8; p<.05$).

Having shown that evaluating low-fit brand extensions can promote more abstract processing, our final experiment tests for implications this might have on consumer choice. Prior work has suggested, although never directly demonstrated, that abstract processing should reduce choice deferral by decreasing decision difficulty (Kim and Dhar 2007). We test this by manipulating if consumers first evaluate high vs. low fit brand extensions then presenting them with an unrelated choice task that includes the option to defer choice (Dhar 1997). In line with our prediction, participants in the low-fit condition were significantly more likely to make a choice (less likely to defer choice) than those in the high-fit condition (choice deferral: $P_{low-fit}=32\%$ vs. $P_{high-fit}=48\%$, $p<.05$). In support of our process, we find this effect does not occur when consumers are not motivated to reconcile the brand with the extension.

Taken together, these results suggest that evaluating low fit brand extensions can have cognitive consequences for consumers both in terms of self-regulatory depletion (Experiments 1 – 4) and level of processing (Experiments 5 and 6). We discuss how these results extend the research on schema congruity, self-regulatory depletion and construal level theory. Because most if not all prior brand extension research has been from the perspective of the firm, we believe our findings offer novel insights into the effects that varying brand extension fit can have on consumers. We conclude with a discussion of the practical implications for these findings.

**Distractions: Friend or Foe in the Pursuit of Conscious and Nonconscious Goals?**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

We have all had the experience of going to a coffee shop with the intent of working, but becoming distracted: the loud conversation at the next table, the music, the sunny weather outside, or even the desire to buy and eat a red velvet cupcake. How might these different types of distractions affect your goal to work? Will the consequences differ depending on whether your goal is conscious or nonconscious?

Conscious and nonconscious goals are generally believed to lead to similar processes and outcomes (e.g. Bargh et al. 2001; Chartrand and Bargh 1996). More recently, however, research is examining how the two types of goals may differ (Gollwitzer, Parks-Stam, and Oettingen 2009). Our research posits that the pursuit of conscious and nonconscious goals diverges when faced with distractions. Consistent with the view that there is a limited pool of cognitive resources (Kruglanski et al. 2002), when a focal goal is faced with a distraction, the motivated response can be to protect the goal and protect the cognitive resources. We propose that because the activation and pursuit of conscious goals require cognitive resources (Kruglanski et al. 2002), introducing a distraction that threatens to compete for those resources will increase the importance of the goal and as a result, increase goal adherence. The activation and pursuit of nonconscious goals, however, require very few cognitive resources (Bargh and Barndollar 1996), such that distractions are not perceived as a threat that requires a response. We hypothesize, therefore, that distractions will enhance the accessibility and pursuit of a conscious goal, but have no effect on a nonconscious goal. Furthermore, we examine the effect that different types of distractions will have on the pursuit of conscious and nonconscious goals. As a key component of our theorizing involves the consumption of cognitive resources by a goal, and the subsequent threat posed to those resources by a distraction, we expect that the increase in goal pursuit will be further moderated by the extent to which the distractions consume cognitive resources. More specifically, we hypothesize that the nature of the distraction will moderate the effect of distractions on goal pursuit. We test these hypotheses in a series of three experiments.

In Study 1, we demonstrate our main proposition that distractions can increase adherence to a conscious focal goal, but not to a nonconscious focal goal. The study was a 2 (Focal goal: conscious health goal vs. nonconscious health goal) X 2 (Distraction: travel goal prime vs. none) between-participants design. Participants first completed the focal goal prime task, then were presented with a distraction task or not. Next, they chose between two magazines: healthy living versus desserts. As expected, we find that among participants primed with the conscious health goal, those who faced a distraction were more likely to choose the healthy living magazine compared to those who did not (83% vs. 69%; $p=.05$). Choice share of the healthy living magazine did not differ among those primed with a nonconscious health goal (73% vs. 72%).

Study 2 measures the influence that distractions have on the accessibility of focal goals. Study 2 was a 2 (Focal goal: conscious academic goal vs. nonconscious academic goal) X 2 (Distraction: environment goal vs. filler task) between-participants design. As in Study 1, participants first completed the goal prime and then completed the distraction or filler task. Participants were then given a word search task and instructed to find 9 hidden words. Ten of the hidden words were academic goal-related words, while the other 10 were neutral words. The notion here is that the more (less) accessible the focal academic goal is, participants would find more (fewer) academic goal-related words. Consistent with our prediction, participants with the conscious academic goal found more goal-related words in the presence of a distraction (i.e. environment goal) than not (i.e. filler task; $M_{distraction}=5.03$ vs. $M_{filler}=4.46$, $p=.05$). There was no difference among the participants with the nonconscious academic goal ($M_{distraction}=4.85$ vs. $M_{filler}=4.69$). Taken together, these findings suggest that 1) conscious and nonconscious goals differ when faced with distractions such as alternative goals and 2) distractions not only activate shielding mechanisms of inhibition, which decrease the accessibility of alternative goals (Goschke and Dreisbach 2008; Shah, Friedman, and Kruglanski 2002), but also actually increase the pursuit and accessibility of conscious focal goals.

Study 3 tests the underlying process that distractions increase conscious focal goal pursuit by increasing goal importance. It also specifies the type of distraction that will produce this effect. In particular, we compare the effect that a resource consuming distraction—a conscious competing goal—would have against a distraction that is less resource consuming—a nonconscious competing goal on focal goal importance. We expect that a conscious competing goal will be perceived as a resource threatening distracter that will elicit a bolstering of the importance of the focal goal, while a nonconscious competing goal will not. As predicted, participants in the conscious
academic goal conditions reported higher importance of the goal to study when there was a threatening distracter (i.e. a conscious goal distracter) compared to when there was a non-threatening distracter (i.e. nonconscious goal distracter; $M_{\text{threat}} = 8.60$ vs $M_{\text{no-threat}} = 7.60, p < .05$). There were no differences across the nonconscious academic goal conditions on importance of the goal to study ($M_{\text{threat}} = 7.22$ vs. $M_{\text{no-threat}} = 7.40$).

These findings contribute to the existing literature on goal pursuit by demonstrating that the pursuit of conscious and nonconscious goals diverge in the presence of distractions. Furthermore, our findings suggest that distractions can have the ironic effect of facilitating the pursuit of conscious goals.

The Positive Consequences of Conflict: When a Conflict Mindset Facilitates Choice

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Conflict is generally thought of as aversive, associated with depression, neuroticism and illness (Emmons & King, 1988), decreased task performance (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002), and impaired decision making. In contrast to this modal and intuitive view, we propose that conflict can also be beneficial. We test our proposal by examining the effects of incidental conflict on people’s willingness to make a decision. Extensive research on decision-making suggests that integral choice conflict increases deferral (Anderson, 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Luce, 1998). In contrast we argue that incidental exposure to conflict activates a mindset that in turn facilitates decision making and increases choice likelihood. A conflict mindset brings with it the procedural benefits of coping with conflict without the associated costs such as negative affect (Luce, Bettman & Payne, 1999) or stress (Lazarus, 1993).

In the current paper we activate conflict outside of awareness by priming conflicting goals, and look for increased choice in domains unrelated to the primed conflict. Our main proposition is that exposure to conflict activates a conflict mindset, which leads to more systematic processing of subsequent, difficult choices. This assumption is in line with prior research indicating people who proactively work to resolve choice conflict systematically consider more available information (Janis and Mann, 1977) and take longer to decide (Bettman, Johnson, Luce & Payne, 1993). We propose that as a result of this systematic processing of choice information, people in a conflict mindset are more likely to resolve conflict and make choices. This is consistent with the notion that people choose more often when preference uncertainty is reduced (Dhar and Simonson, 2003). Four experiments test our propositions.

In experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Healthy/Indulge Conflict; Career/Socialize Conflict, or Control (no conflict). Our priming manipulation was a lexical decision task where participants indicated if the letters on the screen formed a word (21 trials) or a non-word (14 trials). In each of the Conflict conditions, 7 of the words related to one goal (e.g., fitness), 7 related to the conflicting goal (e.g., chocolate). Participants then made two choices (apartments, cell phones), which included a standard deferral option (Dhar 1997). Finally, participants were probed for awareness. As predicted, participants in the Conflict conditions were more likely to make a choice than those in Control ($M_{\text{conflict}} = .73$ vs. $M_{\text{control}} = .62, p < .04$). There were no differences between condition on any awareness measure, for any study reported here (all $p > .1$).

In experiment 2 we test our proposed process using two markers of systematic processing: longer decision times, and consideration of more information (Bettman et. al., 1993; Janis and Mann 1977). We capture these process measures using a program similar to Mouselab (Johnson et al., 1991) and test if systematic information processing mediates the effect of conflict on choice likelihood. Student participants were brought into the lab and primed with either a Study/Party Conflict or Control (no conflict) using the same lexical decision task as Experiment 1. They then made choices, which included a deferral option. The computer recorded the time spent on each choice and the amount of information viewed. Participants in the Conflict condition were more likely to choose one of the options than those in Control, $M_{\text{conflict}} = 82\%$ vs. $M_{\text{control}} = 71\%, p < .05$. Conflict primed participants tended to take more time to make their decision $F(1, 78) = 3.4, p = .06$, and viewed more information $F(1, 394) = 4.5, p < .05$. To test our proposed process, decision time and information viewed were entered into a serial bootstrap model for multiple mediators (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). There was a significant and positive path indicating that conflict increases the amount of information searched, which increases decision time and results in greater choice (95%CI= .001, .088).

Experiment 3 tested a boundary condition and rules out an alternative explanation. Our mindset theory predicts that the conflict prime should facilitate resolution of subsequent difficult choices, but should not increase persistence on a non-choice task. In addition, we have proposed that it is the conflict mindset, and not the activation of a single goal, that brings about our effects. Using the same lexical decision task describe above, participants completed a Control, Conflict (career vs. socialize), or Single Goal (career only) priming manipulation. Half the participants made 2 choices identical to those in Experiment 2 (Album, Theater), while the other half completed a non-choice, persistence task in which they rated as many pictures as they liked before choosing to stop (adapted from Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). As before Conflict participants were more likely to make choices than Control participants, $M_{\text{conflict}} = 86\%, M_{\text{control}} = 75\%, p < .04$. However, as predicted, Conflict and Control participants persisted at a similar rate on a filler task, completing the same number of items, $M_{\text{conflict}} = 14.1, M_{\text{control}} = 12.8, p > .61$, interaction: $F(1, 200) = 4.3, p < .04$. Finally we do not find evidence to support a single goal priming explanation for the increase in choice resolution, as Conflict participants were more likely to make a choice than participants in Control and the participants who were primed with just a Single Goal, $M_{\text{conflict}} = 86\%, M_{\text{control}} = 75\%, M_{\text{single}} = 76\%, p < .05$.

In Experiment 4 we sought to conceptually replicate our findings using another common choice scenario: preference for an extreme option in a three item compromise choice set. We hypothesize people will be more likely to choose an extreme option after being primed with conflicting goals. As predicted, Conflict (vs. Control) participants were more likely to resolve the choice by selecting an extreme option, $M_{\text{conflict}} = 55.1\%, M_{\text{control}} = 41.1\%, p < .02$.

The negative consequences of choice conflict are well documented (Emmons and King 1988, Riediger and Freund 2004). This research examines whether a conflict mindset can have positive consequences, and suggests that the traditional view of conflict as causing a paralytic flight from difficult choices may not tell the whole story.

REFERENCES


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Anthropomorphism: New Insights and Implications

Chairs: Fangyuan Chen, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Rocky Peng Chen, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Paper #1: The Effects of Anthropomorphization on Brand Personality Perceptions: A Motivational Account

Fangyuan Chen, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Jaideep Sengupta, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Rashmi Adaval, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China

Paper #2: Is She My New Friend? The Effect of Social Exclusion on Consumer Preference for Anthropomorphized Products

Rocky Peng Chen, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Echo Wen Wan, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Eric Levy, University of Cambridge, UK

Paper #3: When Consumers Meet Humanized Brands: Effect of Self-construal on Brand Anthropomorphism

Meng-Hua Hsieh, University of Washington, USA
Shailendra Pratap Jain, University of Washington, USA
Xingbo Li, University of Washington, USA
Vanitha Swaminathan, University of Pittsburgh, USA


Julia Hur, Northwestern University, USA
Minjung Koo, Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea
Wilhelm Hofmann, University of Chicago, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Anthropomorphism occurs when people imbue nonhuman agents (e.g., their pets) with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions. In marketing, companies often aid this process of anthropomorphization by creating human-like representations of their brands (e.g., the Michelin Man). Consumers are also known to anthropomorphize brands (Delbaere, McQuarrie, and Phillips 2011; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2012). However, the unique effect of each of these is unknown as is the interaction of the two. This special session attempts to answer this question. In doing so, it advances our understanding of anthropomorphism in the marketing context. The four papers offer new insights on the antecedents and consequences of product anthropomorphism, document novel effects of anthropomorphizing a product on consumer behavior, and examine the mechanisms underlying these effects. This session has implications for brand positioning, advertising, consumer well-being and self-control.

The four papers focus on how anthropomorphism influences consumer behavior and contribute to the literature from different perspectives. First, Chen, Sengupta and Adaval use a motivation-based framework to examine the antecedents of brand anthropomorphism. They show that sociality and effectance motivation prompt consumers to humanize brands and endow them with different personalities. The personality traits that brands are endowed with are often those that alleviate the underlying motivational needs. They also provide implications for brand positioning by showing that consumers with salient sociality (effectance) motivations indicate higher willingness to pay when a brand emphasizes a sociality (functionality) positioning. While the first paper documents the novel antecedents of brand anthropomorphism, the next two papers stress the consequences of anthropomorphizing products on consumer preference. Chen, Wan and Levy examine how consumers respond to products communicated in an anthropomorphic manner as a function of their psychological state of being socially excluded or included. They show that experiencing social exclusion increases consumers' preference for anthropomorphized products, because these products are perceived to provide an opportunity for social re-affiliation. Their studies further demonstrate that this effect is diminished when the brand exhibits a tough personality, which signals higher chance of future rejection. Hsieh et al. take a different perspective to examine different types of anthropomorphism in marketing communication and their impact on consumer decision. Their studies reveal that consumers with an interdependent self-construal are more likely to purchase a brand that is anthropomorphized as a partner (vs. servant). This effect occurs because partner brands exhibit an intention to cooperate, which is consistent with the goals of the interdependent self. Finally, Hur, Koo and Hofmann document negative effects of anthropomorphizing products. They find that anthropomorphizing tempting products hampers consumer self-control, because consumers are less likely to identify self-control conflicts, leading to higher chance to indulge in temptations.

Despite the fact that anthropomorphism is pervasive in marketing communication, scholarly research about how anthropomorphism influences consumer behavior is still at an early stage. The proposed session will advance our understanding of the antecedents and consequences of product and brand anthropomorphism and the process by which consumers anthropomorphize products. By offering new insights and implications, we believe that the special session will stimulate discussion and future research on how to better understand the motivations underlying anthropomorphism and its consequences.

The Effects of Anthropomorphization on Brand Personality Perceptions: A Motivational Account

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Anthropomorphism refers to the tendency that people have to imbue nonhuman agents with human-like characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007). Past research suggests that consumers humanize objects such as brands when they have access to human-like knowledge structures while making brand judgments (Aggarwal and McGill 2007; Kim and McGill 2011). In contrast to the cognitive perspective (i.e., the influence of salient knowledge structures) that informs most of the extant consumer literature in this area, the present research draws on recent findings in psychology (Epley et al. 2007) to provide a motivational account of anthropomorphism. This perspective argues that the salience of certain motivations (e.g., a need for sociality and a need for control or effectance over one’s environment) facilitates the process of anthropomorphism. We apply Epley et al.’s framework to a marketing context and, more importantly, advance the original conceptualization by merging it with relevant insights from the brand personality literature (e.g., Aaker 1997; Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 2010). Specifically, we argue that while sociality and effectance motives both lead consumers to humanize a brand, they differ in the type of human-like traits that the brand is endowed with. We further posit...
that these different antecedents of brand humanizing have distinct consequences on the effectiveness of brand positioning strategies.

Our conceptualization is based on the idea that different underlying motivations (such as the desire for sociality arising out of feelings of loneliness or the desire for effectance arising out of feelings of not being in control) should yield different brand personality perceptions. Based on the idea of motivated perception (Balckeit and Dunning 2006; Changizi and Hall 2001), we hypothesize that the specific motivation that causes consumers to humanize a brand should lead them to endow the brand with the particular human-like trait that can alleviate the underlying need. According to Aaker (1997; Aaker et al. 2010) consumers humanize brands along distinct personality dimensions, such as excitement, competence, sincerity, etc. Consider, for instance, two such brand personality traits: “warmth” and “dependability”. Our theorizing predicts that consumers for whom a sociality motivation has been made salient – e.g., via chronic or momentarily induced loneliness – will think of the brand as a “warm” person because doing so will help to alleviate loneliness. Therefore, when compared to a baseline condition in which no such motivation has been made salient, those with a sociality motivation should rate the brand higher on warmth but should show no difference in dependability perceptions. The reverse should be true for consumers with an effectance motivation, made salient either through chronic or momentarily induced need for control. By thinking of the brand as a “dependable” person, such consumers will be able to satisfy their need for control. Accordingly, compared to a baseline condition where no such motivation is salient, consumers with an effectance motivation should rate the target brand higher on dependability – but not on warmth.

Results from four studies provide convergent support for these arguments, and their implications. Study 1 examined the basic proposition that high sociality or effectance motivation can increase a person’s tendency to humanize a brand. Participants first recalled a personal experience that made them feel lonely (inducing a sociality motive) or helpless (inducing an effectance motive). A third, baseline condition, did not induce any such motive. Then, all participants were asked to draw a picture of an unknown brand. The brand was endowed with more human-like features given a salient sociality or effectance motivation relative to the baseline condition.

In Study 2, participants first went through the same motivation manipulation as in study 1. Next, they were exposed to an unknown brand and were asked to indicate their perception of brand personality along three dimensions – warmth, dependability, and outdoorly (which was assessed as a control dimension). As predicted, lonely (helpless) participants perceived the unknown brand to be warmer (more dependable) than those in the baseline condition. No differences were obtained for the control “outdoorly” dimension. Study 3 was identical to study 2 but replicated the above findings using an open-ended measure in which participants spontaneously listed human-like adjectives that best described the brand.

Finally, Study 4 both reinforced and built on our conceptualization to examine a key consequence of anthropomorphization, relating to the effectiveness of brand positioning. If an underlying motivational need is met by a brand humanizing exercise, it should remove the need to humanize a subsequent brand, rendering motivational appeals for that brand ineffective. To test this, participants’ salient motivation (sociality/effectance/baseline) was manipulated as before. Next, they were exposed to either a brand humanizing task, or a geography task. The former task offered an opportunity for participants to satisfy their salient motivational need through the brand humanization, but the latter task did not. For the latter participants, the initial motivation should remain salient. Next, all participants were asked to evaluate a different product from the one that they had previously humanized – a smart phone calendar application called MyCalendar. This was described either as a great social (functional) app that facilitates the user’s social (work). The key dependent variable was willingness-to-pay (WTP) for this application. Results revealed a three-way interaction involving motivation, opportunity to humanize, and brand positioning on WTP. As expected, when participants had completed a brand humanization task prior to the calendar evaluation task, their sociality/effectance motivations were satisfied. Consequently, participants’ WTP estimates for MyCalendar were not influenced by brand positioning. In contrast, the geography task had presumably left participants’ social/ effectance motivations unfulfilled and these should remain salient while performing the calendar evaluation task. In accord, lonely participants indicated higher WTP when the ad for MyCalendar emphasized a sociality vs. a functionality positioning, with a reverse pattern obtaining for helpless participants. All effects were significant at p < .05.

In sum, this research uses a motivational-based framework to provide a new look at both the antecedents and consequences of brand anthropomorphism. In doing so, we advance basic theoretical knowledge regarding the processes underlying brand anthropomorphism and offer insights into the brand personality literature.

Is She My New Friend? The Effect of Social Exclusion on Consumer Preference for Anthropomorphized Products

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Anthropomorphism, defined as the tendency of seeing human characteristics in non-human agents (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007), is often used in marketing communications. For example, marketers might create a human representation for its brand (e.g., the Energizer Man), or use human terms to describe products’ features in advertising. Past research has suggested that one major motivation for people to anthropomorphize is the desire for social affiliation (Epley et al. 2007). For instance, Epley et al. (2008) found that participants who were primed to feel lonely, compared with those in fear or control conditions, were more likely to describe their pets using supportive anthropomorphic traits. However, it is not clear how experiencing social exclusion, the state of being cut off, ignored, or isolated by other individuals or social groups (Baumeister et al. 2005; Williams 2007), will influence consumers’ preference for products communicated in an anthropomorphic manner. The current research examines this question.

Research in branding has suggested that people can form relationships with products in a similar way to how they form relationships with other people (Fournier 1998). Thus, when socially excluded consumers see human characteristics in the product, they may show more interest because connecting with the anthropomorphized product represents an opportunity for social affiliation. One’s interest in connecting with the product should be exhibited in their product attitudes. Therefore, we predict that socially excluded consumers, compared with socially included consumers, will exhibit greater preferences for anthropomorphized products, but not for non-anthropomorphized products.

However, excluded persons are needy but vulnerable (Maner et al. 2007). They desire new social affiliation, but also want to protect themselves from being rejected again. Downey and Feldman (1996) found that people highly sensitive to rejection tended to avoid social interactions and had more hostile intentions towards others who they believe might reject them. These findings suggest that excluded consumers may not exhibit greater preference for the
anthropomorphized products if the product is imbued with human characteristics that imply the possibility of rejection. Some brand personalities (Aaker 1997) may represent good opportunities for social affiliation while others may not. For example, a friendly personality depicts a kind and approachable image, whereas tough personality describes a less approachable image. Since excluded consumers would be reluctant to approach people with a tough personality due to the fear of being rejected again, we expect that these consumers would have similar reaction towards tough anthropomorphized products. Seeing the product with tough brand personality is expected to reduce their interest in having a relationship with the product. This prediction is consistent with Epley et al.’s (2008) finding that excluded participants did not describe their pets using non-supportive anthropomorphic traits (e.g., devious) more than participants in fear or control conditions. Therefore, we hypothesize that social exclusion will increase preferences for anthropomorphized brands that represent a friendly personality, but not a tough personality.

Empirical results from three studies support our hypotheses. Study 1 employs a 3 (social exclusion vs. social inclusion vs. control) x 2 (anthropomorphism: human vs. object) between-subjects design. Participants first recalled a recent experience in which they felt social excluded, socially included, or a control condition in which they were shopping in the supermarket. Then they were instructed to do an ostensibly unrelated product survey in which an energizer battery was presented for evaluation. The battery was communicated either in human form (i.e., the energizer man image with a first person introduction) or in object form (i.e., the pure object image with a third person introduction). As predicted, excluded participants, compared with those in inclusion and control conditions, provided more favorable evaluations of an anthropomorphized battery, but not a non-anthropomorphized battery.

Study 2 tested the moderating effect of brand personality on excluded consumers’ attitude towards anthropomorphized products. A 2 (social exclusion: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (anthropomorphism: human vs. object) x 2 (brand personality: friendly vs. tough) between-subjects design was employed. Participants first performed a ball-tossing game online (Williams, Cheung and Choi 2000) that manipulated social exclusion. Exclusion participants received far less ball tosses from their partners than included participants did. After completing the game, participants completed an ostensibly irrelevant product survey in which they were asked to evaluate a clock, which was presented either in first person with human facial features, or in third person without human facial features. The clock was described visually and verbally as either friendly or tough in its personality. As expected, results in friendly conditions replicate the finding in study 1, and this effect is diminished in tough conditions, supporting the moderating role of brand personality.

Study 3 examined the underlying mechanism in a 2 (social exclusion: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (anthropomorphism: human vs. object) between-subjects design. The brand personality is manipulated within-subject in the choice task. Following manipulation of social exclusion (rejection or acceptance of a friend request in a social network website), participants provided thoughts about two sub-brands of Walker mint candy: bright princess and dark queen. The two sub-brands represent different personalities: friendly and easy to approach versus cold and difficult to approach. Participants were asked to describe what kind of person versus what kind of product the brands are (Aggarwal and McGill 2012), which manipulates anthropomorphism. Then participants were instructed to choose one between the two candies. To test the underlying mechanism, participants responded to a series of items including the extent to which the candy can become their new friend. As expected, the choice share of friendly candy is significantly higher among excluded participants who humanized the candy, compared to all other three conditions. Results of mediation analysis supports that the perceived social re-affiliation opportunity drives this effect.

In sum, this research demonstrates novel effects of using anthropomorphism in marketing by showing when and what types of anthropomorphism are effective in influencing consumer response. We also identify new behavioral consequences of social exclusion, and contribute to the branding literature by documenting new antecedents of relationship building between consumers and brands.

When Consumers Meet Humanized Brands: Effect of Self-construal on Brand Anthropomorphism

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, and emotions to nonhuman objects (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007). It enables a brand to assume a social role as a relationship partner (Fournier 1998), as in a partnership, a fling (Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004), an exchange, a communal (Aggarwal 2004), etc. Our research investigates how consumers with different self-construals exhibit differential purchase intentions towards brands that assume different social roles.

Further, we attempt to understand the underlying process by examining the different intentions underlying each social role brands assume. Some consumers feel entitled to their needs being met by brands and even demand special treatment thereof while others display flexibility and accommodation in dealing with brands when problems arise (Fournier 2009). In accord, we posit that anthropomorphized brands aim/intend to satisfy consumers’ internal needs and/or cooperate with consumers. In particular, we further argue that a partner brand intends to cooperate with consumers as well as satisfy their internal needs, while a servant brand’s intentions are geared more towards satisfying consumers’ internal needs (Aaker et al. 2004; Braun and Zaltman 2000; Aggarwal and McGill 2012).

Self-construal literature offers insight on how consumers with different self-construal values differ in their brand intentions. Self-construal has been viewed as the extent to which an individual perceives himself or herself as autonomous and independent of others or as embodied within a broader social network comprising of connection with others (Markus and Kitayama 1991). These different self-construals are labeled independent and interdependent respectively. Cooperating with others is an expression of and enhancing the interdependent self, as doing so is conducive to achieving the goal of fitting in. In contrast, expressing one’s inner attributes and focusing on one’s needs is conforming with the independent self, as doing so enables individuals to feel unique and autonomous (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Consequently, we predict that interdependents will prefer brands that exhibit a cooperation intention and independents will prefer brands that intend to satisfy consumers’ internal needs. Since partner brands exhibit both intentions and servant brands intend to satisfy consumers’ internal needs, we expect that consumers with an interdependent self-construal will express greater purchase intention for a partner than for a servant brand, while independent consumers’ purchase intention will be similar for the two.

Study 1 which tested this prediction was 2 (brand anthropomorphism: servant vs. partner) x 2 (self-construal: independent vs. interdependent). 104 undergraduate participants (49 women, M龄 = 21) from a US public university were randomly assigned them to one of two anthropomorphism conditions. In the
servant (vs. partner) condition, participants read that the HTC T5 brand (i.e. a fictitious brand under HTC) works for (vs. with) them and helps them perform many tasks (e.g. navigate the road; adapted from Aggarwal and McGill 2012). Purchase intention, the key dependent variable, was elicited using 3 items (“I would like to buy HTC T5,” “I would like to recommend HTC T5 to other people,” “I would like to switch to HTC T5 from other smartphones”; α =.88). Covariates and control variables included affect. Self-construal was measured using the scale developed by Singelis (1994) towards the end of the questionnaire. We found a significant two-way interaction between anthropomorphized social role and self-construal (β = .55, t = 2.11, p < .05). Consumers with an interdependent self-construal (one standard deviation above the mean) were more likely to purchase the brand when the brand was described as a partner than when it was described as a servant (M_partner = 3.87 vs. M_servant = 3.21; t = 2.06, p < .05); independents (one standard deviation below the mean) were indifferent between a partner and a servant brand (M_partner = 3.34 vs. M_servant = 3.68; t = −1.03, p > .30).

We also investigate a boundary condition of the above effect. Self-brand connection refers to the extent to which individuals have incorporated a brand into their self-concept (Escalas 2003). Aaker et al. (2004) have documented that partner quality is associated with high self-connection. Thus, we theorize that when consumers strongly identify with a brand (i.e., their self-brand connection is high), the consumer-brand relationship resembles a partnership, regardless of the brand’s perceived intention. Under such circumstances, independents and interdependents will not display differential preferences toward a brand. Specifically, we hypothesize that the two-way interaction between self-construal and type of brand anthropomorphism observed in study 1 will be restricted to settings involving low, and not high, self-brand connection.

Study 2 tested this prediction and was a 2 (brand anthropomorphism: partner vs. servant) x 2 (self-construal: independent vs. interdependent) x 2 (self-brand connection: low vs. high) design. 142 participants recruited from an online panel (68 women, M_age = 34) were randomly assigned to an independent or interdependent self-construal condition (Trafimow et al. 1991), and one of two manipulations of anthropomorphized brand roles (partner vs. servant) based on participants’ a) listing a laptop brand that is like their partner (vs. servant), and b) explaining the partnership (vs. service; adapted from Aggarwal and McGill 2012). Subsequently, respondents indicated their purchase intention as earlier (α =.80), responded to control and confounding measures, and finally to the self-brand connection items (Escalas and Bettman 2005). We found a three-way interaction between self-construal, anthropomorphized brand roles, and self-brand connection (β = −.64, t = −2.93, p < .01). Contrast analysis revealed that among consumers with a low self-brand connection, those with an interdependent self-construal were more likely to purchase the partner than the servant brand (M_partner = 5.80 vs. M_servant = 4.60; t = 4.20, p < .001), while those with an independent self-construal were equally likely to purchase the partner and the partner brand (M_partner = 5.25 vs. M_servant = 5.68; t = −1.48, p > .13); consumers with a high self-brand connection were equally likely to purchase the partner and the servant brands, regardless of self-construal (p > .3).

When Temptations Come Alive: How Anthropomorphization Undermines Consumer Self-Control

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Anthropomorphism is defined as imbuing the behavior of nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007). A major conclusion from the extant research on anthropomorphism is that anthropomorphizing non-human agents leads to more favorable attitudes toward those agents (Epley et al. 2008; Gong 2008). Moreover, previous consumer research has shown positive effects of anthropomorphism in consumer contexts (Delbaere, McQuarrie, and Phillips 2011); for example, consumers are less willing to replace a product when they think about it in anthropomorphic terms (Chandler and Schwarz 2010).

However, what if an anthropomorphized product is one’s temptation? None of the prior research has specifically looked at consumer self-control settings, that is, situations in which the anthropomorphized object may be both desirable and at the same time detrimental with regard to consumers’ self-control goals. For instance, how would dieters respond to anthropomorphized high-caloric cookies that hurt their long-term weight-loss goals?

We propose that anthropomorphization of temptation products hampers consumer self-control by decreasing identification of a self-control conflict. According to a number of formulations (Myrseth and Fishbach 2009; Hofmann et al. 2012), successful self-control rests on the concerted interplay of at least two internal processes: the detection of conflict and the recruitment of control to adjust thought, emotion, or behavior in accordance with one’s higher order goals. Consequently, there are two main reasons for self-control failure: a failure to detect motivational conflict in the first place; and, once conflict is detected, a failure to muster up enough control resources to resolve such motivational conflict. The focus of this work is on the primary problem of conflict identification, and we predict that anthropomorphizing temptation decreases the likelihood of conflict identification. Anthropomorphized temptation could be seen as having intentions to tempt people and as having more control over people’s decisions (Waytz et al. 2010). When faced with an anthropomorphized temptation, people may therefore undergo a certain shift in their attributional focus away from an internal attribution of responsibility towards an external attribution on the tempting product itself. As a consequence of losing an internal focus, people may become less likely to detect a self-control conflict and, consequently, less likely to engage in consumer self-control.

Four studies tested our predictions with diverse anthropomorphism manipulations and goal-contexts. Study 1 employed a 2 (temptation product: anthropomorphized (AM) versus control) between-subject design. Participants evaluated high-caloric cookies (tempting product) that were either in a humanlike shape (AM) or in a round shape (control) and reported the extent to which they identify self-control conflicts in consuming the cookies. As predicted, participants in the AM condition felt less conflicted toward eating cookies than those in the control condition.

Study 2 was designed to examine the effect of anthropomorphizing a tempting product on conflict identification and subsequent self-control behavior. The study employed a 2 (temptation product: AM versus control) between-subject design and we used a similar manipulation of anthropomorphism to Study 1. Participants were presented with photographs of the cookie products that were either anthropomorphized or not, and rated how conflicted they were about consuming the products. Upon completion of the
study, participants were offered to take candies (small chocolate bars) as many as they wanted, serving as a measure of self-control. As predicted, participants in the AM condition felt less conflicted toward consuming the products, and took more candies than those in the control condition.

As our theory assumes that the conflict people experience toward consuming the product is part of the self-control process, we predicted that anthropomorphism would not disrupt conflict identification if people do not hold a higher-order goal that conflicts with a target product. In Study 3, therefore, we manipulated the salience of a higher-order goal, and tested whether this goal salience moderates our effects. We employed a 2 (goal prime: focal versus control) × 2 (temptation product: AM versus control) between-subject design. To gain more confidence in our effects, we also moved to a different goal context (academic goals for college students) and employed a different manipulation of anthropomorphism by naming the product and having it talk like a person. Participants were primed with either a focal (academic) or a control goal (health/diet). They then evaluated a temptation product (TV gadget) that was either anthropomorphized or not, and reported self-control conflicts and willingness to pay for the product. As predicted, when participants were primed with the focal goal, those in the AM condition identified less conflict and were willing to pay more for the product than those in the control condition. In contrast, when participants were primed with the control, unrelated goal, anthropomorphizing the product did not yield any effect on self-control conflicts or willingness to pay.

Study 4 tested the underlying mechanism of our effects: people make less internal attribution of their own possible behavior as they shift responsibility to the temptation agent. In addition, we accessed participants’ chronic dietary goal strength and tested whether individual differences in goal strength would moderate the effect. Thus, the study employed a 2 (temptation product: AM versus control) between-subject design, with one self-report variable (dieting goal strength). Participants reported self-control conflicts and degrees of internal attribution toward consuming the cookie product, which was either anthropomorphized or not. Lastly, they reported how often they were on a diet. As predicted, we found a two-way interaction on both conflict and internal attribution: the stronger participants’ dietary goals were, the less conflict they felt toward consuming the cookie, and the less internal attribution they made about their possible consumption, when the cookie was anthropomorphized versus not. The decrease in internal attribution also mediated the effect of anthropomorphism on conflict identification.

Taken together, four studies demonstrate that anthropomorphizing a tempting product decreases the likelihood of identifying the product as temptation, which conflicts with a goal that offers long-run benefits. Then, the decrease in conflict identification leads to more indulgence in temptations and greater willingness to purchase the product. So, what happens when your temptations come alive? It could significantly harm your self-control.

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SESSION OVERVIEW

This session presents new research examining how people use and respond to word-of-mouth (WOM) in order to achieve their social goals. With the rise of written, online recommendations that function as word-of-mouth, we have the opportunity as a field to analyze massive amounts of word-of-mouth data. The data present exciting possibilities for new discoveries, but without a theoretical framework or understanding of the goals that motivate people to produce WOM and those that influence their responses to it, we are more likely to be overwhelmed than enlightened by such data. This session presents four papers, each of which looks at how people produce and respond to word-of-mouth to achieve their social goals.

The first paper, by Dr. Jonah Berger, presents a new goal directed theoretical framework for understanding WOM, and the three other papers each examine a different goal that can be achieved by either the speaker or listener in a conversation about a particular product or experience. By first presenting a theoretical framework in the same session as three empirical papers, we are able to immediately address some of the questions and gaps in the literature that the framework raises. In particular, Berger finds that there is a relative lack of research on the causes of WOM and why people talk about certain things rather than others.

Two of the three other papers examine the social goals of the speaker and the third examines the social goals of the receiver. Kumar and Gilovich and Betteman, and Luce explicitly examine new motives for engaging in particular types of word-of-mouth behavior. Kumar and Gilovich find that talking about experiences fulfills the speaker’s goal for happiness better than does talking about products, and so people talk about experiences more frequently than they talk about products. Wiener, Betteman, and Luce examine conversation pieces, or products that produce questions and interest from others, and find that people use unique, identity relevant and publically displayed products to encourage conversations that enable them to learn about their conversational partners, perhaps ultimately enabling them to find like-minded friends or partners. Presented together these papers suggest that conversation pieces blur the line between product and experience and suggest that a social goals approach has much to tell us about this distinction.

Of course not only do speakers have social goals, but recipients of word-of-mouth have social goals as well. Alexander and Moore examine how listeners may interpret word-of-mouth as social pressure and how word-of-mouth may activate their goal to appear competent to others. This goal may negatively influences how they interact with a product and undermine new product usage.

Together these four papers suggest that the production of and responses to word-of-mouth are quite strategic in pursuit of their social objectives. Given the apparently utility of word-of-mouth for achieving social goals, is it possible that the desire to produce or have a good response to another’s word-of-mouth may actually drive consumption behavior so that a consumer might have the “right” thing to say.

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

There is currently huge popular interest in word-of-mouth and social media more broadly (e.g., Facebook and Twitter). But while quantitative research has demonstrated the causal impact of word-of-mouth on diffusion and sales, less is known about what drives word-of-mouth and why people talk about certain things rather than others.

Why do certain products get more word-of-mouth? Why do certain rumors spread faster than others? And why does certain online content go viral? Further, how does the audience people are communicating with, as well as the channel they are communicating through, impact what gets shared?

This talk addresses these, and related questions, as it integrates various research perspectives to shed light on the behavioral drivers of word-of-mouth. It provides an integrative framework to organize research on the causes and consequences of word-of-mouth and outlines additional questions that deserve further study.

In particular, I argue that interpersonal communication is goal driven and serves five key functions. These include:

1. Self-Presentation
2. Emotion Regulation
3. Information Acquisition
4. Social Bonding
5. Persuading Others

Self-presentation refers to the fact that people often share word of mouth to shape how others see them. This occurs through sharing self-enhancing things, things that signal desired identities, or even engaging in small talk to avoid sitting there in silence. Emotion regulation refers to the fact that people often share word of mouth to help manage or regulate their emotions. This includes venting, seeking social support, reducing dissonance, facilitating sense making, or encouraging rehearsal. Another important function of word of mouth is information acquisition. Talking and sharing to seek advice or figure out how to resolve problems. Word of mouth also serves a social bonding function, allowing people to connect or bond with others. Sharing can reduce feelings of loneliness and reinforce shared view. Finally, people use word of mouth to persuade others to their point of view.

It is worth noting that these goals are predominantly self-serving in nature. While communication almost always involves a recipient, I will argue that word of mouth is mostly self-serving rather other-serving. Though people certainly tune their message to their audience, and some acts of transmission can be interpreted as altru-
ism, these same behaviors can also be explained by self-serving motives (e.g., self-presentation or social bonding).

Finally, I will discuss how contextual factors, such as who people are talking to and what channel they are talking across, moderate these various motives. Talking to weak rather than strong ties, for example, should lead self-presentation motives to have a greater impact on transmission. But it is not only audience type that matters. Audience size may also play a role. Talking to larger audiences boosts self-presentation by encouraging people to focus on the self, while talking to smaller audiences may encourage sharing useful information by encouraging people to focus on others. Different channels should also play a role. Compared to oral communication (e.g., face-to-face discussion), for example, written communication (e.g., email or text) provides more time to construct and refine communication, and, as a result, leads self-presentation motives to play a greater role in transmission.

In sum, what we know about word of mouth is clearly dwarfed by what we don’t know. That said, this talk will attempt to review what we do know, provide a framework to organize this existing research, and outline potential directions for future work in the area.

**Talking About What You Did and What You Have: The Differential Story Utility of Experiential and Material Purchases**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Imagine you just returned from a week in the Caribbean or sampling the restaurants in New York City. How likely would you be to tell others about your trip? Would the telling enhance your experience? Now imagine you spent a similar sum of money on a home theater or some new living room furniture you’ve been eyeing. How likely would you be to tell others about these purchases, and would the telling increase how much enjoyment you get from them?

The research presented in this paper investigates one explanation for the fact that experiential purchases bring us more happiness than material purchases (Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003): consumers talk more about their experiences than their possessions and derive more value from doing so. Such conversations facilitate the re-living of the experience in question, they encourage embellishment, and they foster social connection—all of which serve to enhance enjoyment of the original event. Seven studies demonstrate that people are more inclined to talk about their experiences than their material purchases and they derive more happiness from doing so; that talking away the ability to talk about experiences (but not material goods) would diminish the enjoyment they bring; and that being given the opportunity to talk about experiences (but not material goods) increases the satisfaction they bring.

In Study 1a, we examined whether consumers tend to talk more about experiential purchases than material purchases. Ninety-six participants were given a definition of either experiential or material purchases, and then asked to list their most significant purchase over the past five years in the category in question. Participants indicated that they had talked more about experiential purchases, $F(1, 94) = 12.54, p < 0.0001$, and also indicated that they would be more likely to talk about experiential purchases in a hypothetical situation in which they had to make small talk, $F(1, 94) = 15.46, p < 0.0001$. In Study 1b, we explored whether this difference could explain differences in purchase satisfaction. Accordingly, 102 participants answered the same questions as those in Study 1a, and also indicated how much happiness they derived from their purchase. After replicating our finding from Experiment 1a, $t(100) = 2.78, p < 0.01$, and replicating the satisfaction findings from Van Boven & Gilovich (2003), $t(100) = 1.99, p = 0.05$, purchase satisfaction was regressed onto purchase condition and the talking composite. We found a significant meditational relationship, Sobel $Z = 2.42, p < 0.02$, suggesting that experiential purchases make consumers happier than material purchases, but this difference can be explained by the fact that experiential purchases are more likely to be talked about.

In Studies 2a and 2b, we looked into whether talking about experiential purchases boosts the teller’s happiness more than talking about material purchases. One hundred four participants in Study 2a were given a list of material and experiential purchases and asked what portion of the happiness derived from each purchase came from being able to talk about it. Participants reported that talking was a more important element of the enjoyment of experiential purchases, matched pairs $t(103) = 4.80, p < 0.001$. Experiment 2b was a close replication of 2a, but instead of asking about the percentage of happiness that came from talking about each purchase, 109 participants rated on a Likert scale how much talking about the purchase added to their overall enjoyment. As predicted, participants reported that talking about purchases with others added more to their enjoyment of experiential purchases than material purchases, matched pairs $t(108) = 6.18, p < 0.0001$.

One way to gauge the importance consumers attach to talking about their purchases is to examine what happens when they don’t have the opportunity to do so. That is, how much would not being able to talk about a purchase diminish the enjoyment of it, and is this amount different for experiential and material purchases? In Studies 3a and 3b, we hypothesized that consumers would be willing to accept a lesser experience rather than have a more enjoyable experience they couldn’t talk about—but that they would be disinclined to accept such a trade-off when it comes to material goods. In Study 3a, 98 participants provided the two purchases they would most want to make within the categories of beach vacations (experiential) or electronic goods (material) and were then presented with a hypothetical choice dilemma: they could either have their first choice, but without being allowed to talk about it, or they could have their second choice and be free to tell others about their purchase. Participants were more likely to report wanting to switch to a lesser alternative that they could talk about in the experiential condition than in the material condition, $\chi^2 (1, N=98) = 19.96, p < 0.001$. In Study 3b, we replicated this result, but instead of being restricted to the categories of vacation destinations and gadgets, 98 participants made judgments about purchases from their own lives, $\chi^2 (1, N=98) = 3.86, p < 0.05$. Consumers seem willing to take a hedonic hit on the purchase itself in order to be able to enjoy talking about experiences, something they are less willing to do for material purchases.

In Study 4, we tested whether having participants talk about their experiential purchases would increase their remembered enjoyment of the purchases in question—but that talking about a material purchase would not have a similar benefit. We asked 204 participants to recall the most recent vacation they had taken or the most recent item of clothing or jewelry they had purchased. They spent five minutes simply thinking about their purchase, or five minutes talking to another participant about it. When then asked to rate how much they liked their purchase, we found a significant purchase type x type of activity interaction, $F(1, 97) = 5.37, p < 0.03$, that indicated that participants given an opportunity to talk about their vacations reported higher levels of enjoyment than those who simply thought about them, while no such beneficial effect of storytelling was present for material purchases.
Conversation Pieces

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

People need people: they need people to talk to just for a moment—on a coffee break at work or at a party—and they need friends, people with whom they connect with more deeply (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). People invest time and effort in trying to create these short and long term relationships, but previous research has not examined how they may strategically enlist products to help them to create new social connections. This paper attempts to examine this behavior through examining conversation pieces, or products that produce questions and interest from others, literally ones that start conversations.

Previous research has found indirect ways that products can be used to achieve social goals. For example, excluded individuals may substitute products for people (Mead, et al., 2011) or use products to signal social status (Holt, 1998) or identity (Berger and Heath, 2007) to others. However, these articles have only looked at people using products for one-way communication rather than how products may facilitate interaction with another person. Given that conversation is a key way that people connect with each other, to study relationship development it is necessary to examine people talking about products, not just displaying them.

The word-of-mouth literature studies these conversations but focuses on their consequences for product liking or adoption rather than for social relationships. What research there is on the social motives for word-of-mouth suggests that it may not be motivated by social goals, but merely by what is accessible in the speaker’s environment (Berger and Schwartz, 2011). Other research has suggested that they talk positively about products to self-enhance, to help others, or to create feelings of excitement (Sundaram, Mitra, and Webster, 1998). These goals may be rooted in a desire to have positive social interactions with people, but the ability of word-of-mouth to directly build relationships has not been studied. In this paper we examine how people use conversation pieces to create conversations and thus to facilitate the development of relationships.

Given the lack of previous research on conversation pieces, study 1 examines their basic characteristics and the characteristics of the people who frequently use them. In this study, participants were asked to describe a wearable conversation piece that they had and to rate it on a variety of different characteristics. This study and the subsequent ones asked about wearable conversation pieces (as opposed to furniture or art at a person’s home) because the user has a choice of when to and when not to display the item, enabling us to understand the user’s display motives.

In this study several common characteristics of conversation pieces emerged. Qualitative analysis revealed that conversation pieces tended to be souvenirs (a shirt from Cambodia), items related to media (a Super Mario leather jacket), or simply “interesting” pieces of clothing (a necklace mad out of zippers). Almost all of the conversation pieces described were considered by their owners to be noticeable, unusual, identity relevant, and well liked. Since conversation pieces only inspire conversation if others notice them and think that they are worth commenting on, it is not surprising that they are noticeable and unusual.

Study 1 also examined the personality characteristics of people who frequently use conversation pieces. We find that conversation piece usage was relatively across all participants, but people who are higher in extroversion, possession-self connection, and need for uniqueness were more likely to use conversation pieces than those lower in these characteristics. Despite the fact that almost all of the conversation pieces described were clothing, jewelry or accessories, there were no differences in conversation piece usage between men and women.

In study 2A we investigated the motives behind displaying a conversation piece. In this study, participants answered open-ended questions about why they wore their conversation pieces. Participants identified both long and short term goals that they felt their conversation pieces helped them to achieve. Some conversation pieces make the wearer an easier target for another person to approach and initiate a conversation with—“I like your dress” is a very easy conversation starter. This enables the wearer to achieve a short term goal of not being ignored at a party.

Other participants described using their conversation pieces to achieve longer term goals, such as identifying which people they meet might be good friends. As found in study 1, conversation pieces frequently are identity-relevant and communicate a person’s interests or values. Therefore wearers can use them to identify which other people share or approve of those interests and thus might be potential friends. Approximately one third of participants reported using their conversation pieces as a mechanism for deciding which individuals they were interested in getting to know better. This is exemplified by a quote from a 27 year old male who wears a Ninja Turtles t-shirt and says, “If someone says that a Ninja Turtle shirt is childish or stupid or lame I know that they don’t have the same kind of sense of humor I do and we likely won’t get along.”

Study 2B followed up on the social motives behind conversation piece usage using an experimental design. Participants were first asked to think of a conversation piece they had and then were randomly assigned to have a goal to get to know new people or with a goal to talk to their friends. People were significantly more likely to wear their conversation piece when they had a relationship initiation goal than when they did not, suggesting that people may use conversation pieces to help them to cultivate relationships with new people. This study provides evidence that part of the function of conversation pieces is to create new social connections, and that when this motive is not active they are less useful and less likely to be worn. In sum, in three studies we find evidence that people use products, specifically conversation pieces, to help them achieve both short and long term goals relevant to social connections.

You Gotta Try It! The Negative Side of Positive Word of Mouth

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Word of mouth (WOM) is a fundamental process in the marketplace (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Positive WOM can increase consumer attitudes (Bone 1995), switching behavior (Wangenheim and Bayon 2004), and trial and adoption of products (Arndt 1967); negative WOM does the opposite, with attendant consequences for firms (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). However, recent work has demonstrated that sharing positive WOM can have unintended negative consequences for the storyteller (Moore 2012). Building on this work, we examine the potential downside of positive WOM (PWOM) from the perspective of the receiver.

We ask whether receiving PWOM can ever be “bad” for consumers, and examine when and why this might be the case. We focus on the context of new products, where WOM is a key driver of diffusion (Arndt 1967; Mahajan, Muller, and Bass 1990), and where consumers might be particularly susceptible to the negative consequences of positive recommendations, given the risk and uncertainty surrounding new products (Taylor 1974; Herzenstein, Posavac, and Brokus 2007; Hirunyawipada and Paswan 2006).
Prior research shows that PWOM can elicit positive emotion by providing useful information and reducing risk (Arndt, 1967; Moldovan, Goldenberg, & Chattopadhyay, 2011; Murray, 1991; Söderlund & Rosengren, 2007). We make the novel prediction that PWOM might also be perceived as social pressure to use the adopted product competently and successfully, or else risk negative judgments from the recommender (Berger & Heath, 2008; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Schultz et al., 2007). Imagine a consumer who hears that the latest smartphone is the best yet. While this information should elicit positive emotion, we ask whether PWOM might also create social pressure for the consumer to have as positive an experience with the phone as the recommender. This PWOM-induced social pressure might elicit negative emotion such as worry or anxiety (Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002), with potential consequences for the consumer’s intentions toward the recommended product (Alexander, 2013; Wood & Moreau, 2006).

We explore when PWOM might elicit both positive and negative emotions in adopters and investigate the consequences of these emotions for usage intentions. Since prior work suggests that PWOM should consistently elicit positive emotion, we focus on identifying conditions under which PWOM also elicits negative emotion. To do so, we examine four moderating variables that should increase the social pressure exerted by PWOM and thereby elicit negative emotion in adopters.

Across three studies, we examine 1) volume of PWOM received (study 1); 2) type of PWOM: whether PWOM is liking-based or performance-based (studies 2 and 3); 3) social distance: whether the recommender is close to or distant from the receiver (study 2); 4) product difficulty: whether the product is easy- or difficult-to-use (study 3). We predict that when these moderators exert social pressure to competently use a new product—when volume is high, PWOM is performance-based, the recommender is close, and products are difficult-to-use—adopters receiving PWOM will feel negative as well as positive emotion.

In study 1, we examined how PWOM influenced emotions in a sample of real consumers (N = 299) adopting one of 21 new technological products. We surveyed consumers within one week of acquiring the new product and measured their receipt of PWOM and their positive and negative emotions. We found that the more PWOM consumers received about the product they adopted, the more positive and the more negative emotions they felt about this newly acquired product. However, study 1 is correlational, and consumers do not always receive WOM in such quantities. Thus, our next two studies use a controlled lab setting to explore additional moderators that might elicit negative emotion in single episodes of PWOM.

In study 2, we examined how social pressure affects negative emotion after receiving PWOM from a single consumer. We held product difficulty constant and manipulated type of PWOM and social distance. Undergraduates imagining receiving liking-based (participants were told their friends were “addicted” to the product) or performance-based PWOM (participants were told their friends were “masters” at using the product) from a close or distant other (a friend or an exchange student). To ensure that our results were due to the social pressure exerted by PWOM, rather than to receipt of new information, we also manipulated whether participants adopted the app because of the PWOM or on their own initiative. This resulted in a 2 (type of PWOM: liking or performance) by 2 (social distance: close or distant) by 2 (adoption influence: own or other) design. We predicted that only in the other-adoption condition would performance-based PWOM from close others exert social pressure and therefore elicit negative. As expected, there were no significant effects on negative emotion in the own-adoption or in the liking-based PWOM conditions. However, as predicted, in the other-adoption conditions, participants who received performance-based PWOM felt more negative emotion when this recommendation came from a close compared to a distant other.

In study 3, undergraduate participants were informed that their school was adopting video editing software for use in class projects, and that the software was generally regarded as either easy- or difficult-to-use. They then imagined receiving PWOM from a close friend, who said the software was “incredibly cool”, and that they were either either addicted to (liking-based PWOM) or masters at using it (performance-based PWOM). Thus, study 3 was a 2 (type of PWOM: liking or performance) by 2 (difficulty: easy or difficult) between-subjects design. We predicted that negative emotion would be elicited only when performance-based WOM was received about a difficult-to-use product. Consistent with this prediction, positive and negative emotions were simultaneously elicited only in the difficult-to-use conditions when participants received a performance-based WOM recommendation; type of PWOM did not influence emotions in the easy-to-use conditions. In this study, we also measured usage intentions. We found that positive emotion increased, while negative emotion decreased, usage intentions. We also found that negative emotion mediated the relationship between our social pressure variables (type of PWOM and difficulty) and usage intentions.

In sum, in one field survey and two lab studies, we find evidence of a downside of PWOM: PWOM can elicit negative as well as positive emotions in new product adopters, and negative emotions undermine adopters’ usage intentions.

REFERENCES


Look Who’s Talking: Linguistic Signaling in C2C and B2C Communication
Chairs: Gaby Schellekens, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Ann Kronrod, Michigan State University, USA

Peeter W.J. Verlegh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Camiel Beukeboom, Vrije University Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Christian Burgers, Vrije University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Paper #2: Wii Will Rock You! The Role of Figurative Language in Word of Mouth.
Ann Kronrod, Michigan State University, USA
Shai Danziger, Tel-Aviv University, Israel

Gaby Schellekens, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Peeter W.J. Verlegh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Ale Smidts, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Grant Packard, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Sarah G. Moore, University of Alberta, Canada
Brent McFerran, University of Michigan, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers and firms communicate their intentions through a variety of language uses. Instances of such language uses may be pronoun use (‘I/we will consider your complaint’), negation (‘It wasn’t expensive’), figurative language (‘It’s the Ferrari of vacuum cleaners’), or language abstraction (‘That perfume smells fresh/is nice’). Recently emerging work on linguistic behavior in marketing (Kronrod, Grinstein and Wathieu 2012a, 2012b; Moore 2012; Patrick and Hagvedt, 2010; Schellekens, Verlegh and Smidts 2010) has directed a spotlight to questions of language use and its effect in marketing communication.

The current session is, figuratively speaking, a ray of this spotlight. In this session we intend to make a difference, bringing a new breeze of research to the attention of our research community. We will present works, all of which investigate phenomena in marketing linguistics, hoping the session will stimulate wide discussion of consumers’ and firms’ talk and what effects it has. The papers in this session are all closely tied around language use of consumers and firms. All four deal with the question: how do variations in language use affect consumers?

Verlegh and Beukeboom investigate the effect of negation in WOM and find that consumers use negation (e.g. ‘it didn’t take long’) when they describe experiences inconsistent with their expectations; receivers of negation interpret this as a signal of unexpected product performance. Kronrod and Danziger examine the use of figurative language in communication originating from users (WOM) or firms (ads) and show how the source (WOM or ads) moderates the effect of figurative language on product evaluations and choice, for hedonic and utilitarian options. Schellekens, Verlegh and Smidts also compare WOM to firm communication and demonstrate that the use of abstract (vs. concrete) language in product referrals from sales agents activates more persuasion knowledge than when it comes from other consumers. Finally, Packard, Moore and McFerran find that when firm service agents use “I” rather than “you” or “we” in responding to customer inquiries and complaints, customer purchases increase up to one year after the interaction, due to elevated perceptions of the employee’s agency and empathy.

Together, the works in this session represent the growing interest in linguistic behavior of firms and consumers. The issues investigated in each of the papers have clear implications for consumers and marketers, as language is a natural component of almost any communication in marketing. Although these papers are tightly connected in their focus on language use in marketplace communication, they display variety of approaches and topics that will stimulate additional research into the role of language in marketing and consumer behavior. The combination of novel concept and a strongly increasing interest in linguistic issues in consumer behavior should warrant a wide interest for this session at ACR 2013.

A Negation Bias in Word of Mouth: How Negations Reveal and Maintain Expectancies about Brands and Products

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers like to talk about their product experiences with others. This word of mouth (WOM) can have a strong impact on product evaluations and sales (e.g., Chevalier & Mayzlin 2006), both practitioners and academics have great interest in understanding its effects and underlying mechanisms. Although research on WOM has a long history, dating back to the seminal work of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), academics have only recently begun to examine language use (Moore 2012; Schellekens, Verlegh & Smidts, 2010). Findings suggest that consumers implicitly reveal much information “in between the lines” of their WOM messages. Such formulation differences may for instance reveal speakers’ a priori brand expectations when they describe a product experience. Of particular interest is the use of negations. The Negation Bias (Beukeboom, Finkenauer & Wigboldus, 2010) demonstrates that negations usage (e.g., not stupid, rather than smart) is more pronounced when (stereotypic) expectancies are violated, compared to when expectancies are confirmed For instance, garbage men performing poorly on IQ-tests is stereotypically expected and likely described as “stupid”, for professors this would be unexpected and described as “not smart”. Importantly, negations lead message recipients to infer that the described experience was an exception, caused by situational circumstances (Beukeboom et al., 2010).

In two experiments, we examined the existence of a negation bias in WOM. We expect that negations are used more often in descriptions of expectancy inconsistent than consistent product experiences. We also expect that receivers can “decode” these implicit communications: a speaker’s use of negations leads the receiver to infer that the described experience is an exception to the rule. The use of negations in inconsistent situations will dampen the impact of WOM on receivers, serving to maintain a brand’s positive or negative reputation, even in the face of WOM disconfirming that reputation.
Experiment 1 examined whether people are more likely to use negations when they describe product experiences that are inconsistent (versus consistent) with their a priori brand expectations. Participants were presented with WOM vignettes that varied according to a mixed 2 (positive/negative brand expectation) x 2 (positive/negative experience) x 5 (vignettes) design. To manipulate expectations, we used pretested brands scoring either high or low on a focal attribute. For example, a customer received slow (versus fast) service in a Hilton (versus Ibis) Hotel. We created five vignettes for each condition. Each participant saw all five different vignettes within one condition. This was analyzed as a within-subjects factor.

Following Beukeboom et al. (2010), participants rated how well each experience was described by a negation or an affirmation (e.g., “the service was not fast/ slow”). After rating all five experiences, they were again presented on a separate page, and participants rated the expectedness of each experience.

A mixed model ANOVA revealed the predicted expectation x valence interaction, for both dependent variables (F(1,115)> 9; p < .01): for positive experiences, negations were rated more applicable when participants held low (versus high) expectations, and for negative experiences, negations were rated less applicable when participants held low expectations. Effects were mediated (Hayes, 2012) by perceived expectedness: the less expected an experience, the more applicable participants rated the negations, and the less applicable they rated affirmations.

Experiment 2 examined whether a speaker’s use of negations indeed leads receivers to infer that the experience was unexpected. Participants (N=123) read a scenario in which a friend commented on a purchase. This comment was varied in a 2 (valence: positive/negative) x 2 (description: negation/affirmation) design. Participants then participated in a survey. We measured participants’ inferences about (1) the expectedness of the experience, (2) the speaker’s surprise with the experience, (3) the speaker’s expectations before the experience, and (4) speaker evaluation of the experience.

As predicted, participants inferred that the experience was less expected and more surprising when the speaker used negations versus affirmations (both F(1,119)> 4; p < .05). Interactions with valence were non-significant. For inferences about the speaker’s a priori expectations we do predict an interaction: negations in descriptions of negative experiences (“not fast”) signal a positive a priori expectation, but the opposite is true for positive experiences (“not slow”). Indeed, we found a (marginally) significant interaction (F(1,119)=3.55, p = .06): the effect was significant (p < .05) for negative experiences, and directionally consistent for positive experiences.

Importantly, we found no significant effects of negations on inferences about the speaker’s evaluations. After all, negations do not communicate whether an experience was positive or negative. They do, however, communicate whether it was (un)expected, and whether it confirmed the speaker’s expectations. In this manner, negations provide a subtle mechanism for communicating and maintaining brand reputations.

Wii Will Rock You! The Role of Figurative Language in Word of Mouth

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Research in advertising has studied the persuasive effect of figurative language. Figurative language is the use of words and expressions to convey an additional connotation beyond that of their lexical meaning (Fogelin 1988). Instances of figurative language may be, among others, metaphor (The Ferrari of vacuum cleaners), word play (Don’t leave without a good buy), idiomatic expressions (My car’s a lemon), hyperbole (the service person was a cell phone professor) or imitating sounds (This teacher is wrrrruff, meaning a tough teacher, orouch!, meaning I was offended).

The common finding and general conviction is that figurative language evokes positive affect and attitudes across contexts (McQuarrie and Mick 1999, 2003; McQuarrie and Phillips 2005; Phillips and McQuarrie 2009). In contrast, we suggest that figurative language in user generated content is effective only in certain contexts. We propose that this context sensitivity results from a difference in the conversational norms regarding advertising and consumer generated content. For example, consumers often perceive ads to be biased, persuasive attempts (Sweldens, Van Osselaer, and Janiszewski, 2010). By contrast, user-generated content is generally perceived as an objective sharing of opinions (Moore 2012; Schellekens, Verlegh, and Smidts 2010; Sen and Lerman 2007). Thus, conversational norms regarding persuasive text may include expectations for linguistic tactics and artful word play. Conversely, the norms of using figures of speech in user generated content may not be governed by a general expectation of the text to be persuasive, but rather of it to reflect a sincere opinion.

Because of these differences we suggest consumers have a different set of conversational norms and expectations regarding advertising and user generated content. Namely, it is typical for, and expected of, advertising communication to be exaggerated and emotionally intensified. Therefore, figurative language is generally normative for advertising (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Rolfst and Torzoll 1980; Simonson and Holbrook 1993; Toncar and Fetscherin 2012; Xu and Wyer 2010). But user generated content is a form of natural language in interpersonal communication. Therefore language perception and language choice may be governed by considerations that differ from those in advertising, particularly in their crucial dependence on the context of conversation (Grice 1975; Schwarz 1996; Sterber and Wilson 1995).

We base our reasoning on psycholinguistic literature that demonstrates a positive link between emotional intensity and use of figurative language (Bryant and Gibbs 2002; Caillles and Butcher 2007; Fussell and Moss 1998; Zemanova 2007). We then suggest hedonic and utilitarian consumption as contexts commonly associated with emotional and rational attitudes, respectively (e.g. Alba and Williams 2013; Chaudhuri and Ligas 2000; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). Building on these literatures, we propose figurative language is more conversationally normative, and therefore more effective, in hedonic consumption than in utilitarian consumption. Following the reasoning whereby communication norms govern not only perception, but also language choice, we then test and find support for the prediction that consumers also use figurative language more in descriptions of hedonic consumption rather than utilitarian consumption.

In our studies we focus on the conditions that invoke the use of figurative language in consumption context and the conditions that increase the effectiveness of figurative language in WOM. In study 1 we contrast the effectiveness of figurative language in ads versus in WOM. Participants read a description of a hotel for either a business or a vacation purpose, which was presented as if taken from an ad or from a consumer review. The description was either figurative (e.g. The service is like on a king’s reception) or literal (e.g. The service is very professional). Results comparing ads to reviews suggest it is conversationally normative for figurative language to be used in advertisements for both hedonic and utilitarian product descriptions, and therefore the effectiveness of figurative language is similar for both types of product. However, figurative language is less norma-
tive, and therefore less effective, in utilitarian product descriptions provided by consumers ($F(1, 1334) = 4.2, p < .05$).

In study 2 we examined the effects of figurative language on real consequential consumer decisions. After reading figurative or literal reviews of the same store, which contained both hedonic and utilitarian products, participants were asked to choose a hedonic or utilitarian product as a reward for participation in the experiment. Participants who read reviews containing figurative language chose more hedonic products as prizes than participants who read reviews that did not contain figurative language ($t = 5.0, p < .001$).

Study 3 involves natural data analysis. We analyzed product review headlines from www.Amazon.com. We find higher frequency of figurative language in hedonic product reviews, compared with utilitarian product reviews ($F(1, 21) = 15.8, p < .05$). Our analysis also shows that in reviews of hedonic products more extreme product evaluations employ more figurative language, while in reviews of utilitarian products review extremity does not moderate use of figurative language ($F_{1, 24} = 18.4, p < .001$).

Finally, in study 4 participants use liquid soap for either a utilitarian purpose (washing a spoon) or a hedonic purpose (blowing bubbles) and compose reviews of the products. Linguistic analysis of the reviews shows higher figurativeness of reviews for the soap when used to blow bubbles ($t(1, 88) = 2.12, p < .05$).

This work contributes to consumer research by exploring an underrepresented aspect of online consumer communication – use and effects of language. This work also contributes to research of communication and psycholinguistics by being the first to investigate the effect of figurative language in natural communication. Finally, we propose a new theoretical explanation for the link between figurativeness and emotion, introducing conversational norms.

How Language Signals Persuasion: Concrete and Abstract Language in Product Referrals from Consumers and Firms

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Nowadays it’s becoming more difficult to detect if a product review or referral is made by another customer (without self-interest in advertising a product), or by someone with a commercial interest (advertisement, word-of-mouth marketing). Consider raving product reviews on Amazon.com or emails with product offerings from Facebook friends. What could be sincere word of mouth could also be a marketing scheme. One way to figure out the sincerity of the communication situation is to examine the language use in product referrals.

While psycholinguistics in marketing communication has received much attention from academics (for overview see Lowrey, 2007), language use in word of mouth only recently gained popularity (e.g., Moore 2012). Building on the linguistic category model (Semin & Fiedler 1988), Schellekens et al. (2010) have studied the use and effects of abstract versus concrete language in word of mouth. According to this model, an event can be described at different levels of abstraction. For example, the low fuel consumption of the Toyota Prius may be described as “the Prius use little gas” (concrete) or “the Prius is eco-friendly” (abstract). The use of abstract language describes the information as general and stable (“traitlike”), while concrete descriptions contain verifiable information on product functioning. Schellekens et al. (2010) showed that receivers of word of mouth are receptive to the use of abstract versus concrete language. They found that senders of positive (negative) word of mouth were perceived to be more positive (negative) about a brand if they use more abstract language, and that consumers who receive word of mouth are persuaded more when the sender uses more abstract language. The current studies extend prior research on language abstraction and examine the role of communication setting (commercial vs. non-commercial). The studies suggest that communication setting moderates the impact of language abstraction on consumers through the activation of persuasion knowledge. Persuasion knowledge refers to consumers’ assumptions and beliefs about persuasion and marketers’ motives, strategies, and tactics (Campbell & Kirmami, 2000; Friestad & Wright, 1994).

We argue that environmental cues in a communication setting can moderate the effect of language abstraction on persuasion knowledge of consumers, which in turn could affect product attitude and buying intention. More specifically, an environmental cue (e.g., advice giver has a sales motivation) could trigger consumers to be suspicious and attentive to persuasion cues. Since language can be used as a subtle mechanism to signal more information than the literal meaning of a message, suspicious consumers could scrutinize language use. Previous research showed that abstract (vs. concrete) descriptions are used more when trying to be persuasive (Schellekens, Verlegh & Smidts, 2012). Sales personnel is expected to try to convince customers to buy products and therefore might be expected to use more abstract (vs. concrete) language when describing products. Thus, positive product referrals framed abstractly (vs. concretely) from a sender with a commercial motive may be seen as more manipulative and incite more persuasion knowledge. On the contrary, without environmental cues indicating a commercial motive (i.e., word-of-mouth communication) we have no reason to expect a difference is the activated persuasion knowledge between abstract and concrete language use in referrals.

In Study 1, we manipulated the communication context (source of referral: commercial vs. non-commercial) and language abstraction of referral (concrete vs. abstract) between subject design. Participants read a scenario in which a person (‘Sandra’) was shopping in a perfumery when she heard a referral about a new perfume (‘Spring’). Half of the participants were told that this referral was given by a sales person, while the other half were told it was given by another customer. The product referral was either described concretely as ‘Spring smells fresh’ or abstractly as ‘Spring is a nice perfume’. The participants rated the goal of the communication from trying to (1) inform me about ‘Spring’ perfume to (9) persuade me into buying, and the interest of the speaker from (1) help Sandra to (9) own interest (6.66 vs. 5.94, $t(130)=6.04, p = .015$), serving his own interest (6.66 vs. 5.94, $t(130)=2.86, p = .015$), and having persuasion motives (i.e., being seen as more manipulative and pushy and less sincere and honest) (5.61 vs. 4.89, $t(130)=5.34, p = .002$). On the contrary, in line with our expectations the language abstraction of referrals from another customer has no effect on persuasion knowledge (all $t(130) < 1$).

In study 2, we focused on the intervening construct, suspiciousness, which we activated by informing all participants that some of the product referrals of the study were written with a motive to be persuasive. We thus examined whether consumers who have a reason to be suspicious about the source of a referral associate the use of abstract (vs. concrete) language with a persuasion motive. We presented participants with five different product descriptions which were either abstract or concrete. For each description they were
asked to indicate on a nine-point scale whether they thought that the referral was given by (1) a friend or (9) a company agent. The concrete description of the household appliance was for example “this appliance works good” and the abstract version was “this appliance is good”. As expected, abstract (vs. concrete) statements were more strongly linked to salespersons than to friends (5.03 vs. 4.09, F(1.46)=10.77, p<.01).

The present studies extend the prior work by Schellekens and colleagues (2010), and show that the use of abstract language does not necessarily lead to more persuasive referrals. The two studies show that the use of abstract language may trigger persuasion knowledge, especially in commercial contexts. The findings add to the growing body of knowledge on the impact of language on persuasion, and help us understand how language abstraction affects consumers differently in different contexts. They also add the use of (abstract) language to the list of factors that are known to activate persuasion knowledge, which may provide fertile ground for future research in this area.

**Putting the Customer Second: Pronouns in Customer-Firm Interactions**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Recent work has demonstrated the importance of specific word use in influencing consumer behavior. This emerging body of work has examined the impact of language use on consumer senders and receivers of word of mouth (Moore 2012; Patrick and Hagvedt, 2010; Schellekens, Verlegh and Smidts 2010) and advertising (Sela, Wheeler and Sarial-Abi 2012). Yet there is little work examining the impact of firm employee language on consumers, particularly in the context of service interactions.

Firms, however, are starting to pay attention to interaction content, particularly when it comes to training and evaluating front-line employees. For example, Apple has “stop words” that employees are prohibited from saying to customers (Chen 2011). In contrast, online retailer Zappos does not have scripts for its agents, allowing each to create a “personal emotional connection” with customers (Hsieh 2010). Despite their different philosophies on language use, both Apple and Zappos recognize the importance of measuring and managing what is said between customers and employees. In this vein, we offer an empirical examination of the behavioral consequences of language use in service interactions. While prior research on service interactions often examines how actions taken by firm agents (e.g. apologies, compensation; e.g. DeMatos et al. 2007; Rust and Chung 2006) influence customer attitudes and/or behaviors, we are unaware of research assessing how their words might affect the same outcomes.

Our conceptual focus is on pronoun use, as pronouns are an important psychological indicator (Pennebaker 2011) and have been found to impact brand information processing (Bittner 1990; Sela et al. 2010). Further, it is not clear which pronouns firm agents should use in their interactions with customers. Managerial theory suggests that firm agents should talk about “you” (the customer) in interactions, thereby “putting the customer first” (Basch 2003, Evenson 2011). This tenet is corroborated by findings from linguistic psychology that demonstrate “you” pronouns can convey a focus on and desire to satisfy an interaction partner (e.g., Ickes, Reidhead and Patterson 1986).

In contrast, we predict that more self-centered firm agent language—represented by heavier use of “I” pronouns—may be particularly effective. Some support for this prediction comes from research suggesting that “I” pronouns indicate agency (e.g., Ahearn 2001; Pennebaker 2011) and socially-shared concerns (i.e., empathy; Campbell and Pennebaker 2003). Our research thus examines the impact of firm-agent use of “I” (vs. “you”) pronouns on customer attitudes and behaviors, with perceived firm-agent agency and empathy as potential mediators of this relationship. We leverage a linguistic analysis package (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis 2007) that identifies the proportion of words used in 70 linguistic and psychological categories, including pronoun sub-groups (e.g., the “I” sub-group includes “I’m”, “me”, “my”).

Study 1 examined which pronouns firms prioritize in practice. We constructed two emails—a customer question and a complaint—and sent these to a random sample (N = 20) of the top 100 Internet retailers (https://www.internetretailer.com/top500). Consistent with the tenet of “putting the customer first” we found, for example, that while “you” pronouns appeared in 100% of firm responses, “I” pronouns were present in only a minority (27%). It appears that firm agents indeed focus on the customer (vs. themselves) in these interactions. But is this necessarily ideal?

In Study 2, a controlled experiment examined the impact of firm agent pronoun use on customer satisfaction, with perceptions of firm agent agency and empathy as mediators. Participants (N = 376) imagined they had engaged in one of eight versions of a customer-firm interaction in a 2 (customer inquiry: complaint, question) x 4 (firm response: 1, we1, you, control) between-subjects design. Versions of the firm response varied the preponderance of pronoun use only, with no change in meaning. After reading the interaction, participants reported their satisfaction with the interaction and their perceptions of firm agent agency and empathy. Regardless of interaction type (question or complaint), the “I” condition resulted in higher customer satisfaction than the “you”, “we”, or control conditions. Bootstrap tests confirmed parallel mediation of the “I” effect by participant perceptions of firm-agent agency and empathy.

In our third study, we leveraged a unique dataset from a large online retailer to examine whether firm agent pronoun use has real behavioral consequences. The data is comprised of over 1,100 unique interactions (6,500 emails) between customers and firm agents over a one-year period and includes each customer’s purchase data for a one year period pre/post their interactions. Similar to our Study 1 findings, firm agent use of “you” pronouns was higher than the use of “I” pronouns (91% vs. 28% of emails). More importantly, controlling for a large number of alternative explanations and covariates (e.g., customer pronoun use, pre-interaction purchases, complaint dummy, compensation dummy, # of emails in interaction, customer anger, demographics), we found that firm agent use of “I” pronouns (but not “you” or “we”) was linked to a significant increase in post-interaction purchases at one-year and shorter time intervals.

This research opens the door to further examinations of language use in customer-firm interactions. We show that while firms appear to prioritize the customer through the use of “you” pronouns, the use of “I” pronouns have a greater positive impact on customer satisfaction and purchase behavior. Our analysis sheds light on how firms might leverage the linguistic content of customer-firm communications (e.g. email, blogs, social networks, etc.) to improve their use of language in these interactions, thereby enhancing customer relationships.

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1 We also assessed “we” pronouns as a third relevant pronoun group, but refrain from extensive discussion of “we” here for brevity. Judge coding found that over 98% of firm agent use of “we” referred to “firm + agent”, not “firm + customer” or “agent + customer.” “We” was thus the primary non-customer pronoun used by firm agents. “We” pronouns were ineffective in relation to customer satisfaction (negative impact of “we” vs. “I”, null “we” vs. control) and purchases (null or negative impact for “we”).
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Paper #1: Scamming Depression Era Elders: Neuroanatomical Basis for Poor Decision Making Among Older Adults
Brian K. Koestner, University of Iowa, USA
William M. Hedgcock, University of Iowa, USA
Kameko Halfmann, University of Iowa, USA
Natalie L. Denburg, University of Iowa, USA

Paper #2: Linking Individual Differences in Motivational and Executive Control Neurocognition to Real World Craving and Snacking Behavior: The Case of Restrained and Unrestrained Eaters
Ji Lu, Dalhousie University, Canada
Laurette Dubé, McGill University, Canada

Paper #3: Identifying Symbols of the Consumer Marketplace from Human Brain Activity
Yu-Ping Chen, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Ming Hsu, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Leif D. Nelson, University of California, Berkeley, USA

Paper #4: Reward Substitution: Incentivizing Consumers to Choose Smaller Portion Sizes
Martin Reimann, University of Arizona, USA
Deborah MacInnis, University of Southern California, USA
Antoine Bechara, University of Southern California, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
The purpose of this session is to integrate investigations on consumer neuroscience and neuromarketing—that is, the study of brain function associated with consumers’ judgments and choices—(e.g., Plassmann, Yoon, Feinberg, & Shiv, 2011; Reimann, Schilke, Weber, Neuhaus, & Zaichkowsky, 2011; Smidts, 2002) with transformative consumer research—that is, research on how to increase consumers’ welfare and quality of life (Ozanne, 2013). This session will highlight contemporary research in this new domain of transformative consumer neuroscience—which we define as “utilizing neuroscientific insights and methodologies to improve consumers’ judgments, choices, and overall well-being”—and stimulate discussion on future research. The four papers in this session make important contributions in areas such as aging and decision making (Koestner, Hedgcock, Halfmann, & Denburg), craving and snacking behavior (Lu & Dubé), encoding of intangible characteristics of rewards (Chen, Hsu, & Nelson), and incentivizing consumers to choose less food (Reimann, MacInnis, & Bechara). In Paper 1, Koestner, Hedgcock, Halfmann, and Denburg study the neurobiology behind consumer vulnerability, particularly the brain activation patterns of older adults viewing deceptive and non-deceptive advertisements. The authors found that decreased activation in a region of the prefrontal cortex critical for complex decision making was associated with greater vulnerability. In Paper 2, Lu and Dubé link a lab measurement of neurocognition components involved in motivated behaviors with large-scale field observations of eating behavior. The authors found that snacking and the predictive power of craving on snacking vary between restrained and unrestrained eaters under the operation of different motivational and executive control processes. In Paper 3, Chen, Hsu, and Nelson advance current understanding of value representation by studying how the brain represents the intangible characteristics of goods, specifically branding. The authors found that by using machine learning techniques together with Aaker’s brand personality scale, they can predict, from brain activity, pairs of previous-unseen brands with accuracies significantly above chance. Finally, in Paper 4, Reimann, MacInnis, and Bechara establish that offering non-food rewards (lottery tickets, toys) bundled with smaller food portions as an alternative to full-portion meals can substantially decrease chosen portion sizes. The authors explain this effect by a “common reward currency” at the brain level. All four papers incorporate different neuroimaging and neuropsychological measurements to study imperative questions on consumers’ decision making and well-being.

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Deceiving the elderly is not a new problem, but it is one that has been growing in prevalence. To illustrate, financial abuse of elders aged 65 and older has risen from a low of 8% in 1950 to an astounding 20% in 2010 (Infogroup / ORC, 2010; Kemp, 2005). These recent statistics may even underestimate the extent of the problem, with only 1 in 25 cases being reported (Wasik, 2000). Financial losses due to elder fraud are considerable. Estimates have placed losses at $2.6 billion in 2008, rising to $2.9 billion in 2011 (MetLife, 2011). Sadly, these numbers do not take into account the devastation fraud can have on the elderly and their families, often wiping out entire savings and years of work in a single action, not to mention the negative psychological effects.

The neurobiology behind elder fraud has received very little attention from researchers, but there is a sizeable literature in cognitive neuroscience that can be used to generate hypotheses. To illustrate, multiple studies have lent support to the idea of the “frontal aging hypothesis”, which states that the frontal lobe of the brain undergoes the greatest amount of age-related decline in the context of healthy aging (West, 1996). Also, lesion studies have demonstrated that the prefrontal cortex, and specifically the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, is crucial to real-world decision making (Bechara et al., 2000). Most directly, a recent study conducted by our research group demonstrated that patients with acquired ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions displayed greater vulnerability to advertisements with misleading and deceptive content than both normal comparison and patients with brain damage outside the prefrontal sector (Asp, Manzel, Koestner, Denburg, & Tranel, 2012). Combined, these studies led us to hypothesize that older adults who were vulnerable to consumer fraud would have abnormal brain activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and insular cortex while viewing advertisements.

The older adult participants were recruited from a registry compiled in the Department of Neurology, University of Iowa College of Medicine. Thirty-two participants, age 62 to 88 years, participated; however, the data from one participant was excluded secondary to malfunction during the functional magnetic resonance imaging session, resulting in 31 final participants (52% female; M = 76.8, SD = 7.0 years). Participants were scanned using a Siemens 3T magnetic resonance imaging scanner with 12-channel head coil. Data analysis was completed using the Brain Voyager QX software package. Stimuli were created based on six advertisements deemed deceptive by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 1998). We created deceptive and non-deceptive versions of each advertisement. While in the scanner, participants were shown three deceptive and three non-deceptive advertisements. Outside of the scanner, each participant completed a questionnaire that assessed their comprehension of the

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Chair: Martin Reimann, University of Arizona, USA

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advertisement’s content as well as their purchase intentions for each of the advertised products. During an earlier testing session, all participants completed a battery of neurocognitive evaluations and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, 2007), a laboratory measure of decision making under uncertainty.

From the questionnaire data, we utilized participants’ comprehension ratings of the three deceptive advertisements to create two groups based on their susceptibility to being deceived: “vulnerable” (n = 16) and “non-vulnerable” (n = 15). These two groups did not differ with regard to demographic variables (age, education, sex distribution) or cognitive variables (intellect, attention/working memory, language, visuospatial, anterograde memory, executive functioning) (all p > .05). Vulnerable participants had less activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex when viewing both deceptive and non-deceptive advertisements than non-vulnerable participants (p < .05).

We also observed that brain activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was inversely correlated with personality trait Trustworthiness (a measure of “gullibility” from the NEO Five-Factor Inventory) (p < .05). Finally, brain activation in insular cortex correlated with Iowa Gambling Task performance such that laboratory decision making was positively associated with insular activation (p < .01). Interestingly, poorer laboratory decision making performance was predictive of greater activation for deceptive advertisements contrasted against non-deceptive advertisements (p < .05).

These findings provide some of the first evidence for differential neural patterns of brain activation to deceptive advertisements among older adults in relation to consumer vulnerability, personality traits, and decision making performance. Overall, older participants demonstrated greater susceptibility to deceptive advertising, higher gullibility, or lower financial decision making performance displayed less activation in brain regions crucial to decision making and emotional processing, suggesting that prefrontal brain regions, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and insular cortex, may be integral to the protection of the older consumer from fraud.

**Linking Individual Differences in Motivational and Executive Control Neurocognition to Real World Craving and Snacking Behavior: The Case of Restrained and Unrestrained Eaters**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

**Background**

Recent neuroscience research has generated detailed models of brain circuits involved in reward processing, decision-making, and self-control to understand may-motivated behaviors, including eating (Dagher, 2012). However, research thus far has typically considered neurocognition components, one at a time (Vainik, Dagher, Dubé, & Fellows, 2013), divorced from the complexity of brain and real-life environment (Hammond et al., 2012). Thus, it is important to bridge the current knowledge of brain from neuroscience lab to real-world eating, sparking the transformation in individual behaviors, market -

**Research Aims and Hypotheses**

At any given point of time, eating is jointly determined by neurocognition components that combine homeostatic (e.g., hunger), motivational (e.g., attentional bias to food cues and incentive salience in working memory) and executive control (e.g., inhibitory control and mental flexibility) processes (Dagher, 2012). Many but not all food consumptions result from yielding to craving, which has been attributed to a combination of inhibition over responses to rewarding cue, poor mental flexibility, and resulting incentive salience in working memory (Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005). Individual differences in these motivational and executive control processes can be traced both at neurocognitive (Affective Shifting Task, AST; Murphy et al., 1999) and behavioral levels (restrained and unrestrained eating; Herman & Polivy, 1984).

Presuming individuals are constantly being exposed to high-caloric highly-rewarding food (HRF) cues, this study aims to examine the expectation that a person’s likelihood of having HRF snacks, after hunger being controlled, will be predicted by the presence of craving. At individual level, we further expect that both snacking and the predictive power of craving on snacking vary between restrained and unrestrained eaters under the operation of different motivational and executive control processes. Restrained eaters are self-trained to heavily rely on their inhibitory control to regulate eating (Stroebe, Mensink, Aarts, Schut, & Kruglanski, 2008). As their goal is to resist the temptation of HRF, its related information persists and is elaborated in working memory resulting heightened craving (Polivy, Coleman, & Herman, 2005). Therefore, we expect restrained eaters with relatively better inhibitory control would be more vulnerable to HRF eating. Mental flexibility is the cognitive ability of intentionally directing attention to facilitate the switch between tasks with different cognitive rules (Cserjesi, Molnár, Luminet, & Lénárd, 2007), and is one of the critical neurocognition components to resist the temptation of rewarding cues (Mobbs, Iglesias, Golay, & Van der Linden, 2011). Unrestrained eaters do not particularly intend to regulate eating beyond homeostatic processes (LeBel, Lu, & Dubé, 2008); while HRF cues catch their attention, they may or may not want to shift attention away depending on their contextual goal (e.g. whether they are hungry). But if they do, we expect that a stronger mental flexibility would contribute to resist HRF eating.

**Method**

In laboratory, 109 non-obese adult women performed AST. Restrained and unrestrained eaters were identified by restraint-scale (Polivy, Herman, & Warsh, 1978). They subsequently participated in an experience-sampling study (Reis & Gable, 2000) reporting their hunger feeling, HRF craving and snacking 6times/day in a ten-day period.

In AST, English words were presented, one for each trial, on a computer screen. In half of trials, participants were asked to quickly respond to positive English words (rewarding cues) and ignore neutral words; in the other half of trials, the rule was reversed. The rule-switches were structurally arranged. For each participant, AST indicators were obtained to assess her neurocognition components: Attentional bias was reflected in one’s superior responsiveness to rewarding cues than to neutral stimuli. Inhibitory control was assessed by performance in the trials that responses to rewarding cues have to be stopped. And mental flexibility was assessed by the magnitude of decrement in task performance due to rule-switching.

To link individual AST indicators with HRF snacking reported in the experience-sampling study, data was analyzed by a generalized hierarchical linear model with two-level specification (see Appendix). At episode-level, HRF snacking (Yes/No) was explained by context variables (hunger and time) and HRF craving (Yes/No). At individual-level, the individual differences in HRF snacking likelihood and the predictive power of craving were further explained by...
Identifying Symbols of the Consumer Marketplace from Human Brain Activity

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumer neuroscience seeks to understand how consumer decisions are shaped by marketing actions. Recent research, guided by formal economic models, has made rapid progress in understanding the neural basis of value representation. These idealized models, however, rely on well-defined and stable preferences in a human population that is famously fickle, and prone to influence from subtle signals like brands, which may be unrelated to intrinsic value. An understanding of these influences is therefore critical for both our understanding of consumer decision-making, as well as potential real-world applications.

The twin challenges in this work are the need to (1) capture, in controlled laboratory conditions, some tractable set of stimuli from consumer daily life, and (2) to characterize, using quantitative, theoretically-grounded measures, the underlying mental representations. Here we bring together research in consumer behavior and decision neuroscience to understand how these intangible characteristics are represented in the brain. Specifically, we investigated the neural basis of brand perception by building on the well established semantic associations related to brands, widely known as “brand personality.”

Brands are tractable and nearly inexhaustible. Frequently they are instantly recognizable, and emotionally and behaviorally evocative. Perhaps most importantly, brands have been nearly exhaustively studied. Research in consumer behavior in particular, has developed a rich framework for characterizing consumers’ perceptions and attitudes toward brands, how they are formed, and factors that influence them (American Marketing Association 2012).

Historically, neuroimaging studies systematically map brain regions to experimental manipulations of cognitive states and/or behavior. In consumer neuroscience, for example, there have been several studies that have investigated brain regions that respond differentially to branded vs. unbranded items, or when making inferences about brands vs. about people (Yoon, Gutchess, Feinberg, & Polk 2006; Schaefer & Rotte 2007). Our experiment, in contrast, asks the question, “What type of information about brands (or other aspects of the consumer experience) is contained in the brain regions that respond to brands?” We do so by studying the neural responses to brands by combining functional neuroimaging of brand perception with a quantitative model of an important aspect of brand perception—the brand’s personality.

A total of 18 participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while being shown a set of 45 of logos of well-known brands in a passive viewing task. Prior to the experiment, they were instructed to think about the characteristics and personalities of the brands. To access the latent perceptions of our participants, we used a measure of brand personality developed in Aaker (1997). Following the experiment, participants were asked to complete, for each brand, the 42 item brand personality scale, as well as familiarity and preference, for a total of 1,980 ratings per participant. The total time for completion of the experiment was approximately 3 hours, and they were paid $70 upon completion of the experiment.

This widely used and validated factor analytic system, which has been cited more than 2,000 times, posits that brand personality can be described as a set of five orthogonal personality dimensions: sincerity, excitement, competence, sophistication and ruggedness. With the dimensions of brand personality, we decompose each brand as the composition of these factors, using them as the measure of the mental contents of brands.
We first found that activity in the striatum is correlated with brand preference ratings. This is a region of the brain known to respond to primary and secondary rewards, and is consistent with the idea that our brains respond to preferences of abstract objects such as brands. Then, we found that activity in the temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) is correlated with the brand personality index. This brain region has been hypothesized to be a general brain region of thinking about people and intentions (Saxe, 2006). This provides the first evidence that a significant proportion of variance in brain responses to brands can be captured by the brand personality construct.

Next, we used multi-voxel pattern analysis to predict the cognitive states of the participant using their neural responses to the brands and their latent associations (Haxby & Gobbini 2011; Naselaris, Pegnner, Kay, Oliver, & Gallant 2009). To train the model, we reconstruct the relation between the personality dimensions and the brain activation. With those we were able to predict the brain activations associated with the brands outside the training set. Once trained, we evaluated our model by comparing the predicted fMRI images and the actual data. Our model successfully distinguished pairs of previously unseen brands with accuracies significantly higher than chance. Similarly, we are able to test whether we can reconstruct which brands participants are viewing by using the physical feature of the logos, such as shape, color, and text, as well as using the brand personality model. This can be interpreted as a more stringent test of whether neural representation of brands is sufficiently captured by the brand personality construct.

Understanding the neural basis of consumer psychology and behavior has important managerial, financial, and ethical implications. Here we investigate whether and how the brain represents a specific construct—brand personality—that has excellent psychometric properties and is widely studied in consumer behavior. Beyond branding, this research represents a novel attempt to overcome the conceptual and technical challenges in bridging the mind and the brain, and how our brains deal with the astonishing diversity of goods and services afforded by the modern economy.

**Reward Substitution: Incentivizing Consumers to Choose Smaller Portion Sizes**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

In many societies, food has become abundant and calorie-rich. A pandemic of obesity has ensued, with high costs to governments, businesses, and consumers. The medical sciences’ remedy to this issue seems deceptively simple: Consumers should eat less (Lamberg, 2006). However, this advice is easier to give than to follow or enforce in societies that value having freedom and a variety of available options. One stream of research shows that—without altering satiation—smaller portion sizes can drastically decrease the overall quantity of food consumed (e.g., Geier, Rozin, & Doros, 2006; Rolls, Roe, & Meengs, 2006; Rozin, Kabnick, Pete, Fischler, & Shields, 2003). This notion of decreasing food intake by altering portion sizes contributes to the extant literature on consumer food choice by showing that attempts of promoting the choice of smaller food portions (1) can be behaviorally effective, (2) is moderated and even intensified by manipulated but not self-reported satiety/hunger, and (3) attracts the same neurophysiological process as familiar with the product. Because self-reported satiety/hunger did not moderate the reward substitution effect in Studies 1 and 2, we manipulated consumers’ satiety levels in Study 3 and found moderation of the reward substitution effect by manipulated satiety. In Study 4, we investigated the underlying neurophysiological process associated with choosing the half-sized meal with the non-food reward compared to choosing regular full-sized meals without such non-food rewards. Recent neuroimaging research has independently shown brain activation in the same brain system—the striatum—for distinct rewards such as food (Berridge, 1996), money (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001), beautiful faces (Aharon et al., 2001), and aesthetic packages (Reimann, Zaichkowsky, Neuhaus, Bender, & Weber, 2010). Our research builds on the idea of a common neural currency (Montague & Berns, 2002; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Wise, 1978) to see whether the combination of a small food portion and a non-food reward would attract activation in the striatum as does a large food portion alone.

Taken together, the findings from these four studies present a comprehensive examination of the reward substitution effect that contributes to the extant literature on consumer food choice by showing that attempts of promoting the choice of smaller food portions (1) can be behaviorally effective, (2) is moderated and even intensified by manipulated but not self-reported satiety, and thus, may be particularly effective in food-abundant societies in which consumers are generally satiated, and (3) attracts the same neurophysiological process, if non-food rewards are offered as partial substitutes for food.

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Examining the “Me” in Emotion: How Emotion and Different Aspects of the Self Influence Self-Control
Chair: Anthony Salerno, University of Miami, USA

Paper #1: The Downstream Consequences of Incidental Emotions and Preference Inconsistent Information
DaHee Han, Indiana University, USA
Nitika Garg, University of New South Wales, Australia
Morgan Poor, University of San Diego, USA
Adam Duhachek, Indiana University, USA

Paper #2: Failing to Meet the Standards: How Guilt Triggers Preferences for Unrelated Self-Improvement Products
Thomas Allard, University of British Columbia, Canada
Katherine White, University of British Columbia, Canada

Paper #3: ‘I’ versus ‘You’: Self-focus as a Mediator of Emotion Effects on Self-control
Nitika Garg, University of New South Wales, Australia
Gergana Y. Nenkov, Boston College, USA

Paper #4: The Influence of Pride Diagnosticity on Self-Control
Anthony Salerno, University of Miami, USA
Juliano Laran, University of Miami, USA
Chris A. Janiszewski, University of Florida, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

In what ways are a consumer’s day to day emotional experiences and self-control dilemmas related to each other? Research has established that when consumers succeed (fail) at self-control, positive (negative) emotion is experienced in response (Carver and Scheier 1998). However, an overview of the literature shows that it is less clear when emotion will work to facilitate versus impede a consumer’s willingness to overcome a self-control dilemma (Winterich and Haws 2011). Understanding how emotion influences self-control requires focusing on the specific emotion experienced, as each discrete emotion activates unique cognitive and motivational properties that can change depending on the context (Tamir, Mitchell, and Gross 2008). In this session, we will focus specifically on how various discrete emotions influence aspects of the self, to then influence a consumer’s self-control.

The first paper, (Han, Agrawal, Poor, and Duhachek), shows how emotions create “situational selves” that shift preferences for certain types of information as a means of affirming one’s self. Specifically, they find that angry (versus shameful) people become more likely to exhibit increased counter-argumentation to inconsistent (consistent) information which affirms one’s self and leads to subsequent boosts in self-control. The second paper, (Allard and White), demonstrates that guilt (relative to sadness) leads to increased self-control by increasing the desire to engage in self-improvement rather than mood repair. This increased desire to self-improve is hypothesized to occur because guilt is experienced in response to violations of self-standards. The third paper, (Garg and Nenkov), suggests that sadness (relative to anger) leads to greater self-focus which decreases self-control efforts via indulgent consumption. In addition, they explore whether the increased indulgent consumption brought on by sadness attenuates if people are encouraged to shift their focus away from the self and towards others. The fourth and final paper, (Salerno, Laran, and Janiszewski), explores how certain experiences of pride are more likely to be perceived as a reliable experience which then influences self-control. Specifically, they find that in the absence of an active goal, pride that emerges from a stable behavioral pattern or success at a high effort task is interpreted as diagnostic of a person’s self-concept and leads to increased self-control efforts.

Thus, the objective of this session is to address two key questions: (1) what are the ways in which various specific emotions effect aspects of the self and (2) what are the downstream consequences for a consumer’s ability to exert self-control? This research is important as it comes at a time in which the costs of self-control failure are higher than ever before, reflected in consumer overspending (Baumeister 2002), weight gain and obesity (Sharpe, Staelin, and Huber 2008), and addiction (Grant et al. 2010). We expect ACR attendees interested in the topics of emotion, the self, and self-control to be our primary audience with the session also being of general interest given the scope of theoretical constructs covered.

The Downstream Consequences of Incidental Emotions and Preference Inconsistent Information

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers are constantly exposed to information, which sometimes conflicts with current preferences. Research has shown that consumers typically resist preference-inconsistent information (e.g., Kunda 1990; Chen and Chaiken 1999) by discounting, ignoring, or selectively processing it in a way that reinforces pre-existing beliefs (e.g., Jain and Maheswaran 2000). Recent research has also highlighted the importance of consumers’ affective state, showing that emotions with differing valence and agency can influence decision-making after exposure to preference consistent versus inconsistent information (Agrawal, Han, and Duhachek 2012). The purpose of the present research is to tie together research on preference inconsistent information and emotional appraisals to explore the downstream consequences of emotions and appraisal (in)consistent messaging, specifically in terms of self-control. We employ the appraisal-tendency framework (e.g., Lerner and Kelten 2000; 2001; Lerner and Tiedens 2006) and self-affirmation theory (Sherman and Cohen 2006) to show that emotions of the same valence (e.g., shame and anger) can have different effects on self-control following confrontation with either preference consistent or inconsistent information.

According to self-affirmation theory, people are motivated to maintain the integrity of the self, where integrity is defined as a sense that one is a good and appropriate person (Sherman and Cohen 2006). We argue that incidental emotions create a situational self, such that the appraisal tendencies associated with an emotion can influence perceived “appropriateness” when presented with preference consistent or inconsistent information and this can activate the need to self-affirm. The appraisal tendency for shameful individuals is that they have transgressed an aspiration or ideal (Tangney 1991). Thus, to the extent that preference consistent information is considered a threat to this situational self (I’m wrong but you’re telling me I’m right), the individual will try to affirm the self by counter-arguing the message. The appraisal tendency for angry individuals is an offense against the self (Lazarus 1991); to the extent that preference inconsistent information is perceived as a threat to this situational self (I’m right, but you’re telling me I’m wrong), the individual will try to affirm the self by counter-arguing the message. Altogether, we predict that preference inconsistent (consistent) information is perceived as a threat to the situational self-identity of angry (shameful) individuals because it is at odds with the emotion’s respective appraisal. In an
In study one, we tested the predicted interaction using a 2 (emotion: anger, shame) x 2 (preference consistency: consistent, inconsistent) between subjects design (N = 118). First, the target emotions were primed using an emotional recall task that induced either anger or shame (cf., Robinson and Clore 2001). Next, preference consistency was manipulated using a two-part procedure adapted from previous research (Jain and Maheswaran 2000). In part one, subjects read a description of two different products. To form a moderately strong preference for Product A, subjects were told that scientific testing showed that Product A was superior to Product B on five out of eight product attributes. In part two, subjects were shown evaluations from actual users of both products and randomly assigned to either a preference consistent or inconsistent condition. In the consistent (inconsistent) condition, subjects were told that the percentage of respondents who felt Product A (B) performed better than Product B (A) was much higher than those who felt Product B (A) performed better. Self-control was measured by asking subjects’ hedonics exposed to preference consistent information exhibited more self-control when they felt shameful versus angry (p < .05). In contrast, subjects in the preference inconsistent condition exhibited more self-control when they felt angry versus shame (p < .05).

In study two, we sought to replicate these results and also provide process evidence (N = 167). The design and procedure mirrored that of study one, except that subjects were asked to provide cognitive responses after exposure to the product evaluations in part two of the preference consistency manipulation. These cognitive responses were then coded to reflect the proposed mediator, counter-argumentation. The results replicated those found in study one: subjects in the preference consistent condition exhibited more self-control when they felt shame versus anger (p < .05), but subjects in the preference inconsistent condition exhibited more self-control when they felt anger versus shame (p < .05). Further, counter-argumentation was shown to mediate this relationship, such that angry (shameful) subjects expressed more counter-argumentation toward inconsistent (consistent) information, which in turn boosted subsequent self-control.

In study three, we sought converging evidence for our theory by including a trait measure of self-control. The design and procedure mirrored that of study one, with two exceptions. First, situational self-control was captured using a behavioral measure in which subjects were allowed to eat freely from a bowl of chocolates. Fewer chocolates consumed indicated greater self-control. Second, trait self-control was measured using Puri’s (1996) Consumer Impulsiveness Scale (CIS). Subjects that scored above (below) the median on the reverse-scored prudence subscale and on the hedonic subscale of the CIS were classified as prudents (hedonics) (N = 152). According to our theoretical model, we would expect that the effects found in studies one and two would be amplified (attenuated) among hedonics (prudents) because these individuals are chronically low (high) in self-control. The results were consistent with these predictions, revealing the predicted three-way interaction between emotion, preference consistency, and trait self-control (p < .05). Specifically, hedonics exposed to preference inconsistent information exhibited more self-control when they were angry versus shameful (p < .05), while hedonics exposed to preference consistent information exhibited more self-control when they were shameful versus angry (p < .05). This pattern was attenuated among prudents.

Taken together, this research shows that emotions of the same valence (e.g., shame and anger) can have different effects on self-control following confrontation with preference consistent/inconsistent information. These results have implications for marketers and consumers alike.

Failing to Meet the Standards: How Guilt Triggers Preferences for Unrelated Self-Improvement Products

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Guilt has traditionally been described as a self-conscious emotion stemming from some violation of normatively held standard of behavior (Basil, Ridgeway, and Basil 2006; Heidenreich 1968) and is often viewed as an interpersonal emotion arising from concerns over a transgression against others (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994). This research examines a novel downstream consequence of guilt, namely, preferences for self-improvement products in domains unrelated to the source of the guilt.

Previous work on the downstream consequences of guilt has largely examined two types of outcomes. First, the experience of guilt leads individuals to engage in actions allowing for direct repair of the wrong-doing (e.g., Dahl, Honea, and Manchanda 2005; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989). Second, guilt can lead to out-of-domain downstream consequences wherein the activation of guilt in one context can lead to prosocial behaviors in a second context (Konecni 1972; Regan et al. 1972). In other words, research suggests that people can take direct or indirect means of resolving guilt. Such behaviors have been attributed to resolving the negative emotions associated with guilt by repairing the mood or engaging in impression management (Cialdini et al. 1987).

We alternatively suggest that guilt can activate a desire for self-improvement. Drawing on past work suggesting that falling short of one’s own personal standards can activate guilt (Higgins 1987; Peltz, White, and Shang 2013), we propose that guilt activation makes salient one’s failure to meet important self-standards. As a result, consumers will exhibit self-improvement strivings. When options to engage in moral actions to directly or indirectly alleviate guilt in the prosocial domain are not available, we predict that activating guilt in one domain leads to increased preferences for consumption choices geared toward general self-improvement in subsequent unrelated domains.

Our approach draws from a recent body of literature focusing on improving our understanding of the distinct motivational outcomes of specific emotions (Griskevicius, Shiota, and Nowlis 2010; Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011; Winterich and Haws 2011) to compare the effects of guilt with those of sadness – an emotion of similar valence, intensity, and certainty about its source – and of neutral emotional states on consumption preferences. More specifically, we compare two strategies for regulating negative emotional states, preferences for self-improvement and mood-management options. We thus compare the typically more effortful and future oriented process of making changes to the self with the process of regulating one’s mood. We present four experiments investigating this spillover effect.

Study 1 uses a 3(emotion: guilt vs. sadness vs. neutral) between x 2(goal type: self-improvement vs. mood-management vs. control) within, mixed-model design. Participants recalled an event that either made them feel particularly guilty, sad, or recalled a neutral event. In an ostensibly separate study, they were asked to help evaluating upcoming book titles in the “100 Tips to...” series. Par-
Participants evaluated the titles “Becoming Your Best Self” as the self-improvement option, “Improving Your Mood” as the mood-management option, and other control titles (e.g., “Exploring Italy”). Results support the predicted interaction between the emotion recalled and the goal associated with each title. Participants in the guilt condition rated the self-improvement title higher than participants in the sadness or control condition. No significant difference was observed for the other titles. Study 2 uses a 2(emotion: guilt vs. sadness) x 2(social-comparison Type: upward vs. downward) within-mixed-model design. It provides additional support for the effect by testing how participants’ affective state influences agreement with alternative measures of self-improvement and mood-management desires. After performing a recall procedure similar to study 1, participants rated their agreement with both upward (self-improvement) and downward (mood-management) social-comparison behaviors. Participants in the guilt condition agreed more with upward social-comparison behaviors than those in the sadness condition. No difference was observed for downward social-comparison.

Study 3 uses a 2(emotion: guilt vs. sadness) between x 2(goal type: self-improvement vs. mood-management) within-mixed-model design. This study provides support for our theoretical framework by examining the mediating role of self-improvement motives. After engaging in a recall procedure similar to study 1, participants evaluated two functional music album titles. Participants in the guilt condition evaluated more positively than the ones in the sadness condition the self-improvement choice titled “Music to Improve Your Self,” which was recommended to “create the optimal environment for mastering new skills.” Ratings were not significantly different between conditions for the mood-management title “Music to Improve Your Mood,” which was recommended to “lift up mind, body, and spirit.” A difference score comparing participants’ ratings of each title also supported the notion of a relative preference for self-improvement over mood-management consumption. This relationship was mediated by participants’ self-improvement motivations.

Study 4 uses a 2(emotion: guilt vs. sadness) x 2(self-theory: incremental vs. entity) between-subjects design. It extends our understanding of the phenomenon by highlighting the importance of believing in one’s ability to change. We posit that individuals who view their self as being malleable and improvable will be particularly likely to pursue self-improvement products in another domain after experiencing guilt. We examined the impact of self-theory (Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 1997) or the extent to which participants believed the self to be stable (i.e., entity theory) or malleable (i.e., incremental theory) on subsequent product choices. Participants were asked to select three samples from two functional teas: the self-improvement “Get Smart” tea or the mood-management “Get Happy” tea. Results supported the predicted interaction between emotion and self-theory on consumers’ choices of self-improvement over mood-management products. Among participants in the guilt condition, incremental theorists made more self-improvement choices than entity theorists. No such difference was observed in the sadness condition.

Taken together, the results of the four studies provide converging evidence that activation of guilt can subsequently lead to preferences for self-improvement consumption choices in unrelated domains. This relationship is driven by the activation of a general desire for self-improvement and contingent upon people’s belief that the self can be improved over time.

‘I’ versus ‘You’: Self-focus as a Mediator of Emotion Effects on Self-control

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Anecdotal evidence has suggested that behavior and consumption are related with the emotion that a person is experiencing. Indeed, research on incidental or ambient emotions has discovered the pervasive tendency of emotions to carry over from one situation to another, coloring behavior in unrelated tasks (e.g., Keltner and Lerner 2010; Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). Among emotions, sadness is unique because of two important reasons. First, although negative, sadness does not conform to the standard predictions based on its emotional valence. Based on a valence-based model, one would predict that negative emotions, including sadness, will trigger generalized negative assessments of the environment and lead one to perceive the world in negative ways. In contrast, sadness actually triggers positive valuation of new products, as measured by willingness-to-pay (Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004). Second, the carryover effect of sadness drives consumption behavior across diverse domains. In the domain of eating, for example, sadness (relative to happiness) leads to increased consumption of tasty, fattening food products, such as buttered popcorn and M&M candies (Garg, Wansink, and Inman 2007; Garg and Lerner 2013). In the domain of consumer transactions, sadness (relative to a neutral state) increases the amount people spend to purchase items (Lerner et al. 2004).

One of the factors implicated in the sadness-consumption relationship is the enhanced self-focus that sadness engenders. Cryder et al. (2008) found that this increased self-focus was tied to higher willingness-to-pay for a new product (water bottle). However, these authors focused on just acquisition of a new product rather than generalized indulgent (hedonic) consumption across domains.

In the present research, we hypothesize that the self- versus other-focus associated with emotions and its effect on consumption might hold more generally across emotions. In our studies we examine two specific, negative emotions – anger and sadness. We focus on the “self” because based on the appraisal tendency framework it connects with one of the key dimensions - self-responsibility - differentiating emotions and their subsequent effects (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Self-responsibility refers to the degree to which one feels responsible for what is happening in the situation.

Understanding the differences in the effects of anger and sadness is important as they are two of the most common negative emotions associated with consumption experiences (Garg, Inman, and Mittal 2005). From a theoretical perspective as well, anger and sadness are very interesting, because even though both have a negative valence, they arise from different appraisal tendencies that lead to differential impact on a subject’s degree of self-responsibility (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Whereas, a heightened sense of self-responsibility characterizes sadness, anger is associated with others being responsible for the situation (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Thus, whether anger and sadness lead to systematic differences in self-control relevant consumption becomes an important question to examine. The answers will broaden our understanding of the relationships between emotions and consumption in general, well beyond our current knowledge that is limited to the sadness-consumption links.

The current research also examines whether outcome elaboration moderates the emotion-consumption link. Extant research has established the beneficial effects of considering the potential future outcomes for effective self-control in the present (e.g., Baumeister and Heatherton 1996; Nenkov, Inman, and Hulland 2008). Prior re-
search, however, has not differentiated between different outcome elaboration approaches. We argue that elaborating on the potential outcomes of a behavior for the self versus others would moderate the relationship between emotions and consumption. We predict that since the self-focus associated with sadness drives its detrimental effects on self-control, switching the focus on others, rather than the self (e.g., by reminding participants about the potential effects of their behavior on others) could attenuate these effects.

To test our hypotheses, we conduct a series of three studies to examine whether anger and sadness are associated with varying levels of self-focus and whether this differential self-focus results in systematic shifts in preferences for hedonic options (Study 1); whether manipulating the focus of outcome elaboration (to emphasize the self vs. others) can alter the extent to which sad and angry individuals opt for hedonic options (Study 2); and finally whether self-focus and outcome elaboration can influence the amount of hedonic food product (M&Ms) consumed rather than simply shifting preferences for hedonic options, as in Studies 1 and 2 (Study 3).

Study 1 tested the hypothesis that sadness leads to a higher self-focus as compared to anger, and that this enhanced self-focus mediates the link between emotion and preference for hedonic options. We examined two consumer domains – preference for healthy versus hedonic food and preference for time spent on a utilitarian versus hedonic task. A 2 (emotion: sad, angry) x 2 (preference: food, time spent) between-subjects design was implemented to test the hypotheses of the study. Results find that sad individuals are significantly more self-focused than angry individuals and tend to prefer hedonic options across both domains. Also as predicted, this differential self-focus mediates the relationship between emotion and preference for hedonic options.

Study 2 aims to show that the focus of outcome elaboration - self vs. others – moderates the influence of emotions on preference for hedonic options. Study 2 uses a 3 (emotion: sad, angry, neutral) x 2 (outcome elaboration: self, others) between-subjects design. We expect that outcome elaboration would succeed in overriding the effect of sadness on preference for hedonic consumption only when it is focused on others (rather than self).

The final study seeks to replicate and extend the results of Studies 1 and 2 in the domain of actual food consumption (Garg et al. 2007; Garg and Lerner 2013). This study would test our predictions in a well-tested domain to bolster the reliability of our results and would move from examining simple preferences to actual behavior.

Overall, this research aims to provide critical insight into the theoretical moderators and mediators underlying the emotion-hedonic consumption relationship. This will have important implications for the strategies employed to attenuate the influence of contextual factors such as emotions because of the negative consequences of unbidden consumption.

The Influence of Pride Diagnosticity on Self-Control

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Pride is a self-conscious emotion shown to generate appraisals of increased self-worth, which can have a diametric influence on self-control efforts. In some instances, pride’s increased self-worth can encourage people to exert self-control (Patrick, Chun, and MacInnis 2009; Williams and DeSteno 2008). In other instances, this same sense of self-worth can foster a “license to sin” and lead to self-control lapses (Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011; Winterich and Haws 2011). Thus, understanding when pride assists versus impedes self-control may depend on the consideration of other moderating factors.

This research proposes that the influence of incidental pride on self-control is a function of (1) whether the experienced pride is perceived to provide diagnostic information about how to behave and, (2) a person’s present goal state. We find that two antecedents (i.e., the circumstances that were responsible for the pride) determine whether pride is diagnostic: stability and effort. Stability is pride experienced as a function of how frequently an accomplishment is made within a domain. Effort is pride experienced as a function of the difficulty level of an accomplishment within a domain. When pride is high (versus low) in stability or effort in one domain, it should be perceived as diagnostic for what to do in other domains. This is because pride high in stability (effort) pertains to an accomplishment requiring persistence (overcoming difficulty). Such an accomplishment should be more trustworthy for what to do in other domains because persistence (overcoming difficulty) is applicable to attaining self-control success across all domains (Freund and Riediger 2006; Williams and DeSteno 2008).

We predicted that the effect diagnostic pride has on self-control will depend on one’s current goal state. When no regulatory goal is active, diagnostic pride should be used to make inferences about one’s self-concept (i.e., “The event that made me proud is part of who I am”). To the extent that opportunities (i.e., means) are available to pursue in other self-control domains important to an individual, diagnostic pride should increase self-control. However, when a regulatory goal is active, pride should become diagnostic to goal pursuit and supersede adjustments to the self-concept (Wheeler, DeMarree, and Petty 2007). Goal-pursuit relies on feedback for control; such that when progress is insufficient (sufficient), goal pursuit is increased (decreased) (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). Since the experience of diagnostic pride occurs in response to success in one’s long-term goals, pride should signal that the person is effective at regulatory behavior and to deemphasize the importance of the goal. Thus, diagnostic pride should lead to an inference that enough progress has been made toward the active goal (i.e., “The event that made me proud is enough of an accomplishment for now”) and decrease self-control.

We tested our hypotheses in three studies. Studies 1A and 1B used a two (regulatory goal: inactive vs. active) x two (pride experience: nondiagnostic vs. diagnostic) between-subjects design. The studies were identical in design and procedure except that each study manipulated one pride antecedent. Study 1A (1B) manipulated pride diagnosticity using the stability (effort) pride antecedent, where pride high in stability (effort) was diagnostic while pride low in stability (effort) was nondiagnostic. Participants first completed a lexical decision task that either primed the regulatory goal of being virtuous or no goal. Then participants responded to a hypothetical scenario that either evoked diagnostic or nondiagnostic pride. In study 1A (stability), participants in the nondiagnostic (diagnostic) pride condition were told to think about a time in which they were proud of their part. Lastly, participants completed a task purportedly related to everyday decisions but was actually our dependent measure for self-control. In study 1B (effort), participants in the nondiagnostic (diagnostic) pride condition were told to think about a time in which they were proud of an A they received with very little effort (a great deal of effort) on their part. Lastly, participants completed a task purportedly related to everyday decisions but was actually our dependent measure for self-control. Participants made 15 total decisions, where each decision had two possible options, and one option was always more virtuous than the other. Results showed that when no regulatory goal was active, diagnostic pride led to a greater number of virtuous decisions made compared to nondiagnostic pride. However, when a regulatory goal was active, diagnostic pride led to a lower number of virtuous decisions made compared to nondiagnostic pride.
Study 2 builds upon studies 1A and 1B, showing that the perceived diagnosticity of pride is critical to predicting how pride will influence self-control. The study’s design was modified to include a manipulation which made the concept of nondiagnosticity either salient or non-salient, using a two (nondiagnosticity salience: low vs. high) x two (regulatory goal: inactive vs. active) x two (pride experience: nondiagnostic vs. diagnostic) between-subjects design. First, participants completed the priming task from study 1, with the regulatory goal changed to savings. Next, participants completed the pride manipulation from study 1A. Then, participants completed a task supposedly related to reading comprehension but in truth manipulated nondiagnosticity salience. In the low salience condition, participants read about a new bird exhibit at the local zoo. In the high salience condition, participants read about a new book that highlighted the importance of “not using success in one area of their lives to infer what they should do in other areas.” Lastly, participants completed a budgeting task and indicated how much they would save for the upcoming month, which served as our dependent measure for self-control. When nondiagnosticity salience was low, the pattern of saving intent replicated study 1. However, when nondiagnosticity salience was high, differences in pride experience attenuated, where only participants in the active regulatory goal condition exhibited greater saving intentions than those in the inactive regulatory goal condition.

Collectively, these studies show that the effect of pride on self-control is jointly determined by the diagnosticity of the pride experience and the presence (versus absence) of regulatory goals. As such, the findings contribute to our understanding of how emotions influence self-control, with important implications for consumer motivation and well-being.

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Making the Best of Uncertainty: The Role of Message Framing, Processing Style, and Risk Aggregation

Chair: Alison Jing Xu, University of Toronto, Canada

Paper #1: The Influence of Framing on Willingness to Pay as an Explanation of the Uncertainty Effect
Yang Yang, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Joachim Vosgerau, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
George Loewenstein, Carnegie Mellon University, USA

Paper #2: The Role of Cognition in Uncertainty Aversion: When Less Thought Leads to More Rational Choices
Kelly Goldsmith, Northwestern University, USA
On Amir, University of California, San Diego, USA

Paper #3: Psychological Risk Aggregation: Selling Products of Uncertain Qualities with Probabilistic Promotions
Mengze Shi, University of Toronto, Canada
Alison Jing Xu, University of Toronto, Canada

SESSION OVERVIEW
The literature on judgment and decision making has long focused on the disutility of uncertainty. The certainty effect for example, first evidenced in the Allais paradox (Allais 1953), suggests that people overweight certain outcomes relative to probable outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky 2000). In general, people are risk averse in gains—they prefer a sure gain to a lottery of gains with the same expected value (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In an extreme demonstration of risk aversion, Gneezy, List, and Wu (2006) showed that risky prospects are valued less than their worst outcome. Recently, however, researchers have begun to explore conditions under which consumers embrace uncertainty. For example, Goldsmith and Amir (2010) found that in the absence of thoughtful consideration, innate optimism drives consumers to respond to uncertain promotions and certain promotions with the best outcomes equally favorably, although the expected benefits of uncertain promotions are lower.

The current session brings together three papers each exploring a way to maximize the utility of uncertainty or minimize its disutility. Across the three papers, we discuss (a) how to frame risky prospects to increase willingness-to-pay; (b) which information processing strategy to use to decrease uncertainty aversion; and (c) how consumers aggregate promotion and product risk to minimize overall risk aversion.

The first paper by Yang, Vosgerau, and Loewenstein explores the influence of framing on consumers’ valuation of a risky prospect. In particular, framing a risky prospect as “uncertain gift” compared to “lottery” substantially increases consumers’ willingness to pay for the prospect. Although framing does not change consumers’ subjective value of the risky prospect, the “uncertain gift” frame evokes a higher reference price than “lottery” frame which increases WTP. The second paper by Goldsmith and Amir compares effects of intuitive processing versus deliberative processing on people’s tendency to avoid uncertainty. The results suggest that intuitive processing actually decreases uncertainty aversion, and thus increases one’s likelihood of making a rational choice in contexts where uncertainty aversion usually biases choices. The third three papers focus on people’s reactions to a single source risk. The final paper by Shi and Xu extends the scope of investigation by looking into how consumers make decisions when companies market products of uncertain qualities with probabilistic promotions. In this case, consumers aggregate two independent sources of risks (product and promotion risks) and evaluate them jointly. The results show that product risk and promotion risk interact in determining joint risk evaluation – it is amplified when consumers perceive salient contrasts between the sizes of two risks.

Introductory remarks will briefly review the previous research on risk aversion and uncertainty aversion and emphasis will be placed on recent discoveries on the positive influence of uncertainty. Each speaker will discuss the theoretical perspective from which the findings are grounded. The last 10 minutes of the session will be devoted to summarizing the factors that have been examined in exploring the upside of uncertainty and encouraging the speakers and the audience to generate new theoretical perspectives that may highlight avenues for future research. In line with the theme of ACR of “making a difference,” this session will aim to provide an overview of emerging findings that are built on previous work on risk aversion and uncertainty aversion but also make a difference by exploring the promises of uncertain environment.

We expect this session will be of interest to a broad audience at ACR. Given that risk aversion is one of the most prominent finding in consumer judgment and decision making, insights into when consumers embrace risk and uncertainty provides new opportunities for consumers, retailers, and manufacturers.

The Influence of Framing on Willingness to Pay as an Explanation of the Uncertainty Effect

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Gneezy, List, and Wu (2006) documented the intriguing uncertainty effect (UE) where risky prospects are valued less than their worst outcome. For example, people are willing to pay an average of $26 for a $50 gift certificate, but only $16 for a lottery that would pay either a $50 or a $100 gift certificate with equal probability. The psychological mechanism underlying this effect is still unknown. Keren and Willemsen (2009) claimed that participants simply misunderstand the instructions in the lottery condition. Simonsohn (2009) carefully ensured participants’ correct understanding and reliably replicated the effect, proposing that the uncertainty effect denotes a direct form of risk aversion.

This extreme form of risk aversion appears even more peculiar given that in the marketing domain researchers have documented the opposite. Goldsmith and Amir (2010) examined the effect of uncertainty on promotions and found that risky prospects framed as a free gift could be more attractive than their expected value. Why do people exhibit extreme risk-aversion in the situations examined in the research documenting the UE, but extreme risk-seeking for seemingly closely equivalent risky choices in the domain of consumer research? In a series of 9 studies, we show that framing a risky prospect as a “lottery ticket” as opposed to an “uncertain gift certificate” substantially reduces WTP, because the lottery frame evokes a lower reference price, but people value the risky prospect equally under both frames.

In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that when a risky prospect is described as a “lottery” as opposed to an “uncertain gift”, WTP is substantially reduced causing the UE. In Experiment 2, for example, we orthogonally manipulated framing (a lottery ticket vs. a gift certificate) and uncertainty (certain vs. uncertain). Framing a risky prospect as a lottery ticket—no matter whether it was certain or uncertain—substantially decreased WTP. Thus, the uncertainty effect...
only occurred when the uncertain item was framed as a lottery ticket and the certain item was framed as a gift certificate.

In Experiments 3A and 3B we replicated the framing effect, and tested four possible explanations - subjective uncertainty, processing fluency, negative attitudes toward lottery tickets, and anchoring. The procedure in these studies was identical to that in the previous studies; additionally, participants also indicated how much uncertainty they felt in this offer (subjective uncertainty), how difficult the offer was to understand (fluency), and their attitude toward lotteries. Finally, we also asked participants to indicate the typical price of a lottery ticket either before or after they indicated their WTP to test whether WTP is anchored on typical lottery ticket prices. Neither subjective uncertainty, fluency, attitudes towards lotteries nor anchoring were related to WTP.

In Experiments 4-6 we manipulated aleatory uncertainty, mental representations of uncertainty, and anticipated disappointment. While we replicated the previously found framing effect in all three studies, none of the uncertainty and disappointment manipulations had an effect on WTP.

Experiments 7 and 8 test a reference price account of the UE that was inspired by Weaver and Frederick’s (2012) reference price theory of the endowment effect. According to this account, the lottery frame may evoke a lower reference price than the gift certificate frame.

One prediction that follows from this account is that if the lottery ticket frame evokes a lower reference price than the uncertain gift certificate frame, setting an explicit reference price under both frames should lead to an assimilation of WTP to that reference price. In Experiment 7, we manipulated the presence of a reference price by telling half of the participants that the majority of participants in previous studies had been willing to pay $35 for the risky prospect ($35 is the median WTP across framing conditions in our experiments). In the control conditions no reference price was mentioned. As predicted, we found that the differences in willingness to pay (WTP) disappeared when the same reference price was set for both frames.

The reference price account also allows for another elegant prediction. According to Weaver and Frederick (2012), people are not willing to pay more than the reference price \( r \) (i.e., the market value) even when they subjectively value \( v \) the good more, because this would constitute a bad deal. Formally, \( \text{WTP} = \min(r, v) \). WTA, however, is equal to the maximum of the reference price and valuations, and should not thus be affected by the low reference price under the lottery frame. Formally, \( \text{WTA} = \max(r, v) \). This suggests: WTA, in contrast to WTP, should not be affected by the framing manipulation. In Experiment 8, we test this prediction by manipulating the frame (lottery vs. gift certificate) and endowment status buyer vs. seller. Consistent with the reference price account, results show that lottery framing reduces WTP but not WTA.

Experiment 9 and 10 examine whether our finding can be generalized to other frames, such as “raffle”, “gamble”, “coin flip” and “voucher”. Consistent with the reference price account, we found that “raffle”, “gamble”, “coin flip” frames significantly reduced WTP compared to “voucher” frame. No UE effect was observed when the frame of the risky prospect and its worst outcome matched. We also found that framing had a greater impact on WTP than on WTA.

Concluding, in a series of 11 studies we demonstrate that framing influences WTP and thus explains the UE. We rule out a host of possible explanations for the framing effect on WTP, and find evidence consistent with a reference price account.
aversion, relative to more intuitive processing, which can decrease one’s likelihood of making a rational choice in contexts where uncertainty aversion commonly biases choices (e.g., the Allais Paradox). We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications for these findings.

Psychological Risk Aggregation: Selling Products of Uncertain Qualities with Probabilistic Promotions

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Companies often market products of uncertain qualities with probabilistic promotions (e.g., 50% chance of getting 15% off; 50% chance of getting 45% off). A product provides uncertain qualities to consumers either because it is new to the market or because the product is inherently risky (e.g., investment products). When such products with uncertain qualities are promoted with probabilistic risks, consumers need to aggregate two sources of risks (product and promotion risks) and evaluate them jointly to decide the attractiveness of the deal package. This paper studies consumers’ psychological reactions to aggregated risks from independent sources. Our paper extends the existing literature on probabilistic promotions that has focused on consumer responses to the uncertain nature of the probabilistic promotions, comparing their performance relative to fixed promotions (Goldsmith and Amir 2010, Mazar, Shapmanier, and Ariely 2012) or exploring the optimal design of reward structure (Kalra and Shi 2010). Most of the existing studies, by examining either established brands such as Nike athletic shoes, Amazon gift cards, and M&M’s or hypothetical ones, have neglected the potential performance uncertainty in the products being promoted.

We develop a theoretical framework for joint risk evaluation that incorporates three factors: risk aversion, probability weighting, and contrast effects. First, risk aversion is the core concept in normative economics theory, which suggests that decision makers evaluate a two-risk prospect by computing the expected value of its outcomes. Assuming that people are risk averse, this model predicts that people should prefer fixed promotion over probabilistic promotions, and for any given product promoted by a probabilistic promotion, the joint evaluation of the two-risk prospect should monotonically decrease as the risk of the probabilistic promotion increases. Second, prospect theory assumes that people may overweigh favorable outcomes and they are risk-averse. When probabilistic promotion involves low risk, since people may overweight the more favorable outcome in the reward package, the joint evaluation of the two-risk prospect can be greater than a fixed promotion with no risk. However, as promotion risk continues to increase, risk-aversion will overshadow positive-outcome-overweighting and lead to decrease in joint evaluation. Note that both frameworks assume that promotion risk and product risk independently influence joint evaluation. No direct interactive effect between two sources of risks is predicted. Finally, we extend above two frameworks with a joint-risk evaluation model to accommodate the contrast effect that may occur when aggregating two independent sources of risks (a promotion risk and a product risk). Specifically, when people perceive a large and a small risk prospect simultaneously, the larger risk is more salient and becomes the focus of attention. The smaller risk serves as the reference of comparison. Contrasting the large risk against the small risk amplifies the perceived size of the large risk. As a result, perception of joint risks is higher and joint evaluation is lower when the differences between the two risk prospects are sufficiently large to produce a contrast effect.

In two experiments, we manipulate the size of product risk (between-subject) as well as the size of promotion risk (within-subject) and investigate how consumers make joint evaluations of the two-risk prospect in two diverse contexts. In the first experiment, product risk was manipulated by the variance of mutual funds’ annual returns in the past (high vs. low). The size of promotion risk was manipulated through the spread between large and small rewards (7 levels from low to high): the larger the spread, the higher the promotion risk. The probability of getting either reward is 50%. Joint evaluation of this two-risk prospect was measured by the likelihood of choosing the mutual fund over a fixed-income fund with no promotion. The results revealed an interactive effect of product risk and promotion risk. First, inconsistent with the predictions of normative economic theory, the joint evaluation of the two-risk prospect did not decrease with reward spread monotonically. When the product risk was high, the joint evaluation dropped sharply when a low risk promotion was introduced, but then bounced as promotion risk increased to a higher level. Monotonic decreasing trend was observed when the promotion risk increased from the medium to high levels. This drop-bounce-drop trend was also in contradiction to the bounce-drop-drop trend predicted by single risk Prospect Theory. Second, when the product had low risks, introducing a small promotion risk had little impact on the joint evaluation. However, as the promotion risk increased from the medium level to high level, joint evaluation dropped dramatically.

The second experiment manipulated product risk by using three types – radically-new, incrementally-new, and established – of products in the airline industry (high vs. low vs. no risk; between-subject). The quality of a flight service would be uncertain when it is a new flight route offered by an established airline; and the uncertainty would be even higher when the new service route was offered by a newly founded airline. In contrast, the established product involves minimal quality uncertainty. Again, the size of promotion risk was manipulated through the spread between large and small rewards (7 levels from low to high). Joint evaluation of the target product was measured by indicating the matching price for a competing product that make the target and the competing products equally attractive. Again, the interactive effect of product risk and promotion risk supported the joint evaluation model.

Our results suggest that we should extend the commonly applied single-risk prospect theory models by explicitly accounting for psychological interactions between two sources of risks when they are evaluated jointly. The joint risk evaluation model developed in this paper offers one approach to incorporate such contrast effects between two risks.

REFERENCES


It’s Not Just About You: Social Influences on Creative Outcomes

Chairs: Kelly Herd, Indiana University, USA
Ravi Mehta, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, USA

Paper #1: Heart Versus Head: Examining Differential Effects of Empathy Versus Perspective Taking on Creative Product Design
Kelly Herd, Indiana University, USA
Ravi Mehta, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, USA

Paper #2: The Light Side of Creativity: An Honesty Mindset Can Boost Creativity
Anne Laure Sellier, HEC Paris, France
Darren W. Dahl, University of British Columbia, Canada

Paper #3: Towards Understanding Creative Ingenuity in Dire Situations
Haiyang Yang, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Amitava Chattopadhyay, INSEAD, Singapore

Paper #4: The Impact of Comparisons with Others on Creativity Outcomes
Ke (Christy) Tu, University of Alberta, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada

SESSION OVERVIEW

Creativity has been defined as the generation of ideas, insights or problem solutions that are both new and useful (Amabile 1983; Sternberg and Lubart 1999). Consumers themselves engage in various problem solving activities and enjoy creative outputs in a wide range of contexts. In today’s society, perhaps more than ever, creativity prevails as part of our everyday consumption environment. Whether sharing an idea in an online community, engaging in a craft project or creating a customized product, consumers value creative outcomes. It is no surprise then that over the past several decades, researchers have delved in understanding the antecedents and effects of consumer creativity. Recently however, most research in consumer creativity has focused on studying the effects of situational variables, such as external constraints (Moreau and Dahl 2005), involvement (Burroughs and Mick 2004), noise (Mehta et al. 2012), spaciousness (Meyers-Levy and Zhu 2007) on creativity.

The proposed session aims to diverge from this trend. This session brings together four papers that examine a more human side of creativity. First paper (Herd and Mehta) furthers current understanding of empathic design and teases apart the differential effects of empathy and perspective taking on creativity. Specifically, this paper demonstrates that empathy leads to higher levels of shared identity which then leads to more creative product outcomes. The second paper (Sellier and Dahl) examines the role of ethics in consumer creativity. Building upon recent research which demonstrates that higher creativity can lead to more unethical behavior, this work shows that an ethical (or a moral) mindset can lead to higher levels of shared identity, which in turn will lead to product designs that are more creative in nature. We test our hypothesis across three studies involving real design tasks and consistently find that empathy (vs. perspective taking) leads to more creative product designs. To pinpoint shared identity as the underlying process, we both measure and manipulate it across studies.

In study 1, all participants (N = 80) were prompted with either perspective taking or empathy strategy (manipulation adapted from Batson et al. 2007). In the perspective taking condition, participants were told to visualize a target consumer interacting with the product. In the empathy condition, participants are told to imagine how a target consumer would feel while using the product. Following the manipulation, all participants were directed to provide new creative ideas for a laptop that is specifically designed for consumers age 65+. Following the study, independent raters blind to condition evaluated each participant’s ideas on the following dimensions: creativity, novelty, originality. These measures were averaged to create a mean objective...
creativity score (α = .91). Results revealed a main effect of empathy vs. perspective taking (M_{PT} = 3.45 vs. M_{Emp} = 3.56; F(1, 79) = 4.65, p < .04).

In the next study, all participants (N = 45) were again primed with either a perspective taking or empathy strategy. Following the manipulation, each participant provided as many creative ideas as they could for a grocery cart for the elderly. Again, we found a main effect of strategy on objective creativity such that those prompted with empathy were more creative (M_{PT} = 3.50 vs. M_{Emp} = 3.84; F(1, 44) = 4.12, p < .05). In order to better understand the underlying process, we also captured shared identity measures of how similar they imagined themselves being to the elderly and how much they imagined themselves as a unique individual (reverse-coded). Media- tion analysis using bootstrap approach showed a significant indirect effect of shared identity through which empathy (vs. perspective tak- ing) influenced creativity (95% CI: .0455, 4.336).

Finally, in study 3, we manipulated shared identity to provide further evidence that this change in how participants identify with consumers influences creative output. All participants (N = 180) were provided with Lego-like toy pieces called Krinkles and were instructed to create a toy prototype for a 4-6 year old child. Strategy (empathy vs. perspective taking) was manipulated as in previous studies. Shared Identity was manipulated by asking participants to “imagine, as a product designer, if you were a 4-6 year old child how you would interact (how you would feel) while playing with the toy.” In Self Identity condition the participants were asked to “imagine, as a product designer, how this segment of 4-6 year old children will interact (feel) while playing with the toy.” Following the study, we took pictures of each design and asked moms of 4-6 year old children to evaluate each design’s creativity (creativity, novelty, originality). A significant two way interaction was observed (F(1, 179) = 7.78, p < .01) such that when the participants were primed with self identity empathy lead to lower creativity of the prototypes. However, when shared identity was primed no difference was observed between em- pathy and perspective taking conditions.

Taken together, these studies reconfirm that perspective taking and empathy are distinct constructs which differentially influence identification with consumers, driving differences in consumers’ abilities to develop new and creative ideas and designs.

REFERENCES


The Light Side of Creativity: An Honesty Mindset Can Boost Creativity

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Considerable consumer research has established that a critical area of study is the investigation of contextual factors that enable consumers to be creative (e.g., Moreau and Dahl 2005). Alarming- ly, recent research documented that creativity can negatively affect ethical behavior (e.g., Gino and Ariely, 2012). The present research flips this perspective to show that creators with an ethical mindset can enjoy greater creativity (study 1). We further show that a moral mindset can similarly serve as a creative boost (study 2). In sum, the activation of “good” can increase creativity.

What is a mindset? Engaging in certain tasks is known to activate a set of cognitive operations, which remain activated beyond the initial task, thereby influencing subsequent and unrelated tasks — the term “mindset” is used to refer to this global readiness (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990). Following this research, we define an ethical mindset as a global readiness to have appropriate feelings in distinguishing between what is morally acceptable versus not (Crisp 2000). As such, an ethical mindset involves one’s justification of one’s actions as being appropriate (Gino & Ariely, 2012); it implies moral flexibility. A moral mindset is different in that it represents a global readiness to abide by an absolute set of rules allowing no internal justification — whether actions are appropriate is externally dictated.

We examine how an ethical mindset versus a moral mindset shapes subsequent creative cognitive processing. Prior research pin-pointed constraints as a critical antecedent of creativity (e.g., Dahl & Moreau, 2007). Both an ethical and a moral mindset constrain the creative process in that they focus creators on ethical/moral creative solutions. Further, an ethical mindset provides autonomy, because it allows internal justification of one’s actions, whereas a moral mindset stifles autonomy. For these reasons, we expect that an ethical mindset will foster individual creativity more than a moral mindset and than a non-constraining, neutral mindset.

We tested this prediction in a first study in which 92 students (45 men, age = 20.1 years) completed creative tasks after having been primed with ethics-related, morals-related, or neutral words. They were told that they would take part in two studies. The first study was a word search task. Participants had to circle words hidden in a grid, from a list appearing below the grid. We varied the list of words, so that most of the words either related to ethics (e.g., “altruistic,” “generous”), morals (e.g., “abiding,” “imperative”) or were neutral (e.g., “armchair,” “telephone.”). Participants subsequently
reported how creative, original, novel, inspired, artistic, and innovative they perceived their alien to be (1-7; not at all/very), their mood, and other measures.

Next, participants participated in an ostensibly unrelated creativity study. They were instructed to imagine visiting a different planet, and encountering an alien there. Their task was to be as creative as possible in drawing this alien (Ward, 1994). Next, they were given a creative problem-solving task, the Duncker candle task, for which only one solution exists.

Once all data from creators were collected, 16 peers independently rated each alien’s creativity, indicating how creative, original, novel, inspired, artistic, innovative (1-7; not at all/very; α for the averaged creativity score across peers = .99) the aliens were. Subsequently, they rated each alien’s attractiveness (6 items, all αs > .85).

Seven participants did not follow the study instructions, and were therefore excluded from the sample. We report our analyses for the remaining 85 participants. We computed a self-perceived creativity index by averaging creators’ creativity ratings (α = .91), and subjected this index to an ANOVA. We found a significant impact of Mindset, F(1, 85) = 3.15, p < .05, r = .04, such that creators with an ethical mindset perceived their aliens to be significantly more creative than creators with a moral mindset (Methical = 3.14 vs. MMoral = 3.44, t(82) = 1.94, p < .05, r = .04); and than creators with a neutral mindset (Mneutral = 2.38, t(82) = 2.34, p < .03, r = .06). Moral and neutral creators rated themselves as equally creative, t < 1.

Next, we computed an objective creativity index by averaging peers’ creativity ratings (all αs > .85). An ANOVA using this index as the dependent variable showed a significant impact of Mindset, F(1, 85) = 3.16, p < .05, r = .04, such that the ethical aliens were judged more creative than the moral aliens, Methical = 4.34 vs. MMoral = 3.77, t(82) = 2.27, p < .03, r = .06; and than the neutral aliens, Mneutral = 3.81, t(82) = 1.94, p = .05, r = .04. Moral and neutral aliens were rated equally creative, t < 1.

Focusing on the Duncker candle problem, we found that 54% of ethical participants found the correct answer, a greater performance than moral participants (29% solved correctly, χ² = 3.62, one-tail p < .03), and than neutral participants (30%, χ² = 3.24, one-tail p < .04). We found no influence of mood or peers’ alien attractiveness ratings on our results, all p’s > .08.

A second study examines when a moral mindset can boost creativity above and beyond an ethical mindset. Following research in moral psychology (Haidt 2007), we suggest that a moral mindset (vs. an ethical mindset) will foster greater creativity when creators work in groups, because it activates group cohesion and facilitates processes during the creative process. In contrast, because it boosts autonomy, an ethical mindset compromises group cohesion.

We primed 90 participants with an ethical or a moral mindset as in study 1, before they worked on designing a toy for people eating behind the wheel, in groups of 3 or 4. Subsequently, they rated their creative process experience, in particular the extent to which they felt the group worked well and enjoyed cohesion. We found that moral groups produced more creative toys than ethical groups primed, p < .05. Further, we found that groups’ ratings of how well they worked together mediated this effect.

Together, our results suggest that, if creativity can lead to dishonesty, honesty can also produce a creative advantage.

REFERENCES


Towards Understanding Creative Ingenuity in Dire Situations

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

From deadly natural disasters to terrorism and wars to violent crimes, today’s 24/7 media constantly exposes us to information that makes our own mortality salient. At times, we may even be quite close to such misfortunes (e.g., living in the areas ravaged by Superstorm Sandy or Hurricane Katrina). This research explores how mortality salience affects people’s creative ability and what type of individuals are more sensitive to this effect.

Prior research suggests that mortality salience elicits existential anxiety and, to buffer against this paralyzing anxiety, people deploy terror management strategies to create a sense of meaning and order that can transcend death (e.g., Solomon et al.1991; Greenberg et al. 1997). Because cultural values provide meaning and structure to one’s world and represent permanence beyond an individual’s demise, mortality salience intensifies people’s adherence to their cultural values and worldviews (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1990; Rosenblatt et al. 1989). Supporting this theorization, a large number of studies show that the onset of mortality salience can alter evaluations of self and others (Burke et al. 2010). These effects have also been shown to be non-consciousness and unique to mortality salience (as opposed other aversive situations; Greenberg et al. 1994).

Nonetheless, how mortality salience impacts creativity is not well understood. The current research proposes that mortality salience inhibits access to information outside of one’s core conventional knowledge, as a means to protect the coherence and stability of one’s core cultural values and worldviews. This inhibition occurs because access to peripheral information that may conflict or cast doubt on one’s cultural values and worldviews, can make adherence to them more difficult, reducing the usefulness of this terror management strategy. Thus, mortality salience is likely to hamper access to divergent information in memory, impairing creative ingenuity.

Moreover, because death represents the ultimate form of loss of control (Becker 1973), mortality salience may impact people with different control beliefs differently. While individuals with high internal locus-of-control believe that event outcomes are primarily controlled by their own efforts and actions, those with moderate or high internal locus-of-control believe that they have control over only some events (Rotter 1966). The first group’s beliefs are irrecusable with the notion of death, which should lead to the elicitation of stronger terror-management behaviors under mortality salience. This, in turn, impairs their creative ability more. Consequently, while individuals with high internal locus-of-control can be more creative problem solvers in many situations (e.g., Burroughs and Mick 2004), their
creativity ability is likely to be inferior to those with moderate level of internal locus-of-control under mortality salience.

Our propositions were tested in the field and the lab. In study 1, we obtained consumers’ new product suggestions (n=44,864) submitted to a major beverage company over a period of 174 weeks. Each of these ideas was evaluated by the firm’s customers and the average quality of the ideas submitted was calculated for each of the weeks. We also obtained empirical data on the extent to which death was reported in the media during the same period. We ran a regression with the quality of the new product ideas as the dependent measure, as well as variables controlling for consumer participation level and seasonality effects. Consistent with our proposition, the level of death reporting in the media had a significant negative effect on the quality of new product ideas (beta=-3.32, t=-2.18, p<.03).

Study 2 examined whether mortality salience (MS) inhibits access to divergent knowledge. Participants (n=221) first responded to a locus-of-control scale (Rotter 1966). Following a most commonly used TMT paradigm (Burke et al. 2010), participants were then asked to write down thoughts regarding either their own death (MS condition) or viewing TV programs (control condition). Next, they completed the PANAS (Watson et al. 1988) that captured participants’ affective states and served as a delay task (cf. Pyszczynski et al. 1999). Thereafter, participants in both conditions were asked to write down all the place names they could think of with “A” as the first letter. Consistent with the hypothesis that mortality salience inhibits access to divergent information in memory, participants in the MS condition wrote down significantly fewer foreign place names (e.g., Algeria, Aruba, Azerbaijan) than those who in the control condition (Mcontrol=3.98, MMS=5.09, t=2.50, p<.01). Further, a significant interaction effect between the locus of control measure and mortality salience manipulation was found (beta=-.86, t=2.95, p<.05). To prove the interaction, we trichotomized participants based on their locus-of-control. Contrast analyses revealed that, in the MS condition, participants with high internal locus-of-control wrote down significantly fewer foreign place names than those with moderate internal locus-of-control (Mmoderate=4.96, MMS=3.56, F=4.96, p<.03); however, the opposite was true in the control condition (Mmoderate=5.02, MMS=7.25, F=8.27, p<.05).

In study 3, participants (n=247) were given a business decision making task—deciding what new business should go into a commercial property where a restaurant went bankrupt (adapted from Goncalo and Staw 2006); Whether participants followed the precedent—using the space for a restaurant again served the DV. The experimental procedure was similar to that of study 2. As expected, the same pattern of interaction effect and contrast comparison results emerged (p’s<.04). Finally, inconsistent with an affect-based account, including PANAS scores in the analyses did not affect the findings of study 2 and 3.

Overall, these results shed light on how mortality salience affects information accessibility and creative problem solving, add to the literature non-conscious processes underlying creativity (e.g., Yang et al. 2012; Zhong et al. 2008), and illuminate the role of control beliefs in terror management theories. Moreover, our findings contradict lay intuitions: A survey of mid to senior level executives (n=30) at one of the largest logistics firm in the world revealed that the majority (67%, χ²=15.2, p<.01) would put high locus-of-control managers in charge of problem solving, in crisis scenarios (e.g., natural disasters or terrorist attack that resulted in a major loss of life). Our results, however, suggest that those with moderate locus-of-control may be more creative problem solvers in those dire scenarios.

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The Impact of Comparisons with Others on Creativity Outcomes

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

From scrapbooking to gift designing, from online co-creation (e.g., “My Starbucks Idea”) to customization (e.g., NikeID customization service), people often undertake the role of designer. The success of these activities requires participants to be creative. Also, these situations often entail a social environment where participants may interact with, and expect evaluation from similar others. While past research has investigated the impact of evaluation expectation from experts (people who are experienced in the domain under investigation) on creativity (for a review, see Amabile 1996), little research has examined the situation where evaluations are expected from similar others who are involved in either the same or a different creativity task. The present research attempts to fill this gap.

Building upon social comparison theory (Festinger 1954), we propose that in a creativity task (e.g., making a card), in order to assess their own abilities, people are likely to compare with others when they can easily see others’ creations, especially when evaluating creativity task. The present research attempts to fill this gap. From similar others who are involved in either the same or a different creativity task. The present research attempts to fill this gap.

Lastly, the proposed research will make a number of contributions. Foremost, this research will add to work on creativity by investigating the impact of similar others on one’s creativity. Second, this research will extend social comparison theory by demonstrating that within the domain of creativity, people can make social comparisons at different levels (i.e. outcome vs. individual ability), and that the outcome of creativity depends on the level of such comparisons.

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In the lab, learning is typically studied with brands that are artificially created to have minimal prior associations. However, in the real world, prior associations typically exist. The next two papers study systematic influences of pre-existing associations. Like the first paper, the third paper assumes that consumers draw spontaneous inferences during associative learning. This is studied in the context of co-branding an unknown brand with a known brand (the pre-existing associations). This paper argues that consumers learn more than a simple association between the two brands. Instead, they also infer associations between each brand and the benefits of these brands. The paper shows that when an unknown brand pairs up with a known one, the unknown brand could benefit or suffer, depending on how the benefit-benefit associations are affected.

The fourth paper studies the real-world problem of a brand having pre-existing negative emotional associations. The paper assumes that learning positive emotional associations could work as anti-dote, but asks which type of positive emotions would be the most effective anti-dote.

**Investigating Deliberative and Spontaneous Inferences as Outcomes of Associative Learning with High versus Low Contingency Awareness**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

In his insightful theoretical critique, De Houwer (2007) advocates an effects-based perspective regarding the meaning of evaluative conditioning (EC): evaluative conditioning can be defined as an observed change in liking that is due to the pairing of stimuli (p. 233). Embracing this effects-based perspective is stimulating a host of new research questions about associative learning. This perspective motivates competing theorizing about what causes the transfer of liking that takes place when stimuli co-occur (cf. De Houwer 2007; Jones, Olson & Fazio 2010). Additionally, recent studies featuring “non-evaluative” US’s as part of a conditioning procedure are beginning to show effects more diverse than a simple transfer of liking (e.g., Forderer & Unkelbach 2011; Galli & Gorn 2011; Glaser & Walther 2013; Meersmans et al. 2005; Miller & Allen 2012). Said another way, conventional EC methods and procedures are now being utilized to examine a wide array of questions about associative learning beyond simple, direct affect transfer from US to CS.

Our research approaches associative learning as a formidable process that can include the spontaneous inferences people draw from co-occurring stimuli. Referring to the process as “formidable” reflects the theorizing of Kardes, Posavac & Cronley (2004), who assert that spontaneous inferences will have a significant impact on other judgments, yielding attitudes characteristic of the central/systematic route to persuasion rather than the peripheral/heuristic route. This challenges the longstanding view (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo 1981) that conditioning mechanisms only apply in the peripheral route to persuasion.

In the experiment described here we investigated the effects caused with conventional EC procedures on deliberative and spontaneous inferences and implicit and explicit attitudes. To probe subjects’ self-generated inferences this experiment included several innovative features: 1) the US’s used in this study were selected through extensive pre-testing to possess inference-provoking potential in one specific product domain; 2) spontaneous inferences are assessed through a unique Implicit Association Test (IAT); 3) con-
The contingency awareness is treated as an experimental manipulation rather than being assessed post hoc.

The experiment was presented to subjects as a study in how they process visual information as consumers. The EC procedures follow Olson & Fazio (2001) with several alterations. Target stimuli (the CS’s) were real but unfamiliar bottled water brands (not Pokémon characters). The US’s were visual images of natural scenery chosen through pre-testing to evoke inferences of purity and freshness, rather than general positive words and pleasant pictures. The conditioning procedure had 5 blocks of trials with 86 images presented per block. Numerous filler images appeared in each block. In the conditioning treatment, the brand Isb re was paired with the natural images 8 times per block, for a total of 40 pairings across the 5 blocks. In the control group, Isb re bottled water was paired with neutral images 40 times across the 5 blocks. Contingency awareness (CA) was manipulated through instructions to subjects. For the high CA condition, subjects were told to identify any reoccurring patterns in the images presented and to press the spacebar when a red dot appeared on the screen. In the low CA condition, subjects were told to count backward by 3’s from 300 and press the spacebar when a red dot appeared on the screen. The common spacebar task ensures consistent attentiveness in the two conditions (Gibson, 2008). Following the conditioning procedure subjects completed separate IAT’s to assess implicit beliefs and attitudes; and then measures for explicit beliefs and brand attitudes. A “strong measure” of CA (adapted from Field & Moore, 2005) taken at the end of the study was used to validate a successful manipulation.

This experiment provides a test of a key assertion from Kardes et al. (2004) that spontaneous inference formation is more likely when one’s motivation and ability to deliberate are high. Subjects’ motivation and especially their ability to deliberate are influenced as a result of the contingency awareness manipulation. Moreover, deliberative and spontaneous inferences are tracked via measurement of explicit and implicit beliefs. The data show that with high CA, both deliberative and spontaneous inferences are present in the treatment versus the control group, but they are largely unrelated and each has unique downstream effects on explicit versus implicit attitudes, respectively. Simply stated, deliberative and spontaneous inferences appear to operate in separate systems. In the low CA condition no treatment effects were observed on any of the dependent measures. These findings regarding the necessity of contingency awareness to the observed outcomes are consistent with research on what has recently been labeled “non-evaluative” conditioning (Forderer & Unkelbach, 2011; Kim, Allen & Kardes, 1996; Meersmans et al., 2005).

On the Automatic Effects of Advertising: The Uncontrollability of Evaluative Conditioning Effects

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Changing brand attitudes by pairing brands with affective stimuli is called evaluative conditioning (EC). EC is defined as the change in liking of conditioned stimuli or brands (CS) caused by their pairing with valenced, unconditioned stimuli (US). This basic procedure of pairing brands with positive stimuli lies at the heart of branding and advertising strategies and is therefore of central importance to consumer research (Shimp, Stuart, & Engle, 1991; Stuart, Shimp, & Engle, 1987; Sweldens, van Osselaer, & Janiszewski, 2010). Whereas there is no doubt that EC effects can be established through conscious propositional reasoning, a long-standing disagreement in the literature concerns whether there can also be a contribution of an unconsciously operating automatic process in the attitude acquisition (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Sweldens, et al., 2010). A process is defined as automatic if it occurs in the absence of awareness, is uncontrollable and is not influenced by intentionality or processing resources (Bargh, 1994).

In a recent contribution (Hüttel, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012) we showed that previous methods were biased towards the conclusion that EC effects require conscious awareness of the CS – US pairings. We developed a new method based on the process dissociation procedure (Jacob, 1991), providing evidence that EC can, in fact, establish attitudinal effects without explicit memory for the pairings. In the current research, we present a new method to assess the automaticity of the learning process by focusing on the controllability of the EC effect. Specifically, we developed a process dissociation procedure that allows dissociating the effects of controlled processes from uncontrollable processes during the conditioning stage. In the standard condition, participants are informed that the USs are informative about the CSs. Participants thus believe that the valence of the USs can be trusted to form an attitude about the CSs. In order to separate controllable from uncontrollable processes involved in this task, a reversal condition was designed. The reversal instructions still stated that the valence of the USs is informative for the CS, but that it should actually be opposite in valence from what is presented. Participants thus believe that the valence of the US needs to be reversed to form accurate attitudes about the CS. To the extent that the valence transfer in an EC procedure is controllable, participants should be able to reverse the US valence in the generation of their CS attitudes. To the extent that the valence transfer is automatic and uncontrollable, participants will not be able to execute this reversal. Hence, the reversal condition is implemented so that controllable and uncontrollable processes lead to differential evaluations of the CSs.

We first conducted two experiments which implemented the standard and reversal conditions in a between-subjects (Experiment 1) and a within-subject (Experiment 2) design. A multinomial processing tree model was then applied to distinguish the relative contributions of controllable valence transfer (estimated by the c-parameter) from automatic uncontrollable valence transfer (estimated by the u-parameter). We used both types of designs as an opportunity for parameter validation. In Experiment 3, we increased participants’ motivation to control the effects of affective stimuli on brand attitudes by offering financial rewards for complying with task instructions (i.e., successfully applying the valence of the affective stimuli in the standard condition and reversing it in the reversal condition). Experiment 4 features a cognitive load manipulation to validate the parameter estimates. A controllable process is hypothesized to be susceptible to cognitive load. An automatic, uncontrollable process on the other hand should not be affected by reductions in cognitive processing capacity.

In all experiments we found a significant u-parameter, which specifies an automatic uncontrollable EC effect on attitudes. Moreover, the u-parameter estimates did not differ between experiments, increasing confidence in their robustness. While the controllable (c) component was sensitive to the complexity of the conditioning phase, task experience, and the availability of cognitive resources, the automatic uncontrollable (u) component was insensitive to any of these procedural factors as well as participants’ motivation to exert control over the acquisition process. Interestingly, the explicit evaluative ratings of the CSs do indicate a reversed EC effect in the reversal condition (albeit smaller in size than the normal EC effect in the standard condition). A researcher looking only at these evaluative ratings would have no means to distinguish the controllable from the uncontrollable components in the emergence of the total EC effect.
As these explicit evaluative ratings do indicate a reversed EC effect in the reversal condition, the researcher would probably – erroneously – conclude that EC effects are under conscious control.

Our demonstration of uncontrollable learning in EC has important implications for the study of branding and advertising in general, and for ethicalities questions in marketing in particular. Our experiments show that even when consumers believe that a particular advertisement is misleading, they cannot help but be influenced by the affective stimuli included in the commercial. This raises a serious problem for the protection of consumers from unwanted influence. In addition, our research has important implications for dual process theories of learning, suggesting that associative and propositional processes are qualitatively distinct despite recent claims to the contrary (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009).

Riding Coattails: When Co-branding Helps versus Hurts Less-known Brands

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

New brands often partner with established brands to leverage existing associations. Conventional wisdom holds that such partnerships disproportionately benefit the less-known (Aaker and Keller 1990; Boush and Loken 1991; Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Levin and Levin 2000). A popular account for this is the Human Associative Memory (HAM) model, according to which an unknown brand is relatively devoid of associational content and is therefore a blank slate ready to receive the presumably positive associations from an established brand. Although there is intuitive appeal to this account, the HAM model presumes a static association between entities in which the consumer need only learn that the two brands are partnering together. Most consumer exposures to co-branding, however, are much more dynamic since the consumer learns not only of the existence of a partnership, but also of expected product benefits stemming from the partnership. When these dynamic effects are incorporated, research on consumer associative learning has found that the transfer of associations can deviate from the predictions of the HAM model.

Associative learning models predict that consumers will not simply strengthen the association between the component co-brands, but each component co-brand may also interact when forming associations with the outcome (e.g., the benefit the new co-branded product delivers). This cue interaction may lead the two brands to become asymmetrically associated with the benefit. Competitive cue interaction effects can bias consumers’ predictions of which product features predict product performance for a given brand (e.g., Cunha, Janiszewski, and Laran 2008; Cunha and Laran 2009; van Osselaer and Alba 2000). In co-branding arrangements, competitive cue interaction could ironically cause the established brand to dominate associations with the benefit, thus undermining the advantage of co-branding for the less-known brand.

We draw upon the animal learning literature to propose that facilitative cue interaction effects are also possible (Urcelay and Miller 2009). In contrast with cue competition effects, facilitative effects would actually enhance the strength of association between a less-known brand and the outcome and thereby benefit the less-known brand. We propose that time delay between the presentation of cues (brands) and outcomes (product features) influences the breadth of stimulus generalization such that narrower (broader) generalization operates when time intervals are shorter (longer) time delays. When generalization is narrower, effects consistent with cue competition are predicted because little is generalized about the less-known brand when it co-brands with a well-known brand. When generalization is broader, effects consistent with cue facilitation are expected because more is generalized about the less-known brand when it co-brands with a well-known brand.

In Experiment 1 participants were presented with a series of three learning trials. In the compound condition, an unknown breakfast cereal brand was paired with a well-known cereal brand (Kellogg’s). In Experiment 2, subjects were then asked their willingness to try a sugar cookie produced by an unknown and a well-known brand. In the control condition, no differences in willingness to try the new brand were observed as a function of whether the new brand was presented in a co-branded format versus presented by itself. After receiving feedback about the cereals, however, subjects were less likely to try the new brand when it was presented in a co-branded format than when it was presented by itself, a cue competition effect.

In Experiment 3, we verify that a focus on learning co-branding outcomes produces benefits for less-known brands owing to facilitating cue interaction effects and not to a HAM process. Experiment 3 manipulated whether the well-known brand has expertise in the product category, and the critical dependent measure was willingness to try a new product offered in a different category, a learning transfer task. Subjects learned information about the quality chocolate produced by an unknown and a well-known brand. They were then asked their willingness to try a sugar cookie produced by the less-known brand (a transfer task requiring stimulus generalization). In the no-delay condition, the negative effect of co-branding was again replicated. In the delay condition, however, the effect of co-branding was positive further supporting an underlying cue-interaction process.

From a theoretical standpoint, identifying the conditions under which cue interaction is competitive versus facilitative allows us to unify the diverging findings from the co-branding literature under a single theoretical model, rather than a dual-process account. From a practical standpoint, a better understanding of cue interaction effects will help marketers learn when to expect a less-known brand to strengthen (vs. weaken) its position after co-branding with a well-known brand.

Emotional Counter-Conditioning of Brand Attitudes

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

We investigate a situation when a brand’s image suffers from negative emotional associations, such as for the Škoda car brand in the UK, which presumably was associated with embarrassment
of any research that develops a general theoretical position as to the
there is even less evidence. Even more importantly, we are not aware
transferred by means of conditioning, and for counter-conditioning
(see Maren 2001; Mason and Richardson 2010; Mineka and Oehlberg 2008).
Thus it is not clear whether emotional meaning in general can be
transferred by means of conditioning, and for counter-conditioning
there is even less evidence. Even more importantly, we are not aware
of any research that develops a general theoretical position as to the
type of emotion that would be most effective for counter-conditioning.
Building on appraisal theories of emotions (cf. Clore, Schwarz,
and Conway 1994), we develop such position. We introduce the con-
cept of specific counter-emotions, emotions that differ in valence but
share a similar appraisal structure. For example, the pleasure from
eating food, i.e., sensory pleasure, shares a similar appraisal struc-
ture with the disgust one feels from tasting a spoiled food item. For
instance, both attribute the negative feeling to a sensory event, here
the taste of food. The joy one feels when experiencing a pleasurable
event with friends, i.e., (social) joy, shares a similar appraisal struc-
ture with the sadness one feels when loosing a friend. According to
our main hypothesis, tainted brand attitudes can be more effectively
improved through conditioning by pairing the brand with specific
counter-emotions (specific counter-conditioning) rather than with
other positive emotions (nonspecific counter-conditioning).

In a conditioning experiment we manipulated attitudes toward
spring water bottles labeled with different brand names. In a first
stage we initially paired these brands with images eliciting negative
emotions (disgust, sadness). In a second stage, we counter-conditioned
these brands with positive emotions (sensory pleasure, joy) and measured brand attitudes one week later. As predicted, specific
counter-emotions were most effective at improving brand attitudes.
That is, attitudes toward a “disgust brand” were improved more
when counter-conditioned with sensory pleasure than with joy. Con-
trary, attitudes toward a “sadness brand” were improved more when
counter-conditioned with joy than with sensory pleasure. Thus, the
concept of specific counter-emotions provides a guideline managers
can use to select a positive emotion as “anti-dote”. They can then
use specific counter-conditioning to complement objective improve-
ments of deficiencies.

As an additional finding, the superiority of specific counter-
conditioning replicated when we attempted to deteriorate positive
brand attitudes with negative emotions (e.g., as in anti-smoking ads).
If smoking is motivated by seeking a feeling of confidence or pride
by associating with a respected group who smokes (e.g., peers, cool
cowboys, actors), the common strategy of eliciting disgust or fear
of disease is unlikely to counter feelings of pride. Our theorizing
indicates that ads provoking embarrassment and shame may be more
effective in undermining the motives behind teen smoking.

Emotions are multi-dimensional constructs, but respondents
have difficulty articulating these dimensions. They also have diffi-
culty articulating the extent to which they associate specific emotions
with a brand. We addressed this difficulty by having our respondents
provide similarity judgments of brands (counter)conditioned with
different negative and positive emotions, which is easier for them.
From these similarity judgments we derived perceptual maps and
uncovered emotional dimensions, including brand attitude.

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Prosocial Choices and Consequences
Chair: Michal Herzenstein, University of Delaware, USA

Paper #1: Crowdfunding to Make a Difference: The Role of Choice in Funding Social Ventures
Scott Sonenshein, Rice University, USA
Michal Herzenstein, University of Delaware, USA
Utpal M. Dholakia, Rice University, USA

Paper #2: Giving to What We Want Instead of to What We Should
Cynthia Cryder, Washington University at St. Louis, USA
Simona Botti, London Business School, UK
Yvetta Simonyan, University of Birmingham, UK

Paper #3: Leave Them Smiling: How Concretely Framing a Prosocial Goal Creates More Happiness
Melanie Rudd, University of Houston, USA
Jennifer Aaker, Stanford University, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA

Jonathan Z. Berman, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Emma E. Levine, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Alixandra Barasch, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Deborah A. Small, University of Pennsylvania, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
The objective of this session is to increase our understanding of prosocial behavior. About two thirds of all Americans engaged in prosocial behavior in 2012 by either giving money or volunteering their time to help others. However, this number might be a conservative estimate because a substantial number of prosocial behaviors are undocumented, such as giving money to homeless people or buying a particular brand from a company that donates some of the proceeds versus a company that does not. Opportunities to engage in prosocial behavior are ample but for most people resources are limited. In this session, the papers seek to address the following question: How do people choose among prosocial opportunities and how do they feel after the behavior was carried out?

Understanding prosocial behaviors and their consequences is important and can benefit both organizations and individuals in making better decisions. In a world where hunger, disease, and impoverishment are still prevalent, charities and other organizations should weave prosocial activities into their functioning and increase public appeal. Individuals, on the other hand, can engage in prosocial behavior with many charities and organizations, and therefore should learn how to best choose among these opportunities.

With four papers, this session addresses these issues as it integrates various research perspectives to identify factors affecting the entire decision making process, starting with how consumers choose where to give, through how consumers feel after they give, to how others perceive those who give. The papers complement each other in that they examine different aspects of prosocial behavior using different methodologies including analysis of archival data and laboratory studies with some innovative procedures.

Sonenshein, Herzenstein, and Dholakia show that social ventures posted on Kickstarter.com increase their likelihood of getting funded if they offer consumers very few or many donation choices, thus providing an alternative perspective to the “choice overload hypothesis”. The authors show that backers of those ventures engage in intuitive, rather than rational, decision making. Cryder, Botti, and Simonyan further examine donation choices and show that despite believing a cause to be of low priority people prefer to give to that cause, over a more pressing cause, because the former is more appealing and personally satisfying to them. While the extent of a cause’s neediness is valued as more important, actual donations reveal that the cause’s attractiveness is actually more important. Rudd, Aaker, and Norton ask: How can we maximize the happiness experienced by people who engage in prosocial behaviors? These authors show that framing the goal of a prosocial act concretely rather than abstractly increases the giver’s happiness because the giver focuses on the logistics of achieving the act versus the broader meaning of the act itself. Finally, Berman, Levine, Barasch, and Small show that when people engage in a prosocial behavior privately but then brag about it publicly (on Facebook), they are considered more generous, compared with those who do not brag. However when people engage in a prosocial behavior publicly and also brag about it, they are considered less generous, compared with those who do not brag.

Crowdfunding to Make a Difference: The Role of Choice in Funding Social Ventures
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Internet has allowed individuals across the globe to contribute to and even actively participate in ventures influencing pressing social issues. The growing prevalence of online venues that support social issues is due in part to so-called crowdfunding organizations that use the Internet to bring together geographically dispersed individuals to make small contributions to ventures. By widening the pool of potential contributors and matching entrepreneurs with potential backers across the globe with minimal transaction costs, crowdfunding has altered the process of obtaining resources. But this model of resource acquisition comes with some significant challenges. For example, ventures must compete with numerous others from all over the world for attention. There is also greater potential for fraud because of limited regulation, a fact that makes the decision making process more difficult for potential contributors (Herzenstein, Sonenshein, and Dholakia 2011; Sonenshein, Herzenstein, and Dholakia 2011).

Given limited regulation but wider participation, a key question is how potential contributors decide which ventures to support, especially when most are developed and pitched by unknown and unproven organizers. Early analyses of this question (Edwards 1954; Harbaugh 1998) applied a rational utility maximizing framework supporting more choices ad infinitum, but research over the past decade has convincingly placed boundary conditions on this economic argument. Based on individuals’ limited cognitive abilities, this growing body of research has found that an overload of choices can lead to diminishing returns (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Schwartz 2005). Scholars embracing this “choice overload hypothesis” (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd 2010) have found that decision making tends to follow an inverted U-shaped relationship such that initially more choices lead to favorable processes and outcomes up to an inflection point beyond which additional options lead to diminished outcomes for the decision maker.

Although the choice overload perspective offers an important qualification to the economic decision making paradigm, both perspectives assume that individuals rationally process information, and differ only on the role of cognitive limitations in decision making.

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But for social ventures, it is not clear whether economic assumptions about rational decision making best explain how contributors allocate financial resources. Indeed, some research suggests that individuals are less prone to follow a calculative, rational mindset when considering support for social issues (Ashford and Barton 2007; Sonenshein 2007, 2011). Individuals may instead adopt a prosocial motivation in which they desire to have a positive impact on other people, groups, or organizations (Grant 2007). We argue that this focus on “the other” fundamentally alters how contributors make decisions about funding social ventures, thereby requiring new theory development beyond economic models of choice and the choice overload hypothesis.

To that end we develop and test theory we label “the intuitive leader impact hypothesis”. This hypothesis posits that individuals abandon the deliberate information processing approach, instead relying on intuitive judgments about a venture’s leader. We suggest that contributors focus less on maximizing their own utility and more on making a difference for others. Since most people who wish to help others do it through donations to organizations, charities, or ventures, the competency of the organization and its leaders is of utmost important. We hypothesize that organizers of social ventures offering potential donors few or too many donation choices will be viewed as more competent because they either carefully designed the collection of choices they offer or they exerted significant effort to offer something for everyone, respectively. As a result, these ventures are more likely to get funded and be successful in the longer term when compared to those offering a medium number of choices. This pattern represents a flipping of the choice overload hypothesis. We test these predictions in three studies.

In study 1, we used data scraped from Kickstarter.com, currently the largest online crowdfunding organization. Our dataset includes over a thousand ventures posted on kickstarter.com during July and August 2011 that were coded by trained RAs for whether they have a social mission or not. Controlling for the funding goal and other financial measures we show that ventures with a social mission are more likely to fund when they offer few or many funding choices—a U-shaped relationship between the number of choices and decision making outcomes—thus reversing the choice overload hypothesis. Projects that do not have a social mission follow the choice overload hypothesis—an inverted U-shaped relationship between the number of choices and the likelihood of funding. In study 2, we replicated and extended our field-based findings using a controlled laboratory experiment. Building on a real venture from kickstarter.com we described a band that wishes to raise money to record a new album. We manipulated whether the venture has a social mission (donating some of the proceeds to poor children) or not and the number of donation choices it offers (2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 choices), and asked participants to split $500 between this venture and future ventures. We further asked participants a series of measures aiming to assess the competency of the venture’s leader. We replicate the results from study 1 and show that participants made more intuitive (faster) decisions for the social venture, and that perceptions of the venture leader’s competency mediate the effect of the number of donation choices on funding. Finally, in study 3, we surveyed Kickstarter venture leaders whose ventures have a social mission to examine the relationship between the number of choices leaders offered potential contributors and the venture’s success one year after launch. We find that leaders of ventures with few or many donation choices described the status of their ventures as being more successful than leaders of ventures with average number of choices.

To summarize, our mixed methods approach helps ground a new perspective on choice theory by showing how intuitive processes prompted by concerns for others challenge traditional economic theory and invert the choice overload hypothesis.

**Giving to What We Want Instead of to What We Should**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

There is a puzzling phenomenon in charitable giving that people give a lot of money to seemingly low-priority causes (e.g., sports fundraisers) while other highly pressing causes remain severely underfunded (e.g., water sanitation in destitute countries). In this project, we hypothesize that a fundamental reason why needy causes are ignored is because of a need to self-enhance via others’ positive attributes. Therefore, despite a strong and widespread belief that the neediest causes should receive priority, causes that are attractive or appealing can triumph over more needy alternatives.

Study 1 investigated people’s explicit preferences about the importance of neediness in resource allocation decisions. Two-hundred and twenty-eight participants generated an open-ended answer to the question: “If multiple individuals needed help and you were deciding which one to donate to, what would be the single most important thing you would consider when deciding which person to donate to?” Forty-six percent of participants spontaneously answered that neediness was the most important criterion. The next most popular criterion was the impact of the donation, receiving only 8% of responses; all other possible answers received a lower percentage of endorsement.

Study 2 investigated preferences for needy versus attractive alternatives in real allocation decisions. Participants viewed pictures of four girls who had received successful cleft palate surgery from the charity Smile Train. A pre-test verified that one of the girls, Angelica, was judged to be significantly more attractive or “cute” (p < .0001) and significantly less needy (p < .0005) than the other three girls.

In the experiment, participants were informed that each of the girls needed financial support to move on with their lives post-surgery. Participants selected one of the girls to support and were told that the researchers would send $1 on their behalf to support the girl that the participant chose. The experiment included 3 conditions: 1) a control condition in which participants were simply asked to choose a girl to support, 2) an “Attractiveness” condition in which participants were asked to explicitly rate the cuteness of each girl before making their allocation decision, and 3) a “Neediness” condition in which participants were asked to explicitly rate the perceived neediness of each girl before making the allocation decision.

Participants exhibited a significant preference for allocating to Angelica, the cutest and least needy girl, over all other girls in the Control condition (p < .05) and the Attractiveness condition (p < .01). Results were significantly different, however, in the Neediness condition; in this condition, participants chose Angelica at a rate equal to that at which the other girls were chosen (p = .30) and were significantly less likely to choose Angelica than in the Control condition (p < .05).

Study 3 tested how self-involvement influences preferences for appealing options. Participants either indicated which child they would choose to sponsor themselves (self condition) or indicated which child they would advise an anonymous donor to sponsor (advisor condition). When participants chose for themselves, they exhibited a significantly greater preference for Angelica than when they advised others (p < 0.01).

Study 4 manipulated the presence of choice to further investigate the idea that self-enhancement underlies the preference for appealing options. Research has shown that choice is often used as a means to
express one’s own self (Iyengar 2010) and, at least in the Western world, can be seen as a way to define oneself as an individual (Markus and Schwartz 2010). In a 2x2 experimental design, participants viewed either post-surgery (attractive) or pre-surgery (unattractive) photos of a mixed-gender group of Smile Train children. Participants then chose to allocate to a particular child (choice condition) or were randomly assigned to allocate to a particular child (no-choice condition). Subsequently, participants were asked how much they would donate to Smile Train. We observed an interaction such that participants in the no-choice condition reported giving equivalent amounts to Smile Train regardless of whether the children they allocated to were attractive or unattractive. However, participants in the choice condition, who had an opportunity to boost positive self associations via their choices, gave more when the children were attractive compared to unattractive.

Finally, because choices based on neediness may not satisfy donors’ need for self-enhancement from their generous acts, we hypothesized in Study 5 that explicit reminders of neediness may have perversive consequences on generosity in the long run. Participants were randomly assigned to the Control and Neediness conditions from Study 2, and also completed a follow-up measure that asked participants how likely they would be to donate to the charity Smile Train in one year. We once again observed that while Angelica was preferred in the Control condition (p < .0001), this preference disappeared once participants explicitly considered neediness before the resource allocation choice (p = .55). When asked about donations in one year, however, participants indicated that they would donate significantly less if they had been in the Neediness condition compared to if they had been in the Control condition (p < .05). Considerations of neediness therefore appear to be a double edged sword—they increase evenhanded allocations in the short term but decrease overall kindness in response to future requests.

One of the most intense debates in the history of Social Psychology centered around the question of whether human generosity was altruistic or egoistic at its core (Batson, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1987). The current project sheds light on this issue. Although people carry with them an explicit belief that neediness should triumph all in resource allocation, actual judgments of resource allocation often are based on what we want to give to—appealing and attractive options. Although people can behave in a truly altruistic fashion, such as when focusing on others’ neediness, doing so appears to squelch future generosity because it does not satisfy a primary motivation to self-enhance via appealing causes.

**Leave Them Smiling: How Concretely Framing a Prosocial Goal Creates More Happiness**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

A growing body of research has demonstrated that behaving prosocially creates a “helper’s high” (Luks, 1988) and increases subjective well-being (Anik et al., 2009; Lyubomirsky et al., 2004; Post, 2005; Thoits & Hewitt, 2001). But, do certain prosocial pursuits more effectively increase personal happiness? We explore this question, examining one factor linking prosocial acts and happiness: How the goal of the act is framed.

Goals can be framed at various abstraction levels (Emmons & Kaiser, 1996; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001), and striving for concrete (versus abstract) goals has been correlated with less psychological distress and greater well-being (Carver et al., 1988; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Emmons, 1992). Building upon these results, we hypothesize that prosocial acts lead to greater giver happiness when the act’s goal is framed concretely (e.g., make someone smile) versus abstractly (e.g., make someone happy).

Why might a prosocial goal’s abstraction level influence personal happiness? When a goal is concretely-framed (versus abstractly-framed), one’s expectations of achieving the goal may be better calibrated (due to greater focus on the “how?” and logistics versus the “why?” and broader meaning of goal-directed actions; Torelli & Kaikati, 2009; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989). Moreover, the outcome of goal-directed actions may be perceived more favorably (due to concrete goals having clearer standards of success; Emmons, 1992; Locke & Latham, 1990). Importantly, these characteristics should enable concretely-framed (versus abstractly-framed) prosocial goals to shrink the gaps between people’s expectations of success and reality (Kopalle & Lehmann, 2001; Ojasalo, 2001; Schwartz, 2005; Walker & Baker, 2000)—and smaller expectation-reality gaps are associated with greater satisfaction and well-being (Davis, 1981; Michalos, 1985; Schwartz, 2005; Thomas, 1981; Vermunt et al., 1989). Therefore, we predicted that concretely (versus abstractly) framing a prosocial goal increases personal happiness by reducing the gap between givers’ expectations of accomplishing the goal and the actual outcome of their goal-directed acts. Because people routinely incorrectly predict how much happiness things in life will bring (Aknin et al., 2009; Brickman et al., 1978; Buehler & McFarland, 2001), including the hedonic benefits of performing prosocial acts (Dunn et al., 2008), we also predicted that people would not recognize that concretely-framed (versus abstractly-framed) prosocial goals cultivate more personal happiness.

Experiment 1 instructed participants to perform an act of kindness within 24 hours. Manipulating the abstraction of the prosocial goal of the act, participants randomly assigned to the concrete [abstract] condition were asked to do something to make someone else smile [happy]. Twenty-four hours later, in a follow-up survey, participants reported the extent their act created happiness in their own life, how well the outcome of their act met their expectations for accomplishing their assigned goal (i.e., their expectation-reality gap), and the specificity of the goal they had in mind when performing their act.

Manipulation checks confirmed concrete (versus abstract) condition participants had a more specific goal in mind when performing their act. Two ANOVAs then revealed concrete (versus abstract) condition participants felt the outcome of their act better met their goal achievement expectations and felt their act created more personal happiness. Importantly, a mediation analysis demonstrated that these shrunken expectation-reality gaps are what increased the personal happiness of those in the concrete (versus abstract) condition.

Experiment 2 ruled out several alternative accounts and began investigating the accuracy of people’s prosocial goal predictions. Participants were pairs of friends—one friend served as the “giver,” the other the “receiver.” Placed in separate rooms, the friends answered questions about their friendship and were then told they would get a three-minute-long break (in a room with their friend) before completing another survey (in separate rooms). At this time, givers randomly assigned to the concrete [abstract] condition were asked to do something to make their friend (i.e., the receiver) smile [happy] during this break. After the break, the givers reported their current happiness, their beliefs (before the break) about their assigned (i.e., how challenging it would be, their ability to accomplish it, and their expectations for succeeding at it), how well their act actually met their expectations for accomplishing their assigned goal, and their perceptions of the size and concreteness of their act. The
receivers reported their current happiness and their happiness (and smiling) during the break.

Manipulation checks confirmed givers in the concrete (versus abstract) condition viewed their prosocial goal as more concrete (versus abstract). ANOVAs then revealed concrete (versus abstract) condition givers felt happier after performing their act and that the outcome of their act better met their expectations. As in Experiment 1, a mediation analysis demonstrated that their increased personal happiness was driven by these smaller expectation-reality gaps. Additional ANOVAs showed these effects could not be explained by differences in the type of receiver (e.g., a friend), closeness of the giver-receiver relationships, givers’ perceptions of their act’s size, or receivers’ actual happiness (or smiling) during and after the break—as these factors did not differ across conditions. Three final ANOVAs revealed givers in both conditions had (before the break) viewed their goal as equally challenging, their ability to accomplish it equally great, and their expectations for success equally high—initial indications that people would not recognize the hedonic advantage of pursuing concretely-framed (versus abstractly-framed) prosocial goals.

Experiment 3 directly tested whether people would correctly predict which prosocial goal was better for personal happiness. Participants, assigned to the concrete or abstract condition, imagined taking part in Experiment 1 and predicted their responses to the follow-up survey. Subsequently, the two prosocial goals from Experiment 1 were described, and participants rated each goal (from 1-100) on how much personal happiness it would create.

An ANOVA revealed concrete (versus abstract) condition participants did not correctly predict their act would create more personal happiness. Furthermore, repeated measures ANOVAs, with the goal ratings as the within-subjects factor, revealed participants (within and across conditions) incorrectly rated the goal of making someone happy (versus smile) as able to create more personal happiness.

Conclusion. We extend the prosociality literature, showing that, contrary to people’s intuitions, an act of kindness with a concretely-framed (versus abstractly-framed) goal leads to greater personal happiness—an effect driven by shrunken expectation-reality gaps.

The Braggart’s Dilemma: On the Social Rewards and Penalties of Advertising Prosocial Behavior

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Public displays of generosity are ubiquitous. People often signal their generosity to others by wearing t-shirts or announcing their good deeds to wide audiences on social networking sites. One reason it is surprising to see so many people advertise their good deeds is that there exists a strong norm to be modest about prosocial behavior. Further, individuals go to great lengths to communicate to that their good deeds are not motivated by self-interest (Ariely, Bracha & Meier, 2009). However, successfully demonstrating generosity has positive returns on reputation (Flynn, 2003), making it appealing to publicize one’s good deeds to others.

We examine the role of bragging about prosocial behavior on attributions of generosity. We expect that bragging communicates that an actor has done a good deed, but also signals that the actor was motivated by selfish desires. Thus, an individual whose good deeds are unknown to others will be seen as more generous when he brags, because it informs others of his prosocial behavior. However, an individual whose good deeds are already known to others will be seen as less generous when he brags, because bragging no longer provides new information about his behavior, and instead signals that his actions were motivated by reputation concerns.

In Study 1a, participants (N = 201) were asked to imagine running into a coworker named Jeff around town. During their walk, they passed by a group taking donations for a local children’s hospital. We then manipulated (a) whether the participant saw Jeff donate to the charity and (a) whether Jeff later publicized his donation on Facebook. Participants then rated Jeff on a 12-item charitable credit measure, which included items such as how moral, nice, and altruistic Jeff is. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Donation Visibility X Facebook Post crossover interaction (p < .001). Participants in the Unknown condition gave Jeff more charitable credit when he bragged (M = 5.38) than when he did not brag (M = 4.63, t(99) = 4.65, p < .001). However, when the donation was Known to others, participants gave Jeff less credit when he bragged (M = 5.24) versus when he did not brag (M = 5.72, t(98) = -2.66, p = .009).

Study 1b tests the robustness of these results using a more subtle form of bragging. Specifically, we manipulated whether Jeff wore a button that advertised his donation to charity or one that supported his college basketball team. We replicate all results.

Studies 2 and 3 show why bragging about prosocial behavior is different from other forms of bragging. When prosocial behavior is already known, bragging becomes self-defeating: by telling others of their good deeds, a braggart is seen as having selfish motives which undermines the perception that he is generous. However, bragging about personal achievements and gains for the self do not undermine perceptions of motivation; for self-interested pursuits, image concerns are not directly at odds with perceptions about personal qualities. Thus, we expect that—unlike prosocial behavior—bragging about self-interested pursuits will have no effect on perceptions of the trait conveyed in a brag.

In Study 2, participants (N = 203) imagined running into a colleague named Jeff. We manipulated (a) whether Jeff just finished volunteering for charity or running a 10k race and (b) whether he bragged about his achievement on Facebook. Participants then rated (a) Jeff’s intrinsic motivation for helping others [running in the race] and (b) how much charitable [athletic] credit Jeff deserved for his accomplishment. In order to compare credit across conditions, we first standardized our credit measure across the two activity types. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Activity Type X Facebook Post interaction, p = .011. In the Prosocial condition participants rated Jeff as being less charitable when he bragged (M = -0.31) than when he did not brag (M = 0.33), t(100) = -3.38, p = .001. However, in the Athletic condition, participants did not evaluate Jeff’s athleticism differently when he bragged (M = 0.04) versus when he did not brag (M = -0.04), t(96) = 0.72, p = .72.

We also ran a moderated mediation analysis using the bootstrap procedure to test the process by which bragging affects credit. We predicted that in the Prosocial condition, a braggart will be seen as less intrinsically motivated to help which will reduce the credit he receives. However, in the Athletic condition, there will be no such mediation. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a significant indirect effect for the Prosocial condition (Indirect Effect = -0.66, SE = 0.15; 95% C.I. = [-0.97, -0.39]), but not for the Athletic condition (Indirect Effect = 0.00, SE = 0.14; 95% C.I. = [-0.26, 0.27]).

It is possible that participants felt that running a 10k required more effort than volunteering, and bragging is more acceptable for high effort behaviors. In Study 3, (N = 203) we hold effort constant by comparing bragging about spending money on oneself versus bragging about spending money on the self. Specifically, we manipulated (a) whether Jeff donated $60 to charity or purchased a $60 tennis racket and (b) whether he bragged about it on Facebook.
We then proceeded in the same manner as in Study 2, and replicate our previous findings. Specifically, a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Expenditure x Facebook Post interaction, p = .041. In the Spending on Others condition, participants rated Jeff as being less charitable when he bragged (M = -0.23) than when he did not brag (M = 0.23), t(99) = -2.37, p = .02. However, in the Spending on Self condition, participants did not evaluate Jeff’s athleticism differently when he bragged (M = 0.05) versus when he did not brag (M = -0.05), t(101) = 0.55, p = .59. Additionally, we replicate the moderated mediation results from Study 2.

In sum, bragging communicates that an individual has acted generously, but also signals that the braggart was not motivated by pure intentions. For any prosocial behavior, this illuminates the fundamental tension between doing good and appearing good.

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Virtual Lives
Chair: Gia Nardini, University of Florida, USA
Richard J. Lutz, University of Florida, USA

Paper #1: Virtual Learning about Alcohol through Narrative Transportation into Television Episodes
Cristel Antonia Russell, American University, USA
Edward F. McQuarrie, Santa Clara University, USA

Paper #2: Coping with Stress in the Age of Warcraft: A Conceptual Framework for Consumer Escapism
Andrew Kuo, Louisiana State University, USA

Paper #3: When a Picture is Worth Less Than a Thousand Words
Gia Nardini, University of Florida, USA
Robyn A. LeBoeuf, University of Florida, USA
Richard J. Lutz, University of Florida, USA

Paper #4: Somewhere Out There: The Power of Brands to Act as Virtual Proxies Signifying Safety and Representing Home during Intense Risk-filled Separations
Hope Jensen Schau, University of Arizona, USA
Mary C. Gilly, University of California, Irvine, USA
Mary Wolflinbarger Celsi, California State University, Long Beach, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers’ lives are increasingly intertwined with technology (Evans 2003). As smartphones, tablet computers, and access to mobile broadband continue to diffuse throughout the population, constant connectivity has become a way of life.

The title of this session suggests that, as consumers spend more and more time with various forms of media, and as those media become more encompassing, interactive, and immersive, consumers’ lives have an ever-greater virtual component. Consumers spend hours in massively multiplayer online games, sleep with their iPhones so as not to miss a single text, constantly manage their online identities via Facebook posts, and create avatars in online worlds like Second Life.

Clearly, consumers perceive multiple beneficial outcomes emanating from their virtual lives, or their participation would not be so intense. However, it is also apparent that the consumption of various forms of entertainment media that can nurture consumers’ “virtual lives” also can sometimes have negative consequences in “real life”. The mental health community, for example, is increasingly concerned with consumer addictions to videogames, devices such as smartphones, and social networking sites like Facebook.

The purpose of the session is to explore several instances of consumers’ virtual lives broadly construed in order to gain more insights into the positive and negative consequences of this phenomenon. First, Russell and McQuarrie present the results of a series of experimental studies funded by NIAAA to investigate the role of narrative transportation (i.e., immersion into the story) in teens’ reactions to TV programming featuring underage alcohol use. They find that narrative transportation is a powerful mediator of participants’ attitudes toward drinking, beyond mere emotional reactions and identification with characters. Kuo reports the results of a qualitative depth interview study of escapism in the context of video games. He finds positive short-term consequences such as stress relief and self-esteem repair but also hints of long-term negative consequences of excessive and prolonged participation in escapist activities. Nardini, LeBoeuf & Lutz introduce the concept of “implicit distraction” to explain the deleterious effect of excessive picture taking on enjoyment of an experience. Two experiments show that picture taking damages enjoyment, yet is not perceived by participants as a distraction. Finally, Schau, Gilly & Celsi use archival analysis and depth interviews to illuminate how consumers use brands as virtual connections during times of separation. Working with military families, they develop a typology of roles that brands can fulfill when serving as virtual proxies for safety and home.

Taken together, the papers in the session address the questions: How do consumers create and nurture their virtual lives? What are the tradeoffs between positive and negative outcomes of virtual lives? How can consumers manage their virtual lives more judiciously to enhance their “real life” wellbeing?

Virtual Learning about Alcohol through Narrative Transportation into Television Episodes

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research focuses on the health implications of immersing oneself into a virtual story, in our case, a fictional television episode. We pursue this research question in the context of a major public health problem: under-age drinking. Social policy research has established that depictions of alcohol and storylines that revolve around drinking are common in popular culture forms directed at a youthful audience. Alcohol consumption shows up in music lyrics and in music videos, and across a wide variety of movie and television genres (Dal Cin et al. 2008; Gunasekera, Chapman and Campbell 2005; Gruber et al. 2005; Russell and Russell 2009; Sargent et al. 2005; Sargent, Tanski, and Gibson 2007). In turn, exposure to media programming that features alcohol has been implicated as a causal factor in alcohol use and abuse by teens. The presentation reports the findings of an experimental program funded by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) concerning the impact on teens of alcohol-related narratives. We constructed TV episodes to present these narratives. The episodes feature fictional characters’ “virtual lives” whose experiences with alcohol could, based on narrative transportation (NT) theory, alter teen viewers’ own beliefs about real life drinking and its consequences (Green and Brock 2000). The premise of NT theory is that transportation into the virtual world of the story causes dispositions to shift in a direction consistent with the story world (Gerrig 1993). So, if the story shows teenagers having fun drinking alcohol, and the teenage viewer is transported into that story, then that viewer’s beliefs about the consequences of consuming alcohol should shift in the direction of perceiving more positive outcomes. Conversely, if the story shows realistic negative outcomes of alcohol, then a transported teen’s dispositions toward alcohol should accordingly shift in a more negative direction. Because transportation into the story is usually induced through identification with the virtual characters that populate it, character identification is also a likely driver of the persuasiveness of the messages contained in the story.

We present a series of experiments to test the theoretical prediction that shifts in real life beliefs about alcohol will be mediated by the degree to which the teens immerse themselves into the virtual life presented in a TV episode. In other words, we assess the possibility that these virtual narratives can indirectly persuade teens through narrative transportation (Green and Brock 2000) and character iden-
Coping with Stress in the Age of Warcraft: A Conceptual Framework for Consumer Escapism

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

This research explores the phenomenon of consumer escapism within the context of online gaming. While there exist many strategies for coping that involve the consumption of products, escapism through gaming is unique in its ability to immerse consumers in virtual realities where desires, wishes, and fantasies can come true. With continuing advances in media technology (e.g., online connectivity, photorealistic CGI, intuitive motion/touch controls), escaping into the digital worlds of video games and other such interactive platforms has become an increasingly common consumer behavior. In the current marketing literature, the escapism construct has been invoked in several consumption contexts. In their examination of online search behavior, Mathwick and Rigdon (2004) describe escapism as a state of psychological immersion. Within their framework of television connectedness, Russell, Norman, and Heckler (2004) define escapism as the process by which viewers immerse themselves in their favorite shows for the purpose of avoiding reality. These same themes are echoed in research examining other consumption contexts such as themed restaurants (Kozinets et al. 2002) and historical reenactments (Belk and Costa 1998). This research seeks to extend the current literature by examining the motivations and processes inherent to escapism through online gaming.

To accomplish this goal, in-depth interviews were conducted with two sets of participants: (1) four individuals who regularly participated in online sessions of Warcraft III: Reign of Chaos, and (2) four individuals who frequently engaged in non-gaming escape behaviors (e.g., watching TV). Following a methodology adapted from Mick and Buhl (1992), interviews were conducted over several sessions in participants’ homes. The first session of each interview focused on uncovering relevant insights into the life themes and histories of each participant, and subsequent interviews obtained descriptive first-hand accounts of individual escape experiences. A general framework for escape was developed by analyzing the relationship between life themes, the interpretation of stress, and the escape behaviors that ensued.

There were several key findings that emerged from the qualitative analysis. The first stage of the analysis focused on understanding how the different stressors that motivate escape influence the gaming experience. Threats against self-esteem, for example, have been shown to trigger behaviors such as overeating (Mandel and Smeesters 2008) in an effort to cope. Within the context of gaming, threats against self-esteem (e.g., a poor job performance review) motivated respondents to adopt online avatars within Warcraft that allowed for a strong sense of affirmation. More specifically, such players tended to gravitate toward characters that represented ideal versions of their real life personas. One informant, for example, consistently chose elf characters because of their unique character traits (i.e., agile, chivalrous, intelligent). From the perspective of self-discrepancy theory (Higgins 1987), these respondents were given the opportunity to overcome perceived self-discrepancies by assuming the identities of their avatars within the Warcraft universe. Consequently, strong emotional attachments were formed with the avatars that persisted over long periods of time.

For other informants, threats against self-control (i.e., the inability to control interactions with the environment and other individuals) were the primary stressors motivating their gaming behavior. When faced with a loss of control in real life (e.g., lack of authority at work), such informants used Warcraft as means of re-establishing a sense of control within the confines of a virtual world. To achieve
maximum control of the in-game environment, these informants strategically chose avatars that possessed the power to dominate other players. Instead of forming a personal connection with their avatar, informants motivated by the need for control sought only the feelings of empowerment that come with in-game victory. One informant, for example, felt no attachment to his chosen avatar; rather, he repeatedly chose to use a specific character (i.e., the Death Knight) due to its ability to overcome the feelings of powerlessness he often experienced in the real world.

In contrast with the active role taken by consumers during a session of Warcraft, escapism through other forms of entertainment is often more passive in nature. When watching TV, for example, the viewer is generally a third-person observer, rather than a first-person participant. Consequently, informants engaging in non-gaming forms of escapism did not accrue the same benefits of affirmation and empowerment through their escape experiences. Instead, passive escapism functions as a coping mechanism through distraction and mental absorption. For example, one informant frequently used televised sporting events as a means of redirecting his thoughts away from stressful situations. The effectiveness of escape under such circumstances is contingent on the degree to which the stimulus can hold the attention of the viewer. Other informants reported similar experiences with magazines, music, and TV dramas.

As an emotion-focused style of coping (Lazarus 1999), active escapism through video games is particularly potent due to the feelings of affirmation and empowerment that emerge during the process. Although passive escapism may offer limited amounts of affirmation or empowerment through vicarious consumption, the element of role-play inherent to gaming allows for these feelings to be powerfully realized. For this reason, escapism through video games can become pathological; several informants, for example, reported that their gaming behaviors had negatively impacted their job performance and their relationships with family members. In this way, escapism through video games can become a vicious cycle whereby gaming leads to an increased amount of stress in the long-term. In extreme instances, addiction may occur when individuals see their existence in the virtual world of a game as preferable to their existence in the real world.

As gaming becomes increasingly prevalent across a broad range of consumers, this research contributes to the literature by creating a basic framework for understanding escapism in the gaming context. The insights gained through this research suggest that the unique stressors faced by individuals have a direct impact on the character of an escape experience. More specifically, threats against self-esteem lead to an escape experience that focuses on the affirmation of identity. In contrast, individuals who experience a loss of control in reality use the escape experience as a means of reestablishing a sense of control within the game.

When a Picture is Worth Less Than a Thousand Words

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The use of technology, and particularly social media, has become exceedingly common, especially among young adult consumers. Consumers multitask; check Facebook while in meetings, tweet while watching TV, and text while partying with friends. Although consumers seemingly assume that these media add to their overall enjoyment and wellbeing, we contend that such media multitasking can detract from enjoyment in some consumption situations. Specifically, a consumer participating in a hedonic consumption experience (e.g., a visit to a national park) may inadvertently diminish his/her enjoyment of the experience by constantly taking photos intended for Facebook. In essence, the desire to document the experience via pictures, tweets, or texts, distracts the consumer from the experience. However, because consumers take such activities for granted, they do not recognize them as distractions. Hence, we propose that the use of technology during a hedonic consumption episode becomes an implicit distraction, or a distraction that people fail to recognize. These implicit distractions may lead to unique effects not observed in response to more explicit distractions that people are aware of.

Past research on pain tolerance and on the enjoyment of positive experiences has found that distraction suppresses the effect of the informational component associated with an experience, thereby increasing dependence on the more automatic affective component (Leventhal, Brown, Shacham, and Engquist 1979; Shiv and Nowlis 2004). However, in this past research, the distraction (e.g., memorizing a number) was quite explicit to participants. We examine cases where the distraction is implicit or embedded within the experience, and we propose that the process is somewhat different. We suggest that with implicit distractions like taking pictures, the attention devoted towards the experience itself must be further divided, from simply enjoying the experience to also documenting it. This shift may lessen the amount of attention available for enjoying the experience itself.

We test this theory in two studies. Study 1 examined the effects of various types of distractions on the enjoyment and subsequent choice of a sampled experience. In the “High Implicit Distraction” condition, participants were asked to take as many pictures as possible during a 1-minute video of a private island in the Virgin Islands. In the “Low Implicit Distraction” condition, participants were told that they could take pictures if they wished, but that they weren’t required to. In the “High Explicit Distraction” condition, participants memorized an 8-digit number while watching the video. Finally, in the “Low Explicit Distraction” condition, participants memorized a 2-digit number while watching the video. To gauge participants’ enjoyment of the video, they were asked whether they would choose to watch a 5-minute version of the same video or instead watch an alternative (unsampled) 5-minute video, as well as rate their degree of enjoyment, involvement, and distraction while viewing the video.

The type and level of distraction significantly influenced both choice and rated enjoyment. Choice of the sampled video was significantly higher with high explicit distraction (memorizing an 8-digit number; 82%) than with high implicit distraction (taking many pictures; 50%; χ² = 4.77, p = .029). When distraction was low, choice of the sampled video was marginally higher in the implicit (71%) than explicit condition (46%; χ² = 3.05, p = .081). Planned contrasts also revealed that participants taking only a few pictures enjoyed the experience (M = 13.42) significantly more than participants taking many pictures (M = 12.27, p = .05). However, participants felt significantly more distracted in the high explicit condition than in each of the other conditions (all p < .05). Thus, taking many pictures (a high implicit distraction) did not feel particularly distracting but did reduce enjoyment of the experience.

Study 2 investigated consumers’ lack of awareness of the detrimental consequences of taking too many pictures by looking into the lay theories people hold. Participants read a scenario about a person who vacationed at the Grand Canyon. We manipulated whether the vacationer took 10, 50, or 100 pictures during the 1-day trip.

The number of pictures taken significantly influenced predictions of enjoyment. Positive affect was predicted to be significantly lower when 10 pictures were taken (M = 11.44) than when 50 or 100 pictures were taken (M = 13.65 and M = 14.08 respectively, p < .001). Further, participants predicted marginally more regret when 10 pictures were taken (M = 2.12) than when 50 or 100 pictures were taken.
(M= 1.54 and M= 1.44 respectively, p= .09). Finally, participants predicted a significantly worse trip when 10 pictures were taken (M= 1.76) than when 50 or 100 pictures were taken (M= 1.23 and M=1.20, p= .03). These results suggest that people believe that others enjoy experiences more, not less, when more pictures are taken. (We also found that when participants rated how much they themselves would enjoy the trip that they read about, the number of pictures taken by the vacationer did not affect the participant’s own predicted enjoyment. Thus, our findings cannot be explained by participants judging the trip to be subpar when only a few pictures were taken.)

Our results thus far indicate that not all distractions have the same types of effects. The influence of distraction on the enjoyment of experiences depends on the nature of the distraction. While an explicit distraction at high levels (i.e. memorizing an 8-digit number) led to more enjoyment of an experience, an implicit distraction at high levels (i.e. taking many pictures) led to less enjoyment. Further, contrary to participants’ lay theories, taking many pictures was significantly less enjoyable than taking only a few pictures.

Our findings have implications for consumers’ use of technologies such as social media while engaged in hedonic experiences. Further research is underway to determine if the effects observed here hold for other common multitasking activities like texting and tweeting. In addition, we are working to develop a deeper process account of the effects.

Somewhere Out There: The Power of Brands to Act as Virtual Proxies Signifying Safety and Representing Home During Intense Risk-Filled Separations

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

There are about 1,400,000 active military personnel across all branches: 103,000 are “afloat” and 297,000 are installed in foreign countries (US Census 2012, Table 509). All are in a state of risk-filled separation. All communicate with families and friends. All seek to bridge the distance between themselves and loved ones. During separation, co-creating home and signaling proximity can bolster both deployed soldiers and family and friends who remain at home. Our research focuses on how home is enacted and consumed during family separation and how proximity is signaled. Our context heightens the importance of maintaining connections to home since deployment often involves the risk of bodily injury.

Fournier (1998) established that consumers create and maintain bonds with brands that in many ways resemble interpersonal relationships. Abundant literature has considered the manner in which these consumer-brand and consumer-company relationships are formed (c.f., Aggarwal 2004; Bhattacharya and Sen 2003), are enacted within specific consumer constituents (c.f., Kates 2000; Luedicke, Thompson and Giesler 2009), become intensified as in brand love (c.f., Carroll and Ahuvia 2006; Batra Ahuvia and Bagozzi 2012), and eventually end (Fiona, Hall and Meamber 2012). Belk (1988) argues that relationships between consumers and objects are never truly dyadic (consumer-object), but rather are multi-pronged (consumer-object-consumer). Consumers’ relationships with objects like brands are most often social. Interestingly, Fournier’s (1998) informants revealed that their consumer-brand bonds often originate in strong interpersonal relationships (a daughter engages in a relationship with a cleaning product her mother used). Schau and Gilly (2003) detail how consumers post brands in personal webpage as shorthand to communicate identity details to website visitors, engaging in conspicuous virtual materialism sharing identity projects with known and unknown others. Research on direct transitional objects show people actively use mementoes to transition from one identity to another as in physical displacement and death (c.f., Gentry, Kennedy, Paul and Hill 1995; Hill 1991; Hill and Stamey 1990; Parkin 1999). The object sometimes stands in for a loved one or a special place. Research has examined how people create home away from home (Clapham 2012; Gorman-Murray 2007; Malone and Dooley 2006; McCracken 1989). While these studies elucidate many complexities surrounding consumers’ relationships with objects and brands, they do not yet reveal how consumers use brands within their real life, active, interpersonal relationships, or specifically how brands connect consumers in virtualities. Our research seeks to understand the manner in which consumers undergoing intense risk-filled separations from family and friends use brands in their communication with distant loved ones. Specifically, we examine the manner in which deployed military and their family and friends utilize brands in their interpersonal communications.

Using historical documents (archived military personal correspondence), brand promotions that explicitly call upon patriotic military themes (especially separation), 26 interviews with families that have experienced a military deployment, and online forums for deployed military and their families, we uncover the strategic use of brands within personal communications during intense risk-filled separations.

We examined outward facing consumer-brand bonds that have a communicative function to an external set of constituents (family and friends not deployed to the same base). We find two broad categories: comfort brands and military-endorsed brands. For comfort brands and military-endorsed brands there are two consumer-brand relationship trajectories: continuing (once begun they are maintained in and out of military service) and contextual (only active during active military service).

Comfort Brands are consumed explicitly for comfort-oriented reasons. For example, brands are used to signify safety and proximity to friends and family in the U.S. or to represent locales like home. By function, we identify them as: proxies (brands that communicate proximity like being under the same sky as in An American Tail or singing the same song), cozies (brands that communicate that military personnel are safe and the situation is mundane rather than in peril, such as eating Dunkin Donuts), homies (brands that represent locales specifically home [US or regional] like McDonalds, Coca-Cola, or Alejandro tortillas specific to Tucson), and techies (brands that literally bring family and friends together technologically like Skype, iPhone/iPad, Google Chat, Gmail). Within comfort brand relationships we have two distinct types: legacy brand relationships, a form of continuing bonds (those that continue pre-military or extra-military consumer-brand bonds) and emergent brand relationships, a form of contextual bonds (those that emerge as comfort brands through military exposure on base).

Military Endorsed Brands are brands that military personnel first encountered in the military through defense-based contracts (e.g., Oakley) that then come to be trusted as high quality. Insiders who know military use of the brands and military grade standards come to mark these vetted high-quality brands as safe. In this research, we are specifically looking at family and friends of military. Within the military-endorsed brands we have two types: treasures and tools. Treasures are a form of continuing bonds where brands that are initially used within the confines of the job but then are exported or used outside of active military-related uses (e.g., used within families and friend sets). Tools are a form of contextual bonds where brands are used only within the confines of the job.

In essence, we find that consumers utilize brands as virtual proxies signifying safety and representing home during intense risk-filled separations. Both consumers at home and those deployed share...
pictures and stories of shared brands to strengthen bonds and communicate shared safety and solidarity.

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From the Bedroom to the Bank: Novel Insights into Sex and Consumer Choice
Chair: Kristina M. Durante, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

**Paper #1: Conspicuous Consumption, Relationships and Rivals:**
Women’s Luxury Products as Signals to Other Women
Vladas Griskevicius, University of Minnesota, USA
Yajin Wang, University of Minnesota, USA

**Paper #2: Playing the Field: The Effect of Fertility on Women’s Desire for Variety**
Ashley Rae, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Kristina M. Durante, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

**Paper #3: Sex as Power: Attractive Women Link Sexuality and Power for Personal Gain**
Carlos J. Torelli, University of Minnesota, USA
Chiraag Mittal, University of Minnesota, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA

Steven J. Stanton, Oakland University, USA
O’Dhaniel Mullette-Gillman, National University of Singapore, Singapore
Crystal Reeck, Columbia University, USA
Charlotte Mabe, Duke University, USA
Kevin S. LaBar, Duke University, USA
Scott A. Huettel, Duke University, USA

**SESSION OVERVIEW**

The idea that “sex sells” is commonplace in the marketing world. But, is it possible that sexual motives influence consumer choice far beyond the draw of explicit sexual cues? While sexual cues are an effective method for attracting consumers’ attention, research has yet to consider how consumers’ sexual and mating concerns influence decisions particularly within consumer domains that, on the surface, have little to do with sex. This special session features groundbreaking research that combines business science with the natural sciences. Each set of findings provide a unique window into the mating-related mechanisms that can underlie consumer choices and challenge some existing views of the factors that influence consumption.

The first two papers offer a fresh take on women’s conspicuous consumption and desire for variety. In the first paper, Wang and Griskevicius investigate the role sexual rivals play in driving women’s consumption of luxury goods. Four experiments show that women’s conspicuous consumption is triggered by a desire to signal to other rival women, and that flaunting expensive products is effective at deterring rivals from stealing a romantic partner. The second paper, by Rae and Durante, examines a previously unconsidered factor that influences consumer variety seeking: the hormones that regulate fertility. Four experiments show that ovulating women desire greater variety in product choice and that this increase in variety seeking is driven by an increase in desire for new men.

The final two papers provide new evidence for how sex and power impact economic and consumer choice. The third paper, by Torelli, Mittal, and Vohs, focuses on how attractiveness influences women’s internalization of a link between sexuality and power. Four experiments show that more (vs. less) attractive women endorse sexual leveraging for acquiring/restoring power and – subsequently – attempt to boost their attractiveness via products that enhance sex appeal when feeling powerless. The fourth paper, by Stanton and colleagues, switches gears to also shine a light on men. Two studies challenge the notion that testosterone – a hormone responsible for driving sexual behavior and status striving – is also responsible for risky financial decisions. Findings are the first to demonstrate that how testosterone influences financial risk depends greatly on whether the decision has social implications or only impacts the self.

This session aims to make a difference by introducing research lines that open an exciting new frontier for marketing research. Separately, each paper in this session provides a different insight into the role sex plays in consumer choice. Together, these papers provide an additional perspective on the idea that “sex sells” by showing how, when, and why the bedroom can often lead to the bank. As such, the session would be of interest to a breadth of consumer researchers, including those interested in materialism, sexual economics, motivation, social perception, nonconscious processes, romantic relationships, and biological and evolutionary approaches to consumer behavior.

**Conspicuous Consumption, Relationships and Rivals:**
Women’s Luxury Products as Signals to Other Women

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

A designer handbag found on the shelves of stores such as Neiman Marcus, Saks Fifth Avenue, or Nordstrom costs anywhere from several hundred to several thousand dollars. Yet an average American woman purchases three new handbags each year, prominently flaunting designer brands such as Fendi, Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Marc Jacobs, Christian Dior, Prada, and Chanel. Spending on luxury goods amounts to as much as $525 billion per year in the United States alone, with women’s products accounting for over half of this consumption. Given women’s passion for pricey possessions, why do they desire luxury goods?

Considerable research has examined why people purchase luxury products. Past work finds that the reasons for why consumers seek such possessions include everything from pursuing happiness and boosting self-esteem to signaling one’s status and identity (Belk 1985; Han, Nunes, and Drezé 2010; Richins 1987; Veblen 1899). But there is reason to believe that luxury goods play an important role in another ubiquitous part of life-relationships. Recent findings suggest that men’s conspicuous consumption plays a vital role in relationship building by serving as a “sexual signaling system” (Sundie et al. 2011). In the current research, we examine whether women’s conspicuous consumption might have any function in relationships.

We propose that women’s conspicuous consumption may function as a signal to romantic rivals. We hypothesize that a woman can use luxury products to signal to other women that her romantic partner is especially devoted to her. In turn, flaunting expensive handbags and designer shoes might help women deter romantic rivals from poaching her relationship partner. We investigate the idea of whether women’s conspicuous consumption might function as a signaling system to guard mates in four studies.

Study 1 examined whether other women infer information about a woman’s relationship based on the luxuriousness of her possessions. Sixty-nine women were randomly assigned to read one of the descriptions about a woman either wear designer products or non-designer products at a party with her romantic partner. Results indicate that a woman was perceived as having a more devoted partner when she had designer compared to non-designer outfit and accessories (Ms=5.40 vs. 4.82, t=2.01, p=.048).

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Study 2 examined if experimentally activating a motive to guard a mate triggers women’s conspicuous consumption. Using guided visualization manipulations from previous research (Griskevicius et al. 2007; Maner et al. 2007), we activated either a (1) mate guarding motive, (2) mate attraction motive, or (3) control. Because the desire for conspicuous goods is related to the size of product brand logos (Lee and Shrum 2012; Nunes et al. 2010), women were then given the opportunity to draw luxury brand logos on a handbag, shoe, car, and T-shirt that they would want to purchase. The dependent measure was the size of the logo women drew for each product. Findings showed that only a mate guarding motive altered the size of logos ($t(134)=3.21, p = .002$), leading women to draw luxury brand logos that were about twice the size compared to those in the other conditions.

Study 3 sought to conceptually replicate and extended the mate guarding finding from Study 2 using different dependent measures including desire to spend for both conspicuous and non-conspicuous consumption products. The results suggest that mate guard motive, does not simply lead women to want to spend more on any products, but is instead specific to products used for conspicuous consumption. Study 3 also ruled out two possible alternatives, showing that this effect is not driven by threat to one’s self-esteem or by the mere present of another woman.

Study 4 examined the intended audience of women’s conspicuous product displays. Because women’s conspicuous consumption is hypothesized to ward off female rivals, we predicted that the intended audience of women’s luxury possessions would specifically be women who are potential threats to the relationships. We activated a mate guarding motive, but the situation was manipulated so that the woman’s conspicuous products could only be seen by either other women or men. Thus, the study had three between-subjects conditions: (1) mate guarding – male audience, (2) mate guarding – female audience, and (3) control.

To assess conspicuous consumption, all participants earned 5 extra dollars in the study, which they could either take home or use to purchase raffle tickets to win a $200 gift card for a spending spree at a luxury store (e.g., Neiman Marcus, Tiffany & Co., etc.). Participants could spend as much or as little of the $5, with higher spending increasing the likelihood of getting the card. Findings showed that activating a mate guarding only increased women’s conspicuous consumption when the audience were other women ($t(72)=2.90, p=.04$).

Additional data suggest that when a woman had luxurious possessions paid by her partner, other women were less willing to romantically pursue her relationship partner if the opportunity arose. Therefore, women’s luxurious possession is in fact effective signal to facilitate mate guarding.

Overall, this research makes a contribution by identifying a novel function of women’s conspicuous consumption, showing the workings of how luxury products can function as signaling system to ward off romantic rivals, and revealing how products play an important and previously unknown role in relationships.

Playing the Field: The Effect of Fertility on Women’s Desire for Variety

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

While considerable past research has examined variety seeking in consumer choice (e.g., Kahn 1995), the current research is the first to examine whether women’s desire for variety is influenced by a universal biological factor – the monthly ovulatory cycle.

The ovulatory cycle spans, on average, 28 days, during which a woman can become pregnant on about one week — the ovulatory phase of the cycle. Although most women do not know when they are ovulating, research has shown that ovulation can non-consciously alter women’s psychology and decision-making. For example, near ovulation women have more fantasies about other men that are especially different from their current partner (Sheldon et al. 2006) and have more extramarital affairs (Bellis and Baker 1990). Ovulating women are particularly attracted to men other than their current partner who display markers of genetic fitness (e.g., symmetry, masculinity, social dominance; Durante et al. 2012; Garver-Apgar et al. 2006). These findings suggest that the hormonal fluctuations associated with ovulation may increase women’s openness to variety – at least in men. Here, we explore whether this ovulatory-induced shift in preference for different men translates to the marketplace.

Study 1 examined whether ovulation increases variety-seeking in consumer choice. Women made 15 choices about nail polish color (out of 20 colors). Participants were told to select a nail color for each day (1 – 15) and were told they could select as many or as few nail colors as they preferred. Results showed that women chose a greater variety of colors near ovulation compared to when not ovulating ($M_{ovulating} = 6.73$ vs. $M_{not-ovulating} = 5.46; p = .044$).

Because we propose that women’s desire for variety in product choice is a reflection of an ovulatory increase in openness to different men, Study 2 examined whether openness to sex with a new man mediates women’s variety seeking. Women made 15 choices of nail color as in Study 1 and reported the likelihood they would date, have sex with, or engage in a brief affair with a man other than their current partner. Ovulating women sought greater variety in nail choice compared to women who were not ovulating ($M_{ovulating} = 6.63$ vs. $M_{not-ovulating} = 5.52; p = .056$). Ovulating women also reported higher likelihood estimates for having a sexual affair with other men ($M_{ovulating} = .179$ vs. $M_{not-ovulating} = .076; p = .014$). The effect of ovulation on women’s variety seeking was mediated by women’s openness to sex with other men ($r = .21; SE = .14; 95\% \text{ BCI} .027 – .647$).

Given that mating motives appear to underlie the effect of ovulation on women’s variety seeking, Study 3 sought to suppress the ovulatory effect on desire for variety by manipulating women’s mating goals. While ovulation leads women to be open to short-term sex with attractive men, an important moderator of this effect is the quality of a woman’s current romantic partner. Research finds that ovulation does not lead women to be interested in other men when their current partner is high in sexual desirability (e.g., Larson et al. 2013). This suggests that ovulating women should be motivated to retain a current mate if he is someone who is physically attractive. Study 3 therefore investigated whether a motive to retain an attractive partner (vs. a control) would suppress the effect of ovulation on variety seeking. Study 3 also measured variety seeking in four different product categories: nails, high heel shoes, candy bars, and restaurants.

There was no influence of fertility on variety by product type so the four product categories were converted into a variety seeking composite ($a = .77$). As predicted, there was no difference in variety seeking between ovulating and non-ovulating women in the mate retention condition ($M_{ovulating} = 8.50$ vs. $M_{not-ovulating} = 9.40); $p = .13$. Replicating Studies 1 and 2, ovulating women in the control condition chose a greater variety of products near ovulation compared to when they were not ovulating ($M_{ovulating} = 10.35$ vs. $M_{not-ovulating} = 8.65; p = .016$).

To this point, we have examined the effect of ovulation on variety seeking for both single and married women. However, unlike single women, married women have made a significant commitment to one partner and they may have considerably more to lose from...
the dissolution of their relationship. Further, married women often wear a symbol of their commitment to one man in the form of a wedding ring. Because a wedding ring is considered to be a strong and universal symbol of commitment to one’s partner (Chesser 1980), we reasoned that the act of removing and putting on one’s wedding ring should augment feelings of commitment. Drawing on the idea that sensorimotor stimulation translates to cognitions associated with that stimulus (Ackerman et al. 2010; Chandler et al. 2012), Study 4 examined how removing and replacing one’s wedding ring would influence the effect of ovulation on variety seeking. We hypothesize that removing one’s wedding ring lead to cognitions associated with lower commitment (akin to a mate attraction motive) and, thus, bolster the effect of ovulation on variety seeking. Conversely, the act of putting one’s wedding ring back on (akin to a mate retention motive) should suppress the effect of ovulation on variety seeking. There was a significant interaction between fertility and condition, \( p = .03 \). While there was no difference in variety seeking by condition for women who were not ovulating (\( p = .37 \)), our key prediction concerned how removing and replacing a wedding ring would affect variety seeking in women who were ovulating. Near ovulation, women sought more variety in product choice after they removed their wedding ring and less variety when they put their wedding ring back on \( (M_{\text{Roff}} = 10.52 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{Ringon}} = 8.48; p = .035) \).

Four studies show that the hormones associated with ovulation influence women’s desire for variety. This research adds to the literature on how hormones can influence consumption behavior (Durante et al. 2011) and is among the first to demonstrate the mediating role mating motives play in consumer choice.

Sex as Power: Attractive Women Link Sexuality and Power for Personal Gain

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

It is often believed that women and men differ in their approaches for exercising power, in that women in powerful positions seem more likely than men to mentor and coach (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt 2001). Although women and men tend to differ in their emphasis on the personal versus relational self (Cross and Madison 1997), women nonetheless possess a personal self complete with individualized goals, desires, and preferences (Gabriel and Gardner 1999). Knowing that women generally use power for mutual gain while acknowledging that women have inner goals that they seek to attain for their own personal gain suggests that there will be circumstances in which women seek personal gain through power. When and how women seek power for personal gain was the focus on the current research.

Our task was to study women’s views about the meaning and purpose of power, particularly as it relates to the use of sex and attractiveness. Social interactions with men can offer an opportunity for some women to gain personal power. Sexual Economics Theory (Baumeister and Vohs 2004) proposes that sex is a female resource that bestows upon women considerable negotiating power in the context of heterosexual relationships. This power enables women to be able to request valuable resources (e.g., respect or material gifts) in order for the sexual exchange to occur. Women’s negotiating power is particularly strong in the case of more (versus less) attractive women. Because attractive women are more desirable than others, they have even more of an upper hand and thusly the power to demand more resources (Baumeister and Vohs 2004). Since men often see the world through sexual glasses and interpret their social interactions with women in sexual terms (Shotland and Craig 1988), men can become quite concerned about gaining the approval of attractive women (Van Vugt and Iredale 2012). As a consequence, there is spillover from the heterosexual negotiation script into mixed-sex social interactions, which also are especially favorable to attractive women (Dion and Stein 1978). To the extent that more attractive women successfully leverage their physical attractiveness for fulfilling their personal goals, these women could both develop a stronger belief that power can be useful for personal gain and that leveraging one’s physical attractiveness is an acceptable and effective means for doing so (Darley and Fazio 1980). Therefore, we predicted that more (versus less) attractive women, who can use their physical attractiveness more often and effectively, would have a higher likelihood to conceptualize power in personalized terms (i.e., that the purpose of power is for personal gain, Winter 1973), as well as to endorse the use of sexual leveraging for achieving or restoring power.

Four studies tested these predictions by comparing the beliefs, reactions, choices, and behaviors among women who were (self- or other-rated as) more or less attractive. Study 1 used established scales to measure different facets of personalized power related to one’s ability to control/influence others for personal gain, aspiration for gaining social status, and desire to dominate others, as well as participants’ physical attractiveness. Findings suggested that more (versus less) attractive women expressed aspirations to achieve high social status, thought that assertive, forceful, and self-assured behaviors are good, and more confidently believed that they can influence others and satisfy their own desires.

Study 2 directly assessed the link between women’s physical attractiveness and the use of sexuality to acquire/restore power. Participants first answered questions in response to four interpersonal situations including some contexts in which targets were portrayed exercising or reacting to power (Torelli & Shavitt, 2010). Two situations involved leveraging sex appeal for acquiring/restoring power, whereas the other two involved forceful, non-sexual actions in response to abuses of power. These latter situations were included for comparison purposes to explore the possibility that more (versus less) attractive women are simply more likely to react to the negative feelings triggered by misuses of power. Next, participants answered questions that measured their self-reported tendencies to leverage their sex appeal for gaining power. Last, we measured attractiveness in two ways as a robustness check. The results demonstrated that attractiveness was positively related with women’s approval of the use of sexual leveraging for acquiring or restoring power. Furthermore, the higher approval of sexual leveraging actions for acquiring power among more (versus less) attractive women was mediated by their own self-reported tendencies to leverage their sex appeal. Findings also show that attractiveness seems to be unrelated with the likelihood that women would react to the negative feelings triggered by powerlessness.

Study 3 experimentally manipulated feelings of powerlessness in order to directly test the extent to which more (versus less) attractive women seek to amplify their sex appeal when feeling powerless. We assessed women’s choices for products that can enhance sex appeal after inducing (versus not) a sense of being powerless. Results showed that feelings of powerlessness prompted more attractive women to choose products that could boost their sex appeal, compared to their choices in a neutral condition and compared to less attractive women. Less attractive women in contrast, showed no differences as a function of condition. Study 4 directly measured women’s attempts to boost their physical attractiveness in response to feelings of powerlessness using a behavioral measure, and used others’ ratings of participants’ physical attractiveness as the measure of attractiveness. The findings demonstrated feelings of powerlessness made more attractive women become more interested
in products that are instrumental for boosting their attractiveness. These effects were specific to such products, and did not emerge for products that were described in sexuality-appealing terms but were not instrumental for boosting attractiveness. This argues against the alternative account that power is linked to the general concept of sex in more attractive women, suggesting that they do not possess a global link between power and sex.

The combined results of the studies provided converging evidence for the notion that feelings of power and sexuality are linked for women high in attractiveness, which therefore make these women more likely to compensate for a lack of power by attempting to boost their sex appeal.

Sex Hormones & Economic Decisions: The Effect of Testosterone on Financial Risk Depends on Social Context

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Does testosterone influence risky decisions in economic and social domains? There has been recent speculation in the media that testosterone drives risky decisions, and that the Great Recession started in 2008 because there was “Too Much Testosterone on Wall Street” (Hewlett 2009). In spite of those strong claims, there was scant empirical research to corroborate them, and generally little was known about physiological factors that might account for individual differences in our risk preferences. In two studies, the present research explored the extent to which testosterone predicts individuals’ willingness to take risks when making economic decisions alone and when making socially-interactive economic decisions.

Decades of research have shown that testosterone drives mating behavior and is associated with social dominance, the pursuit of status, and aggression (Archer 2006; Mazur and Booth 1998; Stanton and Schultheiss 2009). For example, individuals with high testosterone levels pursue high-status, risk-laden careers (Dabbs et al. 1990; 1998), and army soldiers with the highest levels of testosterone are the most likely to abuse drugs, be violent, and go AWOL (Mazur, 1995). These behaviors put one’s social relationships as well as one’s health and well-being at risk. While testosterone is associated with these and other risky social behaviors, it is unclear whether or not high levels of testosterone predispose individuals to pursue risk in other domains such as economic decision making. The present studies examine not just how testosterone may relate to risky economic decisions, but also the extent to which the social nature of the economic decision may influence the relationship between testosterone and economic decision-making behavior.

Across studies, testosterone was collected and measured from saliva using standard methods and radioimmunoassay techniques (Schultheiss and Stanton 2009). Testosterone levels were z-scored within sex and collapsed over gender (Mehta et al. 2008).

Study 1 investigated the relationship between individuals’ testosterone levels and their tolerance of unfair offers made in the ultimatum game. The ultimatum game is a dyadic social economic game that involves the exchange of money between participants within a constrained format that allows one to compare how often a participant is willing to accept fair versus unfair exchange offers. Participants’ (N = 57) testosterone levels were negatively related to their acceptance of unfair offers, \( r(55) = -0.27, p = 0.04 \), meaning that high-testosterone individuals were less tolerant of unfair offers. The relationship persisted when controlling for gender \( \beta = -0.28, p = 0.04 \). Moreover, there was no relationship between testosterone levels and acceptance of fair offers, \( r(55) = 0.11, p = 0.43 \), which demonstrates that testosterone selectively predicts behavior when confronted with unfairness. Unfairness may be perceived as a challenge to one’s dominance. Accordingly, one would predict that testosterone should have selective effects on decisions regarding unfair offers as opposed to fair offers, which is what the data reflect.

But, does testosterone always lead individuals to make riskier decisions? Study 2 investigated the relationship between testosterone and aversion to risk in economic decisions that people make independently. In addition to interrogating the direct relationship between economic risk aversion and testosterone, the potential effects of participants’ relationship status were also considered. In the domain of power and sex hormones, relationship status is a critical factor, such that positive association between power and sex hormones is strongest in those who are single (Stanton and Schultheiss 2007; Stanton and Edelstein, 2009). From an evolutionary perspective, testosterone may more robustly promote behaviors associated with the pursuit of power and economic gains in single individuals (Saad and Vongas 2009; Stanton and Edelstein 2009).

Participants’ (N = 390) risk aversion was determined through 120 trials in which they chose between a certain outcome (a guaranteed win) and a risky gamble that could potentially pay more or less than the certain outcome. Across the 120 trials, the values of the certain outcome, probabilities of winning the gamble, and the ratio of the expected value of the gamble to the value of the certain option were varied and randomized. Participants’ payment was dependent on their choices, which ensured that their behavior was incentive compatible.

Across all subjects, testosterone levels were positively associated with risk aversion, \( r(388) = 0.13, p = 0.01 \). In other words, low-testosterone individuals were the most risk seeking, which stands in contrast to received wisdom. This effect persists when controlling for gender \( \beta(387) = 0.13, p = 0.01 \). Further exploration of the effects of participants’ relationship status revealed that testosterone and risk aversion were particularly strongly correlated amongst those participants who were single, \( r(211) = 0.19, p = 0.005 \). This effect was then tested independently for each gender, and both single men and single women showed a similar relationship between testosterone and risk aversion, Men: \( r(80) = 0.27, p = 0.02 \), Women: \( r(128) = 0.15, p = 0.09 \). In contrast, testosterone and risk aversion were not significantly associated for those who were coupled, \( r(175) = 0.04, p = 0.56 \), and independent of testosterone, those in a relationship were not riskier than those who were single \( r(388) = 0.12, p = 0.90 \). It may be that low-testosterone individuals desire to pursue risk, but feel inhibited in social domains, which leads them to pursue risk in domains that are socially isolated such as economic decisions that are made independently. The findings suggest that testosterone’s relationship with risk aversion may be both counterintuitive as well as more complex than previously assumed.

The present studies demonstrate that testosterone is uniquely associated with risky decision making depending on social context and social factors. For social decisions, higher levels of testosterone predict greater risk and less tolerance of unfairness, whereas for economic decisions made alone, higher levels of testosterone predicted greater risk aversion. Interestingly, in both studies, the relationship between individuals’ testosterone levels and behavior were the same in men and women, which suggests that the putative male-specific role of testosterone in promoting riskiness is ill-founded. These studies suggest that individual differences in testosterone levels are a potential physiological mechanism that accounts for heterogeneity in economic risk preferences.
REFERENCES


Of Simple and Social Excuses to Indulge
Chair: Michael L. Lowe, Texas A&M University, USA

Paper #1: “So Cute I Can Eat it Up”: Priming Effects of Cute Products on Indulgent Consumption
Maura Scott, Florida State University, USA
Gergana Y. Nenkov, Boston College, USA

Paper #2: Consuming Functional Innovations: Are Utilitarian Behaviors Enhanced or Undermined?
Aaron M. Garvey, University of Kentucky, USA
Lisa E. Bolton, Pennsylvania State University, USA

Paper #3: Anticipated Sharing and Preference for Hedonic Products
Peggy J. Liu, Duke University, USA
Gavan J. Fitzsimons, Duke University, USA
James R. Bettman, Duke University, USA

Paper #4: Camaraderie in Crime: Shared Self-Control Decisions and Affiliation
Michael L. Lowe, Texas A&M University, USA
Kelly Haws, Vanderbilt University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
On its surface, exercising self-control would seem like a fairly simple proposition involving the decision to resist fleeting temptation and adhere to more important, long-term goals. In practice, however, choosing between indulgence and restraint is a daily convolution of emotions, aspirations, appetites, and rationalization, subject to a wide array of influences. Understanding the precursors and processes that lead a consumer to indulge or exercise restraint, and understanding the outcomes of these decisions, is of utmost interest to marketers, policy makers, and consumers alike. Consumers seem to be adept at generating justifications and excuses for lapses in self-control, contributing to a general propensity towards indulgence. Although most self-control research emphasizes the benefits of choosing virtues over vices (e.g., Wertenbroch 1998), consumers can clearly derive benefits from indulgent consumption experiences, and continually missing out on indulgence comes at a price (Haws and Poynor 2008; Kivetz and Keinan 2006). Still, indulgence as an intricate behavioral phenomenon has rarely itself been the focus of research.

The present set of papers offers intriguing and overlapping novel perspectives involving indulgent behaviors. These papers together illuminate a set of product- and situation-relevant conditions under which consumers become more likely to indulge and even receive enhanced benefits from indulgent consumption. For example, creating cuter versions of both hedonic and utilitarian products (Scott and Nenkov), adding functional innovation benefits to products (Garvey and Bolton), and sharing hedonic goods with others (Liu, Fitzsimons, and Bettman; Lowe and Haws) all enhance the likelihood of indulgence. In addition, sharing or co-indulgence is found to provide added benefits of engaging in more indulgent consumption (Lowe and Haws).

Specifically, the papers by Garvey and Bolton and Scott and Nenkov emphasize that the nature of the product itself matters—that is, the overall framing of the level of hedonic benefit associated with a product can be dramatically influenced by fairly simple changes to the core product. This may be through adding utilitarian functionality that in turn provides a license for indulging, or by priming concepts of fun and frivolity through making products “cute”. Next, the papers by Liu et al. and Lowe and Haws both explore the social aspects associated with indulgent experiences. Social interactions and experiences appear to be enhanced with hedonic consumption.

Overall, this session explores influences on indulgent consumption that are novel and not always immediately apparent. The papers illuminate previously unexplored product-level and situational factors, which lead consumers to indulge more readily and/or enhance the benefits of the indulgent experience. Important general questions emerge from this set of papers including: 1) how do we maximize the benefits we receive from choosing to indulge, while also minimizing the costs? And, 2) what can we learn by considering both the product level and social benefits provided by consuming indulgences? As such, this session embodies the “making a difference” theme of ACR 2013, and it should be of interest to a significant portion of ACR attendees including scholars studying self-control, indulgent consumption, and social interaction.

“So Cute I Can Eat it Up”: Priming Effects of Cute Products on Indulgent Consumption

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This research examines exposure to cute products—a previously unexplored factor that might affect the extent to which consumers engage in indulgent consumption. Companies market cute products in various categories not only to children, but also to adult consumers. The marketplace is replete with cute clothes, utensils, appliances, foods, and even automobiles (e.g., Taylor 2011). Despite the abundance of cute products in the marketplace, however, academic research on their evaluation or their downstream effects on consumer decision-making and behavior is limited. This is the first research to examine how cute products available in the marketplace (e.g., cute cookies or cute ice cream scoops) may influence consumers’ consumption behavior.

In the current research we explore cuteness, which refers to products (and other objects) that are attractive in an adorable or endearing way and have a whimsical nature. Past research had shown that exposure to cute human stimuli (e.g., babies, baby-like facial features) triggers caretaking behavior and carefulness (Sherman, Haidt, and Coan 2009; Sherman et al. 2012), which should lead consumers to engage in more restrained and careful behavior. On the other hand, we put forward the possibility that cute products might have the opposite effect of triggering indulgent and frivolous behavior. We propose that exposure to cute products (i.e., evaluating, using, or consuming such products) would increase indulgent consumption, because cute products’ whimsical nature would prime mental representations of fun and frivolity.

Displaying behaviors of a primed concept or category has been replicated in a variety of contexts (e.g., Aggarwal and McGill 2012; Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001). The activation of the construct also activates all the related features including behavioral tendencies associated with it, which increases the likelihood that these behavioral tendencies will be acted upon. The activation of a particular construct, in this case, fun and frivolity, should thus lead to a greater likelihood of nonconscious behavior associated with this construct. We predict that exposure to cute products will prime mental representations of fun and frivolity, leading consumers to display behaviors consistent with these representations, resulting in more indulgent consumption.

In a series of seven experiments we show that exposure to cute (vs. non-cute) products primes mental representations of fun and...
Consuming Functional Innovations: Are Utilitarian Behaviors Enhanced or Undermined?

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

A frequent practice in marketing is the introduction of products with new functionality; that is, a product is modified with attributes that afford consumers with additional opportunities for action (Dourish 2001; Ziamou and Rattray 2003). Examples include functional foods (e.g. omega-3 ice cream) and green products (e.g. natural detergents) that provide benefits over their traditional counterparts, and which represent substantial portions of their respective consumer markets (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009).

The present research examines how functional innovations may unexpectedly and ironically undermine the very outcomes their novel functionality is intended to support. Although prior research has deeply studied factors which influence preference for (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982, Naylor, Droms, and Haws 2009) and categorization of (Moreau, Markman and Lehmann 2001; Moreau, Lehmann, and Markman 2001) functional innovations, research is sparse examining the downstream consequences of consuming these products. Extant research has demonstrated that evaluative processing of novel innovations results in a heightened focus upon incremental benefits versus traditional products (Alexander, Lynch, and Wang 2008; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). We propose that this “functional focus” may influence subsequent consumption patterns. Prior research has demonstrated that explicit self-perceptions of utilitarian behavior have the tendency to subsequently increase hedonic behaviors through a variety of mechanisms, including reducing perceived risk (Bolton, Cohen, and Bloom 2006), guilt reduction, (Wansink and Chandon 2006), executive resource depletion (Vohs and Heatherton 2000), and utilitarian goal-release (Laran, Janiszewski, and Cunha 2008).

Our research indicates that consumption of functional innovations subsequently increases hedonic-seeking behaviors which undermine utilitarian outcomes. Our results are consistent with a process of passive goal-guidance (Laran and Janiszewski 2009), in which consumption of a functional innovation releases relevant utilitarian goals, followed by involuntary emergence of conflicting hedonic desires (Carlson, Meloy, and Miller 2013) that subsequently guide perception and behavior. The result is a so-called hedonic “boomerang” that undermines overall utilitarian outcomes and the functional benefits of the innovation. Furthermore, we propose a method to interrupt this process and thereby mitigate the “boomerang” by priming a utilitarian goal beforehand—which shields (Chartrand et al. 2008) against the release of the functional goal.

A series of real behavior and scenario studies supports the proposed model and intervention, while ruling out alternative explanations. Study 1 examined the impact of consuming a functional innovation upon subsequent hedonic-utilitarian behavior. An environmental innovation in the technology domain (smartphones) was employed. Following purchase of a functionally innovative (“with Eco-Safe battery technology”) or non-innovative smartphone, participants indicated choice likelihoods for multiple phone application pairs containing one hedonically oriented and one utilitarian oriented option. As predicted, participants purchasing the functional innovation indicated a greater likelihood to purchase hedonic software apps.

Studies 2A-B were conducted to i) provide direct process evidence for a heightened hedonic and suppressed utilitarian state following consumption of a functional innovation distinct from conscious choice, and ii) demonstrate that a similar “hedonic boomerang” effect does not occur for traditional, non-innovative prod-
ucts that provide comparable utilitarian benefits, thereby iii) ruling out conscious “justification” process explanations such as guilt reduction (Wansink and Chandon 2006), or conscious licensing due to inferences of goal progress (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). Study 2A directly measured involuntary activation of a heightened hedonic state due to functionality without soliciting conscious choice. In study 2A, participants first imagined purchasing either an environmentally responsible (washable cotton towel) or irresponsible (disposable paper towels) product that was either functional (“with Eco-Nurture additives”) or non-functional. To measure activation of a hedonic state, participants were next exposed to a 15x18 letter matrix containing an equal number of utilitarian (e.g. “responsible”) and hedonic (e.g. “exciting”) words. As predicted, functionality significantly increased (decreased) the number of hedonic (utilitarian) words found in the puzzle, regardless of the base product type or perceived environmental responsibility of the purchased product. These results are consistent with activation of a hedonic state that guides attention outside of conscious awareness. Furthermore, these results preclude explanations for behavioral shifts due to conscious guilt-reduction or “balancing” mechanisms, which propose that conscious justification of prior behavior is used as a “license” to engage in hedonic behaviors. Study 2B employed the same design and initial stimulus, but measured behavioral intentions through choice likelihood ratings of environmentally responsible and irresponsible options. Consistent with the process findings of 2A, functional innovations (regardless of base type) subsequently decreased preference for environmentally responsible options.

Study 3 explored in a real-behavior context whether consumption of a functional innovation undermines utilitarian behavior. As part of a “taste test” cover story, participants first consumed a real pre-packaged cookie labeled as functional (“with antioxidants”) or non-functional, then spent fifteen minutes viewing movie trailers and eating actual M&Ms. Consistent with our predictions, individuals consuming a functional innovation subsequently ate more grams of the candy. Study 4 replicated this effect with (non-) functional innovation versions of a “healthy” base product, yogurt.

Study 5 provided further evidence for the proposed process by demonstrating that prior activation of a utilitarian (vs. hedonic) goal mitigates the effect of functionality upon subsequent consumption. Thus prior utilitarian goal activation inoculates consumers and introduces a method for “undoing” the functional boomerang.

In summary, this research is, to our knowledge, the first effort to address these alternative explanations through behavioral choices. Study 4A addresses these alternative explanations by asking participants to allocate a store credit between hedonic and utilitarian products. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a 2 (shared, individual) x 2 (high shareability, low shareability) group between-subjects design. Participants read one of four scenarios, depending upon their assigned condition. All participants were told to imagine being at dinner with their best friend. Participants in the shared, high shareability condition were asked whether they would order twelve buffalo wings to share with their friend as an appetizer. Participants in the individual, high shareability condition were asked whether they would order six buffalo wings for themselves as an appetizer. Participants in the shared, low shareability condition were asked whether they would order two scoops of ice cream to share with their friend. Participants in the individual, low shareability condition were asked whether they would order one scoop of ice cream for themselves. All responses were on a scale from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). Analysis revealed a main effect of the shared/individual factor, qualified by a significant interaction between shared/individual and shareability. In the high shareability condition, participants were more likely to order the hedonic food if it was to be shared versus not shared. In the low shareability condition, participants were equally likely to order the hedonic food regardless of whether it was to be shared.

Study 1.

In study 1, we conduct a first test of our hypothesis, examining whether people are more likely to choose a hedonic food if they anticipate sharing (vs. not sharing) it. In addition, we identify shareability as a boundary condition, in that this effect does not apply to products that are not as easily shared. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (shared, individual) x 2 (high shareability, low shareability) group between-subjects design. Participants read one of four scenarios, depending upon their assigned condition. All participants were told to imagine being at dinner with their best friend. Participants in the shared, high shareability condition were asked whether they would order twelve buffalo wings to share with their friend as an appetizer. Participants in the individual, high shareability condition were asked whether they would order six buffalo wings for themselves as an appetizer. Participants in the shared, low shareability condition were asked whether they would order two scoops of ice cream to share with their friend. Participants in the individual, low shareability condition were asked whether they would order one scoop of ice cream for themselves. All responses were on a scale from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). Analysis revealed a main effect of the shared/individual factor, qualified by a significant interaction between shared/individual and shareability. In the high shareability condition, participants were more likely to order the hedonic food if it was to be shared versus not shared. In the low shareability condition, participants were equally likely to order the hedonic food regardless of whether it was to be shared.

Study 2.

A potential alternative explanation for these results is that participants inferred that it would be cheaper for them to pay for half of a shared product than to pay for an entire non-shared product of half the size, thus leading them to be more likely to order the shared product than the non-shared product. Another potential alternative explanation is that sharing leads people to be more likely to purchase all products, not merely hedonic products as we propose. Study 2 provides further evidence for the proposed process by demonstrating that prior activation of a utilitarian (vs. hedonic) goal mitigates the effect of functionality upon subsequent consumption. Thus prior utilitarian goal activation inoculates consumers and introduces a method for “undoing” the functional boomerang.

In summary, this research is, to our knowledge, the first effort to address these alternative explanations through behavioral choices. Study 4A addresses these alternative explanations by asking participants to allocate a store credit between hedonic and utilitarian products. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a 2 (shared, individual) x 2 (high shareability, low shareability) group between-subjects design. Participants in the shared, high shareability condition were asked whether they would order twelve buffalo wings to share with their friend as an appetizer. Participants in the individual, high shareability condition were asked whether they would order six buffalo wings for themselves as an appetizer. Participants in the shared, low shareability condition were asked whether they would order two scoops of ice cream to share with their friend. Participants in the individual, low shareability condition were asked whether they would order one scoop of ice cream for themselves. All responses were on a scale from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). Analysis revealed a main effect of the shared/individual factor, qualified by a significant interaction between shared/individual and shareability. In the high shareability condition, participants were more likely to order the hedonic food if it was to be shared versus not shared. In the low shareability condition, participants were equally likely to order the hedonic food regardless of whether it was to be shared.

Study 3.

In study 3, we explore in a real-behavior context whether consumption of a functional innovation undermines utilitarian behavior. As part of a “taste test” cover story, participants first consumed a real pre-packaged cookie labeled as functional (“with antioxidants”) or non-functional, then spent fifteen minutes viewing movie trailers and eating actual M&Ms. Consistent with our predictions, individuals consuming a functional innovation subsequently ate more grams of the candy. Study 4 replicated this effect with (non-) functional innovation versions of a “healthy” base product, yogurt.

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Anticipating Sharing and Preference for Hedonic Products

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumption situations in which people share products with others are common (Belk 2010). For example, people may share an appetizer at dinner with a friend or share household items with a roommate. We examine how sharing can alter consumers’ product preferences. Specifically, although products can differ along many dimensions, we focus on how anticipating sharing products shifts consumers’ preference for hedonic versus utilitarian products. Research has shown that there is an important distinction between hedonic and utilitarian products; hedonic products are desired for their greater enjoyment but are more difficult to justify selecting, whereas utilitarian products are desired for their functionality and easier to justify selecting (Khan and Dhar 2006; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Wertenbroch and Dhar 2000).

Prior research has shown that a variety of different factors can alter preferences for hedonic versus utilitarian products. For example, Okada (2005) found that in single evaluation (i.e., products presented separately), preference for hedonic products was higher than preference for utilitarian products, but that in joint evaluation (i.e., products presented together), preference for utilitarian products was higher than preference for hedonic products. Kivetz and Simonson (2002) found that expending greater effort in a frequency reward program shifted consumers’ preferences away from utilitarian rewards and towards hedonic rewards.

We examine how anticipating sharing versus not sharing a product affects hedonic product choice. We predict that anticipating sharing a product makes consumers more likely to select hedonic (versus utilitarian) products. Results from two studies support our hypothesis.

Study 1.

In study 1, we conduct a first test of our hypothesis, examining whether people are more likely to choose a hedonic food if they anticipate sharing (vs. not sharing) it. In addition, we identify shareability as a boundary condition, in that this effect does not apply to products that are not as easily shared. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (shared, individual) x 2 (high shareability, low shareability) group between-subjects design. Participants read one of four scenarios, depending upon their assigned condition. All participants were told to imagine being at dinner with their best friend. Participants in the shared, high shareability condition were asked whether they would order twelve buffalo wings to share with their friend as an appetizer. Participants in the individual, high shareability condition were asked whether they would order six buffalo wings for themselves as an appetizer. Participants in the shared, low shareability condition were asked whether they would order two scoops of ice cream to share with their friend. Participants in the individual, low shareability condition were asked whether they would order one scoop of ice cream for themselves. All responses were on a scale from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). Analysis revealed a main effect of the shared/individual factor, qualified by a significant interaction between shared/individual and shareability. In the high shareability condition, participants were more likely to order the hedonic food if it was to be shared versus not shared. In the low shareability condition, participants were equally likely to order the hedonic food regardless of whether it was to be shared.

Study 2.

A potential alternative explanation for these results is that participants inferred that it would be cheaper for them to pay for half of a shared product than to pay for an entire non-shared product of half the size, thus leading them to be more likely to order the shared product than the non-shared product. Another potential alternative explanation is that sharing leads people to be more likely to purchase all products, not merely hedonic products as we propose. Study 2 addresses these alternative explanations by asking participants to allocate a store credit between hedonic and utilitarian goods. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a 2 (shared, individual) group between-subjects design. Participants in both conditions were told that they would divide a store credit between digital entertainment (e.g., DVDs, digital music downloads,
Internet video streaming credits, movie tickets) and household supplies (e.g., floor cleaners, cleaning wipes, detergents, paper towels). Participants in the shared condition were told to imagine that they planned to spend a $20 store credit on products to share with their roommate, and participants in the individual condition were told to imagine that they planned to spend the $10 store credit on products for themselves. To measure preference for hedonic or utilitarian products, we calculated the percentage of total store credit allocated to digital entertainment. Thus, high values indicate greater preference for hedonic products, and low values indicate greater preference for utilitarian products. An analysis conducted on percentage allocated to digital entertainment revealed a significant main effect of shared/individual, such that participants allocated a significantly greater percentage of the store credit to digital entertainment in the shared versus the individual condition.

This research examines the choices that consumers make for themselves in situations in which they anticipate sharing versus not sharing products. First, we found that consumers are more likely to opt for a hedonic product if they anticipate sharing versus not sharing it. Second, we found that consumers allocate more money to hedonic versus utilitarian products if they anticipate sharing versus not sharing it. In doing so, we contribute to the literature on hedonic versus utilitarian choice while answering recent calls to examine how sharing shapes consumption choices (Belk 2010). Process mechanisms for this effect are being tested and will be presented and discussed.

Camaraderie in Crime: Shared Self-control Decisions and Affiliation

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Self-control decisions very often involve an element of both social influence and social consequence, and consumers exhibiting high levels of self-control experience greater social acceptance for a number of reasons. For example, these individuals are more likely to display pro-social behavior (DeWall, Baumeister and Vohs 2008), appear trustworthy (Righetti and Finkenauer 2011), and self-monitor more effectively (Finkel et al. 2006). It has even been suggested that self-control exists for the very purpose of facilitating group membership (Baumeister, Schmeichel and Vohs 2007) by ensuring that our behavior that is coordinated with that of our peers.

However, previous research on the social outcomes of self-control decisions has generally employed actor-observer scenarios or actor-influencer scenarios (McFerran et al 2010, Ackerman et al. 2009, VanDellen and Hoyle 2010) and has very rarely examined shared self-control decisions or taken the perspective of a participating peer. However, no research that we are aware of has ever examined the potential outcomes of shared self-control decisions. As there are two key elements of a shared self-control decision – the peer(s) and the object of the decision itself – we offer a new conceptual framework to examine consumer self-control decisions in social settings and explore the outcomes of shared self-control decisions regarding 1) affiliation and 2) product experience.

In this paper we pay particular attention to shared self-control failure (co-indulgence). While it is true that socially coordinated behaviors lead to positive social outcomes, socially coordinated behavior may take various forms. Mutually indulging in a tempting consumption opportunity may offer a unique set of benefits that mutual restraint (co-abstinence) does not. Indulgence helps preserve cognitive resources that exercising self-control can deplete (Baumeister and Alquist 2009) and prevent feelings of regret associated with missing out on enjoyable experiences (Kivetz and Keinan 2006). Of most interest to us, however, is that co-indulgence seems to provide a valuable bonding experience for those involved which in turn impacts the product experience. We examine the importance of perceived similarity and reduced anxiety in producing these co-indulgent effects. In three studies, we demonstrate that co-indulgence and co-abstinence both produce significant feelings of affiliation with peers with the effect being stronger for co-indulgence. Perceptions of similarity and reduced anxiety mediate this relationship. Product experience is also enhanced by co-indulgence because of this positive shared experience and a reduction of guilt.

In study 1, participants (N=155) imagined a dyadic shared self-control decision and were randomly assigned a choice condition (indulge vs. restrain) and a peer choice condition (peer indulge vs. peer restrain). Participants then indicated the impact this scenario would have on their feelings of affiliation for their peer, their product experience, and several other measures. The analysis resulted in a significant interaction between the two conditions such that shared indulgence and shared abstinence yielded much higher levels of felt affiliation. An increase in perceived similarity mediated this process. Contrast analyses also showed that co-indulgence led to higher levels of affiliation than co-abstinence and that this was mediated by reduced feelings of social anxiety. Among participants who indulged, co-indulgence also greatly enhanced the anticipated consumption experience. Co-indulgence led to significantly lower feelings of guilt which mediated the improved consumption experience.

In study 2, participants (N=172) were again asked to imagine a shared self-control decision with a peer. In this study, participants encountered a tempting purchase opportunity while on a tight budget. Participants imagined either a relatively expensive or inexpensive temptation (high-severity vs. low-severity, counterbalanced) and were randomly presented with one of two decision scenarios (co-indulgence vs. co-abstinence). An ANOVA was conducted on the measure of affiliation using co-indulgence vs. co-abstinence and indulgence severity as between-subjects factors. Analysis revealed a significant interaction such that co-indulgence resulted in higher feelings of affiliation when the indulgence severity was low, while the opposite was true when the severity was high. Examining the contrasts, the difference between co-indulgence and co-abstinence was significant in the low severity condition, while in the high severity (expensive) condition, the difference between co-abstinence and co-indulgence was marginally significant. A bootstrap analysis reveals that guilt significantly mediates the relationship between the interaction variable (co-indulgence vs. co-abstinence and cheap vs. expensive) and affiliation. The less guilt a consumer feels, or the more guilt a consumer avoids, the more socially beneficial a shared experience will be.

Study 3 (N=153) examines a three-way interaction between participant choice (indulge vs. restrain), peer choice (indulge vs. restrain), and peer familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar). A three-way ANOVA on affiliation using familiarity, participant choice and peer choice as factors was significant. Co-indulgence resulted in greater affiliation than even co-abstinence for familiar peers, whereas matched behaviors mattered for unfamiliar individuals, but there was no significant difference between co-indulgence and co-abstinence.

Our research demonstrates the effects of shared self-control decisions on interpersonal affiliation and product experience. We show social and experiential benefits to self-control failure and elucidate the conditions under which this applies. Self-control is not always a social positive. Consumers do at times seek for and appreciate moral support, but in the right circumstances they also value camaraderie in crime.
REFERENCES


Expanding the Theoretical Boundaries of Consumer Acculturation: Investigating the Role of Institutional Forces and Nostalgic Consumption

Chairs: Katja H. Brunk, ESMT, Germany
Luca M. Visconti, ESCP Europe, France
Ela Veresiu, Witten/Herdecke University, Germany

Paper #1: Fiddler on the Street: How Roma Refugees Enact Host Cultural Images of Nostalgic Otherness
Ela Veresiu, Witten/Herdecke University, Germany
Markus Giesler, York University, Canada

Paper #2: Generations at the Mirror: First and Second Generation of Turkish Consumers' Home Country Nostalgia
Luca M. Visconti, ESCP Europe, France
Celina Stamboli-Rodriguez, Iseg Marketing and Communication School, France

Paper #3: Locals as Migrants in German Unification and Acculturation: How Nostalgia Enchants the Former East
Katja H. Brunk, ESMT, Germany
Benjamin J. Hartmann, Jönköping University, Sweden

Paper #4: Asserting Integration through Nostalgic Discourses: Acculturation to the International Community
Julie Emontspool, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
Dannie Kjeldgaard, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark

SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumer acculturation is on the rise and of interest to consumer researchers (Askegaard, Arnould, and Kjeldgaard 2005; Chytikova 2011; Dion, Sitz, and Remy 2011; Fernandez, Veer, and Lastovicka 2011; Oswald 1999; Peñaloza 1994; Vihalemm and Keller 2011). Although this research stream's overarching goal is “to understand and conceptualize the various forces that define, allow, facilitate, or complicate consumer acculturation under specific cultural conditions” (Luedicke 2011, 238), prior studies have predominantly focused on the micro-processes of individual migrants' cultural adaptation. A few notable exceptions include works on how migrants succumb to institutional domination (Üstüner and Holt 2007) or escape from it by using the market as a form of empowerment (Üstüner and Thompson 2012).

Hence, previous research has devoted surprisingly little attention to the role of macro-institutional variables. In line with this year’s conference theme, this session aims to unpack various institutional forces that make a difference in migrants’ market acculturation through four mature empirical studies (see Appendix 1 for project overview). The papers investigate how different institutional forces (market-mediated ethnic myths, market agents’ imagined ethnic communities, political mergers, and multicultural environments) lead to different manifestations of nostalgia, commonly defined as “a sentimental longing for the past” (Holbrook and Schindler 1991). The authors then examine how these forms of context-driven nostalgia impact various migrant groups’ market acculturation practices and experiences. Collectively, the projects show that different institutional conditions of acculturation 1) lead to distinct and previously unexplored manifestations of nostalgia, theorized here as performances, enchantments and discourses; 2) impact social networks with which to share nostalgic consumptions and feelings; and 3) result in unusual patterns of acculturation.

In detail, Veresiu and Giesler first conceptualize ethnic entrepreneurship as the strategic actions of migrant consumers to enact and embody the host culture’s market-mediated images of nostalgic otherness in order to ensure a smoother and speedier acculturation process, based on an ethnography of Roma refugees in Toronto, Canada. Second, Visconti and Stamboli focus on how institutional agents participate in the construction of an ethnic imagined community mediated by nostalgic market discourses in France’s Turkish migrant community. Third, Brunk and Hartmann discuss how nostalgic enchantment for the former GDR’s consumer culture may actually inhibit or even reverse acculturation of East-German consumers who have become migrants in their own country following Germany’s political merger. Fourth, Emontspool and Kjeldgaard show that instead of exclusively promoting cosmopolitan detachment from home culture, multicultural environments, such as the one found in Brussels, can encourage displays of national belonging, expressed in nostalgic discourses about mundane and global products.

This session is relevant since it expands the theoretical boundaries of consumer acculturation by exploring macro-institutional forces and nostalgic sources. Secondly, it involves four empirical projects employing diverse data collection methods (depth-interviews, ethnography, netnography, and introspection). Thirdly, it has the potential to appeal to a broad audience interested in the interactions between macro (institutional variables and ethnicity) and micro (identity and personal emotions) dimensions in consumer research.

Fiddler on the Street: How Roma Refugees Enact Host Cultural Images of Nostalgic Otherness

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

It looks like there are two big reactions: the very exotic reaction like oh wow the Gypsies make their dreams, it's like the life of freedom and stuff or there is also the thing with us being thieves and you know like we take the chickens and steal the stuff. So you find the two same stories, but it looks like at some point we are accepted here [Toronto, Canada]. Here we can make a living, we are not living in extremely poor conditions or anything like that, maybe a bit like out of the society, but it looks like we have more power and we have more space and we don’t have to live in camps.

(Gabriela, 52, Roma Refugee, Freelance dancer, in Toronto for 4 years)

Gabriela’s reflexive remark illustrates the important institutional influence of local stereotypes and attitudes about ethnic minorities on the lived experiences of migrant consumers. The Canadian host culture commonly defines “Gypsy” as either a lifestyle or a distinct nomadic ethnicity existing predominantly in Europe (Lee 1998a). More specifically, overview studies (e.g., Csepeli and Simon 2003; Liégeois 1994; Rehfisch 1975) consistently distinguish between two main market-mediated myths of the Roma ethnicity that dominate popular opinion: one characterizing these individuals as passionate, mysterious, and talented “Gypsy” artisans and the other typecasting them as thief, lazy, and dirty “Gypsies.” Previous consumer acculturation research has explored in detail the processes and agents through which migrant individuals socialized into a different (mi-
How host cultural images about ethnic populations shape consumer acculturation experiences and practices has received much less attention, however. To redress this key theoretical oversight, as well as empirically engage Luedicke’s recent (2011, 730) call for “consumer researchers to explore the reflexive interactions between local and migrant groups that compete for (or share) consumption spaces, services, objects, symbols, and natural resources,” we conducted an in-depth ethnographic investigation of the interactions between Roma refugees (colloquially known as “Gypsies”) and local residents in Toronto, Canada. Overall we found that Roma refugees, like Gabriela, are not only well aware of the two opposing ethnic stereotypes circulating throughout popular culture, but also strategically employ enactments of the market-mediated nostalgic image of the artisan “Gypsy” through everyday consumption-related activities in order to actively dispel the negative myth of the thriving “Gypsy.”

To better understand this phenomenon, we draw on performance theory (e.g., Schechner 2006). According to performance theory scholars, ethnicity can be seen as a performance since it involves patterns of behavior that have been socially constructed, learned, practiced and revised by a certain group for a particular audience, over time. More specifically, this approach “underscores ethnicity as behavior, as a social skill of manipulating, masking, and assuming various cultural characteristics through innumerable symbolic activities. In this sense, one can view ethnicity as performance” (Staub 1989). Building on the idea that ethnicity is a type of performance, we develop the construct of ethnic entrepreneurship, which we define as the strategic actions of migrant consumers to enact and embody the positive images of nostalgic otherness from the host culture in order to ensure a smoother transition into the new consumer cultures. In particular, our findings section unpacks how Roma refugees in Toronto strategically employ enactments of the market-mediated nostalgic image of the artisan “Gypsy” to 1) dispel negative competing images of Roma as lazy, thieving, and dirty, 2) ensure ethnic acceptance is increased, 3) enable economic gains, and 4) allow for a smoother consumer acculturation process by resolving tensions between dominant and minority cultures.

Methodologically we used an ethnographic approach that combines both a discursive level (related historical documents and cultural materials from mass media channels and online), as well as a practical level (non-participant observation and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 18 Roma refugees, aged 16-75, 56% female, 16 locals working in the immigration service industry, aged 25-65, 56% female, and 9 local residents, aged 25-61, 33% female). We analyzed the complete dataset (34 interviews, 1125 pages of historical and cultural data) using the hermeneutical analysis mode of tackling back and forth between data and theory (Thompson 1997).

This paper anticipates making two contributions. First, we expand the consumer acculturation literature by unpacking the important institutional role of the host culture’s market-mediated ethnic stereotypes on migrant consumer acculturation practices and experiences. Second, this paper contributes to the literature on marketplace mythologies by exploring the impact of ethnic myths on the identity construction projects of migrants.

Generations at the Mirror: First and Second Generation of Turkish Consumers’ Home Country Nostalgia

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Migrants, as well as their children, typically live in a ‘hyper-ethnicized’ world. Institutional pressures coming from the outside—the dominant society as well as the ethnic communities (Zouaghi and Darpy’s ‘ideal us’; 2006)—and even from internal confrontations with family members—for example, across generations (Visconti and Napolitano 2009)—constantly reinvigorate the ethnic discourse. Hence, migrants are not allowed to overcome their often presumed ethnic diversity, and the way they behave and consume is permanently interpreted in the light of such (self)attributed difference. Elif, a Turkish second generation living in Lille, voices this institutional hurdle: “Look, have you seen how Turkish people are represented by French television? Think of what integration means. Are we willing to integrate by watching this stuff? No! We do on our own...”

Elaborating upon Benedict Anderson’s (1983) idea of ‘imagined community’, we claim that ethnic discourses produced by institutional agents represent powerful imagined communities, invisible as much as immanent in the life of migrants and indigenous people. This idea complies with Jenkins’ (2002) analysis of the ‘imagined’ but not the ‘imaginary’ nature of ethnicity. As Jenkins observes, ethnicity is constructed within an institutional scenario—thus, it represents its agents’ ‘imagination’—but its invisibility and immateriality do not make it ‘imaginary’, that is, without social consequences for the people producing and embodying that imagination. In a nutshell, fostered by increased mediatisation and connectivity, imagination appears today as a form of ‘organized social practice’ (Appadurai 1990/2011).

By acknowledging a large array of institutional agents (dominant society, consumer culture, the mediascapes, ethnic communities, families, groups of peers, and marketers of different ethnicities), our paper attacks two main outcomes of these agents’ imaginative production: 1) the broad category of ethnicity, here largely meant as ‘Turkishness’; and 2) the more specific category of generational ethnicity, under the assumption that also different generations might constitute different ‘imagined communities’, which often receive specific juridical recognition within a nation. More precisely, we observe how first and second generations of Turkish in France refer to, elaborate, and use feelings of ‘home country nostalgia—“the psych-sick suffering caused by expatriation” (Robert-Demontroid 2001, 319)—in the market. By home sickness we mean an obsession to be (back) to a different physical space, cultural context, social network, market, and institutional setting. As our data shows, these nested references combine factual as well as imaginary traits, and can be addressed specifically to migrants’ country of origin or more broadly to a generic ‘elsewhere’. Our aims are threefold. First, we want to relate home country nostalgia to institutional agents and unpack their interplay. Second, we wish to mark differences across first and second generations in terms of institutional forces at play and their impact on nostalgic discourses and consumption practices. Third, we contextualize former findings on migrants’ acculturation in order to inspect the effects of home country nostalgia—as mediated by institutional agents—for first and second generations’ acculturation.

Empirically, the work relies upon an ethnography on 18 Turkish informants (7 first generations and 11 second generations) around the city of Lille during a period of 18 months. Methods include depth interviews, participant observation and observation of indirect indicators (e.g., indicators of social and economic capital), collection of factual data, and photography. Interpretation is granted by iterative data analysis and field/theory alternation (Thompson 1997).
First, we demonstrate that nostalgia is seldom, if at all, possible in the absence of institutional pressures. Data reveals that nostalgia is often presentable as ‘imposed nostalgia’. Consistently with Emon-stoopool and Kjeldgaard this session, we also observe that the dom-

inant society expects Turkish people to be homesick (Matt 2007). We argue their expectation reflects both imaginative stereotyping about ‘enduring ethnicity’ and opportunities to consume Turkish difference made visible by nostalgic market behaviors in an attempt of ‘cross-over dreaming’ (Grier, Brunbaugh, and Thornton 2006). Second, we show that while the dominant society and the ethnic communities exert highest institutional pressures on the first generation, the first generation and the group of peers exert substantial pressures on the second generation. As such, Turkish parents’ nostalgic consumptions are more displayed beyond the family whereas children’s nostalgic consumptions are more domestic. Finally, by being institution-

ally stimulated, nostalgia and nostalgic-related consumptions play a major role in acculturation. In order to organize different effects of imposed home country nostalgia on first and second generations’ acculturation, we identify two conceptual dimensions: 1) individual versus social nostalgia; and 2) nostalgic consumptions having a defensive versus an offensive function against institutional pressures. By crossing these two dimensions, four different ends of nostalgic consumptions appear (cfr. Appendix 1).

Our contributions are threefold. First, we show that home country nostalgia is not only the consequence of hostile or favor-

ing institutional agents (Stern 1992) that stimulate a ‘myth of return’ (Akhtar 1996) but that it can become an additional institutional force whenever external agents expect migrants to feel homesick: from an institutionally-led to an institutionally-leading nostalgia manifested via the market. Second, in its defensive manifestations, home coun-

dry nostalgia is not an expression of ‘desire for a place’ (i.e. being there) but of ‘desire for a nonplace’ (i.e. being elsewhere) that are objectified through material possessions. Ideally, the home coun-
dry becomes the context in which migrants are able to forget their ethnicity, and thus ‘subvert the imagined world of the official mind and of the entrepreneurial mentality that surround them’ (Appadurai 1990/2011, 285). Third, we demonstrate that home country nostalgia is not only a side effect of acculturation but a force able to orient market acculturation effectively.

**Locals as Migrants in German Unification and Acculturation: How Nostalgia Enchants the Former East**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Consumer acculturation is commonly understood as a process of physical movement and the resulting adaptation to the cultural environment in one country by persons from another country (Peñaloza 1994). However, acculturation processes may take place even without migration. This project analyses such consumer accultura-
tion instantiated in the specific institutional context of Germany’s political unification in 1989. With the fall of the wall, consumers in former East-Germany were—metaphorically—‘being crossed by the border’ becoming local migrants exposed to Western consumer culture and an inescapable process of cultural learning and adaptation.

This particular acculturation process is intertwined with a spe-
cific form of nostalgia. Emically glossed by the term ‘Ostalgie’—a combination of Ost (east) and Nostalgie (nostalgia); or Eastalgia—we witness an increasing nostalgic revival of East-German brands and consumptionscapes. Although East-Germans considered their products of low quality as well as unattractive back then and aspired Western brands as the ‘real things’ (Veenis 1999), today, many of these previously disliked commodities are cherished.

While public discourse has interpreted Eastalgia primarily as a longing for East-German life, anthropological literature suggests that the stereotypical image of the eastalgie East-German is an invention by West-German media to cope with Germany’s past (Boyer 2001; 2006). This suggests that Eastalgie consumption exceeds notions of being a mere retro phenomenon (Brown 1999; Brown, Sherry, and Kozinets 2003). Underneath its retro-coat, Eastalgia represents a re-

source for coping with acculturation processes in the institutional context of political re-unification. Given that we know surprisingly little about these deeper-routed cultural functions of nostalgia, this study explores and illustrates the sources, roles, and underlying func-

tions of Eastalgia as a specific form of nostalgic consumption vis-à-

vis acculturation processes for ‘local migrants’.

The current consumer cultural dynamics are rooted in the past and lived today, hence methodologically, the historical and contem-

porary context necessitates various materials. Our research starts with seven guided introspections (Wallestend and Brucks 1993) of ‘local migrants’ reflecting upon the experienced changes and various aspects of their life before, during, and after the unification using a written essay format. Introspections were followed by long inter-

views (McCracken 1988) including photo elicitation and review of historical materials where possible. Moreover, netography of face-

book fanpages, blogs and commercial sites relating to Eastalgia, as well as newspaper articles and documentaries complement our mate-

rial. This combination of methods allows a deeper understanding of the ‘then’ and ‘now’: the symptom, its manifestations, and its roots.

Our theoretical approach is inspired by literature on enchant-

ment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment, discussing how consum-

ers carry the burden of enchanting their lives (Ritzer 2005; Firat and Venkatesh 1995) and how they turn towards shelters of collective enchantment projects (Arnould, Price, and Ottes 1999). While en-

chantment has previously been portrayed as instantiated in religios-

ity (Muñiz and Schau 2005), magic (Arnould et al. 1999), utopia (Kozinets 2001), or pastoral myth (Press and Arnould 2011), there are explicit links between nostalgia and enchantment: Brown et al. (2003) observe that retro-brand meanings are channeled through enchantment as storied forms of nostalgic myths. Building on this, we frame nostalgia as a form of (re)enchantment that is collectively achieved and utilized by consumers to deal with various aspects of the acculturation process, and ultimately with dominated, modern cultural conditions in the context of (macro) institutional changes.

Our findings contextualize Eastalgia across three cultural-his-
torical phases of the re-unification process: (1) the ‘unification honeymoon phase,’ characterized by euphoria and hyper-consumption of Western brands experienced as enchanting, but also by eradication, discarding, and de-valuing anything East-German (Berdahl 1999; Veenis 1999); (2) the ‘hangover phase’ where Western consumer culture is no longer capable of enchanting, a realization facilitated by the dominated conditions under which political changes occurred, mass unemployment, and shattered dreams of ubiquitous prosper-

ity; and (3) the ‘recovery phase’ during which Eastalgia emerges as a symptom of idealization and re-enchantment of the formerly despised products and consumption experiences through storied forms of myth about life and consumption in the former GDR. Thus, we re-

veal how Eastalgia mediates re-enchantment in three ways (ideologi-

cal, re-enacted, re-appropriated) and unveil the different functions of eastalgie (re-)enchantment in acculturation processes: Eastalgia **inhibits, reverses, and facilitates** acculturation.

This paper aims to make the following contributions to existing literature. By investigating the novel context of ‘locals as migrants’, this study expands our understanding of consumer acculturation, the cultural functions of nostalgia in these adaptation processes, as well
as conceptually links nostalgia and (re)enchantment. We find that Eastalgie is both a symptom and coping strategy for dealing with problematic and contested acculturation and thus acts as a mediator for re-enchantment in dominated, modern cultural conditions. Our findings demonstrate how the sources for the manifestation of nostalgic enchantment are multiple, as are the consequences for acculturation. Nostalgic consumer projects can play a central role in facilitating, inhibiting or even reversing acculturation processes. By offering evidence for reverse acculturation, our study supports Luedicke’s paper (2011) in that acculturation should no longer be seen as a progressive, directed process but rather as a complex recursive system of adaptation by migrants and local consumers.

**Asserting Integration through Nostalgic Discourses: Acculturation to an International Community**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

The concept of nostalgia has played an important role in consumer research for the last decades. Its main conceptualization is one of “bitter-sweet” feelings of longing for a past considered as better than the current situation, which leads consumers to prefer products reminding them of these happy times (Holak and Havlena 1998; Schindler and Holbrook 2003). In the migration context, recent research points to its beneficial side, for instance in easing migrants’ adaptation to a new (consumption) culture (Stamboli-Rodriguez 2003), reminding them of these happy times (Holak and Havlena 1998; Schindler and Holbrook 2003). In the migration context, recent research points to its beneficial side, for instance in easing migrants’ adaptation to a new (consumption) culture (Stamboli-Rodriguez 2003), reminding them of these happy times (Holak and Havlena 1998; Schindler and Holbrook 2003). In the migration context, recent research points to its beneficial side, for instance in easing migrants’ adaptation to a new (consumption) culture (Stamboli-Rodriguez 2003), reminding them of these happy times (Holak and Havlena 1998; Schindler and Holbrook 2003). In the migration context, recent research points to its beneficial side, for instance in easing migrants’ adaptation to a new (consumption) culture (Stamboli-Rodriguez 2003), reminding them of these happy times (Holak and Havlena 1998; Schindler and Holbrook 2003). In the migration context, recent research points to its beneficial side, for instance in easing migrants’ adaptation to a new (consumption) culture (Stamboli-Rodriguez 2003), reminding them of these happy times (Holak and Havlena 1998; Schindler and Holbrook 2003).

Increased migration around the world due to globalization has led to a diversification of migrants’ socio-economic and geographical profiles, which diversifies the cultural influences during acculturation. As a large share of research has however focused mainly on permanent, low-skilled labor migration between two cultures, investigating the role of nostalgia in consumer acculturation of more diversified types of migrants is therefore timely. Hence, the aim of this paper is to investigate individuals’ recourse to nostalgic consumption discourses during multicultural encounters.

In this context, the discursive side of nostalgia is particularly important; migrants resort to different discourses about food consumption as indicator of social identity in one context or the other (Luna, Ringberg, and Peracchio 2008; Oswald 1999). In particular, cultural reflexivity, that is, conscious reflection on one’s culture, impacts consumption practices (Askegaard, Kjeldgaard, and Arnould 2009). As Emontspool and Kjeldgaard (2012) indicate, consumption discourses in multicultural communities can exacerbate this cultural reflexivity, which then becomes a “conscious consideration and enactment of a cultural identity in order to comprehensively and adequately represent cultural affiliation” (Emontspool and Kjeldgaard 2012, 229). The authors show how nostalgic discourses can then illustrate migrants’ cross-cultural consumption experiences.

What has not been discussed until now, is how institutional discourses may induce this behavior. Indeed, as Luedicke (2011) indicates, more focus is needed on the role of host cultural institutions in order to fully investigate migrant consumers’ relationship to markets, as well as different outcomes of their adaptation to these new consumption environments (Askegaard, Arnould, and Kjeldgaard 2005; Peñaloza 1994). Acculturation is not only an individual, psychological change; individuals’ surroundings greatly impact it. In this paper, we therefore propose an exploration of nostalgic acculturation discourses, asking how consumers integrate institutional expectations in those discourses.

To address this issue, the paper firstly analyses 17 in-depth interviews (McCracken 1988) with migrants of different socio-economic and ethnic origins, and investigates consumer acculturation and nostalgia in this population. Secondly, this study draws on interviews undertaken with young migrants living in shared an apartment in Brussels, to focus on cross-cultural discourses, as well as on perceptions of institutionalized discourses within these communities. The chosen sample is particularly representative of multicultural environments of higher cultural capital, as Brussels welcomes large numbers of migrants due to the presence of the European institutions, which provide strong institutional discourses about cultural identity.

The findings of this study illustrate the emergence of nostalgic discourses that are less due to the acculturation process in itself, but rather follow upon migrants’ impression that nostalgic discourses are expected from them. The respondents relate that during social contact, other migrants express curiosity as to the respondents’ country of origin. In consequence, they feel required to express national pride and longing to their culture of origin, although they don’t necessarily feel nostalgic themselves. Nonetheless, they adopt nostalgic discourses about a large range of consumption items.

In an international community as exists in Brussels, nostalgia discourses can thus display integration in multicultural societies rather than longing for a lost past. This finding finds an explanation in the differentiation make by Cannon and Yapprak (2002) between local and global cosmopolitans. While global cosmopolitans, who have no attachment to particular places, consider nostalgia a failure (Thompson and Tambyah 1999), our findings show the compatibility of attachment to the country of origin with multiculturalism as promoted by supranational organizations such as the EU, influencing local cosmopolitans’ consumption discourses and encouraging nostalgic discourse in multicultural settings.

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### APPENDIX 1

Project overview: forces, contexts and conceptual contributions

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<th>Manifestations of nostalgia and impact on acculturation</th>
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<td>Nostalgic performances as a survival tactic and type of ethnic entrepre neurship</td>
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<td>Visconti and Stamboli</td>
<td>Pull forces of migration (migrants for job or family rejoining)</td>
<td>Assimilation, acculturation, resistance, swapping</td>
<td>(Imposed) home country nostalgia</td>
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<td>Nostalgia as survival; sewing; contestation of the imaginary community; and nurturing</td>
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<td>Generational forces (first vs second generations)</td>
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<td>Nostalgia as sewing; and nurturing</td>
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<td>Brunk and Hartmann</td>
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<td>Reverse process: Reflexive acculturation leads to developing nostalgic discourses (something expected by others)</td>
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Consumer Mindsets: Justifying, Comparing, and Competing

Chairs: Alison Jing Xu, University of Toronto, Canada
Aner Sela, University of Florida, USA

Paper #1: Justification Mindset: How Hedonic versus Utilitarian Purchase Influences Subsequent Choice
Uzma Khan, Stanford University, USA
Qing Yao, University of Science and Technology Beijing, China
Ravi Dhar, Yale University, USA

Paper #2: The Comparative Mindset and Managerial Decision Making: Theory Extensions and Boundary Conditions
Christine Moorman, Duke University, USA
Alison Jing Xu, University of Toronto, Canada
Vivian Yue Qin, Duke University, USA

Paper #3: Competitive Mindset: Does Scarcity Call for Selfishness?
Caroline Roux, Northwestern University, USA
Kelly Goldsmith, Northwestern University, USA
Andrea Bonezzi, New York University, USA

Paper #4: Beating the Market: Competitive Mindset and the Allure of Unintended Value
Aner Sela, University of Florida, USA
Itamar Simonson, Stanford University, USA
Ran Kivetz, Columbia University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Mindsets are cognitive schemas (Oyserman et al. 2009), activated in one situation, which persist and impact subsequent behaviors, judgments, and decisions. Despite the pervasive impact of mindsets, consumer researchers have only recently started to investigate their antecedents and consequences for consumers, integrate new findings with existing ones, and explore how mindsets affect the interaction among different actors in the marketplace.

How might purchasing different types of products activate different mindsets that impact subsequent decisions? Can activated mindsets change managers’ decisions and consumers’ interactions with others? And what is the role of mindsets in people’s perceptions of bargains? The current session addresses these related questions, and offers cutting-edge insights into the causes and role of mindsets in judgment and decision making.

The first paper, by Khan et al., makes an important contribution by identifying a novel mindset that consumers develop while making purchases. It compares the cognitive consequences of making hedonic versus utilitarian purchases and shows that purchasing hedonic products induces a justification mindset, which increases choice of easy-to-justify options in a subsequent situation. The second paper, by Moorman et al., demonstrates that activating a comparative mindset not only increases managers’ likelihood of making hypothetical purchases but also elevates their spending levels in real business decisions. Thus, it generalizes the comparative mindset effect to manager decision making and extends the effect from choice to spending level.

The next two papers explore different antecedents of a competitive mindset and show the consequences of such a mindset in decision contexts that involve an interaction between consumers or between consumers and marketers. The paper by Roux et al. shows that a scarcity prime activates a competitive mindset that motivates people to pursue self-focused goals when interacting with others. The paper by Sela et al. suggests that the interactions between marketers and consumers activate a competitive mindset, which leads consumers to attach higher value to offers that seem to fit them by coincidence, without the marketer’s intent, than to offers that were designed to fit their preferences.

Considering the fundamental role of mindsets in consumer behavior and the variety of topics these talks cover, the session should be of interest to a broad set of audiences. Not only should it appeal to researchers working on judgment and decision making, choice, and cognition, but also to those who study social interactions, goals, and motivation more broadly.

Justification Mindset: How Hedonic versus Utilitarian Purchase Influences Subsequent Choice

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers make both hedonic and utilitarian choices. Generally, hedonic choices are guided by pleasure-seeking goals and are more pleasurable than utilitarian ones, which are often guided by functional needs (Alba and Williams 2013). Most literature in the hedonic-utilitarian paradigm has focused on the decision processes by which consumers choose between such products (Dahl et al. 2003; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Okada 2005; Strailevitz and Myers 1998). However, whether choosing a hedonic or utilitarian item guides consumers’ subsequent preferences differently has remained understudied (Mukhopadhyay and Johar 2009; Dholakia et al. 2005). The question is important as growing research has documented sequential influences in decision-making (Novemsky and Dhar 2005; Dhar et al. 2007; Dhar and Simonson 1999). In the current research, we examine how choosing a hedonic versus a utilitarian option affects subsequent choices by changing the reasoning process applied to the subsequent decisions.

We propose that buying a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) item induces a justification mindset. The proposition rests on findings that hedonic items often evoke guilt and are harder to justify (Okada 2005; Khan et al. 2005). Once a justification mindset is activated it may shift consumers’ focus in subsequent decisions from the attributes of the choice alternatives to the reasons that best support each alternative thereby encouraging easier-to-justify actions. A carryover effect of justification mindset is consistent with findings that when a mindset is evoked, it persists, guiding thought and behavior, even in unrelated tasks (Gollwitzer & Bayer 1999; Chandran and Morwitz 2005; Dhar et al. 2007). The framework of a justification mindset allows us to predict how a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) initial purchase (driver) can influence subsequent choices (target) in a seemingly diverse set of contexts.

We start by examining how hedonic (vs. utilitarian) driver affects WTB (willingness-to-buy) of a target. Past research has shown that an initial purchase can increase the purchase likelihood of unrelated subsequent items (Dhar et al. 2007). If hedonic purchases induce a justification mindset, then we predict that a hedonic (versus utilitarian) driver should attenuate purchase acceleration. Study 1 tested this prediction by offering participants an opportunity to purchase either a hedonic (potato chips), a utilitarian (notebook), or no driver item and noting the differences in WTB of a utilitarian target (Keychain) across these groups. As predicted, a utilitarian driver significantly increased (55.3% utilitarian vs. 35.7% control) and a hedonic driver directionally decreased (22.7% hedonic vs. 35.7% control) purchase of the target keychain compared to the control. Note that the reduc-
tion in the subsequent purchases may be even more pronounced when the target is hedonic.

Study 2 tested a justification mindset account for the above findings by eliciting reasons for purchase of a target. In a justification mindset people are likely to focus on the best reasons for their choice, hence asking for reasons should have no further effect. Thus, while asking for reasons should reduce purchase likelihood of the target after a utilitarian driver, it should have no significant impact after a hedonic driver, which is predicted to induce a justification mindset. As predicted, eliciting reasons had an effect when the driver was utilitarian (59\%_reasons vs. 25\%_no-reasons) but not when it was hedonic (20\%_reasons vs. 17\%_no-reasons).

Besides WTB, a justification mindset should also affect the relative attractiveness of hedonic versus utilitarian options: consumers in justification mindset should be more likely to choose easier-to-justify utilitarian items. We first examine this prediction for choice of the compromise option. A need to justify a choice should increase the share of a compromise option (Simonson 1989). Thus, we predict that the compromise effect would be more pronounced after a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) purchase. Study 3 participants were asked to choose between three digital cameras (target choice) involving a price-quality tradeoff. Participants either viewed choice-set ABC where B was the compromise option or BCD where B was a non-compromise option. Prior to this choice, participants were either offered to purchase a bag of potato chips (hedonic driver) or a notebook (utilitarian driver) or nothing (control). As predicted, compromise effect was not significantly different in the control and utilitarian driver conditions (32\%_hedonic-driver vs. 27\%_utilitarian-driver) but almost doubled in the hedonic driver condition (32\%_hedonic-driver vs. 53\%_hedonic-driver).

Study 4 examined implications of a justification-mindset for a choice-set that contains only hedonic options. Goldsmith and Dhar (2009) show that extreme hedonic options may sometimes be easier to justify than moderately indulgent options as they offer a justification of maximum goal attainment. Building on this, we predict that a hedonic (vs. utilitarian) driver would result in greater share of the most indulgent item from an all-hedonic choice-set. To provide further support for the justification-mindset account we also examined an important individual difference relevant to purchase behavior. Rick et al. (2008) have shown that spendthrifts and tightwads differ significantly in their experience of pain-of-paying. Differences in pain-of-paying may partly determine the level of guilt people experience from hedonic purchases, such that spendthrifts may experience less guilt than tightwads. Hence, we predict that hedonic (vs. utilitarian) drivers may affect the subsequent behavior of tightwads more than spendthrifts. To test this idea we asked participants to imagine purchasing an expensive pair of shoes either for work-wear (utilitarian driver) or for party-wear (hedonic driver). Next, they chose between two luxury vacations, one of which was relatively more indulgent. Finally, we measured spendthrift vs. tightwad tendencies. In addition to a main effect of driver-type (higher purchase of more indulgent resort after hedonic driver (50\%_hedonic-driver vs. 38\%_utilitarian-driver)), and a main effect of consumer-type: higher purchase of the more indulgent resort by spendthrifts than tightwads (61\%_spendthrift vs. 26\%_tightwad) an interaction between driver-type and consumer-type emerged revealing higher choice of the more indulgent resort for tightwads after a hedonic driver (33\%_hedonic-driver vs. 15.9\%_utilitarian-driver) but no significant difference for the spendthrifts (62.2\%_hedonic-driver vs. 58.3\%_utilitarian-driver).

Our research contributes to hedonic-utilitarian literature and to the growing work on mindsets and their influences in sequential decision-making and stresses the importance of understanding consumer purchases in the context of their consumption journey rather than as isolated decisions.

The Comparative Mindset and Managerial Decision Making: Theory Extensions and Boundary Conditions

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Previous research on the comparative mindset effect suggests that consumer purchases often involve three sequential steps (Xu and Wyer 2007; 2008). First, they decide whether-to-choose, then they decide which-to-choose, and finally, they implement the purchase. This sequence of steps also occurs in many managerial decisions involving company purchase of products or services as well as in decisions to spend on advertising or strategic initiatives. Extending previous framework in consumer research, we suggest that after making whether-to-choose and which-to-choose decisions, managers often need to decide how much money to spend (i.e., deciding spending level). Because these steps are often pursued sequentially, activating a comparative mindset, which disposes managers to engage in the which-to-choose stage without first considering whether-to-choose, could not only increase managers’ choice likelihood (H1) but also elevate their spending levels (H3). Moreover, this effect is mediated by reduced weighting of negative product information at the decision stage (H2).

Study 1 manipulated comparative mindset by asking participants to state a preference for one animal from twenty pairs of animals (elephants vs. hippos, kangaroos vs. zebras, etc.). In the control condition, they solved twenty word-completion problems about animal names (e.g., __ u __ er ly, H __ p __ , etc.). Then, participants were asked to imagine that they were the Vice President for a company and were planning to buy computers for their company. Based on information about two computers, participants decided whether they would “Purchase Computer A,” “Purchase Computer B,” or “Defer Choice and Search for Other Models.” As predicted, participants in the mindset condition were more likely to purchase one of the computers rather than deferring choice than those in the control condition.

Study 2 explores the processes through which a comparative mindset influences choice. In the mindset condition, participants compared six pairs of ads on a range of criteria (e.g., “Which picture is more likely to prompt consumers to click through on a website?”). In the control condition, participants rated six ads on the same criteria (e.g., “Is this picture likely to prompt the consumer to click through on a website?”). Then, participants made purchase decisions about computers as in study 1. In addition, they reported how much they thought about the computers’ strengths, weaknesses, pluses, minuses, strong points, weak points, etc., when making their decisions. The results replicated the findings in study 1, and show that reduced thinking about the negative aspects, but not increased thinking about the positive aspects, mediated the mindset effect.

Study 3 used the same manipulations as study 2 did. In the dependent task, all participants were asked to play the role of Vice President of a computer manufacturing company and make next-year advertising spending decisions for the company. Based on the descriptions of two computers that their company was selling, participants decided among three options: “Advertise Model A,” “Advertise Model B,” or “Advertise Neither Model and Save the Budget.” Contingent on their choice, those who chose to advertise either Model A or Model B were asked to decide the percentage of budget they wanted to spend to advertise the chosen model and the percentage that they wanted to save. Results indicated that participants in the comparative mind-set condition not only were more likely to choose to advertise one of the models, but also committed a greater percentage of the budget to spending than their counterparts did in the control condition.
Two quasi-experiments examine the comparative mindset effect on real business decisions and the moderating conditions surrounding this effect. We select presidential election years as a context that should stimulate a comparative mindset among managers because the primaries and general election create an intensive period of comparing political candidates. We hypothesize that activating a comparative mindset during presidential election years increases marketers’ advertising spending levels relative to a control group (H4). Moreover, this effect will be weakened when the economy is in a recession (H5), and will be amplified when the manager’s company has higher profits (H6). Both economic recession and company profits are operationalizations of decision scrutiny, which defines the extent to which people make cost/benefit tradeoffs in decisions. Finally, this effect will be amplified when the manager’s company is located in a swing state (H7) because political campaigns are more intensive in these states, and therefore, should enhance the accessibility of the comparative mindset.

The first quasi-experiment tests H4 by using a multiple time series quasi-experimental control group design in which we compare a sample of firms headquartered in the U.S. to a control group of firms headquartered outside the U.S., assuming that managers of non-U.S. firms are influenced less by the comparative mind-set induced by the presidential election. The dependent variable is the advertising spending data pulled from Compustat during the period 1950-2011. The results show that only managers from U.S. firms, but not managers from international firms, spent more on advertising in presidential election years.

The second quasi-experiment tests a set of moderating variables among firms in the U.S. This result indicates a main effect of the presidential election effect. Consistent with H5, we observe that the interaction of Election*Recession is negative and significant, indicating that the comparative mind-set effect associated with the presidential election weakens during tough economic times. The interaction of Election*Firm_Profit, on the other hand, is positive and significant, indicating that when managers’ companies are more profitable, the effect of the comparative mind-set strengthens. This supports H6. We also found a two-way interaction of Election*Swing_State, showing that the effect of the comparative mind-set associated with the presidential election strengthens when the state associated with the manager’s company headquarters is a swing state. This supports H7. We exclude the alternative explanation that these effects are driven by increased ad price in election years.

In sum, this research extends the influence of comparative mindset to spending level decisions among managers, explores the underlying mechanism, and identifies the boundary conditions. In addition, this study shows that the comparative mindset influences not only hypothetical purchase and advertising decisions, but also business spending decisions in the real world.

Competitive Mindset: Does Scarcity Call for Selfishness?

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Scarcity is a prevalent condition that characterizes human existence. Mankind has regularly experienced periods of famine and draught (Chakravarthy and Booth 2004), modern economies often must cope with economic recessions (Griskevicius et al. 2013) and even in resource-rich environments it is common to encounter cues that emphasize the limited nature of products and resources (Cialdini 2009; Gitlin 2007). As a consequence, consumers often think about, worry about and discuss scarcity-related concerns (Twist and Barker 2006). However, in spite of the prevalence of cues and cognitions related to scarcity, little is known about the psychological processes that result when the concept of scarcity is activated in the mind of the consumer, and further what implications those processes might have for decision making (Shah et al., 2011).

This research investigates how activating the concept of scarcity affects consumers’ propensity to behave selfishly in subsequent, unrelated tasks. We draw from research in social and evolutionary psychology (Hill et al. 2012; Griskevicius et al. 2013) to predict that when the concept of scarcity is activated, people’s decision making will be guided by a focus on advancing their own welfare, relative to that of others. We argue that this occurs due to an underlying shift towards a competitive mindset. Our theoretical framework also predicts that activating the concept of scarcity can cause people to become more generous with others, but only in settings where the associated benefits to the self are highlighted (e.g., charitable giving in order to gain status, Griskevicius, Tybur, and van den Bergh 2010).

We test these predictions in five studies. In all studies, participants are first randomly assigned to either a scarcity prime or a neutral prime condition. We employ three different manipulations to prime the concept of scarcity (a listing task, episodic recall and a semantic priming task) and find convergent results supporting our predictions. Study 1 tested for the proposed main effect of priming scarcity on selfish behavior. After the priming task, participants were asked to evaluate the acceptability of an immoral behavior that benefited the self, yet came at a detriment to society (tax fraud). In line with our predictions, participants primed with scarcity rated tax fraud more acceptable (Mcontrol=-3.10 vs. Mscarcity=-4.23; F(1, 88)=4.79; p=.034).

Study 2 tested whether a competitive mindset mediates the effect of scarcity on selfish behavior. After the priming task, participants were given a real donation choice: the option to keep vs. donate $1 of their compensation to a charity. Next, among several filler scales, participants were given the Hypercompetitive Attitude Scale (Ryckman et al. 1990), which was included as a measure of a competitive mindset. In line with our predictions, participants primed with scarcity were more likely to keep the money (β=-1.21; p=.054). They were also more competitive (β=-.58; p=.009) and this competitive tendency had a negative effect on donation rate (β=1.04; p=.035). Most importantly, the direct effect of scarcity on selfish-profitable behavior was not significant when an agentic orientation was added to the model (p=.29; 95% CI [-2.03,-.03]; Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

In order to provide convergent evidence that activating the concept of scarcity makes individuals more focused on the self and, hence, more selfish, study 3 also tested whether it made them less focused on others, and thus reduced their communal orientation (Frimer et al., 2011). After the priming task, participants completed the Communion Management scale (Paulhus and Trapnell, 2008), which assesses dissimilation on communal attributes. In line with our prediction, activating the concept of scarcity significantly decreased participants’ communal tendencies as compared to the control (Mcontrol=6.9 vs. Mscarcity=5.6; F(1, 263)=5.11; p=.025). Studies 4 and 5 tested for boundary conditions to the observed effects. Specifically, study 4 tested whether exposure to scarcity-related cues promotes a strategic response, by increasing selfish behavior only when the behavior is directly self-profitable, instead of simply leading to a generalized, irrational desire to hoard resources. To test this, after the priming task, participants played either a dictator or an ultimatum game. The interaction between the scarcity and the game manipulations was significant (F(1, 187)=6.56; p=.011). In the context of the dictator game, wherein retaining more money leads to more self-profit, scarcity significantly increased the amount of money participants retained for themselves (Mcontrol=$66.17 vs. Mscarcity=$75.17).
pants’ generosity (M = $7.06; F(1, 187) = 4.78; p = .030). However, in the context of the ultimatum game, wherein retaining more money can lead to reductions in self-profit, scarcity had no effect on the amount of money retained (M$_{scarcity}$ = $5.96 vs. M$_{control}$ = $5.47; F(1, 187) = 2.09; p = .150).

Study 5 tested whether priming scarcity can promote other-profitable behavior when such behavior is framed as directly benefiting the self. After the priming task, participants indicated their gift giving intention and their willingness to pay for a gift designed to thank a helpful friend, which were standardized and averaged to form a composite measure of generosity. The interaction between the scarcity and the self-benefit manipulations was significant (F(1, 141) = 5.55; p = .02). When gift giving was not framed as providing any clear benefit to the self, participants’ generosity did not differ between the scarcity and the control condition (M$_{scarcity}$ = -.18; M$_{control}$ = .01; F(1, 138) = .89; p = .3). However, when gift giving was framed as providing a clear benefit to the self, scarcity increased participants’ generosity (M$_{scarcity}$ = .29; M$_{control}$ = -.15; F(1, 141) = 5.87; p = .017).

This paper sheds light on the heretofore unknown consequences of priming the concept of scarcity on selfishness. Across five studies, we demonstrate that scarcity activates a competitive mindset, which in turn motivates people to pursue self-focused goals through selfish means. This suggests that desperate times may indeed call for selfish measures.

Beating the Market: Competitive Mindset and the Allure of Unintended Value

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers often encounter marketing offers that can potentially be construed as valuable opportunities, such as products on sale, loyalty programs, rebate offers, and various promotions. However, the mere fact that an offer is presented or framed as a bargain is often not sufficient to generate consumers’ subjective belief that the offer actually represents superior value for them. While a great deal of research has examined factors that influence value assessment, the factors that produce subjective perceptions of bargain have remained rather elusive.

We propose that one important determinant of deal perception is the degree to which an offer appears more valuable than presumably intended by the marketer. In particular, consumers’ belief that the marketer has not fully factored-in their willingness-to-pay or the utility they derive from the promoted product tends to create the (mis) perception of unintended consumer surplus; this, in turn, enhances the likelihood that the offer will be seen as valuable. We further propose that the tendency to act on such perceived bargains reflects in large part a competitive mindset where consumers are driven by a desire to outsmart the market and obtain a better value than intended by the marketer (Ratner and Miller 2001; Wright 1986).

Thus, subjective perceptions of bargain and the action tendencies they invoke depend on consumers’ belief that the offer is valuable for them without the marketer’s intention. We test these propositions primarily in the important marketing context of offer customization and targeted promotions. Specifically, we contrast cases in which a marketing offer appears to fit the consumer’s preferences better than presumably intended, thereby providing unintended utility or value, with cases in which the offer is explicitly tailored by the marketer to fit the consumer’s preferences. Importantly, we examine the effect of incidental versus tailored fit while holding constant both the actual and the perceived fit between the offer and the consumer’s preferences, and examining both cases of idiosyncratic (Kivetz and Simonson 2003) and non-idiosyncratic fit.

Experiment 1 shows that consumers are more likely to pursue a marketing offer when certain cues lead them to believe the offer fits them better (and is therefore more valuable for them) than intended, than when such cues are absent or when the offer is explicitly designed to fit the consumer. After measuring participants’ idiosyncratic preferences in an unrelated task, we offered participants with a special interest in economics and world news to take advantage of a special promotion for The Economist magazine – an offer that strongly matches their individual preferences. One third of participants were told that the offer was targeted at the average person, thereby providing them with seemingly unintended fit. Another third were told that the offer was designed “for the classic reader of The Economist”. The last third did not get any information about whom the offer was designed for. The offers were otherwise identical. In addition to the offer framing manipulation, half of the participants were primed with a competitive mindset whereas the others were primed with a neutral mindset. Consistent with our propositions, participants interested in economics and world news were more likely to take advantage of the offer when it was framed as designed for the average person than when it was designed “for the classic reader” or when no targeting information was provided. Moreover, the tendency to take advantage of the offer in the average person framing condition increased in the competition mindset priming condition, compared to the control prime.

In Experiment 2, we offered people to take advantage of a Hollywood Hits TV channel for $50 a year instead of a Hollywood Hits + Ballet channel package for $90 per year (almost all our participants favored Hollywood hits and had no interest in ballet). We told half of the participants that the Hollywood Hits offer was available instead of the enhanced Hollywood + Ballet package due to a local infrastructure constraint. The other half were told that the company conducted market research which suggested people were not interested in ballet. In addition, half of the participants were primed with a competitive mindset whereas the others were primed with a neutral mindset. As predicted, people were more likely to take advantage of the Hollywood-only (but better value) offer when it was due to the company’s infrastructure constraints than to market research. Moreover, the tendency to take advantage of the offer increased following the competitive mindset prime, compared to the neutral prime.

Experiment 3 extended these findings and provided direct evidence that offers that seem to provide unintended fit are seen as more valuable than intended by the marketer, compared to equivalent offers that fit the consumer by design.

Experiment 4 bolsters our proposition that the effect of unintended fit/value reflects consumers’ perception of marketers as counterparts in a competitive, zero-sum game. Specifically, we predicted that the competitive motivation to obtain a bargain at the marketer’s expense would be attenuated when it comes at the expense of a not-for-profit entity (McGraw, Schwartz, and Tetlock 2012). Thus, in addition to varying whether the offer seemed to provide unintended versus intended fit/value, we also varied whether the offer was made by a for-profit marketer or a not-for-profit entity. Consistent with our theory, the tendency to pursue the offer providing seemingly unintended value was pronounced when the seller was framed as a for-profit marketer, but it was attenuated when the seller was framed as a not-for-profit entity.

Taken together, the findings show that offers are particularly attractive when their value to the consumer (e.g., through fit) appears unintended rather than premeditated. The findings provide novel insights into factors that lead consumers to perceive offers as subjectively valuable and underscore the hitherto unexplored role of the
adversarial, competitive motivation to outsmart the market by taking advantage of unintended opportunities. The findings also show that explicit offer customization can boomerang by lowering bargain perceptions.

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How Thinking About Money Changes Goal Pursuit
Chair: Emily N. Garbinsky, Stanford University, USA

Emily N. Garbinsky, Stanford University, USA
Anne-Kathrin Klesse, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Jennifer Aaker, Stanford University, USA

Paper #2: Enhanced Desire for Product Choice in Response to Monetary Scarcity
Anneleen Van Kerckhove, Ghent University, Belgium
Renaud Lunardo, Bordeaux School of Management, France
Gavan J. Fitzsimons, Duke University, USA

Paper #3: Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture
Eric J. Johnson, Columbia University, USA
Ran Hassin, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Tom Baker, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Allison T. Bajger, Columbia University, USA
Galen Treuer, University of Miami, USA

Paper #4: Mere Exposure to Money Motivates Goal Attainment
Gülen Sarial-Abi, Bocconi University, Italy
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Reminders of money are ubiquitous. Every purchase we make, bill we pay, and check we receive forces us to think about how much money we have. Additionally, we encounter many subtle reminders of money in our daily lives, such as passing by a bank, ATM, or billboard displaying dollar signs. With this in mind, researchers have examined how thinking about money affects attitudes and behavior. For example, individuals who are primed with money, rather than time, feel less connected to products that they have purchased (Mogilner and Aaker 2009) and are less willing to donate money to charity (Liu and Aaker 2008). However, research in the area of money has largely ignored how priming this concept affects goal pursuit. As activating the idea of money makes people more self-sufficient (Vohs, Mead and Goode 2006), thus changing people’s aspirations, this raises the important question: How does the activation of the idea of money in people’s minds change goal pursuit?

With four papers, this session addresses this question as it integrates various ways to activate the concept of money to examine how these thoughts affect a host of goal-related behaviors. Garbinsky, Klesse, and Aaker prime thoughts of money by influencing one’s subjective level of wealth, via manipulating scale anchors. The authors find that making people feel less wealthy ironically causes them to save less money. They attribute these findings to feelings of powerlessness that are induced by feeling relatively poor, thus making individuals feel like their savings goal cannot be attained. Van Kerckhove, Lunardo, and Fitzsimons manipulate thoughts of money in an alternative fashion by having participants make lists of things they would be unable to do without money or by asking participants to indicate the amount of money in their bank account. They find that priming money scarcity leads consumers to place greater value on option choice as they are willing to invest more resources to keep options open. Johnson et al. manipulate monetary thoughts in a more generalizable way by providing participants with a cost calculator similar to those found on existing websites. They find that these calculation aids, in union with other interventions, cause participants to make better health coverage choices that could ultimately save 10 billion dollars each year. Finally, Sarial-Abi and Vohs show that even subtle reminders are sufficient to activate the concept of money by having participants sit in front of a computer with a screensaver displaying one hundred dollar bills. They find that activating the concept of money enables participants to better achieve a range of goals, from financial to health and problem-solving.

Although this session is designed to be of substantial interest to those who study the psychological consequences of money (as all four papers share a common focus on deepening a theoretical understanding of ways in which thinking about money affects goal pursuit, we also expect this session to have broader appeal. For instance, this session will focus on various ways to prime the concept of money in people’s minds, making it relevant to researchers interested in priming tactics more generally. Additionally, as three of the four papers examine the effects of money on financial decisions (saving, spending, and choosing health insurance), this session should also attract those interested in financial decision making. We hope that attracting a diverse audience will help facilitate a lively and fruitful discussion. In addition to creating connections between research areas, this session should also build connections between academia and industry because of its direct managerial implications; not only do the researchers focus on advancing our theoretical understanding of the consequences of money, but they also identify techniques that could potentially be manipulated by marketers in order to activate thoughts about money and thus change how much people ultimately decide to save, spend, or invest.

With Great Power Comes Financial Responsibility: The Effect of Power on Saving

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The savings rate among the poor is very low. Approximately 10% of all U.S. households, most of which live in poverty, lack formal saving tools (Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shafir 2006). Without banks, they must rely on alternative financial means such as check cashers, payday loans, or borrowing from friends, which can have serious ramifications for spending and savings issues. With this in mind, we sought to investigate why people who feel poor tend not to save as well as ways to encourage saving behavior. In doing so, we shed light on a new mechanism that explains the link between wealth and saving: feeling powerful.

Experiment 1—Subjective Wealth and Saving
This experiment sought to establish that feelings of power drive the relationship between subjective wealth and saving. Subjective wealth was manipulated by asking participants to indicate their annual household income on a scale that ranged from $0 – over $420,000 (low subjective wealth manipulation) or on a scale that ranged from $0 – over $44,000 (high subjective wealth manipulation) (Nelson and Morrison 2005). Then, participants imagined that they just received $100 and indicated how much of this money they would put in a savings account. Participants then indicated the extent to which they felt powerful (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).

Results showed that among those willing to save (N = 68), there was a significant difference in subjective wealth condition such that participants in the high subjective wealth condition (M = $50.86, SD = $29.81) were willing to save more money than those in the low subjective wealth condition (M = $37.12, SD = $26.16), t(66) = 2.02,
that feelings of power drive increases in saving. This pattern was observed by having participants imitate power postures (experiment 2) or write about a past experience in which they felt powerful (experiment 3). Additionally, these results suggest that power causes individuals to save more money by making them feel like their savings goal can indeed be achieved.

Enhanced Desire for Product Choice in Response to Monetary Scarcity

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

While consumers are well-accustomed to having the freedom to choose among alternatives, they often find themselves in situations in which their choice freedom is restricted. A theory apt to deal with people’s reactions to threatened freedoms is ‘reactance theory’ (Brehm 1966), which proposes that perceived threats to freedom motivate people to reassert that freedom. Though abundant, reactance research has been limited as it has exclusively focused on how making a specific option unavailable affects consumers’ behavior with respect to that specific object. The current research, however, focuses on a situation that people may experience as a generalized threat to choice freedom, and as such may have a broader effect on consumer behavior.

As money is generally seen as giving people options in life and yielding feelings of freedom (Mitchell and Mickel 1999; Vohs and Baumeister 2011), we posit that monetary scarcity may be experienced as a general threat to freedom of choice. Hence, monetary scarcity may be experienced as a restriction of choice, resulting in an increased valuation of option choice. Moreover, as people high (vs. low) in trait reactance are more motivated to reestablish threatened freedoms, monetary scarcity may lead people higher in reactance to value option choice.

To study whether monetary scarcity has a more generalized effect on the valuation of option choice than the scarcity of specific products (especially for those higher in trait reactance), participants first completed a reactance questionnaire (Hong and Faedda 1996). Next, they were randomly assigned to one of three scarcity conditions. In each condition, scarcity was activated by having participants list three things they would not be able to do anymore when either gasoline, sugar, or money was unavailable to them (Roux, Goldsmith and Bonezzi). Finally, participants were presented with three pairs of assortments, each comprising a small and a large assortment. Participants indicated from which assortment they would be most happy to choose (Inesi et al. 2011). Three products, namely water, candy, and detergent, were included in the assortment choice task. Results show that while participants in the sugar (vs. gasoline) scarcity condition prefer a larger assortment size for candy only, participants in the monetary (vs. gasoline) scarcity condition prefer a larger assortment size for all three products. Moreover, we find an interaction effect: , The preference for a large assortment in the monetary scarcity condition is larger for highly reactant participants.

Experiment 2 replicates this finding by assigning participants to a monetary scarcity or monetary abundance condition, rather than focusing on different types of scarcity. After completing the reactance scale, participants indicated the amount of money in their bank accounts, either on a response scale with large (monetary scarcity) or small (monetary abundance) increments. Next, participants chose three chocolates out of an assortment of five. Finally, participants evaluated the size of the assortment they chose from and indicated their satisfaction with their choices. Two regressions both reveal a significant interaction: Monetary scarcity (vs. abundance) leads to lower assortment size evaluations and lower satisfaction with a
choice from a small assortment, especially for people high in trait reactance.

Experiment 3 replicates this finding incorporating a clear measure of people’s striving for option choice. After completing the reactance scale, participants were randomly assigned to a money condition (monetary scarcity vs. control; Zhou, Vohs and Baumeister 2009). Next, participants played a ‘door game’ (Shin and Ariely 2004), in which participants could click on three depicted doors. The game was designed such that switching between doors was costly, though necessary to keep doors/options available. People who like to keep options open may be inclined to switch more than others. As anticipated, an interaction occurred whereby monetary scarcity leads people to switch more, especially when their reactance level is high.

Prior research showed that when a resource becomes scarce, people will value it more (Brock and Brannon 1992; Lynn 1991). Hence, as money becomes scarce, people should value money more. The reported studies indicate that under conditions of monetary scarcity, people also value option choice more. Using a 2 (money: scarcity, abundance) × 2 (resource: money, time) mixed-model design with resource serving as a within-participants factor, Experiment 4 focuses on how people trade-off money and option choice under conditions of monetary scarcity.

After measuring reactance, monetary scarcity was manipulated by an episodic recall task (Roux, Goldsmith and Bonezzi). Next, participants were presented with two scenarios; each scenario involved deciding whether to make the purchase from a store offering a small or a store offering a large assortment. In the first scenario the prices of eyeglasses were lower in the small versus large assortment store, while in the second scenario, the small-assortment store was open, and the large assortment store was closed. Desire for a larger choice set was measured, by, respectively, the amount of money participants were willing to spend additionally and the number of minutes they were willing to wait to access the larger choice set. Results show that in the monetary scarcity condition, participants are willing to wait longer to choose from a large assortment, especially when reactance is high, replicating the findings of the previous studies. However, when considering the amount of money people are willing to additionally spend to choose from a large assortment, we find that there is no effect of monetary scarcity, nor an interaction with reactance. This finding indicates that, even though lacking money triggers a greater desire for choice, people do not value option choice more than money. Hence, having choice options cannot substitute for a lack of money.

Overall, these studies suggest that monetary scarcity can lead people to exhibit reactance and to look for freedom. Whereas financially threatening situations generally redirect people’s focus on extrinsic goals such as financial success and social popularity (Sheldon and Kasser 2008), we show that this may also instigate an increased valuation of a ‘higher-order’ goal like freedom of choice. Our research extends the scope of reactance theory, but also sheds new light on the desires of people living under conditions of monetary scarcity.

Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In less than a year, on January 1, 2014, tens of millions of Americans, along with members of Congress, will participate in a grand experiment in consumer choice: They will select health insurance using a marketplace or health insurance exchange operated by states and federal governments as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care and Act. The success of these exchanges depends upon two related premises: First that consumers will be able to select the best policy for their needs, and second that price competition, driven by effective consumer choice, will lower prices.

These premises are critical not only to the new exchanges, but also for all government administered health insurance markets and for the efficiency of privately provided benefit choices. Yet, a large literature in psychology suggests that this may not be the case, since, as we shall see, these exchanges may not provide a helpful choice architecture to support decision making. In this paper, we examine three related questions: Can people select the best policies? Do they know how well they are doing? Does the design of the sites change their performance?

Our results suggest there is significant room to improve these decisions. Without any intervention, respondents perform at near chance levels and show a significant bias, overweighting out-of-pocket costs and deductibles. Financial incentives do not improve performance, and decision-makers do not realize that they are performing badly. However, performance can be improved quite markedly by providing calculation aids, and by choosing a “smart” default, raising the performance of ordinary respondents to that of the MBA students.

Experiment 1 provides a baseline, examining the proportion of people choosing the most cost-effective policy from 4 or 8 options. Fig. 1 shows the outcomes from all experiments. The top half of each bar, in blue, represents the proportion of correct choices, and the bottom half, in red, plots the average dollar error, across respondents. The dashed line represents expected choice quality by a random chooser. Panel A of Fig. 1 shows a rather dramatic outcome: With 4 choice options, respondents select the best option only 42 percent of the time, and make an average mistake of over $200 dollars. With eight options, they select the correct option 21 percent of the time, a figure not different than chance (p < .05). Experiment 2 added monetary incentives. As can be seen in the next two bars of Fig. 1 (A), incentives did not improve outcomes, and performance was close to chance.

One obvious intervention, used in Experiments 3 and 4, provides a cost-calculator stating the annual total cost. This is done on several existing web sites including Medicare.gov. In addition, Experiment 4 also simplified the choice by removing quality information for half the respondents.

The results, shown in the third and fourth columns of Fig. 1(A) are not markedly different. Again respondents chose the most cost effective option less than half the time, and make large financial errors. The unaided decisions makers averaged errors of $611 in Experiment 3 and chose the correct option 32% of the time. Providing the calculators did marginally help but only in Experiment 4: Respondents provided with calculators chose the correct option 10.1% more often, and reduced the size of errors by $216, but still were only correct 47% of the time and made mean errors of $364.

Is this task simply impossible? Experiment 5, used a very different population to see how highly trained, financially literate individuals might do. We presented MBA students enrolled in a class on consumer finance with the same task as in Experiment 4.

As seen in the first column of Fig. 1(B), they perform appreciably better, choosing the right option 73% of the time, and making an average mistake of $126. Their self-reports of how they accomplished the task are interesting: Forty percent reported using excel. This suggests that having both the right mental model and the ability to execute these calculations may be a basic requirement to make good choices.
In Experiment 6, we explored the possibility that mental models plus different possible interventions would produce good performance by those who will be using the exchange. We compared a control condition to four different manipulations. An incentive group received a more extreme and sophisticated incentive regime. We contrasted this to three choice architecture interventions. The first provided a calculator, explained what the calculator did, and tested that understanding. The second provided a smart default that preselected the most cost effective options given that individual’s usage. Individuals could, and did, change that selection if they wanted. Finally, we combined defaults and calculators. The presence of incentives and our choice architecture manipulations allows comparing the cost effectiveness of these interventions.

The last four bars in Fig. 2(B) show that the treatments vary widely in effectiveness. The controls, despite having received instruction and tests of understanding, choose about as well as respondents in prior experiments. The second bar indicates that incentives do not have a significant effect on outcomes, even though individuals in the incentive condition did take 38% longer to make their decisions, a significant increase relative to controls. Calculators (with education), in contrast, produce better decisions, with a significant increase relative to controls. Calculators (with education), in contrast, produce better decisions, with a significant increase relative to controls. Calculators (with education), in contrast, produce better decisions, with a significant increase relative to controls.

Mere Exposure to Money Motivates Goal Attainment

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

How do people achieve their goals? Goal performance has been linked to goal setting, dedication to achieving the goal, self-perceptions of being able to achieve the goal, and the goal’s value to the individual (Heath et al., 1999; Vroom, 1964). Being motivated (i.e., feeling energized toward pursuing the goal) helps too (Locke & Latham, 1990). The current article offers the idea of money, as a simple environmental cue, can aid goal pursuit.

The use of money is intimately tied to goal pursuit. When people use money, they do so to close a gap between a current and desired end-point, the definition of goal pursuit (Baumeister, 1998; Carver & Scheier, 1990). Money is also linked to goal attainment in another manner. The largest source of money gain is earnings, which means that people apply persistence, skill, or other behaviors to perform jobs that meet an acceptable standard.

Hence, there are two distinct ways that money and goal pursuit are intertwined – through spending and earning it. Due to their frequent pairing, the very concepts of money and a goal might stimulate energetic and motivated reactions. We predicted an interaction between being reminded of money and the presence of goal in determining motivated behavior.

Experiment 1: Finances. Participants in money (vs. nonmoney) reminder condition saw 20 images of one hundred dollar bills (vs. shells) arranged onscreen randomly and provided a quick and accurate account. Next, participants in the no-goal condition read the same paragraph, but they also read that they had adopted a goal of being frugal and not spending much money. The next screen displayed and described 11 products (e.g., a CD that includes an additional CD as promotion). They reported the likelihood of buying each item. Ratings were averaged to form an overall spending likelihood measure.

An ANOVA with money reminder and goal condition as predictors of spending intentions revealed the predicted interaction effect, $F(1, 104) = 5.21, p < .03$. Participants in the money reminder condition who were given an explicit goal versus no goal reported lower spending intentions, $F(1, 104) = 7.17, p < .01$. Participants in the no money reminder condition, however, did not differ in their spending intentions as a function of goal and no goal condition, $F < 1$.

Experiment 2: Health. Participants randomly received the money versus non-money reminder manipulation as in Experiment 1. Next, participants read text written in second person to describe a person’s realization of eating too much lately and gaining weight. In the goal condition participants read, “You tell yourself, I must stop eating so much, and this becomes an important goal that you want to reach.” Then participants rated a series of words on their aesthetics using three 5-point scales anchored with: unattractive / attractive, unpleasant / pleasant, and negative / positive. We averaged the health-related items (e.g., apple) to create a healthy attitude score.

An ANOVA with money reminder and goal condition as predictors of healthy attitude scores revealed the predicted interaction effect, $F(1, 86) = 4.68, p < .04$. Participants in the money reminder condition who were presented with a goal reported more favorable attitudes toward the health words than did participants who were not reminded of money ($F(1, 86) = 13.81, p < .01$. In the absence of a goal, whether participants earlier had been reminded of money or not did not affect their attitudes toward the health words, $F < 1$.

Experiment 3: Problem Solving Performance. Participants were handed a stack of questionnaires. Computers nearby had a screen-
saver on, which depending on condition, showed either money versus fish floating underwater. Next, participants in the goal condition read they should adopt the goal of completing as many problems as they can. In the no goal condition, participants read that they would be performing math problems.

An ANOVA with money reminder and goal condition as predictors revealed the predicted significant interaction effect on duration, \( F(1, 104) = 18.85, p < .01 \). When given a goal, participants who had been reminded of money, relative to their non-money counterparts, spent more time trying to solve the math problems, \( F(1, 104) = 17.20, p < .01 \). Without being given a goal, duration was equivalent between participants who were or were not reminded of money, \( p > .05 \).

**Experiment 4: Having Fun.** We last sought to test whether money reminders would help people achieve goals that were not explicitly given to them by us. Participants’ first task was to complete paper forms of questionnaires while a nearby computer’s screensaver showed either pictures of money or fish underwater. Next, participants in the fun (versus no frame) condition were instructed to complete four puzzles that were described as “enjoyable games and puzzles” versus “verbal tasks.” Four items measured participants’ experience: the task was fun/enjoyable; I enjoyed/had fun doing the task.”

An ANOVA on experience of fun during the task revealed the predicted significant interaction, \( F(1, 92) = 4.32, p < .05 \). When participants in the money reminder condition were given a task framed as fun, they experienced more fun compared to those who were in the nonmoney reminder condition, \( F(1, 92) = 12.30, p < .01 \). There was no difference between money and nonmoney reminder condition participants’ experience of fun when the task was not framed as fun, \( p > .57 \).

**General Discussion.** Four experiments showed that reminders of money influences goal pursuit. The findings of this research contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we demonstrate money as a tool for goal-pursuit. Second, we integrate the literature in psychology of money and self-regulation to highlight the underlying mechanism under the influence of money on goal-pursuit. In sum, our data, for the first time, shows that money can be used as a facilitator for goal-pursuit.

**REFERENCES**


The third paper, by Hill, DelPriore, Rodeheffer and Butterfield, also draw from Life History Theory to investigate how resource scarcity influences women’s ideal body sizes. Three experiments demonstrate that exposure to scarcity cues leads women who experienced relatively stressful (benign) childhoods to prefer heavier (thinner) body sizes.

Finally, the fourth paper by Roux and Goldsmith explores how being exposed to scarcity-related cues influences people’s level of processing. Specifically, they show that activating the concept of scarcity induces people to adopt an abstract (vs. concrete) mindset, which broadens one’s consideration, thus leading them to categorize objects into fewer, more general, superordinate groups and to be more likely to include atypical exemplars into a given category.

Taken together, these four papers advance our understanding of how scarcity influences consumer behavior. Overall, this session offers a coherent set of innovative perspectives that enhance the breadth of our knowledge in a growing area of research. We expect this session to appeal to a broad audience, including researchers interested in resource scarcity, store atmospherics, financial planning, family environments, physical appearance, and cognitive processing.

Understanding Consumers’ Perception of and Responses to Scarcity Cues

Chairs: Chiraag Mittal, University of Minnesota, USA
Caroline Roux, Northwestern University, USA

Julio Sevilla, University of Georgia, USA
Claudia Townsend, University of Miami, USA

Paper #2: Planning Under Paucity: Responses to Resource Scarcity Threats Depend on Childhood Environments
Chiraag Mittal, University of Minnesota, USA
Vladas Griskevicius, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #3: The Effects of Resource Scarcity on the Ideal Female Body Size
Sarah E. Hill, Texas Christian University, USA
Danielle DelPriore, Texas Christian University, USA
Christopher D. Rodeheffer, Texas Christian University, USA
Max Butterfield, Texas Christian University, USA

Paper #4: Understanding the Psychology of Scarcity: When Limited Resources Prompt Abstract Thinking
Caroline Roux, Northwestern University, USA
Kelly Goldsmith, Northwestern University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Modern life is rife with inconsistencies in product and resource availability. Not only does the economy continue to be characterized by periods of recessions, but there is considerable inequality among people for access to products and resources. Consequently, how do consumers perceive and react to cues of scarcity in their everyday lives? Despite increasing interest in this research topic, there are still many open questions regarding the antecedents and consequences of scarcity. For example, it is unclear what environmental cues lead consumers to perceive resources as more or less scarce. Moreover, the influence scarcity exerts on consumers’ cognition, judgment and behavior still remain vastly unexplored. This session provides a step forward in this direction by considering various ways in which scarcity shapes consumer behavior.

All four papers in this session provide new insights into how different cues of scarcity, from store atmospherics to news articles indicative of recession, influence consumers’ cognitions and behaviors. Two of the papers also identify important person variables, such as childhood environments, that may affect people’s responses to such cues.

The first paper, by Sevilla and Townsend, investigates how environmental cues influence perceptions of scarcity. Specifically, they demonstrate how the product-to-space ratio in a retail setting leads consumers to perceive products as more or less scarce. Results from three experiments suggest that consumers perceive products to be scarcer when they are surrounded by more empty space, holding the product assortment constant. In turn, scarcity perceptions translate into higher purchase intention and increased price estimates.

The second paper, by Mittal and Griskevicius, draws from Life History Theory to explore whether consumers’ response to scarcity cues depends on their childhood environments. Specifically, the authors investigate how resource scarcity cues differentially influence financial planning. Across three experiments, the authors present evidence suggesting that consumers who grew up with relatively lower levels of family support value financial planning more less when exposed to resource scarcity cues.
as well as address the automatic versus deliberative components of the phenomenon.

Study 1 was a field study that established our proposed effect revealing that consumers spent more money in the store when a constant product assortment was displayed across a larger rather than smaller amount of space ($M_{large\ space} = 6.73$ vs. $M_{small\ space} = 3.67$; $t(195) = 2.24, p < .04$). Moreover, a survey of store visitors revealed more favorable evaluations of products in the low product to space ratio condition ($M_{large\ space} = 5.27$) than in the high product to space ratio group ($M_{small\ space} = 4.73$; $t(84) = 2.29, p < .03$).

Study 2 used a laboratory controlled environment to provide evidence for the display density effect by asking participants to select a choice set from which to make a hypothetical purchase. Specifically, participants considered two sets of men’s neckties that differed on the designs of the ties and on the product-to-space-ratio of the display. The display space and product design factors were counterbalanced and yet significantly more than half of participants selected the assortment with more space as the one from which they would prefer to purchase (59.1%, $\chi^2 = 6.32, p < .02$), which they liked more (59.1%; $\chi^2 = 6.32, p < .02$), found more attractive (67.1%; $\chi^2 = 8.00, p < .01$) and more luxurious and exclusive (59.1%; $\chi^2 = 6.32, p < .02$).

Study 3 considered the underlying mechanism behind this effect by examining potential mediators for the phenomenon. In contrast to study 1, study 2 used a between- rather within-subject design, used estimated price of the featured products rather than choice set selection as a dependent measure, and considered a female-centric product category, that of women’s shoes, as opposed to men’s neckties. As expected, participants in the larger space condition estimated the price of the shoes as higher as did those in the smaller space condition ($M_{large} = $97.51 vs. $M_{small} = $70.20; $F(1, 97) = 6.61, p < .02$). Moreover, both perceptions of scarcity associated with the store ($M_{large} = 3.69$ vs. $M_{small} = 2.98$; $t(99) = 2.10, p < .04, CI: 16.36$ to $-1.14$) and with the product ($M_{large} = 3.74$ vs. $M_{small} = 1.22$; $t(99) = 9.06, p < .0001, CI: -38.63$ to $-1.01$) mediated the effect.

In a set-up similar to study 2, study 4 provided further support for the underlying scarcity mechanism revealing the effect to be deactivated when participants’ beliefs about how scarce a product is are directly manipulated ($\chi = 1.61, p > .20$). Additionally, in this study we found that the effect held under conditions of cognitive load, which suggests predominantly automatic and non-deliberative processing. This is a novel finding when contrasted with past research on scarcity effects, which are usually triggered through rational claims or explicit amounts shown (e.g. Fromkin 1970; Verhallen 1982).

We believe this presentation is consistent with the theme of the conference and would “make a difference” as this topic has direct theoretical consumer behavior and managerial implications. Specifically, we have shown that the effect of product-to-space-ratio plays a positive role in increasing product preference and valuation, and yet this finding may be at odds with cost efficiency concerns that suggest a denser store maximizes rental retail utility. The present research could encourage researchers from these different fields to work together to determine the conditions and situations in which the display density effect can best be employed to maximize profits.

Planning Under Paucity: Responses to Resource Scarcity Threats Depend on Childhood Environments

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Financial planning is pervasive in consumers’ lives. Not only does it impact how we spend money in our everyday lives, but it also has a profound effect on wealth accumulation and retirement satisfaction (Ameriks, Caplan, and Leahy 2003; Elder and Rudolph 1999). Because a principal reason to plan is to have a better and more comfortable future, might uncertainties about the future change people’s planning psychologies? For example, can cues indicating looming resource scarcity such as those related to economic recessions lead people to change their financial planning? Would such cues lead them to plan more or plan less?

Recent work suggests that the answer depends. Research indicates that people respond in divergent ways when faced with threats of resource scarcity based on their childhood resource conditions (Griskevicius et al., 2013, White et al., 2013). For example, adults raised in relatively resource-rich environments took fewer risks and became less impulsive under cues of resource scarcity, whereas those from relatively resource-deprived backgrounds responded to the same cues by taking more risks and becoming more impulsive (Griskevicius et al., 2013). In the present work, we draw on the cost-benefit framework of life history theory to investigate the effects of resource scarcity on people’s financial planning behavior.

In Study 1, we experimentally manipulated resource scarcity cues by having people read a news article about the recent economic recession or having them read a control article. We then examined their beliefs about the importance of financial planning by using an adapted version of the propensity to plan scale (Lynch et al., 2009). Results revealed that for people growing up with relatively higher levels of family resources, the recession news article did not significantly affect their valuation of financial planning. However, among individuals growing up with relatively lower levels of family resources, recession cues decreased their valuation of financial planning.

In Study 2, we sought to replicate the results of Study 1 by using a behavioral measure of the value of planning. Resource scarcity was manipulated by having participants recall an incident when they felt financially deprived compared to their peers (Sharma & Alter, 2012). In the neutral condition, people simply responded to the measure of financial planning. Then, in an ostensibly unrelated task, respondents were informed that the experimenters were interested in knowing the kinds of information people are interested in learning in the context of retirement planning. They were then provided with a list of topics pertaining to retirement finances that they could choose to learn about. Importantly, they were informed that they could read as many or as few of the topics they were interested in. The dependent measure was the amount of time respondents spent on learning about retirement planning. Findings conceptually replicated the results of Study 1. Specifically, respondents who grew up with relatively higher levels of family resources did not differ significantly on learning about retirement planning under scarcity manipulation. In contrast, among those growing up with relatively lower levels of family resources, scarcity thoughts significantly decreased the amount of time they spent on learning about retirement planning.

Study 3 had two goals. First, to ensure the robustness of the experimental findings in Studies 1 and 2, we sought to conceptually replicate the results using a third methodology to prime resource scarcity—a photo slideshow (Griskevicius et al., 2013, Hill et al., 2012). Second, to tested whether people’s perceptions of personal control could be potential mediator of the relationship between resource scarcity cues and planning beliefs. Resource scarcity cues were manipulated by having participants view a slideshow with visual images suggestive of economic recession or control images. Next, participants rated their beliefs about the importance of planning and their perceptions of control over their financial behavior. Consistent with the results from Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 found that for people growing with relatively lower levels of family resources, recession
cues significantly decreased their rated importance of financial planning. Additionally, the changes in the importance of planning were found to be mediated by the changes in perceptions of personal control over financial behaviors.

These studies provide important new insights into the complex relationship between resource scarcity and people’s financial behaviors. It draws on life history theory to explore why people from different childhood backgrounds might respond differently to modern stressors such as resource scarcity and uncertainty. It also identifies perceptions of personal control as an important variable that guides people’s subsequent beliefs and behaviors pertaining to financial planning. This work has important implications for public policy professionals and others who wish to foster better financial planning behaviors in people from underprivileged backgrounds.

The Effects of Resource Scarcity on the Ideal Female Body Size

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

When it comes to women’s body ideals, is it true that thin is in? Or is shapely sexy? The answer to this question varies considerably across cultures. Although ultra-thin female models are idealized in Western nations like the United States, individuals living in nations where resources are scarce, tend to prefer women with a heavier body size (see e.g., Swami et al., 2010). This pattern repeats itself within nations, communities, and across the sexes. People living in relatively safe, affluent regions idealize thinner female bodies than those residing in more dangerous, lower SES communities (Swami et al., 2010). Resource scarcity and stress also increase the heaviness of the body that men most desire in their romantic partners (Swami & Tovée, 2012), but not necessarily themselves (Sobal & Stunkard, 1989).

Why do researchers regularly observe a relationship between resource scarcity and preference for a heavier female body ideal? Here, we use insights from two theoretical models in evolutionary biology – life history theory and the critical fat hypothesis – to examine whether this relationship might emerge from the different life history strategies typically adopted by individuals living in resource scarce versus resource plentiful environments. Female body fat plays a key role in women’s fertility regulation, with thinness being related to suboptimal fertility (Frisch, 1985). Accordingly, we predicted that resource scarcity cues – which promote the contingent expression of a faster life history strategy and more immediate reproduction – would produce a preference shift away from the very thin, sub-fertile female ideal typically chosen by Western women toward a heavier, more fertile female form.

In Study 1, we experimentally manipulated cues of resource scarcity by having men and women read a news article about the recent economic recession. We then asked them about their developmental history and measured their perceptions of the ideal body size using the contour drawing figure rating scale CDFRS (Swami et al., 2010). We predicted that women who experienced earlier pubertal development – a physiological indicator of sensitization to a faster life history strategy – would respond to scarcity cues by shifting away from the very thin, sub-fertile body ideal typically favored by western women, toward a heavier, more fertile female ideal. Because body fat does not influence men’s fertility, we predicted that no such effects would be found for men. The results of Study 1 supported these predictions.

In study 2, we used a similar priming methodology to explore whether we could conceptually replicate these results using a second cue to resource scarcity – cues to heightened environmental stress and uncertainty. Participants read a news article about increasing stress and unpredictability in the modern world or a control article. Next, they reported on their pubertal timing and indicated the ideal female body size. As predicted, women who experienced earlier pubertal development chose a heavier female body ideal after readings a news article about increasing rates of violent crime compared to comparable controls.

Study 3 was designed to extend our findings in two ways. First, we sought to examine whether resource scarcity cues have implications for men’s perceptions of the ideal female body size. Because successful enactment of faster life history strategies is critically dependent on female body fat, both men and women sensitized to faster reproductive strategies should respond to harshness by idealizing a heavier, more fertile female body size. Second, because pubertal timing is not the only developmental marker of life history strategies, Study 3 was also designed to test whether we could conceptually replicate the specific pattern of results found in Studies 1–3 using a different index of developmental history – childhood SES (see e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2011). We predicted that resource scarcity cues would interact with both men’s and women’s childhood SES, such that individuals growing up in lower SES environments would idealize a heavier female body size relative to individuals growing up in higher SES environments. As predicted, we found that men and women growing up in lower SES environments responded to resource scarcity cues by favoring a heavier, more fertile female body ideal.

The results of our three studies provide some of the first experimental evidence regarding how and why people living in relatively safe, affluent regions prefer a thinner female body ideal than those residing in more dangerous, lower SES communities. Specifically, the results of our studies lend support for the hypothesis that this variability might reflect the different life history strategies adopted by those living in resource scarce versus resource plentiful environments. Although this variability is often attributed to differences in exposure to Western media and the thinness of fashion models used in magazines and advertisements, the current research provides evidence that these findings may also reflect fundamental differences in people’s psychologies based on the level of resources present in men’s and women’s childhood and adult environments. This work has important implications for researchers interested in various areas including physical appearances, food consumption, individual differences, and mating behaviors.

Understanding the Psychology of Scarcity: When Limited Resources Prompt Abstract Thinking

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Scarcity is a prevalent condition that characterizes human existence. Mankind has regularly experienced periods of famine and draught (Chakravarty and Booth 2004), modern economies often must cope with economic recessions (Griskevicius et al. 2013), and even in resource-rich environments people routinely encounter cues that emphasize the limited nature of products and resources (Cialdini 2009; Gitlin 2007). As a consequence, people often think about, worry about, and discuss scarcity-related concerns (Twist and Barker 2006). However, in spite of the frequency of cues and cognitions related to scarcity, our understanding of the psychological processes that result when the concept of scarcity is activated remains limited. In this research, we investigate how activating the concept of scarcity influences the way people process information. Specifically, we posit that scarcity-related cues can affect people’s level of processing through the activation of an abstract mindset (Liberman and Trope 2008).
Construal level theory (CLT; Liberman and Trope 1998) posits that psychological distance affects the way in which individuals mentally represent objects or events (Trope and Liberman 2003). More specifically, when events are psychologically distant, people represent them at a higher level, focusing on their superordinate, central, and general features, whereas when events are psychologically proximal, people represent them at a lower level, focusing on their subordinate, peripheral, and concrete features. Research has also shown that unrelated cues can promote these more abstract versus concrete levels of processing (Fujita et al. 2006; Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope 2004; Förster, Friedman, and Liberman 2004) and have carry-over effects on decision processes (Khan, Zhu, and Kalra 2011; Kim, Zhang, and Li 2008; Meyvis, Goldsmith, and Dhar 2012).

We add to this work by testing how exposure to scarcity-related cues affects consumers’ level of construal. Prior work has shown that exposure to threat-related cues can narrow one’s scope of attention to a more local (vs. global) level (Friedman and Förster 2010). Because exposure to scarcity-related cues might trigger cognitions related to threat, one thus might expect such cues to promote concrete levels of construal (Liberman and Trope 2008; Marguc, Förster, and Van Kleef 2011). This prediction is supported by research showing that being raised or put in an environment where resources are scarce changes how people allocate attention, specifically by shifting focus towards the scarcity-related problem and away from other problems or future considerations (Griskevivius et al. 2013; Shah, Shafir, and Mullainathan 2011).

However, we draw from research on resource constraints and goal pursuit to argue that exposure to scarcity-related cues induces people to adopt an abstract mindset. Indeed, research has shown that interfering forces (Higgins 2006) encountered during goal pursuit induce a more global, higher-level perspective in order to improve problem solving through the detection of alternative means or strategies, and that this shift in processing can carry over to tasks unrelated to one’s goal pursuit (Marguc et al. 2011). Related research has also shown that constraints put on a creative process can improve creative thinking (Burroughs et al. 2011; Moreau and Dhal 2005). Therefore, in resource-rich environments, being exposed to scarcity-related cues may not be interpreted as a threat, but instead as an interfering force that induces taking a step back and processing information from a more abstract perspective. We test this prediction in three studies and find convergent results supporting our prediction.

First, to test whether activating the concept of scarcity induces people to adopt an abstract mindset, study 1 manipulated the activation of scarcity (episodic recall, adapted from Fischhoff et al. 2003) prior to having participants complete the Behavior Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher and Wegner 1989), which assesses people’s level of representation (abstract “why” vs. concrete “how”) of 25 different activities. In line with our prediction, participants primed with scarcity were more likely to select higher-level representations of behaviors ($M = 17.05$) than participants exposed to a neutral prime ($M = 14.81$; $p = .054$).

Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate conceptual support for this effect, showing that activating the concept of scarcity broadens one’s considerations. Prior work has shown that when individuals process information abstractly, they tend to categorize objects into fewer, more general, superordinate groups (Liberman and Trope 2008; Marguc et al. 2011; Waslak et al. 2006). Study 2 thus manipulated the activation of scarcity with a listing task (Roux, Goldsmith, and Bonezzi 2012), where participants had to list three things they “cannot do” (vs. “can do”) when different resources are unavailable (vs. available). Participants then completed a categorization task (Waslak et al. 2006), where they had to categorize three different lists of items (camping trip, household, and yard sale items) into groups. In line with our prediction, participants primed with scarcity classified the items into fewer categories overall ($M = 6.12$) than those in the neutral prime condition ($M = 6.64$; $p = .057$).

Prior research has also shown that abstract thinking expands the boundaries of conceptual categories and increases the inclusion of atypical exemplars into a given category (Liberman and Trope 2008). Study 3 thus manipulated the activation of scarcity (listing task) prior to having participants complete a category inclusiveness task (Huang and Galinsky 2011, Isen and Daubman 1984), where they had to rate the extent to which strong, intermediate, and weak exemplars belonged in a given category. In line with our prediction, participants primed with scarcity demonstrated greater category inclusiveness for medium ($M = 8.14$) exemplars than participants exposed to a neutral prime ($M = 7.75$; $p = .04$). A similar pattern of results emerged for the weak exemplars ($M_{scarcity} = 5.90$; $M_{neutral} = 5.48$; $p = .07$), but not for the strong exemplars ($M_{scarcity} = 9.87$; $M_{neutral} = 9.77$; $p = .13$), consistent with prior work (Huang and Galinsky 2010).

In summary, the findings presented here advance our understanding of how being exposed to scarcity-related cues affects one’s psychological orientation. Across three studies, we demonstrate that exposure to scarcity-related cues promotes more abstract construals. Although further research is necessary to fully understand the boundaries of these effects, this research provides an important step towards a better understanding of the psychology of scarcity.

REFERENCES


Let’s Talk About It: Factors Influencing Word-of-Mouth Content

Chairs: Yu-Jen Chen, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA

Paper #1: Who’s Driving This Conversation? Systematic Biases in the Content of Online Consumer Discussions
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA
Ann E. Schlosser, University of Washington, USA
Yu-Jen Chen, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China

Paper #2: When Do People Talk About and Why?
Evan Weingarten, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Jonah Berger, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #3: The Content and Impact of Mobile Versus Desktop Reviews
Nicholas Lurie, University of Connecticut, USA
Sam Ransbotham, Boston College, USA
Hongju Liu, University of Connecticut, USA

Paper #4: Naive or Savvy: How Credible Are Online Reviews for Credence Services?
Shannon Lantzy, University of Maryland, USA
Katherine Stewart, University of Maryland, USA
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers often share information about their consumption experiences and discuss products and services with others online (e.g., by reviewing a service provider or participating in a discussion forum). Although previous research has provided insight about why consumers post content (e.g., Schlosser 2005) and how quantitative metrics such as review volume and ratings change over time (e.g., Moe and Schweidel 2012), we know much less about the factors that influence the qualitative content consumers share. An understanding of online content is critical because decades of research on social influence show that what consumers say influences others (e.g., strong vs. weak arguments: Petty and Cacioppo 1986; vividness effect: Herr, Kardes and Kim 1991).

The four papers in this session, all at an advanced stage, leverage both large datasets from online forums and controlled experiments to examine factors that influence word of mouth (WOM) content. Specifically, they examine whether what consumers say differs when they are:

- the first to post a response vs. the second or third?
- posting about the past or future instead of the present?
- posting a review on a mobile device vs. on their desktop computer?
- reviewing a provider whose services are harder vs. easier to evaluate?

Hamilton, Schlosser and Chen show that early responses to a post affect later responses to the post, suggesting that the first people to respond play a crucial role in driving the content of the discussion. Weingarten and Berger demonstrate that there is a strong present bias in what people talk about but that people tend to talk about the near future and distant past. This suggests that accessibility and emotional intensity affect when people talk about. The next two papers examine the effects of sharing devices and the type of experience. Lurie, Ransbotham and Liu find that restaurant reviews written on mobile devices are more affective and more negative than those written by the same reviewer on desktops. Notably, mobile reviews tend to be rated by others as less useful, perhaps because they are shorter and more emotional. Finally, Lantzy, Stewart and Hamilton also examine reviews of service providers and find that negative reviews contain higher-quality arguments and more information than positive reviews for the same types of service providers. They show that reviews of credence service providers (e.g., doctors, auto mechanics) include more claims about easier-to-evaluate experience attributes than claims about harder-to-evaluate credence attributes.

 Consumers rely on online content to make important decisions. We aim to “Make a Difference” by identifying systematic biases that affect the information being shared online. We expect this session to generate discussion about the emotional and affective nature of online content, the influence of previous posts (either by the same person or by others) on subsequent posts, and the various methods that can be used to study WOM. This session will appeal to researchers interested in the antecedents and consequences of WOM and social media marketing as well as those interested in social influence and communication.

Who’s Driving This Conversation? Systematic Biases in the Content of Online Consumer Discussions

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers rely on online word of mouth to make consumption decisions partly because they believe the information provided helps them make better-informed decisions. However, participants in online discussion forums may have multiple goals, only one of which is to provide others with accurate information. For example, participants may want to signal expertise (Schlosser 2005; Wojnicki and Godes 2012), convey uniqueness (Schlosser 2009) or build connections with others (e.g., Hennig-Thurau et. al. 2004; Schlosser 2009). Because online posting is context-dependent communication in which participants read previous posts within a thread before offering their own opinions (Moe and Schweidel 2012), the information shared in online forums will be influenced by previous posts. Therefore, it’s likely that early responses would drive the discussion towards or away from the information requested in the initial post.

We closely examine the role of early responses on later responses in online discussion threads in which the consumer seeking information explicitly tells other participants which decision criteria are important. For example, a consumer posting on TripAdvisor.com might describe an upcoming trip and ask for hotel recommendations, noting her preferences for location, price level and other services such as parking. Despite the objective value of the information that has been requested, we predict that the discussion content will show systematic biases. For example, we expect already mentioned attributes to be more rather than less likely to be mentioned in subsequent responses. Research on social influence has shown that group members tend to repeat shared information (Larson, Foster-Fishman and Keys 1994; Mojzisch et al. 2010; Stewart and Stasser 1995). Thus, we expect information provided in online discussion forums to be driven by early responses to the query: instead of equally reflecting attributes mentioned in the query, we expect the content to focus more on attributes already mentioned. We suggested that this is because consumers exhibit conformity to express affiliation toward others.

We test our predictions by analyzing public data from online discussion forums and conducting controlled experiments. Our analysis of discussion threads from three online discussion forums (on
Tripadvisor.com and DISboards.com) provides empirical evidence that early responses to a query drive the subsequent discussion. We examined two different consumption categories (hotels and restaurants) in three cities (Seattle, Washington DC, and Orlando). Our sample included 324 posts from 85 discussion threads with at least three participants and the goal of seeking advice about a specific decision (e.g., Should I stay at hotel A or B?) between January 2011 and January 2013. After identifying the attributes most frequently mentioned for each product category (e.g., location, price), two raters coded each response to indicate whether each attribute was mentioned. Because each response could mention multiple attributes, we used a Generalized Estimating Equations approach (GEE; Liang and Zeger 1986) to analyze the data. Controlling for the importance of the product attributes, we find that whether previous responses mention an attribute is more predictive of whether subsequent responses mention the attribute than whether the initial post mentions the attribute. This finding suggests that previous responses to a post play a critical role in influencing the attributes discussed in subsequent responses.

In Study 2, participants were given information about the attributes of two restaurants. Using this information, participants were asked to respond to a posted question asking about the appropriateness of the two restaurants for an occasion involving a large group of friends. The number of previous responses to the question was varied so that participants were either providing the first, second or third response. The content of the previous responses was also varied so that previous posts either mentioned the critical attribute (the suitability of the restaurant for groups) or did not (and mentioned the atmosphere of the restaurant instead). Consistent with our manipulation of the importance of the critical attribute, when there were no previous responses, more participants mentioned the restaurants’ suitability for groups (M = 70%) and fewer mentioned atmosphere (M = 43%). Importantly, more participants mentioned the restaurants’ suitability when all other previous posts mentioned suitability for groups (M = 71%) than when no previous posts mentioned suitability for groups (M = 48%). Notably, when some responses mentioned suitability for groups and others did not, participants were also less likely to mention the important attribute (M = 52%). As in the real discussion threads we analyzed, participants in this study seem to be more strongly influenced by the initial responses to the post than to the query.

Study 3 allowed participants to communicate their own knowledge in their response to a post about a real event in which they were familiar. All participants read an inquiry post and a first response about the event. We manipulated the content of the first response in terms of the attribute being mentioned. The results were consistent with Study 2 such that participants were more likely to be influenced by the first response on attribute that is critical (M_{mention} = 50% vs. M_{not mention} = 13%). However, when the attribute is not critical, whether the first response mentioned did not change participants’ response (M_{mention} = 45% vs. M_{not mention} = 49%).

Study 4 examined whether the perceived expertise of the first responder moderates the effect. The procedure was identical to study 2 except that we manipulated expertise by describing the first responder as a frequent or first-time traveler to the Boston area. Although we replicated the key finding of our first lab study, showing that whether the first response mentions the key attribute has a significant effect on whether the participant mentions it (M = 79% vs. 46%), we did not observe an attenuation of the effect when the first responder was perceived to be less expert. This suggests that the influence of the first responder derives not from his or her expertise but from social incentives to focus on shared rather than unshared information.

In our last study, we manipulate the participant’s goals to provide accurate information in response to the query or form relationships with group members. The procedure was similar to study 2 except that participants were encouraged to adopt either a group goal or an accuracy goal. As predicted, we replicated the early response effect only in the group goal condition, suggesting that participants’ goals moderate the effect, suggesting that participants are responding to normative influence within the group setting.

When Do People Talk About and Why?

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

People talk about things that occur over various time horizons into the past, present, and future. They talk about the television show they are currently watching, the groceries they bought yesterday, and the restaurant they are going to tomorrow.

But, when are people more likely to talk about, and why? That is, how does the likelihood people talk about something vary based on its temporal position from the present, and how does this pattern inform us about the drivers of interpersonal communication?

We suggest two key factors shape when people talk about. The first is accessibility. People are more likely to talk about things that are accessible (Berger and Schwartz 2011). Temporally distant events are less accessible than temporally close events (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 2004). In the context of when people talk about, that suggests that (1) individuals should share more about the present than the past and future, (2) that temporally close events should be shared more frequently than temporally distant events, (3) that people should talk more about the future later in the week when they get closer to the weekend, and (4) that people should talk more about the past 24 hours later in a given day. Second, arousal impacts sharing (Berger 2011; Berger and Milkman 2012) and emotional arousal should also shape when people talk about. Past research has found the future to be more emotionally intense than the past (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 2004; Van Boven and Ashworth 2007), more positive (Newby-Clark and Ross 2003), and less constrained (Van Boven, Kane, and McGraw 2008). Consequently, while people may talk about the near past than near future (because it is more accessible), they may talk about the distant future rather than distant past (because it is more emotionally intense).

To provide a naturalistic examination of when people talk about, we collected a large sample of everyday conversations. We randomly selected about 3,000 tweets posted in the public twitter stream, 3,000 Facebook posts taken from an online database of Facebook data (Kosinski and Stillwell 2011), and hundreds of pages of transcribed in-person conversations from a written corpus. Next, two research assistants removed spam posts from the Twitter and Facebook data set. Then, three research assistants individually coded each message in Excel on a continuous scale in terms of fraction of a day from the present (-7 = a week ago, -1/24 = an hour ago, 0 = now, 1 = a day from now, 365 = a year from now), and resolved disputes together. The intraclass correlation coefficient for the datasets was high (> .95).

Four key results emerged. First, as predicted, interpersonal communication is very focused on the present. Approximately 43% of all rated posts were about exactly now, 29% were about the past, and 28% were about the future ($\chi^2 (2, N = 3812) = 165.64, p < .001$). The past and future did not differ significantly overall in their frequencies ($\chi^2 (1, N = 2169) = 2.324, p = .13$). If the range that counted as “present” was expanded (from 0) to include posts within a half
hour into the past and future, 60% of posts were about the present. This number grows to 64% if broadened to an hour into the past or future. This result shows that many online social media posts, if not focused on the very instant of posting, are focused heavily on the present, which is the most accessible.

Second, as predicted, time of day affects when people talk about. As the day progresses, individuals talk more about what happened within the previous twenty-four hours (excluding the past hour). This result holds in terms of hours (B = .015, Wald = 4.032, \(p = .045\)) and minutes (B = .00217, Wald = 3.171, \(p = .075\)) since midnight. Overall, this result is consistent with the accessibility explanation: individuals have and share more accessible material from earlier in the day as it progresses.

Third, as predicted, day of week also affects when people talk about. As people move further into the week (and away from the weekend), people talk more about the upcoming twenty-four hours. This progression holds for days since Saturday (B = .054, Wald = 7.131, \(p = .008\)) and trends in the right direction for hours since Saturday (B = .00134, Wald = 2.476, \(p = .12\)), and holds when reviewing days (B = .055, Wald = 7.113, \(p = .008\)) and hours (B = .00195, Wald = 4.854, \(p = .028\)) since Sunday. This result is also consistent with the accessibility mechanism if the future becomes more accessible as Friday gets closer.

Fourth, people talk more about the near past and distant future. In other words, the relative frequency of past and future fluctuates based on temporal distance (\(\chi^2 (1, N = 2169) = 63.041, p < .001\)). Looking at nearby time periods, people share more about the previous twenty-four hours than the next twenty-four hours (\(\chi^2 (1, N = 1823) = 20.858, p < .001\)), but for distant time periods (i.e., greater than a day away), people talk more about the future than the past (\(\chi^2 (1, N = 346) = 44.439, p < .001\)). Whereas people talk more about the recent past than near future, they talk more about the distant future than the distant past. This latter finding is in line with the emotional intensity explanation inasmuch as the more evocative, distant future is shared more than the distant past.

Overall, these results are consistent with our predictions about the impact of accessibility and emotional intensity on the sharing from temporally close and distant time frames. People share more nearby events, and more distant future than distant past events. We are currently conducting various lab studies to further explore and provide evidence for our proposed mechanisms as drivers of these effects.

The Content and Impact of Mobile Versus Desktop Reviews

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Although there is a growing body of research on the content and impact of word-of-mouth on consumer behavior, little is known about differences between mobile and traditional desktop reviews. Recent empirical research shows that desktop reviews are generally positive (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), that product ratings in online reviews increase over time but decline as the number of reviews increases (Godes and Silva 2012), and that later reviewers are influenced by earlier ones (Moe and Trusov 2011). Other research shows that the valence, dispersion, and volume of consumer reviews predict sales in traditional (i.e., desktop) online environments (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan, Gu, and Whinston 2008; Godes and Mayzlin 2004). Other research suggests that the perceived value of consumer-created content depends on characteristics such as contribution length, contributors’ prior posting behavior, contributor expertise, and the perceived similarity of the creators to the readers of this content (Forman, Ghose, and Wiesenfeld 2008; Weiss, Lurie, and Maclnnis 2008). However little is known about differences in the characteristics and relative influence of consumer content created in mobile versus traditional settings. In addition, there is substantial debate over the pros and cons of allowing consumers to write real-time reviews with some fearing that mobile reviews will not benefit from reflection and that consumers will affectively (and negatively) respond to their current experiences. This has led some review sites (e.g., Yelp) to allow consumers to start reviews on their mobile devices but require them to use a desktop computer to finish them.

This research addresses these issues by 1) identifying potential differences in content created on mobile versus non-mobile devices and 2) assessing how these factors affect the relative influence of mobile versus desktop reviews.

Given that mobile reviews are more likely to be written during or immediately after service experiences, they should be more accurate, and less optimistically biased, than retrospective (i.e., desktop) evaluations (e.g., therosy view; Mitchell et al. 1997; Novemsky and Ratner 2003; Wirtz et al. 2003). This means that mobile reviews will be more negative than desktop reviews. However, because they are likely to be written in real-time, and therefore reflect “hot” reasoning (Ariely and Loewenstein 2006), mobile reviews may be more emotional and heuristic decreasing their perceived usefulness relative to desktop reviews. Further, time pressure and tradeoffs between physical and cognitive effort on mobile devices (Lurie, Song, and Narasimhan 2009) means that mobile reviews should be shorter; potentially also reducing their perceived usefulness (Weiss et al. 2008).

To gain initial insights into these issues, we collected 299,806 reviews from 125,147 users on 144,231 restaurants on the website Urban Spoon. Of these, 136,306 reviews (45%) were written on mobile devices and 163,500 (55%) were written on non-mobile devices. To control for user characteristics that might drive differences between mobile and non-mobile reviews, we focused on 4,449 users who wrote both mobile and non-mobile reviews providing a sample of 48,610 (20,616 mobile and 27,994 non-mobile) reviews. Review text was analyzed using the LIWC program (Pennebaker, Booth, and Hermann 1999) means that mobile reviews should be shorter; potentially also reducing their perceived usefulness (Weiss et al. 2008).

Naive or Savvy: How Credible Are Online Reviews for Credence Services?

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Online reviews allow consumers to share information about their service experiences with other consumers. Theoretically, sharing this information should reduce market information asymmetries between potential consumers and service providers because many attributes of a service experience cannot be evaluated prior to consumption (i.e., they are credence or experience attributes rather than search attributes; Huang, Lurie, and Mitra 2009). For example, although a consumer might be able to evaluate the prices of entrees (a search attribute) prior to eating at a restaurant, it is very difficult to evaluate their tastiness (an experience attribute) without having consumed a meal, and even after eating them, a consumer cannot verify the claim that they are made with organic ingredients (a credence attribute). Because consumers cannot assess the quality of credence attributes, consumer reviews of services that are dominated by cre-
dence attributes (e.g., doctors, auto mechanics) are of dubious credibility. Indeed, many doctors have strongly resisted the legitimacy of consumer reviews (Andrews 2008; Jain 2010), in some cases even requiring patients to sign documents promising never to review their doctors (ElBoghdady 2012).

Although consumers have numerous forums to review credence services (e.g., RateMDs.com, Angie’s List, Yelp.com), extant research has focused only on reviews of search and experience goods (Huang et al. 2009; Mudambi and Schuff 2010; Park, Kim, and Han 2008). We address this gap by examining the claims typically included in reviews of credence service providers and whether consumers rationally discount claims about credence attributes within reviews. We pose three interrelated research questions: 1) Do the claims made in reviews of credence services on forums such as Angie’s List and Yelp.com substantively differ from the claims made in reviews of experience services, and if so, how? 2) Which attributes do consumers believe are most important for evaluating credence service providers? and 3) When evaluating credence service providers, do consumers weigh credence claims more heavily than experience claims because credence attributes are more important for these services, or do they weigh experience claims more heavily because these claims are more credible?

We address these questions by conducting a content analysis of real online reviews and a series of lab experiments. First, we design and test a rigorous classification method for identifying credence and experience services based on their core and peripheral attributes. The economics of information literature categorizes goods and services into search, experience and credence categories, but does not discuss the possibility that credence services may have search, experience and credence attributes (e.g., a doctor’s office location is a search attribute, bedside manner is an experience attribute, and accurate diagnosis is a credence attribute). Our categorization method fills a gap in the literature by explicitly linking a product’s relevant search, experience, and credence attributes (Ford, Smith, and Swasy 1988) to the categorization of the product as a search, experience, or credence good (Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). Previous work has simply assumed the classification of goods as search, experience, or credence a priori, which has led to conflicting classifications. For example, in Nelson’s original work (1970) and in subsequent papers a camera was classified as a search good, but other authors have argued that cameras should be labeled experience goods (Huang et al. 2009). We propose a replicable and rigorous method for classifying services based on their core and peripheral attributes.

Next, we content analyze online reviews of service providers to compare their content and structure across services that are dominated by credence vs. experience attributes. Using Toulmin’s (1958) theoretical framework for evaluating arguments and claims, we compare the structure of claims made in reviews of experience vs. credence service providers. We find that negative reviews contain higher-quality arguments as well as more information than positive reviews for the same types of service providers. This finding provides an alternative explanation for the greater impact of negative reviews in online word of mouth that has been demonstrated in earlier work (Cao, Duan, and Gan 2011; Laczniak 2001). This pattern of results also may explain why review length seems to mediate the effect of review valence on helpfulness ratings (Wu, van der Heijden, and Korfitis 2011).

Further, we code claims about specific service provider attributes that are mentioned in reviews. Our results indicate that reviews of credence services include a mix of claims about both credence and experience attributes, but claims about experience attributes appear more frequently than claims about credence attributes. Thus, we find that although reviews of credence services contain claims about experience attributes (e.g., a doctor’s bedside manner), they also contain claims about credence attributes that consumers cannot accurately evaluate (e.g., whether the doctor’s diagnosis was accurate).

Finally, we are conducting a series of experimental studies to explore consumers’ perceptions of reviews, manipulating factors such as the type of service provider (experience or credence), the type of attribute in the review (experience or credence), and the valence of the review (positive or negative). We expect to find that although consumers reading reviews may acknowledge the low credibility of credence claims when they are explicitly asked to evaluate the claims, claims about credence attributes significantly influence their evaluations of credence service providers.

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Emotion as Social Information: Insights Into the Interpersonal Effects of Pride, Embarrassment, and Sadness

Chairs: Chen Wang, University of British Columbia, Canada
Yanliu Huang, Drexel University, USA

Paper #1: Proud to Belong or Proudly Different? Contrasting Effects of Incidental Pride on Conformity
Xun (Irene) Huang, Sun Yat-sen University, China
Ping Dong, University of Toronto, Canada
Anirban Mukhopadhyay, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China

Paper #2: The Interplay Effect of Embarrassment and Agentic-Communal Orientation on Consumer Behavior
Yanliu Huang, Drexel University, USA
Chen Wang, University of British Columbia, Canada
Rui (Juliet) Zhu, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, China

Paper #3: Empathy-Neglect in Embarrassment-Avoidance: Observations from an Outsider
Li Jiang, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Aimee Drolet Rossi, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Carol Scott, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

Paper #4: Hardening My Heart: Persuasion Knowledge and Emotion Regulation
Nicole Verrochi Coleman, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Patti Williams, University of Pennsylvania, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

All emotions arise from events that have relevance to oneself. Certain emotions such as pride and embarrassment are particularly self-relevant, since they involve self-reflection and self-evaluation (Tangney and Tracy 2012). It is thus not surprising that a large body of research has examined the intrapersonal effects of emotions. For example, previous research has investigated the impact of pride on self-control (Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011) and self-efficacy (Passyn and Sujan 2012), the antecedents underlying the self-appraisal elements of embarrassment (Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo 2001), and the impact of sadness on evaluative judgment (Schwarz and Clore 1983) and affect regulation (Andrade 2005). In addition to the intrapersonal impacts, emotion also plays a central role in our interpersonal life (Fisher and Manstead 2008; Van Kleef 2010). However, the interpersonal effects of emotions, particularly those self-conscious emotions (e.g., pride), have received little attention in consumer research.

In an attempt to advance our understanding of the interpersonal effects of emotion, this session brings together four papers, which particularly focus on pride, embarrassment, and sadness, to provide insights into how these emotions influence consumers’ interpersonal encounters. Specifically, this session investigates the following questions: How would pride influence consumers’ tendency to conform to others? How would embarrassment impact consumers’ impression management concerns in a social setting? How would taking other’s perspective affect consumers’ embarrassment-avoidant behaviors? How would sadness influence consumers’ reactions towards interpersonal persuasions?

In the first paper, Huang, Dong, and Mukhopadhyay investigate the impact of pride on consumers’ conformity behavior. They show that pride can either increase or decrease conformity depending on lay theories of achievement (entity/incremental). Specifically, those who attribute achievement to personal traits (entity theorists) are less likely to conform than those who attribute achievement to effort (incremental theorists).

In the second paper, Huang, Wang, and Zhu examine the effect of embarrassment on consumers’ impression management concerns in product selection and donation behavior. They show that when feeling embarrassed, consumers demonstrate behaviors to create a positive self-impression and at the same time to be consistent with their agentic-communal orientations.

In the third paper, Rossi and Scott also explore embarrassment by focusing on how taking other’s perspective influences embarrassment-avoidant behavior. They suggest that perspective-taking prompts consumers to engage in less embarrassment-avoidant behavior. But this only occurs for consumers with high public self-consciousness.

In the fourth paper, Coleman and Williams investigate the impact of sadness on consumers’ reactions to interpersonal persuasion. They show that consumers are naturally suspicious of sad (vs. happy) appeals by engaging in emotion regulation. This effect could be strengthened when persuasion knowledge is made accessible.

We believe that this session will appeal to a wide audience at ACR. There has been a limited understanding on emotions, particularly those self-conscious emotions, in an interpersonal setting. This session advances the literature by investigating certain important yet less studied emotions that range from cognitively differentiated affects (e.g., pride and embarrassment) to more global affects (e.g., sadness), and by providing insights into how each emotion may affect consumers’ interpersonal behaviors (e.g., conformity, donation). Twelve studies were included in total with three studies in each paper. Also, this session echoes the conference mission of making a difference by reinventing established perspectives in theory and by providing socially impactful insights in practice.

Proud to Belong or Proudly Different? Contrasting Effects of Incidental Pride on Conformity

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Pride is as an emotional response to success or achievement (Lazarus 1991; Maclnnis and Patrick 2006; Mukhopadhyay and Johar 2007), in which the self is attributed as having achieved an important goal (Tracy and Robins 2004). It is a common response to important life events (e.g., graduation) as well as everyday occurrences (e.g., get praised by teacher). Previous research on pride has mainly focused on how incidental pride influences one’s own behavior in a personal setting. For example, pride can influence consumers’ self-control (Wilcox, Kramer, and Sen 2011), and is linked to self-efficacy (Passyn and Sujan 2012), and motivation for future achievement (Fredrickson 2001; Louro, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2005). In contrast, the current research aims to explore whether and how incidental pride can influence consumers’ preferences given social influence, specifically, their tendency to conform.

We propose that the effect of pride in such situations depends on the lay theories that consumers hold about their achievements. Lay theories influence how people interpret and predict their social worlds (Wyer 2004). Given that our domain of interest is the pride
that people feel in response to achievement, we draw on Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) seminal concepts of lay theories of achievement. In this model, “entity theorists” believe that intelligence and ability are fixed quantities and cannot be changed, whereas “incremental theorists” believe that intelligence and ability are malleable resources and thus can be improved through effort. Hence success is attributed differently depending on one’s lay theories – either to traits (for entity theorists), or to efforts (for incremental theorists; Molden and Dweck 2006).

How do these lay theories influence the effect of pride on conformity? The key insight here is that pride is not a unitary construct, but rather two different types of pride – hubristic and authentic (Tracy and Robins 2007). Hubristic pride results from achievement that is attributed to internal, stable, and uncontrollable causes ("I did well because I’m great."), whereas authentic pride results from achievement that is attributed to internal, unstable and controllable causes ("I did well because I tried."). Importantly, the distinct patterns of attributions for hubristic versus authentic pride are parallel to those made by entity versus incremental theorists.

Now, hubristic and authentic pride can lead to different interpersonal relationship goals. Hubristic pride is associated with superiority (Tracy and Robins 2007) and narcissism (Lewis 2000; Tracy and Robins 2007). People feeling hubristic pride are motivated to “get ahead” at the expense of others (Cheng et al. 2010). In contrast, authentic pride is associated with feelings of self-worth and authenticity (Tracy et al. 2009), and activates the interpersonal goal of “getting along with others” (Cheng et al. 2010). People feeling authentic pride are more likely to feel similarity with others (Batson et al. 1997; Cialdini et al. 1997).

Because perceptions of similarity are an important predictor of conformity (Castelli et al. 2001; Cialdini 2001), we hypothesize that authentic pride will increase conformity, whereas hubristic pride will enhance uniqueness preference. More generally, incremental theorists who feel proud will make effort-based attributions and thus conform, similar to those experiencing authentic pride. In contrast, entity theorists who feel proud will make trait-based attributions and not conform, similar to those experiencing hubristic pride.

Three studies investigated these possibilities. In study 1, we examined if participants who experience effort-based pride (i.e., incremental theorists) express greater conformity than those who experience trait-based pride (i.e., entity theorists). We first asked participants to recall an event when they felt pride due to their efforts versus due to their own traits. Participants then performed an ostensibly unrelated on-line shopping task in which they chose one T-shirt from a set of four options, which were identical except that three of them were white and one was red. A significantly greater percentage of participants in the trait-based (versus effort-based) pride condition chose the uniquely-colored T-shirt.

The procedure of study 2 was essentially the same, except for two differences. First, instead of using manipulating two types of pride, we manipulated entity versus incremental lay theory by presenting participants with a Psychology-Today type article describing the lay theory of achievement (Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 1997), and then asked participants to recall either a pride experience or a typical school day experience (control condition). Second, we used four different product categories to measure conformity. Results showed that proud participants who believed in the entity (vs. incremental) theory showed less conformity. There was no effect in the control condition, meaning lay theory itself did not influence conformity.

Study 3 extended the previous results in the following ways. First, we measured participants’ lay theories, instead of manipulating them. Second, we generalized our findings using a different product category and a different measure of conformity. Participants first recalled either a pride experience or a typical school day experience, and then indicated their evaluations of a popular brand of hiking GPS and a unique one. The difference between the two evaluations served as an index for conformity. In the third task, participants indicated their belief toward implicit theory (entity vs. incremental). Regression analyses with pride condition, mean centered lay theory, and their interaction as independent variables and the conformity tendency as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of lay theory and a significant interaction effect. Spotlight analyses (Aiken and West 1991) revealed entity (vs. incremental) theorists evaluated the popular hiking GPS less favorably when they were feeling proud. However, no significant effects were obtained among incremental theorists.

This research demonstrates a novel effect of incidental pride on consumers’ conformity preference. The distinction between the two types of pride is new to consumer research, and the underlying mechanism represents a synthesis of the literatures on emotions and lay theories.

**The Interplay Effect of Embarrassment and Agentic-Communal Orientation on Consumer Behavior**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Embarrassment is an experience that nearly everyone is familiar with. It occurs “whenever an individual is felt or have projected incompatible definitions of himself before those present” (Goffman 1956), such as when people purchase embarrassing products or when they do not have enough money to pay at the register. Despite its prevalence, little research has been done looking at how embarrassment influences consumer behavior. Hence, this research seeks to investigate how embarrassment impacts consumers’ product selection and donation behavior.

According to typical psychological models of embarrassment (e.g., Edelmann 1981; Keltner and Buswell 1997), behavior inconsistent with social rules in the presence of real or imagined others leads to arousal. The arousal gives rise to nonverbal behavior that provides information to the self and the observer to label the arousal as embarrassment. There is a need of “face-saving” after embarrassing interchange to honor, maintain, and restore the desired public identity (Goffman 1956, 1959). The need motivates people to develop strategies to alleviate distress and create a favorable impression (Brown and Garland 1971; Keltner and Buswell 1997).

We argue that this face-saving need interacts with agentic-communal orientation to influence consumers’ product selection and donation behavior differently. Individuals with agentic orientation are self-centered and tend to be independent from other people, whereas individuals with communal orientation are other-oriented and tend to focus on interpersonal affiliation (Eagly 1978, 1987; Carlson 1972). Therefore, we hypothesize that when feeling embarrassed, people will follow strategies that are consistent with their orientation and at the same time try to create a positive self-impression. Specifically, for product selection which is self-focused, when feeling embarrassed, communal individuals (e.g., females) will prefer in-group options to enhance affiliation with others, while agentic individuals (e.g., males) will prefer non in-group options to reflect their individuality. Both strategies create a positive self-impression. In the domain of donation which is other-focused (Eagly 1987), the results will reverse (i.e., favor in-group) for agentic individuals. This is because agentic individuals normally favor out-group charity, but when feeling embarrassed, favoring in-group charity helps them cre-
ate favorable self image and at the same time allows their agentic goals still to be met (Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009).

We tested these hypotheses in three studies. In Study 1, we used participants’ gender as a proxy of agentic/communal orientation. Participants came in groups of three, and were asked to choose and evaluate products in a hypothetical shopping task. The products contain either embarrassing products (e.g., adult diapers) or regular products (e.g., paper towel), depending on the condition. The experimenter verbalized each participant’s choice loudly and ensured other participants to hear it. Embarrassment was successfully induced in this way, as the awareness of social presence is critical in creating embarrassment (Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo 2001). After the embarrassment manipulation, participants chose between two pens as a thank-you gift, one with a university logo and the other with no logo (i.e., in-group vs. non in-group). Their pen choice served as our dependent variable. Consistent with our hypothesis, there was a significant interaction between emotion (embarrassing vs. control) and gender, such that females preferred the logo pen whereas males preferred the no-logo pen when feeling embarrassed.

In study 2, we tested our hypothesis in the donation domain. After a similar embarrassment manipulation with study 1, participants indicated how much they were willing to donate out of their $10 compensation towards either an in-group or an out-group charity. Their agentic-communal orientation was also assessed at the end. As predicted, we found a three-way interaction between gender, emotion, and charity type. Specifically, for females, there was only a main effect of charity such that females preferred in-group (vs. out-group) charity regardless of the emotion. However, for males, there was an interaction between emotion and charity type, such that males donated more to in-group charity in the embarrassing condition, but donated more to out-group charity in the control condition. The pattern maintained the same when we replaced gender with agentic/communal scores, which further supported our proposition.

In Study 3, we manipulated agentic-communal orientation and looked at both donation and product evaluation. We adopted a sentence-scrambled task from Kurt, Inman, and Argo (2011) to prime agentic/communal orientation at the beginning. Embarrassment was induced as per previous studies. After the same donation task as that in study 2, participants were asked to evaluate a hypothetical vacuum that was made either domestically (i.e., in-group) or internationally (i.e., out-group). For donation task, we replicated our previous results. For product evaluation, there was a three-way interaction between priming, country of origin, and emotion, such that agency-primed individuals showed more favorable attitudes towards the out-group vacuum when feeling embarrassed (vs. neutral), whereas communally-primed individuals had more favorable attitudes toward the in-group vacuum in the embarrassing condition.

Results from three studies show that embarrassment and agentic-communal orientation jointly influence consumers’ behaviors. Embarrassed individuals tend to engage in behavior consistent with their orientation and creating a positive self to “save face”.

**Empathy-Neglect in Embarrassment-Avoidance: Observations from an Outsider**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

As consumers, we often forgo opportunities to help ourselves and others in order to avoid embarrassment. Our fear of embarrassment prevents us from admitting we do not know how a product works such as a mortgage or birth control, and from asking advice about what we should do such as our mounting mortgage bills and unplanned pregnancies. In many cases, if we are to help ourselves and others, we must overcome our fear of embarrassment. This research offers advice on how to curb consumers’ embarrassment-avoidant behavior.

Recent research should bring comfort to those who worry about others witnessing our embarrassing blunders. First, our blunders often go unnoticed by others (Gilovich, Medvec, and Savitsky 2000). Nevertheless, we overestimate how much others pay attention to us; a tendency termed the ‘spotlight effect’. Second, when others do notice our embarrassing blunders, they tend to make kinder judgments than we expect (Savitsky, Epley, and Gilovich 2001). Still, we fail to take others’ empathy into account, a tendency termed ‘empathy-neglect’ (Epley, Savitsky, and Gilovich 2002). Both of these tendencies—the spotlight effect and empathy-neglect—underlie embarrassment-avoidance. However, no studies to date have examined how these two factors interact to increase or decrease embarrassment avoidance.

A main goal of our research is to investigate the roles that both the spotlight effect and empathy-neglect play in influencing embarrassment-avoidance. For example, if empathy-neglect was reduced, would a spotlight still cause embarrassment-avoidant behavior? This is an important issue since it may often be impossible for consumers to avoid being in the spotlight (e.g. when purchase of a product is public knowledge). Alternatively, would empathy-neglect cause embarrassment-avoidance absent a spotlight? This is also an important issue since it would imply an influence on consumer behavior regardless of whether it occurs in public or private. For example, do consumers who avoid public opportunities to learn about a product, such as a mortgage or birth control, avoid private opportunities as well? An understanding of the separate and combined effects of the spotlight effect and empathy-neglect could provide a basis for effective strategies to manage embarrassment-avoidance. To this end, we must investigate the role of one individual-difference variable, namely public self-consciousness (PUBSC), since it determines whether one or both of these tendencies are at play.

Experiment 1 tested the initial hypothesis that although high (vs. low) PUBSC consumers have higher expectations of being embarrassed and thus engage in embarrassment-avoidance, all consumers regardless of PUBSC suffer from empathy-neglect and persist in embarrassment-avoidant ways. Three ads for an embarrassing but well-paying job were created: control, spotlight disclaimer, and empathy reminder. Analysis found that PUBSC moderated embarrassment-avoidant behavior due to the spotlight effect but not due to empathy-neglect. Specifically, the significant interaction between ad type and PUBSC arose from the control ad, which simply provided details about the job opportunity. High PUBSC was associated with lower application intentions. However, there was no relationship between PUBSC and application intentions in response to either the spotlight disclaimer or the empathy-reminder ad.

We next investigated a process by which empathy-neglect can be countered. Experiment 2 demonstrated in the healthcare context that perspective-taking is a helpful (hurtful) tool to correct for empathy-neglect among high (low) PUBSC consumers. Participants were prompted to take the perspective of either the interviewer or the interviewee, depending on the condition, and indicated their intentions to be interviewed about sensitive issues relating to their sex lives. In a control condition there were no perspective-taking prompts. In addition, half of participants received a cognitive load manipulation. We predicted that cognitive load would inhibit the presumably effortful empathy-transfer. Analysis revealed a three-way interaction among PUBSC, perspective-taking, and cognitive load, such that empathy-transfer (and reduction of empathy-neglect among high PUBSC consumers) could be triggered by adopting the perspective
of the interviewer (but not the interviewee), and required psychological effort (no load).

Experiment 3 tested our theorizing in another important consumer context, advertising embarrassing products. After exposure to a real-world flatulence prevention brand, participants’ purchase intention was assessed and open-ended responses were collected to examine the proposed empathy-transfer process. Analysis found the predicted three-way interaction among PUBSC, ad type, and cognitive load on purchase intentions. A two-way interaction emerged between PUBSC and load for the control ad conditions, whereby higher PUBSC levels were associated with more embarrassment avoidance under no load. Load exacerbated the PUBSC effect. Further, analysis of the thought protocols in terms of self-related versus other-related thoughts under load and no load provided ancillary evidence as to the effortful nature of the empathy-transfer process, as well as chronic differences in how high versus low PUBSC consumers respond to embarrassing ads and perspective-taking prompts.

Together, these three experiments demonstrate the power of our theory to explain, predict, and modify embarrassment-avoidant consumer behavior, even when the consequences are financially and socially significant.

**Hardening My Heart: Persuasion Knowledge and Emotion Regulation**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Consumers do not passively process marketing influence attempts, but rather use persuasion schemas to interpret, resist, and reject persuasion (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Friestad and Wright 1994). The “Persuasion Knowledge Model” (PKM) proposes that consumers develop knowledge structures about persuasion, influence agents, and selling tactics, and that they use this knowledge to cope with persuasion episodes. Researchers propose an assortment of persuasion tactics; invoking social norms, “buttering up” the target, bargaining, and more (Friestad and Wright 1994; Rule, Bisanz, and Kohn 1985). While many of these have been investigated, a repeatedly mentioned but rarely examined tactic is emotions. In fact, using emotional appeals was one of the most common interpersonal persuasion techniques (Rule, Bisanz, and Kohn 1985). Given this, understanding whether consumers recognize emotional appeals as persuasive tactics and how they respond to these attempts is needed.

We specifically focus upon emotion appeals that use sadness to motivate consumers. Sadness results from experiences of loss that cannot be avoided (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989). Expressions of sadness indicate a need for help (Izard 1977) and promote feelings of sympathy (Small and Verrochi 2009), leading to enhanced prosocial behaviors (Small and Verrochi 2009). We draw upon emotion regulation theories—how individuals manage the emotion antecedents and emotional responses (Gross 1998)—to propose that when consumers recognize an emotional appeal as an influence attempt, they regulate their emotions to resist persuasion.

Study 1 examined whether consumers spontaneously regulated their emotions when they encountered emotional advertisements, and whether this would differ for happy versus sad appeals. This was a three-group design, where participants saw either a happy, sad, or neutral commercial. Emotional content was manipulated through pictures and music with identical information. After the commercial, participants reported attitude toward the ad, the degree of emotion regulation, and beliefs about manipulative intent (to measure persuasion knowledge). Attitude toward the ad was the highest for the happy commercial compared to both the neutral and sad commercials. The amount of emotion regulation was highest for the sad commercial, whereas no difference occurred for the neutral and the happy commercials. Also, the sad commercial prompted beliefs of manipulative intent, but the happy and neutral commercials were seen as only mildly manipulative. And indeed, serial mediation found that sad appeals prompted inferences of manipulative intent, which in turn induced emotion regulation, which finally predicted attitude toward the ad. Once the indirect effects were accounted for, the direct effect of emotion appeal was no longer significant in predicting attitude toward the ad, implying full mediation through both manipulative intent and emotion regulation (Preacher and Hayes 2008). These results suggest that consumers naturally see sad appeals as manipulative, triggering an emotion regulating response. However, happy commercials “fly under the radar” and do not prompt the activation of persuasion knowledge and its concomitant rejection.

Study 2 manipulated the accessibility of consumers’ persuasion knowledge. The design was 3 emotions (happy, sad, neutral) x 2 accessibility (high, low); accessibility was manipulated by reading an article about persuasive tactics (high) or about superstitious beliefs (low) prior to the commercial. As before, participants rated their attitude toward the ad, emotion regulation, and manipulative intent. In the low accessibility conditions, the results from study 1 were replicated: emotion regulation and manipulative intent were only high for participants viewing the sad commercial. However, results in the high accessibility conditions showed a different pattern. Specifically, those who viewed the happy or the sad commercials both increased emotion regulation and manipulative intent inferences. Results suggested that when persuasion knowledge was accessible, consumers relied on it to interpret the persuasive messages; happy appeals were also seen as utilizing persuasion, leading to consumers’ emotion regulation.

Study 3 replicated study 2 in the context of donation. Specifically, participants first read the article from study 2 to manipulate accessibility. Then participants were exposed to one of three advertisements for a child’s cancer charity, where the child in the ad was expressing either happiness, sadness, or a neutral expression (Small and Verrochi 2009). Previous work has shown that individuals who view the sad child experience sadness themselves, via emotion contagion, and this experience of sadness then increases sympathy and prosocial behaviors. We predicted that the accessibility of persuasion knowledge would moderate these effects. A significant interaction of persuasion knowledge accessibility and emotion emerged: for those with low persuasion knowledge accessibility, sympathy toward the child was the greatest for the sad ad, replicating earlier work. However, for those with high persuasion knowledge accessibility, the pattern reversed that sympathy for the child was the lowest for the sad ad (no difference occurred between the happy and the neutral ads).

Three studies demonstrate that individuals resist emotion-based persuasive attempts through emotion regulation; however the natural response is only toward sad appeals. When persuasion knowledge is made accessible, individuals recognize that happy appeals are also influence attempts and regulate those as well. Our findings certify that emotion regulation can be used to resist persuasion, suggesting new directions for studying emotion regulation.

**REFERENCES**


Creating and Resolving Tensions: Exploring the Different Effects Materialism Has on Consumers and Society

Chairs: Laurel Steinfield, University of Oxford, UK
Linda Scott, University of Oxford, UK

Paper #1: Materialism and Well-Being among Consumers of Three Asian Subcultures: The Effects of Religion and Ethnicity
Fon Sim Ong, The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus, Malaysia
George P. Moschis, Georgia State University, USA

Paper #2: Social Stratification and the Materialism Label: The Retention of Racial Inequities between Black and White Consumers in South Africa
Laurel Steinfield, University of Oxford, UK
Linda Scott, University of Oxford, UK

Paper #3: When the Going Gets Tough the Materialistic Go Shopping: Materialism and Consumption Response to Stress
Ayalla Ruvio, Michigan State University, USA
Eli Somer, University of Haifa, Israel
Aric Rindfleisch, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

Paper #4: Living in a Material World: The Role of Materialism in Consumer Confidence and Well-Being
Dee Warmath, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA
Nancy Wong, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Who is materialistic, and why, and whether materialism has positive or negative implications, fluctuates pending the social context. Such fluidity suggests that it may be time to reevaluate the basic concept, which has been formulated as an individual construct, to consider encompassing the social milieu—religious influences, group tensions, and socio-economic context.

This special session creates such an opportunity, allowing researchers to explore the meaning of materialism and to move the construct from a deeply rooted personal value to one shaped by social conditions and tensions. To do so, it demonstrates how the concept can have widely different results even when all the studies pull from the same scale (Richins and Dawson 1992). The studies stretch the concept across diverse geographical regions—Malaysia, South Africa, Israel and America—and across divergent groups of consumers and social settings Some pull at the social tensions and consumer stress associated with materialism, others demonstrate how it can be used as a positive force to rejuvenate the economy. This session would open up the constructed scale to expose its inherent biases, to explain what aspects of the scales give rise to the varied findings and how the social context influences these findings, and ultimately, provide a starting ground where cultural biases that shape our understanding and study of the general concept of materialism can be brought to the fore.

Fon Sim Ong and George P. Moschis open the session with evidence that may help explain the contradictory outcomes that have often plagued materialism and well-being studies. Using a large survey of Malaysians, their study finds adherents of Islam, who tend to place material possessions in direct philosophical conflict with pious living, experience higher levels of stress if they are materialistic, which in turn will lower their level of life satisfaction. In contrast, these results differ from Hindus and Buddhists, who conceptualize the relationship between the material and spiritual in a different way. Consequently, the effects of materialism are strongly moderated by both religion and the level of religiosity.

Laurel Steinfield and Linda Scott similarly build from the moral tensions materialism creates around consumption, but view “materialism” as an epithet that is used in South Africa to protect racial stratifications. They demonstrate that “materialism” is a local racial slur, intended to discredit the consumption behavior of blacks when they purchase goods formerly available only to whites. Hurling an insult about black “materialism” thus acts as a moral restriction to protect the demarcating power of goods.

Ayalla Ruvio, Eli Somer, and Aric Rindfleisch discuss how materialism influences coping in extreme stress situations. When traumatic stress increases, materialistic people react more adversely, often by engaging in maladaptive consumption behaviors such as impulsive buying and shopping escapism.

Dee Warmath and Nancy Wong end by discussing how materialism can help a society navigate economic downturns through triggering consumer spending. They break apart the materialism scale to note how the different sub-categories affect consumer behavior. Two dimensions of materialism (success and centrality) combined with hope bolsters consumer confidence about the economy, while the happiness dimension of materialism combined with hope influences personal confidence and leads to higher spending expectations.

Each of the studies points to a different way of viewing materialism and offers potentially fruitful avenues for future research, yet the sum of these approaches may also help us to imagine how a better understanding of the social dimensions of materialism can guide policies, even in high stress situations and among diverse groups, toward more humane tactics. This session should be of relevance to researchers interested in materialism, cross-cultural studies, consumption and well-being, and moral versus immoral consumption.

Materialism and Well-Being among Consumers of Three Asian Subcultures: The Effects of Religion and Ethnicity

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Studies on the relationship between materialism and life satisfaction have produced contradictory findings across cultural settings. There is little theory to suggest the reason(s) materialism is associated (positively or negatively) with well-being in some countries and not in others, the processes that link materialism to life satisfaction, and the variables that moderate this relationship. Furthermore, it is not clear whether materialism is the cause or the consequence of well-being, whether the two variables are causally related, or even whether the previously reported relationships between them represent the effects of third variables.

This paper explores the impact of the socio-cultural context on materialism. It presents the results of a government funded large-scale study that seeks to explain the relationship between materialism and well-being by assuming that materialism 1) affects well-being, 2) is a consequence of a person’s well-being, or 3) its relationship with well-being is the result of third variables, especially ethnic and religious differences among consumers of a culturally diverse Asian society. By confining the present study to a sample of consumers drawn from Malaysia—a country of diverse subcultures who share similar cultural values (collectivistic), we attempt to control the ef-
fects the other possible reasons that generate these differences, ranging from broad macro-environmental factors (e.g., country-related) to mediating processes, as well as ways people in different countries respond to questions and measurement instruments.

The study involved a survey using face-to-face interviews with 1,025 adult Malaysian consumers who lived in five major cities/towns. Non-probability quota sampling was employed to ensure equal representation of the three ethnic groups, Malays, Chinese, and Indians. All of the respondents were age 20 or older, and the average (mean) age of the sample was 48.08 years old, with a standard deviation of 16.58 years. The percentages of female and male respondents were almost equal: 51.4% of the respondents were female and 48.6% were male. The respondents’ ethnic backgrounds were: 52.9% Malay, 29.4% Chinese, 15.6% Indian, and 2.1% were of other ethnic backgrounds.

The items in the questionnaires were designed to collect data on the variables related to the hypotheses of this study. The constructs: materialism, well-being (measured using life satisfaction and self-esteem), stress, and religiosity were measured by using established scales. All of the scales had a Cronbach’s alpha greater than .70. A measure of social desirability was also used.

In this study, we first assumed that materialism is a causal variable that adversely affects well-being, as this is the implicit assumption of most studies (e.g., Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002). We then, however, tested a second explanation for the observed negative relationship between well-being and materialism, assuming a reverse causality – i.e., well-being leads to materialism. Because well-being is defined by psychologists in several ways, including self-esteem and strength of aversive feelings (e.g., depression, anxiety, stress) (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002), it has been shown that materialism helps consumers alleviate negative feelings and low self-worth (e.g. Belk 1988; Chaplin and John 2007). We use structural equations modeling with instrumental variables to decompose the possible reciprocal effects of the two constructs, but our instruments turn out to be weak predictors of their respective variables.

In using conventional methods of data analysis to test our hypotheses, we find that stress mediates the effects of materialism on life satisfaction, and religiosity moderates the relationship between materialism and stress, which has negative effects on well-being. However, this finding holds among the most religious Malays (Muslims). These findings suggest that it is the specific values of the Islam religion that might be in direct conflict with material possessions, not those promoted by Hinduism or Buddhism; and they help clarify the conflicting values perspective (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002) because they suggest that religiosity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition (i.e., religious beliefs matter).

In viewing materialism as a consequence of well-being, we find that only lower degree of stress significantly moderates the effects of self-esteem on materialism. These findings suggest that self-esteem is a coping resource, as suggested by Thoits (1995). During stressful times, material possessions may be viewed as means to reducing stress—i.e., medicating one’s adverse emotions, rather than serving as means of enhancing one’s self in the eyes of others. In contrast, in the absence of stress, Malays may value material possessions as a way of “showing face” to others, a motivation commonly noticed in Asian countries (Wong and Ahuvia 1998).

The study findings suggest that consumers in different Asian ethnic subcultures are affected unequally by their religions and religiosity. Religion may constitute one of the main factors that affect each subculture’s belief system regarding life in general and consumption in particular. As shown in this study, religiosity significantly and directly affects the life satisfaction of all three ethnic groups. However, in terms of consumption behavior, other factors may also influence each subculture differently. Specifically, the study findings suggest that because the materialistic values of the Indians cannot be predicted by either religiosity or life satisfaction. When comparing the three ethnic subcultures, the Malays, who are Muslims, appear to be affected by religiosity the most, both in terms of life satisfaction and materialism. Although the Chinese are less religious than the Indians, their levels of religiosity have a greater effect on their life satisfaction and materialism.

These findings could be explained by other factors that relate to different social structures in which these subcultures are embedded. The results, for example, also demonstrate how different ethnic subcultural groups have different predictors of life satisfaction (Diener and Diener, 1995). Diener et al (1998) have found that causes of subjective well-being reflect people’s values. Thus, in a collectivist culture, differences in subjective well-being could be due to culturally defined norms that lead to different emotional reactions depending on what the subculture defines as acceptable (Suh and Koo, 2008).

This study offers evidence to help explain the socio-cultural context and mechanisms that account for the negative relationship between materialism and life satisfaction reported in previous studies conducted in many countries.

Social Stratification and the Materialism Label: The Retention of Racial Inequities between Black and White Consumers in South Africa

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

We begin from the observation that, in English-speaking societies, “materialistic” is an epithet. The moral polarity that results – materialism (sin) versus spirituality (virtue) – is clearly reflected in the early CB literature on the topic (Belk 1983; Pollay 1986). Indeed, the word’s status as an insult is apparent in socially desirable responding (Mick 1996) among research subjects.

In this research, therefore, we focus on the circumstances in which one group labels another “materialistic”: we ask why they are using that particular label and question whether the people being thus labeled view themselves as “materialistic.” Using Goffman’s (1951) work on status symbols, we look at how the application of this pejorative protects the demarcating power of goods when a threat of misappropriation occurs. Status symbols hold expressive powers (they express the cultural values, lifestyles, privileges or duties a person holds) and categorical powers (they visibly divide the social world), and so their misappropriation threatens the social distinctions that maintain hierarchy. The accusation that someone is “materialistic” exemplifies a set of interested moral restrictions designed to keep outgroups from acquiring the symbols of the established elite. Such moral restrictions are often guised as “religious scruple, cultural disdain, ethnic and racial loyalty, economic and civic propriety, or undisguised “sense of one’s place” (Goffman 1951: 297). In this study, we consider how materialism acts to restrict consumption by social grouping, as well as the power agenda that the rhetoric of morality conceals.

We look at the social context surrounding the use of materialism, not to discern how the meaning of materialism changes with differing value structures, but to look at whether it acts to produce judgments that protect the hierarchy. Using the luxury goods market in South Africa, we show how the term is imbued with power that maintains race-based social stratifications. We assess the reasons “materialistic” people consume and show how personal justifications illuminate stratification.
In South Africa, through government and business initiatives focused on empowerment and wealth creation (such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)), there is an emerging black middle class starting to challenge one of the significant legacies of apartheid - the racial segmentation of class and consumption. Studies being conducted on this group, popularly labeled “Black Diamonds,” show an increase in the proportion of black households in the upper quartile income segment. In 2006, 78.8% of white households, compared to only 8.6% of black households, were in the upper quartile (Statistics South Africa 2008). Yet by 2011, black households represented 40% of South Africa’s richest 10%. In demonstrating their new wealth, Black Diamonds often “trade-up” and emulate the respectable life of the elite White through living in White-majority posh areas, sending their children to prominent English or Afrikaans schools, and procuring the status symbols once definitive of the white elites (UCT Unilever Institute 2011).

Our study focuses on luxury consumption in South Africa, focusing on an observable status symbol with expressive potential, but with previously limited availability for blacks. Media coverage and speeches by prominent South Africans were first analyzed to understand the local discourse around luxury consumption and race. Participant observations were conducted at the boutiques where the line under study was sold. We then conducted forty interviews with luxury goods consumers and sales personnel, using pictorial stimuli and adjective checklists. We administered Richins and Dawson’s (1992) scales, but afterward showed respondents their scores and asked them whether they agreed with the outcome.

As we expected, pejorative terms of “ostentatious,” “flashy,” and “materialistic,” were often applied to describe the luxury consumption of blacks, which did not exist to the same extent for whites. Local terms that emerged during interviews to describe “materialistic” consumers, such as “fat BEE cats” and “tender-preneurs,” are applied only to black people. Our analysis of media and speeches explain how these terms linked the origins of black wealth with corruption and government nepotism, and are used to taint the legitimacy of blacks’ wealth and luxury consumption. Blacks are believed to consume luxury goods for less appropriate reasons than whites: blacks purchased products for status or brand labels, versus the white elite who are believed to purchase and truly appreciate luxury goods for their quality and craftsmanship. These beliefs were accepted and internalized by both blacks and whites, and reflected in their justifications for their own materialistic tendencies. When asked about their own “materialism” scores, blacks would often accept that they could be considered materialistic because they wanted to achieve and demonstrate their new wealth. For them, status symbols were “game changers” in business meetings, in wedding proposals, and for their own personal sense of accomplishment. In contrast, white consumers would downplay the applicability of their materialism scores, saying they merely appreciated the finer things in life.

Thus, we argue that the social dislocations resulting from the post-apartheid power shifts have given rise to moral polarities describing luxury consumption of different races. From this perspective, “materialism” is not a consumer value or trait, but instead a word with a social use: to maintain racial stratifications. These findings suggest that “materialism” is used by people as a moral restriction, and as such, these findings may have relevance for other contexts with intense social dislocations or for other stratifications (gender, class, religion) in which the threat of status deprivation exists.

When the Going Gets Tough the Materialistic Go Shopping: Materialism and Consumption Response to Stress

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Recent consumer research has examined the influence of existential insecurity on a variety of consumption-related behaviors. Drawing upon Terror Management Theory, this research suggests that in times of upheaval and stress people often seek relief via shopping and consumption (Arndt, et al., 2004; Mathwick, et al. 2001 Rindfleisch et al., 2009). Unfortunately, research indicates that consumption provides little benefit to materialistic individuals (Belk, 1985; Burroughs & Rindfleisch 2002; Richins & Dawson 1992). Thus, it might be the case that materialism may actually make bad events even worse. Our research explores this question.

Specifically, we suggest that highly stressful life events (such as a terrorist attack) will generate higher levels of post-traumatic stress (PTS) among materialistic individuals compared to their less materialistic counterparts. Furthermore, we theorize that materialistic individuals will also exhibit higher levels of maladaptive consumption behavior such as compulsive consumption and impulsive buying. In other words, we focus on the moderating effect of materialism on the relationships between PTS and the maladaptive consumption behavior. As such, we extend previous research that largely centers on direct negative outcomes of materialism, by examining the indirect (moderated) effect materialism, which makes negative outcomes even worse.

We conducted a field study that consists of 139 participants in the extreme-stress group who experienced ongoing terrorist attacks and 179 individuals in the low-stress group who were exposed to these events via the media only. Our measures include scales for materialism (Richins and Dawson 1992), PTS Symptom Scale (Foa et al. 1993), compulsive (Babin et al. 1994) and impulsive buying (Beatty & Ferrell 1998).

The results of our hierarchical regressions show that threat condition (0 = non-mortal-threat, 1 = mortal-threat) is positively associated with PTS (b = .44, p < .01). The mean level of stress in the mortal-threat condition was 17.4 (range: 0-51) compared to 6.5 (range: 0-40) in the non-mortal-threat condition (t(310) = -8.30, p = .001), indicating that participants from the mortal-threat threat condition experienced higher PTS than participants from the non-mortal-threat condition. In addition a significant interaction between threat condition and materialism (b = .10; p < .05) was established, which indicates that stress associated with a mortal threat is greater among highly materialistic individuals than their less materialistic counterparts.

We tested the effect of PTS as a mediator of maladaptive consumption, compulsive consumption and impulsive buying, and materialism as a moderator of these relationships.

Compulsive Consumption. Threat condition has a significant effect upon compulsive buying (b = .06; p < .05). In addition, PTS (the mediator) also exhibits a significant effect upon this outcome (b = .21; p < .05). Moreover, when this mediator is accounted for, the effect of the threat condition is reduced to non-significance (b = .02; ns). In addition, the interaction between PTS and materialism (the moderator) is also significant (b = .17; p < .01). These results indicate that PTS mediates the association between threat condition and compulsive buying and that materialism moderates the effect of PTS upon this outcome. Specifically, it appears that the use of compulsive consumption as a means of coping with the stress associated with a mortal threat is much more prominent among individuals high in materialism than those low in materialism.
Impulsive Buying: Threat condition has a significant effect upon impulsive buying ($b = .02; p < .05$). In addition, PTS (the mediator) also exhibits a significant effect upon this outcome ($b = .27; p < .01$). Moreover, when this mediator is accounted for, the effect of the threat condition is reduced to non-significance ($b = .01; ns$). In addition, the interaction between PTS and materialism (the moderator) is also significant ($b = .13; p < .05$). These findings indicate that PTS mediates the association between threat condition and impulsive buying and that materialism moderates the effect of PTS upon this outcome. Specifically, it appears that the use of impulsive buying as a means of coping with the stress associated with a mortal threat is considerably more prominent among individuals high in materialism than those low in materialism.

Our results reveal that, in addition to its well-documented harmful direct effect on psychological well-being, materialism also exerts an indirect negative effect by making bad events even worse. Our findings contribute to this school of thought by offering a more comprehensive view of the relationship between materialism and stress. Going beyond the simple association between materialism and higher levels of stress (in the form of PTS), our study suggest that materialism also shapes the manner in which individuals cope with this stress. Specifically, our results indicate that, materialistic individuals are more likely to respond to traumatic stress via impulsive and out of control consumption activities. Thus, materialism’s relationship with stress may be even more pernicious than commonly thought.

Living in a Material World: The Role of Materialism in Consumer Confidence & Well-Being

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In 2008, America entered its worst recession since the Great Depression. Two perspectives were offered as the proper response to lead the country out of that state: the recovery perspective and Depression. Two perspectives were offered as the proper response to lead the country out of that state: the recovery perspective and the reset perspective. The recovery perspective suggests that we awaken the materialism of Americans and get consumers spending again (Posner 2009). In contrast, the reset perspective suggests that materialism is what got us into this mess and that the current circumstances offer a perfect opportunity to seek alternative belief and value systems that promote greater health and well-being (Arndt et al. 2004). These perspectives fundamentally differ in their views on the impact of materialism on well-being, recovery assuming a positive impact and reset assuming a negative one.

Despite our cultural inclination toward materialism, there is meaningful variation in the levels of materialism from one individual to another, due to biological, personal and social circumstances (Giddens, Schermer and Vernon 2009). Numerous studies have examined the relationship between materialism and such consequenc es as quality of life (Roberts and Clement 2006), life satisfaction (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002), pro-social behavior (Briggs et al. 2007), and racism (Roets et al. 2006) and generally find that negative effects of materialism outweigh the positive ones; thus suggesting that we should find ways to reduce our materialistic tendencies.

However, notwithstanding its negative consequences, materialism has also led to increased standard of living, productivity and technological advances (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). More recently, Gardarsottir, Dittmar and Aspinall (2009) suggest that it is not necessarily the pursuit of acquisition, but the motives for that pursuit that determine whether the welfare results are negative. Ingrid, Majda and Dubravka also suggest that “materialistic aspirations will not decrease people’s well-being if they help them to achieve basic financial security of some intrinsic goals” (2009, p. 317). Therefore, motives for acquisition play an important role in determining whether materialistic values produce positive or negative welfare results. “Materialism has often been blamed for consumers’ overspending and excessive debt levels, but there is little understanding of how materialism influences these practices” (Richins 2013).

This study embeds materialism in a broader decision context to examine the process by which materialism triggers consumer spending. Materialism, or possession-defined success and the centrality of acquisition (Richins and Dawson 1992), is shown to bolster general confidence while possession as happiness increases one’s personal level of confidence toward the economy, thus leading to increased expected spending. Another psychological factor, hope (Snyder et al. 1991) provides the motivation, which is conceptualized as “a positive motivational state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (1) agency (goal-directed energy) and (2) pathways (planning to meet goals)” (p. 287). Based on this psychological representation, consumers who are more materialistic and who have higher levels of hope will have higher expectations for future consumption.

Past research on consumer confidence indicators has found that consumer attitudes about the future predict future consumption over and above changes in future economic resources (Carroll, Fuhrer and Wilcox 1994, Ludvigson 2004). More recently, researchers are advocating that marketing and psychological variables that bridge the gap between production and consumption (Bovi 2009) could also play a role in predicting consumer spending. For example, Fornell, Rust and DeKimpe (2010) find that aggregate customer satisfaction (ACS) predicts 23 percent of the variation in future consumer spending growth. However, these studies tend to use time-lagged indices as predictors of current period consumption whereas the current study links individual material values to personal confidence and future consumption behavior.

This paper uses the November and December waves of The Economy Tracker (2009) from The NPD Group, Inc. to provide an empirical assessment of materialism and hope and to observe its combined impact on consumer confidence and buying behavior. We examined the joint effects of materialism (Richins and Dawson 1992) and hope (Snyder et al. 1991) on consumer confidence and purchase intention using structural equations modeling. Confidence/ concern regarding the U.S. economy in general and personal economic perception were measured using a weighted score of a series of questions relating to the near-term outlook for the U.S. economy in general. Since all these scales have been extensively validated, they demonstrated strong composite reliabilities (Materialism = .97, Hope = .95, General Confidence = .96, Personal Confidence = .96). Spending behavior was measured by the retail response indicator developed by The NPD Group, Inc.

The results in Study 1 (N=1620) showed that two materialism dimensions (success and centrality) and hope bolstered confidence toward the economy while happiness and hope positively influence personal confidence leading to higher spending expectations. Study 2 (N=1420) replicated the findings from Study 1 at a special time of the year (December, 2009) when consumer confidence was influenced by the Christmas shopping season and consumers became more susceptible to the impact of materialism and hope. Study 3 (monthly surveys from January 2010-September 2011) further explores the relationship between monthly measures of materialism, consumer confidence, purchase intentions and subjective wellbeing (as measured by Diener’s Life Satisfaction scale (Diener et al., 1985)). Findings from this paper will not only explore the role of materialism as a key indicator of consumer confidence and spending during economic uncertainty, but also its impact on consumer wellbeing over time.
REFERENCES


Choices and the Self from Cognition to Motivation to Physical Expression

Chairs: Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Nicholas Olson, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #1: Thinking That Choices Reflect the Self Leads to Maximizing Behavior
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Nicholas Olson, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #2: On Metacognition and Culture
Aner Sela, University of Florida, USA
Jonah Berger, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #3: One of Each: Variety Seeking to Avoid Choice Difficulty
Joseph K. Goodman, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #4: Imago Animi Sermo Est – Speech is the Mirror of the Mind: The Effect of Vocal Expression on Preferences
Anne-Kathrin Klesse, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Jonathan Levav, Stanford University, USA
Caroline Goukens, Maastricht University, The Netherlands

SESSION OVERVIEW

What does it mean to make a choice? From exerting agency, to drawing conclusions about the self’s values, to wanting to produce a normatively right outcome, to expressing one’s preferences, choice is a fundamental route by which the self is empowered to “make a difference” (as per the theme of ACR 2013).

Theorists (e.g., Baumeister 1998) depict the self as housing three processes that drive behavior: executive functioning, which is comprised of self-regulation and decision making, interpersonal processes, and self-evaluation (e.g., self-esteem). The executive functioning aspect of the self is that which makes humans unique among animals (Baumeister 2005). Hence, there is a special relationship between the self and decision making, one with practical implications for everyday choices as well as ramifications for big decisions about well-being.

The first paper offers a new connection between the self and decision making via maximization tendencies. Vohs and Olson wondered why people would elect to engage in maximization, given its associations with regret, uncertainty, and decision stress. They predicted and found such tendencies arise from the belief that choices represent the self, which explains why and to what degree people exhibit maximizing tendencies.

The second paper builds on the first by overlaying the notion of attribution to choices and the self. Sela and Berger predicted and found that the interpretation of unexpectedly difficult decisions varied by culture. The authors demonstrated that priming American and Indian consumers with the notion that choices represent the inner self versus societal roles leads to different interpretations about what choice difficulty means for the self.

The third paper tackles the motivational side of the choice-self connection. When people are faced with a consumption decision with a host of options, how might they decide? In a further instantiation of constructed preferences, Goodman and Vohs demonstrated people with limited mental resources tend to seek variety. Furthermore, this effect is especially strong in people who often rely on System 1 processing, compared to those who generally rely on System 2 processing. These results suggest a variety-seeking heuristic exists, which helps consumers with a constrained capacity for decision processing.

The fourth paper takes a physical tack on the issue of the self and choices. One would think humans’ sophisticated capacity for self-expression would render all forms psychologically equivalent, but that is not what Klesse, Levav, and Goukens found. They found that when choice is expressed vocally (that is, through speech), consumers make decisions that are more consistent with their automatic, emotional reactions (i.e., choosing unhealthy foods) compared to those who express choices non-vocally (such as by pushing a button).

With new and counterintuitive findings that nonetheless follow from established theories, this session will be of interest to a host of consumer behavior scholars. Most centrally, scholars interested in the self, choice, and choice processes, as well as those interested in expressiveness, self-regulation, ego depletion, and meta-cognition will find a home in this session, as will policy makers seeking to nudge consumers toward making decisions that ‘make a difference’ on the self and society.

Thinking That Choices Reflect the Self Leads to Maximizing Behavior

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers must often employ one of two goals when making choices. They can satisﬁce and seek any option that meets some minimum standard, or they can maximize and attempt to ﬁnd the best possible option available. Research suggests that while consumers’ tendency to maximize may vary depending on characteristics of the decision (Simon 1956; Levav, Reinholtz, and Lin 2012), maximizing is also an individual difference (Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, and Lehman 2002). Certain people, known as maximizers, display high chronic levels of maximizing behavior and often endeavor to make the optimal choice for every decision. They engage in this behavior despite the many negative effects caused by maximization, such as less decision satisfaction, higher regret, and longer decision times compared to those who chronically satisﬁce (Schwartz et al. 2002; Levav et al. 2012). Furthermore, even when maximizing creates objectively better outcomes than satisﬁcing, maximizers are subjectively less happy with the outcome than are satisﬁcers (Iyengar, Wells, and Schwartz 2006).

In light of these ﬁndings, one could reasonably wonder why consumers would ever be motivated to maximize. We hypothesized that one possible cause of maximization is the belief that one’s choices reﬂect the self, which is to say that choices are a representation of one’s identity. We speciﬁcally predicted that those who strongly believe that one’s choices reﬂect the self will be more likely to maximize compared to those who only weakly believe this notion. Three experiments provided support for this hypothesis.

Experiment 1 tested whether people who generally think that their choices are representative of the self also tend to exhibit maximizing behaviors. Participants completed a scale that measured the extent to which they believed that choices reﬂect the self (Choices Reﬂect the Self scale). They then completed two additional scales that measured their tendency to maximize and experience regret. Previous research suggests that in addition to maximizing more frequently, chronic maximizers also experience more regret than those who maximize less (Schwartz et al. 2002). Based on these results, we expected that Choices Reﬂect the Self scores would have a positive relationship with maximizing and regret scores.

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The results were consistent with predictions. Choices Reflect the Self scores were positively and significantly correlated with both maximizing and regret scores. The more participants thought their choices reflected them, the more they tended to maximize and experience regret.

Experiment 2 tested whether a situational manipulation could induce participants to think that choices either reflect the self or do not reflect the self. Participants were asked to write an essay that purportedly would be used to help middle schoolers who were having trouble making choices. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups for this essay: the choices are the self group and the choices are not the self group. They were then instructed to complete the Choices Reflect the Self scale.

In the choices are the self condition, participants were told middle schoolers today were underestimating how much their choices say about who they are, an attitude that leads them to make decisions that reflect poorly on them. Participants were instructed to help middle schoolers with their supposed problem by writing an essay to make kids realize that choices reflect them. The choices are not the self condition used an identical procedure, except in this condition participants were told middle schoolers cared too much about what their choices said about them. Participants were instructed to help middle schoolers with this purported issue by writing an essay to let the kids know they are more than just the choices they make. After writing the essays, participants in both conditions completed the Choices Reflect the Self scale. Results show that those in the choices are the self condition had significantly higher Choices Reflect the Self scores than those in the choices are not the self condition, indicating the manipulation.

Experiment 3 replicated and extended experiment 2 in that in addition to manipulating the idea that choices do or do not reflect the self, experiment 3 tested whether these beliefs would influence maximizing tendencies. Participants were again instructed to help middle schoolers who, it was reported, were bringing about negative consequences for themselves either because they underestimate how much their choices reflect them (choices are the self condition) or overestimate how much their choices reflect them (choices are not the self condition). Participants then wrote an essay that purportedly would be used to help these middle schoolers who were having trouble making choices. They were then instructed to complete the Choices Reflect the Self scale. Finally, participants indicated their tendency to maximize.

As predicted, the results from experiment 3 show that those in the choices are the self condition (vs. choices are not the self condition) indicated significantly stronger beliefs that choices reflect the self, suggesting our manipulation was effective. This condition also reported stronger maximizer tendencies. Furthermore, the extent to which participants believed that choices reflect the self mediated the effect of condition on maximizing scores. This experiment showed that manipulating the idea of choices signifying individuals was effective in eliciting maximizer behavior insofar as the manipulation caused participants to actually believe choices represent the self, which further supports our hypothesis that it is specifically the thought that choices reflect individuals that is leading to maximizer behavior.

Summary: With all of the choices afforded to consumers in society today, it is no wonder that those who frequently attempt the daunting task of maximizing each decision often end up less satisfied than those who merely satisfy. By recognizing why certain consumers feel compelled to strive to select the best option, people can better comprehend the merits of such behavior and ways of countering its adverse effects.
Consistent with prior research, American participants spent more time deciding in the disfluent than in the fluent condition, but only in the unimportant framing condition. However, Indian participants spent slightly less time in the disfluent compared with the fluent condition when the decision was framed as unimportant. Processing difficulty did not influence decision time in the important framing conditions.

A moderated-mediated-moderation analysis suggested that the effect of processing difficulty on time spent, through perceived decision importance, was significant among Americans under unimportant framing but not among Indian participants or under important framing.

Studies 2 and 3 examine whether manipulating the salience of disjoint versus conjoint agency models can reverse the effect of culture on metacognitive inferences. In study 2, we expected priming Indian participants with the notion that choice reflected their inner-self would lead them to spend more time on unexpectedly difficult decisions. We first asked half the participants to describe a choice they had made that strongly expressed who they were, their individual preferences, beliefs, emotions, or goals (e.g., an item they bought because they felt it communicated their identity as individuals). In the control prime condition, we asked participants to list all the food items they consumed that day.

In the next task (borrowed from Sela and Berger 2012), participants chose between two flight options. All the participants chose a flight option and the decision was framed as unimportant. The dependent variable was the amount of time participants spent deciding.

A 2(prime) x 2(processing difficulty) ANOVA on time revealed the predicted prime x difficulty interaction. Disfluency had no effect on time in the control prime condition. However, in the choice-as-self-expression prime condition, participants spent more time deciding in the disfluent than the fluent condition.

In Study 3, American participants completed a similar sequence of tasks as in Study 2, but this time half of them described a choice they had made that was strongly influenced by a societal imperative (e.g., an item they bought because they were expected to). The other half listed foods they consumed that day, as in Study 2. The remainder of the procedure was identical to Study 2.

We expected the social-imperative prime to eliminate American participants’ baseline tendency to spend more time on unexpectedly difficult decisions. A 2(prime) x 2(difficulty) ANOVA on time revealed the predicted prime x difficulty interaction. As expected, in the control prime condition, participants spent more time deciding in the disfluent than the fluent condition. However, in the social-imperative prime condition, disfluency had no effect on time spent. See Table 1.

This research makes an important contribution by showing that susceptibility to metacognitive influences may differ by culture and that these differences may reflect cultural differences in the lay-theories people recruit to interpret their metacognitive experiences. The findings suggest limitations to the idea that metacognitive effects are universal.

### One of Each: Variety Seeking to Avoid Choice Difficulty

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

When consumers are faced with a choice conflict from information overload, they use heuristics and non-compensatory choice processes, such as elimination-by-aspects and conjunctive models, to reduce the consideration set and come to a choice (Broniarczyk 2008; Payne 1976; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). Yet in so many modern-day choice situations, consumers are able to choose multiple options. Moreover, decision difficulty seems to propel consumers to purchase more options (Goodman, Broniarczyk, Griffin, and McAlister 2013). Consumers may seek variety as a way to minimize the conflict and difficulty associated with choice. Consumers seek variety due to actual or anticipated satiation (McAlister 1982), a desire to reduce preference uncertainty (Kahn and Lehman 1991), anticipated satiation (Simonsen 1990).

We propose that consumers possess and use a variety-seeking heuristic to relieve choice conflict and information overload, and provide evidence that variety seeking increases when consumers’ mental resources are taxed. We tested our hypotheses by both manipulating participants’ mental resources (via ego depletion) and measuring consumer’s decision-making processing tendencies (by measuring System 2 processing via a Cognitive Reflection Test). Depletion served as a unique test of our theory because it does not create conflict, per se, but rather reduces the resources available to deal with the existing conflict and difficulty. Three studies tested and found support for our hypotheses.

In study 1, we used a traditional ego depletion manipulation (Vohs et al. 2008). We asked 186 undergraduate participants to watch a video of a woman being interviewed for 4 minutes, with random words flashed on the side of the video. Participants in the depletion condition were instructed to not look at the words. The nondepletion condition was not instructed to control their attention. Participants then completed an unrelated study to measure variety-seeking. Participants imagined that they were purchasing ice cream and asked to choose how many of each flavor (chocolate, vanilla, and strawberry) and size (small, medium, large) they would buy. As expected, the results showed that depleted participants chose more variety (M = 3.27) compared to nondepleted participants (M = 2.45). This effect was not driven by a difference in quantity, as the depletion condition did not increase quantity purchased (F < 1).

In study 2 we examined a common method by which consumers become depleted in the shopping environment by manipulating consumption decisions. We also tested whether the use of the variety-seeking heuristic can be reduced after resources are replenished. We paid 88 participants $7 as part of a longer 40-minute study. Participants in the depletion condition made 24 choices and received one of the products that they chose at the end of the study (Vohs et al. 2008). Participants in the control condition indicated whether they

### Table 1: Results for these studies

**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Importance Framing</th>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Americans (N = 123)</td>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td>Fluent</td>
<td>21.090</td>
<td>4.072</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Disfluent</td>
<td>31.192</td>
<td>3.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians (N = 135)</td>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td>Disfluent</td>
<td>26.300</td>
<td>4.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Important</td>
<td>Disfluent</td>
<td>41.353</td>
<td>4.220</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Prime</th>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and drink</td>
<td>Fluent</td>
<td>26.570</td>
<td>3.594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disfluent</td>
<td>30.751</td>
<td>3.890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice as Self-Expression</td>
<td>Fluent</td>
<td>26.711</td>
<td>4.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disfluent</td>
<td>47.341</td>
<td>4.033</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime</th>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and drink</td>
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<td>17.250</td>
<td>1.370</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disfluent</td>
<td>21.710</td>
<td>1.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice as Social Impulsive</td>
<td>Fluent</td>
<td>19.722</td>
<td>1.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disfluent</td>
<td>17.911</td>
<td>1.516</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
had used each specific product. Participants were then instructed to take a break and choose four snacks, in any combination. This choice task served as our dependent measure, and the snack and break also served to replenish participants’ resources. As expected, depleted participants chose more variety (M = 2.81) compared to the nondepleted participants (M = 2.40, t (87) = 2.10, p < .05). After replenishing their resources, participants responded to the same ice cream choices as in study 1. As expected, there was no longer any a difference in variety seeking after replenishment (M = 2.35 vs. M = 2.40, t < 1).

In study 3 we measured individual differences in System 1 versus 2 processing by administering the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick 2005) after the choice task. We also manipulated depletion as in Study 2. If variety is used as a heuristic, then low CRT participants should exhibit more variety seeking. As in study 2, depleted participants showed more variety seeking (M = 4.52) than nondepleted participants (M = 4.25, t (513) = 2.05, p < .05), and participants that scored low on the CRT chose more variety (M = 4.57) than those high on CRT (M = 4.11, t (513) = 2.61, p < .01).

These results support the presence and use of a consumer variety-seeking heuristic. Furthermore, they suggest that consumers use variety seeking as a shortcut to manage the decision process. Further, the results have important implications for the myriad decision situations that evoke depletion, such as long shopping trips or multi-stage product customizations.

At a theoretical level, these findings imply that consumers who have limited executive resources might vary seek in order to mitigate the potential for future losses, which could be a boon to overall well-being. Yet a contrary view suggests that variety seeking can be a recipe for dissatisfaction. Future work will unravel the consequences of heuristic-driven variety seeking, drawing a pathway from documenting the prevalence of this new heuristic to its implications for consumer welfare.

**Imago Animi Sermo Est – Speech is the Mirror of the Mind: The Effect of Vocal Expression on Preferences**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

The marketplace affords consumers different modes by which to express their preference. These include, but are not limited to, pressing a button, noting something on paper, and vocal expressions. New technologies enable consumers to interact with vending machines and even kitchen devices. Normatively these different modes of expression should not yield different choices, as there is nothing about the option (or the consumer) that differs as a function of expression mode. Yet, we find in our research that mode of expression has a substantial effect on people’s choices.

The study of response mode effects is not new; four decades of research on decision-making show that preference construction can be influenced by the form in which these preferences are elicited (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990; Nowlis and Simonson 1997). However, to date no studies have tested the effect of response modality—that is, the form in which the preference is expressed—on people’s choices. Previous research hints at the possibility of differences due to modality. In particular, vocal and non-vocal preference elicitation modes differ in what is required to translate one’s preference into the desired outcome. Most non-vocal preference elicitation modes—such as pushing a button at a vending machine—require the translation of one’s choice (e.g., Snickers) into another medium (e.g., button B4) to obtain the desired outcome. Speech, on the other hand, is directly connected to emotionality: During a child’s emotional development, speech serves as a main vehicle for emotional expression (Chen, Kennedy, and Zhou 2012). Numerous studies have shown that speech and emotionality are indeed strongly interlinked (e.g., Pavlenko 2002). We conjecture that translating one’s choice into another medium might therefore reduce emotional resonance, which suggests that the more that the situation calls for explicitly vocalizing one’s preferences, the more that emotional, automatic preferences will guide choice outcomes. This would imply that speech, more than non-vocal expressions, would produce decisions reflective of automatic emotional reactions, a prediction that was confirmed in three experiments.

We tested this conjecture in three lab studies. In Study 1 (N = 101), we let participants choose between two choices. Generally, individuals prefer choices because they are inferred to be tastier, but this initial impulsive response can be overridden if more cognitive evaluation takes place (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). In this study, participants chose a snack from a vending machine with healthy (e.g., apple slices, cereal bar, etc.) and unhealthy snacks (e.g., M&Ms, Kit Kat, etc.). Depending on condition, participants expressed their choice non-vocally (i.e., by pushing a button) or vocally (i.e., by speaking in a microphone attached to vending machine).

Based on participants’ choices, we computed the average calorie content of the snack selected in each condition. Participants who expressed their choice vocally chose snacks significantly higher in calorie content (Mb = 239.56) than participants who expressed their choice by pushing the button (Mb = 209.04, F(1,99) = 5.81, p < .05). A logistic regression with choice of snack as a dichotomous variable (i.e., unhealthy vs. healthy) revealed a significant effect of condition (b = -1.06, p < .05). Participants that expressed their choice vocally were less likely to choose a healthy snack.

In Study 2 (N = 59), we let participants choose between regular and low-fat ice cream. Based on research that shows that perceived healthiness and inferred tastiness are negatively correlated (Raghunathan, Naylor, and Hoyer 2006), we assumed that participants’ initial impulsive reaction would be to go for the regular version. During the study, participants were asked to choose an ice cream flavor among three different flavors available in a regular or a non-fat version. Participants expressed their choice either by using the computer mouse or by expressing it vocally into a microphone that was connected to voice recognition software. We conducted a logistic regression with ice cream flavor as the outcome and preference elicitation mode as the predictor. The results revealed an effect of condition, such that participants who expressed their choice vocally were less likely to choose a low-fat ice cream.

Study 3 (N = 132) was designed to provide evidence that expressing one’s choice vocally fosters choices that are more in line with an individual’s automatic emotional reactions. We therefore focused on the special situation of dieting. For dieters, high caloric food is implicitly associated with positive affect, even though at an explicit level they endeavor to override this natural response (Strack and Deutsch 2004). We therefore measured individuals’ dieting status (e.g., ‘I am on a diet’) and expected an interaction effect with preference elicitation mode so that dieting increases the likelihood of choosing a snack higher in calorie content when expressing one’s preferences vocally. An ANOVA conducted on calorie content of the chosen snack revealed a (marginally) significant main effect of condition (F(1,130) = 3.02, p < .09): Participants who expressed their choice vocally chose snacks significantly higher in calorie content (Mb = 220.64) than participants who expressed their choice by pushing the button (Mb = 196.397). A logistic regression with choice of snack (i.e., unhealthy vs. healthy) revealed a significant effect of condition (b = -0.691, p < .05). Participants who expressed their choice vocally were less likely to choose a healthy snack. Further, we find a
(marginally) significant interaction effect between preference elicitation mode and being on a diet ($p < .09$). Using ‘floodlight’ analysis (Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch and McClelland, forthcoming) to probe the interaction we find that the region of significance for preference elicitation mode is all values of being on a diet equal to or higher than 1.696. This indicates that dieters choose snacks higher in calorie content.

Our findings highlight that consumer preferences differ depending on whether they are expressed in spoken word or otherwise. Spoken choices appear to be more congruent with initial emotional reactions, while the translation into another medium (e.g., button B4) acts as a distancing function, promoting more reflective decision-making.

REFERENCES
A Play for Power: Exploring the Ways Consumption Marks Social Stratifications

Chairs: Laurel Steinfield, University of Oxford, UK
Linda Scott, University of Oxford, UK

Paper #1: Effects of Geographic and Religious Stratification and Modernity in the Arab Gulf
Russell Belk, York University, Canada
Rana Sobh, Qatar University, Qatar

Paper #2: Viewing the Creation and Reproduction of Racial Stratification through Consumption: Life Histories of the Black Middle-Class in America
David Crockett, University of South Carolina, USA

Paper #3: Controlling Consumption: The Illusiveness and Pervasiveness of Gender Norms in the Ugandan Marketplace
Laurel Steinfield, University of Oxford, UK
Linda Scott, University of Oxford, UK

Paper #4: The Consuming City: Economic and Health Stratification and the Glasgow Effect
Kathy Hamilton, University of Strathclyde, UK
Katherine Trebeck, Oxfam, UK

SESSION OVERVIEW

This special session examines how power shapes consumption and limits policies or economic actions that attempt to bring about societal change through challenging social hierarchies. We bring together four papers that consider different types of stratification: geographical, religious, racial, generational, gender, and class. We demonstrate how consumption norms and practices that reinforce the stratifications are perpetuated or contested in the marketplace. We start by considering the different ways power dynamics and stratifications intersect and are experienced in the marketplace and build toward recognizing how these dynamics shape and influence the implementation of policies. Each of these presentations use different methods, and thus extend our awareness of tools researchers can use to study normative and socio-economic forces.

Russell Belk and Rana Sobh open the session with vignettes that reflect the intersectionality of geographical, religious, generational and gender stratifications occurring in the prosperous Islamic countries of Qatar and United Arab Emirates. Through cases that emerged in their three years of fieldwork, these scholars examine how consumers navigate the traditional structures and stratifications when Western popular culture starts to influence traditional family life.

David Crockett investigates the racial stratification of America through an historical analysis of postwar black middle-class consumers. He discusses the historical transitions from legislated racial segregation to stratifications maintained through structural and symbolic systems. Using life histories of black middle-class families, he documents how race and class stratifications are maintained through myths about consumption while their reproduction is being contested by generational differences.

Laurel Steinfield and Linda Scott explore the gender stratifications perpetuated by consumption practices in rural and urban Uganda. Policy and legislative protocols are encouraging women to become more educated and employed in the private and public sectors, yet the effectiveness of these changes is hampered by gender biases that affect the consumption of women. Using projective techniques and armed with a shopping bag of goods, Steinfield and Scott conduct interviews that unearth the normative prejudices and pejorative labels that limit the consumption choices that can be made by women and observe the flow of these ideologies to urban areas.

Kathy Hamilton and Katherine Trebeck close with a presentation that demonstrates how economic stratifications are intensified by regeneration strategies. They call into question policies that attempt to spur economic investments and a culture of consumption, noting how too much emphasis on the marketplace can lead to an increase in poverty, inequality and health problems. Presenting the work they have done on the “Glasgow effect”, they remind us that the consumer marketplace is only one of many places in which the effects of stratifications are felt and experienced.

Our session asks how social stratifications are institutionalized and contested through the marketplace, but also reflects on the reasons why such stratifications should matter to policy-makers and should be accommodated in planning and interventions. It explores the tension that exists in market-based solutions to societal change, asking: in what instances does the marketplace perpetuate vulnerabilities and when does it enable empowerment and societal transitions? This session should be of interest to researchers interested in social stratifications, power, religion, race, gender, class, emerging economies and transformative consumer research.

Effects of Geographic and Religious Stratification and Modernity in the Arab Gulf

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Stratification in Qatar and UAE occurs both within these nations and between these nations as well as between the countries of origin of its non-citizen residents who make up 80 to 85 percent of local populations. Religion, location, citizenship, age, income, ethnicity, country of origin, and gender all play a role in the status of those living in these Arab Gulf countries. These stratifications are embedded within one another and in order to appreciate their impact on consumption, it is necessary to consider their intersections. Illustrations of the importance of local intersectionalities include contrasts such as the following:

1. A male Hindu guest worker from Kerala working in UAE for two years versus the same man when he returns to India.
2. A female Muslim Qatari married to a Bedouin Arab of Qatari tribal origin versus another Muslim Qatari woman married to an Ajam Qatari man whose heritage is Iranian and who may speak Farsi rather than Arabic.
3. A 45-year-old Qatari Muslim woman versus her 20-year-old daughter in university.
4. An expatriate Christian British businessman living in UAE versus an expatriate Muslim Indonesian cleaning woman for an Emirati family.
5. A 20-year-old Sri Lankan Muslim non-citizen born and raised in UAE versus his Emirati university friends.

These illustrations, based on a three-year ethnography, demonstrate how the recent petro-wealth and Western popular culture has affected social status and consumption patterns.

In the first case the guest worker in the UAE lives in a “labor camp” in Dubai and is bused daily between the camp and a high rise construction site. He has one day off a week and his employer holds his passport and sponsors his visa. He is near the bottom of the social hierarchy in UAE. He repatriates his money to his family.
in Kerala where he will build a house and become a nouveau riche “king” when he returns home.

In the second case the woman married to the Bedu man has higher social status than the one married to the Ajam man, even though they are both citizens of Qatar and thereby entitled to benefits such as higher salaries, free education, water, and electricity, low cost housing loans, and free land for building a house. There is a further status hierarchy depending on the prominence of the Bedu couple’s clan. Although there are virtually no poor Qataris (or Emiratis), clan and heritage are stratification variables within these societies, with Abd Muslims who originate from North Africa being lower status than either Bedu or Ajam.

In the third case the mother and daughter occupy the same social status (unless the woman gained citizenship by marrying a Qatari man, in which case her daughter would not be a citizen). But the influence of modernity is likely to be strikingly different between the two. Both are likely to wear the traditional black abaya (gown) and shayla (head covering), but the daughter’s is more form-fitting, covers Western designer clothes including tight fitting jeans, red high heels, and accessories from Gucci, Prada, and Louis Vuitton, and is left partly unbuttoned with her hair peeking out from her shayla, also revealing her heavy makeup. Her abaya may be covered in Swarovski jewels and may even have a rock star insignia on the back. It costs hundreds or thousands of dollars and may be out of fashion in two months.

The fourth case involves a relatively wealthy businessman who lives in a high rise apartment and enjoys a high salary, but not enough to keep up with Emirates who have one of the highest per capita incomes in the world (along with Qataris). Unlike the businessman who lives far from the palatial homes of local Emirates, the cleaning woman lives with an Emirati family in a separate quarters. Like the guest workers she repatriates most of her money to her home country. She learns some Arabic and may be able to make the Hajj to Mecca.

Like the Brit, the Sri Lankan man may have a wealthy family, but they enjoy none of the privileges of citizenship and he can never become a citizen, even if he were to get permission to marry an Emirati woman. Since citizens have 20 percent of the jobs set aside for them and earn considerably higher salaries than non-citizens doing the same job in the same establishment, he is at a considerable economic disadvantage.

We draw on our ethnographic data to demonstrate the inadequacy of singular analyses of location, nationality, citizenship, age, gender, ethnicity, education, income, or religion alone in order to understand the status hierarchies of the Gulf States. Rather the structural inequalities that begin with religion and location, are entangled with the intersectionality of other characteristics that must be considered jointly in order to understand the role of consumption in the daily lives and statuses of those living in these newly rich nations.

**Viewing the Creation and Reproduction of Racial Stratification through Consumption: Life Histories of the Black Middle-Class in America**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

This research documents the racial stratification that occurs in the marketplace of America as consumer culture attains dominance in the mid-twentieth century. The history of consumer culture in the West can best be characterized as a social formation that shifts commodity consumption from a peripheral activity in social life to the quintessential activity of social life. The insights generated herein are intended to highlight the critical role played by consumption practices, and consumer culture more broadly, in the creation and maintenance of the Black middle-class.

Any broad-reaching investigation of black middle class family life must place consumption practices and consumer culture at its center. Unfortunately, such a perspective has been either largely absent or marginalized in scholarship found in the humanities as well as the social sciences. Traditionally, scholars in the US study Black life largely by looking at labor and income inequality in isolation or in tandem with critical social institutions like family, school, and church. This traditional approach is very limiting insofar as it ignores or marginalizes consumption’s centrality to identity formation as well as its role in the reproduction of culture. Fortunately, contemporary scholarship has begun to include consumption as part of the analysis of the black experience. Unfortunately, consumption still lurks at the margins.

This research addresses this imbalance by moving consumption to the center of the analysis of the Black middle-class experience. It views the construction of personal and social identity in the Black middle-class as well as upward and downward social mobility through the lens of consumption. It forms part of a larger project that studies consumption at the intersection of race-, class-, and gender stratification under historical conditions specific to late capitalism.

The Black middle-class (typically inclusive of African, Afro-Caribbean, and other immigrants designated as “black” in the U.S.) emerges in recognizable form at roughly the same historical moment that a culture of mass consumption emerges to supplement and then replace a culture of mass production at the very center of U.S. social life. Although the emergence of a black middle class began in the Reconstruction period immediately following the U.S. Civil War (DuBois 1935), the focus of this study is on the post-World War II black middle class, which is qualitative different from its pre-war counterpart (Patillo-McCoy 1999). The post-war black middle class emerges in a consumer culture that is simultaneously a “democracy of goods” yet rife with racial stratification: African Americans are initially the object of legalized racial stratification in markets and the state (Drake and Cayton 1962). Following the collapse of the Jim Crow regime in the U.S., access to markets (and certainly to the cultural capital thought to flow from full participation in them) is at times attenuated even for high income African Americans. Structural features (e.g., high levels of residential segregation) and symbolic representation (e.g., widely-held stigmatization) continue to stratify the market. At the same time consumption serves as a primary means by which the black middle class distinguishes itself from the black working class and poor (Patillo-McCoy 1999). But, even more disconcerting for what Lacy (2007) describes as the “elite” black middle class, in an intergenerational boundary: evident feelings of alienation separate black middle class informants from their children. This interconnection and interplay between consumer culture and black middle class status comes to the fore through the life histories interviews of these informants. Using boundary theory, I show how their histories demonstrate two broad categories of consumption-focused strategies for configuring ethno-racial identity.

In the first category, actors seek to change boundary topography. That is, they try to expand boundaries to incorporate out-group members into an identity group, or, they contract boundaries to expel in-group members. These strategies are on the whole unavailable to Blacks in the US. Thus, I focus on the second category, where actors seek to change their affiliation with particular boundary-created identity groups or alter a boundary’s meaning. Following Wimmer (2008), I show how informants implement consumption-focused strategies (inverting the racial hierarchy, equalization, boundary-
crossing and collective repositioning) to attenuate the impact of stratification with varying degrees of success. Part of this success is determined by the destruction of myths by generational changes; that is, I find that racial stratification in the marketplace is maintained through myths yet these myths, and thus the stratification, lose meaning and power over consumption as they become challenged by generational divergences.

Controlling Consumption: The Illusiveness and Pervasiveness of Gender Stratifications in the Ugandan Marketplace

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In Uganda, as women become more educated and employed, and as laws are enacted to protect their rights, male economic power might be expected to erode. Ideologies, however, continue to uphold the gender hierarchies in this traditional patriarchal society. In rural communities, where traditional tribal laws are still practiced, women continue to be treated like property, traded for a bride-price as soon as they can bear children, or, if a widow, being inherited by her husband’s family and forced to marry his male relative should she have no male children to provide for her. Women continue to submit to these laws for fear that they will be outcasts of society. The local model of domestic virtue continues to restrict a woman’s role in the economy even in urban areas (Kyomuhendo and McIntosh (2006).

Our research investigated the way such gender restrictions are perpetuated through family consumption decisions. We frame our analysis using two of Lukes (2005) faces of power: decisions and preferences. In rural Uganda, a woman is limited in her ability to keep her own money or to get to the shops to buy needed goods. If she works with her husband, the money goes directly to him. Any money she earns through selling small amounts of produce can easily be taken by her husband who, culturally, is allowed to beat her. She becomes trapped at home, burdened with the responsibility of childcare, kept from travelling the miles between her homestead and the trading center by cultural beliefs that make female mobility on a motorcycle immoral. Although norms are less openly restrictive in urban areas, the other face of power – power over preferences – does exist in judgments of appropriate versus inappropriate consumption, with pejorative terms applied to women who challenge gender norms for consumption.

It is infamously difficult for respondents to articulate these kinds of gender issues. To study the influences of power over preferences, therefore, we devised techniques that could be used in spite of language differences and low literacy rates. For instance, we researched typical purchasing habits in remote areas in order to create a typical “shopping bag” of groceries and augmented that set of goods with objects said to have strongly gendered identities in local habits. The final “bag” held a broad array of items, including common foods and everyday “necessities,” as well as gender specific items for both females and males (e.g., hair extensions versus alcohol and phone time). We took the actual collection of objects into remote areas and asked participants to group the goods into piles of items (1) for which they pay and for which their spouse pays, (2) that the household often buys or never buys, and (3) items that men/women think are necessary versus unnecessary. The results made visible the social norms that elevate the consumption habits of men and place limits on the consumption of women. The items men denoted as necessary but said their wives would see as unnecessary (batteries, airtime, and alcohol) nevertheless were frequently purchased staples of the household; in contrast, goods women thought were necessities (sanitary pads, hair extensions, and skin-whitening lotion), but were not thought important by men, were rarely, if ever, bought.

Men were expected to be the main providers for the house, but once they have fulfilled a basic commitment they were allowed to spend their money as they wished – with no social stigma even for flashy purchases or frequent drinking. Women, on the other hand, were not only to grow the food and provide for the other needs of the family (clothes, education, etc), but were always expected to put their family needs before their own. They will buy their daughters sanitary pads, but will not buy sanitary pads for themselves. There is a strong moral suasion held over women to put their families first and to not buy things for themselves, which does not exist to the same level for men.

We used a projective technique based on Haire’s (1950) coffee study to elicit judgments of consumption. We grouped together four goods: sanitary pads, hair extensions, lipstick, and skin-whitening cream, and asked respondents to describe a woman who purchases these items for herself, on a regular basis. In rural Uganda, this woman was often labeled as a “malaya” – a prostitute. To indulge in “inappropriate” consumption habits earns a woman a much stronger social stigma than a man. These moral restrictions protect a man’s money, and thus his freedom to consume, on two accounts: they ensure that a woman will restrict her personal consumption and use her own money, instead of her husband’s money, towards family expenses (thus allowing him more disposable income for his personal consumption) and they prevent her from asking her husband for money for personal items for fear that she will be suspected of prostitution. Even among university students in urban Uganda, a woman who buys self-indulgences on a regular basis was assumed to be engaging in exchange sex. Thus, the myth of the “malaya” transfers from rural to urban settings, applied specifically to women who challenge the social norm of limiting their personal consumption. However, the gender norms that limit economic opportunities, thus causing women to be dependent on men as providers of goods and potentially driving them to engage in prostitution, are seldom recognized.

We see further through this study how gender stratifications in consumption limit the effectiveness of policies and legislation. Our research in rural Uganda, which forms part of a bigger study on girl’s education and sanitary pads, demonstrates how gender biases in household decisions can place limits on a girl’s ability to continue in school, despite government and civil society programs designed to further female education. For instance, families consistently place a man’s social drinking needs ahead of his daughter’s need for sanitary pads, thus limiting the girl’s ability to stay in school. In turn, the next generation of women fails to escape the ideologically-imposed restriction on her economic autonomy, is traded in marriage, and the whole cycle begins again.

The Consuming City: Economic Stratification and the Glasgow Effect

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

This presentation will focus on the city of Glasgow (located within the central belt of Scotland) and explore the way its economic development is influenced by ideological, socio-cultural and historical forces. Images, discourse and media representations associated with Glasgow offer opposing views regarding the success, prosperity and identity of the city. On the one hand, Glasgow is proclaimed to be a city of retail and following London is the UK’s second largest shopping destination. On the other hand, Glasgow has high levels of deprivation. With this in mind, we will consider the
following research questions: Is the focus on consumption making the citizens of Glasgow vulnerable? Are regeneration strategies that centre on consumption effective both for economic development and individual consumers? Or are they counter-productive and instead harming the social assets of citizens already vulnerable due to decades of deindustrialisation?

The development of consumer culture in Glasgow has been a central strategy in response to the identity crisis caused by de-industrialisation and the decline of traditional employment opportunities, particularly that offered by the ship-building industry. Similar to Miles (2010), the consuming city has become central to urban life to the extent that policy-makers and urban planners focus on consumption at the expense of anything else. Since the early 1980s, place marketing campaigns have drawn on sophisticated lifestyle concepts to position Glasgow as a high class destination. One of the most prominent, the ‘Glasgow: Scotland with Style’ marketing slogan was launched in 2005 in an effort to enhance the city’s reputation, increase visitor numbers and increase the economic value of tourism. Proclaimed as the ‘Style Mile,’ Glasgow’s city centre is presented as a destination filled with what Ritzer (2010, p.7) would term ‘cathedrals of consumption:’

“All know that Glaswegians live, breathe, eat and sleep style. Little wonder that, in the very heart of the marvellous city they call home, one square mile houses the most extraordinary concentration of inspirational shopping, atmospheric cafés, fine restaurants, and decadent late night haunts.” (http://www.glasgowstylemile.com/)

The assumption is decades of regeneration policies that focus on physical improvements and the construction of luxury shops will address growing inequalities through increased employment opportunities and other benefits created by economic growth. Some point towards Glasgow being awarded European City of Culture in 1990 and the hosting of the Commonwealth Games in 2014 as evidence of success. However, poverty persists and inequalities have widened. Recent statistics indicated that the percentage of Scots living in relative poverty is 17 per cent, while income inequality has increased since 2004/5 (Scottish Government, 2011). In Glasgow, there are particular concerns related to poor health and high mortality rates. Walsh et al. (2010) undertook a detailed comparison of Glasgow and two other UK cities (Liverpool and Manchester) which have almost identical levels of deprivation and have similar experiences of deindustrialisation. Findings highlighted that Glasgow suffers from excess mortality beyond that attributable to the city’s high levels of socio-economic deprivation, a phenomenon known as the “Glasgow Effect.”

In this presentation we draw on data from Oxfam’s Humankind Index for Scotland which was built following consultation with Scottish people about what aspects of life make a real difference to the prosperity, resilience and sustainability of their households and communities. Particular effort was made to ensure that the consultation was inclusive, especially with regard to seldom heard groups and data collection included focus groups, community workshops, street stalls and an online survey. The results are a set of weighted priorities that describe what Scottish people identify as important to living well in their communities. Findings point to health, security, time with friends and family, access to green spaces and satisfaction in work as priorities. Such priorities are dramatically different from how Glasgow has been marketed – competitive, stylish, imaged-focused. They are also unlikely to be outcomes flowing from the current mode of economic development being pursued in the city.

Although we focus on Glasgow, the trend towards more entrepreneurial governance means that increasingly cities across the world are being marketed as shopping destinations (Kavaratzis, 2004). The danger with such an approach is that the city becomes ‘less a place for and of the people and more a unit for the efficient maximisation of consumption’ (Miles, 2010, p.2). We demonstrate that beneath idealised marketing images, this approach to regeneration is not conducive to the reduction of poverty and inequality. This has important implications for both city planners and city marketers as a more multidimensional focus on the planning and branding of cities would provide a better fit with the priorities of citizens and also ensure greater sustainability. By considering goals beyond economic growth and elevating policies which contribute to better distribution of that growth and growth of what matters to communities in the first place, policy makers would be in a better position to really make a difference to local residents.

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The second paper builds on reactance research to show that highly reactant people resist the influence of direct self-control messages. Three studies show that exposing people to words directly related to a target healthy behavior (e.g., exposure to diet-related words to promote a healthier food choice) can result in negative perceptions of the food. This effect occurs among highly reactant participants and indicates that indirect health messages can be more effective at promoting healthier behavior.

The third paper builds on research agency and self-serving attributions to examine how perceptions of agency in food serving shape post-eating feelings and how anticipation of such feelings shapes eating decisions. Four studies demonstrate that people feel better when unhealthy food is served to them as opposed to when they self-serve it, that people have intuitions about ramifications of different serving arrangements, and that people adjust their unhealthy food portion selections based upon whom they expect to be the server.

These three papers are in advanced stages and collectively leverage psychological theories to investigate important factors that influence healthiness perceptions and healthy choices. Moreover, two papers examine interactions between experimental manipulations and individual differences (self-control, reactance), providing a nuanced understanding of how different consumers may respond to environmental cues, messages, and potential interventions. This session will appeal to an audience interested in self-control, healthy choices, and food psychology. This work relates to the “making a difference” theme because it sheds light on factors influencing consumer welfare.

“This Isn’t So Bad”: Assimilation, Contrast, and Self-Control on Healthiness Perceptions

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Assimilation and contrast effects play an important role in the way consumers make judgments (Ferrari 1992; Schwarz and Bless 1992b). The order of information, in particular, may have a contextual influence on the way we evaluate (Schwarz and Bless 1992a). In the present research, we examine how assimilation and contrast effects might manifest differently in food consumption related situations. Across three studies, we examine contextual order effects and test our hypothesis that these effects are moderated by self-control, facilitating better overall patterns of consumption for individuals higher in self-control. We show that prior exposure to healthy or indulgent food options impacts consumer evaluations of healthiness for subsequent options differently at varying levels of self-control.

Comparative evaluations and order effects are critical to our understanding of consumer judgments and choice. Our research contributes to this knowledge by examining the role of self-control in goal contexts with sequential exposure to different foods. Research on order effects has identified highlighting and balancing behaviors toward pursuit of self-regulation goals (Dhar and Simonson 1999). For example, a dieter may balance an unhealthy lunch by eating a healthy dinner or vice versa. The present research examines judgments about the ambiguously healthy foods that may lead individuals with low self-control to use strategies such as highlighting and balancing ineffectively or categorizing alternatives in a manner that negatively impacts the pursuit of health goals (Pynor and Haws 2009). Specifically, we hypothesize that people with lower self-control will assimilate their perceptions of healthiness for ambiguously healthy options following exposure to healthy foods and contrast after unhealthy foods. This behavior broadens the number of acceptable healthy choices available. For those high in self-control, we expect the opposite pattern to emerge and impede goal-inconsistent choices.

In Experiment 1, participants were shown food images one at a time and asked to rate the healthiness of each. Participants were shown either a healthy (an apple) or unhealthy food (potato chips) followed by an ambiguously healthy food (Goldfish® Crackers). Separately, participants completed the 13-item self-control scale (Tangney et al. 2004). Analysis revealed a significant interaction (p = 0.05) between the order condition and trait self-control. A spotlight analysis confirmed that individuals with lower self-control evaluated the neutral Goldfish option as more healthy subsequent to exposure to a healthier item (an apple) relative to people with higher self-control (p = 0.01). Consistent with our hypothesis, these results indicate that after seeing a healthy item, low self-control individuals assimilate judgments about a subsequent ambiguously healthy item whereas high self-control individuals contrast. In the condition be-
People are exposed to many persuasive health messages that promote the target behavior because automatic resistance to performing the promoted behavior, such that the original message has no effect on them at all (Laran, Dalton, and Andrade 2011). We propose that this automatic resistance happens for some people in response to direct health messages (e.g., diet-related words to promote healthier eating) and that this resistance can be avoided by using indirect health messages (e.g., exercise-related words to promote healthier eating).

To establish more clearly what we mean by direct versus indirect health messages, we borrow an analogy from the goal structure literature (Shah and Kruglanski 2003). In this framework, different subgoals (e.g., diet; exercise) are linked to the same superordinate goal (e.g., self-control). Therefore, if attempting to increase healthy food choice, direct messaging refers to activating concepts related to diet, whereas indirect messaging refers to activating concepts related to exercise. Thus, we argue that increasing healthy food choice can be brought about by either directly (activating diet concepts) or indirectly (through activating exercise concepts, which relate to the same superordinate goal).

Intuitively, one might expect direct messaging to be equally or more effective at promoting a desired behavior compared to indirect messaging. Indeed, past research has shown that exposing people to words directly related to the target behavior affects behavior. For instance, exposing people to words related to cooperation leads them to make thrifter product choices (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008). However, for some persuasive messages, we propose that a subset of people frequently and consistently experience a feeling of resistance paired with a stimulus. We propose that this automatic resistance happens for some people in response to direct health messages (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; 2000; Berger and Fitzsimons 2008; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 2008). However, other consumers may respond by developing an automatic resistance to performing the promoted behavior, such that the original message has no effect on them at all (Laran, Dalton, and Andrade 2011). We propose that this automatic resistance happens for some people in response to direct health messages (e.g., diet-related words to promote healthier eating) and that this resistance can be avoided by using indirect health messages (e.g., exercise-related words to promote healthier eating).

In Experiment 3, we extended our study of order effects by presenting healthiness information for the first snack to half of the participants. We expected to find that conscious processing of health information would attenuate the tendency for people low in self-control to assimilate to healthy items. As in Experiment 1, participants were first shown either a healthy (apple slices) or unhealthy (potato chips) snack. Health grades (A for apple slices and D for potato chips) were provided to participants in the health information condition. Brief information about the algorithm for the health grade was also presented to indicate USDA guidelines and nutrient content as key determinants of the grade. All participants were then shown ambiguously healthy Goldfish and asked to estimate the number of calories in a serving. We find a significant 3-way interaction (p < .05) among order condition, health information condition, and trait self-control. A spotlight analysis on the health-first condition revealed a significant difference between the health information conditions for individuals with low self-control (p < .01). Consistent with our hypothesis, low self-controllers estimated significantly more calories for the ambiguous Goldfish when health information was provided.

Our findings contribute to literature on context effects as part of a goal pursuit process by exploring the role of assimilation and contrast effects in self-control decision-making through the impact on healthiness perceptions. Prior research revealed the importance of categorizations of alternatives in goal pursuit (Poyner and Haws 2009). Here, we identify trait self-control as a factor that moderates order effects, showing that low self-control individuals tend to assimilate their healthiness judgments to prior healthy food choices, whereas high self-control individuals tend to contrast. This effect can lead to suboptimal decisions for people with low self-control. However, we find that presenting health information can reverse the effect and lead to contrasting judgments among low self-control individuals. These findings may help explain why people high in self-control are more successful at pursuing self-control goals.

Avoiding Behavioral Resistance to Diet and Exercise Messages

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

People are exposed to many persuasive health messages that encourage them to become healthy in different ways. For instance, some messages encourage people to eat healthy and diet, and other messages encourage people to get active and exercise. How do consumers respond to the constant bombardment by these messages? Some consumers may respond by developing a cognitive tendency to be resistant to health messages (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; 2000; Berger and Fitzsimons 2008; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 2008). However, other consumers may respond by developing an automatic resistance to performing the promoted behavior, such that the original message has no effect on them at all (Laran, Dalton, and Andrade 2011). We propose that this automatic resistance happens for some people in response to direct health messages (e.g., diet-related words to promote healthier eating) and that this resistance can be avoided by using indirect health messages (e.g., exercise-related words to promote healthier eating).

To establish more clearly what we mean by direct versus indirect health messages, we borrow an analogy from the goal structure literature (Shah and Kruglanski 2003). In this framework, different subgoals (e.g., diet; exercise) are linked to the same superordinate goal (e.g., self-control). Therefore, if attempting to increase healthy food choice, direct messaging refers to activating concepts related to diet, whereas indirect messaging refers to activating concepts related to exercise. Thus, we argue that increasing healthy food choice can be brought about by either directly (activating diet concepts) or indirectly (through activating exercise concepts, which relate to the same superordinate goal).

Intuitively, one might expect direct messaging to be equally or more effective at promoting a desired behavior compared to indirect messaging. Indeed, past research has shown that exposing people to words directly related to the target behavior affects behavior. For instance, exposing people to words related to cooperation leads them to engage in greater cooperation in a resource management game (Bargh, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, Gollwitzer, and Trötschel 2001), and exposing people to words related to thriftiness leads them to make thrifter product choices (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner 2008). However, for some persuasive messages, we propose that a subset of people frequently and consistently experience a feeling of resistance upon encountering the message and facing the choice of whether to follow through on performing the target behavior. For these people, indirect messaging may be more effective than direct messaging at promoting the target behavior, because these automatic pairings of resistance do not arise for words that compose the indirect messages.

Our hypothesis that a subset of people may develop automatic resistance to some direct messages drawn from the theory of reactance, or the psychological tendency to resist restrictions on one’s freedom to choose (Brehm 1966). Prior research by Chartrand, Dalton, and Fitzsimons (2007) found that people high in reactance display a different pattern of responses to a stimulus compared to people low in reactance. They argued that reactance to a stimulus can become automatized when people frequently and consistently experience a feeling of resistance paired with a stimulus. They propose that people who have habitually experienced reactance while encountering similar persuasion messages will come to experience automatic resistance to performing the behavior upon encountering the words often contained in such persuasion messages. For instance, external events (e.g., “eat healthy” diet message) may have been paired with a feeling of resistance (“I won’t eat healthy”) frequently and consistently for people high on reactance. For these people, we hypothesize that indirect messages can be more effective than direct messages at promoting the target behavior because automatic resistance to performing the target behavior has not developed for indirect messages, yet such indirect messages are still strong enough to activate the target behavior. We tested our hypotheses in three studies.
Study 1 had a one-way between-subjects design with three levels (message: direct (diet), indirect (exercise), control). Participants completed a scrambled sentences task that exposed them to words related to diet, exercise, or neutral words. Then, they chose five snacks from a selection of five unhealthy and five healthy snacks. Results showed that the direct message and the indirect message led to more healthy snacks chosen compared to the control condition. More importantly, the indirect message led to more healthy snacks chosen than the direct message.

Study 2 had a 2 (message: direct (diet), indirect (exercise)) x continuous measured reactance between-subjects design. Participants completed a scrambled sentences task that exposed them to words related to diet or exercise. Then, they chose five snacks from a selection of five unhealthy and five healthy snacks. Finally, they completed an individual difference measure of reactance (Hong 1992; Hong and Faedda 1996). Results showed that the indirect message again led to healthier snack choices than the direct message. This effect was moderated by reactance, such that high reactance participants displayed this effect, whereas low reactance participants did not.

Study 3 had a 3 (message: direct (exercise), indirect (diet), control) x continuous measured reactance between-subjects design, which aimed to replicate the conceptual finding of study 2 in the exercise domain. Participants first completed a scrambled sentence task that exposed them to words that were diet-related, exercise-related, or neutral. Then, they chose three activities from a selection of three sedentary and three exercise activities. Finally, they completed a reactance scale (Hong 1992; Hong and Faedda 1996). Results revealed a significant two-way interaction, such that participants high in reactance resisted the direct message but not the indirect message or the neutral words in the control condition.

In sum, in the diet and exercise domains, an indirect message is more effective than a direct message at promoting the direct message’s target behavior for people high in reactance.

**Is Self-Serving Self-Serving? Who Serves Food Shapes Self-evaluation and Eating Decisions**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Eating meals that are served by someone else is commonplace: 50% of all meals are consumed away from the home, and two-thirds of Americans eat out at least every other day (Stewart, Blisard, and Jolliffe 2006). Being served offers convenience – but does it come at a cost for health? Indeed, consumers are aware of making more unhealthy choices when eating out (Gregory, Smith and Wendt 2011). In this research, we explore this phenomenon and investigate how one predominant feature of eating out, being served by someone else instead of serving oneself, might drive it. Based on the literatures of agency and self-serving attributions, we theorize that being more versus less physically involved in the act of serving food differentially affords self-serving attributions of responsibility for one’s food choices. Thereby, it may shape how consumers feel about themselves afterward, and even alter their portion-size choices beforehand.

A variety of consumer research has shown that consumption experiences and behavior can be significantly altered by the degree to which the consumer is active in the process (Botti and McGill 2006; Norton, Mochon, and Ariely 2012). Agency – the sense of controlling one’s actions – considerably influences judgment and decision-making, particularly by intensifying affective reactions (Botti and McGill 2011; Landman 1987). Accordingly, agency attributions are consequential and are often distorted in self-serving ways to protect a positive self-view (Campbell and Sedikides 1999; Miller and Ross 1975). People attribute responsibility for favorable outcomes to themselves but attribute responsibility for unfavorable outcomes to others (Arkin, Gleason, and Johnston 1976; Blaine and Crocker 1993). They also self-penalize less when they can explain away responsibility to other factors (Bandura, 1990), something especially pronounced in goal-domains (Dunning, Perie, and Story 1991).

One such important goal-domain for today’s consumer is healthy eating. Most people want to eat healthily, and eating is intricately linked with self-conscious feelings (e.g., many experience shame for eating indulgent foods) (Ramanathan and Williams 2007). We propose that being served unhealthy food by someone else (versus self-serving) affords an opportunity to reject responsibility and have more positive self-evaluative feelings as a result. Four studies show that (1) self-evaluative feelings following consumption are influenced jointly by the food’s healthiness and who served it; (2) this effect is mediated by feelings of responsibility; and (3–4) people adjust their food consumption in anticipation of this effect.

Study 1 established that healthiness and who serves interactively affect self-evaluative feelings. In a 2 (server: self/other) x 2 (healthiness: healthy/unhealthy) between-subjects design, participants imagined lunch in a cafeteria where they either served themselves or were served, and saw a photograph of their healthy or unhealthy dish. Subsequently, participants indicated how good, justified, guilty, and shameful they would feel after eating this meal, yielding an index for positive self-evaluative feelings. The analysis yielded a main effect for healthiness, with participants reporting significantly more positive self-evaluative feelings when they imagined eating healthy food versus unhealthy food. More important, however, this effect was qualified by the predicted interaction between healthiness and server. For healthy food, people had directionally more positive self-evaluative feelings when they imagined serving themselves than being served by another person. Conversely, for unhealthy food, people had more positive self-evaluative feelings when they imagined being served by others compared to self-serving.

Study 2 tested if this effect is mediated by attributions of responsibility for the plate of food as a function of who served and the food’s healthiness, based on the idea that self-serving may force consumers to accept, but being served may offer an opportunity to reject, responsibility. In a 2 (server) x 2 (healthiness) between-subjects design, participants imagined eating with friends who had cooked dinner where they served themselves [their friend served them], and saw a photograph of their healthy [unhealthy] dish. Subsequently, participants indicated how good, justified, guilty, and shameful they would feel after eating this meal, yielding an index for positive self-evaluative feelings. The analysis yielded a main effect for healthiness and who serves interacting jointly by the food’s healthiness and who serves; (2) this effect is mediated by feelings of responsibility; and (3–4) people adjust their food consumption in anticipation of this effect.

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Study 3 explored whether people’s preferences for who should serve food change as a function of the food’s healthiness. Participants imagined getting a healthy [unhealthy] snack and indicated their preference for serving themselves versus being served by their friend. The analysis revealed that for the unhealthy snack, preference shifted towards being served by the friend, compared to the healthy
snack. Consumers appear to have an intuition about the consequences of serving themselves unhealthy food.

Study 4 tested to what extent this intuition causes consumers to adjust how much food they allow themselves in a given context, depending on the food’s healthiness and the serving-arrangement. In a 2 (server) × 2 (healthiness) between-subjects design, participants envisioned purchasing a healthy [unhealthy] dessert at an establishment where they would self-serve [be served by a clerk]. They then selected one of eight serving-cup sizes. For portion-size choice, the analysis showed a main effect of server, such that those who expected to be served selected significantly larger portions than those who expected to self-serve. More important, this effect was qualified by the predicted interaction with healthiness. Consistent with our other studies, for a healthy dessert, people selected equal portion-sizes irrespective of who would serve. Contrastingly, for an unhealthy dessert, people selected a significantly larger portion when they expected to be served than when they expected to self-serve the dessert.

In combination, studies 3 and 4 showed that people have an intuition of the ramifications of different serving-arrangements and adjust their consumption of unhealthy food accordingly.

REFERENCES


Nudging Consumers in the Right Direction: Effective Interventions for Tackling Obesity

Chair: Hristina Dzhogleva, University of Pittsburgh, USA

**Paper #1: ‘Does This Tax Make Me Look Fat?’: Using Stigma-Inducing Labels to Decrease Unhealthy Food Consumption**

Avni Shah, Duke University, USA
James R. Bettman, Duke University, USA
Punam Anand Keller, Dartmouth College, USA
Peter Ubel, Duke University, USA

**Paper #2: Does Reducing Nutritional Information Complexity Promote Healthier Food Choices?**

Hristina Dzhogleva, University of Pittsburgh, USA
J. Jeffrey Inman, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Jim Maurer, Catalina Marketing Corporation, USA

**Paper #3: Promoting Portion Downsizing by Improving Consumer Response to Percentage Cost vs. Percentage Benefit Offers**

Bhavya Mohan, Harvard Business School, USA
Pierre Chandon, INSEAD, France
Jason Riis, Harvard Business School, USA

**Paper #4: Choosing to Participate: The Effects of Message Type on Enrollment and Participation**

Eleanor Putnam-Farr, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Jason Riis, Harvard Business School, USA

**SESSION OVERVIEW**

The United States is the most obese country in the developed world, with obesity rates already reaching epidemic proportions. About two thirds of adults and one third of children in the US are either overweight or obese. Moreover, obesity is considered to be one of the costliest plagues of the 21st century since it contributes significantly to the already high healthcare costs of the nation - obesity-related healthcare costs are expected to exceed $300B by 2018.

Past efforts to address the problem of obesity have been largely unsuccessful and public policy makers are looking for new initiatives that could prove helpful in curbing the obesity epidemic. Therefore, the four papers in this session (all in advanced stages of completion) offer interventions that have the potential to solve the obesity problem by tackling two of its leading causes – the increased consumption of unhealthy foods and the lack of physical activity.

The first three papers focus on ways in which consumers could be encouraged to make healthier food choices. Specifically, Shah, Bettman, Keller, and Ubel assess the effectiveness of economic and stigma-inducing interventions in reducing unhealthy food choice and consumption and show that stigma-inducing signals prove superior to economic interventions alone (‘unhealthy’ label versus 17.5% tax). The second paper by Dzhogleva, Inman, and Maurer examines how the ease-of-processing of nutritional information at the point of purchase impacts consumers’ food choices. The authors reveal that facilitating the understanding of nutritional information by disclosing nutritional facts in a simple manner helps consumers make healthier food decisions. Mohan, Chandon, and Riis study the moderating role of cognitive ability on consumers’ ability to objectively assess the value of percentage-based promotions. Importantly, the authors demonstrate that providing ratio-based rates nudges consumers away from obesogenic, higher-calorie percentage benefit offers (33% bonus size) in favor of healthier, lower-calorie percentage cost offers (33% price discount) that are also superior from a unit-price perspective. Finally, Putnam-Farr and Riis seek to combat the lack of physical activity part of the obesity problem and evaluate the effectiveness of different recruitment messages on enrollment and participation in a physical activity tracking program. Results show that active choice leads to higher enrollment and equally strong participation as opt-in; moreover, messages focused on intangible health benefits and non-quantified rewards lead to higher duration of participation than those emphasizing quantifiable rewards.

Using diverse methods (lab and field experiments, household shopping data) and offering the perspectives of diverse researchers and a practitioner, all papers in this session aim to make a difference in consumers’ lives by answering collectively the following question: How should we structure consumers’ choice environments such that they promote healthier choices? Thus, all papers converge around the common theme of nudging consumers in the right direction and helping them make decisions that would benefit their long-term wellbeing. We expect this session to be of great interest to a broad audience of researchers, consumers, public policy makers, and health practitioners interested not only in combating obesity but also in improving consumer welfare in general.

‘Does This Tax Make Me Look Fat?’: Using Stigma-Inducing Labels to Decrease Unhealthy Food Consumption

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Obesity and unhealthy food consumption are two of the largest public health concerns nationwide. Obesity rates have more than doubled in the past few decades. While there is debate regarding the cause of obesity, most research has argued that increased consumption of unhealthy food and beverages is a major driver of obesity (Chandon and Wansink 2007, 2011; Young and Nestle 2002). Many public health advocates have suggested that large-scale interventions are necessary to combat the epidemic. While there are proponents of increased nutrition education, others have suggested the use of a tax on unhealthy food and drinks.

Although an economic approach is one possible way to attenuate consumption of unhealthy food, will consumers even notice a price change? Are there other approaches that may be equally, if not more so effective? For example, an intervention that explicitly associates unhealthy food choices to an undesirable social identity may actually be more effective at reducing consumption. Consumer research has shown that individuals attribute a wide array of traits and characteristics such as social appeal, morality, and gender roles to others based on their food choices and consumption habits (Rozin et al. 2012). As a result, what one chooses to eat can have important implications for not only one’s sense of self but also impression management, social judgment, and status (Vartanian, Herman, and Polivy 2007). One of the most devalued and negative identities in social contexts is stigma, which Goffman (1963) characterized as one of the greatest social risks that reduces the stigma bearer “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (p. 3). Given that individuals are conscious of their social identity and strongly seek to avoid social stigmatization from engaging in negative or deviant behavior, it is surprising how little research has examined the influence of explicit stigma-inducing signals on how individuals make food choices, a major area of interest in public health. Using the context of food choice and consumption in a real-world social setting and in controlled lab experiments, we examined the unique and combined effect of economic and stigma-inducing interventions on food choice and consumption. We also investigated...
whether gender and social context (i.e., whether one dines with a friend or alone) moderated the effectiveness of these interventions. Finally, we examined whether self-construal differences between men and women, specifically independent self-construal versus interdependent self-construal, mediated the effectiveness of these interventions on unhealthy food choices.

In Experiment 1, we used a real-world restaurant context to test our initial hypotheses. Over a 16-day span we measured entrée choice and consumption (measured in grams) at a local, mid-priced tapas restaurant open from 4pm-midnight. We ran the study from Monday–Thursday for 4 weeks counterbalancing conditions (N=464 tables, 1063 people, 669 women). We used four different menus containing the same entrée items: Control (no unhealthy food tax or stigma label), Food Tax (17.5% price increase on unhealthy food items, no stigma label), Stigma Label (marked unhealthy items with an asterisk and an explicit ‘Unhealthy’ label, no food tax), Combined (unhealthy food tax plus stigma label). Stigma labels significantly reduced unhealthy entrée choice (p<0.01) and unhealthy food consumption (p<0.01) more than the food tax alone or the control group. The effect of unhealthy stigma labels was moderated by gender, where higher proportions of men at the table significantly increased unhealthy choices and consumption of unhealthy food (p<0.01).

In Experiments 2 and 3, we used a hypothetical food choice scenario to examine whether we could replicate our findings from the field in a more controlled laboratory setting. Experiment 2 tested whether gender moderated the effect of economic and stigma-inducing signals on food choices. An MTurk sample (N=1800) of men and women selected an entrée item from a hypothetical menu with six items (2 beef, 2 chicken, 2 fish, with 1 healthy and 1 unhealthy item within each food group). We used the same four menu conditions as Experiment 1. Replicating the field study, stigma labels are significantly more effective at reducing unhealthy food choices than an unhealthy tax alone or the control group (p=0.007). There was also a significant Gender X Food Tax X Stigma Label interaction (p=0.05): women chose healthier dishes when unhealthy items had a stigma label (p<0.01). Men and women selected more healthy items when unhealthy food was taxed and there was a stigma label (p<0.01).

In Experiment 3, we examined how dining with a same-sex friend influenced the interaction between gender and economic and stigma-inducing interventions on the proportion of individuals choosing an unhealthy menu option. In addition, Experiment 3 sought to investigate a potential mechanism for these effects. Specifically, using the same food choice scenario as Experiment 2, we examined whether self-construal differences between men and women mediated the effectiveness of economic and stigma-inducing interventions on unhealthy food choices. Men eating with other men chose more unhealthy options (p<0.01) while women eating with other women chose healthier options (p<0.01) in comparison to dining alone. Self-construal differences among men and women fully mediate the effects of the stigma label: Men chose more unhealthy items when there was an ‘Unhealthy’ label, the more they were concerned that others would think they were wimpy and less masculine, a more interdependent mindset. In contrast, women chose more healthy items when there was an ‘Unhealthy’ label, the more they felt uncomfortable by others and wanted distance from unhealthy individuals, a more independent mindset.

In the field and lab setting we demonstrate that increasing the tax on unhealthy items alone, even substantially by 17.5% is insufficient for reducing the proportion of individuals choosing an unhealthy entrée. A combination of food tax and a stigma label such as marking items as ‘Unhealthy’, significantly reduced unhealthy choice, regardless of gender and dining partner. We also demonstrate that interdependent/independent self-construal differences among men and women drive these effects. These studies have important practical implications and also demonstrate that social constructs such as stigma may moderate previous notions of gender and self-construal mindsets.

**Does Reducing Nutritional Information Complexity Promote Healthier Food Choices?**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

The Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) was one of the biggest efforts by policy makers to promote healthy eating among Americans. Unfortunately, it has failed to curb the obesity epidemic, so policy makers and marketers are seeking new ways to impact consumers’ dietary decisions. A recent trend among food retailers is to implement in-store nutrition scoring systems that communicate the nutritional value of foods in a simplified manner (e.g., Guiding Stars, NuVal). Our research examines whether facilitating the understanding of nutritional information through such nutrition scoring systems at the point of purchase helps consumers make healthier food choices.

Past research demonstrates that the complexity of understanding nutritional information has impeded consumers from making smarter food choices. Cohn et al. (2012) report that point-of-purchase calorie postings in restaurants are not effective in encouraging consumers to embrace healthier eating because consumers find it difficult to comprehend and use the provided information. This suggests that in order for nutritional information to be incorporated into consumers’ decisions, it does not have to be only available at the point of purchase but also easily “processable” (Bettman 1975; Russo 1975). Russo et al. (1986) argue that consumers face three types of costs in incorporating nutritional information into their food decisions: collection costs (time and efforts to acquire the information), computation costs (efforts in combining the gathered information into an overall evaluation), and comprehension costs (efforts to understand the nutritional information). Reducing all three costs leads to greater reliance on products’ nutritional content in making food choices (Russo et al. 1986).

Although the NLEA largely eliminated consumers’ collection costs, it had less impact on their computation and comprehension costs. Therefore, we propose that providing simpler and easy-to-process nutritional information which reduces all three types of costs will prove helpful in prompting consumers to purchase healthier foods. In other words, we anticipate that the nutrition content of shoppers’ purchases will be higher after the introduction of the nutritional scoring system than before the scores were available at the store (H1). We further predict that this effect will be stronger in categories with greater variability in the healthiness of the offered products (H2). In such categories consumers have a wider variety of products to switch to. Moreover, purchasing a healthy product from a mixed set of both relatively healthy and unhealthy alternatives provides consumers with greater utility than when such a purchase is made from a homogeneous opportunity set (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2012). We also propose that the effect in H1 will be stronger in healthier product categories (H3) because past research suggests that consumers are more likely to use nutritional information in categories which are perceived to be more nutritious (Brucks, Mitchell, and Staelin 1984). Finally, we anticipate that consumers who do not switch away from unhealthy foods after the introduction of the scoring system at the store will buy fewer items of those foods (H4).
We test our predictions using 12-months of individual shopper sales data for over 528K shoppers of a Northeast grocery chain. The data consists of 40.2M purchases in eight product categories: frozen pizza, ice-cream, salad dressing, soup, spaghetti sauce, tomatoes, granola bars, and yogurt. In early 2009, the grocery chain implemented the NuVal Nutritional Scoring System, which assigns each SKU a 1-100 score based on its nutritional value. Since the NuVal scores were displayed on the shelf tags, after their introduction, consumers could easily determine and understand the nutritional value of all foods. Our data contains information about consumers’ purchases before and after the NuVal introduction in the chain, allowing us to use the first 6 months as the baseline and assess its impact on consumers’ food choices using a quasi-experiment.

To test H1-H3, we estimate a hierarchical linear model in which shoppers’ purchases (level 1) are nested within the categories (level 2). The dependent variable is the average volume-weighted NuVal score of each shopper’s purchases (i.e., the nutrition content of shoppers’ purchases), which is predicted by the period (contrast coded: -1=pre-NuVal introduction; 1=post-NuVal introduction). We allow both the intercept and the slope of period to vary randomly across the eight different product categories (the level-2 units); moreover, the slope of period is specified as a function of two category-level variables – the perceived category healthiness and the variability in the healthiness of the offered products in each category. The perceived healthiness was obtained from a separate survey in which shoppers from an online panel were asked to rate the healthiness of the eight product categories on a 7-point scale (1=”Very Unhealthy,” 7=”Very Healthy”). The variability in the healthiness of the offered products is operationalized using the standard deviation of the NuVal scores of all products in the category. Both level-2 predictors are grand-mean centered.

Results support H1, revealing that the nutritious content of shoppers’ purchases in the post-NuVal introduction period was significantly higher than in the pre-NuVal period (p<.0001). Furthermore, in line with H2 and H3, the cross-level interactions of period with the two category-level predictors are significant (both p’s<.0001), suggesting that the effect of the nutrition scoring system on shoppers’ food choices was stronger in healthier categories and those with greater variability in the healthiness of the offered products.

To test H4, we estimate a separate two-level random-intercept, random-slope hierarchical linear model in which the change in total units purchased by each shopper (post – pre) is predicted by the change in the nutrition content (NuVal score) of the shopper’s purchases (post – pre). Results demonstrate that shoppers who did not improve the nutritious content of their purchases after the introduction of the scoring system at the store reduced the number of units they bought (p<.0001), thus supporting H4.

In sum, our work reveals that facilitating consumers’ understanding of nutritional information by disclosing nutritional facts in a simple and easy-to-process format can help them make healthier food decisions. Our findings have important practical implications for consumers, food manufacturers, grocery retailers, and public policy makers interested in combating obesity.

**Promoting Portion Downsizing by Improving Consumer Response to Percentage Cost vs. Percentage Benefit Offers**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Marketing communication, particularly in the domain of food, frequently contains percentage information about benefit changes (e.g., 50% larger food packages) or about cost changes (e.g., 50% price reduction). Nominally equivalent percentage changes to the cost versus the benefit associated with an offer are not economically equivalent in terms of cost/benefit or benefit/cost ratio. To compare two percentage changes in cost and benefit requires knowing whether x% is bigger or smaller than -x/(1+x)%; this comparison involves multiple arithmetic operations and is very difficult to do mentally, even in the simplest cases (e.g., +50% vs. -33%). Chen, Marmorstein, Tsiros, and Rao (2012) have shown that, when comparing offers with percentage information (e.g., a 50% quantity increase vs. a 33% price reduction, which has the same unit price consequence), consumers focus on the nominal percentage and fail to take into account the base levels of these percentages, a phenomenon that they called “base value neglect”.

Across four studies, we examine the robustness of the effect found for bonus packs vs. price changes by Chen, et al. (2012), and demonstrate the moderating roles of consumer goals (minimize cost, maximize benefit, or maximize value), cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005), and provision of a cost/benefit vs benefit/cost ratio (such as unit price) (Manning, Sprott, & Miyazaki, 2003; Larrick & Soll 2008). Study 1 asked participants to choose between a 33% quantity increase and a 33% price decrease (or a 33% quantity decrease and a 33% price increase) for their favorite brand of yogurt or ice cream. Overall, consumers were indifferent between the % price and % quantity offers, regardless of category and whether people were choosing between two gains or two losses. However, there was a strongly statistically significant interaction between outcome valence (gain or loss) and consumer goal (p<.001). For example, consumers who were seeking to minimize cost strongly preferred the 33% price decrease over the 33% quantity increase in the gain condition and strongly preferred the 33% quantity decrease to the 33% price decrease in the loss condition. We also find that the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) is a particularly good predictor of base value neglect because it captures the tendency to follow the intuitive (but wrong) answer instead of engaging in more effortful system-2 computation. Participants who scored above a 0 on the CRT test strongly preferred the economically-superior 33% price change over the 33% quantity change. Finally, we show that providing rate information such as price per unit reduces consumer errors when comparing percentage offers, regardless of CRT score. Participants who were exposed to the unit price were no longer indifferent, and strongly preferred the 33% price change over the 33% quantity change.

In the subsequent 3 studies, we demonstrate the moderating role of CRT, and the corrective effect of providing a ratio, across a variety of tasks and domains. In Study 2, we asked participants to rank printers by speed after taking account either a % change in pages per minutes (benefit) or a % change in the minutes (cost) needed to print a page. Once again, we find that those scoring high on the CRT test strongly preferred the economically-superior 33% price change over the 33% quantity change. Providing a ratio, in the form of pages per minute, also has a significant effect on participant accuracy (p<.01). Next, we examined whether the way a ratio is presented (cost/benefit vs. benefit/cost) influences a consumer’s likelihood of responding to the unit price implications of a cost versus a benefit percentage change. In Study 3, we asked participants to assess percent changes when comparing wireless plans, and manipulated the ratio type by providing either seconds/cents or cents/seconds. We find that people fail to realize that a percentage cost change is better than the opposite percentage benefit change, even when the cost and benefit base values are identical. Moreover, in the presence of a ratio, significantly more participants correctly chose the economically-
superior cost change when the ratio was framed as a cost/benefit as opposed to a benefit/cost, particularly when choosing between 2 losses. Finally, in Study 4 participants completed a word search puzzle at a given wage (6 cents/word), and subsequently chose between the following two payment options for completing a bonus puzzle: a 50% increase in the wage paid per word (9 cents/word), or a 50% decrease in the number of words needed to make the same wage (12 cents/word). Participants with a CRT score greater than zero, as well as participants given the unit wage, were more likely to make the economically optimal choice in this incentive compatible field experiment.

Our results suggest that marketers should frame their offers as a percentage benefit change, which produces the largest nominal percentage, rather than by the equivalent percentage cost change. In general however, framing offers as a percentage benefit change rather than a percentage cost change will lead consumers to suboptimal choices. There are practical implications for consumers making food choices when faced with percentage promotions without accompanying unit prices. If a consumer fails to comprehend that 35% price reduction is better than a 50% quantity bonus from a unit price perspective, they will tend to choose the larger portion, thus increasing the likelihood of overeating (Wansink, 1996; Young & Nesle, 2002). Conversely, consumers are less likely to choose a healthier but smaller portion (e.g., pastry made from real butter instead of palm oil) if someone points out that it is 50% smaller than the regular portion than if the comparison highlights that it is 35% more expensive. At the moment, unit prices are not mandatory for retail distribution in all US states and are never mandatory when accompanying percentage price promotions and in non-retail domains (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013). Thus, our findings have important implications for public policy. They reaffirm the effectiveness of providing unit price information, which is currently only mandatory in brick-and-mortar retailers (and not in restaurants, for example). We think that rate information, in particular unit prices, should be made mandatory everywhere and not just for brick and mortar retailers.

Choosing to Participate: The Effects of Message Type on Enrollment and Participation

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

As more services (including health services) move online, the development of communication strategies to maximize enrollment and engagement has become increasingly important. Programs like Boost (activity tracking) are increasingly used as relatively low cost ways to engage consumers and employees in activities that can improve healthy behaviors and reduce problems related to obesity and its associated diseases. While some research has shown that message framing and choice architecture can affect enrollment, these studies have usually taken place in a forced choice environment where the consumer’s attention is high. The reality is that most recruitment for most online services comes through email or other cluttered channels where attention is lower. Furthermore, engagement (or participation after enrollment) has rarely been examined, yet engagement is a major objective of services that require renewal, or for services that are designed specifically to help consumers manage their own behavior, particularly in the domain of health.

We address both of these issues in a large scale field experiment where over 17,000 employees of a large American company were invited to enroll and participate in an activity tracking program (Boost) and find strong benefits to active choice along with significant differences in participation resulting from the different message frames. Focusing on a high quantified reward is most effective for getting people’s attention, but it does not yield the best outcomes for participation. Thus, marketers who want to involve participants for the long term, such as in diet and exercise programs, would be best served by using an active choice frame which emphasizes a non-quantified reward.

While research on choice architecture has focused initially on the differences between opt-in and opt-out, a number of recent studies (e.g., Carroll et al. 2009; Keller et al. 2011) have started to include an active choice component, where participants are forced to choose between enrolling or not enrolling rather than being presented with a default. Active choice has generally been used synonymously with forced choice because the scenarios have forced participants to choose one or the other option (usually a yes/no for enrollment), yet forced choice opportunities are relatively rare under most recruitment situations.

Despite the knowledge among researchers that expected rewards can have a deleterious effect on intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999), practitioners continue to use rewards as a means of attracting participants due to their strong immediate impact. We contrast the effects of rewards (both quantified and non-quantified) on enrollment and participation to demonstrate the differing short term and long term effects and to highlight the potentially negative consequences of quantifying rewards when aiming to promote long term engagement.

Participants (N = 17,093) were recruited for participation in an activity tracking program run by RedBrick Health and were assigned to one of seven message conditions in a randomized field experiment. All participants were given the same introductory text with basic information about the health and rewards benefits of participating in the activity tracking program. All participants were eligible for $2 per day that they tracked at least 30 minutes of activity, with a quarterly maximum of $125 (other programs also provided rewards). All participants had previously completed a health assessment survey as the basis for program eligibility.

Participants in the control condition were given a standard opt-in message with a link to the enrollment page. The 6 treatment conditions were constructed by crossing two between subject factors pertaining to the yes/no response options. The first factor was message type (3 conditions) whereby different benefits of the program were emphasized. One message focused on health benefits (health), the second focused on the rewards (non-quantified rewards), and the third quantified the rewards (quantified rewards). The second factor was the strength of the “no” option (strong versus weak – 2 conditions). The strong “no” option included a reference to the lost benefit, while the weak “no” condition did not. For example, participants in the health condition all saw the following “yes” text: “Yes, I would like to participate in the Boost tracking program. I want to track my activities to help improve my health” and one of the following “no” options: [STRONG] No, I do not want to participate in the Boost tracking program because tracking my activities to improve my health is not important to me at this time. [WEAK] No, I do not want to participate in the Boost tracking program.

We found that all six active choice messages prompted higher enrollment than opt-in. Despite the expectation that the repetition of benefits in the strong no would increase loss aversion, we found no difference between the strong and weak no. Once enrolled, we found that there were no significant overall differences between opt-in and active choice in terms of their duration or frequency of participation, leading to an overall strongly positive relationship between receiving an active choice email and participation in the program.
Looking at the messages by type, we found that rewards and health were both equally effective in terms of duration of participation, but quantification of the rewards message resulted in lower average duration of participation. This lower average duration is driven by a substantially higher proportion of participants who drop out in the first two weeks after enrollment (25% versus 15% in the non-quantified reward condition). We hypothesize that the $125 message sets a high target and that a lower than expected rate of rewards accumulation in the first two weeks results in demoralization and abandonment. Further work (analysis and follow up experiments) is underway to determine the exact mechanism.

This paper provides insights to managers interested in recruiting participants to programs where their active engagement is an important objective. Involving participants by means of an active choice makes them more aware of the potential benefits of a program that they might otherwise ignore, but marketers should beware that setting a high target for achievement might result in abandonment of the program if participants do not see early success.

REFERENCES


Making a Difference with Metal Pieces: New Findings on Seeing, Possessing, and Losing Money

Chairs: Yuwei Jiang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
Nicole L. Mead, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Paper #1: Monetary Reminders Lead to Exchange Orientation and Emotion Suppression
Yuwei Jiang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
Zhansheng Chen, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Paper #2: Monetary Cues Alter Interpersonal Harmony Because They Activate an Exchange-Orientation
Nicole L. Mead, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Eugene M. Caruso, University of Chicago, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Roy F. Baumeister, Florida State University, USA

Paper #3: To Tip or Not to Tip: Emotional and Monetary Tradeoffs in Tipping
Ayelet Gneezy, University of California, San Diego, USA
Nina Mazar, University of Toronto, Canada

Paper #4: Going, Going, Gone: Hidden Hormonal Influences on Loss Aversion
Ashley Rae, University of Texas – San Antonio, USA
Kristina M. Durante, University of Texas – San Antonio, USA
Vladas Griskevicius, University of Minnesota, USA
Stephanie M. Cantu, University of Minnesota, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumption is constituted as the final purchase of goods or services by individuals. Money, as an extremely efficient medium of exchange, is probably the most common consumption tool. And yet, despite its everyday use as a tool, consumers’ representation and reaction to money extends far beyond what one would expect from a tool. Instead, money is deeply embedded and intertwined in consumers’ minds, so much so that it produces dramatic changes in people’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Although recent research has greatly advanced the field’s understanding of money, two large and very important theoretical questions linger: 1) how does every day use of money change human behavior and society? This special session brings together a novel and diverse set of findings that, collectively, provide fresh insight into these questions by examining various manners of interacting with money: seeing, possessing, and losing money.

The first two papers focus on the first question and show that subtle monetary cues trigger an exchange relationship-style, which in turn accounts for some of the downstream consequences of monetary reminders. The first paper, by Jiang, Chen, and Wyer, investigates the relationship between monetary reminder and people’s emotional expression. Five experiments show that the concept of money activates an exchange relationship orientation, and consequently leads to increased negative attitudes toward expressing emotions, decreased expression of emotion when describing events, exaggerated perceptions of others’ emotions, and decreased willingness to interact with people who express strong emotions. The second paper, by Mead, Caruso, Vohs, and Baumeister, builds on the first paper by examining how monetary reminders affect interpersonal interactions. Three experiments provide novel evidence that merely being exposed to monetary cues drives people to apply money-market norms to social relationships, regardless of the situational norm. And this heightened exchange orientation can hamper interpersonal relationships when situations call for communal norms.

The third and fourth papers address the second major question. The third paper, by Gneezy and Mazar, focuses on the influence of monetary possession on the way consumers tip. Three experiments show that under some circumstances, when not having enough cash to reciprocate the quality of the received service, customers ironically end up tipping bad service (to punish) but not good service (to not insult). The last paper, by Rae, Durante, Griskevicius, and Cantu, studies the fear of losing money from an evolutionary perspective. Four studies reveal that hormonal fluctuations associated with ovulation lead women to become less loss averse but only when a product does not serve to enhance attractiveness.

Together, these papers shed light on how the mere exposure to money, possession of money, and aversion of losing money affect human behavior. We believe this symposium will advance the field’s understanding of the psychology of money and, as such, will be of interest to a broad audience at the ACR conference.

Monetary Reminders Lead to Exchange Orientation and Emotion Suppression

EXERTED ABSTRACT
The mere exposure to money, independently of the context of any goal to which it might be relevant, increases individuals’ motivation to be socially independent and decreases their sensitivity to others’ needs (Vohs, Mead and Goode 2006; 2008). Thus, thinking about money may dispose individuals to view themselves as being more in an exchange relationship with others (Clark and Mills 1979) in which interpersonal interactions are considered in impersonal, transactional terms. Transactions in such a relationship are governed by quid pro quo without regard for idiosyncratic needs of the parties involved. Given that emotions are used to convey information about needs of the senders (Ekman 1993), the expression of emotion is likely to be considered irrelevant and even inappropriate in such a relationship and, therefore, is likely to be suppressed. Our research evaluated implications of this general hypothesis. Five experiments showed that subtle reminders of money can influence people’s disposition toward exchange versus communal relationships, their willingness to express emotion, and their reactions to others’ expression of emotions.

Experiment 1 was conducted online through Amazon’s mTurk website. After exposure to money- vs. control-themed pictures, participants finished items concerned the desirability of expressing emotions and the exchange and communal relationship orientation scale (Mills and Clark 1994). Data showed that activating the concept of money decreases participants’ favorability towards expressing emotions, and this effect is mediated by the increased exchange (vs. communal) relationship orientation of money-primed participants.

Experiment 2 investigated more directly the hypothesis that reminding individuals of money would lead them to suppress their emotions. Participants were first primed with either money or control
concept through a sentence unscrambling task (Vohs et al. 2006). Next, in an ostensibly unrelated task, participants were instructed to imagine that their newly purchased laptop had broken down and they were dissatisfied with how this issue was handled by the company. They further imagined that they had decided to write a negative product review to complain about the incident on a popular online forum. After participants wrote the reviews, independent raters who were blind to our hypothesis read the reviews and rated the emotions expressed in the review. As expected, the complaints participants in the money-primed conditions wrote were less angry and less negative than those of participants in control conditions.

Experiment 3 extended our findings to the suppression of positive emotions. In addition, if priming money really leads people to suppress their emotions, they should have relatively poorer performance on a subsequent task that requires cognitive resources than control participants should (Heatherton and Vohs 2000). We also tested this possibility. After performing the money vs. control priming task as in Experiment 1, participants watched a funny movie clip and then they were asked to describe the movie in writing to future audience. After finishing this writing task, participants performed an anagrams task similar to that used by Vohs (2006) to assess resource depletion. Specifically, participants were given five unsolvable anagrams and the time they spent on the task before giving up was assessed. Results are consistent with our predictions. Participants had significantly less intense emotional reactions to the movie (measured by both self-reports and independent ratings of their writing) when they had been primed with money than when they had not. More importantly, participants also persisted less long on the unsolvable anagrams task if they had been primed with money then if they had not, suggesting that they were suppressing their emotions (thus resource depleted) in the former condition.

People tend to believe that others are likely to behave the same way they personally behave under similar circumstances (Marks and Miller 1987). If people who have been primed with money suppress their emotions, they are likely to expect others to do so as well, and they are likely to perceive persons who do not conform to these expectations as conveying more extreme emotions than they otherwise would. Experiment 4 confirmed this prediction. After completed the sentence unscrambling task as we used in Experiment 2, participants were shown pictures portraying people with happy or sad expressions and they were asked to judge the intensity of the emotion conveyed by each picture. Results showed that money-primed participants rated the emotional expressions shown in the pictures as more intense than control participants did.

If being reminded of money decreases individuals' belief that personally expressing emotion is desirable, it is also likely to affect their belief about others' emotional expressions in a similar way. Thus it should decrease individuals' willingness to interact with others who display intense emotions. In Experiment 5, after completed the sentence unscrambling task to prime money or control concept, undergraduate participants were shown faces with happiness, anger, or neutral expressions. Participants were told that each picture portrayed an incoming foreign exchange student and were asked to indicate the extent to which they would want (a) know more about the person, (b) to meet the person, and (c) to make friends with the person. As expected, money-primed participants were less inclined than control participants to interact with both the person who expressed happiness and the person who expressed anger, but not the person who had a neutral expression.

In sum, our findings suggest that, as the major medium of exchange, the concept of money activates an exchange relationship orientation, in which people view both their own and others' expressions of emotion less favorably. Consequently it led them to have more negative attitudes toward expressing emotions themselves (Experiment 1), decreased their expressions of emotion when describing both a negative event and a positive one (Experiments 2 and 3), led them to interpret others' emotional expressions as more extreme (Experiment 4) and decreased their willingness to interact with person who express strong emotions (Experiment 5).

**Monetary Cues Alter Interpersonal Harmony Because They Activate an Exchange-Orientation**

Consumers coordinate their interactions with others – be it salesclerks, supervisors, or spouses – by drawing from a small set of psychological scripts that serve to guide social interactions (e.g., Clark and Mills 1979; Fiske 1991). Throughout human history, communal relationships were the basis of social life (e.g., Fiske 1991). However, the introduction of money ushered in a new relational style that is characterized by a desire to track and optimize the ratio between costs and benefits. This relational style is called market-pricing mode (Fiske 1991) or exchange orientation (Clark and Mills 1979) and it may be unique to humans. Theoretically, communal and exchange orientations are diametrically opposed to one another (Fiske 1991), which led us to hypothesize that the previously unexplained link between money and hampered social harmony could be explained by exchange orientation. We tested this hypothesis in three experiments by varying whether participants were exposed to the concept of money; subsequent changes in relational-style and interpersonal harmony were measured.

Experiment 1 served as a basic test of the hypothesis that the mere minder of money activates a preference for exchange relationships (vs. communal relationships). After completing a set of filler questionnaires in front of a money or neutral poster (green lettuce), participants were led to believe they would complete a workload-sharing task with another participant. When participants received this task (a number search task), it had been half completed in red ink, ostensibly by the partner. The dependent measure was the pen color that participants chose to complete the task (red and blue were both available on their desk in counterbalanced order). Because using a different color pen makes each person’s work distinct and accountable, choosing a blue pen would be reflective of an exchange orientation. In contrast, because using the same pen color would lead to the sharing of the work and rewards, choosing the red (same) color of pen would reflect a desire for a communal relationship (cf. Clark and Mills 1979). As predicted, participants reminded of money were more likely to choose a different color pen than participants not reminded of money. Hence, the results of experiment 1 suggest that the mere reminder of money is sufficient to activate an exchange orientation.

It is possible that participants reminded of money chose a different pen color for reasons other than a desire to track each person’s contribution, such as a desire for uniqueness or a curiosity about one’s own performance. To rule out these alternative accounts we conducted a follow-up experiment. An additional goal of experiment 2 was to test the hypothesis that money reminders cause people to misapply market-norms to the social relationships. In other words, activating a money market can trump a social market (see also Heyman and Ariely 2004).

The design of Experiment 2 was a 2 (money descramble task vs. neutral descramble task) X 2 (money market vs. social market) between-subjects design. Participants thought they would complete a number search task with a partner, and that performance would gar-
ner rewards. In the social-market condition, participants were told that each answer would result in the donation of 25 grams of rice to malnourished children. In the money-market condition, each answer would result in 25 cents. As predicted, a significant money X market interaction emerged. Participants reminded of money reported a stronger desire to track performance relative to neutral participants, but only in the social market condition. In the money-market condition, there was no effect of the money manipulation. Hence, neutral participants were generally sensitive to the situational market norm, and they altered their behavior accordingly. However, people reminded of money preferred a money-market orientation, and they applied these money-market norms regardless of the overarching context. As expected, no significant effects emerged when predicting desire for uniqueness or desire for knowledge about one’s performance.

Experiment 3 tested the full theoretical model: money reminders strain interpersonal harmony because they conjure up an exchange orientation. Additionally, experiment 3 sought to rule out the possible alternative explanation that money is operating through a change in power. As in experiment 2, we varied the situational norm. After completing a money or neutral descramble task, participants completed measures of exchange orientation (Mills and Clark 1994) and a power subscale (Cassidy and Lynn 1989). The dependent measure was willingness to engage in conversation topics that were pre-rated to be positive for interacting with a new friend (communal relationship) and supervisor (exchange relationship). Overall, results supported predictions. When chatting with a new friend, reminders of money reduced willingness to engage in conversation topics that facilitate the growth and intimacy of a new friendship. Additionally, this effect was fully mediated by exchange orientation. Also consistent with hypotheses, in the exchange context, there was no effect of the money manipulation on willingness to engage in positive conversation topics. Consistent with previous work (Vohs, Mead, and Goode 2008) feelings of power did not shift as a function of the money reminder. Hence, power cannot account for the current findings.

In sum, three experiments provide novel evidence that merely being exposed to monetary cues evokes a shift in people’s relational style. More specifically, having money on the mind caused people to apply money-market norms to social relationships, regardless of the situational norm. Thus, when situations call for exchange norms, people with money on the mind may be fine. However, when situations call for communal norms, people with money on the mind may go awry.

To Tip or Not to Tip: Emotional and Monetary Tradeoffs in Tipping

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Imagine experiencing great service in a cash-only tipping environment, following which you realize you don’t have enough cash to reciprocate the quality of the service. What do you do?

Although tipping norms vary by culture, they are commonly used to promote efficiency by allowing consumers to reciprocate service workers’, such as waiters’ and taxi cab drivers’, efforts. The rule of thumb is that the better the service the higher the tip. Consequently, very low tips are more likely to be associated with poor service.

This paper investigates a tipping paradox and shows that consumers that experience good service would rather not tip at all when the only other alternative is to tip very low. Thus, when not having enough cash, good service providers can end up economically “punished.” We present evidence from three experiments.

Experiment 1

Participants (N=552) were asked to imagine having dinner in a nice restaurant that only accepts cash tips. Using a between-participants design, we manipulated the described behavior of the waiter (3 levels: rude, control, nice) and the tipping options available to the participants (2 levels: $0.25 vs. $0; $7 vs. $0). Participants reported their tipping decision, how they felt about it, the extent to which they cared not to offend the waiter, whether they thought that tipping something was better than nothing, and indicated which of the two tipping alternatives (tip the available cash vs. not tip) they considered more offensive to the waiter and more embarrassing to themselves.

Not surprisingly, when having $7 (an amount considered more appropriate for the tip), participants were significantly more likely to tip the nice (96%) and control (89%) waiter than the rude waiter (52%). Interestingly, when having only 25 cents in their wallet, participants were as likely to tip the nice (49%) and control (41%) waiters as they were to tip the rude waiter (40%). Furthermore, while participants in the $7 conditions felt relatively good about their tipping decisions, for those in the $0.25 conditions, only participants in the rude condition felt good about their decision but those in the nice and control conditions felt significantly worse. A follow up analysis revealed that those with only 25 cents in their pockets did not feel that tipping something was better than nothing. In fact, particularly those in the nice and control conditions were concerned that a 25 cents tip would be offensive to the waiter and indicated feeling embarrassed about leaving such a tip.

Together, these results contradict the general social norm that the better the service level the more tipping and is also in contradiction of the standard economic assumption that some money is better than none.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 2, we tested whether we could reverse participants’ decision not to tip a good service provider by providing them information regarding that person’s expectations. We asked participants (N=126) to imagine using complimentary transportation offered by their car dealership and that their driver was nice and courteous. Participants were then asked to choose one of three tipping options: $1 Tip (very low), $20 Tip (very high), or No Tip. Using a four condition between-participants design we manipulated the driver’s tipping expectations to be high ($6-$10), low ($1-$5), asked the participants to deliberate on the drivers tipping expectations (Own Reference) or did not provide any instructions/information with regards to the driver’s tipping expectations (No Reference).

As predicted, our expectation manipulation had a significant effect on participants’ decisions (χ²(3)=12.21, p<.01). Specifically, participants in the Low Reference condition were more likely (67.7%) to tip $1 relative to the High Reference (27.3%), No Reference (39.4%), and Own Reference (34.5%) participants. Participants in the later three groups did not differ in their likelihood to tip $1.

These results add another layer to our investigation by showing that when the social norms are changed, by making a low tip acceptable, participants were more likely to tip $1. Experiment 3 was designed to test if we could replicate our findings if we restricted participants’ tipping alternatives to tipping a low amount versus not tipping at all and to see if we could find more direct evidence for the underlying psychological process.

Experiment 3

Participants (N=305) were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: High Reference, Low reference, and Con-
control (i.e. No Reference). The first part of the scenario was identical to the one used in Experiment 2. Following the scenario participants were asked to choose between two options: Tip $1 or Not Tip and then answered a battery of questions that tapped into the underlying process.

Similar to participants in Experiment 2, participants’ tipping decisions were affected by the driver’s expectation, \( \chi^2(2)=8.99, p=.01 \). Participants were more likely to tip the driver $1 when the tip expectation was low (92.1%) than when it was high (77.5%), and when there was no tip expectation information (82.4%). A critical component in our framework is the notion that the tipping decision might be mediated by beliefs about economic value, offensiveness to the provider, or embarrassment to oneself when tipping $1 versus nothing. Our analyses revealed that the reference condition only had a significant effect on beliefs about economic value and the offensiveness of tipping $1 (versus nothing) to the service provider (all other measures were non-significant). Follow-up analyses revealed that regressing the decision to tip on both, the tipping reference condition and as potential mediators, the belief about economic value and the offensiveness to the service provider, respectively, each of the two potential mediator variables had a significant effect on the decision to tip and rendered the effect of the tipping reference condition insignificant. Finally, none of our measures, except for gender, moderated the effect of the tipping reference condition on the decision to tip $1 or nothing.

Together our findings are important to our understanding of social preferences and the way they are affected by individuals’ concerns for others’. Considered at a broader perspective, these results propose our concern for others’ emotions may triumph basic norms and conventions.

**Going, Going, Gone: Hidden Hormonal Influences on Loss Aversion**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Loss aversion is the tendency to be more sensitive to losses than comparable gains. Research has converged on the robustness of loss aversion in human psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), yet little research has investigated how biological factors influence intra-individual differences in loss aversion. The current research examined whether women’s sensitivity to loss aversion is influenced by a universal biological factor – the monthly ovulatory cycle.

The ovulatory cycle spans, on average, 28 days, during which a woman can become pregnant only during the week long ovulatory phase of the cycle. Research has shown that ovulation can non-consciously alter women’s psychology. For instance, ovulating women report less commitment to their current romantic partner (Durante and Li 2009; Gangestad, Thornhill, and Garver 2002) and are particularly attracted to men other than their partner who display markers of genetic fitness (e.g., physical attractiveness, masculinity, social dominance; Durante et al. 2012). Consequently, women are more likely to cheat on their partner near ovulation (Bellis and Baker 1990; Garver-Apgr et al. 2006). Because ovulating women become less committed to their current partner and are more likely to engage in behaviors that could threaten their relationship, we predicted that women might exhibit less loss aversion near ovulation. Thus, we investigated whether ovulating women’s decreased commitment to their current partner translates to the marketplace.

Study 1 tested ovulating women’s response to losing hypothetical amounts of money and consumer products. Ovulating and non-ovulating women were asked to indicate how unpleasant losing money in increments of $5, $10, $15, $20, and $25, as well a pair of running shoes and a laptop (α=.74). Results revealed that ovulating women were significantly less loss averse than women who were not ovulating (M_{ovulating} = 3.07 vs. M_{not ovulating} = 5.55).

Study 2 examined how ovulation influenced selling price in an actual marketplace exchange. A high selling price indicates that a consumer places a higher value on the product and greater upset associated with losing that product (Aggarwal and Zhang 2006). In Study 2, women came into the lab once on a high fertility day (near ovulation) and again on a low fertility day. The sessions were counterbalanced and ovulation was confirmed via urinalysis. This methodology provides the most precise measure of ovulation and also allows us to examine behavioral change within the same woman across the cycle. At each session, women were given a coffee mug or a picture frame to keep. Women were told the mug (or frame) was $5.00. Later in the testing session women were told that another participant in the same study was interested in buying the mug (or frame), and the participants were asked to indicate at what price they would be willing to sell the mug to the other participant. Results showed that women who had a significantly lower selling price when they were ovulating compared to when they were not ovulating (M_{ovulating} = $6.59 vs. M_{not ovulating} = $8.46). This suggests that women are less loss averse near ovulation.

Study 3 examined the mechanism responsible for the effect of ovulation on loss aversion. Because ovulation leads women to become less committed to their current partner to facilitate greater sexual receptivity to men with markers of genetic fitness (Garver-Apgr et al. 2006), Study 3 attempted to suppress the effect of ovulation on loss aversion by manipulating a mating goal. To do this, women imagined they were on a date with a boyfriend who was described as handsome, confident, affectionate, and loving. The manipulation was designed to endow women with a partner who met the criteria of a man high in genetic fitness and effectively increase women’s desire to commit to one partner. After exposure to either the mate retention or a control condition, women were asked to indicate the price they would be willing to pay for a hypothetical gym membership and the price they would be willing to sell the membership. We predicted that the mate retention condition would suppress the effect of ovulation by reinstating loss aversion for ovulating women. As predicted, there was a larger discrepancy between the sell price and buy price for ovulating women in the mate retention prime condition (M_{sell-buy} = $40) compared to ovulating women in the control condition (M_{sell-buy} = $6). There was no difference in sell and buy prices across conditions for women who were not ovulating. Results suggest that women’s decreased level of commitment to a romantic partner near ovulation is the psychological mechanism that underlies the effect of ovulation on loss aversion. Increasing women’s desire to commit to one man in the mate retention condition effectively suppressed the effect of ovulation on loss aversion.

Will ovulation always lead women to become less loss averse? Previous research finds that ovulating women desire to look more attractive and choose clothing and accessories that are sexier (Durante et al. 2008; Durante et al. 2011; Haselton et al. 2007). Thus, ovulating women might display increased loss aversion if the product serves an attractiveness-enhancement function. To investigate this possibility, in Study 4, women were given a coffee mug and lipstick palette and asked to indicate their selling price. Results replicated Study 2, and showed that ovulating women had a significantly lower selling price for the coffee mug compared to women who were not ovulating (M_{ovulating} = $6.09 vs. M_{not ovulating} = $8.89). However, when women were asked to indicate at what price they would be willing to sell the lipstick palette, ovulating women had a significantly higher...
selling price compared to women who were not ovulating (M\(_{\text{ovulating}}\) = $11.54 vs. M\(_{\text{not ovulating}}\) = $9.10). This suggests that women are less loss averse near ovulation only for products that do not serve an attractiveness-enhancement function.

This research adds to the literature on loss aversion and provides further evidence of how biological factors such as hormones can influence robust psychological phenomena commonly studied in marketing and decision research.

REFERENCES


Effects of Self-Affirmation on the Personal Self and the Interpersonal Self

Chairs: Ji Kyung Park, University of Delaware, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #1: Broadening Perspective, Changing Narratives, and Improving Academic Performance: The Effects of Values Affirmation Interventions
David K. Sherman, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
Kimberly A. Hartson, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
Kevin R. Binning, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

Paper #2: The Multifaceted Role of Affect in Self-Affirmation Effects
William M. P. Klein, National Cancer Institute and University of Pittsburgh, USA
Peter R. Harris, University of Sussex, UK
Rebecca Ferrer, National Cancer Institute, USA

Sara Kim, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Ann L. McGill, University of Chicago, USA

Paper #4: Self-Affirmation has the Power to Offset the Harmful Effects of Money Reminders
Ji Kyung Park, University of Delaware, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

The theme of ACR 2013 is “Making a Difference.” One of the most functional approaches to making a difference in the self is to incorporate feedback from the environment in a healthy, instructive manner and modify the self accordingly. Nevertheless, all too often dismissiveness and defensiveness get in the way of such personal growth.

One process that repeatedly and robustly has been shown to open people up to unflattering feedback and turn their attention toward others’ wants and needs is self-affirmation. The papers in this session delve into the promise for self-affirmation to bring about positive self-change.

Self-affirmation refers to processes that bolster a global sense of self-integrity (Steele 1988). Self-affirmation manipulations remind people of important aspects of the self, enabling them to view events from a reasonable, considered, rational view (Sherman and Hartson 2011). By enhancing the psychological resources of self-integrity, self-affirmation reduces defensive responses to threatening information and events, leading to positive outcomes in various areas such as psychological and physical health, education, prejudice and discrimination, and social conflicts (Sherman and Cohen 2006).

Although studied extensively by social psychologists, self-affirmation has only just begun to receive attention from consumer researchers. This session provides an overview of self-affirmation theory, and discusses why self-affirmation is beneficial to consumers’ personal and interpersonal well-being. The first two papers provide new evidence and insights on underlying processes that help explain how self-affirmation benefits the self under threat. The next two papers propose that self-affirmation enables people to transcend concerns about the self in order to care about others.

First, Sherman, Hartson, and Binning report results from a longitudinal field experiment involving minority students and the experience of academic threat. The authors find that self-affirmation alters the students’ narrative explanations about events and in doing so changes their perspective about threats. Self-affirmed (vs. not affirmed) students viewed threatening events within a larger view of the self and construed events at a more abstract level, with the result being that they were less undermined by identity threat. This new model has the potential to change the way that scholars think about self-affirmation in offering new mechanisms for how it works - while elucidating one of the most powerful and straightforward ways that consumers can ‘make a difference’ in themselves.

Second, Klein, Harris, and Ferrer examine how self-affirmation influences and is moderated by negative affect. They show that self-affirmation when combined with the experience of health-related threats increases the negative emotions of worry and anxiety (about getting breast cancer after reading an article linking alcohol consumption with breast cancer risk). These specific negative emotions consequently promote behavioral changes. Further, the authors find that affect moderates the effects of self-affirmation. Negative affect such as anger and sadness impairs the effectiveness of self-affirmation, whereas general positive affect enhances the effects of self-affirmation. In tying self-affirmation to specific and theoretically-derived forms of affect, this paper opens up new avenues for understanding how health-related messages should be constructed.

Third, in continuing with the theme of negative emotions and affirmation, Kim and McGill propose that self-affirmation enhances caring about others’ negative feelings. They find that self-affirmation increases people’s willingness to spread negative word of mouth (WOM) on behalf of others who are angry about product failures. Yet, affirmation decreases willingness to spread negative WOM about one’s own negative experiences. These outcomes occur because a broader view resulting from self-affirmation reinforces social connections, enhancing the importance of others’ negative feelings. However, such a broad self-view uncouples the self from threat, mitigating the importance of one’s own negative feelings.

Finally, Park and Vohs show that self-affirmation offsets the harmful effect of money priming on the interpersonal self. Money priming, which enhances the self-sufficiency orientation, has been found to reduce helpfulness toward others and requests for help, and to enhance tendencies to separate the self from others. The authors show that self-affirmation reduces such adverse money priming effects, and helps people become more sensitive to interpersonal needs. This work points to the power of self-affirmation while raising fresh and interrogating questions about the psychology of money as well.

These four presentations propose different effects of self-affirmation under various contexts such as identity threats, health threats, product failures, and money priming, which can significantly affect consumers’ well-being. By focusing on the effect of self-affirmation on the personal self (Sherman, Hartson and Binning; Klein and Harris) and the interpersonal self (Kim and McGill; Park and Vohs), the presentations proposed here paint a picture of how affirming the self impacts consumers. This presentation will be of interest to researchers studying goal-attainment, self-regulation, information processing, word of mouth, and prosocial behavior — and anyone interested in one of the most effective ways that consumers can “Make a Difference.”
Broadening Perspective, Changing Narratives, and Improving Academic Performance: The Effects of Values Affirmation Interventions

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Research on self-affirmation theory has repeatedly shown that brief interventions designed to affirm the self-concept can produce lasting benefits on a variety of behavioral outcomes, including academic performance. However, the question of what causes these effects is the topic of continued research attention. The purpose of the present talk is to summarize self-affirmation theory, to present a general model to explain the effects of values affirmations (Sherman & Hartson, 2011), and to introduce new evidence from two values affirmation intervention studies that supports this model.

Self-affirmation theory evolved from an alternative explanation for cognitive dissonance phenomena (Steele, 1988; see also Aronson, Cohen, & Nair, 2009; Stone & Cooper, 2001) to an intervention strategy employed in a wide range of settings (see Harris & Epton, 2009; Garcia & Cohen, 2012 for reviews). Its core idea is that people have a general motivation to maintain self-integrity—that is, the perception of one’s self as efficacious, consistent, and good (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). In the face of threats to one’s self-integrity, people behave in ways that serve to protect the self-concept. For example, when faced with the threat of confirming negative stereotypes about one’s group (i.e., stereotype threat), people may defensively disengage from the domain rather than risk confirming the stereotype. However, when global perceptions of self-integrity are affirmed, for example, via a writing task that reminds people of an important personal value, otherwise threatening information may lose its capacity to threaten the self. After completing values affirmations, individuals feel, both to themselves and to others, as though the task of maintaining self-integrity is settled. Consequently, they can focus on other demands in the situation beyond ego protection—for example—the academic tasks at hand in a school environment.

Sherman and Hartson (2011) proposed a model that seeks to explain the cognitive processes by which affirmation exercises may exert their influence. Specifically, affirming important values is proposed to augment the psychological resources available to an individual to confront a threat. That is, self-affirmation allows people to experience threatening events and information within a broader, larger view of the self. Self-threats, when viewed in the context of this enhanced perception of self-resources, can be seen from a broader perspective. This broader perspective changes people’s narrative of their ongoing experience, such that the threat does not affect, to the same extent, their overall evaluations of themselves. In the context of a focal threat, the general attenuation of concern about self-evaluation can lead to attenuated stress responses, and improved performance. And to the extent that these effects shape enduring narratives of experience and initiate (or interrupt) recursive processes, they can lead to long-term psychological changes.

Evidence supporting this model comes from recent investigations in other laboratories (e.g., Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Waksnak & Trope, 2009; Logel & Cohen, 2011) and two recent studies we have conducted, each featuring a longitudinal field experiment in a mixed-ethnicity middle school. These studies examined the achievement gap between Latino American and European American students and whether a values affirmation writing exercise could attenuate this gap, and the processes by which this attenuation occurs.

In Study 1, students completed multiple self-affirmation (or control) activities as part of their regular class assignments (in procedures modified from Cohen et al., 2006; 2009). The manipulation did not affect the grades of White students, but Latino American students, the identity threatened group, had higher grades in the affirmation than control condition as assessed by core course GPA over the academic year. Examination of quarter by quarter performance indicates that the affirmation elevated Latino American students’ trajectory. The results persisted for three years, the period of examination, and persisted despite approximately 2/3 of the sample moving on to high school. The long-term effects of Study 1 suggest that students’ narratives of their ongoing experiences changed, and that they took this new “story” with them into the new environment (cf. Wilson, 2011).

To provide more direct evidence as to how affirmation shaped students’ narratives of their ongoing academic experience, Study 2 featured daily diaries where participants reported their daily adversity, perceptions of identity threat, and feelings of academic fit. In addition, Study 2 included multiple assessments of construal level (the Behavioral Identification Form; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) to examine participants’ perspective. We predicted that affirmation would broaden construals and prevent daily adversity from being experienced as identity threat. We also predicted that affirmation would insulate academic motivation from identity threat.

Study 2 replicated the effects of values affirmation on academic performance, as affirmed Latino American students earned higher grades in their core courses than non-affirmed Latino American students. Evidence supporting the general model of affirmation effects (Sherman & Hartson, 2011) was also obtained, as the affirmed Latino American students also construed events at a more abstract (broader) rather than concrete level and were less likely to have their daily feelings of academic fit and motivation undermine by identity threat. More specifically, affirmed Latino American participants saw events and situations at a broader level of construal than Latino American students in the control condition. The measures of construal focused on general topics, and not just academics, and were separated from the affirmation manipulation by weeks to months, and thus, the effects seemed quite general. Being under identity threat may lead individuals to experience a narrowing of perspective. Providing value affirming experiences and thereby reminding them of their important self-resources may broaden this perspective.

The diary findings also suggest that when affirmed, and with self-worth perhaps more secure, identity-threatened students did not experience daily adversity as indicative of identity threat. Further, to the extent that they perceived threat in their environment, these negative experiences did not spread into and affect academic motivation. Rather, the Latino American students sustained motivation independently of the perceived threat in the environment. Together, these findings suggest that affirmation can change psychological experience and instigate lasting changes in how people create narrative experiences over time.

In sum, these two experiments provide evidence to support the general model of affirmation effects—that values affirmations exert their effects, in part, by bolstering resources, broadening perspective, and changing the narrative of ongoing experience under threat.

The Multifaceted Role of Affect in Self-Affirmation Effects

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Self-affirmation theory holds that threats to the self can be reduced by focusing on cherished values unrelated to the content of the threat (Steele, 1988). Because threat often leads to defensiveness (Liberman & Chaikin, 1992), self-affirmation can be a useful technique to promote even-handed, non-defensive responding. Indeed, several studies show that people are more accepting of a threatening
were a proxy for the effects of positive affect or that positive affect effects of self-affirmation might vary with affective state. Early research found that there was little or no effect of self-affirmation on general mood, reducing the likelihood that self-affirmation effects were a proxy for the effects of positive affect or that positive affect mediated those effects. Instead, we propose that the relationship between self-affirmation and affect is much more nuanced. In particular, we contend that (1) self-affirmation influences more specific affective experiences such as worry and feelings of vulnerability (in contrast to more general affect), (2) rather than being a direct consequence of self-affirmation, general incidental emotions – that is, discrete emotions (e.g., sadness, anger) minimally related to the self-affirmation experience – will moderate effects of self-affirmation, and (3) self-affirmation can alleviate the impairment of performance elicited by negative affective states such as stress.

We first consider the effects of self-affirmation on specific affective experiences rather than general affect. In one study, female undergraduates who consumed moderate to large amounts of alcohol read an article linking alcohol consumption with breast cancer risk. Prior to reading the article, participants were randomly assigned to a self-affirmation condition (in which they wrote an essay about a value important to them) or a standard no-affirmation condition (in which they wrote about how a value unimportant to them might be important to someone else). We found that participants in the self-affirmation condition expressed more worry and anxiety about getting breast cancer – specific affective experiences that promote behavior change (Klein, Harris, Ferrer, & Zajac, 2011). Moreover, self-affirmation was found to strengthen the relationship between affective responses and intentions. Two additional studies demonstrated that these effects on message-specific affect mediated subsequent effects on.

Finally, as a complement to our overarching investigation of how affect moderates the beneficial effects of self-affirmation, we explored how self-affirmation might offset the influence of negative affect – in this case, chronic stress. Much work suggests that chronic stress can impair performance on difficult tasks (Liston, McEwen, & Casey, 2009). We hypothesized that self-affirmation can ameliorate such effects. Undergraduate students varying in chronic stress were given 30 difficult Remote Associate Test (RAT) items and asked to complete them in front of an evaluator. This experience was stressful as demonstrated by increased heart rate and blood pressure. Importantly, self-affirmed individuals performed better on the RAT task than controls, particularly among participants who were chronically stressed.

As a group, these seven studies demonstrate a multifaceted relationship between affect and self-affirmation, building on previous research showing no direct effects of self-affirmation on general measures of affect. Self-affirmation appears to have effects on more precise threat-relevant affective experiences such as worry, and there are important interactive effects between self-affirmation and affect on message processing, behavioral intentions, and task performance.

Prior research has shown that the “self-affirmation task,” that is, reflecting on core values, reminds people of their broader identity (Sherman and Cohen 2006). Within this broader perspective, people feel more secure in their self-integrity and less pressure to defend a particular aspect of the self. As a consequence, affirmed consumers are more likely to process potentially threatening messages, for example, reports that favored products might have negative health consequences, in an open-minded way (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). We build on this prior research to explore additional consequences of a broadened self-view. First, in a direct extension of prior work, we posit that a broader view of self may mute the intensity of people’s own feelings about a product or services failure because each event is “just one thing” in a broader view of the self. That is, the affirmed individual is not whipsawed about by each individual passing event because the broader view incorporates other, more stabilizing influences (thoughts and feelings about the rest of one’s life). This theorizing leads to the hypothesis that affirmed consumers will be less angry after experiencing product or service failures, and, in turn, when they have a chance to spread negative WOM, they will be less likely to do so.

Less about Me, More about You: How Self-Affirmation Changes Word-of-Mouth Intentions for the Self versus Others

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Previous literature on WOM has focused on consumers’ communications about their own experiences (Berger and Schwartz 2011; Dichter 1966; Dye 2000), however, consumers may also talk about others’ consumption experiences, sometimes when jointly experiencing a product or service (e.g., dining companions) or when another consumer reports an experience and the target consumer must consider whether to pass that story on. The present research shows that self-affirmation decreases the tendency for consumers to complain about their own, but to increase the tendency to talk about others’ negative experiences, the “Consumer Champion Effect.” We trace this effect to the broader perspective adopted by affirmed individuals, which mutes the extremity of their own emotional responses to events while it concurrently produces a more accurate understanding and deeper appreciation of the intensity of others’ emotions. These responses thereby lead to an ironic effect of self-affirmation in which very calm consumers, who are not upset about their own negative experiences, may nevertheless be vocal critics of a firm on behalf of others.

The first experiment, consisting of two studies, examines the influence of self-affirmation on estimation of others’ emotions. In experiment 1a, self-affirmation was manipulated using an essay writ-
ing task, commonly employed in this literature (Sherman and Cohen 2006). Participants in the high self-affirmation condition wrote an essay about their most important value while those in the low self-affirmation condition wrote an essay about the least important value. Then, participants listened to moderately annoying sounds (e.g., electric drill, squeaking door) then indicated either what they felt about the sounds or what they thought another person felt about the sounds. The results show that self-affirmation reduced the intensity of one’s felt emotions while it amplified the estimated intensity of others’ emotions. We also provide evidence that affirmed consumers more accurately estimate others’ emotions while projecting less of their own emotional states.

Experiment 1b further examines consumers’ assessments of others’ emotions through their interpretation of posted user reviews. In addition, in this experiment, instead of manipulating self-affirmation through an essay writing task, we measured individual differences in self-affirmation tendency, specifically, their self-concept clarity. We observed that participants with high self-concept clarity estimated more intense emotions from both positive and negative reviews, seeing positive reviews as more positive and negative reviews as more negative.

In experiment 2, which was a scenario study, participants were asked to imagine various situations involving product or service failure, for example, poor restaurant service during a celebratory dinner, and then to estimate either their own or the other person’s emotional reactions. Self-affirmation was manipulated as in study 1a using an essay writing task. We found self-affirmation led to lower willingness to generate negative WOM for the self but greater willingness to generate negative WOM on behalf of the other person.

Experiment 3 was intended to probe the process underlying the effect further by exploring the effects of a theoretically motivated moderator, specifically, anonymity of the communication. If self-affirmation produces the Consumer Champion Effect by reducing narrow and defensive processing, it should be less prevalent when such processing is already limited, such as when one’s comments are anonymous. Consistent with this view, when participants had to identify themselves, we again found that self-affirmation lessened participants’ tendency to report their own concerns but more likely to champion the concerns of others. When anonymity was guaranteed, self-affirmation was less effective.

Self-Affirmation has the Power to Offset the Harmful Effects of Money Reminders

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Self-affirmation, which encourages people to ponder why their core values are important to them, promotes a broad-minded, big picture perspective of the self, and enhances psychological resources of self-integrity (Sherman and Cohen 2006). Prior research has provided ample evidence that self-affirmation positively affects interpersonal aspects of the self by making people be more open to those holding opposite opinions who accordingly are judged favorably (Cohen, Aronson and Steele 2000; Sherman and Cohen 2002), reducing within-relationship threats (Lockwood et al. 2004), and enhancing a key other-directed feeling—love (Croker, Niiya, and Mischkowski 2008).

In this paper, we asked the question: Given its impressive ability to promote prosocial responses, could self-affirmation reduce the negative effects of money on the interpersonal self? Money, a social resource, makes people feel self-sufficient and behave accordingly (Vohs, Mead and Goode 2006, 2008). When reminded of money, people pursue personal goals and prefer to be separate from others. Thus, people prefer that others do not depend on them, and want to be free from dependency (e.g., reduced helpfulness toward others and reduced requests for help) (Vohs et al. 2006, 2008). Further, money leads people to prefer to be separate from others, and to be less distressed about social exclusion (Zhou, Vohs and Baumeister 2009). In sum, prior research has consistently found that money negatively affects the interpersonal self. We proposed that affirming important values will help people be less affected by money. Within the broader and abstract perspective of the self, money should lose its symbolic power.

In the first experiment, we tested whether self-affirmation reduces tendencies to be free of dependents and dependency that money brings about. First, participants received the self-affirmation (vs. control) manipulation. In the self-affirmation condition, participants wrote an essay on a paper explaining why their core value is important to them, whereas those in the control condition explained why a less important value would be important to the average person. In the middle of writing about values, one of two screensavers appeared. Participants in the money (vs. control) condition saw a screensaver depicting various denominations of currency floating underwater (vs. white dots on a black background).

Next, to measure the tendency to be free of dependents, we used willingness to help others in need. Participants were asked to read about a non-profit organization—Operation Smile, which is an international children’s medical charity that provides reconstructive surgery for children born with facial deformities, such as cleft lip and cleft palate. Then, they were told that in this experiment, five participants would be randomly selected to win a bonus payment of $50. If they were chosen as a winner, they could donate all or part of the $50 to Operation Smile. They were asked to write down the amount of money they would donate to Operation Smile.

Finally, as an indicator of dependency, we used a request for help during a difficult task. Participants were asked to outline all segments of a geometric figure without lifting their pencil or retracing any segments. Unbeknownst to the participants, the figure was unsolvable. Participants were told that it was not a matter of how many tries it took or how long it took them to solve the puzzle. They were instructed work on it until they either solved it or decided to get help from the administrator. After 10 minutes, they were asked to stop.

Consistent with prior research, money priming led to self-sufficiency orientations, reducing helpfulness toward others in need and dependency on others while attempting a difficult task (Vohs et al. 2006, 2008). In the no self-affirmation condition, participants primed with money (vs. not primed) donated less money and were less likely to request help. However, self-affirmation reduced such an adverse money prime effect. Participants who self-affirmed and received the money prime donated more money, and were more likely to ask for help while solving a difficult task, as opposed to those who did not self-affirm prior to the money prime.

In the second experiment, we tested if self-affirmation reduces different effects of money priming—tendencies to reduce social contact and to feel less distressed under social exclusion. First, participants received the self-affirmation manipulation and the money priming, as in study 1. Then, participants were asked to choose between two activities. Within each item, one option was an activity for one person (e.g., planning your own vacation) and the other option was for two people or more (e.g., planning a family vacation).

Next, we manipulated social exclusion by asking all participants to play a computerized ball-tossing game (Cyberball; Eisenberger et al. 2003). Participants were led to believe they played with 3 live participants, but in fact, the computer simulated the other play-
ers. Initially, the ball was tossed equally among the 4 players. In the normal-play condition, this equal play continued throughout the game. In the social-exclusion condition, the simulated confederates stopped throwing the ball to the live participants after 10 throws. Afterward, participants rated the social distress they felt about the game using the Southampton Social Self-Esteem Scale (Sedikides 2008). Sample items on this scale included, “I feel devalued,” and, “I feel rejected.”

Consistent with prior research, money priming led to social separateness (Vohs et al. 2006, 2008). In the no self-affirmation condition, participants primed with money (vs. not primed with money) chose more individually focused leisure experiences and were less likely to feel distressed after social exclusion. However, self-affirmation reduced the adverse money prime effect. Participants who self-affirmed and received the money prime were less likely to choose individually focused leisure experiences, and were more likely to feel distressed after social exclusion, as opposed to those who did not self-affirm prior to the money prime.

Conclusion: Self-affirmation and money are both simple but powerful motivators of behavior change. Past work has documented the deleterious effects that even small and subtle reminders of money can have on interpersonal outcomes. The current work has documented that self-affirmation can not only nullify such troubling negative outcomes but in some cases actually reverse them. By understanding how self-affirmation alters the typical effects of money priming, the field is in a better position to understand more about the psychology of money as well as how self-affirmation works—seemingly to instigate the interpersonal self over the personal self.

REFERENCE


Re-interpreting Culturally Construed Consumption and its Embodiment within the Female Body
Chair: Andrew Lindridge, The Open University Business School, UK

Paper #1: Constructing Identity through Cultural and Ancient Interpretations of the Female Body
Anoop Bhogal-Nair, Coventry Business School, UK

Paper #2: The Halal Nail Polish: Religion and Body Politics in the Marketplace
Özlem Sandıkcı, Faculty of Business Administration, Bilkent University, Turkey

Paper #3: Religiosity and Acculturation through Apparel Consumption Amongst North African Migrant Women in France
Ranam Alkayyali, UPEC, ESCP Europe, Paris, France

Paper #4: Renegotiating the Patriarchal Bargain and The Embodiment of Womanhood
Andrew Lindridge, The Open University Business School, UK
Lisa Peñaloza, Bordeaux Business School, France
Omnipreye Worlu, The Open University Business School, UK

SESSION OVERVIEW
In an increasingly globalized world, where images are disseminated around the world in mini-seconds and economic changes challenge the fundamental principles of what we want and expect from society the role of women within this remains a contentious issue. Indeed events from ranging from the role of women in the Arab spring revolutions to a serious of news reports from Indian on female rape cases serves to remind us that the cultural and societal embodiment of what constitutes being a woman remains a site to be contested. Contested by the women who feel their have ownership over their bodies and have they are perceived, versus how others, typically men, perceived the role of women and their bodies. In the middle of this field lies the market, adapting and nurturing change in an effort to open new market segments, opportunities and profit possibilities. How then do women use consumption in these changing environments – as an opportunity to thrive, resist or conform?

Perhaps central to this cultural understanding is religion, where women feature prominently in various roles. From the Hindu scriptures where women, presented as gods, are revered and worshiped as a form of perfection, to Christian and Islamic teachings on women's modesty, religion determines how men, society, and women themselves are perceived. Yet religions role, both from a cultural and societal, perspective has become the embodiment of why women's bodies are a site to be contested. In India, the sexualization of the female body has recently increased not only in Bollywood films but wider Indian society, especially amongst the middle classes. Economic growth has led to get feelings of female empowerment and consumption opportunities to dress in a more Western style. Yet this consumption act challenges and embodies widely societal changes, as traditional male roles are usurped by newly empowered women. The consequences of this form the basis for our first paper.

Whilst India represents implied state control, critics of France's recent laws on religious symbolism argue that the state now has implicit legal powers to arrest any women wearing a hijab, burka or any other symbolic piece of religious clothing. As women are often the bearers of a religion's tangible values, such laws inherent discrimination is targeted then at women. Yet it is not just France that views women's bodies and their representation as a site for state control. How women respond to this is discussed in our second paper.

The market itself continues to play an important role in cultural and symbolic meaning embodied within women's bodies. Our third paper, explores how enterprising organizations now see the female consumer, their body and religion as a marketing opportunity. Consequently, the market actively works with religion to find new ways of redefining women's bodies, whilst challenging and renegotiating wider cultural and societal norms. Yet, the market itself may not lead to such renegotiation. Indeed, in our last paper, market produced goods are shown as tools to be wielded within the acculturation process. Consumption then is used to redefine migrant women's identities and bodily meanings, asserting greater independence and equality, often against the husband's wishes.

The four papers in this special session offer insights then into the contradictory themes of state and individual, male and female, consumption and ownership roles in women's lives and their bodies. From these themes two questions emerge:

1. To what extent does consumption represent a contested site for the state and gender differences towards women and their bodies be acted out, and
2. Are women merely victims of consumption that aims to directly or indirectly reinforce their oppressed position?

Constructing Identity through Cultural and Ancient Interpretations of the Female Body

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In societies undergoing modernity, how do women use consumption to negotiate the contrasting cultural values of tradition and modernity when their own bodies are held to be sacred (Agniew, 1997; Mukherjee, 1983; Wadley, 1977)? This paper explores the nuances surrounding consuming the female body in India through the material/spiritual dichotomy that manifests in the discourses of nationalistic modernity (Chatterjee, 1989). Women are defined and located through social and moral parameters which serve as prominent markers of control and surveillance over their consumption choices for ‘clothing’ their body. Through changes in family and household structures (Sardamoni, 1992), an increasing female workforce (Venkatesh and Swamy, 1994) and changes in media representations of women (Mankekar, 1999), women are encouraged to reconstruct their identity.

Indian womanhood has been characterized as an ambivalent state, wherein women are both revered and subjugated, worshiped and molested, free to express themselves in different domains and yet voiceless. The Indian woman’s body then becomes the embodiment of Hindu religious texts, such as the Vedic and Dharmic literature, with the female body as a contrasting site of power and destruction, needing to be controlled.

Yet within India contrasting female imagery in media and society consolidates a form of sexual, cultural and religious worship, women in the social sphere are still deemed the atavistic and authentic ‘body’ of national traditions (McClelland, 1992). In this position women simultaneously function as the living archive of the national archaic (Reuben, 1994), becoming a standard to construct around a modernizing nation. Indian women then are seen as spiritual qualities that characterize a nationalistic form of modernity (Mukhopadhyay, 1969), whilst embodying the social and familial embodiment. Effectively Indian women are juxtaposed between contrasting and
opposing forces; revered and subjugated, worshiped and molested, free to express themselves in different domains, and yet voiceless (Altekar, 1987; Olivelle, 2004). Within this ambivalence, modernity has created a consumer culture empowering women to challenge, subvert or re-negotiate societal patriarchy in material world once reserved for men. Women are portrayed not as passive but as active, assertive and visible agents vivaciously participating ‘body projects’. The tension created here becomes one between the self as individual and as a collective object. It is within this fissure that women negotiate their sense of self through their consumption activities. Shilling (2006) noted that the rise of the body within consumer culture was a bearer of symbolic value where the “body provides a firm foundation on which to reconstruct a reliable sense of self in the modern world” (p.2). The young Indian women in my study had modified their consumption choices in light of what was socially acceptable and they were also seen to “skillfully resolve the tension between being faithful and comfortable and creating, modifying, and vigorously legitimizing their clothing choices” (Ger and Sandikci, 2010, p. 26). Consumption at the level of the body, then, becomes a metaphor for an unraveling Indian modernity, one which is fraught with the contradictions of Indian womanhood. If, as Puri (2002) notes, women’s bodies are used to articulate discourses of modernity and development, then these are also the sites where fear of loss of national tradition are expressed. Consumption, in this vein, illustrates how performing identities at the level of the body creates tensions between an autonomous and collective sense of self. A three month multi-method interpretive research study involving 23 young urban and rural women was undertaken in New Delhi. A mixture of focus groups and one-to-one interviews were conducted, with each interview lasting up to ninety minutes. Respondents were also asked to create posters and take photographs of their consumer experiences. The findings showed how participants considered the role of the body as central to negotiating both consumption activities and notions of modernity. Conclusions were drawn about the centrality of consumption for the young women in being able to forge alternative identities which have not been socially scripted. However, the attempts made at constructing this alternative (through rebellion, seeking loopholes and testing boundaries) was constrained through forms of control and surveillance from the familial and social spheres respectively, presenting an ongoing tug-of-war between traditional, social narratives of the conduct of women, and an individually ascribed notion. The ‘self’ emerged as an ontological dilemma where the preoccupation with the ‘self’ was looked down upon by rural respondents who felt that the loss of collectivity would result in a loss of tradition. The self in terms of grooming and maintaining trends was a project of necessity for the urban respondents; the rural girls on the other hand critiqued this expression of self-indulgence as unnecessary, especially before marriage. Control and surveillance were of particular importance as they operated as mechanisms to curb and control not only women as their physical selves, but formed to protect the ‘morality’ of the nation. The most palpable effects of the markers of distinction were held between the urban and rural girls, in that the appropriation of Western clothing, Western music, hybrid linguistic forms, emphasis upon professional achievement and personal grooming deemed the urban girls as directly involved with the project of modernity. For rural consumers, the global flows served to hinder and problematize the status quo and they believed that the erosion of village sentiment was in part attributed to the attainment of new global symbols of prosperity which encompassed characteristics deemed as “modern... Ultimately, as material and discursive sites where tradition is performed (Oza, 2001), the body poses a number of complex and often contradictory negotiations for the young women in light of their constructions of identity. This paper develops an understanding of the body through its cultural frame, however, as noted by Shilling (2006), contemporary analyses of the body as socially constructed phenomena, refer to the body as a theoretical space, but the body often remains relatively neglected as an actual object of analysis. This paper aims to address this shortcoming. Tracing through history, it can be concluded that the body project itself is tempered through both nationalistic and ancient ideals of womanhood in India. Consumption choices amongst the young women express a system of values which reflect an ethos of modernity where the clothing of the body demonstrates prevailing socio-cultural processes which condition respondents’ daily lives.

**The Halal Nail Polish: Religion and Body Politics in the Marketplace**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

In January 2013 the Polish cosmetic company Inglot introduced the first ever halal nail polish, the O2M line of breathable nail enamel. Wearing nail polish is a contentious issue for pious Muslim women, both symbolically and materially. While some religious scholars emphasize that looking beautiful is a requirement in Islam, others call for a refrain from any action that would attract the male gaze. Moreover, wearing nail polish interferes with ablution, a ritualized body cleansing process that every Muslim should undertake before prayer. Because nail polish sets a permanent barrier between water and nail, ablution cannot be performed without first removing the nail polish. Inglot claims to have devised a formula of breathable nail polish, which allows water to penetrate nail, hence is suitable for prayer. In this paper, I use halal nail polish as a case to interrogate the complex ways through which social, cultural, material and religious interpretations of body intersect with marketplace dynamics and informal identities.

The perception and evaluation of one’s own body and physical appearance contribute significantly to self-concept (Thompson and Hirschman 1995). Within the logic of consumer culture, body turns into a site of endless choice and possibility. However, the relationship between body and choice becomes complicated in the context Muslim identities. As substantial amount of research has shown the concept of modesty plays an important role in shaping Muslim identities and practices related to body. While modesty requirement applies both men and women, it is the female body that modesty becomes embodied, most prominently in the form of Islamic veiling (Ahmed 1992; El Guindi, 1999; Mahmood, 2005; Sandikci and Ger, 2010). Increasingly, the discussions of a modest body take place in the marketplace. The veiling industry and related Muslim lifestyle media promote products and images that promise women fashionable yet modest looks (Sandikci and Ger 2007). Underlying these is an understanding that modest dressing, like other body management practices, is a choice for individual women. This emphasis on choice resonates with the construction of the neoliberal consumer subject and aligns religious norms with market logic. The introduction of halal nail polish exemplifies this mutually informing relationship between Islam and neoliberal consumerism. However, what is interesting in this case is the product’s capacity to invoke internal debates about female body and concepts of modesty.

I explore these debates through ethnographic and ethnographic methods. Blog entries, news stories and forum discussions on social media sites as well as interviews with women selling and using the product constitute the data set. As the nail polish has been recently introduced, data collection still continues. Preliminary analysis sug-
gests three main themes. First, there is a debate about the ‘necessity’ of a halal nail polish that revokes on the one side the notion of market opportunism and on the other side the notion of consumer freedom. Second, there is a tension between religious and material conceptions of body. While references to scriptural texts and norms seek to define boundaries of Muslim female body and situate nail polish within this normative framework, testaments based on the physical experience of the product attempt to expand the very boundaries of religiously appropriate and inappropriate forms of bodily consumption. Third, the debate about the nail polish brings forefront the question of who has authority to speak on behalf of women and what defines being a pious and modern Muslim woman today.

Overall, reactions toward the halal nail polish underlie the question of what Muslim looks like, or what looks Muslim. Body features predominantly in these interrogations, but not only at the symbolic level. The nail polish draws attention to the material understandings of body and highlights how products shape women’s relationships to their bodies by enabling or preventing performance of certain practices and contribute to their sense of being a “good” Muslim. While introduction of halal nail polish appears to be yet another example of the growth of modest fashion and lifestyle sector (Lewis, 2010), it also shows the increasingly instrumental role market actors play in the construction and maintenance of pious consumer identities.

**Religiosity and acculturation through apparel consumption amongst North African migrant women in France**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Migration challenges the cultural, religious and social values associated with consumption for both the migrant and the recipient society. Previous studies have tended to focus on multi-cultural societies that take a melting pot perspective that recognizes and accepts difference, such as the USA and UK (Péhaloza, 1994; Gbadamosi, 2012). However what happens when migrants are faced with a society that openly rejects cultural and religious differences? And how is this rejection acted through consumption? This paper mobilize post-colonial theory which shows a perspective of the subordinated and marginalized (Brace-Govan and Burgh Woodman, 2008) to explore these themes through the role of Islam amongst North African female migrants living in France. A strongly secular country that legally prohibits public displays of religious symbolism (Tahran, 2011) and views ethnic marketing as an irrelevance (Héran, 2007). How female migrants and their daughters, who represent the most visible cultural difference, resolve potential conflict between personal religious and societal beliefs forms the focus of this paper. In doing so we address calls for further research into inter-generational influences (IGI) amongst immigrant family settings (O’guinn et al, 1986) and religiosity within consumer research (Cleveland and Chang, 2009; Sandicki, 2006). We also explore how stigmatized consumers differentiate themselves through customizing their traditional ethnic dress in an established market (Sandicki and and Ger, 2010).

Acculturation, describing the level of individual and community attachment to the values of the original culture or host culture, has been extensively applied to consumer research (Péhaloza, 1994; Askergaard et al, 2005). Whilst some studies drawing upon Berry’s (1997) categories, such as Ustünner and Holt’s (2007) reflect upon acculturation as a range of outcomes, others have viewed migrants as constantly changing their identities and related consumption depending upon the context (Lindridge et al, 2006). However, these studies assumed that migrants actively want to assimilate, whilst retaining their own ethnic identity. In countries where the nation culture is deemed to be superior, cultural and religious differences are seen as subservient. Such as Islamic women wearing the Hijab (head scarf) in public, in France, is an illegal act. Yet, research into the role of religion in consumption in secular countries reflects wider tensions. For example Sandicki (2006) found that religion influenced poor female migrants’ acculturation into life in Turkey’s cities conflicted with secular demands to change their bodily representation through clothing. The city’s cultural codes of wearing body hugging clothes were viewed as an act of resistance to God. In a similar vein, Gbadamosi (2012) found that Black African migrant women in London viewed religious beliefs as sufficient to resist societal pressure to acculturate to wearing body revealing clothes. These findings suggest that the women’s body, her ownership over it, and how it is represented becomes a site for acculturation conflict (Sandicki, 2006).

Our paper explores these themes by researching North African Muslim migrant women living in Paris, France, where 70% of migrants originate from North and West Africa constituting 8% of the 5 million ethnic minority population (Héran, 2010). France was chosen following its legal ban on all religious symbolism in Government spaces, such as wearing the Hijab. Forty-one participants’ interviews were undertaken from women born in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco living in Paris. Participants were categorized as either highly religious (HR) faithful to Islamic values in their life and were recruited from mosques. Casually religious women (CR) who practice Islam occasionally were recruited through a snowballing technique. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes to two hours supported by researcher observation of participants in their daily lives.

Our analysis revealed conflicting behaviors regarding the role of religion within acculturation. CR migrant women favored French stores that sold western style clothing, demonstrating little reverence for clothing that met with Islamic principles, due to their weak Islamic beliefs and their strong identification with France. HR migrant women, in contrast, resisted French secular clothing styles by rejecting clothing patterns that were considered against Islamic teachings. For example, French clothing brands were rejected as too fashionable, body revealing and symbolic of legal system that outlawed religious clothing. In term of (IGI) whilst HR / CR mothers had HR/CR daughters respectfully, in some instances this was not always true. When HR mothers had CR daughters acculturation tensions arose when CR daughters left the traditional family house to gain individual freedoms and to engage with secular consumption. Daughters’ rejection of their HR mothers manifested through consumption, such as buying / renting their own apartments, living with their boyfriend, attending night clubs, wearing revealing apparel and rejecting ethnic meals.

CR mothers who had HR daughters experienced tensions around food preparation, with their HR daughters’ preferring Halal meat. Consequently these mothers found their daughter’s extreme Islamic behavior manifested through refusing to shop with their mothers, eat from their meals, and not exchanging ideas around purchases items. Our analysis locates religion then as a central variable within acculturation, manifesting through contesting how the female body should be presented. Consumption then provided the means to construct a project that communicated acceptance or resistance to society, as well as a sense of ownership and belonging to society.

**Renegotiating the patriarchal bargain and the embodiment of womanhood**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

This research explores how migrant women use consumption to renegotiate their culturally construed gendered identity and related
bodily representations. Central to this renegotiation is the embodiment of the migrant female identity embodied within the patriarchal bargain, representing a set of pre-existing rules and scripts that regulate gender identity and related roles (Kandiyoti, 1988). For example, duties the wife is expected to perform, such as mother, cook etc. As migrant women's roles transition from a wife within a consanguine, traditional, family based around patriarchy to a nuclear family that encourages equality, the cultural values embodied in these women are challenged and renegotiated. This research then addresses previous research gender bias towards male immigrants, with female immigrants either invisible or stereotyped (Dona and Ferguson, 2004; Reid and Comas-Diaz, 1990). Consequently, although the process of immigration offers opportunities for culturally determined gender roles to be reconstituted in the new host society (Dona and Ferguson, 2004), the extent that immigration improves or undermines a women’s ability to renegotiate her sense of identity remains unclear (Moon, 2003).

Patriarchal bargaining exerts a powerful influence on shaping a woman’s gendered subjectivity and determines her sense of gender ideology and embodiment in different contexts, for example in the family, as an employee etc. Previous research has shown that men and women, within the family, have unequal power and, hence, ability to change the thoughts and/or actions of each other (Olson and Cromwell, 1975). Consequently, the man is widely perceived as having greater powerful influence over his spouse and, therefore, ability to exert his decisions and his gendered expectations (Kranichfeld, 1987). Whilst both men and women accept and collude with these rules and scripts, they may also challenge, redefine or renegotiate them.

Acculturation’s emphasis on cultural change presents an interesting perspective to explore how women’s gender embodiment is renegotiated. This cultural re-negotiation we argue can either be undertaken with mutual acceptance between husband and wife, or resisted and subversively created by another. Drawing upon the work of McCracken (1986) we argue that consumption with its related rules and scripts, they may also challenge, redefine or renegotiate them.

REFERENCES


Unleashed Restraint: Feeding the Psychological Needs of Restrained Eaters
Chair: Katherine E. Loveland, HEC Montréal, Canada

Paper #1: Do Restrained Eaters Identify as Dieters? Exploring the Role of Self-Concept in the Consumption of Restrained Eaters
Keri L. Kettle, University of Miami, USA
Katherine E. Loveland, HEC Montréal, Canada
Gerald Häubl, University of Alberta, Canada

Paper #2: Do Weight Watchers Want More Options? How Activating Self-Regulatory Concerns Triggers the Need for Variety
Anne-Kathrin Klesse, Tilburg University, the Netherlands
Caroline Goukens, Maastricht University, the Netherlands
Kelly Geyksens, Maastricht University, the Netherlands
Ko de Ruyter, Maastricht University, the Netherlands

Paper #3: The Role of Reactance in Responses to One-Sided Advertisements: How Health-Related Appeals Backfire among Restrained Eaters
Nguyen Pham, Arizona State University, USA
Naomi Mandel, Arizona State University, USA
Andrea Morales, Arizona State University, USA

Paper #4: The Acuity of Vice: Goal Conflict Improves Visual Sensitivity to Portion Size Changes
Yann Cornil, INSEAD, France
Nailya Ordabayeva, Erasmus, the Netherlands
Pierre Chandon, INSEAD, France

SESSION OVERVIEW
The purpose of this session is to better understand the psychological needs that drive the often seemingly irrational consumption of restrained eaters. Restrained eaters tend to chronically experience two conflicting motives when making daily food decisions: hedonic enjoyment and weight control (c.f. Stroebe et al. 2008). This conflict leads restrained eaters to be hyper sensitive to food cues in the environment, often resulting in disinhibited consumption. This disinhibited consumption tends to be interpreted as a self-regulatory failure; however, the papers in this session take a different perspective. Rather than condemning the failures of restrained eaters, the papers in this session each seek to understand the question, “What are the psychological needs that restrained eaters are addressing through their consumption?”

As the obesity epidemic continues to grow, at great physical, emotional and economic cost to both individuals and society at large, it is becoming clear that the efforts of chronic dieters (a.k.a. restrained eaters) to lose weight are not working. In order to find a solution to this problem, it is important to understand why restrained eaters are more self-aware and self-conscious about how they are viewed by others than non-restrained eaters (Blanchard and Frost 1993; Heatherton and Baumeister 1991). These differences are frequently attributed to societal pressures on individuals to be thin (Herman et al. 2003; Strauman et al. 1991). Yet, it is unclear the extent to which restrained eaters’ chronic concern about weight control and dieting is purely a social phenomenon, or has been internalized to become a part of their self-concept.

We examine the role of the self-concept in the consumption behavior of restrained eaters. To do so, we use a general self-concept prime — signing one’s name — that has been shown to activate the aspect of one’s self-concept that is afforded in the present situation.
(Kettle and Häubl 2011). This simple intervention enables us to investigate how activating the self-concept of restrained eaters influences their self-regulatory efforts in controlling their food consumption. In particular, our research seeks to better understand the extent to which restrained eaters’ urge to regulate consumption has been internalized and incorporated into their self-concept, versus remaining an essentially external force. In other words, as restrained eaters engage in that never-ending battle between their “love of food and not wanting to get fat,” which side of the battle is more closely linked to the self-concept? In answering this question, our research takes an important step toward better understanding the self-concept of restrained eaters.

In studies 1A and 1B we explore whether a general self-concept prime leads to increased or decreased consumption among restrained eaters. Based on finding by Kettle and Häubl (2011), we theorized that since food is relevant to the self concept of restrained eaters that a general self-concept prime should impact the food consumption of restrained, but not unrestrained eaters. What was less clear was whether a general self-concept prime would lead to increased or decreased consumption. We reasoned that if restrained eaters identify as dieters then a general self-concept prime in the presence of food would activate that aspect of the self, resulting in decreased consumption. If, on the other hand, restrained eaters do not identify as dieters and the desire to restrict consumption remains an essentially social construct, then a general self-concept prime should result in increased consumption. In study 1A we find that restrained eaters who engage in a general self-concept prime (signing their name) purchase more chocolates with money earned in an unrelated task than restrained eaters in a control condition (printing their name). As predicted, the general self-concept prime has no effect on the chocolate consumption of unrestrained eaters. In study 1B we replicate the same pattern of results with non-hedonic foods finding that after a general self-concept prime restrained eaters eat more carrots and more pretzels compared to a control condition, while the consumption of unrestrained eaters is unaffected by the general self-concept prime.

In study 2 we sought initial evidence for our proposition that the increased consumption exhibited by restrained eaters in response to a general self-concept prime is caused by decreased accessibility of the dieting construct. Participants signed (did not sign) their name in the presence (absence) of food and then engaged in implicit measure of thought accessibility (DeMarree, Wheeler, and Petty 2005) in which the target words were diet related (e.g. overeat, indulge). Among restrained eaters in the general self-concept prime, food present condition, diet related words were significantly less accessible compared to the control condition, providing initial evidence that dieting is not part of the self-concept of restrained eaters.

In study 3 participants received a bag of pretzels and engaged (did not engage) in a general self-concept prime. Participants then listed 5 thoughts about the pretzels and rated each thought in terms of how relevant it was to food, dieting, and themselves. Among restrained eaters, fewer diet related thoughts were reported after the general self-concept prime compared to the control. Additionally, restrained eaters were more likely to consume the pretzels after the general self-concept prime compared to the control. No effects were found for either D.V among unrestrained eaters. Furthermore, among restrained eaters, the number of diet related thoughts mediated pretzel consumption only in the control condition, while in the general self-concept prime condition there was no relationship between diet thoughts and consumption. These results provide additional support for our proposition that dieting is not consistent with the self-concept of restrained eaters and it is this inconsistency that leads to increased consumption after a general-self-concept prime.

Do Weight Watchers Want More Options? How Activating Self-Regulatory Concerns Triggers the Need for Variety

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In daily life food variety has become omnipresent. When dining out or grocery shopping consumers can select between a variety of different dishes and products. On the upside, these strategies correspond with individuals’ preference for variety in food consumption and provide them with higher consumption utility (Kahn & Wansink, 2004). On the downside, food variety fosters increased consumption (Rolls et al., 1981). Parallel to this trend, weight watching has become a recurring theme in present-day life. When reading magazines or watching TV, one is bombarded with information on dieting programs, creating the impression that watching one’s weight is the status quo. Considering these recent developments in combination, the question that presents itself is whether weight concerns, in general, and restricting one’s food intake, in particular, could influence individuals’ need for variety: Do individuals who restrict their food intake seek more or less variety than individuals free from self-regulatory concerns?

When individuals are concerned about their weight, they restrict their food intake and adhere to self-imposed demands instead of listening to physiologically determined satiety boundaries (Herman & Polivy, 1984). This brings about stronger hedonic responses to highly tempting food (Hofmann, et al., 2009). In fact, when individuals restrict their food intake, they constantly ruminate about food and evaluate food stimuli in terms of pleasure that can be derived from eating. Accordingly, restricting one’s food intake provokes a struggle between adhering to self-imposed demands and the desire to maximize pleasure from eating. Consuming the same kind of food easily results in habituation and decreases enjoyment of that particular food (Epstein et al., 2009) while eating a variety of different food is expected to bring about higher anticipated levels of consumption utility (Kahn & Wansink, 2004).

Taking these findings together, we predict that restricting one’s food intake potentially increases variety seeking since it provides a means to compensate for the decreased pleasure that comes with adhering to these self-imposed demands. Specifically, we argue, first, that dieters seek more variety than non-dieters and, second, that non-dieters engage in higher variety seeking if self-regulatory concerns are activated. In study 1 we utilized a 2 (mental budget vs. no mental budget) x 2 (dieter vs. non-dieter) x 2 (between-subject design). Participants took part in two seemingly unrelated studies. The first part served to manipulate the mental budget activation. In line with Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2009) participants in the treatment condition read that people try to limit their snack consumption to 2.13 snacks a day and were asked to type in the number of snacks they would allow themselves today. Subsequently, all participants took part in a taste test and were randomly assigned to either taste a small piece of chocolate cake or chocolate. At the end participants could choose another piece of waffle or cake as an additional reward.

We measured variety seeking as switching away from the food item just eaten. A direct logistic regression with our manipulation (mental budget vs. no mental budget) and dieting status (dieter vs. non-dieter) and their interaction effect on the likelihood to seek va-

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1 Using the restrained scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980) we categorized participants as dieters (i.e., a score > 16) and non-dieters (i.e., a score ≤ 16).

2 Because product type (i.e., waffle or cake) eaten during the taste test did not influence individuals’ likelihood to seek variety, we collapsed the data across product types.
riety (no vs. yes) revealed dieting status ($p < .05$, beta = 1.30) and mental budget as significant positive predictor ($p < .05$, beta = .79). Dieters as well as non-dieters with a mental budget were more likely to choose a different snack than non-dieters or participants without a mental budget. The interaction effect is insignificant (beta = -.71). This study provides initial evidence that self-regulatory concerns increases variety seeking.

In study 2 we exclusively focused on non-dieters. Again, we activated self-regulatory concerns by means of asking half of the participants to generate a mental budget of how many snacks they want to allow themselves. Afterward, all participants were allowed to customize their own chocolate bar by choosing any six toppings out of a six-item choice set (e.g., cappuccino chocolate chips, or nougat piece). The results show that participants who imposed a mental budget chose significantly more different toppings ($M_{\text{diff}} = 3.52$, SD = .14) than those who did not impose a mental budget ($M_{\text{diff}} = 3.12$, SD = .15), $F(1, 53) = 3.93, p < .06$. In study 3, we manipulated self-regulatory concerns by asking half of the participants to respond to the restrained scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980) and by assessing their weight. Afterward, participants obtained a cake covered with whipped cream and were told to customize it by choosing among seven different toppings (e.g., Smarties®, chocolate flakes, or small almond cookies). Participants for whom self-regulatory concerns were activated chose significantly more different toppings ($M_{\text{diff}} = 3.73$, SD = .27) than participants without active self-regulatory concerns ($M_{\text{diff}} = 3.00$, SD = .25), $F(1, 30) = 3.90, p < .06$.

By means of three studies we establish a relationship between self-regulatory concerns and variety seeking. In doing so, our findings suggest that particularly those individuals who are watching their weight are most susceptible to the negative consequences of variety, i.e., increased food intake: When confronted with varied product assortments individuals with self-regulatory concerns are most likely to seek variety and, thereby, run the risk of overeating.

The Role of Reactance in Responses to One-Sided Advertisements: How Health-Related Appeals Backfire among Restrained Eaters

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In this research we explore consumer attitudes toward one-sided appeals that present only the negative aspects of consuming indulgent food and determine how these attitudes influence subsequent food preferences. Public service announcements (PSAs) often use one-sided messages (e.g., “All dessert is bad”) to encourage healthy behaviors and to discourage unhealthy behaviors, such as overindulging in indulgent food. These kinds of messages can backfire, however, because consumers perceive them to be biased since they only mention the negative aspects of dessert and disregard anything positive. Since the intended purpose of the message is to convince consumers that they should eat fewer desserts, consumers may rightly feel that such one-sided messages are trying to limit and constrain their choices. Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966, 1989) suggests that when individuals feel that someone else is constraining their freedom to choose or act, they will initiate a motivational state of reactance to regain that freedom. We propose that under certain conditions, one-sided messages will cause reactance, leading consumers to pursue goals that run opposite to those intended by the message, such as increasing consumption of indulgent food.

More specifically, we propose that consumers’ dietary restraint status (Herman and Polivy 1980) will determine whether one-sided messages produce reactance rather than compliance. Because restrained eaters (or dieters) have a greater concern for their figure and/or weight, and exhibit a strong desire to be thin, they are highly involved in and emotional about issues of indulgent consumption. Thus, their reactance is high because it comes from the motivation to be cognitively engaged with one-sided messages about indulgent food. In line with reactance theory (Brehm 1989) which emphasized the motivational construct of reactance, we posit that dieters (versus non-dieters) are more motivated to react to the one-sided message related to indulgent consumption. Particularly, dieters who see the message “all dessert is bad” are likely to feel their food choices are being constrained, thereby activating a goal to reassert their freedom of choice by consuming more (rather than less) indulgent food. Conversely, dieters who see the message that “all dessert is good” are unlikely to feel their food choices are being constrained, and thus do not need to respond with reactance to the message. Moreover, because reactance is motivational in nature, any reactance induced by a one-sided message should get stronger after a delay since it activates a goal to pursue the opposite behavior (Chartrand et al. 2008).

In a pilot study, participants (n=66) received a one-sided message (“All dessert is bad”) or a neutral message (“Tortola is the main island of the British Virgin Islands”) and performed a lexical decision task, where they decided whether each string (14 unhealthy food words, 56 neutral words, and 70 non-words) was a word by pressing the “Y” or “N” key. A regression analysis revealed a significant message by dietary restraint interaction effect on the speed of word recognition (b=-164.014, p<0.01). Dieters who received the one-sided message were faster at recognizing the unhealthy food words than dieters who received the neutral message (b=-222.086, p<0.01). This effect was not significant among non-dieters. Results provide preliminary evidence that exposure to a one-sided message focusing on the negatives of indulgence increases dieters’ interest in indulgent foods. However, an alternative explanation is that the one-sided manipulation simply activated thoughts of food whereas the control manipulation did not, particularly among dieters for whom food concepts are more top-of-mind. We addressed this limitation in Study 1 by activating thoughts of food in all experimental conditions.

Study 1 was similar to that of the pilot, except for the following changes: (1)Participants (n=397) randomly saw one of three messages: “All dessert is bad” (one-sided negative message), “All dessert is good” (one-sided positive message), and “All dessert is food” (neutral message), (2)In place of a word recognition task participants pressed the “F” and “J” keys (labeled “pos” and “neg”) to indicate whether they thought a word (20 healthy food, 20 unhealthy food and 20 neutral words) was positive or negative. (3) We measured participants’ situational reactance (Hong and Faedda 1996). Dieters who saw a one-sided negative message scored higher on reactance (b=0.364, p<0.05) and generated a higher number of positive thoughts about unhealthy food (b=2.116, p<0.01) than dieters who received a neutral message. This effect was not significant among non-dieters. There was no effect of the one-sided positive message on the number of positive thoughts about unhealthy food or reactance for either dieters or non-dieters.

The purpose of study 2 was to investigate the process underlying our findings. Specifically, does a one-sided message activate a goal in dieters’ minds, such as the goal to choose whatever foods they desire? The procedure was similar to that of Study 1, except for the following changes: (1) We added a manipulation of delay/no-delay to test whether the effects get stronger after a delay, and (2) Participants (n=414) chose snacks for the next two weeks from a list of seven snacks pretested as unhealthy (Oreo cookies) and seven snacks pretested as healthy (Whole wheat crackers). Dieters who received

3 We excluded one outlier on the variety-seeking measure (SD > 2.5).
the one-sided negative message scored higher on reactance and made more unhealthy choices than dieters who received the neutral message (b=1.055, p<0.01) and (b=2.844, p<0.01). Further, these effects were stronger after a delay (b=1.294, p<0.01 and b=4.530, p<0.01) and were not significant among non-dieters, suggesting that the one-sided negative message activated a reactance goal among dieters. There was no significant difference in the number of unhealthy choices made by dieters who received the one-sided positive message and dieters who received the neutral message.

Studies 1 and 2 showed dieters’ reactance to the one-sided appeal reflected in their faster recognition of unhealthy food words, and increased positive thoughts and choice of unhealthy snacks. Further research will explore the effects of consumer reactance to one-sided messages about healthy food, examining whether dieters react to biased, negative appeals about healthy food (e.g., vegetables) the same way they react to biased, negative appeals about indulgent foods. We expect that the effects for healthy food will be symmetric to the ones we have already observed for unhealthy food.

The Acuity of Vice: Goal Conflict Improves Visual Sensitivity to Increasing Portion Sizes

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

There is a broad consensus that the rise in the obesity epidemic in the past several decades has been driven more by overeating (increased calorie intake) than by expending fewer calories (Ludwig & Nestle, 2008; Swinburn, et al., 2011). These effects are compounded by today’s oversized food portions (Chandon & Wansink, 2007; Rollis, Roe, & Meenig, 2007).

Supersized portions increase food intake partly because people rarely read the size information on the labels and instead rely on their visual impressions to estimate portion size. However, visual perception is biased, and consumers tend to underestimate the changes in food portions, more so for large portions than for small portions. As a result, consumers overeat because they fail to realize just how large supersized portions really are (Chandon & Wansink, 2007). These findings have brought the biases in portion size perception and their remedies to the forefront of the research and the policy agenda.

Previous research on this issue focused on the effects of physical properties of packages such as size and shape, and on solutions to design packages that do not bias visual perception (Chandon & Ordabayeova, 2009; Folkes & Matta, 2004; Raghubir & Krishna, 1999; Wansink & Van Ittersum, 2003). In this research, we examine how higher-order factors, namely, ambivalent attitudes towards food (perceiving the food as desirable but harmful) influence size perceptions. Our results propose strategies that can effectively reduce biases in portion size perception without requiring any changes in physical package attributes such as size or shape (which may be costly, time-consuming, and difficult to enforce through policy).

We draw on two sets of findings in the motivated perception literature to formulate our hypothesis. One group of findings has shown that people are more sensitive to changes in the physical properties (e.g., quantity, distance) of desirable (vs. undesirable) objects (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010a). For example, coins look larger to people with low financial means and with low power (Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2010). Another set of studies has found that undesirable stimuli, too, can enhance visual sensitivity, when they pose an imminent threat (e.g., a pointed gun; (Van Ulzen et al 2008)), although these effects should arguably also occur with more common and less imminent threats such as temptations and objects detrimental to a goal (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010b).

Building on these findings, we predict that desiring a food item and perceiving it as harmful should enhance visual sensitivity to changing portions. Since in food decisions desire and harm perceptions reinforce each other (Raghunathan, Naylor, & Hoyer, 2006), we expect that ambivalence (or conflict) between these two attitudes will influence impressions of food portions more than each attitude individually. In three studies we show that this effect occurs when ambivalent attitudes are chronic (e.g., among restrained eaters) and when ambivalence is induced through external interventions (e.g., through ambivalence primes).

In Study 1 we examined the effects of ambivalent attitudes towards food on portion perceptions of children. We showed six portions (which doubled in size from one portion to the next) of chocolate chunks or baby carrots to eight-year old schoolchildren, who are an important population to study from a public policy perspective. Provided the size of the smallest portion (in units), we asked the respondents to estimate the number of units contained in the remaining portions. Afterwards we measured their ambivalence toward the food by asking them to rate their desire for the food item and their anticipations of being scolded by parents for eating the food item. The results indicated that children who felt ambivalent towards chocolate were more sensitive to the increasing portions of chocolate than children who did not experience ambivalence (because they perceived it as delicious but likely to be scolded by parents). Ambivalence did not influence perceptions of carrots.

In Study 2 we tested whether inducing ambivalence through separate manipulations of desire and perceived harm would improve portion size perceptions of adults. Participants saw four portions of gummy candies (which increased in size by 75% from one portion to the next). Provided the size of the smallest portion (in grams), the participants estimated the remaining three portions. We described the stimuli as “Omega 3 nutrition chews” (low harm condition) or as “gummy candies” (high harm condition). We manipulated desire by either asking the participants to consume either one gummy (high desire condition) or no gummy (low desire condition) (Walsh, Shiv, & Nowlis, 2008). The results revealed that portion size perceptions were the most accurate when ambivalence (perceptions of food desirability and harmfulness) was manipulated to be high. Similar patterns were observed with the implicit measure of ambivalence (as captured by implicit association tests of participants’ desire and danger perceptions associated with hedonic foods).

In Study 3, we sought to extend the findings to a consumer group that naturally holds ambivalent attitudes towards hedonic foods. We therefore approached a sample of dieting and non-dieting individuals at a gym. The participants saw six portions of potato chips as in Study 3. The chips had a regular label for half of the participants and a low-fat label for the other half. Consistent with our predictions, restrained eaters (who hold naturally ambivalent attitudes toward hedonic foods) had more accurate portion size estimates than unrestrained eaters for regular chips, but not for low-fat chips.

Our findings contribute to the literature on motivated misperception by examining the interplay of wanting and liking in driving portion size perceptions. They also propose ambivalence as a useful tool for improving consumers’ portion size perceptions.

REFERENCES


Paper #1: The Selfish Side of Sharing: Effects of Need for Control on Advice Giving

Alessandro M. Peluso, University of Salento and LUISS University, Italy
Andrea Bonezzi, New York University, USA
Matteo De Angelis, LUISS University, Italy
Derek D. Rucker, Northwestern University, USA

Paper #2: The Altruistic Side of Sharing: Giving Misery Company by Sharing Personal Negative Experiences

Troy Campbell, Duke University, USA
Dan Ariely, Duke University, USA

Paper #3: La vie en Rose at the Top? Why Positive (Negative) Information goes Up (Down) in a Hierarchy

Christilene du Plessis, INSEAD, France
David Dubois, INSEAD, France

Paper #4: The Negative Consequences of Empowering Consumers and Employees

Tami Kim, Harvard Business School, USA
Leslie K. John, Harvard Business School, USA
Todd Rogers, Harvard Business School, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Sharing information goes by many names: word of mouth, recommendations, information transmission, voting, gossiping, or in modern times “tweeting.” Acts of sharing are one of (if not the) strongest influences on many consumer behaviors, influencing both the sharer and recipient of the information. Accordingly, many businesses have sought to drive and guide sharing behavior. However, both businesses and academics remain blind to many of the underlying factors that surrounding sharing, particularly issues surrounding the sharer. Although academics have extensively examined how recipients respond to sharers’ recommendations and general social influences, much less is known about the sharer. Particularly what motivates the sharer? And how does the sharer feel about transmitting different types information, to different types of people, in different types of situations?

The first paper by Peluso, Bonezzi, and De Angelis begins by examining a selfish side of advice giving, specifically examining how a motive to gain a sense of personal control leads people to share advice (even advice that may hurt recipients) to fulfill this motive. Campbell and Ariely complement the first paper by presenting an altruistic side of sharing, finding people share personal negative experiences they wish not to share in order to provide others with beneficial social comparison. The second paper also examines the influence of differences in valence of shared content and personal relationship with the recipient. Du Plessis and Dubois pick up on the topics of valence and relation to the recipient in the case of hierarchies, finding that people tend to share positive information up the hierarchy ladder and negative information down the ladder. The authors propose that arousal underlies these patterns. Kim and colleagues finish the session by examining a specific case of communication in a hierarchy: that between stakeholders (e.g. consumers, employees) and the larger firm. The authors critically examine the popular trend of firms (e.g. Facebook) inviting stakeholders to share opinions and vote on issues. Though seeming a positive step toward giving stakeholders a feeling of influence and autonomy, the authors find many negative consequences for both firms and stakeholders.

In addition to the theme of feelings and motives, many of the papers tackle other overlapping themes, specifically: the trading off of sharer and recipient welfare (paper 1 and 2), the valence of transmitted information (paper 2 and 3), recipient characteristics (paper 2 and 3), hierarchies (paper 3 and 4), and feelings of control (paper 1 and 4).

In sum, this session seeks to reaffirm how basic consumer research can make a big difference in a modern world of increasingly sharing behavior. All the benefits of sharing, tweeting, and word of mouth hinge on a potential sharer actually choosing to share. Accordingly, understanding what motivates the sharer and how the sharer feels about sharing is fundamentally important if one wishes to promote any type of sharing from peer-to-peer tweeting to good ol’ fashioned face-to-face word of mouth.

The Selfish Side of Sharing: Effects of Need for Control on Advice Giving

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers’ purchasing decisions are often influenced by information provided by others in the form of advice (Cheema and Kaikati 2010; De Bruyn and Lilien 2008; Fitzsimons and Lehmann 2004). Previous literature has often conceptualized advice giving as an altruistic behavior driven by empathic concern for others (Goldsmith and Fitch 1997; Liu and Gal 2011). From this perspective, consumers provide advice to improve or protect others’ well-being (Hennig-Thurauf et al. 2004; Sundaram, Mitra, and Webster 1998).

Despite the intuitive validity of this argument, we suggest that a self-serving motive, and not empathic concern, sometimes drives advice giving. We argue that consumers sometimes provide advice to fulfill a self-serving motive to restore a lost sense of personal control. Building on the notion that consumers experiencing a threat to their sense of control seek means to restore control (Kay et al. 2008; Whiston and Galinsky 2008), we suggest that giving advice can provide one means of accomplishing such an objective. Thus, we propose that individuals with a need to restore control are more likely to give advice than individuals who do not have such a need.

Experiment 1 tested whether individuals who experience a temporary need to restore control are more likely to provide advice than individuals without this need. Moreover, we also tested whether this tendency is stronger for individuals with a higher chronic desire for control (Burger and Cooper 1979; Gebhardt and Brosschot 2002). Eighty-two participants were assigned to either a need to restore control condition (Burger and Cooper 1979; Gebhardt and Brosschot 2002). Eighty-two participants were assigned to either a need to restore control condition (Burger and Cooper 1979; Gebhardt and Brosschot 2002). Eighty-two participants were assigned to either a need to restore control condition (Burger and Cooper 1979; Gebhardt and Brosschot 2002). Eighty-two participants were assigned to either a need to restore control condition (Burger and Cooper 1979; Gebhardt and Brosschot 2002). 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advice when feeling out of control was stronger for individuals with a higher chronic desire for control ($p < .01$) compared to those with a low chronic desire for control ($p > .10$).

Experiment 2 directly tested for a differential effect of empathy and need to restore control on advice giving. We reasoned that, in situations in which providing advice may be potentially detrimental to the receiver, empathy vis-à-vis need to restore control should produce opposite effects. Specifically, individuals motivated by empathy should be more likely to refrain from giving advice, to avoid potentially hurting the recipient. In contrast, individuals motivated by a self-serving need to restore control should be more likely to give advice, as worry less about potential negative consequences for the recipient. One hundred and sixty five participants were assigned to three conditions of a between-participants design. We used an episodic recall task to activate across conditions either empathy, a need to restore control, or a neutral state (baseline). Next, respondents were asked to read a scenario describing a consumer in need of advice about applying for a fixed versus adjustable-rate mortgage. In particular, the scenario was characterized by ambiguity about the best course of action and potential for harm to the receiver if the wrong advice is provided. Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they would provide advice to the person involved in that situation. A logistic regression revealed a positive effect of need to restore control on advice giving, indicating that respondents in this condition were more likely to give advice than respondents in the baseline condition (72.2% versus 53.4%, $p = .04$). In contrast, the results showed a negative effect of empathy, indicating that respondents in this condition were less likely to give advice than respondents in the baseline condition (34% versus 53.4%, $p = .04$).

Experiment 3 tested whether the desire to engage in advice giving is attenuated when an alternative way to restore one’s threatened sense of control is provided beforehand. One hundred and sixty participants were assigned to a 2 (need to restore control: present versus absent) × 2 (opportunity for self-recovery: present versus absent) between-participants design. We manipulated personal control using an anticipatory thinking task (Rutjens et al. 2010). Half of the participants then engaged in a choice task that provided an opportunity to restore their threatened sense of control (Inesi et al. 2011). Finally, respondents were asked to recall and write about a positive experience they had with a product and indicate their propensity to advise others to buy that product (“I am definitely going to suggest to others to buy this product”; 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree). There was a significant need to restore control by opportunity for self-recovery interaction, $p < .10$. Contrasts revealed that when no intervening opportunity for self-recovery was present, participants with a need to restore control expressed a higher intention to give advice ($M = 8.66$) than participants with no need to restore control ($M = 7.60$, $p < .001$). In contrast, when an intervening opportunity for self-recovery was present, participants’ intent to give advice did not differ as a function of need to restore control, $p > .10$.

Overall, this research furthers our understanding of the motives that drive advice giving. Contrary to prior research, we show that advice giving can be motivated by a self-serving desire to restore a lost sense of control. Attesting to the compensatory role of advice giving as a means to regain a temporary threatened sense of control, our results suggest that advice giving might in fact be attenuated when an alternative way to restore control is provided.

REFERENCES


The Altruistic Side of Sharing: Giving Misery Company by Sharing Personal Negative Experiences

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

“The world needs people like you and me who’ve been knocked around by fate. ‘Cause when people see us, they don’t want to be us, and that makes them feel great. We provide a vital service to society!”-Avenue Q the Musical

Why do people so often share negative personal information (e.g. a fight with a spouse, a miserable product experience) when research shows focusing on one’s own or another’s negative personal experiences produces undesirable outcomes? (Neuman & Strack, 2000; Schwarz & Strack, 1999; Tiedens & Linton, 2001) In this paper we attempt to shed light on this puzzle. Building upon the altruism (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Monroe, 1994; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007) and social comparison theory literatures (Corcoran et al., 2011; Wills 1981), we propose that the sharing of personal negative experiences is often motivated by social altruism such that people willingly trade off personal costs to provide benefit to target-persons through the process of downward social comparison. Thus, people (who we call “supporters”) share negative personal information not because they are unaware of the costs associated with focusing on negative information. Instead, supporters tell target-persons about their own negative experiences because of a conscious intention to aid target-persons based on a lay understanding of social comparison (Exline & Lobel, 1999).

In sum, the findings paint a picture of people as daily social altruists who engage in a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis of two competing forces. The first force, the salient negative force entails a cost for both supporter and target-person. This force focuses both parties on negative experiences, leading both parties to feel negative emotions and dissatisfaction. In contrast, the second force, a downward social comparison force, may benefit the target-person. When considering the combination of the two forces involved in sharing personal negative information, supporters consistently predict a personal cost for sharing such information. However, supporters predict the effect on the target-person will vary depending on whether the cost of the salient negative force or the benefit of the downward social comparison force looms larger for target-persons. Importantly, by speaking about their own negative experiences, people believe they can literally give “misery” beneficial company and are willing to become such company.

In the current project we conducted five scenario experiments to test this social altruism sharing hypothesis, assess the intuitions people have about the effects of sharing negative personal information, and understand the factors that intensify and dampen the likelihood of sharing personal negative information for socially altruistic purposes.

In the first two experiments we found supporters shared more negative (and separately less positive) personal information with a target-person who had recently experienced negative experiences and that this pattern was stronger when the target-person’s negative experiences was unchangeable. In the third experiment we found the above pattern significantly occurred for targets that were and were not friends with the supporter, however the pattern was notably stronger for friends.

Experiments 4 and 5 revealed more direct evidence that this sharing behavior is intended to benefit target-persons through downward social comparison. In Experiment 4, when sharing experiences with target-persons, we found supporters not only selectively choose
to share more personal negative experiences to benefit bad feeling target-persons, but that supporters also lie about their personal experiences, portraying their experiences as more negative when target-persons would benefit from a downward social comparison. Thus supporters may incur the moral cost of lying (Grover, 1993) for the benefit of target-persons. The tendency to more negatively portray one’s experiences with target-persons who had recently experienced negative rather than positive events was completely mediated by intentions to benefit the target-person. Further, we found that when target-persons had recent negative experiences, supporters reported a much higher intention to benefit the target through personal sharing. This finding suggests that it is when others are suffering that socially altruistic processes in personal sharing are most often triggered.

Finally, Experiment 5 documented how in interpersonal conversation situations like those explored in the first four studies, people predict sharing negative experiences would be A) costly for supporters’ general feelings and worsen supporters’ own satisfaction with their personal experiences and B) beneficial for targets’ general feelings and improve targets’ satisfaction with their own experiences. Together the experiments also rule out alternative behavioral patterns and hypotheses, such as taking advantage of situations to vent, matching the conversation tone of a conversation partner, or a mean reduction in personal sharing with negative feelings others.

We began with the puzzling observation that although research has demonstrated negative consequences of focusing on one’s own or others’ personal negative experiences and people have a general preference against sharing and being exposed to negative personal experiences (De Angelis et al., 2012; Kowalski, 2002), people often choose to complain and share negative personal experiences. Though previous research has observed such behavior to occasionally be motivated by selfish desire (Taylor, Wayment, & Carrilo, 1996; Kowalski, Smith, 1983), here we propose a different (though not exclusive) motivation for this behavior: social altruism. We found that at times, supporters will incur a personal cost and share negative personal experiences when they believe doing so will benefit a target-person. We explain our findings by theorizing people hold a lay intuition of social comparison theory (Corcoran, et al., 2011; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Wills, 1981), such that supporters seek to deliberately construct downward social comparisons for target-persons by sharing their own negative experiences. Future research should explore under what circumstances sharers’ strategies are effective and if sharers can anticipate when sharing personal negative information is most likely to provide target-persons with beneficial social comparison, though past research suggests this would be in general a beneficial strategy (Jordan et al., 2011). We discuss implications for consumer behavior, social welfare, and word of mouth.

REFERENCES


La vie en Rose at the top? Why Positive (Negative) Information goes Up (Down) in a Hierarchy

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A key concern for marketers, both in academia and practice, is understanding when and why positive and negative product information spreads through word-of-mouth (WOM). Indeed, positive WOM often leads to an increase in sales (Chen, Wang and Xie...
On the premise that information is not arousing per se. Rather, informational or negative WOM as a function of arousal. Our reasoning builds on the fact that the recipient is physically aroused when sharing information (Berger and Milkman 2012). This is because arousal is a state of excitement which leads to mobilization (Berger and Milkman 2012). Extant research shows that consumers’ likelihood to share a stimuli (e.g. a WOM message or a video) increases when the content evokes arousing emotions such as anxiety or amusement, relative to content that evokes emotions which are less arousing, such as sadness or contentment (Gross and Levenson 1995). Accordingly, even incidental arousal unrelated to the message content (e.g., whether a sender is physically aroused when sharing information) can boost sharing (Berger 2011).

We aim to shed light on when consumers will share more positive or negative WOM as a function of arousal. Our reasoning builds on the premise that information is not arousing per se. Rather, information becomes more or less arousing depending on the context of the information sharing (Berger 2011) or the sender and recipient’s characteristics.

In particular, we propose that the hierarchical relationship between a sender and a recipient of a WOM message can dramatically shift the information’s arousing properties. Specifically, we hypothesize that sending a message to someone lower in the hierarchy will increase the arousal of negative information. In contrast, we hypothesize that sending a message to someone higher in the hierarchy will increase the arousal of positive information. This is because low hierarchical positions are typically associated with negative information in the form of stereotypes or negative affect, while high hierarchical positions are often viewed more positively (Cozzarelli, Tagler and Wilkinson 2002). In turn, we expect that this differential focus will make positive or negative information more arousing, depending on the recipient’s position in the hierarchy. Thus, we predict that the increased arousal, elicited by an expected sharing of information with a recipient higher or lower in the hierarchy will result in differential sharing of positive and negative information. These ideas are tested across two experiments.

In Experiment 1, undergraduates were presented with a review for a car, which has an equal number of pros and cons. After reading the review, participants were asked to send a WOM message as if they were to send an email. Key to the experiment, they were either instructed to send a WOM message to someone higher (high hierarchy condition) or lower (low hierarchy condition) in their company structure. To communicate this difference, participants were told that their task was to share a message to Paul, presented as their boss (HH) or employee (LH). To increase the hierarchical divide between the sender and the recipient, participants were presented with a graphical representation (i.e., a tree graph) representing Paul as either immediately above (HH) or below (LH) them in the tree. Next, participants wrote their messages. We counted the number of pros and cons in the message, and computed a valenced index (number of pros less the number of cons and divided by the total number of thoughts). Results indicated that participants’ message was significantly more positive when they addressed a recipient higher in the company hierarchy than when they addressed someone lower, p < .01.

In Experiment 2 we specifically manipulated recipient’s relative standing based on their own actual perceived standing, once again through a graphical ladder representing social hierarchy (see Piff et al. 2012). To do so, senders (participants) first indicated their position on the ladder. Next, a research assistant told them they would be randomly assigned to another participant to whom they will send a WOM message, and were given an information sheet about this participant. Key to the experiment, the information sheet was staged. In the high hierarchy condition, the information sheet mentioned that the assigned recipient had indicated being two steps higher on the ladder. In contrast, in the low hierarchy condition, the information sheet mentioned that the assigned recipient had indicated being two steps lower on the ladder. Next, participants shared a WOM message about a car. We coded participants’ messages as in experiment 1. Consistent with our hypotheses, messages were more positive when respondents wrote an email description to a recipient higher in the social hierarchy than when they were asked to email someone lower in the social hierarchy, p < .05.

Overall, this research contributes to our understanding of when and why valenced information is shared by demonstrating how psychological arousal arising from the hierarchical relationship between the recipient and sender of the WOM message impacts the sharing of positive vs. negative information and are consistent with arousal-hierarchy hypothesis.

These findings also have important practical implications for understanding how information might be distorted across multiple successive transmissions in an organization: the same situation might be seen in rosy hues by those at the top but through gloomy lens for those at the bottom. In turn, this discrepancy in perception might explain why leaders can be unrealistically optimistic and ignore warning signs regarding the health of their organizations, and why individuals lower in the hierarchy might show more distress or anxiety about the future—because they’ve received different information.

REFERENCES
The Negative Consequences of Empowering Consumers and Employees

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Gone are the days of managers acting as sole decision-makers in strategic choices. Increasingly, managers “outsource” some decisions – from creating advertisements to deciding on mission statements – to both internal and external stakeholders: employees and customers. While delegation of agency is often a strategic move to dodge responsibility for potential missteps or avoid being perceived as lacking transparency (Bowen and Lawler, 1992), collecting information through shared decision-making also allows companies to induce positive effects by empowering those who participate. In workplace settings, for instance, empowering employees leads to increases in job satisfaction and performance (Kirkman, 1999; Spreitzer, 1995). Similarly, research on consumer empowerment – such as allowing consumers to personalize products and services – points to the benefits of involving consumers (Fuchs, Prandelli, and Schreiter, 2010; Prahhalad and Ramaswamy, 2004; Wind and Ramaswamy, 2001). In contrast, we explore the possible negative consequences of such empowerment, examining how opening the Pandora’s box of empowerment can prove problematic when companies wish to close the lid and revert to making their own consequential decisions.

Our research focuses the consequences of empowering stakeholders to vote, with three goals, each of which contributes to a broader understanding of the negative consequences of empowerment over time. First, we explore whether allowing people to vote leads them to want to continue voting on subsequent decisions, even when the “vote giver” may no longer desire such input. Indeed, research in political science shows that political participation (including voting) engenders future participation (Finkel, 1978; Putnam, 2000). As in the previous literature, we expected stakeholders to be satisfied when empowered; in addition, however, we expected empowerment to lead to stakeholders’ demand to continue voting. Second, we examine whether stakeholders who are allowed to vote on one issue and then have the vote taken away for a second issue are more upset than those who are not allowed to vote on the first issue and then given the vote for the second: while in each case stakeholders will have voted once, we suggest that having the vote taken away is so aversive that stakeholders are as dissatisfied as they are with never being allowed to vote at all. Finally, we explore whether all voting is good voting. In particular, we explore issues of voting on trivial issues.

Study 1 tests the idea that once empowered to vote, people will express the desire to vote more and more in the future. Participants (N=106) acted as consumers of a breakfast products company called Cereal Central. The study employed one between-subjects manipulation, where participants either voted six times on company-related issues with one filler task in the middle, or were simply told about the choices the company was considering. They were then given a list of ten company issues and were asked whether each should be put up to a vote. As predicted, voting begets more voting: those in the vote condition indicated that they wanted to vote for more issues (M=2.98) than those in the no vote condition (M=2.43), t(104)=2.32, p<.05.

Study 2 explored whether voting and then having the vote taken away can be worse than not voting and then being given the vote – and even as bad as never being able to vote at all. In a 2 (vote vs. no vote on the first issue) x 2 (vote vs. no vote on the second issue) between-subjects design, participants (N=243) acted as employees of a local firm whose management team decides to let employees vote or not vote on each of two company-related issues (revising bonus scheme and promotion policies). A 2x2 ANOVA revealed no significant effect of voting on the first issue on satisfaction, F(1, 239)=1.80, p=.18, but a significant main effect of being able to vote on the second issue, F(1, 239)=78.37, p<.001, such that participants who could vote the second time were more satisfied (M=4.00) than those who could not (M=2.79). Most importantly, we observed the predicted interaction, F(1, 239)=7.65, p<.001. Follow-up tests indicated that participants who did not vote the first time and were given a chance to vote for the second issue reported significantly higher satisfaction (M=4.29) than those who voted both times (M=3.72); t(122)=3.22, p<.001: being given the vote feels better than having had the vote all along. In contrast, once empowered to vote, having that ability taken away for the second issue made people feel less satisfied (M=2.89) than those who did not vote and then voted (M=4.29), t(122)=7.96, p<.001, despite the fact that in both cases participants voted once. Indeed, having the vote taken away made participants feel as dissatisfied as if they had never gotten to vote at all (M=2.69), t(117)=.90, p>.34.

Finally, Study 3 explored whether empowerment can backfire in a different way: when stakeholders are repeatedly asked to vote on issues that they deem trivial. Using the same workplace paradigm from Study 2, participants (N=480) were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (the first issue is important vs. trivial) x 2 (the second issue is important vs. trivial) x 2 (vote vs. no vote on the second issue) between-subjects design. An ANOVA revealed that being able to vote the second time significantly increases people’s level of satisfaction overall, F(1,472)=33.44, p<.001. This main effect, however, was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 472)=53.12, p<.001. In contrast to all other conditions – in which being disempowered on the second issue led to decreased satisfaction – employees who considered trivial issues at both times were actually more satisfied when the vote was taken away on the second issue (M=4.05) than those “empowered” to keep voting on trivial matters (M=2.84), t(121)=7.73, p<.01.

These results suggest that while empowering stakeholders by giving them the vote generally increases satisfaction, such empowerment can come with downstream costs: stakeholders demanding to vote in the future (Study 1), stakeholders becoming angry when the vote is taken away (Study 2), and stakeholders becoming irritated when repeatedly forced to vote on issues about which they do not care (Study 3).

REFERENCES


The Maximizing Mindset

The first paper, by Ma and Roese, shows that comparative tasks in non-consumption domains can activate a maximizing mindset, and that this mindset can have a cross-domain impact on satisfaction with computers or smartphones. The second paper by Hsee and Zhang, demonstrates a potential gain of comparative thinking in the context of charity donations. The authors introduce a virtually costless method for boosting charitable donations: unit-asking. Unit-asking entails that donors are asked to indicate a hypothetical willingness-to-donate for one needy person before being asked to decide willingness-to-donate for N needy persons. This method makes salient the comparison between one and N needy persons, increasing individuals’ scope-sensitivity and thus boosting donations.

The third paper by Gu, Botti and Faro, identifies conditions in which the pain (vs. gain) of comparative thinking is more likely to occur. Specifically, they show that choice closure, the psychological process by which consumers come to perceive a decision to be final, increases satisfaction when the chosen option compares unfavorably with the forgone options, but reduces satisfaction when the chosen option compares favorably with the forgone options.

Lastly, Chabris et al. find that the preference for absolute over positional income levels (e.g., preferring a society in which you earns $100K while others earn $200K over one in which you earn $50K while others earn $25K) is significantly predicted by three different measures of intellectual abilities (vocabulary, CRT, WPT), but is not predicted by sex, in contradiction to most evolutionary theories.

Our proposed session can contribute to the theme of ACR 2013—making a difference. The research papers in this session extend, refine, and challenge prior research on comparative thinking and consumer well-being, and contribute to both basic theory development and marketing strategy.

The Maximizing Mindset

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Getting the best is great. It has been advocated as ideal in almost every domain of life. In business, companies strive to become the most competitive in the market. In education, students are encouraged to get as many “A”s as possible. Even in entertainment, the most popular TV shows, such as “American Idol,” “Dancing with the Stars,” and “X Factor” center on the crowning of the best performer. Although maximizing outcomes might be considered a goal, here we suggest that it may also be a mindset, that is, a way of thinking that carries over across different judgment domains.

If there is such a maximizing mindset, how does it influence satisfaction with various outcomes in life? Moreover, most people do not always achieve the best outcome, and another key question is the consequences of a maximizing mindset after failure as well as success. For example, does looking for the most suitable city in which to live have a carry-over influence on consumers’ regret level when they miss product promotions? Does trying to get “A”s in school have a cross-domain impact on satisfaction with computers or smartphones? Does seeking an ideal mate make consumers more likely to switch brands?

Past research on maximizing has centered on individual differences in chronic behavioral patterns, such that some people consistently try to get the “best” (maximizers) whereas others tend to “satisfice” and settle for “good enough” outcomes (Simon 1955). It has been proposed that maximizers have two key features: the goal to get the best out of any situation and the tendency to compare and search for alternatives (Iyengar, Wells, and Schwartz 2006; Schwartz et al. 2002). Moreover, it has been found that maximizers tend to experience greater regret and lower satisfaction than satisficers (Nenkov et al. 2008 Schwartz et al. 2002). Beyond this pattern of correlation, it remains unclear what causal impact a temporarily activated maximizing mindset might have on various affective responses to particular outcomes.

The present research experimentally activated individuals’ tendency to maximize (i.e., mindset priming) via tasks involving comparing and getting the best (e.g., a choice task). In conjunction
with this mindset priming, we manipulated different consumption outcomes and measured participants’ consumption satisfaction (e.g., regret, satisfaction, likelihood of returning the product). We assumed that this experimentally activated maximizing mindset in non-consumption domains would have a carry-over effect on subsequent consumption satisfaction. This assumption is based on the extant literature on procedural and mindset priming, which specifies that a cognitive process that is activated in the pursuit of one task remains active and is shifted to subsequent tasks, affecting responses in these tasks as well ( Förster and Liberman 2007; Kray, Galinsky, and Wong 2006; Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller 1990; Schooler 2002; Xu and Wyer 2007).

We showed that constantly trying to get the best in non-consumption domains can induce a maximizing mindset which features an elevated tendency to compare and a salient goal to get the best. This mindset can have a cross-domain impact on consumption domain, amplifying regret and dissatisfaction, increasing the likelihood of returning products, and dampening sensory experiences, such as taste.

Across six experiments, we examined the impact of the maximizing mindset activated in non-consumption domains on consumer satisfaction (e.g., regret and satisfaction) in various consumption scenarios, such as missing the best deal, product malfunction, and an imperfect vacation. Experiments 1a demonstrated the basic effect by showing that the maximizing mindset activated in non-consumption domains magnified regret in a consumption domain when participants did not get the best product deal. In a different consumption scenario, Experiment 1b further demonstrated that the maximizing mindset activated in non-consumption domains magnified regret, dissatisfaction, and likelihood of returning a product when the product malfunctioned. To probe the effect in Experiment 1 further, Experiment 2 sought to validate our proposed definition of the maximizing mindset by showing directly that this mindset indeed involves a heightened tendency to conduct upward comparisons. Experiment 3 further showed that even the sensory experience of a product (i.e., the taste of a snack) was hurt by the maximizing mindset when this product was not participants’ best choice. Moreover, this experiment also showed that although the maximizing mindset decreased satisfaction when the outcome is not the best, when the outcome is the best individuals in the maximizing mindset condition were as satisfied as individuals in the control condition.

To support our theory that the cross-domain impact of the maximizing mindset is a carry-over effect of procedure priming which is not context specific, Experiment 4 manipulated the maximizing mindset in the consumption domain (i.e., choosing brands) and then examined its impact on individuals’ satisfaction in a non-consumption domain (i.e., satisfaction about performance on an IQ test). We found that individuals’ regret and dissatisfaction about their IQ task performance were magnified after their maximizing mindset was activated in the consumption domain. Finally, Experiment 5 was designed to show the maximizing mindset is different from the comparative mindset in earlier research. Specifically, this experiment showed that the maximizing mindset and the comparative mindset both improved task performance, but only the maximizing mindset amplified regret and dissatisfaction.

The present research documents a new kind of mindset that has not been articulated in prior research yet which has unique effects on consumption satisfaction. The maximizing mindset is distinguishable from other mindsets (e.g., comparative mindset; counterfactual mindset, etc.) that have been examined in earlier research. Future research may explore further the unexpected impact of mundane daily tasks on well-being. For example, choosing the tastiest dish from a long menu in a restaurant, watching American Idol, and grading students’ assignments may all involve temporary activation of the maximizing mindset, which may in turn amplify regrets and dissatisfaction in unrelated life domains.

**Unit Asking: A Method to Boost Donations and Beyond**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Raising charitable donations requires considerable time and effort. In the U.S., for example, it costs over $50 billion each year to raise roughly $300 billion in individual donations (Greenfield, 1999; National Philanthropic Fund, 2012). In this research, we introduce a simple and virtually costless method for boosting donations.

To illustrate, consider a web-based fundraiser that solicits donations to help N needy persons. Imagine two alternative versions of the website: One version asks the donors to decide how much to donate for all of the N persons. The other version first asks the respondents a hypothetical question—how much they would donate for one of the N persons—and then asks them to decide how much to donate for all of the N persons. Notice that the second version merely adds a hypothetical question that carries no additional external information. Yet we propose that this hypothetical question will considerably boost donations. We refer to this effect as the unit-asking effect.

The unit-asking effect occurs because donors are initially scope-insensitive (Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Zhang, 2010); thus, the willingness-to-donate (WTD) donors in the unit-asking condition indicate for one needy person would be similar to the WTD donors in the control condition indicate for all of the N needy persons. When the donors in the unit-asking condition are subsequently asked to decide on their WTD for all of the N needy persons after having indicated their WTD for one needy person, their desire for consistency will compel them to contribute more for the N persons than for one person. Thus, donors in the unit-asking condition will donate more money than will those in the control condition, resulting in a unit-asking effect.

We tested the unit-asking effect in three studies involving both real fundraisers and hypothetical fundraisers. In one study testing the unit-asking effect in a real fundraiser, a company in China sent a mass email to its employees announcing a fundraiser aimed to help 40 students from low-income families at an elementary school in rural Sichuan, a school the company had sponsored following the region’s 2008 earthquakes. The email encouraged each employee to make a donation on a designated Web site within one week. The Web site had two versions, control and unit-asking. Within one week of the announcement, 320 employees visited the Web site and were randomly directed to one of the two versions. Consistent with our prediction, the unit-asking version solicited significantly more donations than did the control version.

In another study, we replicated the unit-asking effect in a different context and showed that the unit-asking effect is distinct from the well-known identifiable victim effect. One hundred and thirty-one persons recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were asked to imagine that they received a letter from the head of a trustworthy local orphanage soliciting donations for 30 new orphans. We manipulated two factors between-participants. One was the soliciting method, control vs. unit-asking. The other was victim identifiability: Half of the participants received no identification information about any of the orphans; the other half were provided with the name and a picture of one of the orphans. A 2 x 2 ANOVA found both a significant main effect of method, replicating the unit-asking effect, and a significant main effect of victim identifiability, replicating the identifiable-victim effect. The interaction effect was not significant.
suggesting that the unit-asking and the identifiable victim effects are orthogonal.

In a third study we further replicated the unit-asking effect and addressed two questions. One is whether unit-asking worked because it increased the salience of the number of needy persons. To address this, we included a number-recalling condition in which respondents were asked to recall the number of the needy persons before indicating their WTD. Another question is whether asking the donors to write down their unit-WTD is necessary. To address this, we included a thinking-only condition in which respondents were asked to merely think about how much they would donate for one of the needy persons without writing down a unit-WTD. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect. Post hoc Duncan comparisons showed that WTD was significantly higher in the unit-asking condition than in any of the other three conditions, the control condition, the number-recalling condition, and the thinking-only condition. No other effects were significant. These results replicated the unit-asking effect. They also suggested that unit-asking worked not because it increased the salience of the number of needy persons, and that asking the donors to write down their unit-WTD was necessary; what was written down was concrete, and hence more likely to compel the donors to be consistent.

In sum, our studies show that a subtle manipulation based on psychological science can make a substantial difference in real life. Even if only a small fraction of fundraisers adopt the unit-asking method, it can considerably increase total donations.

When Choice Closure Reduces Satisfaction: The Moderating Role of Decision Outcome Valence

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Previous research has shown that choice closure, defined as the psychological process by which consumers come to perceive a decision to be final, increases satisfaction with difficult decisions (Gu, Botti, and Faro forthcoming). This positive effect is explained by the fact that the sense of completion associated with choice closure inhibits comparisons between the chosen and the forgone options after the decision has been made. As comparisons tend to reduce an option’s attractiveness (Brenner, Rottenstreich, and Sood 1999), choice closure enhances satisfaction with the selected option. However, research has also found that comparisons do not always decrease the evaluation of the option being compared (Hsee and Leclerc 1998; Simonson 1989), suggesting that choice closure may, under some conditions, be detrimental to satisfaction.

In this paper, we examine the role of decision outcome valence in moderating the effect of choice closure on satisfaction. Literature has shown that a negative outcome causes individuals to engage in upward counterfactuals, resulting in lower satisfaction with the outcome, whereas a positive outcome elicits downward counterfactuals, leading to greater satisfaction (Markman et al. 1993). As choice closure works through the inhibition of these comparisons, we predict that consumers experiencing closure will be more satisfied than those not experiencing closure when the outcome is negative, but less satisfied when the outcome is positive. We also predict that consumers may not anticipate the effects of choice closure, and therefore act contrary to what may enhance their satisfaction. Prior research shows that negative, as opposed to positive, affect, is more prone to activate counterfactual comparisons (Roese 1997). As negative (positive) outcome is likely to be accompanied with negative (positive) affect, we argue that when given the opportunity of reaching choice closure, consumers may avoid it and engage in more comparisons when the outcome is negative, and instead look for closure when the decision outcome is positive.

We tested these two predictions in three studies. Based on literature showing that sensations can metaphorically activate a related abstract concept (Landau et al. 2010), in these studies we triggered choice closure using visual cues as signals to the decision maker that a decision is final and the rejected alternatives should not be further compared.

Study 1 was a computer-based study involving a hypothetical choice of chocolate, with a 2 (choice-closure trigger: closure vs. no-closure) × 2 (feedback: positive vs. negative) between-subjects design. On the first screen, participants were asked to choose one chocolate from a selection of 12 chocolates. After choosing, participants moved onto the next screen where they encountered both the choice-closure-trigger and the feedback manipulations. Choice closure was triggered via visual alterations in the assortment presentation format. Specifically, the chosen chocolate was framed in yellow and shown together with the other 11 forgone chocolates. Each forgone chocolate was either labeled with a “rejected” tag (closure condition) or not (no-closure condition). Outcome valence was manipulated through providing feedback about the quality of the selected option relative to the average quality of the assortment—either above (positive-feedback condition) or below (negative-feedback condition) the average. As predicted, in the negative-feedback (positive-feedback) condition participants exposed to the “rejected” labels were more (less) satisfied than those who were not.

Study 2 aimed to test the process underlying the observed effect by directly manipulating either negative or positive comparisons. This study was a 2 (choice-closure trigger: closure vs. no-closure) × 2 (feedback: positive vs. negative) × 2 (comparison: replication vs. comparison) between-subjects design, involving a real experience with the choice outcome. The study procedure and the manipulation of choice-closure trigger and feedback were similar to study 1. In addition, participants were submitted to a comparison manipulation while tasting the chocolate. In the comparison condition, participants were instructed to describe how the selected chocolate might be better (worse) than other chocolates in the selection, if they had previously received positive (negative) feedback. In the replication condition, participants wrote anything that came to their mind. The results in the replication condition replicated those of study 1: when receiving negative (positive) feedback, participants in the closure condition were more (less) satisfied than those in the no-closure condition. Consistent with our hypothesized process, in the positive-feedback condition, positive comparison enhanced satisfaction in the closure condition, but had no effect in the no-closure condition. In contrast, in the negative-feedback condition, the negative comparison reduced satisfaction in the label condition, but had no effect in the no-label condition. These results support the theory that comparisons, favorable or unfavorable depending on outcome valence, drive the effect of closure on satisfaction.

Study 3 tested whether consumers have an intuition of when choice closure can help and when it can hurt their satisfaction. Participants were asked to imagine buying a flavor of coffee online from 12 different coffees. They were told that, after the purchase, they found an independent report showing that their selected coffee was rated either among the top three (positive-feedback condition) or last three (negative-feedback condition) coffees among the same set of 12 coffees. In the control condition, no feedback was provided. Next, participants were directed to two purchase history webpages that concluded their purchase. These two webpages differed in presentation formats: webpage A showed the chosen along with the rejected coffees, but separated by a solid line (closure design) whereas
webpage B displayed the chosen and the forgone options without any separation line (no-closure design). Participants were asked to choose which of these two webpages might enhance their satisfaction with the selected coffee. Results showed that participants in the positive-feedback condition were more likely to select the closure-design webpage than those in the control condition. However, participants in the negative-feedback condition were less likely to select the closure-design webpage than those in the control condition. As predicted, consumer do not seem to have an intuition for when they should and when they should not seek closure, and when given the opportunity to choose between experiencing choice closure or not they act in ways that could be detrimental to their satisfaction.

Intelligence Predicts Choice of Absolute Versus Positional Income

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Positional goods are those whose valuation depends, in part, on the levels held by others. For example, if the productivity of all PhD students doubles, the rising tide of publications would not necessarily increase anybody’s job prospects, since publication records are evaluated relative to each other. Other goods, such as the amount of food at a picnic, are non-positional. A picnic feast can be relished by all, and the satiated are not made better if some go hungry.

Many goods lie in between. Indoor plumbing reduced the inconvenience of bathroom visits, but before it was universal, its value came partly from having it when one’s neighbors did not. Since income can be used to purchase indoor plumbing, swimming pools and other things in this intermediate category, we can presume that income, itself, is a positional good to some extent.

A study by Solnick and Hemenway (1998), offers a pertinent data point on this issue. They posed the following question to 257 students, faculty, and staff at the Harvard School of Public Health:

Which of these two worlds would you prefer to live in?
A. Your current yearly income is $50,000; others earn $25,000.
B. Your current yearly income is $100,000; others earn $200,000.

Note: Prices are what they are currently and prices (therefore the purchasing power of money) are the same in states A and B.

Respondents were roughly evenly split. Thus, if taken at face value, the data suggest that roughly half of these participants would be willing to have their real income cut in half to reduce others’ income by a factor of eight. (Or, equivalently, would forego an opportunity to double their income if it meant that they would lose their positional status they enjoy in world A.)

The rationality of preferring A over B (or vice versa) presumably depends on individual differences in the uses of money and in the intensity of feelings of inequity. Without knowing more, it would be hard to label either preference a mistake. One can, however, ask whether intellectual abilities predict such preferences. And we did. Our participants included undergraduate students at a selective liberal arts college and people recruited from other sources such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Each participant completed one of several different measures of cognitive ability, including a 10-item vocabulary test (adapted from the General Social Survey), a 3 or 5-item version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005), or the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT).

Three results are noteworthy: First, income appears to be less of a positional good than Solnick and Hemenway’s data suggest: 70% of our participants chose world B, in which they sacrifice relative position for more purchasing power. Second, the preference for B was predicted by intellect. For each of the three tests of cognitive ability, those who preferred B scored significantly higher. The vocabulary and WPT tests were as predictive as the CRT, which suggests that a preference for world A is not necessarily a product of some compelling intuition that is rejected upon second thought (though the test results do indicate that cognitive ability affects the considerations brought to bear or the construal of the “tradeoff” between absolute and positional standing). Third, preference between regimes was unrelated to sex. This contradicts a prediction evolutionary theorists would likely aver: that men would be more attuned to relative standing, as this would determine mating opportunities and number of offspring.

REFERENCES


they instead behave in ways that maximize remembered happiness. Time period is short (minutes, hours). Thus, though people may experience happiness to remembered happiness, except when the focal paper 3, Mogilner and Norton show consumers tend to prefer experiences, relative to construal at time of encoding particularly in circumstances when construal level at time of choice plays a major role in decisions, relative to construal at time of encoding particularly in circumstances when construal is incidental to the stimulus.

Papers 3 and 4 examine emotional consequences of time. In paper 3, Mogilner and Norton show consumers tend to prefer experienced happiness to remembered happiness, except when the focal time period is short (minutes, hours). Thus, though people may generally prefer experienced happiness, in minute-to-minute decisions they instead behave in ways that maximize remembered happiness. Finally, paper 4 (McGraw, Williams, and Warren) demonstrates consumers’ humorous response to tragedies depends on their distance from the event. Moderately distant tragedies are more humorous than both close and far tragedies, consistent with predictions made by benign violation theory. This session aims to bridge researchers who are looking at a variety of consumer research issues through the lens of time and temporal distance. Through that lens, it raises several interesting questions such as how meaning evolves over the course of time and how focusing on the present versus the future impacts behavior. It will also stimulate discussion on the effects of time across multiple areas in one’s life, both in the consumer and the personal realms. More specifically, several of the papers have implications that show marketers how to better position their products in ways in which people can make themselves happier. As such, the session aims to make a difference for people in terms of their overall well-being and raises questions about the implications of time in other related consumer domains.

In sum, our session integrates research on a wide range of consumer issues through the shared lens of time. Adopting such a perspective offers unique insights for consumer well-being and marketing practice. We expect the session to be of broad interest to ACR attendees, particularly to scholars interested in issues pertaining to goals, information processing, happiness, humor, and of course, time. We also hope the session will stimulate discussion of other ways in which time and temporal perspectives shape behavior, raising interesting questions for future research.

All research is in advanced stages, each with substantial empirical support (e.g., from field and laboratory studies).


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Many of consumers’ goals persist over long periods of time. Given the long-term nature of ongoing goals, one might expect looking ahead to the future (rather than simply focusing on the present) would be critical for achieving successful outcomes. Indeed, consumers’ propensity to plan for the future predicts wealth accumulation (Ameriks, Caplan, and Leahy 2003) and satisfaction upon retirement (Elder and Rudolph 1999). Alternatively, focusing on goal pursuit in the future might make the goal ‘loom larger’, or seem broader in scope. If consumers feel overwhelmed by goal pursuit, they may be more likely to disengage. When will focusing on goal pursuit in the present versus future be motivating versus demotivating?

In this research we suggest that how focusing on present versus future goal pursuit impacts motivation critically depends on whether consumers perceive they are in early or later stages of goal pursuit. Recent work suggests what drives goal-directed motivation evolves as consumers progress toward their goal (Etkin and Ratner 2012; Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Zhang and Huang 2010). When perceived
progress is low, consumers tend to be more concerned about the attainability of their goal, whereas when perceived progress is high, consumers tend to be more concerned about the value of their goal (Huang and Zhang 2011; Zhang and Huang 2010). Thus, factors that make one’s goal seem more attainable should be motivating at early stages of goal pursuit, whereas factors that make one’s goal seem valuable (i.e., important) should be more motivating at later stages of goal pursuit.

We suggest whether consumers adopt a present versus future focus for goal pursuit will mitigate (vs. exacerbate) their attainability and value concerns. Thinking about pursuing a goal over the next few days (i.e., present) should make the goal seem smaller in scope, and goal pursuit more manageable. Conversely, thinking about pursuing the same goal over the next few months or years (i.e., future), should make the goal seem larger in scope, and goal pursuit less manageable. Thus, focusing on goal pursuit in the present (future) should mitigate (exacerbate) goal attainability concerns, but exacerbate (mitigate) goal value concerns. Because consumers who perceive low goal progress to-date are attuned to fluctuations in goal attainability, we predict present (vs. future) temporal cues will increase motivation when perceived progress is low. In contrast, because consumers who perceive high goal progress to-date are attuned to fluctuations in goal value, we predict future (vs. present) temporal cues will increase motivation when perceived progress is high.

A series of studies supports our predictions. In study 1, we manipulated perceptions of progress (low vs. high) towards a fitness goal and asked participants to think about pursuing their goal over the next seven days (present) or over the next seven weeks (future). We find focusing on goal pursuit in the next seven days (vs. weeks) increased motivation among participants who perceived low goal progress ($M_{days} = 5.58$, $M_{weeks} = 4.65$; $F(1, 72) = 4.24$, $p < .05$), but decreased motivation among participants who perceived high goal progress ($M_{present} = 5.05$, $M_{future} = 6.18$; $F(1, 72) = 6.39$, $p < .001$). Consistent with our theorizing, focusing on the present (this week) boosted motivation for those who perceived they were in early stages of goal pursuit, whereas focusing on the future (the next two months) boosted motivation for those who perceived they were in later stages of goal pursuit.

Study 2 replicates this interaction pattern in a different goal domain: savings goals. We measured participants’ perceptions of progress towards their savings goal and then introduced them to a real website (SaveUp.com) designed to facilitate saving money. We asked participants to think of SaveUp as a tool to help people save money ‘right now’ (present) versus ‘over the next year’ (future), and recorded whether they signed up for an account as a measure of motivation. We found the present (vs. future) cue increased sign-ups among participants who perceived low goal progress, but decreased sign-ups among participants who perceived high goal progress toward their own savings goals.

Our subsequent studies investigate moderators and mediators of these effects. For example, two studies demonstrate that self-efficacy (measured in one study and manipulated in another) moderates the impact of temporal cues on motivation for low-progress consumers. Results suggest low-progress consumers differ in the extent to which they are concerned about goal attainability, and therefore the extent to which focusing on the present (future) is motivating (demotivating). Consumers high in self-efficacy (Jerusalim and Schwarz 1992) feel confident in their ability to achieve their goals, despite being in a (temporary) state of low progress. Consistent with our prior studies, near (vs. far) future temporal cues increase motivation for low-progress consumers in chronic (or situationally-induced) self-efficacy. Among low-progress consumers high in self-efficacy, in contrast, far (vs. near) future temporal cues increase motivation, similar to high-progress consumers.

Many of consumers’ most important goals are ongoing quests that require persistence over time. Understanding factors that enable (or detract from) consumers’ ability to stay motivated to pursue ongoing goals thus has important implications for consumers and marketers alike. Our results suggest maintaining a high level of motivation may require strategic management of whether consumers look to the future, or instead, focus on goal pursuit in the present.

**What was I Thinking? Effect of Construal on Memory-Based Choice.**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Construal Level Theory (CLT) argues that one’s construal level, or the degree to which one represents information concretely vs. abstractly, has a broad influence on attitudes, choice, and related behavior (Trope and Liberman, 2010). Despite the theory’s wide impact, a fundamental aspect of the theory’s mechanism is still unclear. Consider a situation where information is encountered long before a decision relevant to that information will be made. For example, consumers encounter most advertisements far from the moment of choice. This type of situation raises an important question about how construal operates: does abstract construal at the time of encountering a stimulus determine the effect of that stimulus on a later choice or does the concrete construal at the time of choice determine the effect of the previously encountered stimulus? In other words, does construal operate at encoding, causing the memory representation to reflect the encoding level of construal or does construal operate at the time of retrieval via differential weighting of information from a construal-free memory representation? In our research, we examine decisions where all the information has been learned before the moment of choice to discriminate an encoding and a retrieval account of CLT effects.

Across all studies, we use a single paradigm in which participants learn information at one point in time (with or without making a choice) and later make a choice based on their memory of the information they saw before. Construal level at exposure and final choice were independently manipulated. In order to remove potential ceiling effects, all studies involved choices between 2 vacation destinations that had 4 feasibility attributes and 4 desirability attributes. One of the vacations was high on desirability and one was high on feasibility.

In Study 1, participants were asked to choose between 2 vacation destinations that involved desirability/feasibility tradeoffs at time 1 using a superordinate/subordinate categories manipulation where participants were asked questions that required them to identify either the superordinate or the subordinate category of an item. After completing a series of unrelated tasks for 10 minutes, participants were asked to choose between the same vacation destinations under either the same or a different temporal construal. This time no information about the vacations was presented, leaving participants to rely on their memory of the vacations. An attentional mechanism would produce a main effect of time 1 construal on time 2 choice or an interaction while a weighting mechanism would predict only a main effect of time 2 construal. Only a main effect of time 2 construal was found suggesting that construal level does not influence memory representations, but rather operates through an attribute weighting mechanism.

Memory of attributes was also tested. Even though participants remembered about half of the attributes, on average, the ratio of feasibility to desirability attributes remembered did not differ by con-
dation suggesting that memory was not affected by construal at the
time of encoding even though construal at the time of encoding did
affect choice at encoding.

Finally, this study also included a mouselab type measure that
allowed us to record which attributes participants were viewing and
for how long. These measures also showed that while time 1 prefer-
ences were consistent with the construal level at that time, there were
no differences in the number of feasibility/desirability attributes
viewed or the amount of time spent viewing them.

While study 1 asked for a choice at time 1 as well as time 2,
study 2 did not ask for a choice at time 1 in order to show that choice
is not required to establish product memory. Also, we used different
types of construal manipulations at time 1 and time 2 to avoid arti-
factual dominance of the time 2 construal manipulation. Construal at
time 1 was manipulated using the how?/why? manipulation that has
been shown to reliably change construal level (Freitas, Gollwitzer,
and Trope, 2004) while construal at time 2 was manipulated using
a temporal distance manipulation similar to those used in the ear-
lier experiments. The results showed only a main effect of time 2
construal consistent with the idea that construal operates only at re-
trieval. Study 2 memory results were consistent with Study 1.

Finally, to generalize our results to a longer time span, Study 3
used vacation choices with 48 hours between information exposure
and choice. Results were consistent with our previous studies. This
study also reconciled our results with somewhat differing results
found by Kim, Park, and Wyer (2009). In their study, they found
effects of construal level at encoding after using temporal construal
manipulations at Time 1. Study 3 replicates their study and com-
pares their temporal manipulations, integral to the stimulus itself,
to our manipulations, which are more priming based and incidental,
suggesting that there is a difference in the way that these two forms
of construal affect encoding in memory. Study 3 results suggest that
integral manipulations do affect attention and memory while inci-
dental manipulations do not.

In sum, across a series of 3 studies manipulating the construal
level under which participants learned information as well as re-
trieved it to make choices, we find that construal level at final choice
is a major factor in decisions, for both long and short delays. Further-
more, these findings have theoretical implications for CLT suggest-
ing that construal does not seem to influence attention or memory
representations unless the construal level is integral to the stimulus
itself.

Philosophies of Happiness: Preferences for Experienced
and Remembered Happiness

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Which life would you prefer: a life where you experience hap-
piness on a moment-to-moment basis such that you feel happy dur-
ing your life; or a life that you reflect back on and feel happy thinking
about and remembering? Now, imagine answering this same ques-
tion for just your next hour, rather than for your life overall – would
you choose an hour of experienced happiness or remembered hap-
piness? We explore not only people’s preferences for happiness, but
also examine how these different philosophies of happiness play out
in how people spend their hours – and ultimately how they live their
lives.

Blaise Pascal observed, “All men seek happiness. Whatever
different means they employ, they all tend to this end.” Although
everyone wants to be happy and research has begun informing this
universal pursuit, the factors shown to be associated with happiness
seem to be largely dependent on how happiness is assessed (Kahen-
man and Deaton 2010; Nelson et al. 2012; Stone et al. 2010). While
some of the research treats happiness as a moment-to-moment state,
where the goal is to optimize the happiness people experience over
the course of their daily lives (Csikszentmihaly and Hunter 2003;
Kahneman et al. 2004; Killingsworth and Gilbert 2010; Mogilner
2010; White and Dolan 2009), other research asks people to evaluate
their happiness by reflecting back on their lives more generally (Die-
er, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin 1985; Easterlin 1995; Lyubomir-
sky and Lepper 1999). Kahneman (2011) describes this distinction as
experienced happiness (being happy in your life) versus remembered
happiness (being happy about your life). Although there has been
considerable research identifying factors that are associated with
each kind of happiness, researchers have not asked people which
form of happiness they would prefer. In short, we ask the question:
which happiness are people looking to optimize?

We asked 398 individuals from across the United States to
choose which of these two forms of happiness they would prefer, and
we varied the time frame under consideration such that participants
chose between experienced and remembered happiness for their life,
the decade, the year, the month, the week, that day, that hour, or
that minute. Overall, most people (67%) chose a life experienced
as happy over a life remembered as happy (33%). This preference
held irrespective of gender, age, income-level, marital status, having
children, and reported life satisfaction; indeed, the only individual
difference that had an effect was impulsivity, with highly impulsive
people being even more likely to choose an experienced happy life
(88%) over a remembered happy life (12%). Most interestingly, this
preference for experienced happiness persisted for all of the time
frames except the minute and the hour. When choosing for these
shorter time frames, individuals preferred remembered happiness
(58%) over experienced happiness (42%). Because minutes and
hours necessarily add up to days and weeks, these results suggest a
possible mismatch between short-term and long-term preferences:
overall, people want a life of experienced happiness, yet in any given
minute they choose remembered happiness.

We tested the robustness of these preferences in a different
sample of 203 Americans who were presented with this choice of
happiness for all seven time frames in a within subjects design. The
results persisted: 74% chose a life experienced as happy over a life
remembered as happy (26%). Again, this preference reversed for
shorter time frames, with 73% choosing a minute remembered as
happy over a minute experienced as happy (27%). Interestingly, this
preference reversal did not occur among participants who were first
presented with the choice for their life (rather than for the minute).
Among these participants, preference for experienced happiness per-
sisted through to the smaller time frames, suggesting that starting
in an “experienced” mind frame in the long-term may help people
choose experienced happiness in the shorter-term as well.

Thus, it appears that there is a general preference for expe-
renced happiness over remembered happiness; however, when
considering smaller time frames, people are generally more likely
to prefer remembered happiness. Indeed, when we manipulated a
week-long vacation to be perceived as shorter in another study, we
saw the preference for experienced happiness decrease. Specifically,
we asked a sample of university students to choose between experi-
encing or remembering happiness for their upcoming Spring Break,
which was highlighted on either a year calendar (making the break
seem relatively short) or on a month calendar (making the break
seem relatively long). There was also a control condition with no
calendar shown, for which the results looked very much like the long
break condition, in which most (77%) chose a vacation experienced
as happy over a vacation remembered as happy (23%). However,
when led to view their Spring Break as shorter, students’ preferences for experienced happiness significantly decreased (to 60%).

Not only is one’s philosophy of happiness malleable, but the philosophy one adopts manifests in distinct behaviors. For instance, Spring Breakers who chose experienced happiness were more likely to spend their vacation relaxing on the beach, whereas those who chose remembered happiness were more likely to spend their vacation days volunteering. Similarly, individuals whom we instructed to maximize their experienced happiness reported being more likely to spend the next hour relaxing, whereas those whom we instructed to maximize remembered happiness reported to be more likely to spend that hour working or volunteering.

Although people’s lives are the sum of the minutes and hours they spend, our results demonstrate that individuals seek to maximize different versions of happiness when considering these different time frames. And if people decide how to spend their next hour in pursuit of remembering happiness (as our results suggest), they might miss out on their preferred life of experienced happiness.

The Psychophysics of Humor

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Psychological distance (due to the passage of time, degree of social familiarity, differences between geographical locations, or degree of reality) is an important factor in transforming tragedy into comedy (McGraw et al. 2012; Morreall 2009). Understanding how psychological distance influences humor perceptions has implications for happiness (enjoying life), advertising (knowing who to target with humorous ads, and when), coping (transforming pain into pleasure), and sensitivy (avoiding “too soon” comedy fails).

In contrast to theories that explain why distance linearly increases perceptions of humor (McGraw et al. 2012), we draw from the benign violation theory to predict a curvilinear relationship. There is a sweet spot to comedy in which humor in response to a tragedy will rise and subsequently fall with distance.

The benign violation theory proposes that humor occurs when something that seems wrong, threatening, or unsettling (i.e., a violation) simultaneously seems okay or acceptable (i.e. benign; McGraw and Warren 2010). For example, tickling is physical attack that does not cause true harm (Koestler 1964; Veatch 1998). The theory suggests two ways that something may fail to elicit humor: it can be purely benign (tickling oneself) or purely violating (a stranger does the tickling; McGraw and Warren 2010; Veatch 1998). Humor requires the right balance of threat. Too much threat reduces humor by making it difficult to see things as benign, whereas too little threat reduces humor by making it difficult to see a violation.

Psychological distance reduces threat (Mobbs et al. 2007; Williams and Bargh 2008). Thus, the benign violation theory predicts that increased psychological distance (e.g., passing time) alters whether an event seems purely violating (insufficient distance), a benign violation (the right amount of distance), or purely benign (too much distance). We thus expect that a tragic event (a severe violation) can be transformed by passing time (or other forms of distance) into something that is humorous (a benign violation) and then into something that is boring (a benign situation) producing a curvilinear relationship between distance and humor.

Hurricanes are anticipated tragedies, providing a unique opportunity to examine the influence of distance on humor found in social media content. As Hurricane Sandy approached the New York metropolitan area, people were already joking about it. @AHurricaneSandy tweeted, “It’s RAINING men. Literally. I just picked up a bunch of dudes and threw them.” To illustrate the dynamic inter-play between the passage of time and humor, we presented online samples of participants potentially humorous tweets about Hurricane Sandy before, during and after the hurricane hit the northeastern US. We recruited participants at nine time points: one day before the hurricane hit the northeastern United States, the day the hurricane made landfall there, and again numerous days and weeks following the natural disaster. At each point, participants evaluated the humor in three tweets related to Hurricane Sandy.

Humor is highest at wave 0 (the day before the storm hits), then drops to its lowest point at wave 4 soon after the storm hit (16 days), goes back up to a second peak at wave 7 after more time has passed (36 days), and drops again at wave 8 (64 days) as the event starts to become a distant memory. These data suggest that (1) in the immediate wake of the storm, it is “too soon” to find humor in jokes about it, (2) with distance, it becomes “okay” to find humor in such jokes, but (3) with too much passage of time, jokes about the tragedy lose their punch. In a one-way ANOVA treating wave as a random factor, we find that humor significantly varies across time, F(8, 908) = 2.60, p = .008, partial eta-squared = .02. Contrast tests support a non-linear view of time on humor, as the linear contrast was not significant, but the quadratic (p = .004) and cubic contrasts (p = .003) were reliable.

We suggest that psychological distance creates a sweet spot in which one is most likely to find humor in tragic events. The sweet spot should vary as a function of the degree of tragedy or threat. More severe violations (vs. less severe violations) should stay longer in the “too soon” category, thus taking longer to get to the “just right” sweet spot. They should also take longer to become benign and fall into the “too late” category. To illustrate we asked an online panel to provide examples of tragedies (severe violations) and mishaps (mild violations). First, participants described an event that, “observers would generally agree is so bad that it is a tragedy, but can be joked about” (e.g., “a piano falling on one’s head”). Next, participants described an event that, “observers would agree is bad, but falls well short of being a tragedy, and can be joked about” (e.g., “breaking a leg”). Participants then indicated either when it is “too soon” to find humor, or “too late” to find humor, in jokes about the previously listed events.

Participants indicated that it takes longer for it to become “okay” to joke about severe tragedies (median = 30.4 days) compared to milder negative events (median = 0.4 days). It also takes longer for it to become “too late” to joke about severe tragedies (median = 547.5 days) compared to milder negative events (median = 182.5 days). Hence, when it comes to finding humor in tragic events, the severity of the event determines the best time to joke about it. We conducted a 2 (severity) x 2 (timing) repeated measures ANOVA, with severity (tragedy vs. mishap) serving as the within subjects variable and timing (too soon vs. too late) serving as the between subjects variable. Most critically, the analysis revealed a main effect of severity, F(1, 93) = 18.9, p < .001.

Human history is rife with tragedy, and triumph over tragedy. Psychological distance is an important factor in triumphing over tragedy, first through humor and next through irrelevance. The dynamic nature of humor challenges the leading theories of humor and psychological distance, but it is supportive of a benign violation approach to humor and a threat reduction approach to psychological distance.

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Paper #1: With Friends Like These Who Needs Money? Three Tests of the Substitutability Hypothesis of Money and Social Support
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Jannine D. Lasaleta, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #2: Money and Marriage? How Marital Dynamics and Gender Differences in Risk Affect Financial Portfolio Composition Choices
Avni Shah, Duke University, USA
Howard Kung, University of British Columbia, Canada
Jawad M. Addoum, University of Miami, USA

Paper #3: Friendship and Finance: The Psychology of Borrowing and Lending
Noah J. Goldstein, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Ashley N. Angulo, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA

Paper #4: Increasing Tax Compliance by Empowering Taxpayers
Cait Poynor Lamberton, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, University College London, UK
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
If one could wish for two gifts that would substantially improve life, having money and strong close relationships would be ideal candidates. Money and relationships, while being able to improve life’s outcomes, do so by dramatically different routes and mechanisms—and yet have significant overlap too. This session peels into the consequences that money and close relationships have for one another—and in doing so reveals some thought-provoking patterns for scientific understanding and consumer welfare.

This session features cutting-edge research in the psychology of money and relationships, and seeks to answer two important questions: 1) How can individuals’ close relationships influence their perceptions of and decision-making with money? 2) Conversely, how can decisions about money influence the behavior and perceptions within relationships? This session explores two fundamental areas of research in consumer research and seeks to understand the theoretical and practical implications to aid consumer well-being.

The first two talks investigate how close relationships can influence perceptions of money and decision-making with financial assets. Vohs starts the session by examining how social support and money can be treated as interchangeable resources. Vohs and Lasaleta demonstrate the substitutability hypothesis: when people have strong close relationships and feel supported by others, individuals have less desire to obtain and hold onto money. Shah investigates the interaction between social support and money by exploring how marital status can affect financial portfolio compositions.

The last two papers examine how money can influence perceptions and attitudes towards relationships. Goldstein discusses how perceptions and attitudes within relationships change when lending or borrowing money. The researchers show that there is a unique exchange expectation in lending relationships in comparison to gift-giving for example, regarding what types of goods or services the recipient is expected to consume with the borrowed money. Lenders believe that they are entitled to a certain level of control over the borrowers financial decisions, reporting frustration and anger when they feel money has been misused. At a system level, these results help explain why American taxpayers were so outraged by seeing their money being used by the government to fund indulgences such as bonuses, resulting in subsequent tax avoidance and evasion.

In summary, this session investigates the interactive nature of money and relationships. Using a diverse set of methodologies these papers have incredible implications for policy and societal well-being, as well as basic scientific understandings of the psychology of money and relationships.

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Our theory is that there is something correct about the two direct association explanations. People seem to treat money and social support as interchangeable resources, a claim that we have termed the substitutability hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that to the extent that one resource is seen as plentiful, people will act as if there is little need to pursue the other. There already exists evidence supporting one form of the substitutability hypothesis, that money can substitute for relationships with others (e.g., Vohs et al. 2006; Zhou et al. 2009). Therefore, our investigation tested the novel hypothesis that when people feel that they have ample support from others, defined as the perception that one is cared for by others (Wills, 1991), they have less desire for money, defined as the motivation to obtain and hold onto money.

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Rich people have fewer friends than the rest, according to a Gallup poll (2004). Respondents whose income was at the top of the scale reported having the fewest friends, while those making the least money reported having the most friends.

There are many possible explanations for these stylized facts. One is that having or being around money creates a preference to be alone or an inability to make friends. Another is that having many friends weakens the desire or ability to obtain money. (Of course, there are third-variable explanations too.)

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Aim: Experiment 1 was the initial test of the substitutability hypothesis. Method: Participants (n=39) were instructed to recall instances of social support or the number of facts they had learned throughout their lives. Next, participants ranked a list of twelve life values and traits in order of personal importance (adapted from self-affirmation research). This list included business skills and financial success, both related to the acquisition of money. Results: In an initial show of our hypothesized effect, participants who recalled in-
stances of social support ranked business skills and financial success as less important than those who recalled number of facts learned.

**Aim:** Experiment 2 provided a conceptual replication of the effect using different measures of desire for money: worry over money and willingness to pay. We reasoned that as desire for money weakens, people would be less worried about it, and more willing to give it up for goods and services. Experiment 2 also aimed to address an alternative explanation for the proposed effect. It is possible that recalling instances of social support heightens positive affect, which could affect how much people care about money. **Method:** Participants (n=119) rated the number of friends they talked to every day on scales that cued a social network that was small (low social support condition) or large (high social support condition). Next, participants completed a worry over money scale and indicated their willingness to pay for twenty-two items. **Results:** As predicted, participants who were cued to see themselves as having a more expansive network reported less worry over money and greater willingness to pay for goods than those cued by a smaller social network. As expected, there was no effect of condition on positive or negative mood reports. This rules out an alternate explanation of our effects based on changes in mood.

**Aim:** Experiment 3 further tested our theory using a face valid measure of desire for money and provided process evidence. **Method:** Participants completed the same manipulation from Experiment 1, recalling either number of facts learned or friends made throughout their lives. Participants then completed a standard measure of social support (Social Connectedness Scale – Revised; Lee, Draper, and Lee, 1991) to provide process evidence. Next participants completed a money importance scale as an indicator of desire for money (sample item: “Frankly speaking, having money is something that I value”). **Results:** As predicted, participants who were reminded of their friends expressed less money importance than those reminded of facts. Process evidence revealed that the effect was mediated by increased perceptions of social support. **Conclusion:** Three experiments demonstrated evidence in support of the novel hypothesis that feeling socially supported weakens the desire for money. More broadly, this work supports the substitutability hypothesis, which states that people treat money and social support as interchangeable resources. Both money and help from others can enable people to obtain what they want and need from society and culture, and the apparent substitutability of these resources translates into a diminished motivation to attain one when feeling flush with the other.

The current work connects two large literatures whose focus bears significantly on the daily lives of people worldwide, and yet do not connect much with one another. Close relationships constitutes a fundamental part of psychology, an entire field, economics, is devoted to the study of money, whereas marketing has interests in both relationships and money. What is therefore surprising is how little research there is on how these two motivations relate, which the current work seeks to rectify.

We opened the paper by noting that a Gallup poll (2004) presented an interesting association. Respondents with the highest incomes said that they had on average the fewest friends, whereas those with the lowest incomes said that they had the most friends. While wanting to be popular can drive people to engage in unhealthy behaviors and enter dangerous situations, a putatively bigger problem (perhaps especially today) is the powerful drive to have money, lots and lots of money. Our research suggests a way to offset its power — stoke a sense of social support and people’s motivation for money should wane.

**Money and Marriage? How Marital Dynamics and Gender Differences in Risk Affect Financial Portfolio Composition Choices**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Disagreements over money are widely believed to be one of the leading causes of divorce and separation in the developed world. Hence, it is perhaps unsurprising that examination of transitions in and out of marriages reveal large differences in financial portfolio decisions. Women invest a significantly smaller proportion of their portfolios in stocks when single. In contrast, men tend to significantly increase their stockholdings when single (e.g., Hinz et al., 1997; Barber and Odean, 2001). However, what remains unclear is how these gender differences manifest themselves in financial portfolio allocations.

We examine how portfolio compositions are altered when single individuals transition to marriage, or conversely when married individuals transition to divorce. We ask how varying income levels or sudden income shocks amongst men and women within marriage affect bargaining power and subsequent financial portfolio decisions? Finally, what psychological mechanisms account for these differences in financial risk-taking and changes in bargaining power in marital dyads? We suggest that gender differences in risk, specifically that women are more risk averse while men are risk seeking, can substantially influence how financial portfolios are composed within and out of marriage. We argue that wanting to ensure financial certainty for the future will mediate this gender and safer portfolio choice relationship.

We first used field data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a nationally representative longitudinal survey of nearly 9,000 U.S. families to investigate whether intra-household frictions are significant predictors for explaining life-cycle portfolio choice. We found significant evidence that women, both individually and in dyads are more risk averse than men. This was reflected in stock allocation differences. Furthermore, our results were robust to alternative risky asset definitions, including investments in stocks, real estate, and holdings in private businesses. Also, the proportion of safer to risky assets was shifted towards safer holdings when women had sudden income shocks, such as a raise or inheritance, in comparison to men. We sought to dig deeper into this relationship across three experiments.

In Study 1, we investigated whether differences in risk was actually moderated by gender. We gave participants a series of twenty gambles to choose from varying the probability of winning and amount of money earned if won. Participants were given $5 with each gamble costing $1 to play. Individuals could choose to play up to five gambles at most or could choose to play none and keep the $5. Women significantly (p<0.01) chose less gambles to play overall than men and chose gambles with higher probabilities of winning in comparison to men demonstrating the gender disparity in risky decision-making with money (p<0.01).

In Study 2, we sought to investigate how perceived marital status (i.e., single, married, divorced) influenced the relationship between gender and risky financial choices. We repeated the study design from experiment 1, but asked individuals to imagine that they were either single, married, or divorced during the decision-making process. We replicated the finding that women were more risk averse than men, but we found significant evidence that women made riskier choices when they were in the marriage stage as opposed to single and divorce. In Study 3, we wanted to investigate the potential mechanism of why women and men acted differently regarding financial decisions.
within and outside of marriage. We repeated the same study design as the first two experiments but told participants that in addition to their $5 they were given for gambling, they would be given an additional either $1 or $5 in order to mimic a sudden income shock. Women made safer asset choices when single or divorced, and also made safer choices when they received larger income shocks. This effect was mediated by wanting to ensure future financial certainty, especially for their family. Thus, it is clear that relationship stage can influence decisions with assets. Also, it seems that the need for financial certainty for the future, or in other words wanting to protect resources for one’s future family also influences safer or riskier choices with money.

Such differences are interesting in documenting a potential mechanism for better understanding how and why marital status, gender, and intra-household bargaining can affect financial portfolio decisions over time.

The Psychology of Borrowing and Lending

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

How do we feel when other people – like our friends and family – spend our money? A great deal of research explores the factors that influence our satisfaction with the goods and services that we consume with our own money (Bearden and Teel 1983; Spreng et al. 1996; Van Boven and Gilovich 2003). However, there is surprisingly little research on the factors that influence our satisfaction with the goods and services that other people consume with our money. In particular, we explore the case in which one person loans another a sum of money and then must watch (uncomfortably) as that borrower spends that cash before paying it back to the lender. We suggest that this mixing of friendship and finance can quickly go awry, harming relationships in the process.

Researchers have drawn distinctions between market and communal relationships (Fiske 1992) and the unique currency (i.e., financial and social, respectively) that is acceptable for exchange within each (Heyman and Ariely 2004). Situations that blend the two types of exchanges – like close friends loaning money to each other in the manner of a bank – often have unexpected consequences.

Exchange relationships between lenders and borrowers are unique but prevalent; the implications can be small, ranging from a cup of sugar lent to one’s neighbor, to monumental in the 2008 example of the federal government loaning A.I.G. money in the largest bailout in American history (Walsh 2008). Due to the everyday and large-scale implications of lending relationships, it is important for researchers to understand how the details of the exchange, the purchase, and different expectations influence satisfaction with the various dimensions of the lending and borrowing experience.

In our research, we demonstrate that lenders and borrowers differ in both (a) how they mentally account for the loaned funds (Thaler 1985) and (b) the expectations they have for how the money should be spent. We argue that this asymmetry between lenders and borrowers contributes to the dissatisfaction with the lending experience, affecting the relationship and influencing whether lending will occur again.

Our first study demonstrates that what the borrower purchases influences the lenders’ satisfaction. Participants read a scenario in which they imagined they had loaned a certain amount of money to an acquaintance. Some participants learned that the borrower made a utilitarian purchase with the money (a textbook), whereas other participants learned the borrower made a hedonic purchase (music from iTunes). Participants reported more anger towards borrowers who made the hedonic purchase than borrowers who made the utilitarian purchase. Participants also viewed borrowers that made the hedonic purchase as more selfish and ungrateful than borrowers who made a utilitarian purchase.

Study 2 explored whether these different reactions to borrowers buying hedonic or utilitarian products was unique to lending experiences – experiences that mix market and communal relationships. We compared three types of exchanges: one where a gift was given to a recipient (communal), one where a payment was made to a recipient (market), and one where a loan was made (mixing the two). As in Study 1, we also manipulated whether the recipient spent the money on a hedonic or utilitarian good. Consistent with predictions, participants reported more anger if the borrower purchased a hedonic item (versus a utilitarian one), but those who had loaned the money (versus gifted or paid) reported the most anger. These results suggest that there is a unique exchange expectation in lending relationships regarding what goods or services the recipient is expected to consume with the money they borrowed.

In Study 3, we explored whether these effects were limited to loaning money to borrowers, as opposed to lending other tangible resources, such as products. Specifically, whereas money is fungible, a tangible good like a video game is not. Participants read a scenario where they either lent a friend a video game worth $50 or loaned the friend $50 cash. Participants again reported being angrier with the borrower who purchased iTunes (versus textbook) whether they had lent them a game or loaned them money; those who loaned money (versus lent the game), however, reported the most anger.

In our last study we aimed to investigate whether the driver for lenders’ anger was the expectation that they should be able to control what the borrower purchases. Through a sense of endowment for the loaned money, the lender might expect more influence over what the borrower purchases than what the borrower expects of the lender. We asked participants how much control borrowers (versus lenders) believe that lenders should have over what the borrower does with the money. Our results revealed that lenders believe they are entitled to far more control over what the borrower purchases than borrowers believe lenders to be. This result sheds light on the possible root of the anger that lenders feel when borrowers seem to “misappropriate” their loan (Studies 1-3).

Taken together, these findings provide insights into the psychology of interpersonal lending and borrowing. More broadly, the results help to explain the “outrage” (Reddy and Bendavid 2009) American taxpayers felt after discovering that much of the money the federal government loaned to companies such as A.I.G. went to employee retention bonuses (a luxury purpose). In this example – as with lending between friends – lenders (in this case taxpayers) believed that borrowers should use the loaned money for utilitarian purchases, and were enraged when borrowers seemed to indulge.

Increasing Tax Compliance by Empowering Taxpayers

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers would prefer to spend their money on nearly anything but taxes (Sussman and Olivola 2011). Given this deep-seated hatred of taxes, achieving tax compliance remains a challenge. In fact, as a result of tax avoidance or tax evasion, major public programs in the US are subject to funding shortfalls amounting to over $300 billion per year. Despite the increased attention paid to financial decision-making by consumer behavior researchers, research has not yet documented interventions that increase tax compliance – behavior that can have hugely positive effects on public well-being.

We suggest that consumers’ tax compliance can be significantly increased simply by providing them a structured opportunity to voice
their opinions about spending priorities. This voice opportunity is offered in a simple advisory allocation process, where consumers provide non-binding input regarding the way their tax dollars are spent. In addition, increased compliance appears to increase satisfaction with payment, suggesting that such an intervention could benefit not only the institutions that depend on tax dollars, but decrease the irritation that taxpayers experience when paying taxes.

Two experiments support these conclusions. In study 1, two-hundred and fifty-seven English speaking US citizens recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk panel received a nominal payment in return for their participation. Participants first provided basic demographic information, reported their tax filing status, and stated their gross household income. Some participants were then given the opportunity to provide input about the way that 10%, 25% or 50% of their tax dollars would be allocated across various categories currently used by the US government to describe tax spending (www.whitehouse.gov), while others were given no allocation opportunity. Then participants were asked to imagine that they became aware of a tax loophole that enabled them to avoid paying 10% of their income tax bill, and were asked if they would take the loophole.

When not given the opportunity to allocate, approximately 64% of participants indicated that they would take the questionable loophole. Allowing 10% allocation led to a significant decrease in likelihood of taking the questionable loophole (45%) relative to non-allocation ($2.11, Wald chi-square = 4.18, p = .04). Further, we find that effects on compliance are mediated by participants’ beliefs that taxes will support something they value (95% CI for indirect effect of allocation via value use: 0.01 to 0.14). This finding is consistent with Frey and Stutzer’s (2000) suggestion that higher subjective well-being associated with other direct democracy actions can be attributed to “political outcomes closer to voters’ preferences, as well as to the procedural utility of political participation possibilities.”

In contrast, beliefs about audit likelihood did not explain compliance (p > .5), consistent with a large body of literature showing the relative ineffectiveness of stringent penalties in this domain (Isaac, Schmidt and Walker 1989). Most interestingly, we find that higher compliance also mediated participants’ satisfaction with paying the lab tax (95% CI for indirect effect of allocation via amount paid: .01 to .13); this mediation does not however hold if causality is reversed. This finding is consistent with recent work suggesting that tax payment may create, rather than result from, satisfaction (Akay et al. 2012).

Future work will explore allocation’s effectiveness relative to other interventions designed to increase compliance, examining their interplay and documenting their relative effects.

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Redistribution and Social Justice in Consumer Behavior

Chairs: Gabriele Paolacci, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Klaus Wertenbroch, INSEAD, France & University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #1: Deserved Fruits of Labor? Culture, Just-World Beliefs, and Preferences for Redistributive Incentive Schemes
William W. Maddux, INSEAD, France
Douglas H. Frank, INSEAD, France
Klaus Wertenbroch, INSEAD, France & University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #2: Spreading the Health: Americans’ Estimated and Ideal Distributions of Death and Health(care)
Sorapop Kiatpongsan, Harvard Business School, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA

Paper #3: The Effect of Income Tax on the Motivation to Work Depends on People’s Cultural Philosophies
Scott Rick, University of Michigan, USA
Gabriele Paolacci, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Katherine Burson, University of Michigan, USA

Paper #4: Conspicuous Consumption Reflects How Redistribution Influences Perceived Social Justice
Barbara Briers, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Klaus Wertenbroch, INSEAD, France & University of Pennsylvania, USA
Breagin K. Riley, Syracuse University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
The financial crisis of 2008 that originated in the U.S. and the subsequent, ongoing economic crisis across the industrialized economies of Western Europe have focused societal attention on the importance of consumer preferences for (in)equality and social justice. This session sheds light on two questions that are at the core of the current political and public debate on inequality in many countries: How much (in)equality do consumers prefer, and what effects do different redistribution regimes designed to reduce income inequality have on consumer behavior and motivation? Madsux, Frank, and Wertenbroch examine preferences for income (in)equality. They observe cultural differences in preferences for economic redistribution, both via individual incentive schemes as well as fiscal redistribution via income taxation, and demonstrate that these cultural differences are due to cultural variations in consumer just-world beliefs about the sources and deservedness of individual success. Kiatpongsan and Norton examine preferences for income-based health (in)equality. They assess Americans’ perceptions of (in)equality of health-related outcomes along with their ideal distributions of these outcomes, showing not only that respondents underestimate the concentration of gains in life expectancy among the wealthy and overestimate gains in life expectancy among the poor but also that respondents prefer greater health equality among the rich and the poor than is currently the case. Rick, Paolacci, and Burson examine how income redistribution affects motivation to work. Contrary to normative predictions, they show that the mere presence of taxes decreases effort and accuracy in a repeated labor task. However, people who favor both redistribution and government intervention are actually motivated by the presence of a tax, resulting in increased productivity and earnings. Briers, Wertenbroch, and Riley examine how people’s redistribution preferences affect consumption behavior. Specifically, they posit that people who favor less rather than more fiscal redistribution are more inclined to perceive and display status consumption as a meaningful signal because they consider income to be more deserved, that is, because they have a stronger belief in a just world.

The objective of the session is to broaden the scope of consumer research into the political and macroeconomic realm, by linking theories from economics and social psychology to derive implications for consumer behavior in its social context. Because the papers in the session address key questions in the current political, public, and academic debate of (in)equality and social justice, we expect it to draw a large and diverse audience of consumer researchers. In turn, we hope this session will foster further scientific efforts that will contribute to such debate with novel angles. The papers have experienced consumer researchers as authors and/or presenters, which may also help increase the visibility of the session. All empirical studies described in this session proposal are complete.

Deserved Fruits of Labor? Culture, Just-World Beliefs, and Preferences for Redistributive Incentive Schemes

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Until recently, managers and business leaders have tended to assume that organizational reward systems are equally acceptable around the world. However, several recent high-profile failures highlight the potential hazards of applying a “one-size-fits-all” reward system around the world. For example, the failure of Wal-Mart’s entry into Germany has been attributed in part to its unwillingness to embrace egalitarian German wage-setting practices (Knorr and Arndt 2003). Similarly, the Lincoln Electric Company, the subject of the best-selling Harvard Business School case study, failed initially when it tried to expand abroad from the U.S. The CEO said executives had mistakenly assumed that all cultures would be equally receptive to the company’s performance pay system (Hastings 1999). The cultural acceptability of these systems, especially of “high-powered,” individual performance incentives (Lazear 2000), is also of increasing relevance in the context of growing income inequality (Plender 2012). Thus, the French government recently discussed limiting top executive salaries in state-controlled companies from exceeding those of the lowest-paid employees to a ratio of 20:1. What makes different incentive schemes more or less preferable in different cultures?

We identify a particular psychological mechanism, linking cultural variations in social preferences for egalitarian versus performance-based compensation schemes to beliefs about the relationship between effort and success. Building on recent economic research on preferences for fiscal redistribution, we propose that cultural differences in preferences for compensation schemes are at least partly driven by cultural differences in “just-world beliefs” (JWBs, e.g., Lerner 1980). JWBs refer to individuals’ general beliefs about whether the world is a fair place where people largely get what they deserve. In cultures where JWBs are relatively strong and the typical individual is seen to generally get what s/he deserves, performance-based compensation should be seen as fair and compensation schemes should be relatively motivating and desirable for employees. Thus, Lincoln Electric’s reward system in the United States, a country relatively high in JWBs (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), reflects James Lincoln’s philosophy that each worker “must have a reward that he feels is commensurate with his contribution” (Lincoln 1951, p. 33).
which is consistent with the country’s dominant cultural ethos. In contrast, in cultures where JWBs are weaker and the link between effort and performance is generally believed to be more tenuous, more equal payment schemes should be seen as fairer and thus be more preferred. Thus, in Europe, where JWBs are lower overall and where Lincoln stumbled, performance-based incentives were less successful. There, compensation practices are more regimented due to widespread collective bargaining (e.g., Flanagan 1999), which leads to wage compression (e.g., Kahn, 2000). This wage compression weakens the link between an individual’s reward and her contribution and makes compensation inherently more redistributive than a system that aims to match wages and productivity.

An impact of JWBs on cultural differences in organizational reward systems and preferences for incentive schemes has not been noted in the literature. In hypothesizing an effect of JWBs on these preferences, we leverage recent cross-national analyses in economics of a link between JWBs and attitudes towards redistribution in the context of taxation and social spending (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). We build on the structural similarity between tax-based, fiscal redistribution and organizational incentive schemes, both of which can be designed to reward the results of individual performance (by tax higher incomes at relatively low rates or by paying performance-based wages) or to redistribute them across group members (by taxing higher incomes at relatively high rates or by paying more equal wages for different degrees of performance). Based on this similarity between tax- and wage-based redistribution, we propose that cultural differences in JWBs impact preferences for more or less redistributive individual compensation schemes much like they impact preferences for more or less fiscal redistributive tax policies. Study 1 demonstrated a general correlation between the JWBs of a culturally diverse sample of former managers (measured with items from Rubin and Peplau 1975) and their preferences for performance pay on an individual task, controlling for expected task performance. Study 2 showed that American participants had stronger preferences for individual performance pay in an experimental task (controlling for task performance) and for lower general tax rates than French participants and that these differences were mediated by JWBs. Study 3 held culture constant in a moderation-of-process design and replicated these effects by experimentally manipulating instead of measuring JWBs, demonstrating the causal effect of JWBs on preferences for performance based reward systems while controlling for possible differences in cultural value systems (e.g., Siegel and Larson, 2009, on the role of egalitarian value systems; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004, on the role of Hofstede’s, 1980, power-distance and individualism).

In the current political and social debate about growing income inequality in countries around the world, our research provides guidance to policy makers and executives in gauging the cultural acceptability of different tax regimes and pay practices. We demonstrate that cultural variations in fundamental social beliefs about the causes of individual performance and success—about “how the world works”—are responsible not only for cultural variations in preferences for fiscal redistribution but also for redistributive reward systems.

**Spreading the Health: Americans’ Estimated and Ideal Distributions of Death and Health(care)**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Recent debates in the United States about universal health care – with some viewing the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (or “Obamacare”) as a moral imperative but others viewing it a government intrusion – have highlighted differences in opinion about how the costs and benefits of health care should be distributed among poor and rich Americans. Using two metrics – life expectancy and access to healthcare – we sought to measure people’s understanding of how health is currently distributed among Americans, as well as assess their preferences for how health should be distributed. We then compared these estimates to the actual distribution. Importantly, we also explored whether Americans from across the political and income spectrums (rich and poor, liberal and conservative) showed consensus in their ideals.

415 Americans (58% female; age range: 18 to 74) estimated the distribution of outcomes for Americans in each of the five income quintiles in two domains: a) unmet need for prescription medications (unable to obtain prescription medication due to cost in the previous year) and b) gains in life expectancy (average increase in the number of months people lived over the previous 20 years). Respondents also reported their ideal distributions of death and healthcare – how they thought each should be distributed among Americans. These estimated and ideal distributions were then compared with the actual distributions.

Respondents’ estimated distributions of unmet need for prescription medications as a function of income were fairly accurate. However, respondents underestimated the extent to which gains in life expectancy were concentrated among the wealthy and overestimated the extent to which gains in life expectancy were shared by the poor. Most importantly, estimated and ideal distributions differed significantly on both dimensions – unmet need for prescription medications and gains in life expectancy – such that respondents wanted these health outcomes to be spread more evenly among the rich and poor than they estimated them to be. Female, Democrats and lower income respondents preferred more equal health distributions compared to Male, Republicans and higher income respondents, respectively (p<0.05 for all the comparisons). However, all respondents – male and female, rich and poor, conservative and liberal – desired more equal distributions of health outcomes than the current actual distributions in the United States.

In sum, estimated and ideal distributions of health and healthcare differ significantly, suggesting that Americans across the political and economic spectrums would prefer health and healthcare to be more equally distributed among the rich and poor.

**The Effect of Income Tax on the Motivation to Work Depends on People’s Cultural Philosophies**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

When income is based on effort and performance, daily decisions about how much and how hard to work can add up to influence one’s financial well-being. We investigate how income tax influences the decision to work. Some have famously promised to exit the labor force in response to income tax. For example, many Tea Party enthusiasts have considered “going Galt” (quitting their jobs to reduce the amount of income tax the government can collect), inspired by Atlas Shrugged protagonist John Galt. However, despite decades of empirical research, economists have yet to reach a consensus on how income taxes influence labor force participation (Keane 2011). The lack of a definitive answer may be due to the conflicting effects of income tax posed by neoclassical economic theory. Income taxes make leisure relatively less expensive (substitution effects), but also make people poorer, producing a greater need to work (income effects).

Beyond income and substitution effects, income tax may impose psychological costs that influence labor force participation. Although people across the political spectrum prefer a more equi-
table distribution of wealth than currently exists in the United States (Norton and Ariely 2011), the interventions required to achieve that more equitable distribution (e.g., income tax) may be psychologically aversive to many.

To examine the psychology of taxation, some previous experimental research has investigated the effects of the mere presence of taxation (taxation that did not reduce net wages or increase consumer prices, and thus, from an economic perspective, should not influence behavior). Some studies have found that taxes are more aversive than comparable non-tax price increases (Hardisty, Johnson, and Weber 2010; Sussman and Olivola 2011), whereas others have found that people respond positively to taxes (e.g., Djanali and Sheehan-Connor 2012).

We propose that an important source of the mixed results is heterogeneity in what Kahan (2012) and colleagues refer to as “cultural philosophies.” Taxes involve both redistribution and government intervention, and thus the extent to which people find inequality aversive and endorse government intervention are likely to be influential. Such cultural philosophies are separable (correlated but distinct), stable, and differ widely across individuals. Regarding inequality, “Egalitarians” find it distressing, whereas “Hierarchists” are comfortable with existing levels of inequality. Regarding government intervention, “Communitarians” believe that it is needed to protect citizens, whereas “Individualists” object to government intervention.

To examine whether cultural philosophies influence reactions to income tax, we conducted a multi-round, incentive-compatible labor experiment in which we controlled for net wages. From a normative perspective, the presence of taxation that does not affect net wages should not influence productivity (persistence and accuracy). Psychologically, however, taxes may be irritating enough to forgo income unless people favor both redistribution and government intervention. As a result, the mere presence of taxation may reduce productivity among everyone except Egalitarian-Communitarians, who may actually be motivated by income taxes.

In our experiment, participants were given the opportunity to earn money by performing a tedious task. In each round, participants counted the number of zeros that appeared in a matrix of zeros and ones (cf. Abeler et al. 2011). Participants were assigned to a No Tax or Tax condition. In the No Tax condition, participants were paid 20 cents per acceptable response (a response within ± 1 of the correct response). In the Tax condition, participants were paid 40 cents per acceptable response, and 20 cents in tax was immediately deducted. The tax was redistributive: participants were told that their taxes would go to “students who participate in different studies with us.” A paycheck, indicating their pay-rate and net pay for that round, appeared at the end of each round. Participants were told they could stop working at any time, and (unbeknownst to participants), they could complete up to 20 rounds. At the end of the study, following several filler items, participants completed the short form of the Cultural Cognition Worldview scales (Kahan et al. 2011). Our manipulation did not influence responses to these trait scales.

Overall, we found that taxed participants earned significantly less than non-taxed participants (even though taxes, by design, did not influence net wages). This was driven by taxed participants’ greater tendency to make more mistakes and to quit sooner. However, as predicted, we also found a three-way interaction between condition, communitarianism, and egalitarianism. Among Egalitarian-Communitarians, the mere presence of tax increased persistence, accuracy, and earnings.

The results raise the possibility that populations that include a high proportion of Egalitarian-Communitarians may be less resistant to income tax. To address this question, we compared state-by-state responses to the 2010-2012 ANES Evaluations of Government and Society Study (EGSS) with state income tax rates (a proxy for resistance to income tax). The EGSS uses a representative U.S. sample and measures respondents’ state of residence. The EGSS includes nine items that capture Egalitarian/Hierarchical philosophies (e.g., “When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors.”) and three items that capture Communitarian/Individualist philosophies (e.g., “How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington DC to do what is right?”). (In a pre-test, these EGSS subscales correlated strongly with the Kahan et al. (2011) subscales.) We averaged responses on the two subscales among respondents in each state, and then ran two regressions. In the first, we regressed the lowest income tax rate in each state on average Egalitarian/Hierarchical responses within the state, average Communitarian/Individualist responses within the state, and their interaction. The second regression utilized the highest income tax rate in each state as the dependent measure. As predicted, each regression revealed a significant interaction between egalitarianism and communitarianism: State income taxes were highest in states that were highest in both egalitarianism and communitarianism, and clearly lower elsewhere.

Taken together, the results suggest that income tax may generally reduce productivity, unless the population enduring the tax has a large proportion of Egalitarian-Communitarians. Such populations may support high income tax and work harder when income taxes are high.

**Conspicuous Consumption Reflects How Redistribution Influences Perceived Social Justice**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

The market-based economies in the United States and Western Europe face what has been called a crisis of legitimacy. At the heart of this crisis lie questions about the extent to which unequal rewards and the resulting inequality of incomes in society are justified and deserved. The wealth gap between the top one percent of U.S. earners and the rest of society has more than doubled in the last 20 years (The Economist 2011), while growth rates of Western economies have slowed. Among calls for increasing taxes on higher earners to reduce income inequality and fiscal debt, policy makers have to stimulate consumer spending. To inform this debate, we examine whether perceptions of, and preferences for, status consumption as a reliable signal depend on redistribution preferences and their mutual association with just-world beliefs (BJW; Lerner 1980), specifically beliefs about how deserved variations in people’s income are.

Status consumption, also conspicuous consumption (Veblen 1899), is a meaningful signal of status only when it involves exerting effort or incurring other costs to obtain the signalled status (Grafen 1990; Miller 2009; Spence 2002). For example, Nelissen and Meijers (2011) found that the social benefits of wearing conspicuous clothing disappear when participants are aware that the clothes are not the beneficiary’s own, that is, when the beneficiary did not pay for the clothes. Status—and conspicuous consumption as a signal of status—is not meaningful when it is undeserved, that is, when it does not reflect exerted effort (Dreze and Nunes 2009).

The degree to which effort is a source of success reflects Lerner’s (1980) theory of the Belief in a Just World (BJW; Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Bénabou and Tirole 2006). BJW refers to the belief that individuals are responsible for their own fate and therefore generally receive what they deserve. Although it is highly functional to believe that individual outcomes are the predictable consequences of
people’s behaviors (Lerner 1980), everyday life as well as statistical data often belie that belief. For example, Hochschild (1982) finds no difference in the effort invested by the top and bottom percentiles of earners, suggesting that hard work is not (highly) correlated with high income (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Lerner 1980).

Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model how beliefs about the role of effort as a determinant of individual earnings influence societal preferences for fiscal redistribution to reduce income inequality. A dominant social belief that individual economic success is highly correlated with personal agency and thus deserved (high BJW) yields regimes with relatively low redistribution, whereas a dominant belief that success is not (always) deserved (low BJW) yields regimes with relatively high redistribution. In turn, the resulting redistribution regimes also shape consumers’ BJW and perceptions of deservedness (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Bénabou and Tirole 2006).

We build on these reciprocal effects between just-world beliefs and redistribution to investigate how redistribution-driven perceptions of deservedness manifest in status consumption. If people in favor of lower redistribution tend to have a stronger BJW and thus a stronger belief that people’s income is deserved, they should place more value on conspicuous consumption as a meaningful signal of deserved status. Alternately, if people in favor of more redistribution tend to have a weaker BJW and thus a weaker belief that people’s income is deserved, they should value conspicuous consumption less as a meaningful signal of deserved status. We thus hypothesize that a preference for lower (higher) redistribution leads to a higher (lower) value of status consumption, and that this effect is driven by BJW. Data from two experiments and a national consumer survey support this hypothesis.

In Study 1, we directly tested whether manipulated redistribution attitudes affect the perceived deservedness of conspicuous consumption. The results indicate that people with a preference for lower (higher) redistribution are more likely to interpret conspicuous consumption as a signal of deserved status. In Study 2, we then explored the mediating mechanism with a national panel survey that measured consumers’ attitudes toward taxation, their BJW, and their value of possessions as a signal of success. It is shown that consumers’ attitudes toward taxation affect their value of possessions as a signal of success and that this effect is driven by BJW. The correlation results of Study 2 are replicated in Study 3 in which manipulated attitudes toward redistribution via taxation are proven to affect preferences for conspicuous yet not for inconspicuous consumption (Griskevicius et al. 2007), again driven by BJW.

Our work adds to recent research that has begun to examine consumption behavior in its political and macroeconomic context (Cutright et al. 2011). Our contribution is threefold. First, we offer a theory of conspicuous consumption that extends beyond mere status signaling by linking it with recent economic theories of redistribution and beliefs about social justice (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Bénabou and Tirole 2006). Thus, we show that beliefs about the causes of (in)equality, not just actual inequality (Christen and Morgan 2005) or equality (Ordabayeva and Chandon 2011), influence consumer spending. Second, by shedding light on the effects of redistribution on specific types of consumption, our theory adds a new facet to research on the complex and often contradictory effects of taxation on consumer spending and on the economy (Feldstein and Elmendorf 1990; Romer and Romer 2010). Third, we present initial experimental evidence that redistribution can undermine consumers’ fundamental social beliefs, such as whether hard work results in deserved material wealth, a notion of major motivational importance in society and a key aspect of the American Dream.

REFERENCES


Paper #1: Suffering in Silence: Close Customers’ Reluctance to Complain Damages Service Relationships

Nita Umashankar, Georgia State University, USA
Morgan Ward, Southern Methodist University, USA


Mina Rohani, HEC Montréal, Canada
Yany Grégoire, HEC Montréal, Canada
Renaud Legoux, HEC Montréal, Canada
Jean-Charles Chebat, HEC Montréal, Canada

Paper #3: The Effects of Consumer Vulnerability on Service Evaluations and Wellbeing Outcomes

Laurel Anderson, Arizona State University, USA
Danielle Matharas, Arizona State University, USA
Richard J. Caselli, Mayo Clinic, USA
Denise M. Kennedy, Mayo Clinic, USA
Amy L. Ostrom, Arizona State University, USA

Paper #4: Acknowledging Consumer Gratitude: Leveraging the Voice of the Consumer to Increase Loyalty

Paul W. Fombelle, Northeastern University, USA
Clay Voorhees, Michigan State University, USA
Sterling Bone, Utah State University, USA
Alexis Allen, Florida State University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Building on existing literature, the proposed session will contribute to a better understanding of how consumers engage with service firms. Research papers to be presented investigate this topic from multiple theoretical and substantive perspectives, offering a broader view of consumers’ perceptions of positive and negative service relationships. Given the growing importance of service relationships for both service and product firms, a better understanding of how consumers react to and benefit from and are negatively impacted by good (vs. bad) service experiences is likely to have a significant effect on future research on consumer services. The proposed session will contribute to the understanding of several content areas that are of great interest to ACR conference attendees, including social closeness, consumer revenge, consumer vulnerability, and customer satisfaction.

Broadly, the four papers in the session explore consumers’ response to service experiences. First, Anderson et al. examine the issue of consumer complaining through the lens of consumer vulnerability. They introduce a new the construct of consumer vulnerability and define it as a state that arises when individuals face potential high levels of perceived risk coupled with low levels of perceived control. The authors present a research model that shows a positive correlation between complaint rates and customer satisfaction levels which the authors theorize is driven by the differential vulnerability of the individual.

Building on this research, both Umashankar and Ward as well as Rohani et al. examine how consumers respond to service failures and how self-expression can sometimes mitigate the residual negative feelings the consumer harbors toward the provider. First, Umashankar and Ward observe how the social closeness between the service provider and the consumer impacts the way in which complaining affects consumers’ perceptions of the firm after a service failure. They show that customers in close (vs. distant) relationships are less likely to complain after a service failure, and that when consumers do so, close consumers feel more positive about the provider as a result, while distant consumers subsequently feel more negative about the provider. In related work, Rohani et al. look specifically, at consumers’ desire to take revenge on the firm. They show that revenge can be mitigated with time and surveys. Specifically, the authors show that time reduces the desire for revenge when combined with answering multiple surveys as consumers experience some catharsis from giving feedback. However, the passage of time without the presence of surveys surprisingly has an amplification effect on desire for revenge.

Lastly, Fombelle et al. examine customer service experiences from the opposite perspective and investigate the effects of acknowledging very satisfied customers. The authors demonstrate the benefits of acknowledging positive feedback from consumers following a successful service experience. This research demonstrates that better management of the post-purchase process for the most satisfied consumers can provide substantial gains for firms in the form of increased patronage and loyalty.

The discussion will aim at facilitating a broader understanding of consumers’ engagement (positive and negative) with service firms. Across the four papers, the way in which firms enable and respond to consumer feedback after a service experience will be considered with an eye on investigating the key questions of: How should and when should firms encourage consumer interaction after a service? How does the mode of expression affect consumers’ subsequent perceptions and actions toward the firm?

Suffering in Silence: Close Customers’ Reluctance to Complain Damages Service Relationships

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Firms strive to create strong relationships between their service providers and customers (Yim, Tse, and Chan 2008). Indeed, strong customer relationships drive favorable word of mouth (Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2002), justify price premiums (Bolton 1998), and lower staff turnover (Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995), all of which leads to higher firm profits. Such relationships can be cultivated through close customer-service employee interactions, which help strengthen customer-firm linkages (Yim, Tse, and Chan 2008). Furthermore, the extant literature on customer service relationships touts the benefits of close customer-service employee relationships insofar as when something goes wrong, consumers are more forgiving if the service relationship is built on friendship rather than on an exchange relationship (Goodwin 1996). However, more recent research suggests that close relationships with customers may not always benefit the firm. In fact, when consumers have a “friendship” with the firm, in some instances they have stronger negative reactions to a service failure (Wan, Hui, and Wyer 2011). Yet, the few papers that exist in this area largely focus on customers’ perceptions of a service failure as the outcome of interest rather than the consequences of these perceptions, for the firm. Wan, Hui, and Wyer (2011) aptly note that future research should consider, “Other reactions, such as complaining and switching service providers.”

In this research, we build on prior findings and consider how providing feedback may impact consumers’ subsequent behavioral responses to the provider (i.e. perceptions of the provider, consumer loyalty) after a service failure or a delightful customer experience.
The act of self-expression (in the form of complaining or complimenting) can be beneficial for consumers as complaining is cathartic and enables them to air their grievances and express their disappointment while complimenting may intensify the positive experience (Bearden and Oliver 1985; Aliche et al. 1992; Dunn and Dahl 2012; Pennebaker and Beall 1986). However expressing one’s opinion can also make the issue more salient to the individual. We identify the moderating variable of social closeness in differentially predicting whether self-expression is beneficial or detrimental to consumers’ loyalty to the firm after a service failure. Research on social closeness indicates that although individuals in close relationships are more likely to self-disclose, they are also motivated to limit direct, negative feedback or express negative emotions in order to keep the relationship intact (Bell 1978; Locke and Horowitz 1990; Sommers 1984).

Given the extant research on self-disclosure to close others, we predict that customers in close (vs. distant) relationships will be less likely to provide feedback (complain) after a service failure, whereas they will be more likely to complement the provider following service delight. Furthermore, we predict that when consumers do complain, close consumers will feel more positive about the provider as a result, while distant consumers will subsequently feel more negative about the provider. Three studies support these predictions.

Study 1
In our first study we asked participants to recall and describe a very poor (vs. delightful) service experience with a close (vs. distant) service provider. Participants were then asked whether they gave feedback to the service provider. The data reveal a main effect such that participants were more likely to give feedback to the provider after receiving a delightful experience. However, as predicted the main effect was qualified by a marginal interaction with social closeness such that after a poor experience, individuals were more likely to give feedback to a distant (vs. close) service provider ($F(1, 134) = 3.65, p < .06$).

Study 2
Based on the open-ended responses to Study 1, we created a scenario that drew from common experiences reported by our participant pool. In our second study, participants read a scenario which manipulated both the service experience and the social distance between the participant and the service provider. In a 2 (service experience: poor vs. delightful) x 2 (social closeness: close vs. distant) experiment, participants read about receiving an excellent (vs. terrible) haircut from a hairdresser with whom they had a very close (distant) relationship. Again, the data reveal a main effect such that participants were more likely to give friendly feedback after receiving a delightful (vs. complaining after a bad) experience ($F(1, 152) = 19.24, p < .0001$). However, a marginal social closeness by experience interaction ($F(1, 152) = 3.75, p < .05$) was also replicated, indicating that when consumers who receive a disappointing (vs. pleasing) service from a close (vs. distant) provider, they are less likely to voice their dissatisfaction.

Study 3
Finally, we more closely examine the process of giving feedback after a bad experience, and how giving feedback effects consumers’ subsequent desire to return to the service provider. In a 2 (social closeness: close vs. distant) x 2 (subsequent complaint: complain vs. no complaint) experiment, participants read only the poor service scenario. After reading the scenario, participants had (vs. did not have) an opportunity to complain about the poor service they received. We find a marginally significant interaction ($F(1, 224) = 2.61, p < .10$) such that close customers who complain (vs. do not complain) are more likely to return to the hairdresser, whereas distant customers are less likely to return to the hairdresser after complaining (vs. not complaining). The results indicate that while complaining enables close customers to express their discontent thereby mitigating their bad experience, it may increase distant customer’s focus on the service failure and lead them to abandon the provider.

Pour Oil on Troubled Water: The Effects of Mere-Measurement and Time on Customer Desire for Revenge

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Since revenge significantly affects both victim and offender, research on revenge has received increasing attention in the psychology (McCullough, Fincham, and Tsang 2003; McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak 2010) and marketing literatures (Grégoire, Tripp, and Legoux 2009). One of the most robust findings is that revenge substantially and quickly decreases over time. It has been convincingly argued that revenge is associated with intense emotions (e.g., anger) and cognitions (e.g., betrayal) that are difficult and unhealthy to sustain over time.

The current research further explores the effects of time on customer desire for revenge, which is defined as the motivation of bringing the firm down to get justice after a service failure (Bechwarti and Morrin 2003). The research addresses a key weakness of most longitudinal designs which refers to the confounding effect of the variable “time” with “answering a survey”. We argue that very fact of answering a questionnaire can influence a desire for revenge. This effect is known as the mere-measurement (Fitzsimons and Morwitz 1996). In other words, this research wonders whether the observed reduction in revenge over time is caused by a mere-measurement effect, the effect of time, or the combination of both factors.

Two rival explanations exist for the mere-measurement effect in this context. The “catharsis effect” paradigm argues that answering a survey about service failures allows customers to vent their negative emotions and actively process the situation (Barclay and Skarlicki, 2009); this effect would reduce a desire for revenge over time. On the other hand, the “amplification effect” paradigm suggests that answering questions about an unfair experience may lead customers to mentally re-experience the service failure (Chandon et al. 2011; Fitzsimons and Morwitz 1996), which would reinforce a negative mood and enhance rumination (Bono, McCullough, and Root 2008; McCullough et al. 2001). This alternate process would sustain customer desire for revenge over time.

To address this issue, we performed a longitudinal experiment with an online third party organization, ConsumerAffair.com, over 60-days. The study involved two conditions. The first condition involved four series of questionnaires that were administered every two weeks over two months. The second condition involved a survey that was sent only at the end of two months. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. In the first condition, 111 customers completed the four surveys over time. In the second condition, 56 participants completed the only survey received after the two month period. The “desire for revenge” is measured with an established five item scale ($\alpha=.96$; $M=3.41$; $SD=2.11$) (Grégoire, Tripp, and Laufer 2009).

For the first condition, we analyze the evolution of the means with a within-subject ANOVA with the four levels of revenge desire that correspond to the four waves. Overall, the coefficients for the linear term ($F(1, 111)=22.11; p < .000$) and the quadratic term ($F(1, 111)=4.97; p < .028$) are both significant. This result implies that the
desire for revenge decreases following a quadratic pattern over time. Moreover, the desire for revenge of the participants who answered only one survey at the end of two months is significantly higher compared with those who received a survey at wave 1 (M=4.32 vs. M=3.41, t(50)=2.82, p<.01) in the other condition. Another t-test reveals that the desire for revenge of the customers who answered multiple surveys over the two months is significantly lower than those who answered one survey at the end of the two-month period (M=4.32 vs. M=2.58, t(162)=4.87, p<.000).

Overall, our findings offer a better understanding of the effects of time on desire for revenge. On the one hand, time reduces the desire for revenge when combined with answering multiple surveys. In this first case, we found a catharsis effect of answering multiple surveys over time, which is consistent with the result of previous studies. On the other hand, time without the presence of measurement bias surprisingly has amplification effect on desire for revenge. Customers who did not answer a survey about a service failure in the two-month period have the highest desire. This result may be explained as follows: customers did not have the opportunity to retrieve and re-process their negative experience by answering multiple surveys. This important result contradicts most evidence reported in the revenge literatures, and questions the appropriateness of many longitudinal designs.

The Effects of Consumer Vulnerability on Service Evaluations and Wellbeing Outcomes

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Working with a large health service provider, we explore the effects of consumer vulnerability on post-service failure evaluations, outcomes, and behaviors. First, we introduce an individual-level, multidimensional construct of consumer vulnerability (potential harm, perceived level of risk, perceived level of control). Then, we develop a framework of post-service failure evaluations, outcomes, and behavior as a function of consumer vulnerability. Consumer vulnerability in the health care domain is of utmost importance, as patients may experience physical pain, psychological pain, illness, fear of the unknown, and a perceived lack of control during the service interaction (Berry and Bendapudi 2007). Not only can service failures in health care lead to objective harm to patients/consumers, the resulting drops in service quality and customer satisfaction scores can lead to decreases in federal funding for the health care institution and decreases in pay-for-performance for providers. Our key research question is: how does consumer vulnerability influence evaluations of the service experience, complaint behavior, and ultimately the health and well-being of the consumer? In examining department-level patient satisfaction and complaint data, we identified a positive correlation between complaint rates and customer satisfaction levels in some departments; these departments received high patient satisfaction scores but also high rates of complaints. We believe that the different levels of consumer vulnerability within each department may be driving this relationship, perhaps due to the differences in customer expectations for the service encounter and differences in the criticality of care.

The construct of consumer vulnerability is becoming increasingly important due to changing economic conditions, evolving health complexities and disparities, immigration patterns, and the widening educational divide. In this research, we define consumer vulnerability as a state that arises when individuals facing potential economic, physical, or psychological harm experience high levels of perceived risk coupled with low levels of perceived control. Our conceptualization allows potential harm to be present, (e.g., membership to a vulnerable population, such as a cancer patient), but if that individual feels in control of their health, then individual-level vulnerability can still be relatively low. Vulnerable populations or groups have been covered quite extensively in the macro-marketing sense (see Journal of Macromarketing December 2005); researchers typically discuss vulnerability as a grouping variable, with vulnerable populations characterized by their degree of physical sensitivity/competency, mental competency, and sophistication level (Morgan et al. 1995). In the consumer literature, individual-level consumer vulnerability has been discussed in Luce and Kahn (1999) and the Health Belief Model (Becker 1974, Rosenstock 1974), where vulnerability is operationalized as one’s perceived susceptibility to contracting a disease in the future.

Here, we re-conceptualize consumer vulnerability as a multidimensional, higher-order construct with three dimensions: potential harm, perceived level of risk, and perceived level of control. The first dimension, potential harm is the presence of chronic or situational factors that pose objective threats to an individual, such as individual characteristics (e.g., physical issues), individual states (e.g., grief), and external conditions (e.g., discrimination) (Baker, Gentry, and Rittenburg 2005). The second dimension, one’s perceived level of risk, is a subjective perception of susceptibility to harm caused by a potential threat (Luce and Kahn 1999; Rosenstock 1974). And the third dimension, perceived level of control is a belief about one’s influence over outcomes and events (Klein and Helweg-Larsen 2002; Wallston et al. 1987). A new diagnosis or false-positive test results can lead to a loss in one’s sense of control and order (Luce and Kahn 1999; Pavia and Mason 2004). Loss of control over the service outcome can cause customers to experience stress, anxiety, and feelings of low self-efficacy (Berry and Bendapudi 2007).

We then explore how the construct of consumer vulnerability operates within a service evaluation and outcome model. We posit that vulnerable consumers are more likely to be physically or psychologically harmed during a service failure, especially within a health care context. We also build upon the classic expectation/disconfirmation models of perceived service quality (Parasuraman et al. 1985) and customer satisfaction (Oliver 1980; 1993), to suggest that consumer vulnerability influences service evaluations and outcomes by impacting one’s expectations for the service experience. We hypothesize that higher levels of vulnerability may lead to greater expectations for the service interaction, as the consumer has a greater need for critical care, objectively and subjectively. To test
our hypothesis, we conducted a pilot study using department-level survey data for 32 departments. In the survey, we asked three independent coders to evaluate some of our key variables by department. The coders were selected for their wide base of knowledge about the health care institution and all of its departments, but were completely blind to our research hypotheses and purpose of the study. The coders rated patient-provider relationship strength and length, health severity and complexity (objective harm), patient expectations for care, and subjective wellbeing. We found a positive correlation between health severity and service expectations ($r = .36, p < .05$) and a positive correlation between health complexity and service expectations ($r = .37, p < .05$). These results provide some initial department-level support for our hypothesis that a patient’s vulnerability may influence expectations for the service interaction. We are now analyzing patient-level satisfaction data to test our full model.

Overall, we introduce a new conceptualization of individual-level customer vulnerability and present a transformative consumer research model of how vulnerability may influence post-failure evaluations, outcomes and behaviors. Our research provides new insights to researchers interested in individual-level vulnerability, as well as to service firms for understanding the role of consumer vulnerability in shaping service quality and satisfaction ratings. We hope to start the discussion of how we can deliver services in a manner that decreases consumer vulnerability by potentially increasing perceptions of control or reducing perceptions of risk. While we look at these relationships in the context of health care, we expect similar issues to be present in encounters with critical services, such as in the areas of financial services and education.

Acknowledging Consumer Gratitude: Leveraging the Voice of the Consumer to Increase Loyalty

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

When consumers’ purchase experiences end in dissatisfaction, complaints are often triggered and most customer-oriented firms invest heavily in recovery with hopes of addressing their complaints and restoring loyalty. While addressing complaints is certainly a critical customer service strategy, it is imperative that these efforts don’t detract from investments in maintaining relationships with the most satisfied customers. In fact, evidence from companies like Starbucks suggests that the revenue differential between highly satisfied and satisfied customers dwarfs that of the difference between unsatisfied and satisfied customers (see Figure 1). More specifically, highly satisfied customers spend 3.4 times more over their lifetime than satisfied customers (Moon and Quelch 2006).

Data like these suggest that the savvy manager would dedicate more effort to managing relationships with their most satisfied consumers. Traditionally, most efforts focused on managing these relationships have centered on moments of truth during the core service experience. While these efforts help build baseline satisfaction levels with a focus on the service delivery stage of the purchase journey, they ignore post-purchase stages of the journey, which offer a great opportunity to build the relationship outside of the service facility. By leveraging ongoing consumer research efforts, firms can create new moments of truth focused on dialogue with their best customers. More specifically, when these most satisfied customers reply positively to customer satisfaction assessments, these words of praise traditionally are documented and then quickly forgotten. We contend that these words of praise represent an opportunity for service firms to create a new moment of truth focused on acknowledging the feedback and extending the dialogue with their best customers. Ultimately, these relational investments will increase bonds with their best customers and result in increased patronage.

Although research on acknowledgement of positive feedback is sparse in the marketing literature, several other streams of research are particularly applicable. At a fundamental level, research on reciprocity finds that people respond to each other in kind—positive actions on behalf of one entity elicit positive actions from another, and vice versa (Gouldner 1960). Relatedly, extensive research exists on the mechanism governing the process of expressing gratitude to a customer, as well as the resulting changes in behavior of that customer. The current research focuses on the organization’s expression of gratitude. We are suggesting that a simple expression of gratitude can result in relationship-building outcomes. Past research also suggests contingencies to this relationship. Drawing on literature from marketing, social psychology, information systems, and online commerce, the authors have identified acknowledgement type, acknowledgement speed, and reward provision as potential moderators to the relationship between acknowledgment and positive relational outcomes (see Figure 2 for Conceptual Model). First, the type of acknowledgement indicates the level of customization the company response includes in the expression of gratitude. The key question here is whether or not a customized response is necessary or if a generic expression of gratitude can suffice. Secondly, the timing of the acknowledgment may prove critical. While an immediate response may feel automated and disingenuous, a long delay may cause the consumer to feel like the company really didn’t care. We seek to identify the proper delay in company response. Lastly, a small token of appreciation or reward may play a key role. The nature of this reward may also be relevant, as monetary and social rewards may trigger different consumers from consumers (Heyman and Ariely 2002).

The current research seeks to understand the effect of extending the dialogue with very satisfied customers who offer positive feedback. Specifically, we investigate the effects of acknowledging very satisfied customers with an expression of gratitude via a brief email. Along with an initial pilot study, Study 1 utilizes an online, scenario-based survey to provide initial support for the benefits of acknowledging positive feedback from consumers following a successful service experience. In an effort to extend these findings, we partner with a large, full-service restaurant chain to conduct a follow-up lon-
gitudinal field experiment for Study 2. Additionally, we consider the moderating effects of acknowledgement speed, personalization, and incentive provision. This research demonstrates that better management of the post-purchase process for the most satisfied consumers can provide substantial gains for firms in the form of increased patronage and loyalty.

In Study 1, online panel participants read a scenario in which they had a great dining experience, completed a satisfaction survey regarding the experience, and then received or did not receive an acknowledgment from the restaurant. Results support the relationship between acknowledgment and positive relationship outcomes, as both satisfaction and willingness to recommend were significantly higher when consumers received an acknowledgment after providing positive feedback. Although level of personalization did not produce significant effects, acknowledgment speed and reward incentive significantly moderated the relationship between acknowledgment and positive relationship outcomes.

The sample for Study 2 consists of customers of a large, full-service restaurant chain who indicated high levels of satisfaction on a guest satisfaction survey following a dining experience. Half of the sample received an acknowledgment email from the restaurant. Initial results are consistent with those found in Study 1, such that consumer attitudes and repatronage intentions are significantly higher when an acknowledgment is received compared to when no acknowledgment is received. Interestingly, there appear to be significant gender differences, as well; acknowledgment positively impacts women’s attitudes and intentions significantly more so than men. Also, face enhancement and communal strength appear to fully mediate this relationship.

While the first phase of Study 2 data collection assesses the attitudinal changes associated with firm acknowledgment of positive feedback, the second phase will assess behavioral changes. Over a six-month time period, behavioral measures such as time until next visit, number of visits, and total spend per visit, will be tracked. Thus, we hope to provide support for the attitudinal and behavioral changes of acknowledging positive consumer feedback.

REFERENCES


What’s Love Got to Do with It? Close Relationships and Consumer Behavior
Chair: Jordan Etkin, Duke University, USA

Paper #1: How do Friends and Strangers Interpret Shared Experiences? Synchrony as Relationship-Bolstering or Experience-Heightening
Suresh Ramanathan, Texas A&M University, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Ann L. McGill, University of Chicago, USA

Paper #2: The Rewarding Nature of Matchmaking
Lalin Anik, Duke University, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA

Paper #3: Power and Brand Compatibility in Close Relationships: A Dyadic Investigation
Grainne M. Fitzsimons, Duke University, USA
Danielle J. Brick, Duke University, USA
Tanya L. Chartrand, Duke University, USA
Gavan J. Fitzsimons, Duke University, USA

Paper #4: Is Variety the Spice of Love?
Jordan Etkin, Duke University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Maintaining close relationships is an integral part of life, and people spend a good deal of time interacting with close others (Kahneman et al. 2004; Leary et al. 1994). We go on dates with our spouse, cook with our family, and shop with our friends. As these examples suggest, many of the ways we interact with close others involve consumption. Dating may require the purchase of flowers, movie tickets, dinner, or drinks. Cooking typically means a trip to the grocery store. And shopping outings may lead to any number of purchases, from clothes to jewelry and sporting equipment to electronics. How do our close relationships shape the way we behave as consumers?

Our session sheds light on this question. Each paper adopts a unique perspective on how close relationships shape consumer behavior, drawing on diverse methodology and theory. Paper 1 (Ramanathan and Vohs) begins by discussing how relationships change inferences drawn from feelings synchrony. When consumers share an experience (e.g., watching a film) with a close friend, the more evaluations of the experience align, the more connected one feels to the friend (i.e., synchrony is attributed to closeness of friendship). If consumers instead share an experience with a stranger, greater alignment in evaluations improves ratings of the experience overall (i.e., synchrony is attributed to a higher quality experience).

Paper 2 (Anik and Norton) move from considering friendships to early stages of dating. They demonstrate that consumers derive positive utility from playing “matchmaker”. Connecting others (i.e., making matches) is intrinsically rewarding, increasing the matchmaker’s happiness by closing gaps in their social network. Next, Paper 3 (Brick, Fitzsimons, Fitzsimons, and Chartrand) examines brand preferences among married couples. Brick et al. consider how the extent that two romantic partners share similar brand preferences (i.e., brand compatibility) impacts life and relationship satisfaction. Results of a longitudinal couples study suggest that the impact of brand compatibility on satisfaction depends on one’s power status within the relationship; high-power partners are more satisfied when brand compatibility is high, but the opposite is true of low-power partners.

Finally, Paper 4 (Etkin) explores how the variety of joint-activities couples do together influences pro-relationship motivation. When partners perceive their relationship to be in early stages, doing varied (vs. similar) joint-activities increases pro-relationship motivation (e.g., willingness to spend on dinner). When partners perceive their relationship to be in later stages, in contrast, doing similar (vs. varied) joint-activities increases pro-relationship motivation. Etkin demonstrates similar effects on a range of relationship-related consumption behaviors.

Despite the fact that consumers often evaluate, purchase, and consume in the presence of others, relatively little is known about how close relationships influence such behaviors. Our session begins to address this gap. Across papers we consider a several types of close relationships, including friends, dating partners, and married couples, and a diverse set of consumer behaviors, ranging from evaluation of shared experiences and brand preferences, to matchmaking and partners’ willingness to spend on joint-activities. Together, these papers further understanding of how close relationships shape consumer behavior.

How do Friends and Strangers Interpret Shared Experiences? Synchrony as Relationship-Bolstering or Experience-Heightening

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
People spend the vast majority of their waking time interacting with others, whether casual acquaintances or intimate partners (Kahneman et al. 2004; Leary et al. 1994). We intentionally spend time with friends, family, coworkers, and acquaintances by engaging in joint-activities such as watching TV or shopping (American Time Use Survey; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Government, 2003). Yet close others are not the only ones with who people share experiences. People meet and connect with strangers in social settings such as shopping malls, museums, art galleries, movie theaters, concerts, or train and plane rides. These interactions are not meaningless, either: they influence the way that people perceive those events.

In the current research, we argue that shared experiences create synchrony among interaction partners, provided they can observe each other during the interaction. As people share an experience, their evaluations of that experience become entwined and co-vary with each other. This synchrony emerges due to evaluations being colored by shared emotions (Neumann and Strack 2000; Ramanathan and McGill 2007). We posit that when moment-to-moment ratings of a shared experience become highly synchronous, synchrony will have spillover effects that vary as a function of whether participants have a basis for attributing the synchrony to the relationship or some contextual feature.

For people in an existing relationship, the experience of similar emotions at similar times enhances relationship satisfaction (Gonzaga, Campos, & Bradbury, 2007; Murray et al., 2002) and bolsters the strength of the relationship. Hence, friends may consider a highly synchronous experience as validation of the relationship. We therefore predicted that friends experiencing synchrony will show greater interpersonal closeness after the shared experience than would friends who experienced low synchrony or as compared to strangers. We predicted that high synchrony among friends would not, however, influence evaluations of the experience itself because friends look to the relationship as being the source of the synchrony. We did not expect strangers to use the experience of synchrony as affirmation of their (nascent) relationship. To the extent that they do experience synchrony, strangers might focus on the situation more than the relationship in determining what the feeling of synchrony
means. We therefore predicted that strangers experiencing high levels of synchrony with each other would evaluate the experience more positively compared to those not experiencing synchrony but would not differ in interpersonal closeness.

In two experiments, we tested whether friends and strangers consume and interpret shared experiences differently. In Experiment 1, we did or did not allow dyads of friends (22 pairs) or strangers (18 pairs) to see each other while they sat side-by-side to watch a funny film. Three key dependent variables were assessed. One was moment-to-moment film ratings, from which we derived our measure of synchrony. Participants moved a joystick to indicate their liking of the film at each second. The extent to which participants’ ratings could predict their partners’ ratings at different frequencies indicated the degree of synchrony the dyad exhibited. Further, two video cameras recorded participants’ facial expressions continuously while the video clip was played. A second outcome was retrospective film evaluations, which were summary judgments of the film after its completion. A third outcome was seating distance in a waiting room, which we took to indicate momentary relationship closeness. These outcomes were related to each other in specific ways, and they were predicted by relationship type and whether participants could observe one another during the film. Partners who could see one another exhibited higher synchrony than partners who could not, and this was especially strong for friend dyads. The greater synchrony for friends in the low partition condition was due to their glancing at each other and sharing emotions of the same valence, while strangers in the same condition seemed most influenced by unreciprocated glances.

The extent to which partners’ ratings exhibited a high degree of synchrony predicted more positive retrospective film ratings, but this occurred for strangers and not friends. Friends, in contrast, sat closer together to extent that their real-time film ratings exhibited a high degree of synchrony. Therefore, we hypothesized that strangers looked to the situation as the source of their feelings of synchrony, whereas friends looked to their relationship.

Experiment 2 used a similar design to directly test the attribution hypothesis. We allowed all participants to see each other, which meant that friends would likely show more synchrony than strangers. (They did.) Germane to the attributional story, we tested whether telling half of the participants that the aim of the study was to test the effects of the quality of watching in the room on shared experiences would diminish not only the overall levels of synchrony (which it did) but also erode the link between synchrony and retrospective film ratings for strangers and seating distance for friends. In both cases, having an alternate idea of what might be causing the feelings mitigated the effects we had seen in Experiment 1. This attribution effect suggests that friends’ and strangers’ interpreted the feelings that arise during a shared experience as being signals of the quality of the relationship or the experience itself, respectively.

**The Rewarding Nature of Matchmaking**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

At some point, most people have made matches between others, from grabbing and introducing two strangers at a party to brokering romantic connections; even if not matchmakers themselves, many people can think of a friend or acquaintance who is notorious for their efforts to make such introductions – even if sometimes awkwardly unsuccessful. We investigate this proclivity to match others, demonstrating that such matchmaking – creating ties between others – has a causal impact on their happiness.

Certainly, a great deal of evidence suggests that people enjoy connecting themselves to others and that having such social connections is strongly and consistently associated with higher well-being. Indeed, humans spend some 80% of their waking hours in the company of others (Emler 1994; Kahaneman et al. 2004). Social interactions and social support impact both subjective and objective well-being, with social relationships both serving as a buffer against and hastens recovery from negative events ranging from depression to physical illness (e.g., Berkman and Syme 1979; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2009; Seeman 1996; Uchino 2004).

We explore the emotional impact of making matches not between oneself and others, but between two other people. In one view, such matchmaking should have no impact on happiness, because matchmakers are by definition introducing people they already know and are thus not growing their own circle of social support. In another view, matchmaking could negatively impact happiness; research in social networks has noted that “brokers” – people who stand between two other actors in a social network – derive power from those two people not knowing each other (Burt 1998; Simmel 1955); thus, such an introduction might decrease one’s social capital. We propose a third view: closing gaps in one’s social network is rewarding because it facilitates people’s general and fundamental need for closure (Kruglanski 1989). We suggest that people high in need for closure are more likely to not just assume (Flynn, Reagans, and Guillery 2010) but actually create connections between others and that meeting this “need for network closure” is associated with increased happiness for the matchmaker.

Four studies examine the psychology underlying people’s proclivity to play “matchmaker”. Study 1 first explores the relationship between chronic matchmaking and happiness. In an online survey, participants rated their propensity to make matches between others, reported their total number of acquaintances and friends, and completed a well-being scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). We found that chronic matchmakers are happier with their lives overall even when controlling for the size of their social networks, offering correlational evidence that real world matchmaking is rewarding.

Study 2 documents the causal impact of matchmaking on happiness in a lab setting. We assigned people (N = 128) to match individuals to each other and measured their happiness pre- and post-matching. We also investigated whether the type of match matters by randomly assigning people to one of three tasks: making matches on the basis of who would get along well (match), who would get along poorly (mismatch), and who had the most similar social security numbers (random). We found that matching people with the goal of creating connections (match) resulted in significant increase in pre- to post-matching happiness compared to making matches on any other dimension (mismatch or random).

Study 3 assesses the benefits of matchmaking using a different methodology: rather than measuring happiness directly, we measured the intrinsic reward of matchmaking by examining people’s persistence on a matching task. Participants (N = 168) came to the lab and were informed that they would be completing fifty trials of computer tasks and could choose how to split these trials between two tasks: a matching task and a boring unrelated task. We instructed participants either to match a target individual based on who they would best get along with (match) or who they looked most similar to (appearance). We measured the number of matchmaking trials completed before switching to the boring task and also varied whether participants completed each trial of the task for free, for $1, or for 2$, a design that allowed us to document the intrinsic reward of matchmaking.
As expected, participants in the free conditions completed more than twice as many match task trials than the appearance task, suggesting that connecting others based on liking (vs. physical similarity) is intrinsically more rewarding. Interestingly, incentives increased the number of trials participants completed of the appearance task, in a significant linear trend from free to $1$ to $2$, but not of the match task; here, incentives significantly decreased willingness to complete trials both for participants in the $1$ and $2$ conditions compared to those in the free condition. These results suggest that while payment increased motivation for the less intrinsically appealing appearance task, incentives crowded out motivation for the more intrinsically appealing match task.

Study 4 examines the moderating effects of NFC on the relationship between condition and the number of trials completed. Participants ($N = 179$) were given the same task as in Experiment 2. They then completed the 47-item NFC scale (Webster and Kruglanski 1994; $a = .85$). We found that people high in need for network closure are most likely to find connecting others to each other rewarding, with that reward being particularly pronounced when making matches with the goal of social connection (match).

Taken together, these experiments provide evidence for a causal relationship between matchmaking and happiness. Inducing people to make matches between strangers increased happiness in the moment, and people found creating meaningful matches to be more intrinsically rewarding than other types of matching. We document that having a need for network closure enhances the intrinsic reward of matchmaking. Our investigation offers a model for how matches at the micro level can translate into social capital at the macro level.

We suggest that people who make matches do not necessarily suffer the gap, we introduce the term appearance match. For those high in power, brand compatibility may indicate that their partner is accommodating their interests. For those low in power, brand compatibility may indicate that their partner is accommodating their own intentions into their own intentions (VanderDrift et al. 2012). Given this, we suggest that people who make matches do not necessarily suffer from losing their broker status, but in fact can reap rewards from matchmaking and that this reward value increases social capital at the group level.

**Power and Brand Compatibility in Close Relationships: A Dyadic Investigation**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Although consumers often evaluate, purchase, and consume brands in the presence of others, relatively little is known about the role that brand preferences play in close relationships. To fill this gap, we introduce the term brand compatibility, which refers to the extent to which two people in a romantic relationship have similar brand preferences. In this first investigation of brand compatibility, we propose that its effect on relationship and life satisfaction depends on one’s personal sense of power within the relationship. Being low in power leads one to take on close others’ emotions (Anderson et al. 2003), and to be more likely to incorporate close others’ intentions into their own intentions (VanderDrift et al. 2012). Given this, we suggest that brand compatibility reflects two different states for those high and low in relationship power: For those high in power, brand compatibility may indicate that their partner is accommodating their interests. For those low in power, brand compatibility may indicate that they are accommodating their partner’s interests. If so, brand compatibility may produce different effects on relationship and life outcomes for those who are high versus low in relationship power. It may lead those high in power to feel happier, and those low in power to feel less happy, with the relationship and their lives more broadly. In this paper, we examine these ideas dyadically, by measuring brand preferences from both members of a romantic relationship.

A diverse set of dating and married couples – 136 heterosexual couples (56.5% Caucasian, 33.5% Asian, 10% mixed or other; $M_{\text{age}} = 20.80; SD_{\text{age}} = 2.16$) with a mean relationship duration of 34.42 ($SD = 29.10$) months completed the study.

Participants came into the laboratory as couples and completed a battery of personality and relationship measures, including two standard scales assessing power, modified for close relationships (Anderson, John, and Keltner 2012; Ronfeldt, Kimerling, and Arias 1998). The two scales individually had acceptable reliabilities (alphas = .86 and .69), but were highly correlated ($r = .53$). As such, we combined the items to produce one mean power scale (alpha = .84). Participants also completed a standard life satisfaction scale (Die- ner, Emmons, Larson, and Griffin 1985) and a standard relationship assessment (Rusbult, Martz, and Agnew 2005) that measured both self-reported satisfaction and evaluations of the attractiveness of alternatives to the relationship.

One month later, participants completed an online follow-up questionnaire, which measured brand compatibility. Rather than asking couples to rate the compatibility of their brand preferences, a potentially biased measure, we asked partners about their brand preferences individually and then created a brand compatibility score from those responses. Participants provided the names of their own and their partner’s favorite brands for several common product categories (e.g., beer, chocolate). Four research assistants, blind to hypotheses and familiar with brand choices in the Canadian market, coded these responses. Responses were rated on a 1 (completely incompatible) to 5 (completely compatible) scale. The following guidelines were used: 5 for the same exact brand (e.g., Diet Coke and Diet Coke), 4 for almost the exact same (e.g., Diet Coke and Coke), 3 for the same brand family (e.g., Coke and Sprite), 2 for brands that are related brand families, but would not be included in a brand price promotion (e.g., Schweppes and Dr. Pepper), and 1 for different, competing brand families (e.g., Coke and Pepsi).

Analyses employed multilevel modeling procedures (Kenny, Kashy, and Cook 2006), which account for violations of statistical independence. As predicted, relationship power interacted with brand compatibility to predict life satisfaction, $F (1, 207.17) = 6.38$, $p < .01$. High power participants (+1SD) reported higher levels of life satisfaction when they and their romantic partner shared compatible brand preferences than when they reported incompatible preferences, $t = -2.2$, $p = .03$. In contrast, low power participants (-1SD) reported lower levels of life satisfaction when their brand preferences were compatible than when they were incompatible, $t = 2.3$, $p = .02$. Power and brand compatibility also interacted to predict relationship evaluations as measured by attraction to alternatives, $F (1, 225.05) = 4.14$, $p = .04$, but not as measured by self-reported satisfaction, $F < 1$, ns. High power participants reported more attraction to alternatives when their brand compatibility was low than when it was high, $t = 1.9$, $p = .06$, while low power participants reported more attraction to alternatives when their brand compatibility was high than when it was low, $t = 1.95$, $p = .04$.

We found that for people high in power, having high brand compatibility with their partner leads to better evaluations of the relationship and their life. But for those low in power, high brand compatibility leads to worse evaluations of their partner and life. We speculate this is because high brand compatibility results from low power partners accommodating the preferences of higher power partners, although this mechanism remains to be tested. In sum, we have introduced the construct of brand compatibility and shown that it, in conjunction with power, influences relationship and life satisfaction. The results suggest that brand compatibility may be a useful tool for looking at relationship processes, and highlight the potential relevance of consumer behavior for the understanding of close relationships.
Is Variety the Spice of Love?

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Relationship partners do many things together. They eat dinner, watch television, discuss their days, and potentially even take art classes or travel. Different couples, however, vary in the variety of joint-activities they engage in. Some couples tend to do relatively similar activities; watching different TV shows on consecutive nights or eating slightly different dinners. Other couples tend to do relatively dissimilar or varied activities; watching TV one night, going out to dinner the following night, and playing tennis the next. Spending time together is positively correlated with relationship quality (Kilbourne, Howell, & England, 1990; Kingston & Nock, 1987; Orden & Bradburn, 1968; Orthner, 1975), but might the variety of activities couples do together matter, and if so, how?

We suggest that the impact of activity-variety on relationship quality depends critically on where partners see themselves in the course of their relationship. Socio-emotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Carstensen, Gross, & Fun, 1997) suggests that how much time people see ahead of them (i.e., future time abundance) varies over the life course. Perceptions of future time abundance, in turn, impact what people value. When people see lots of time ahead of them, for instance, they value feeling excited, whereas when they see little time ahead, they value feeling calm (Mogilner, Aaker, & Kamvar, 2012; Mogilner, Kamvar, & Aaker, 2011).

Perceptions of future time abundance should also vary in romantic relationships. Couples who think they are in early stages of a committed relationship should see much time ahead, whereas people who think they are in later stages should see less time ahead (relative to time passed). We suggest that these differences will affect what people value. When partners perceive their relationship as relatively short to-date, they should value excitement in the relationship, but partners who perceive their relationship as relatively long to-date should value stability in the relationship.

These differences in valuation, in turn, should shape how similar versus varied joint-activities impact motivation and satisfaction with the relationship. Variety, by definition, is associated with stimulation and change (Berlyne, 1970; Khan, 1995; Raju, 1980). Consequently, we predict that varied joint-activities should make a relationship feel more exciting. Similar joint-activities, in contrast, should increase feelings of stability. Thus, engaging in varied activities should benefit the relationship when partners perceive the relationship to be in its early stages, whereas similar joint-activities should be more beneficial when a relationship seems to be in its later stages.

Five experiments support these predictions. Across studies we assess the impact of joint-activity variety on pro-relationship motivation (i.e., willingness to behave in relationship-enhancing ways). In study 1, we ask participants their perceptions of how long they've perceived their relationship as shorter, listing different measures of pro-relationship motivation: willingness to spend on a special occasion dinner for one’s partner (study 2) and avoidance of an attractive member of the opposite sex (study 3). Results of both studies support our predictions that varied (similar) joint-activities benefit one’s relationship at perceived early (later) stages.

Study 4 tests the proposed process driving these effects. We found joint-activity variety increased pro-relationship motivation by increasing feelings of excitement when relationships seemed short (95% CI: .08 to .98), but not long (95% CI: -.92 to .14). In contrast, joint-activity variety decreased pro-relationship motivation by decreasing feelings of stability when relationships seemed long (95% CI: -.50 to -.04), but not short (95% CI: -.05 to .35). These results support our suggestion that when relationships feel short (long), engaging in more varied (similar) joint-activities enhances pro-relationship motivation by increasing feelings of excitement (stability).

Our final experiment tested whether these findings extend to the field. Particularly for men, giving flowers to one’s partner is a standard way of showing caring and devotion. We stopped men walking in a large downtown metropolitan area and gave them a survey that manipulated relationship duration and joint-activity similarity. Then, as thanks, we gave them the opportunity to pick up a free rose (from a flower shop a few blocks away) to give to their significant other. We tracked whether participants redeemed the rose. Results support our predictions. In the short duration condition, more men picked up the rose after listing different joint-activities ($M_{diff} = 14.3\%; \chi^2 = 2.67, p = .10$). In contrast, in the long duration condition, more men picked up the rose after listing similar joint-activities ($M_{diff} = 17.6\%; M_{sim} = 8.1\%; \chi^2 = 3.98, p < .05$).

Maintaining good romantic relationships is an important part of life. Indeed, satisfying relationships are crucial for both physical and psychological health (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). While popular wisdom suggests that people should incorporate more variety into their relationships, our findings indicate that this may not always be the best approach. Doing varied joint-activities seems to be particularly, if not uniquely beneficial early on in relationships. Later in relationships, or in cases where people see their relationship as long, doing similar joint-activities should be more beneficial.

REFERENCES


The Time of Our Lives: The Role of Time in Consumer Well-Being and Virtue
Chair: Amit Bhattacharjee, Dartmouth College, USA

Paper #1: Too Impatient to Smell the Roses: Exposure to Fast Food Brands Impedes Happiness
Julian House, University of Toronto, Canada
Sanford E. DeVoe, University of Toronto, Canada
Chen-Bo Zhong, University of Toronto, Canada

Paper #2: Happiness from Ordinary and Extraordinary Experiences
Amit Bhattacharjee, Dartmouth College, USA
Cassie Mogilner, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #3: Time, Money, and Morality
Francesca Gino, Harvard Business School, USA
Cassie Mogilner, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #4: Temporal Decay, Reinstatement, and Debiasing of Self-Deception
Zoe Chance, Yale University, USA
Francesca Gino, Harvard Business School, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA
Dan Ariely, Duke University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Time is perhaps our most precious resource: the number of hours and days we are granted is decidedly finite. How can we spend the finite time we are allotted to most benefit ourselves and others? The four papers in this session examine time from different angles to highlight its central role in consumer well-being and virtue. Together, they demonstrate how our conceptualization of time, as well as its actual passage, is imperative to understanding the effects of our decisions on our own well-being and the well-being of others.

In particular, the first two papers examine the effects of time on happiness from people's own experiences. The first paper shows that exposure to fast-food brands affects subjective time perception, making people impatient and less able to enjoy happiness from pleasurable experiences. The second paper demonstrates how perceptions of the time people have left in life impact the relative happiness they gain from ordinary and extraordinary experiences. The final two papers investigate how time influences immoral behaviors that could affect others' well-being. The third paper finds that activating the concept of time encourages self-reflection and reduces immoral behaviors. The last paper examines how self-deception and immoral behaviors attenuate with the passage of time.

These four papers echo this year's theme, "Making a Difference," as all of them illuminate specific behaviors and choices that can make a difference in how well people live, in terms of both experienced well-being and honest behaviors. Each paper contributes to the study of consumer well-being or morality by highlighting the integral role of time. Given the fundamental importance of these constructs, we expect our proposed symposium to generate significant interest among a broad audience at ACR, including researchers with interests in well-being, time, aging, social connection, prosocial behavior, morality, and decision making. All four papers are either completed manuscripts or manuscripts in preparation.

The goal of the session is to incite questions and future research on the determinants of consumer well-being and virtue and the psychological influence of temporal factors. Each presenter will have fifteen minutes to present their paper, leaving about fifteen minutes for questions from the audience, integrative discussion, and ideas for future research.

While all of these papers relate to consumer well-being and time, each paper provides a unique perspective and proposes different answers to the fundamental question, "What can we do to live well?" By integrating different dimensions of time, measures of well-being and virtuous behavior, environmental triggers, and psychological factors, we hope to provoke a fruitful discussion at ACR that bears on both important theoretical and substantive issues.

Too Impatient to Smell the Roses: Exposure to Fast Food Brands Impedes Happiness

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

There is more to life than increasing its speed.
—Mahatma Gandhi

Innovative products and services offering convenience, speed, and temporal efficiency have brought remarkable changes to the use of time in our society. While we used to wait for weeks or months for letters to arrive, simultaneous global communication between individuals and groups for negligible cost is now only a few key strokes away. The processing of information is on a similar asymptotic trajectory approaching instantaneity: Sifting through piles of papers and books in libraries has largely been replaced by online search engines that deliver almost instant hits. This societal shift towards the instantaneous and the acceleration of activities with the explicit intention of saving time is infused into our very sustenance. Frozen prepared meals save us from having to spend time preparing food and the microwave saves us from having to wait for an oven to cook it. Better yet, fast food restaurants offer hot meals that can be picked up at drive-thru windows and are ready to be consumed on the go.

We tested whether exposure to the ultimate symbols of an impatience culture—fast-food brands—undermined people’s ability to experience happiness from pleasurable visual and auditory stimuli. The essence of fast food is not what you eat (e.g., tacos, fried chicken, burgers, or pizza), but how you eat it. This is meaningfully conveyed by the manner in which fast food is served. Fast-food packaging facilitates temporal efficiency because there are no dishes to wash, no waiter to wait for, and portable containers make meals easier to eat while multitasking (i.e. in the car or at your desk). To demonstrate that the implicit effects of fast food occurs independent of the type of food, we examined whether the same food served in different packaging would interfere with people’s enjoyment of pleasant stimuli. Participants in the fast-food condition viewed pictures of food in ready-to-go branded packaging; whereas, participants in the control condition view the same food displayed on ceramic tableware.

To determine whether fast food impedes happiness directly or by interfering with enjoyment of pleasant experiences, Experiment 1 randomly assigned participants to rate their state of happiness after viewing 10 beautiful nature photos or not. We hypothesize that when participants view the beautiful nature photos, those primed with fast food would be less happy than those primed with control stimuli, but that when there are no photos, the priming stimuli would not cause any differences in people’s state of happiness. Therefore, Experiment 1 enabled us to assess whether fast food makes people less likely to “smell the roses.”

Two hundred fifty-seven participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (fast food vs. control) × 2 (pictures vs. no pictures) facto-
Happiness from Ordinary and Extraordinary Experiences

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

How should we invest our finite resources to maximize our happiness? One influential stream of literature finds that experiential purchases bring greater happiness than material purchases (e.g., Van Boven and Gilovich 2003). But which experiences lead to greater happiness? Prior work has not yet begun to categorize and compare experiences to see which ones most resonate and increase well-being.

While some researchers have suggested a special role for special, once-in-a-lifetime experiences in consumer well-being (Zauberman, Ratner and Kim 2009), others have highlighted the importance of savoring mundane, everyday experiences (DeVoel and House 2012). Hence, the current research investigates this important distinction and attempts to resolve these inconsistencies. While ordinary experiences are common, frequent, and within the realm of everyday life, extraordinary experiences are uncommon, infrequent, and go beyond this realm (Sussman and Alter 2012). Will consumers enjoy greater happiness from a lovely dinner with a close friend at a favorite neighborhood restaurant, or from a once-in-a-lifetime, gastronomically inventive feast at elBulli?

Because the very definition of happiness varies over time (Mogilner, Kamvar and Aaker 2011), we predicted that the answer to this question would depend on one’s perspective on time. Indeed, five studies suggest that extraordinary experiences lead to greater happiness among those with an extensive future. Meanwhile, when time is seen as limited, ordinary experiences are increasingly linked to happiness.

An initial study, mirroring Van Boven and Gilovich’s (2003) approach, asked participants to recall and describe a happy experience that was either ordinary or extraordinary, and to report their resulting level of happiness. Content analysis suggests that engagement in social relationships and indulgence in comforts accounts for most happy ordinary experiences. Conversely, life milestones or cultural travel are most representative of happy extraordinary experiences. To serve as a proxy for future time perspective, we examined experiential happiness by participant age. Among younger participants (whose future is more extensive), extraordinary experiences resulted in greater happiness than ordinary experiences ($M = 7.86$ vs. $6.69$, $F(1,217) = 13.20$, $p < .001$); however, among older participants (whose future is more limited), no difference in reported happiness emerged ($M = 7.84$ vs. $7.59$, $F < 1$). In other words, while happiness from extraordinary experiences did not vary with age ($F < 1$), ordinary experiences led to greater happiness for older (vs. younger) participants ($F(1, 217) = 7.72$, $p = .006$).

To further investigate whether these categories of experience naturally resonate, we asked a separate group of participants to rate 20 randomly selected experiences generated in the first study. This group was able to reliably distinguish between others’ described experiences, rating extraordinary experiences as significantly more extraordinary than the ordinary experiences ($M = 6.61$ vs. $3.62$, $t(120) = 19.60$, $p < .001$). Importantly, their predictions of happiness followed the same pattern: younger participants reported that extraordinary (vs. ordinary) experiences would lead to greater happiness ($M = 6.96$ vs. $6.24$, $F(1, 119) = 27.34$, $p < .001$), whereas older participants’ reports of happiness did not differ by experience type ($M = 7.01$ vs. $6.83$, $F(1, 119) = 1.57$, $p > .10$).

Next, we examined a natural data source to see if the same pattern holds. A sample of Facebook users reported their last five status updates that reflected personal experiences and completed a measure of future time perspective (Lang and Carstensen 2002). They then rated and categorized these experiences as ordinary or extraordinary. Results indicated that future time perspective predicted both ratings ($β = .16$, $t = 2.11$, $p = .04$) and categorizations ($χ^2(1) = 4.81$, $p = .03$) of reported experiences: even in this organic setting, those who saw time as extensive made more extraordinary updates, and those who saw time as limited made updates reflecting more ordinary experiences.

Given that our findings hinge on future time perspective, a fourth study tested for potential differences between past and future (planned) experiences. Participants described past happy experi-
ences or future experiences they expected to be happy, then rated these experiences on how ordinary or extraordinary they were. Finally, they reported their future time perspective. Regression results were consistent: regardless of past or future status (t < 1), those with a more extensive perspective reported more extraordinary experiences, while those with a limited perspective reported more ordinary experiences (β = -.28, t = -2.90, p = .005).

Our final study sought convergent evidence by manipulating time perspective: participants were led to view their lifespan as either extensive or limited. A second goal of the study was to examine how associating a brand with consumer experiences would affect brand attitudes. Participants viewed an advertisement for a Flip video camera that urged them to “Capture life’s everyday [extraordinary] moments.” Results revealed a significant interaction of experience x time perspective on brand attitudes (F(1, 210) = 5.74, p = .02). In particular, those with an extensive time perspective viewed the brand more positively when it highlighted extraordinary (vs. ordinary) moments (M = 5.60 vs. 5.12, F(1, 210) = 5.79, p = .02). However, brand attitudes did not vary by experience among those with a limited time perspective (M = 5.46 vs. 5.66, F < 1). That is, while highlighting extraordinary experiences led the brand to be perceived similarly regardless of time perspective (F < 1), highlighting ordinary experiences was seen more positively among those who viewed their future as limited rather than extensive (F(1, 210) = 7.29, p = .007). Results for purchase likelihood were fully consistent.

Together, our findings highlight a previously unexamined dimension of experience, distinguishing ordinary from extraordinary experiences. Results show that this distinction is meaningful, resonates with people, and matters for brand attitudes as well as subsequent happiness. Follow-up analyses from our first study suggest that self-definition may drive these effects (β = .01, t = 2.56, p = .01): the experiences that define us vary with our perspective on time, and what defines us may bring us greater happiness.

Time, Money, and Morality

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

It seems a day doesn’t go by without some unethical behavior by a politician, movie star, professional athlete, or high-ranking executive splashing the cover of newspapers. Although less sensational, revelations of cheating have also crept into the sciences, and continue to show up in classrooms, businesses, and marriages. Sadly, such actions have ruinous consequences, hurting individuals, families, corporations, and entire academic fields. Given that decades of psychology research have shown that people strive to maintain a positive self-concept (Adler, 1930; Rogers, 1959) and that morality is central to people’s self-image (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996), the prevalence of unethical behavior and the fact that even good people are prone to lose track of their moral compass is surprising (Ayral & Gino, 2011; Mazur, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Are there simple ways to encourage self-reflection, thus decreasing individuals’ tendencies to behave immorally? Here, we focus on two triggers that are ubiquitous enough in the environment to have a chance at instigating a widespread effect on unethical behavior: money and time.

Prior research has shown that when people focus on money they behave in self-interested (but not self-reflective) ways. For instance, merely thinking about money leads people to be less helpful and fair in their dealings with others, less sensitive to social rejection, and to work harder towards personal goals (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006, 2008; Yang, Wu, Zhou, Mead, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2012; Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009). However, when focused on time, people become more generous in their charitable giving (Liu & Aaker, 2008) and are more motivated to connect with loved ones (Mogilner, 2010)—a behavior that is particularly treasured when reflecting on one’s life (Frederickson & Carstensen, 1990; Loewenstein, 1999). We thus predict that priming people to think about time, rather than money, will lead to more ethical behavior by encouraging people to reflect on who they are, making them more conscious of how they conduct themselves so as to maintain a positive self-image.

Study 1 tested this by priming either time or money and then measuring cheating. Participants were first presented with a sentence unscramble task which surreptitiously exposed them to time-related, money-related, or only neutral words (Mogilner, 2010). Next, participants played a “Numbers Game” in which they had the opportunity to cheat and receive additional money. The results show that participants were more likely to cheat in the money condition (87.5%, 28/32) than in either the control condition (66.7%, 22/33; χ²(1, N=65)=3.97, p<.05) or the time condition (42.4%, 14/33; χ²(1, N=65)=14.44, p<.001). Participants were also less likely to cheat in the time condition than in the control condition (χ²(1, N=66)=3.91, p<.05). In other words, money primes encouraged unethical behavior while time primes discouraged it.

Study 2 replicates these results while also providing initial insight into why time discourages unethical behavior. Participants were primed with time or money through searching for songs that had lyrics exemplifying how people feel about either time or money. Next, participants completed the same Numbers Game, but here it was framed as either an intelligence test or a personality test indicative of the person they are. The results showed a significant interaction (F(1,138)=3.99, p<.05): Only when the game was framed as an intelligence test did thinking about money lead to greater cheating than thinking about time (F(1,138)=6.69, p=.01); however, when the game was framed as a personality test, there was no difference in cheating between the money and time conditions, F<1.

Study 3 again tests for the role of self-reflection. Participants were primed with money or time by either counting a stack of 30 $1 bills or days in a paper calendar (1 page per day). Half of the participants completed this task facing a mirror while half did not. Participants then completed the same Numbers Game from Study 1. Results showed a significant interaction (F(1,116)=4.30, p=.04): Only when participants did not complete their tasks in front of a mirror did thinking about money lead to greater cheating than thinking about time (F(1,116)=9.11, p=.003). When a mirror was present, however, there was no difference in cheating between those in the money and time conditions, F<1.

Study 4 measured self-reflection directly through self-report measures. Participants were primed with time or money using the same sentence unscramble task from Study 1, and then asked to rate their amount of self-reflection. Next, they completed a word unscramble task which provided an opportunity to cheat for extra money. The results show that those in the money condition reported lower levels of self-reflection compared to both the control (p=.001) and the time condition (p=.001), and participants reported greater self-reflection in the time condition than in the control condition (p=.024). The same pattern of results was found for cheating: Those in the money condition were more likely to cheat than those in either the control (χ²(1, N=143)=4.04, p=.044) or time condition (χ²(1, N=145)=16.44, p<.001), and were less likely to cheat in the time condition than in the control condition (χ²(1, N=138)=4.16, p=.041). Finally, a mediation analysis revealed that self-reflection drove the effect of the prime on cheating behavior.

Taken together, these findings suggest that although priming money increases cheating, priming time reduces cheating because it
Temporal Decay, Reinstatement, and Debiasing of Self-Deception

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Research on the individual psychology of ethical decision-making tends to take a “one-shot” approach by examining the effect of one or more specific variables on one subsequent unethical act, or a global approach assessing general beliefs such the tendency to view oneself in a positive light (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Moore & Kim, 2003; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Along these lines, Chance et al. (2011) documented how a single act of cheating can lead to self-deception in the short term. The current investigation explores ethics over a longer time course, examining how an initial unethical behavior changes people’s beliefs in the longer term – and how those beliefs are impacted by both receiving more information about one’s abilities over time (Study 1) and being provided with subsequent opportunities to engage in further unethical behavior (Study 2).

People misbehave: They lie, they cheat, they steal, they betray. Yet most view themselves as good and moral individuals (Aquino & Reed, 2002). One means of resolving this apparent inconsistency between bad behavior and a positive self-image is through self-deception (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004): distorting negative behavior to reflect positively on the self – for example, by cheating on tests and attributing improved performance to ability. Given the costs of self-deception to both individuals and organizations, we explore two means by which self-deception can be decreased: natural decay and an attentional intervention. We show that self-deception diminishes over time when self-deceivers are repeatedly confronted with evidence of their true ability (Study 1); importantly, however, this “learning” fails to make them less susceptible to future self-deception (Study 2). Given the ease with which self-deception recurs, we test a mechanism for debiasing self-deception: asking participants to reflect on the fact that they may have cheated, thereby drawing their attention to the true cause of their high performance (Study 3). Taken together, these studies offer insight into when and how self-deception can be attenuated.

Cheating and self-deception paradigm

Participants are assigned to a control or an answer condition. Both groups complete a series of tests of general knowledge trivia such as “What is the only mammal that truly flies?” (from Moore & Healy, 2008). At the beginning of the study, they learn that for each test, they will earn an additional $0.25 for each correct answer. Participants in the answers condition have the answers to all ten questions printed in an answer key at the bottom of the page. Their instructions read, “It’s okay to check your answers as you go, but please do your own work.” (A pilot study showed that using the answers to achieve a higher score was perceived as cheating and unethical.) The control group has the same test questions, but no answer key. Everyone completes Test 1, and then receives a score sheet with an answer key on which they record their score. Thus, before continuing to Test 2, participants in both conditions have seen the answer key to Test 1 and know their Test 1 score. They then look over Test 2 before writing down their predicted score. After predicting their score, they complete the test, which does not have answers at the bottom. Cheating is measured by significant differences in performance between the control and answers groups on Test 1. Self-deception is measured by significant differences between predictions and scores on subsequent tests for participants in the experimental conditions but not the control condition.

In Study 1, we observed the natural decay of self-deception over time, finding that when faced with repeated exposure to counterevidence – in this case, scoring lower on three tests they could not cheat on – self-deceivers eventually come to terms with reality. In everyday life, however, people face repeated temptations to engage in questionable behavior, and thus repeated opportunities for self-deception. Therefore, Study 2 tested whether a second chance to cheat would reinstate self-deception, overwhelming the effect of learning from corrective feedback. It did. Self-deception is therefore sticky, therefore reducing it may require an intervention after cheating has occurred, but prior to making predictions of future performance. In Study 3, we tested whether drawing attention to the answer key before the prediction task would reduce self-deception. We added a new “answers/attention” condition in which we interrupted test takers before they predicted their scores on Test 2 to ask them to reflect on the effect that the answer key might have had on their performance on Test 1. Participants in the answers/attention condition predicted lower scores on the second test than those in the answers condition, despite both groups having cheated to a similar degree on the first test.

In our experiments, participants have the opportunity to cheat on a test, and then to self-deceive about their own ability. We explored two means by which self-deception may be decreased: by repeated counterevidence, and drawing attention to the root cause. Our studies demonstrate that time and repetition of unbiased feedback can reduce self-deception and eventually eliminate it (Study 1); however, the tendency can reemerge when the opportunity for cheating presents itself again (Study 2). Attentional interventions early in the process, however, may debias self-deception (Study 3). While we examined the impact of self-deception on people’s beliefs about their future performance, self-deception in contexts like these may also impact people’s subsequent behavior. For example, it may lead them to spend less time preparing for future challenges, thus reducing learning in addition to hampering the possibility of good future performance. Future research could examine this type of behavioral consequence, both in the context of academic cheating as well as in other contexts where people may inflate their performance by cheating and then deceive themselves.

REFERENCES


Paper #1: Doing it the Hard Way: Low Personal Control Drives Preference for High-Effort Products
Keisha M. Cutright, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Adriana Samper, Arizona State University, USA

Paper #2: Earning Luckiness: The Effect of Active Loyalty Program Membership on Consumer Predictions of Randomly-Determined Marketing Outcomes
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA
Kelly Haws, Vanderbilt University, USA
Chris Summers, Ohio State University, USA

Paper #3: Customized Assembly: How Does Effort Influence the Value of To-be-assembled Products?
Eva Buechel, University of Miami, USA
Chris A. Janiszewski, University of Florida, USA

Paper #4: The Effect of Goal Progress Salience Cues in Effortful Consumer Domains: An Implicit Theory Perspective
Pragya Mathur, Baruch College, USA
Lauren Block, Baruch College, USA
Ozge Yucel-Aybat, Pennsylvania State University-Harrisburg, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Common adages like, “you get what you work for” and “there are no shortcuts” emphasize the importance of putting in significant “hard work” or effort to obtain the outcomes you desire. In the current session, we apply the notion of “hard work” to consumption. While prior research has shown that shopping difficulty leads to greater product liking (Cardozo 1965) and people value products more that they make themselves (Norton Mochon and Ariely 2012), limited research has explored what drives the desire to expend higher effort, the consequences of increased effort beyond valuation, or the contexts in which higher effort does not yield greater valuation. What makes us want to work hard? How might this desire shape our product preferences? How does hard work change our expectations or beliefs? And finally, do we always want what we work for? In the current session, we answer these questions, exploring what causes people to desire higher-effort products and the consequences of increased effort across product and service contexts.

The papers in this session flow from antecedents to consequences. First, Cutright and Samper establish low personal control as a causal factor that drives a desire to expend greater effort and seek out products that require higher effort (e.g., exercise equipment that emphasizes harder vs. easier effort to see results). They find that low-control consumers view these higher effort products as a vehicle to restore control. Next, Naylor, Haws and Summers look at the consequences of higher consumer effort in a loyalty context, establishing that the increased effort put forth by active loyalty program members leads to increased feelings of control over randomly-determined outcomes. Buechel and Janiszewski also look at the consequences of higher vs. lower effort in contexts where consumers have control over product design and composition (e.g., Build-a-Bear). They find that when choices and assembly are integrated (i.e., you create as you build), increased effort drives increased value of the components, yet this effect reverses when choices and assembly are segregated (you make a plan first, then build). Finally, Mathur, Block and Yucel-Aybat examine how higher effort tasks can be shaped to improve performance and satisfaction for different types of consumers (entity vs. incremental theorists) depending on the presence of common goal progress cues.

These papers, all at advanced stages of completion, should appeal to anyone with an interest in consumer effort, identity, personal control, product design, customization, loyalty programs and goals. More broadly, this session should resonate with anyone interested in how hard work is shaped by and shapes the consumption process. Consumers are becoming more involved in choosing and designing the products, services and activities they enjoy, thus expending a higher level of effort. By examining this effort, we provide an avenue to make a difference in consumer welfare; we can empower consumers to use hard work to restore control over their lives, be cognizant of their biases in light of their hard work, target their work toward activities that will yield greater value, and help develop products that can more aptly benefit different types of consumers in high-effort contexts.

Doing it Hard Way: Low Personal Control Drives Preference for High-Effort Products

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Get stronger, healthier, skinnier, smarter, and cleaner with less work. Such messaging is hard to escape in today’s marketplace. At every turn, a product promises to help us improve in a variety of areas with exceptional ease. Consistent with such communication, research suggests that people often seek experiences that require the least effort (e.g., Child 1946, Russell and Mehrabian 1975). However, people also often appreciate more effortful experiences (Aronson and Mills 1959, Gibbs and Drolet 2003, Kivetz and Simonson 2003). Thus, we ask the question—when it comes to improving the self (and its extensions, such as the home), do consumers seek high or low effort products?

We predict that feelings of control will be a critical determinant of whether consumers choose high or low effort products. Specifically, we posit that when feelings of control are low, individuals will want to re-establish control (e.g., Fiske, Morling and Stevens 1996). Consequently, they will prefer products that emphasize and demonstrate how their personal effort is required to generate results. We test this hypothesis across 5 studies.

In study 1, our goal was to simply establish that low control leads people to favor the idea of high effort over that of low effort. Participants first completed a common control manipulation (“write about a time when you had low (high) control”) (e.g., Kay, et al. 2008) and were presented with 9 different inspirational ads, 3 emphasizing high effort (e.g., “You get what you work for”) and 3 emphasizing low effort (e.g., “Relax.”). For each ad, participants were asked, “How much do you agree with this quote?” Analyses revealed a significant interaction of control manipulation by ad type (F(1, 54) = 7.42, p = .01). Individuals in the low control condition preferred the high effort ad (M = 5.95) over the low effort ad (M = 4.99). The difference was not significant in the high control condition (in this study or in the remaining studies).

In study 2, we established that the desire for high effort products when control is low manifests itself in product attitudes. We manipulated control as in study 1 and then presented participants with two current Swiffer™ commercials. In the low effort condition, the
Swiffer ad stressed how easy it is to clean with Swiffer. In the neutral condition, the Swiffer ad highlighted the technical features of Swiffer. Analyses revealed a significant interaction of control and effort condition on liking for Swiffer ($F(1, 92) = 4.67, p = .03$). Individuals in the low control condition preferred Swiffer more when it was associated with the neutral ad ($M = 6.04$) than when it was associated with the low effort ad ($M = 5.33$).

In study 3, we sought to better understand the drivers of our effect. We manipulated control with an established essay manipulation similar to studies 1 and 2 and then presented participants with a Nike sneaker that emphasized that it would either take less effort to get in shape with the shoe (“You don’t have to work as hard to get fit fast”) or more effort (“If you work hard, you get fit even faster.”). Results revealed a 2-way interaction, ($F(1, 151) = 3.90, p = .05$) such that when control was low, individuals preferred the high effort ad ($M = 4.75$) to the low effort ad ($M = 3.91$). This result was fully mediated by the degree to which people felt empowered and restored feelings of control when thinking about the sneakers (95% CI, B=-.66; -1.34, -0.06).

In study 4, our goal was to build on the prior studies and understand not only purchasing attitudes, but also behavior. We manipulated feelings of control and then presented individuals with an ad about golf clubs that either emphasized that very little effort (“Improves performance with limited practice or effort”) or a great deal of effort is required to improve performance (“Improves performance when accompanied by diligent practice and effort”) outcomes with the club. Participants were then given an opportunity to practice putting, followed by questions regarding purchase intent. Results indicated that when control was low, participants practiced longer ($F(1, 160) = 5.34, p = .02$) irrespective of effort condition, indicating a desire for greater control over their performance. Importantly, participants were more likely to purchase the clubs that were advertised with the high effort message ($M = 3.78$) than the low effort message ($M = 2.91$), suggesting preference for a product that was congruent with their desire to expend greater effort.

In study 5, we ran a field experiment to test our hypotheses. We recruited intramural basketball players directly after a game and presented them with a Nike shoe print ad. The ad suggested that either less effort (“Work Less, Jump Higher”) or more effort (“Work Harder, Jump Higher”) was required to improve their performance. Results revealed a 2-way interaction ($F(1, 82) = 3.91, p = .05$) whereby when feelings of control were low (i.e., when individuals lost), individuals were more interested in purchasing the shoe when presented with the high effort ad ($M = 3.76$) versus the low effort ad ($M = 2.75$).

In conclusion, we find that when feelings of control are low, people prefer products that require hard work over those that require little work to achieve the same outcome. We posit that this seemingly irrational preference is due to a desire to reassert control through high effort.

**Earning Luckiness: The Effect of Active Loyalty Program Membership on Consumer Predictions of Randomly-Determined Marketing Outcomes**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Prior research on loyalty programs has examined how structural and motivational features affect consumer behavior within program confines (Bagchi and Li 2011; Drèze and Nunes 2009; Kivetz 2005; Kivetz and Simonson 2002, 2003; Kivetz, Urminskey, and Zheng 2006; Lewis 2004). We add to this work by showing that loyalty program membership has psychological effects extending beyond the context of the program itself. Our series of studies demonstrates that consumers display a “lucky loyalty” effect, such that active loyalty program members feel they have a greater subjective likelihood of experiencing positive randomly-determined outcomes offered by the firm administering the loyalty program, even when these outcomes are unconnected to the loyalty program. We propose that status earned in a loyalty program through past purchases can lead to a relative illusion of control compared to non-members of the program or program members who lack elite status. This illusion of control, in turn, leads consumers to believe that randomly-determined positive firm-related outcomes are more likely to happen to them than to other customers of the firm. Why should this be the case?

Thompson et al. (1998) introduce the “control heuristic” to argue that judgments about control are based on two conditions: In order for an individual to perceive that he or she has control over an outcome, he or she must (1) find the outcome desirable and (2) perceive a link between his or her actions and the outcome. We propose that both of these conditions are present for elite members of loyalty programs considering randomly determined, positive outcomes like winning a sweepstakes or other promotional contest. These consumers will naturally find the outcome desirable and, if they have put in enough effort to earn elite status with the company through past patronage, they will feel that they have earned special treatment. We posit that these two conditions (desirable outcome and perceived link between actions and outcome) lead to the perception that active members of loyalty programs who have earned elite status are more likely to receive randomly-determined firm-related positive outcomes compared to others who have not earned the same elite status in the loyalty program.

We test our hypotheses across five studies that explore different types of loyalty programs and different types of randomly-determined outcomes. The primary purpose of study 1a was to test whether hotel loyalty program members with elite status feel they are more likely to win a random drawing for a gift basket during a hotel stay than non-members of the loyalty program. Note that the drawing was open to all hotel guests and was not contingent on loyalty program membership or status. We conducted a 2 (loyalty program elite status: yes vs. non-member of loyalty program) between-subjects ANOVA with predicted likelihood of winning the random drawing as the dependent variable. The results revealed that elite loyalty program members thought they were more likely than other guests to win the drawing ($2.91$ vs. $2.39$; $F(1, 196) = 7.27, p < .01$), supporting our prediction of a relative illusion of control for elite loyalty program members versus non-members. We also found that the perception that one has earned special treatment from the firm mediated the effect of loyalty program status (vs. non-membership) on predicted likelihood of winning the gift basket using procedures recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008) and Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010); the mean indirect effect was positive and significant ($a = 0.0522$, with a 95% confidence interval excluding zero (.0069 to .1172). Study 1a thus provides evidence that elite loyalty program members think they are more likely to receive positive randomly-determined outcomes than non-loyalty program members and that this “lucky loyalty” effect is mediated by a sense of having earned special treatment from the firm. Study 1b compares retail credit card holders who have earned versus not earned “Valuable Customer” status with the retailer. The results replicate the lucky loyalty effect and mediation by special treatment using a different positive firm-related outcome ($M_{\text{elite status}} = 2.88, M_{\text{non status}} = 2.44$; $F(1, 286) = 5.67, p < .05$).

Study 2 again uses a retailer discount context and provides additional evidence for the causal role of effort in the lucky loyalty effect by manipulating whether the consumer had to exert effort (by making purchases with the firm) in order to obtain elite status within
a loyalty program. As expected, the lucky loyalty effect obtains only when status is earned and not endowed ($M_{earned-status} = 3.16, M_{unearned-status} = 2.59, F(1, 198) = 6.61, p < .01$).

In studies 3 and 4, we demonstrate important boundary conditions to the lucky loyalty effect that provide further support for the control heuristic as the causal mechanism. Specifically, in study 3 we show that the lucky loyalty effect does not extend to randomly-determined desirable outcomes not related to the firm administering the loyalty program, including outcomes related to other firms (i.e., winning a prize under a soda cap, winning a restaurant raffle, getting an airline upgrade) or organizations (i.e., winning money in the lottery), and outcomes not related to any firm or organization (i.e., hitting green lights vs. getting stopped at red lights) (all $p$'s > .15). Finally, study 4 provides additional evidence in support of the control-related mechanism by demonstrating that the lucky loyalty effect does not obtain when the random firm-related outcome is undesirable (i.e., a sprinkler going off in the customer’s hotel room during their stay).

Theoretically, our work contributes to the literature on illusory control (Langer 1975; 1977; Thompson et al. 1998), as our research shows that individuals appear to believe that they can “earn” control over positive randomly-determined outcomes through effort. It also has significant implications for firms deciding how to use loyalty programs and promotional contests.

### Customized Assembly: How Does Effort Influence the Value of To-be-assembled Products?

#### EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers often invest effort by participating in the production of products. Customized product assembly, for example, involves making a series of product composition choices while investing physical effort in assembling a product (e.g. Build-a-Bear).

Consumer participation in the production of products has been shown to lead to a greater valuation of the finished product (Dahl and Moreau 2007; Deng et al. 2010; Norton et al. 2012). This increased valuation has been attributed to an increased fit between the final product and consumer preferences (Delleart and Stremersch 2005; Franke and Piller 2004), feelings of competence (Dahl and Moreau 2007; Norton et al. 2012), and feelings of pride/accomplishment (Dahl and Moreau 2007; Deng and Hutchinson 2011). The increase in valuation contrasts principles of economic theory, which suggest that effort expended during the design and assembly process should be subtracted from the value of the co-produced product (Bendapudi and Leone 2003; Delleart and Stremersch 2005; Etgar 2008; Meuter and Bitner 1998).

We propose that positive or negative utility can be derived from the product assembly experience itself. To understand the utility from customization and assembly efforts that is independent from the end product (product fit, pride and accomplishment) we assess how customized assembly influences the perceived value of the components of the to-be-assembled product. This approach assumes consumers will assign more value to the components (e.g., the parts at Build-a-Bear) that provide a better customized assembly experience.

We hypothesize that assembly effort increases the perceived value of the components of the to-be-assembled product when the assembly experience is positively engaging (i.e. creative), whereas assembly effort decreases the perceived value of the to-be-assembled product when the assembly experience negatively engaging (i.e., irritating). A customized assembly experience is more positively engaging when customization and assembly are integrated (i.e., the experience is creative) as opposed to segregated (i.e., the experience is irritating).

We tested our predictions in four experiments using simple craft activity kits. Participants in our experiments were asked to create holiday-themed figures by (1) choosing adornments from different adornment options (e.g. two different ears, mittens, shoes), (2) cutting out the adornment pieces and (3) assembling the figures by pasting these pieces onto a line-drawing of the figures. In all our experiments effort expended to create the figure was manipulated by the number of adornments participants selected (3 vs. 8). Our dependent variable was their valuation of the craft activity kit (i.e. the to-be-assembled product).

Study 1 manipulated whether customization decisions and assembly actions were integrated or separated. In an integrated “assemble-as-you-go” condition, participants were asked to pick the first adornment (e.g. ears) from two options, cut them out and paste them on the figure. Then they were asked to pick the second adornment (e.g. mittens), cut them out and paste them on the figure, and so forth. In a separated “assemble-at-the-end” condition participants chose their adornments and cut them out but did not paste them on the elf (i.e. assemble) until all choices were made and all pieces were cut out. In the “create-as-you-go” condition more effort (i.e. more choices and more pasting) led to a higher valuation of the components of the to-be-assembled product ($F(1, 152) = 6.75, p < .05$). Mediation analysis revealed that this higher valuation was a consequence of participants being positively engaged in the assembly task (i.e., finding the task creative; 95% CI = .56, 9.22). In the “assemble-at-the-end” condition, more effort led to a lower valuation of the components of the to-be-assembled product ($F(1, 152) = 4.81, p < .05$). This lower valuation was a consequence of participants being negatively engaged in the assembly task (i.e., finding the task irritating; 95% CI = -7.6, -0.6).

Study 2 used the “create-as-you-go” condition from study 1. To separate the customization decision from the assembly process, half of the participants in this study created a plan of their choices before creating the figure “as they were going”. As in study 1, in the “no-plan-create-as-you-go” condition more effort led to a higher valuation of the components of the to-be-assembled product ($F(1, 162) = 8.38, p < .05$). In the “plan-create-as-you-go”, more effort led to a lower valuation of the components of the to-be-assembled product ($F(1, 162) = 7.76, p < .05$).

Study 3 used the “assemble-at-the-end” condition from study 1. To make this negatively engaging assembly process more positively engaging, half of the participants’ mindset was manipulated by having these participants think about what it was like to be young, create art at school and bring it home to share it with the family during the assembly process. As in study 1, in the “no-mindset-assemble-at-the-end” condition, more effort led to a lower valuation of the components of the to-be-assembled product ($F(1, 174) = 3.49, p = .06$). In the “positively-engaging mindset assemble-at-the-end” condition, more effort led to a higher valuation of the components of the to-be-assembled product ($F(1, 174) = 11.22, p < .05$).

In summary, we show that the effort associated with customized assembly can add or detract from the perceived value of the components of the to-be-assembled product. By focusing on the value of the craft kit (or the-to-be-assembled-product) we show an influence of the customized assembly experience that is independent of the consequences of the customized assembly (i.e., the finished product).
The Effect of Goal Progress Salience Cues in Effortful Consumer Domains: An Implicit Theory Perspective

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers are faced with a plethora of products and services that provide cues to mark progress (called goal progress salience or GPS cues). Several firms endeavor to provide indications of progress (e.g., e-book readers that provide information about the percentage of the e-book completed; video games that provide information about the skill a player has learned at different levels) with the assumption that consumers appreciate this information. The literature on goal progress has generally shown that providing progress cues tends to bolster performance and goal achievement (Cheema & Bagchi, 2011). However, contrasting research (e.g., Amir and Ariely 2008) has shown that progress cues could hinder goal pursuit and task performance. In this research, we suggest that the effects of GPS cues may not be uniform for all individuals and for all kinds of consumption domains. Specifically, we suggest and find that the consumption domains that are deemed demanding and require consumer effort are differentially impacted by the presence and type of such progress cues, contingent on whether consumers endorse an incremental-theory and focus on learning goals or endorse an entity-theory and focus on the outcome.

Research has identified two types of implicit theories: entity and incremental. Entity-theorists tend to view people, events, and objects in relatively fixed, unchanging terms; whereas incremental-theorists possess a more dynamic and flexible view (Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 2005). People often rely on their implicit theories to guide judgment and behavior when they encounter task domains that require effort and are deemed difficult. In the current research, we propose that when encountering demanding domains, entity-theorists, who are outcome-focused, will prefer opportunities that demonstrate favorable outcomes and provide evidence of their ability/achievement. Hence, cues that will inform entity-theorists about their achievement (e.g. cues that highlight percentage completed) will help them meet their performance goals. Thus, they will be less likely to persevere on a task and their performance will be negatively impacted. However, due to the positive outcome they infer from these cues, entity-theorists’ task-evaluations will be favorable. In contrast, incremental-theorists, who are process-focused and are driven by learning goals, will not be impacted by GPS cues that highlight completion. Since incremental-theorists focus on building mastery skills in order to achieve end goals, they will only be impacted by GPS cues that highlight learning, such that they will more favorably evaluate tasks that include learning-GPS cues, but their performance will be unaffected. In three studies, we support these expectations with both converging evidence in different consumption domains (maze books and language learning products).

In study 1, set as a proofreading task, respondents proofread a dense chemistry article (demanding task) or a gossip article (less demanding task) that had been separated into five sections. After each section, half the respondents saw completion-GPS cues indicating such progress cues, contingent on whether consumers endorse an incremental-theory and focus on learning goals or endorse an entity-theory and focus on the outcome. When the completion-GPS cue was present, entity (vs. incremental) theorists evaluated the task less favorably ($M_{ET-completion} = 1.97, M_{IT-completion} = 2.82, p < .05$). In the less demanding task condition, both theorists’ task evaluations and performance were unaffected regardless of the absence/presence of GPS cues.

In study 2, we extended this finding by examining the effects of GPS cues that highlight learning, expecting incremental-theorists to more favorably evaluate tasks that included such cues. Implicit theory was manipulated as done in study 1. In a high-effort consumer domain, in which a Morse-code training package was presented as four modules, participants saw progress bars which informed them either about the percentage of the task completed (completion-GPS cue condition), or the skill they had learned (learning-GPS cue condition) at the end of the each module. As expected, entity (vs. incremental) theorists evaluated the Morse code training program more favorably when completion-GPS cues were present ($M_{ET-completion} = 5.26, M_{IT-completion} = 4.88$) and were more likely to buy the training module when they saw the completion (vs. learning GPS cues) ($M_{ET-learning} = 3.77, M_{IT-learning} = 3.02, p < .05$). Incremental-theorists, in contrast, evaluated the Morse code training product more favorably when they saw the learning (vs. completion) GPS cues ($M_{ET-completion} = 4.90, M_{IT-learning} = 5.62, p < .05$). We also observed that entity (vs. incremental) theorists felt better about themselves ($M_{ET-completion} = 5.34, M_{IT-completion} = 4.59, p < .05$) and thought that they were good at Morse code when they saw the completion (vs. learning) GPS cues ($M_{ET-completion} = 4.40, M_{IT-learning} = 3.83$).

In study 3, we replicated these results using another consumer product category that requires consumer effort, a puzzle book of mazes. Participants completed four different mazes and saw either completion-GPS cues or learning-GPS cues. Results show that in the presence of completion (vs. learning) GPS cues, entity-theorists evaluated the mazes more favorably ($M_{ET-completion} = 4.85, M_{IT-learning} = 4.11$) and felt that they improved their ability ($M_{ET-completion} = 4.19, M_{IT-learning} = 3.48$). However, incremental-theorists evaluated the mazes more favorably ($M_{ET-completion} = 4.10, M_{IT-learning} = 4.99$) and felt that they improved their ability ($M_{ET-completion} = 3.25, M_{IT-learning} = 4.20$) in the presence of learning (vs. completion) GPS cues.

Thus, in three studies, we show that an individual’s implicit theory of change and whether the consumption domain is associated with expending effort, serve as important determinants of how such cues that highlight progress or learning impact task pursuit, achievement, and consumer satisfaction.

REFERENCES


Paper #1: Smart Phones, Bad Decisions? The Impact of In-store Mobile Technology Use on Consumer Decisions  
Michael R. Sciandra, University of Pittsburgh, USA  
J. Jeffrey Inman, University of Pittsburgh, USA

Paper #2: Close, Yet So Far Away: The Influence of Temporal Distance on Mobile Promotion Redemption during a Shopping Experience  
Daniel Sheehan, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA  
Koert van Ittersum, University of Groningen, Netherlands

Paper #3: The Wireless Good Samaritan: Pro-social Behavior in Mobile Networks  
Jayson S. Jia, Stanford University, USA  
Xianchi Dai, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China  
Jianmin Jia, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Paper #4: Digital Shopping: What You Need to Consider  
Nikhil Sharma, V.P. of Shopper Insights, The Nielsen Company, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Digital technologies are becoming a pervasive component of consumers’ purchase experience. For example, U.S. e-commerce sales accounted for 5.4% of total sales in 2012 (Thomas, Davie, and Weidenhamer 2012) while mobile technologies influenced 5.1% of all U.S. retail sales in 2012 (Brinker et al. 2012). As we progress into the digital age, marketers have the opportunity to use advanced technologies, such as computers, smartphones and location-based services, to gather consumer insights, influence consumer decisions at the point-of-purchase, and engage consumers in a truly unique manner. However, in order to tap into the wealth of opportunity offered by digital advancements, marketers must first understand how consumers utilize, interact, and react to these technologies. Therefore, the four papers in this session explore how new technologies impact consumers decisions and behaviors.

In the first paper, Sciandra and Inman investigate consumers’ lay beliefs associated with in-store mobile technology use and assess how mobile technologies alter purchases. In particular, the authors explore the influence of shopping-related and shopping-unrelated mobile device use on consumer outcomes. Depending on use, Sciandra and Inman find that, counterintuitively, mobile technologies can lead to more unplanned purchases, more forgotten items, longer time spent shopping, and additional shopping trips. The second paper by Sheehan and Van Ittersum examines the influence of temporal distance on consumers’ mobile promotion redemption. They demonstrate that the perceived temporal distance between a promotional offer and the promoted product influences redemption and evaluation of the promoted product. While smartphones and smart carts provide flexibility in interacting with consumers, the results suggest that the timing of mobile marketing interventions during a shopping trip significantly impacts consumer decisions. In the third paper, Jia, Dai, and Jia explore the impact of mobile technologies on pro-social behaviors such as donation activities, recycling habits, and aiding strangers. The authors find that consumers’ wireless social network characteristics predict behavior in pro-social contexts. In particular Jia et al. show that greater social status (as measured by iPhone usage and connectivity asymmetry) negatively impacts voluntary behaviors intended to help others. Finally, Sharma assesses the impact of digital technology on the consumer package goods (CPG) industry and outlines key principles for marketing success. The author identifies two barriers and accelerants to success of CPG in digital channels and finds that consumers’ preference for digital outlets depends upon the characteristics of the shopper and product category.

This proposed session brings together a combination of leading scholars and practitioners to examine consumers’ use of and response to digital technologies in general and mobile in particular. As a cohesive unit, the four papers illuminate the role of technology in the consumption environment and provide guidance for managers as they interact with the new “digital consumer.” These papers address a broad range of digital issues; further, each paper focuses on real-world problems facing marketers and consumers and maintains a cogent session theme. Importantly, because these papers also make conceptual contributions to multiple streams of literature (e.g., contextual-level theory, social influence, in-store decision making), this session should appeal to a broad audience.

Smart Phones, Bad Decisions? The Impact of In-store Mobile Technology Use on Consumer Decisions

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

A critical topic of interest to marketers, in-store decision making is common for many consumers (Inman and Winer 1998). One understudied factor impacting consumer decisions are mobile technologies such as cellphones and smartphones. As mobile devices continue to grow in popularity, it is critical that marketers understand how these devices are used in retail environments.

Recently, mobile technologies have been praised for helping consumers make better decisions (Shapiro 2012). However, research acknowledges unintended visual and cognitive impairments associated with these devices (e.g., Strayer, Drews, and Johnston 2003; Strayer and Johnston 2001). Consequently, the use of mobile technologies in shopping environments may act as a double-edged sword with both positive and negative implications for shoppers.

We argue that the nature of mobile use (shopping-related vs. shopping-unrelated) will differentially impact consumer outcomes. When used in an unrelated manner (e.g., talking, texting, surfing the web), we predict that multi-tasking exhausts attentional resources and results in negative outcomes such as purchasing more unwanted products or more time spent shopping. When used in a related manner (e.g., checking prices, using shopping applications), we predict that mobile technologies may have both positive and negative outcomes. For example, consumers should be better equipped to track spending and be more likely to purchase forgotten needs items. However, we also argue that relevant technology use may still prove distracting and result in more impulse purchases and longer shopping times.

To gain a richer understanding of consumer in-store mobile use we completed two exploratory studies. In Study 1a, 30 consumers were asked to describe a time they used their mobile device in a retail setting. Seventy percent of respondents indicated they used their phones to perform at least one shopping related and one shopping unrelated function during the trip. Despite using phones in both related and unrelated manners, 80% of respondents indicated that their
phone enhanced their decision making while only 13% of respondents indicated that their phone acted as a significant distraction.

In Study 1b consumers again described a time they used their mobile device in a retail setting. However, half of the participants were prompted to discuss a time they used their phone in a related manner, while the remaining half were prompted to discuss a time they used their phone in an unrelated manner. The purpose of this study was to reveal lay beliefs of in-store mobile technology use. As anticipated, participants in the related condition believed their phone use helped with shopping ($p < .001$) and enhanced decision making ($p < .001$) more than participants in the unrelated condition.

In addition, we asked participants to evaluate shopping outcomes in direct comparison to situations in which they were not using their phone. In comparison to not using a mobile device, participants in the Unrelated condition spent less than they expected compared to shoppers planning to purchase many items. Therefore, under certain conditions in-store mobile phone use stimulates additional consumer purchases.

We find that in-store mobile technology significantly altered consumers’ behaviors. First, looking at unplanned purchases, we find that consumers in the Unrelated usage condition made more unplanned purchases when compared to consumers not using phones ($\beta = .12, p < .01$). However, shoppers in the Related or Both conditions did not show any difference in unplanned purchases compared to shoppers not using phones. Therefore, under certain conditions in-store mobile phone use stimulates additional consumer purchases.

Second, looking at number of items planned but not purchased, we found that participants in the Unrelated condition missed more planned items than consumers not using mobile technologies ($\beta = .26, p < .05$). Further, consumers in the Related or Both conditions showed no difference in planned items not purchased ($\beta = .19, p < .10$). This result is consistent with our contention that mobile technology use distracts consumers from the shopping task.

Third, assessing trip length, we found that Unrelated phone use enhances the positive effect of number of items purchased on shopping time ($\beta = .01, p < .05$). Therefore, it appears that Unrelated phone use can substantially increase the amount of time spent in-store for shoppers planning to purchase many items.

Finally, we found an interesting relationship between phone use and deviations from expected spending. Overall, shoppers in the Unrelated condition spent less than they expected compared to shoppers not using a phone ($p < .05$). However, Unrelated technology use strengthened the positive impact of number of items purchased on deviations from expected spending ($\beta = .02, p < .01$). Essentially, as consumers in the Unrelated condition made more purchases they exceed expected spending more rapidly. Further, Unrelated use strengthens the negative relationship between planned items not purchased and deviations from expected spending ($\beta = -.05, p < .05$). This result is consistent with our prior finding that consumers using phones in an Unrelated manner miss more planned items and suggests that these consumers may need to make additional shopping trips to purchase forgotten items.

In summary, we find that mobile phone use can exert a distracting influence on shoppers and interfere with shopping goals. Further, it appears that consumers do not anticipate these effects. While consumers understand the positive implications of in-store mobile technology use, it appears they are unaware of the negative impact these devices can have, especially when used in a distracting manner. Depending on use, mobile technology may lead to more unplanned purchases, more planned but not purchased items, longer shopping times, and additional shopping trips.

**So Close, Yet So Far Away: The Influence of Temporal Distance on Mobile Promotion Redemption during a Shopping Experience**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Consumers have traditionally been exposed to price promotions either before entering a store or at the moment of choice (Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox 1995). Yet, with the proliferation of consumer facing technology, such as smartphones or smart shopping carts, retailers and manufacturers have a greater level of flexibility as to when to present shoppers with promotions during a shopping experience. This research contributes by examining the role of the temporal distance between the promotional offer and the promoted product and its influence on redemption likelihood, product perceptions, and spending behavior.

Priming literature states that promotional offers should be transient, which suggests that shoppers are more likely to redeem a promotion when it is encountered closer to the purchase decision for the promoted product (Crowder 1976). However, temporal construal theory suggests that the temporal distance between the promotion and the promoted product positively influences consumer perceptions about the product (Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002). Specifically, when decisions are perceived to be temporally distant, individuals construe these decisions in terms of abstract, high-level terms, while more temporally proximal decisions are based in concrete, low-level considerations (Liberman and Trope 1998). Temporal distance increases the influence of the value of high-level construals, while reducing the value of low-level construals, in consumer purchase decisions and evaluations.

An important distinction between high- and low-level construals of goal-directed behavior is the focus on desirability versus feasibility considerations (Liberman, Trope, and Waks 2007; Vallacher and Wegner 1987). Desirability considerations refer to the value of the decision outcome (the “why” of the behavior), whereas feasibility considerations refer to the ease or difficulty of reaching the decision outcome (the “how” of the behavior; Trope, Liberman, and Waks 2007). This implies that when the temporal distance between the promotional offer and the promoted product is close (e.g., the promotion is offered immediately prior to the purchase decision), shoppers would be relatively more influenced by feasibility considerations, such as the costs and uncertainties associated with acquiring the promoted product (Castano et al. 2008). When the temporal distance between the promotional offer and the promoted product is longer (e.g., the promotion is offered in advance of the purchase decision), shoppers are relatively more influenced by desirability considerations, such as the brand or taste (Alexander, Lynch, and Wang 2008).

In order to examine the influence of temporal distance between the promotional offer and the promoted product on redemption likelihood and spending behavior, we conducted a number of simulated shopping tasks. In Study 1, participants were presented with a shopping list consisting of 8 different product categories and told that...
their decisions would occur in the order of the shopping list. After every purchase, the shopping list indicated what purchases have been made with a strikethrough (ex: bread) to draw attention to the temporally sequential purchase decisions (Hornik 1984). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a temporally distant promotional offer (received prior to the 2nd purchase decision), a temporally proximal promotional offer (received prior to the 5th purchase decision that was for the promoted product), or a control condition with no promotions. The promotional offer was “$2 off Starbucks ground coffee.” The results indicate the promotions were effective: participants in both promotion conditions were more likely than the control condition to purchase Starbucks (21% vs. 6%; \( \chi^2 = 9.129, p<0.01 \)). More importantly, and consistent with temporal construal level theory, participants were more likely to redeem temporally distant promotions than proximal promotions (34% vs. 17%; \( \chi^2 = 4.78, p<0.05 \)).

Study 2 replicated Study 1 with the three exceptions. First, to mitigate concerns of primacy, participants shopped for 12 items with the promoted product as the 11th purchase decision. The temporally distant promotion occurred before the 5th purchase decisions, while the proximal promotion occurred before the 11th purchase decision. Second, the promotional offer was reduced from $2 to $1. Third, perceptions of the promoted product were collected to examine the salience of desirability considerations. As in Study 1, the promotions were effective (37% vs. 8%; \( \chi^2 = 7.05, p<0.01 \)), and participants were more likely to redeem temporally distant promotions than proximal promotions (50% vs. 26%; \( \chi^2 = 2.84, p<0.1 \)). Furthermore, participants who received the temporally distant promotion offer evaluated the taste and quality of the coffee more favorably than those who received the temporally proximal promotion (F(1, 87) = 5.57, p<0.05). This suggests a temporally distance promotion may actually enhance a shopper’s evaluation the desirability characteristics of the promoted product.

In order to examine the robustness of the effect of promotional temporal distance and the proposed mechanism in more detail, Study 3 promoted a product in a different category: $1 off for Freschetta pizza. Furthermore, additional perceptual measures were collected to examine the effect of the temporal distance on both desirability and feasibility considerations. The results again show that the promotional temporal distance increases the likelihood that participants redeem the promotion and purchase the promoted product (50.0% vs. 39.5%; \( \chi^2 = 1.85, p<0.10 \)). Furthermore, the promotional temporal distance is shown to positively relate to a consumer’s perception of the promoted product’s taste (5.66 vs. 5.18, F(1, 96) = 4.15, p<0.05). An examination of the purchases of those participants that did not purchase the promoted product revealed some interesting results. The temporally proximal promotion leads to a lower spending on pizza ($6.39 vs. $6.19; t(1,94) = 1.63; p=0.10), resulting in higher share for the least expensive brand (39% vs. 20%; \( \chi^2 = 4.14, p<0.05 \)). Thus, temporally distant promotions appear to enhance the desirability considerations (e.g., taste) of the promoted product, while the temporally proximal promotion enhances the influence of feasibility considerations (e.g., price).

This research makes two important contributions. First, we are among the first to examine how consumer make distinct inferences about products by increasing the temporal distance between the promotion and product within a single shopping trip. Second, we significantly extend the literature on Construal Level Theory (Thomas, Chandran, and Trope 2006) by demonstrating how the level of a construal about a promoted product changes within a shopping trip as a function of only a few purchases.

The Wireless Good Samaritan: Pro-social Behavior in Mobile Networks

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

A growing body of research on individual and group behavior in digital social networks (Borgatti et al. 2009; Eagle, Pentland, and Lazer 2009; Kossinets and Watts 2006; Lazer et al. 2009; Ommera et al. 2007) suggests that network and telecommunications patterns can predict social relationships and other behavioral constructs (Eagle et al. 2009; Ommera et al. 2007). Population-scale telecommunications databases of prior behavioral histories thus open new avenues for investigating pro-sociality, especially given how the ubiquity of mobile telecommunications in modern life has irrevocably altered the basic parameters of social interactions. In a world where most human beings are constantly interconnected through wireless networks, mobile telecommunications (e.g. voice call, text message, internet) have not only expanded the boundaries of traditional social interactions, but have also begun to substitute for face-to-face interactions (Eagle et al. 2009; Ommera et al. 2007). How pro-social behaviors function within humanity’s unprecedented state of networked interconnectivity remains an open question, especially given the known basis of pro-sociality in face-to-face environments.

Pro-social norms are evolutionarily adaptive social characteristics displayed not only by humans (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Danielson 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Trivers 1971) but also by species ranging from chimpanzees to rats (de Waal 2008; de Waal, Leimgruber, and Greenberg 2008; Rutte and Taborsky 2007). For many species, including our homininae relatives, pro-social acts are strongly biased in favor of kin and reciprocating partners, and are never extended to strangers (Rutte and Taborsky 2007). Even amongst humans, adherence to pro-social norms is often determined by un-altruistic factors such as personal identification, relatedness, immediacy, peer pressure, and potential future interactions (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Danielson 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Trivers 1971). However, these conventional theoretical preconditions for pro-social behavior are much weaker, if not completely non-existent, during interactions between strangers in non-traditional wireless network contexts. Vastly different from our evolutionary environments (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Danielson 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Trivers 1971), wireless or virtual social contexts are often anonymous, distant, one-to-one, and single-shot. Exploring pro-social behavior within such contexts not only allows us to explore how social network characteristics can predict pro-sociality in the modern social landscape, but also tests the durability of the social norm in a ‘vacuum’ environment.

In a large-scale exploratory phone survey and two randomized field experiments, we successfully use people’s social network characteristics to predict the strength of objective and verifiable pro-social behavior in a large wireless network. Besides demonstrating what specific network characteristics predict actual pro-social behavior in multiple domains (Studies 1 and 2), we also test the causal robustness of our predictors in between-condition field experiments within the network (Study 3).

Across three studies that involved 10,000 mobile phone users (who were connected to 330,000 other users on a mobile network), we used field experiments that combine measures of verifiable behavior, population-scale databases of network behavior, and between-condition manipulations to study the basis of pro-social behavior. We found that individuals’ social status (e.g., iPhone ownership) and network structure (e.g. network centrality) could predict...
their pro-social behavioral intentions (Study 1) and actual pro-social behavior in a range of contexts (Study 2). Specifically, in Study 2, we sent text messages, ostensibly messages from a stranger, to 5,000 randomly selected mobile phone numbers (directly connected with 137,710 other subscribers) that requested a response, e.g. “I’m feeling depressed with the holidays, can you send me some cheerful message?” Higher status predicted less altruistic helping behavior, more response latencies, less detailed responses, etc.

Critically, we are able to causally test this relationship between-condition experimental manipulations. In Study 3, research assistants called 2,000 randomly selected numbers (with 76,783 other direct connections) and masqueraded as a visitor who just arrived in a city, who ostensibly misdialed while trying to call a friend, and attempted to ask for directions “since you’re already on the line”. Number of questions answered and time spent were used as dependent variables. We manipulated the accent of the caller as a novel proxy for social status, and found that individuals with higher status within their wireless network discriminated against lower-class accents in terms of amount of help rendered. That an interaction between social status network-variables and an exogenous manipulation of social status moderated previous effects showed that the network variables in Studies 1 and 2 did not reflect some factor unrelated to social status, such as dispositional curiosity or information overload.

Whereas previous network research has often been limited by correlational results and lack of hypothesis testing, our research strategy bridges the gap between network research and traditional scientific research by alloying the predictive power of network data with classic experimental design and hypothesis testing. Our methodology is the first to combine measurements of verifiable behavior, exogenous between-condition experimental manipulations, and large-scale network data analysis, and uses a previously untapped wealth of individual behavioral histories from wireless devices to identify and confirm the drivers of pro-social behavior.

We advance the understanding of theoretical constructs of social network connections by linking them to real behavior. We show that it was not the number and strength of connections between people in a network, but the relative structure of those connections that best predicted actual behavior. In particular, we identified connectivity asymmetry as a network variable that proxies for social status and can predict a wide range of behaviors. We show that greater social status predicted less pro-social behavior in several domains, contrary to traditional notions of social responsibility and social welfare.

Furthermore, we introduce several new measurement techniques to capture real and verifiable pro-social behavior; our use of binary response rate and strength of response (measured both explicitly by task completion, and implicitly by time spent) represents an ecologically valid measurement that can be used in numerous communication contexts for any research question that looks at response strength (e.g. advertising response, falling for phishing).

Most importantly, our results showcase the possibilities of using large network based field experiments in experimental social sciences, which has recently come under criticism for small sample sizes, biased selection and self-reported information, and other methodology flaws. A network based approach can potentially facilitate experiments with sample sizes in the millions and capture real behaviors that were previously inaccessible before detailed and objective histories of individual behavior from large consumer-technology databases became widely available.

Digital Shopping: What You Need to Consider

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Success in the digital shopping environment requires a deep understanding of shopper needs and the ability to effectively deliver products to consumers. The digital revolution has transformed industries like music, books and travel almost entirely because e-commerce solutions delivered shopper needs in ways that traditional channels couldn’t match. Are consumer packaged goods (CPG) next in line? Further, is technology a friend or a foe to retailing in CPG? This paper provides a thorough assessment of the impact of digital on the CPG industry, and outlines key principles for marketing success in a world where digital is the new normal. While we acknowledge that both shopper understanding and economic considerations dictate success in the digital world, this paper focuses primarily on the former: the shopper, their category needs, and the digital touchpoints that influence their behavior.

Digital technology is widely pervasive today and will only continue to grow at a rapid pace into the future. For example, over 117 million people own smartphones, and approximately 80 percent of them use these devices for shopping activities like finding stores, making lists, checking prices, researching products, sharing content, and purchasing (Nielsen Mobile Shopping Report, Q1 2012; Nielsen Mobile Panel, 2012). Amidst these activities, people seek to satisfy three fundamental needs when they shop: convenience, choice, and value. We believe that product category characteristics will interact with these fundamental needs and influence digital sales of CPG products.

To examine this contention, we conducted extensive research across 36,000 shoppers of CPG products spanning 18 categories, including both food and non-food items. Based on our research and analysis of online purchase data, we identified two barriers and two enablers that collectively determine how successful a CPG category can be in e-commerce. The two category characteristics identified as barriers to digital success are urgency and inspection. The urgency barrier refers to shoppers’ desires to buy and use immediately, without waiting to have the product delivered. The second barrier is the inspection barrier or the need to inspect certain products. Concerns about spoilage can discourage online purchasing because they negatively affect the product value proposition if items get discarded. Moreover, since consumers are more likely to buy other products that they need while examining spoilable goods, the inspection barrier has a secondary effect on the entire basket.

In addition, our research uncovered two category characteristics which enable the success of CPG in e-commerce: the stock-up enabler and the price enabler. Storable goods, such as products with predictable consumption rates and a long shelf life (e.g., diapers and dog food) lend themselves to online purchasing. As for price factors, online retailers enjoy several cost advantages over traditional operations, particularly related to overhead. Lower costs of doing business online often translate directly to lower consumer prices or steeper discounts for digital shoppers. This allows marketers to retain price sensitive shoppers in a more profitable way.

Along with CPG product categories, our research also investigates consumer usage of digital touchpoints (e.g., websites, social media sites, blogs, and coupon sites) and how these touchpoints influence shoppers’ purchase decisions for various CPG categories. Based upon our analysis, three key findings emerged. First, preference for digital touchpoints varies across shoppers. In particular, consumer demographics influence the type of digital media consulted. For example, African-American shoppers use store websites more than other consumers while Hispanic shoppers tend to rely more
on blogs. Second, shoppers prefer different digital touchpoints for different CPG categories. For example, consumers use coupon sites most often when purchasing diapers; brand emails most often when purchasing baby food or diet aids; and store websites most often when purchasing small appliances. Finally, an integrated approach, leveraging traditional and digital touchpoints, is most effective. Focusing solely on a social or mobile strategy is not prudent. Marketers leveraging traditional and digital touchpoints, is most effective. For example, when purchasing small appliances. Finally, an integrated approach, leveraging digital and its distinct characteristics, retailers can complement brick-and-mortar operations rather than replace them, building sales on both fronts. For manufacturers, we conclude that digital is no longer optional. It is paramount that manufacturers engage shoppers using digital touchpoints, particularly mobile, to influence relevant decisions on their path to purchase.

REFERENCES

Indulgent or Industrious? How Seemingly Separate Events Influence Our Consumption Choices
Chair: Uma R. Karmarkar, Harvard Business School, USA

Paper #1: BYOB: How Bringing Your Own Shopping Bags Leads to Indulging Yourself and the Environment
Uma R. Karmarkar, Harvard Business School, USA
Bryan K. Bollinger, New York University, USA

Paper #2: The Nearly Winning Effect
Monica Wadhwa, INSEAD, Singapore
JeeHyse Christine Kim, INSEAD, Singapore

Paper #3: From Fan to Fat?: Vicarious Losing Increases Unhealthy Eating, but Self-Affirmation Is an Effective Remedy
Yann Cornil, INSEAD, France
Pierre Chandon, INSEAD, France

Paper #4: The Fresh Start Effect: Temporal Landmarks Motivate Aspirational Behavior
Hengchen Dai, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Katherine L. Milkman, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Jason Riis, Harvard Business School, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Understanding how people make decisions about consumption, particularly indulgences, is important from the perspective of not only marketing but also public health and policy. Much of the existing research examines decisions in which a more virtuous/healthy option is contrasted with a more indulgent/unhealthy one. Furthermore, the experimental target is often to understand how related goals or particular attributes of the choice targets might bias the outcome. However, in everyday life, consumption decisions can arise in a manner that is intertwined with other considerations. A choice to go to a party might add social elements or framing to a decision to accept an alcoholic drink, or to absent-mindedly dip in to a bowl of chips. Thus this session examines how seemingly separate events can influence individuals to pursue more or less indulgent consumption paths. The events studied range from personal choices or experiences to entirely exogenous occurrences. However, across findings, their impact on consumption appears to be related to how important a person feels the event is to their own self and/or goals.

To better approach the complexity of these effects, the work in this session represents both laboratory experiments, and empirical analyses of “real world” data. The first paper, by Karmarkar and Bollinger, shows that taking an environmentally virtuous action caused grocery shoppers to reward themselves by increasing purchases of indulgent foods in addition to purchasing more “green” items. But it also shows that this result was sensitive to common competing motivations. In the second paper by Wadhwa and Kim, losing a chance based game subsequently led to an increased desire for unrelated rewarding items. Notably, this effect was dependent on how strongly the loss was felt – that is, on the game’s outcome being “near-win.”

The work by Cornil and Chandon extends beyond losing a game oneself, to watching others lose. Using archival and experimental data, they find that a loss in a sporting event can increase consumption of unhealthy food by fans who identify with the losing team. This effect was tied to degree to which the loss was felt as a personal one. Balancing these data on increased indulgences, work by Dai, Milkman and Riis, provides evidence that externally defined events can also promote more “industrious” choices when they are seen as opportunities or signals for the individual to make a fresh start.

Again, the power of these events arose from how meaningful they were to the individual.

As implied, these papers raise the general question of how important self-identification with an event is as a mechanism (or moderator) for these effects. Related discussion questions are 1) whether it is also important that the acts of consumption are strongly affective and/or associated with the self and 2) whether the impact of separate events is related to being an unconscious influence, or a conscious motivation. By combining experimental results with field (or empirical) data, these findings may provide practical suggestions for “making a difference,” in addition to appealing to researchers who study consumption, health-related behavior and goals/motivation.

BYOB: Bringing Your Own Shopping Bags Leads to Indulging Yourself and the Environment

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As concerns about climate change and resource availability become more central in the public discourse, the use of reusable grocery bags has been strongly promoted as an environmentally and socially conscious virtue. Thus it is useful to ask whether adoption of this behavior could subconsciously influence consumers’ in-store choices (e.g. Dijksterhuis et al. 2005). As a physical reminder of a virtuous act, reusable bags might be assumed to prime shoppers’ attention or motivation towards environmentally responsible products. Similarly, bringing one’s own bags could be self-signaling, suggesting to the consumer that they themselves are “green” or “good”, leading to a higher spend on organic or healthy foods and possibly avoiding indulgent ones, for the sake of consistency.

However, we propose that as an indicator of a virtuous self, bringing a bag gives shoppers permission to make less virtuous choices. Such a result is consistent with licensing effects, in which a virtuous action in one domain allows individuals to select indulgences in subsequent choices (Fishbach and Dhar, 2005, Khan and Dhar 2006). Here we demonstrate support for both priming and licensing effects of bringing one’s own grocery bags via a combination of experimental studies and empirical analysis of real world shopping data.

In our first study, participants (N = 74) were asked to examine a schematic of a grocery store layout, and to imagine going to shop at this store. We asked participants to list ten food items they would be likely to purchase during this trip. People who imagined they had brought reusable bags with them listed significantly more indulgent items, such as desserts or snack chips, than those who had received no information about bags (F(1,72) = 4.39, p<.05).

A second experimental study investigated whether this increased consideration of indulgent purchases was accompanied by an increase in their perceived value. Participants (N=377) again were instructed to imagine shopping for groceries, and were (were not) told that they had brought their own bags with them. They then indicated their willingness to pay (WTP) for groceries from “green”, “hedonic” and “baseline” (e.g. canned soup) categories. In an additional manipulation, participants either did, or did not, see prices associated with each item. For the group who received no price information, those who imagined shopping with reusable bags showed a relatively higher WTP for both green (F(1,337)=8.52, p<.005) and hedonic (F(1,373)=13.97, p<.001) foods as compared to the baseline.
However, when price information was present, no effects of bringing a bag were found for either category.

Together, these experimental results suggest that the use of reusable shopping bags might have a significant influence on grocery purchasing behavior in stores. However, the findings here are sensitive to other information, such as the salience of reference prices. Thus it was important to examine whether these results existed “in the field”, where consumers are exposed to many different competing influences. In addition, using real data meant that the decisions reflected true incentive compatibility, in comparison to the hypothetical experimental situations.

Thus as a third study, we performed an empirical analysis of cardholder transaction data from one location of a large U.S. grocery store chain. The data include over 2 million transactions by approximately 60,000 households, although we restrict the sample to frequent shoppers. Transactions in which the consumers had their own shopping bags were identified by a small monetary bag credit. Using a rich set of controls, we found that having one’s own bags increased consumers’ probability of purchasing both hedonic items (e.g., chips and high sugar foods like desserts or candy) as well as organic versions of products. These data also show how the effects of bringing one’s own bag are sensitive to common competing motivations. In studies 1 and 2, the data was restricted to individuals who did not have dependents under the age of 18, as the presence of children in a household has distinct influences on grocery basket composition, particularly in the realm of health conscious choices (Mangleburg, 1990; Prasad et al., 2008.). For study 3, we designed one set of controls to identify shoppers with young dependents in their household. Our analysis confirmed that the effects of bringing one’s own bag on indulgent purchasing only held for those consumers who did not show other purchases related to having very young children.

We demonstrate that remembering to bring one’s own grocery bags may license consumers to treat themselves while also priming them to treat the environment. This suggests that consumers would be particularly sensitive to the impulse indulgences often found at checkout registers, as the presence of the bags becomes highly salient at this point. It also predicts that environmentally related products could benefit from this stage of the shopping experience, since their consideration should be increased as well. In addition, seating our effect within the licensing literature suggests that its occurrence is dependent on consumers’ having some agency in choosing to bring their bags (Khan and Dhar 2006). Thus as several communities, cities and countries consider laws banning disposable bags (New York Times, 2012), the strength of these effects are likely to depend more on individual consumer’s attributions for whether they (or the government) are the reason they are bringing their own bags.

**The Nearly Winning Effect**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Prior research on goal gradient theory has shown that one’s motivational drive associated with a reward intensifies with increasing advancement toward the reward (Hull 1983). These findings raise an interesting question—what would happen to this intensified motivational drive when one nearly wins a reward? To answer this question, we turn to an emerging body of research on motivation, which suggests that the motivational drive is more general in nature, such that once induced through an incidental cue, it could lead to a broad array of reward seeking behaviors (Van den Bergh, Dewitte and Warlop 2008; Wadhwa, Shiv and Nowlis 2008). Drawing upon these findings, we propose that the intensified but unsatiated motivational drive induced as a result of nearly winning a reward could enhance the desire to seek subsequent unrelated rewards. We term this effect, the “nearly winning” effect. We examine our nearly winning effect hypothesis in four studies, including a field study, and also rule out alternative accounts related to mood and arousal.

In Study 1, we tested our basic research hypothesis related to the nearly winning effect. The winning factor was manipulated by having participants play an eight trial game, similar to the computer game—minesweeper—where they saw a box of 16 tiles, half of which contained a rock, while other half contained a diamond. If they managed to find eight diamonds, they could win a pen. The game was rigged such that in the clearly-losing condition, participants only managed to find one out of the eight diamonds. In order to examine our argument related to increasing advancement toward the reward, we included two nearly-winning conditions in this study. In both the nearly-winning conditions, participants managed to find seven of the eight diamonds. However, in one of the conditions, participants missed a diamond on the eighth trial (nearly-winning-advancement) whereas in the other condition, participants missed a diamond on the second trial itself (nearly-winning-no advancement). Therefore, in the nearly winning-no advancement condition, while participants still nearly won the reward, they were aware of losing the reward from the second trial and thus the feeling of advancement toward the reward was attenuated early on. Subsequently, participants were informed that they could return their survey and collect a small gift (a chocolate bar) from another experimenter at the end of the corridor. The speed with which they walked to get the chocolate bar became the main dependent variable in this study. Consistent with the nearly winning hypothesis, our results show that those who missed a diamond on the eighth trial in the computer game (nearly-winning-advancement condition) showed a greater desire for chocolate bar, as manifested in the walking speed toward the chocolate bar, than those in the nearly-winning-no advancement or clearly-losing conditions. Furthermore, there was no difference in walking speed between the nearly-winning-no advancement and the clearly-losing conditions. Given there was no difference in these two conditions, in the subsequent studies, we dropped the nearly winning-no advancement condition.

In the second study, we sought to provide stronger support for our underlying conceptualization by examining the role of reward value in moderating the nearly-winning effect. Further, in this study, we used level of salivation toward a reward as a way to measure one’s desire for a reward (Gal 2012). We argue that if the nearly winning effect is driven by a general increase in desire for a reward, then those in the nearly-winning condition versus clearly-losing condition should salivate more when presented with an unrelated high reward value item, but not a low reward value item. The winning factor was manipulated using the same game used in the first study and the reward value was manipulated by having participants view a picture of either a high reward value (100 dollar bills) or a low reward value (five cents) item. Our findings provide support for our hypothesis—nearly winning versus clearly losing in the game subsequently led to a higher salivation level toward an unrelated high reward value item, but not toward a low reward value item. No such difference was found in the level of salivation for participants in the clearly-losing condition. Moreover, there were no differences found in the mood or arousal levels across conditions in this or in subsequent studies.

In the third study, we provide further support for our conceptualization related to the activated motivation drive by showing that the nearly-winning effect gets attenuated when the motivational drive is dampened in an intervening task. Participants played the same game used in the previous two studies. In this study, we also included a winning condition (wherein participants did manage to find all the
eight diamonds). Subsequently, we manipulated the motivational drive dampening by having participants sample either an unpleasant odor or a neutral odor (adopted from Wadhwa et al., 2008). Participants then engaged in a purportedly unrelated card arranging reward responsivity objective test (CARROT; Powell et al. 1996), which measures how much effort an individual exerts to earn a reward. Consistent with our predictions, those in the nearly-winning condition, versus clearly-losing condition and clearly-winning conditions, exerted significantly more effort to earn an unrelated reward (as measured by CARROT). Further, this nearly winning effect was attenuated when the motivational drive was dampened in an unrelated intervening task.

In the last study, we test the generalizability of the nearly winning effect by conducting a field study at a fashion-accessory store. Consumers participated in a short survey in an exchange for a chance to win $20 gift certificate by playing an instant scratch-off lottery. Consumers were randomly assigned to one of the three winning conditions where they won (clearly-winning) the lottery, or lost the lottery by one digit, which was the last digit (nearly-winning) or by the last five digits (clearly-losing). The amount they spent in the store became the main dependent variable in this study. Consistent with our predictions, our findings show that those who nearly won the reward spent significantly more than those who clearly won or lost the reward.

In sum, findings from this research show that nearly winning a reward as compared to clearly losing or winning a reward can activate a general motivational drive leading to a broad array of reward seeking behaviors.

**From Fan to Fat?: Vicarious Losing Increases Unhealthy Eating, but Self-Affirmation Is an Effective Remedy**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Sport watching is more popular than ever: 108 million Americans watched the 2013 NFL Super Bowl and 2.2 billion people watched the 2010 FIFA soccer World Cup. Using archival and experimental data, we explore whether the vicarious defeats and victories that supporters experience influence their ability to regulate their food intake.

Supporters tend to perceive their teams’ successes and failures as theirs (Hirt et al. 1992), which has a measurable effect on their self-regulation abilities. Football and soccer defeats, especially when they are narrow or unexpected, increase alcohol-related criminality (Rees and Schnepel 2009), traffic fatalities (Wood, Mcinnes, and Norton 2011), and domestic violence (Card and Dahl 2011).

Consistent with studies showing that ego threats increase preferences for indulgent food (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1993), we expected that people would eat less healthily after the defeat of a football team that they support. Second, as vicarious sports victories improve the perceived self-worth of supporters (Hirt et al. 1992), we hypothesized that vicarious football victories would lead to healthier eating. Third, we expected that allowing supporters to self-affirm after experiencing a vicarious defeat would eliminate its impact on unhealthy eating, as self-affirmation reduces the impact of vicarious sports defeats on self-serving biases (Sherman et al. 2007) and, more generally, improves people’s self-regulation abilities (Schmeichel and Vohs 2009).

The first study is a quasi-experiment in which we examined the self-reported daily food consumption of a representative panel of 730 US consumers and 3150 consumption days, during two NFL seasons. We assumed that most people in the panel watch football games and support the team of the city where they live, based on surveys showing that about 60% of Americans declare being NFL fans (Gallup 2012). We examined the effects of 450 Sunday games on consumption on the day of the game and on the following Monday and Tuesday. We measured unhealthy eating by calculating saturated fat consumption and calorie intake from the food consumption data provided by the panelists.

Compared to their average consumption, people consumed 16% more saturated fat and 10% more calories on Monday if their team had lost the day before but consumed 9% less saturated fat and 5% less calories if their team had won. In contrast, consumption was at its usual level on the same Monday among people assigned to control groups: those living in cities without an NFL team and those living in cities whose NFL team did not play on that Sunday. Second, we found that the outcome of the game had no effect on food consumption on the Sunday of the game and on the following Tuesday. This shows that the Monday effects were not compensated on the subsequent day or anticipated on the previous day. Third, we found that these effects were particularly strong when the outcome of the game was uncertain, as measured by a low point spread in the bookmakers’ predictions. This suggests that surprise and disappointment are important drivers of the effect. Fourth, we found that saturated fat consumption was especially low when the victory was crushing and particularly high when the defeat was tight, which is consistent with the literature on close-call counterfactual thinking (Medvec and Savitsky 1997). Finally, we found that the effects were stronger in cities where people identify the most to their NFL team (based on survey data): a 28% increase in saturated fat consumption following a defeat, and a 16% decrease following a victory. Gender did not moderate these results, which is consistent with extant studies on the impact of game outcomes on cardiac accidents (Carroll et al. 2002; Klener et al. 2011).

We replicated these results in a controlled laboratory experiment in France. Participants were asked to describe either a victory or a defeat by their favorite sport team. After this, they were given the opportunity to eat different foods. We found that people asked to think about a defeat ate more unhealthy food and less healthy food than people asked to think about a victory. Three coders also measured the extent to which the participants engaged in spontaneous self-affirmation when describing the sporting event. As expected, we found that spontaneous self-affirmation helped vicarious losers limit their consumption of unhealthy food.

In a third study, we asked a representative panel of French participants to watch a 7-minute video of a soccer game and manipulated self-affirmation. Participants were randomly assigned to a 3 (defeat, victory, control) x 2 (self-affirmation, control) between-subject design. The games of the victory and defeat conditions were important finals that the French national soccer team had either won (Euro 2000) or lost (World Cup 2006) against its archival, the Italian national team. The control game opposed two Belgian soccer teams, irrelevant to participants’ identity. In the self-affirmation condition, participants were asked after watching the videos to rank their core values and to elaborate on their top-ranked value (McQueen and Klein 2006). Participants in the control condition were asked to list the important features of chairs. Then, we measured participants’ desire for various foods. Compared to the control condition, watching the defeat video increased preferences for less healthy food whereas watching the victory video increased preferences for healthier food. As expected, the effect in the defeat condition was attenuated when participants could affirm their core values.

These results contribute to the literature on self-control by showing how an important contextual factor of everyday life (sporting events) can promote or hinder healthy eating. We also show how
the interplay between sport watching and eating relates to identity issues. A simple self-affirmation intervention can eliminate the unhealthy consequences of the vicarious defeat. Ultimately, this research has important managerial and political implications: we show what kinds of games are susceptible to raise health issues, providing precious information to regulators - and socially responsible advertisers - concerned with the obesity epidemic.

**The Fresh Start Effect: Temporal Landmarks Motivate Aspirational Behavior**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

The notion that renewal is possible and offers individuals an opportunity to improve themselves has long been endorsed by our culture. For example, many religious groups engage in ritual purification ceremonies, Christians can be “born again,” and the metaphorical phoenix rising from the ashes ubiquitously represents rebirth. This suggests a widely shared belief that we have opportunities throughout our lives to start fresh with a clean slate, with the well-known “New Year’s effect” representing just one example of a far broader phenomenon. The current research explores naturally-arising points in time when an individual is particularly motivated to engage in aspirational behaviors (or activities that help people achieve their wishes and personal goals).

Past research suggests that temporal landmarks, including personally-relevant life events (e.g., anniversaries, birthdays) and reference points on the calendar (e.g., holidays, the start of a new week/month/year/semester) demarcate the passage of time and create discontinuities in our memories, experiences, and time perceptions (Robinson, 1986; Shum, 1998). Further, temporal landmarks may increase the subjective distance between a person’s current self and past self (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Peetz & Wilson, 2013; Wilson & Ross, 2003). The theory of temporal self-appraisal posits that the more disconnected people feel from their past selves, the more likely they are to disparage their past selves (Wilson & Ross, 2001). By doing so, they are able to maintain a positive perception of themselves in spite of past failures (Wilson & Ross, 2001). Consequently, we conjecture that temporal landmarks separate people from their imperfect past selves, which makes them feel superior and thus capable of pursuing their aspirations. We hypothesize that this process of wiping the slate clean generates fresh start feelings and motivates people to tackle their goals.

Across three studies, we document evidence of the proposed “fresh start effect” in the field. Study 1 examines public interest in a widespread goal – dieting – by using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict daily Google search volume for the term “diet” (N_days=3,104). We find that relative to baseline, interest in dieting increases at the start of new weeks (by 14.4%), months (by 3.7%), and calendar years (by 82.1%), and following Federal holidays (by 55.1%; again particularly following holidays that feel like fresh starts), as well as following their birthdays (by 2.6%) (all p’s<0.05 except birthdays: p=0.07). Importantly, we find that temporal landmarks motivate people to tackle a broad set of health-irrelevant goals (e.g., “study harder for GMATs”), suggesting that the fresh start effect is not merely the result of efforts to rebalance one’s health after over-indulging.

Three additional laboratory studies provide support for our hypothesized mechanism. In Study 4, we manipulated the psychological meaning associated with a temporal landmark. Participants (N = 303) read about a middle-aged female, Jane, who was not satisfied with her weight and would soon start a new position at work. In this three-condition, between-subject experiment, participants were told either that Jane (a) viewed the new job as a meaningful life change, but it would not affect her daily routines; (b) did not view the job change as meaningful, but it would shift her daily routines; or (c) did not consider the job change to be meaningful, and it would not shift her daily routines. Participants then rated how motivated Jane would be to add healthier habits to her life following the change. As expected, a meaningful job change was perceived to be more likely to motivate health improvements than a job change described in either of the other two conditions (ps < .001). Furthermore, participants’ rating of the extent to which the new job would feel like a fresh start to Jane fully mediated the effect of the meaningful job change on Jane’s motivation to improve her health.

Studies 5a (N = 199) and 5b (N = 203) present scenarios examining the effects of two different temporal landmarks: moving to a new city (5a) and celebrating a birthday (5b). We replicate our Study 4 finding that more meaningful temporal landmarks generate stronger fresh start feelings and thus are perceived as more likely to motivate aspirational behaviors (in this case, quitting smoking) than less meaningful but objectively equivalent temporal landmarks. We also measured the extent to which participants believed each scenario’s protagonist would feel (1) disconnected from his/her past self, and (2) close to his/her ideal self. Supporting our proposal mechanism, mediation analysis shows that fresh start feelings following temporal landmarks originate from a psychological dissociation from one’s past self and a perceived increase in closeness to one’s ideal self.

Together, this research investigates how and why temporal landmarks can affect individuals’ motivation to engage in aspirational behaviors. Organizations and individuals may be able to capitalize on various temporal landmarks to facilitate goal pursuit. Also, marketers of products designed to help people attain desirable objectives (e.g., gym memberships, healthy restaurants, online education programs) may be best able to appeal to consumers’ desires for self-improvement by advertising to consumers at fresh start moments.

**REFERENCES**


Study 3 uses data from the goal-setting website StickK.com to examine a wider range of goals (including job, educational and financial pursuits). OLS regressions (N_goals=66,062, N_days=866) show that people are more likely to create goal contracts at the beginning of a week (by 62.9%), month (by 23.6%), year (by 145.3%), and following Federal holidays (by 55.1%; again particularly following holidays that feel like fresh starts), as well as following their birthdays (by 2.6%) (all p’s<0.05 except birthdays: p=0.07). Importantly, we find that temporal landmarks motivate people to tackle a broad set of health-irrelevant goals (e.g., “study harder for GMATs”), suggesting that the fresh start effect is not merely the result of efforts to rebalance one’s health after over-indulging.

Study 4, we manipulated the psychological meaning associated with a temporal landmark. Participants (N = 303) read about a middle-aged female, Jane, who was not satisfied with her weight and would soon start a new position at work. In this three-condition, between-subject experiment, participants were told either that Jane (a) viewed the new job as a meaningful life change, but it would not affect her daily routines; (b) did not view the job change as meaningful, but it would shift her daily routines; or (c) did not consider the job change to be meaningful, and it would not shift her daily routines. Participants then rated how motivated Jane would be to add healthier habits to her life following the change. As expected, a meaningful job change was perceived to be more likely to motivate health improvements than a job change described in either of the other two conditions (ps < .001). Furthermore, participants’ rating of the extent to which the new job would feel like a fresh start to Jane fully mediated the effect of the meaningful job change on Jane’s motivation to improve her health.


Understanding Intertemporal Preferences to Foster Consumer Well-Being: Increasing Patience and Goal Pursuit  
Chair: Selin A. Malkoc, Washington University in St Louis, USA

Paper #1: To Know and To Care: How Awareness and Valuation of the Future Jointly Shape Consumer Savings and Spending  
Daniel Bartels, University of Chicago, USA  
Oleg Urminsky, University of Chicago, USA  
Shane Frederick, Yale University, USA

Paper #2: Making Decisions For the Future: Value of Delayed Durables and Shrinkage in Usage Duration  
Kyu B. Kim, University of Southern California, USA  
Raghu Ram Iyengar, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #3: Loosening vs. Gaining Control: Enhancing Feelings of Control Reduces Present Bias  
Kelly (Kiyeon) Lee, Washington University in St. Louis, USA  
Selin A. Malkoc, Washington University in St. Louis, USA  
Derek D. Rucker, Northwestern University, USA

Paper #4: The Influence of Time-Interval Descriptions on Goal-Pursuit Decisions  
Nira Munichor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel  
Robyn A. LeBoeuf, University of Florida, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Many important consumption decisions, such as making a purchase now (vs. saving), paying more for faster delivery (vs. being patient) or choosing to pursue long-term goals (vs. giving into temptation), have intertemporal components. Extensive research studying preferences over time has demonstrated that consumers often deviate from normative theories (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002), effectively acting against their long-term interest. Despite the calls to utilize decision research to increase consumer welfare (Ratner et al., 2008), little research has examined ways to help consumers make decisions that are in line with their long-term goals. Four papers in this session address this gap by pointing out important ways in which consumers can be nudged to make decisions that are in line with their long-term interests.

The first paper by Bartels, Urminsky, and Frederick demonstrates that consumers’ patience in financial decision-making depends on: (1) consumers’ awareness of the inherent intertemporal tradeoff and (2) their caring about the future self. They show that connectedness to one’s future-self influences financial decision making primarily when tradeoffs are apparent. Their research shows that getting consumers to make far-sighted financial decisions, in line with their long-term goals, require a combination of both valuing future outcomes and recognizing opportunity costs.

The second paper by Kim and Iyengar informs us that impatience, observed mainly with monetary outcomes, might underestimate consumers’ impatience when it comes to durable purchases. They show that consumers are significantly more impatient when considering durable goods than monetary outcomes and that this impatience is rooted in the shrinking estimates of their usage duration for such products. Their results show that interventions that would help decrease shrinkage in time perceptions (Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc and Bettman 2009) can increase patience for both durable (and monetary) goods.

The third paper by Lee, Malkoc, and Rucker shows that consumer impatience can be remedied by giving them contextualized or generalized control. Their studies demonstrate that consumer impatience can be, at least in part, attributed to consumers feeling not in-control of their decisions. They show that endowing consumers with control either locally (by giving them explicit options) or globally (by making them feel powerful) decreases their impatience. Their results point out simple interventions that can nudge consumers to make long-term oriented decisions.

The final paper by Munichor and LeBoeuf describes that describing the future intervals as extents (e.g., in 3 months) as opposed to dates (e.g., by July 1st) increases consumers’ likelihood of pursuing long-term goals. Their results indicate that when time is presented as extents consumers’ attention to long-term goals and their benefits is increased, while date descriptions draw attention to day-by-day passage of time. Their results highlight how simple framing changes can be powerful tools in increasing consumers’ long-term orientation.

Taken together, papers in this session propose ways to nudge consumers to make long-term oriented decisions. The session is aligned with the conference theme, as it attempts to “make a difference” in consumers’ well-being. We expect this session to draw an interdisciplinary audience from intertemporal choice and consumer welfare literatures.

To Know and To Care: How Awareness and Valuation of the Future Jointly Shape Consumer Savings and Spending  

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers are often advised to cut back on everyday small spending and invest the money instead, which can make a substantial difference in the long run. Adopting and maintaining such a strategy requires the consumer to both (i) consider the tradeoff inherent in the purchase; i.e., purchasing now requires foregoing an opportunity to use the money to further one’s long-term interests, and (ii) care enough about the future self who would benefit from their forbearance to warrant restraint in the present. We argue that consumer financial decision-making hinges on a specific interaction between both components that has not been demonstrated in prior research. Across six studies, we show that the psychological relationship with one’s future self (operationalized as the degree of connectedness to one’s future self; Parfit 1984) influences financial decision making primarily in those contexts where tradeoffs are apparent (Frederick et al., 2009). Thus, far-sighted choices require the combination of both valuing future outcomes—as affected by connectedness and reflected in the discount rate—and the recognition of opportunity costs.

In Studies 1a (N=88) and 1b (N=233), we show that manipulating participants’ awareness of opportunity costs interacts with measured factors relating to their valuation of the future (connectedness in Study 1a and estimates of temporal discounting in Study 1b) to impact a typical purchase decision. As in Frederick et al. (2009), participants were asked whether or not they would purchase an entertaining DVD for $14.99, and in the opportunity cost condition the reminder “keeping the $14.99 for other purchases” was added to the not-purchase option. Participants were also asked to rate their perceived connectedness to the future self in Study 1a and were asked to complete a short temporal discounting task (choosing between $900 available in a year and various smaller amounts available immediately) in Study 1b. In both studies, we find a significant interac-
tion between the opportunity cost reminder and factors relating to people’s valuation of the future. In Study 1a, participants’ ratings of connectedness influenced purchase decisions when participants were reminded of opportunity costs ($r = -.41, p < .01$), but not in the no-reminder control condition ($r = .04$). Similarly, in Study 1b, purchase decisions are related to our measure of temporal discounting when participants were reminded of opportunity costs ($r = -.20, p < .05$), but not in the no-reminder control condition ($r’s = .09, p > .10$).

In Study 2 (N=199), we replicate Study 1a (manipulating the salience of tradeoffs and measuring connectedness), and also measure the propensity to plan. We find a significant three-way interaction between connectedness, opportunity cost salience and planning, such that connectedness reduces spending when participants either see an explicit opportunity cost reminder or have a high propensity to plan (and therefore spontaneously consider opportunity costs).

In Study 3 (N=146), using a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, we crossed a manipulation of connectedness with an opportunity cost manipulation, measured people’s purchase intentions, and then measured temporal discounting. We manipulated connectedness by having participants read a short description of “recent research” suggesting that young adulthood is either characterized by stability in identity (inducing high connectedness) or is characterized by instability in identity (inducing low connectedness). Participants then chose between purchasing one of two iPads (64 GB for $829 or 32 GB for $599) or buying neither product. The price difference was highlighted for the lower cost iPad in the “opportunity cost” conditions (“leaving you $230 for other purposes”), but not in the control condition. We found that making people feel less connected to the future self increased temporal discounting ($δs = .51$ vs. .58 for low vs. high connectedness, $p < .05$), replicating Bartels and Urminsky (2011). When people were reminded of opportunity costs, manipulating connectedness reduced purchases of the expensive iPad (9% vs. 0%, low vs. high connectedness, $p < .07$), but the manipulation had no effect when people were not prompted to consider opportunity costs (8% vs. 7%). We found a significant interaction of manipulated connectedness and manipulated opportunity cost on the average spend ($p < .05$). The difference in intended spend was mediated by the connectedness-manipulation-induced changes in discounting when opportunity costs were highlighted, but not when they weren’t.

In Study 4 (N=130), we generalize to a more naturalistic manipulation of tradeoff salience. We asked participants to rank the desirability of six product categories (pocket video cameras, blenders, bed sheets, pocket watches, laser printers, and nonstick frying pans), and choose between one more expensive and one less expensive product from each of these categories. The order of the last two blocks (ranking and choosing) was varied and served as our manipulation of tradeoff salience. Ranking before choosing induces recognition of tradeoffs—that the satisfaction of one purchase goal is likely to entail the subordination of other purchase goals—and it also causes participants to think of at least five other uses of their money before their first decision to splurge or save. Our primary dependent variable was the number of expensive items purchased, which was reduced by manipulated connectedness when tradeoffs were highlighted (2.19 vs. 1.45, low vs. high connectedness) but not when tradeoffs were not highlighted (i.e., when participants chose before ranking the product categories: 2.03 vs. 2.36; interaction $p > .05$). In particular, the increase in fiscal restraint that we observe occurs almost exclusively for decisions involving those product categories that each participant ranked as less personally desirable. As a result, higher-connectedness respondents’ tastes for spending are both reduced and more focused on higher-valued goods when considering opportunity costs (i.e., after completing the ranking task).

Lastly, Study 5 (N=304) measured adult bank account holders’ savings and spending behaviors and attitudes. We find a correlation between connectedness and savings (even controlling for income and demographics) among participants who reported that they enjoyed managing their finances and looked forward to it. In contrast, we find no such correlation among participants who report that they dislike managing their finances and dread having to do so, presumably because their lack of engagement suppresses consideration of financial tradeoffs.

Making Decisions For the Future: Value of Delayed Durables and Shrinkage in Usage Duration

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Durable goods provide not only immediate benefits but also an extended stream of benefits over their usage duration. Consumers often face situations where they have to make purchase decisions for durables available only after a delay. Delayed purchase of durables are challenging both to consumers and retailers. For consumers, they should appropriately compare a future alternative to any available immediately and decide whether it is worth delaying their purchases. Such decisions are essentially intertemporal tradeoffs. For retailers, selling goods not in stock is challenging as they have to consider appropriate financial incentives for inducing consumers to delay their purchase (e.g., price discounts for back-orders). How consumers change their valuation for alternatives depending on temporal availability will clearly impact the level of monetary compensation.

Past work on intertemporal decision making has repeatedly shown that delayed alternatives look less attractive than immediately available ones. This may be due to individuals preferring immediate over delayed consumption, uncertainty associated with future preferences, or subjective perception of delays. Note that these factors are likely to influence the discounting of all types of goods like monetary outcomes or consumables as well as durables.

Durables, however, are different from other types of goods because they provide a stream of utility over a usage duration. For instance, a television purchased today provides benefits starting from the purchase time till the time of discard. Does using a product over a duration have implications for how their benefits are discounted? Past work provides little direction. In fact, some past research has tested factors impacting time discounting using durables but reports no systematic difference in preference for durables and for monetary outcomes.

In the current article, we seek to investigate how durables are discounted and, in particular, what role does usage duration play in this process. We posit and find evidence that consumers subjectively shrink the expected usage duration associated with durables that are expected to be purchased in the future. That is, they expect to use the same durable for a shorter period of time when it is purchased in the future than immediately. This shrinkage in usage duration serves as a factor of time discounting in addition to other factors such as time preference or uncertainty in future preference (which are unrelated with usage). As a result, a future durable looks even less attractive than an immediate one even after accounting for all factors known to influence time discounting.

Supporting our premise on the shrinkage in usage duration, we found evidence for the shrinkage effect in usage duration in two types of judgment: estimation of unknown usage duration and subjective perception of a known duration. In study 1, we show that estimated usage duration shrink when a durable (e.g., a smartphone) is planned to be purchased in the future as compared to the present.
In study 2 and 3, we demonstrate the shrinkage effect in subjective scaling of a given duration that is objectively given to participants. Demonstrating the implication of the shrinkage effect, in study 4 we show that individuals’ tendency to shrink future usage durations (relative to usage durations starting from the present) is an important determinant of their impatience for durables. That is, those who shrink future usage duration more would expect to use the same durable purchased in the future for a shorter period of time as compared to those who shrink it less. As a result, the former consumers would discount the value of delayed durables more and would become more impatient for immediately available durables than the latter consumers.

In study 5 we further demonstrate that the shrinkage effect in usage duration would result in more impatience for durables than for monetary outcomes, if all other conditions are equal. Note that various factors known to influence time discounting for monetary outcomes such as pure time preference, uncertainty, subjective perception of delays, and various individual and situation factors would influence time discounting for durables as well. But the shrinkage effect in perceived usage duration is a unique factor that influences only the time discounting of durables. Therefore, if all other conditions are equal, consumers would be more impatient for durables than they would be for money.

Taken together, our results demonstrate the important role of usage duration and its judgment in determining consumers’ intertemporal preference for durables. We also discuss the implications for retailers in determining the optimal level of monetary compensation for delayed durables.

**Loosing vs. Gaining Control: Enhancing Feelings of Control Reduces Present Bias**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Consumers regularly make decisions about the timing of their consumption. For instance, they decide how fast to ship an online purchase, when to take vacations, or when to make a large purchase. Extant research on such decisions has shown a variety of consumer phenomena, most notably present bias (a.k.a. hyperbolic discounting). Preferences are considered present-biased when a consumer is willing to pay higher premiums to avoid a 3-day delay in shipment (e.g., $5, or $1.8 per day) than a 10-day delay (e.g., $10, or $1 per day; Malkoc and Zauberman 2006).

A substantial amount of research has investigated the underlying mechanisms for present-bias. The last decade has seen a surge in research that theorized, and empirically tested, a host of cognitive explanations, based on changes in mindsets (Malkoc, Zauberman and Bettman 2010), representation of the outcomes (Malkoc and Zauberman 2006), resources (Zauberman and Lynch 2005) or time (e.g., $5, or $1.8 per day) for present-biased preferences. Prior research has theorized that forgoing a current outcome is painful and leads to a feeling of deprivation (Hoch and Lowenstein 1991), resulting in impulsive-ness and impatience; however, this account has not been empirically tested. More importantly, the theory is not precise as to why the act of deferral is so painful. Based on this notion, we propose that the mere act of consumption deferral leads consumers to feel that they have less control of their consumption. In a typical present-bias elicitation task, participants are asked to imagine having an outcome in the present (e.g., a DVD available today) and then asked to delay this outcome for monetary gain. Such a proposition elicits a feeling of lack of control over the consumption decision. Therefore, we propose that when asked to forgo a presently available outcome, consumers feel they have less control over their consumption. As a result, consumers, now wanting to regain control, represent the subsequent intertemporal choice as an opportunity to gain control, requiring higher premiums in their immediate responses and resulting in present bias. We investigate this proposition in four studies. Experiment 1 shows that giving people control over their consumption timing decreases present bias. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that a more generalized sense of power and control leads to similar reductions in present bias. Finally, experiment 4 shows that decreasing the level of control can increase present bias.

In experiment 1, using a typical present bias paradigm, we asked participants to imagine having ordered a DVD online where their default delivery was scheduled for the same day. They then imagined delaying their delivery by 3 days and 10 days (within-subjjects) and asked to indicate the premium they required to delay. Participants in the “choice control” condition were first asked whether they would like to delay the delivery before they indicated their delay premium. We expected that merely having a chance to express their willingness to delay to make participants feel more in control of their consumption decision, decreasing present bias. Results supported this prediction, with significantly lower level of present bias in the choice control condition ($M_{3\text{days}-10\text{days}} = 0.45$), compared to the standard present bias paradigm ($M_{3\text{days}-10\text{days}} = 0.66$; $t(147) = 2.04, p < .05$).

In experiment 2, we examined whether a generalized and previously evoked sense of control could influence the extent of present bias in subsequent tasks. To evoke control, we induced participants with power, which has been found to directly affect one’s sense of control (Fast et al. 2009). Since high power individuals feel they have more control over their outcomes, we predicted that high power would diminish present bias. To test this idea, half of the participants recalled an incident where they had power over others, a task that has been successfully used to induce power (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee 2003). The other half simply recalled events of the previous days. Next, all participants imagined having a cash refund ($45) that was available that day and asked to delay it by 4 and 10 weeks. As predicted, participants who were induced with power showed less present bias ($M_{4\text{weeks}-10\text{weeks}} = 1.29$), compared to the control condition ($M_{4\text{weeks}-10\text{weeks}} = 2.62$; $t(97) = 1.78, p = .07$). In experiment 3 we replicated these findings using an alternative method to induce power (via an employer/employee task, Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2010).

In the final experiment we examined whether taking control away from participants would have the opposite effect and increase present bias. To that end, some participants completed a deferral task where they imagined ordering a DVD online, scheduled to arrive within 24 hours. They were then asked to indicate their premium to delay it by 3 days and 10 days. The remaining participants (low control) were instructed to imagine that they chose to pick up their DVD from a local store. However, when they arrived at the store, their DVD was not available, but the clerk offered to have it delivered to their home within 24 hours. They were then asked to indicate their delay premium to defer the receipt of this DVD by 3 days and 10 days. We predicted and found that having already lost control over their consumption, these low control participants showed greater present bias ($M_{3\text{days}-10\text{days}} = 0.66$), compared to those in the baseline condition ($M_{3\text{days}-10\text{days}} = 0.38$; $t(171) = 2.26, p < .05$). Moreover, we found that feelings of control over consumption mediated the observed effect.

In sum, our studies show that the feeling of control in related (experiments 1 and 4) and unrelated (experiments 2 and 3) contexts influences the extent of present bias. Further, we consistently find that decreasing (increasing) feelings of control increases (decreases).
present bias. Taken together, this research suggests that the feeling of control plays an important role in present bias, and demonstrate a more affective explanation for present bias.

The Influence of Time-Interval Descriptions on Goal-Pursuit Decisions

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

A diet ad proclaims, “Sign up today and lose 25 pounds in 2 weeks!” What would influence a consumer’s decision to pursue this diet? Although many factors might play a role (Aarts, Gollwitzer, and Hassin 2004; Freitas et al. 2002; Zhang, Fishbach, and Dhar 2007), this paper focuses on one unexplored factor in particular: the description of the time interval allowed for goal completion. We suggest that whether the interval is described by extents (“2 weeks from today”) or dates (“between today and May 6”) influences goal-pursuit decisions.

Although how a time interval is described may seem unimportant, it can affect how people plan for the future (LeBoeuf and Shafir 2009) and evaluate future transactions (LeBoeuf 2006; Read et al. 2005). We suggest that time-interval descriptions also affect whether people initiate goal pursuit, with people being more likely to pursue goals with completion intervals described by extents than by dates. We suggest that changes in time focus (i.e., focus on the near vs. distant future; Lee, Lee, and Kern 2011) underlie such effects. Whereas extent descriptions refer to “chunks” of time (e.g., weeks, months) and may lead to a focus on the interval as a whole, date descriptions direct attention to specific time points (LeBoeuf 2006; Malkoc et al. 2010; Read et al. 2005) and may prompt a focus on the day-by-day passage of time, conjuring considerations such as what one will do each day. Thus, an interval described as “three months from today” may focus people more on the distant future than does an interval described as “between today and July 23.” This leads us to predict that, when people are contemplating pursuing a goal during a time interval, extent descriptions of that interval may direct people’s attention more to the goal’s long-term benefits, which may increase the goal’s perceived importance, and less to the other mundane tasks that will occupy the interval. This may result in greater willingness to pursue desirable goals.

Study 1a tested the effect of interval description on people’s willingness to diet. Participants indicated whether they would be willing to lose 1.5 pounds in two weeks, with time interval described either by extents or dates. Participants also reported how long the target interval seemed. More participants were willing to diet when the interval was described by extents than dates (65% vs. 44%, respectively, \(\chi^2(1)=4.06, p=.04\)), but interval description did not affect perceived interval length. Study 1b replicated these results using a savings goal. Thus, people are more likely to pursue a goal when the allocated time interval is described by extents, rather than dates, and this effect seems not to be driven by a change in the interval’s perceived length.

In study 2, participants indicated whether they would be willing to read three books in one month (described by extent or date) and indicated how many books they would commit to reading within that interval. Study 2 also examined the possible mechanism by collecting ratings of the goal’s importance. When the interval was described by extents, versus dates, participants pursued reading at a higher rate (35% vs. 10%, respectively, \(\chi^2(1)=4.74, p=.03\)), were willing to read more books (\(M_{\text{extents}}=1.84\) vs. \(M_{\text{dates}}=0.93\), \(t(53)=2.62, p=.01\)), and found the goal more important (\(M_{\text{extents}}=4.31\) vs. \(M_{\text{dates}}=3.26\), \(t(53)=2.19, p=.03\)). Goal importance mediated the relationship between interval description and goal pursuit (95% CI: .040, 1.51).

These results hint at one possible underlying mechanism: extent descriptors lead to greater perceived goal importance and to greater goal pursuit, perhaps because extent descriptions trigger a focus on a longer time horizon and long-term consequences.

If extent descriptors lead people to focus more on the distant future than do date descriptors, they should only increase willingness to pursue goals with positive long-term consequences, such as studying, and not goals with negative long-term (but positive short-term) consequences, such as watching television. To test this hypothesis, participants in Study 3 considered pursuing one of two goals—watching more television or studying more—for one month.

The effect of time-interval descriptor depended on the type of goal (\(\chi^2(1)=5.38, p=.02\)). Participants were more likely to pursue the television goal when time was described by dates versus extents (45% vs. 26%, respectively, \(\chi^2(1)=4.38, p=.04\)). For studying, however, dates yielded less goal pursuit than extents (4% vs. 14%, respectively, \(\chi^2(1)=3.17, p=.075\)). Thus, people are more likely to pursue goals with positive short-term consequences when time is described by extents, but they are more likely to pursue goals with positive short-term consequences when time is described by dates. These findings suggest that extents lead to a greater focus on the distant future than do dates.

Study 4 explored another boundary condition: interval length. When goal completion stretches out over a very long interval, people may naturally focus on the distant future and therefore on long-term consequences. In this case, people may be less sensitive to relatively small focus adjustments caused by description nuances (see also Goodman and Malkoc 2012), and therefore descriptions may have a lessened impact on people’s general time focus and subsequent decisions. To test this hypothesis, participants read an article about adverse effects of dairy consumption and indicated their likelihood of reducing their dairy consumption within either one month or three years. The effect of interval descriptor depended on interval length (\(F(1,131)=4.80, p=.03\)). Participants were more likely to reduce consumption within one month when the interval was described by extents than dates (\(M_{\text{extents}}=3.03\) vs. \(M_{\text{dates}}=2.23\), \(t(64)=2.29, p=.03\)). For three years, however, there was no such difference (\(M_{\text{extents}}=3.00\) vs. \(M_{\text{dates}}=3.52\), \(t(67)=1.06, p=.2\)).

In summary, even small nuances in how a goal and the time interval allocated to its pursuit are described can alter the decision to pursue that goal. An interval described by amounts of time may focus people more on the distant future than an interval described by dates. This increases people’s willingness to initiate goal pursuit during that interval, as long as goal pursuit has positive long-term consequences and a relatively short duration.

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Antecedents of, Predictions About, and Responses to Financial Constraints

Chairs: Stephanie M. Tully - New York University, USA
Hal E. Hershfield - New York University, USA

Paper #1: From Intuition to Insolvency: Intuitive Decision Makers End up More Financial Constrained
Christopher Y. Olivola, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, University College London, USA

Paper #2: Expense Neglect in Forecasting Personal Finances
Jonathan Z. Berman, University of Pennsylvania, USA
An T. Tran, University of Colorado, USA
John G. Lynch, University of Colorado, USA
Gal Zauberman, University of Pennsylvania, USA

Paper #3: Financial Constraint Induces a Shift Toward Material Versus Experiential Purchases Through Long Term Focus
Stephanie M. Tully, New York University, USA
Hal E. Hershfield, New York University, USA
Tom Meyvis, New York University, USA

Philip M. Fernbach, University of Colorado, USA
John G. Lynch, University of Colorado, USA
Christina Kan, University of Colorado, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Even though the world has seen great economic growth in past decades, the gap between rich and poor continues to widen in most nations (Gurría 2011). While some consumers’ resources are increasing, a large number of consumers are increasingly facing more difficult financial situations. As this disparity between the wealthy and the poor grows, understanding how consumers arrive at different points along this spectrum and how they behave is more important than ever. Along these lines, a recent JCR curation highlighted the importance of studying the financial climate of the consumer and understanding how it affects consumers (Peracchio, McGill and Luce 2012).

The goal of this session is shed further light on this increasingly important topic, and to gain a better understanding of the antecedents of beliefs about and implications for consumers’ financial constraints. In doing so, this session looks at financial constraints from a number of angles, and addresses implications for consumer policy and well-being. While the first two papers explore antecedents of actual and perceived future financial constraints, the last two papers examine outcomes of financial constraints on consumer behavior. The first paper by Olivola and De Neve looks at a potential antecedent of financial constraints and explores evidence from a unique 15-year longitudinal dataset suggesting that intuitive decision makers are more likely to have lower financial well-being. The second paper by Berman et al. demonstrates an important bias in consumer predictions of their own future financial constraints. In seven studies, they provide evidence that consumers under-weight the impact of future changes in expenses compared to future changes in income on estimations of future available monetary slack. Tully, Hershfield and Meyvis next present four studies examining the effects of financial constraints on consumers’ decision criteria and choices in discretionary spending. The authors suggest that financially constrained consumers are more apt to prefer material versus experiential purchases when spending discretionary money due to an increased focus on how long their purchase will last. Finally, Fernbach, Lynch, and Kan investigate the relationship between resource constraints and consumer planning. They differentiate two psychologically distinct types of planning (“efficiency planning” and “priority planning”) and show how consumers’ level of constraint affects the type of planning a consumer employs.

The papers included in this session offer findings that are of interest both theoretically and practically. The papers offer new insights regarding the causes of real and perceived future financial constraints and the shifts in consumer behavior that result from such constraints. On a pragmatic level, the included papers further our understanding of when financial constraints can lead to potentially suboptimal behaviors. Finally, by looking at financial constraints with a multi-method approach, this group of papers suggests many new avenues for future research focused on financial constraints.

From Intuition to Insolvency: Intuitive Decision Makers End up More Financial Constrained

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

People shape their lives through the decisions that they make. Whether these choices produce beneficial or detrimental outcomes for the decision maker largely depends on the decision process itself. Therefore, how people approach decisions, and not just what they choose, has important consequences. Broadly speaking, people can approach decisions in two ways (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; 2011; Slo- man, 1996): through careful deliberation (using logic, reason, and rational considerations) and/or by relying on their intuitions (going with their “gut feelings”). Poets, philosophers, and scholars have long debated the relative merits of human deliberation vs. intuitions. This debate has raged on in the social sciences, particularly among decision researchers, with some arguing that intuitions alone generally lead to suboptimal choices (Baron, 1998; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kmett, Arkes, & Jones, 1999), while others have defended the merits of intuitions and questioned the value of deliberation (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Far from abating, this ongoing debate about intuitions has received renewed attention from researchers and spilled out of academic circles and onto the public sphere (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2001; Gilovich, 1991; Gladwell, 2005; Groopman, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Myers, 2002).

Yet most studies examining the success or failure of intuitive choices have been carried out in controlled settings with limited real-world validity. More importantly, in nearly all of these studies, the impact of relying on intuitions has been evaluated over very short time periods. In contrast, there have been few longitudinal studies relating individual decision making tendencies (whether someone tends to rely on intuitions when making decisions) to important life outcomes. Clearly, understanding the long-term impact of an intuitive decision making style would inform the debate concerning the merits of intuitions.

Here, we use a unique longitudinal dataset to measure the predictive impact of an intuitive decision making style on financial wellbeing. Specifically, we examine how the tendency to rely on intuitions (even in adolescence) predicts financial outcomes up to 12-15 years later. These data were drawn from a multi-wave, panel study that surveyed a nationally representative U.S. sample of approximately 15,000 respondents over four time periods (Waves 1-4), starting in adolescence, and going up to adulthood. In all four waves,
respondents reported whether they tended to rely on their “gut feelings” when making decisions, using a five-category scale. In the most recent wave (Wave 4), they reported various aspects of their financial circumstances, including their income, financial assets, debts, gambling problems, etc. The richness and longitudinal nature of these data allow us to measure the impact of intuitive decision making styles on later (and current) financial well-being while controlling for a host of variables related to respondents’ characteristics and early environments (e.g., ethnicity, gender, socio-economics, parents’ education, respondents’ academic performance, etc.).

We find that intuitive decision making is a negative predictor of financial wellbeing: the more respondents reported relying on their gut feelings to make decisions, the worse their financial situation was in the final wave of the survey. Specifically, a greater reliance on gut feelings to make decisions was associated with lower positive indicators of financial wellbeing (personal yearly earnings, neighborhood safety, likelihood of having health insurance, and likelihood of owning their home) and higher negative indicators of financial wellbeing (debt problems and difficulty paying bills, the need for government financial assistance, job loss, and gambling problems). Furthermore, for many of these indicators, this relationship holds whether decision making style is measured early on (in Waves 1 and 2) or when respondents are older (Waves 3 and 4). We also find that this relationship holds when we control for indicators of cognitive ability (e.g., GPA and other measures of school performance) and for conscientiousness (one of the “Big Five” personality traits).

Finally, we test (and ultimately reject) a rational self-selection account of our results, according to which intuitive people are less well off financially because they have intentionally chosen to pursue careers that pay less (e.g., the arts), and not because they are more prone to errors in financial decision making. Specifically, three pieces of evidence refute this account. First, the tendency to rely on gut feelings also predicts an increased risk of having gambling problems, which is presumably not caused by one’s career choice. Second, intuitive decision making styles measured in Waves 3 or 4 (i.e., after most respondents have already selected their career paths) negatively predict financial wellbeing even when we control for intuitive decision making styles measured in Waves 1 and 2 (i.e., before and/or while most respondents select their career paths). In other words, even after controlling for an early tendency to rely on gut feelings when making decisions (which may be correlated with a person’s career preferences), we find that additional increases (vs. decreases) in this tendency later in life are associated with more negative (vs. positive) financial outcomes. Finally, we find that the tendency to rely on gut feelings when making decisions is negatively related to self-reported life satisfaction, which runs counter to the notion that intuitive decision makers are deliberately (and happily) choosing to pursue low-paying professions.

Our findings suggest that relying on gut feelings to make decisions leads to negative life outcomes, at least in the financial domain. The recent financial crisis and the events that followed have highlighted the dangers of hasty financial decisions and their impact on individual, national, and global financial wellbeing. Based on our results, we strongly caution against teaching children and/or adults to rely on their gut feelings when making financial choices.

Expense Neglect in Forecasting Personal Finances

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In economics, “life cycle” consumption models postulate that consumers borrow and save across time periods in order to account for expectations about changes in income and expenses over time. But it is a nontrivial problem to predict future income and expenses, and therefore whether it makes sense to consume now, to save or to borrow. Any mistake in the forecasting of one’s finances can cause serious negative consequences, such as derailing a future retirement plan or driving someone into long-term debt. How, then do people form their expectations about how much money will be available in the future? Zauberman and Lynch (2005) demonstrated the role of expectations of spare money (i.e., money slack) in influencing people’s intertemporal preferences. But we know little about what inputs drive these perceptions of spare money, and in particular, whether people are sensitive to changes in income and expenses as they form these judgments.

Across seven studies, we demonstrate that even though people generally think their expenses will rise in the future, they neglect or under-weigh expenses compared to income when forecasting their future spare money. In other words we find that while people expect that both their income and expenses to increase in the future, they naturally are much more sensitive to changes in income rather than changes in expenses when predicting their future financial situation.

In Studies 1a-c (N = 580), we sampled a wide range of participants with varying financial conditions. Our sample included fully employed and part-time employed adults, unemployed adults, and adults not currently in the labor force (Study 1a); university students (Study 1b); and business executives (Study 1c). Participants were asked to tell us how much spare money they currently have this week and how much spare money they expect to have over a fixed time in 3 months and 12 months from now (1 = “Very little spare money” to 11 = “Lots of spare money”). In addition, participants estimated how much they expected their income and expenses to change in 3 months and 12 months from now (-5 = “I expect my income[expenses] to decrease” to +5 = “I expect my income[expenses] to greatly increase”).

For each sample, we ran a regression that included expected income change and expected expense change as independent variables, and expected change in spare money as a dependent variable. The results show that the growth in spare money is fueled by the expectation that income will be higher at more distant points in the future than it is today. Interestingly, people do not factor in their expense growth when estimating their future finances, and consequently, their expectations about spare money are determined primarily by their expected change in income rather than their expected change in expenses. See table 1 for a summary of the results.

In Study 2 (N = 244), we examine whether the previous results are due to the possibility that participants evaluate income and expenses on different scales. To test this, half the participants were asked to evaluate their expected income and expense growth on a standard likert scale, as before, whereas the other half of the participants were asked to evaluate their expected income and expense growth using a modulus that normalizes judgments on a single scale (e.g., if your income today is 100 chips, what will be your income in 12 months?). We find that regardless of scale, participants consistently neglected to incorporate expenses when judging future slack.

Study 3 (N = 301) rules out the possibility that participants under-weigh future expenses because they believe that future expenses are more uncertain than future income. Participants were first asked to make judgments of their future income and expense growth and were then asked to state how confident they were in their estimate. Surprisingly, we find that participants felt more confident about their future expense growth (M = 8.09), than their future income growth (M = 7.83, paried-t = 2.27, p = .024). Furthermore, we replicate our main finding, suggesting that even though participants are highly confident about the extent to which their expenses will grow in the future, they do not factor in this increase when making financial decisions.
future, they still do not sufficiently account for expenses compared to income when estimating future slack.

Studies 4a (N = 302) and 4b (N = 74) rules out the possibility that these results are due to a bias caused by the manner in which we ask participants to estimate their available spare money. In particular, asking participants about how much slack they have may be priming them to think about the driver of slack money (i.e., income). If so, then asking participants to think about how financially constraint they are may cause participants to think about the driver of financial constraint (i.e., expenses). In Study 4a, half the participants are asked to estimate how much slack they have now and in the future, whereas the other half is asked to estimate how financially constrained they are now and in the future. We find that a focus on constraint does not diminish or eliminate expense neglect. In Study 4b, we replicate our findings using a three-item measure of resource availability that includes (1) a subjective assessment of slack money, (2) a subject assessment of financial constraint, and (3) an assessment of whether or not participants think they are likely to be able to pay an unexpected bill of $1,500.

Finally, we make a series of attempts to debias participants by focusing their attention on the various sources of expenses that may change in the future (Study 5, N = 243), how their expenses have changed in the past (Study 6, N = 159), and the role that exceptional expenses may play on current and future slack (Study 7, N = 184). However, we are unable to find any consistent factor that leads participants to increase the weight that expenses play in determining future available money slack. This speaks to the robustness of expense neglect as a bias that impacts the way individuals forecast their future available spare money.

### Financial Constraint Induces a Shift Toward Material Versus Experiential Purchases Through Long Term Focus

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

As people try to spend their money in ways that maximize their happiness, they need to trade off investments in experiential versus material purchases. Past research has shown that money allocated to experiential purchases may result in greater long-term happiness (e.g., Carter and Gilovich 2010; Nicolao, Irwin, & Goodman 2009; Van Boven & Gilovich 2003), suggesting that consumers should spend more money on experiential purchases (Dunn et al. 2011). The current research examines what happens when people feel financially constrained and this trade-off is more pressing than usual. Are financially constrained consumers more likely to spend their limited resources on experiences, thus allocating their scarce resources to get a bigger happiness bang for their buck? We propose that, rather than increasing the hedonic efficiency of their investments by focusing on experiential purchases, financially constrained consumers instead allocate more of their scarce resources to material goods. Specifically, we propose that financial constraint increases concerns about durability, which in turn shifts preferences towards material goods.

Given that financial constraints tend to highlight opportunity costs (Spiller 2011), we propose that, financially constrained con-

### Table 1: Summary of Main Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Time Period (Months)</th>
<th>Mean Slack Change</th>
<th>Mean Income Change</th>
<th>Mean Expense Change</th>
<th>β (Income)</th>
<th>β (Expense)</th>
<th>β(Inc.)/β(Exp.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.22 ***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.36 ***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>6.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.33 ***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>6.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.31 ***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.31 *</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.59 ***</td>
<td>-0.38 ***</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Modulus</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>+25%</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>0.48 ***</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.63 ***</td>
<td>-0.26 ***</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Modulus</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>+100%</td>
<td>+40%</td>
<td>0.42 ***</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.52 ***</td>
<td>-0.22 ***</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Likert</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.52 ***</td>
<td>-0.19 **</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Likert – Constraint</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.35 ***</td>
<td>-0.17 *</td>
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<tr>
<td>4b</td>
<td>Likert – 3 Item Measure</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.63 ***</td>
<td>-0.31 **</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A ratio of greater than 1 indicates that participants are over-weighing income relative to expenses, whereas a ratio of less than 1 indicates that participants are over-weighing expenses relative to income.

For studies using a modulus scale, we report median income and expense change in percentages.

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Sumers will recognize that a purchase today may inhibit a purchase tomorrow, thus focusing them on future consequences of the purchase and the longevity of their purchase. Whereas material goods tend to physically persist over time, experiences are characterized by a shorter objective life expectancy. Thus, although experiences have been shown to provide longer lasting happiness, material purchases may appear more enduring. Because physical duration is likely more salient than the longevity of memories at the time of purchase, we suggest that consumers under financial constraint are partial to material rather than experiential options.

In three studies, we provide evidence that consumers thinking about real or hypothetical financial constraints are more likely to choose material versus experiential choices across a variety of shopping scenarios. In study 1, we manipulate financial constraints by asking consumers to imagine and write an essay about life on or not on a budget. Next, they are asked to imagine that they have decided to spend their money on something nice for themselves as a treat and then are provided with six pairs of options that were pre-tested to equate on expected happiness, desirability, and perceived value of the item at the stated price. We observe that participants imagining life on a budget are more likely to prefer the material options than participants imagining life not on a budget, $F(1,71) = 12.02, p < .001$. Importantly, they are also more likely to mention duration as a factor in their choice than participants in the no-budgeting condition, $F(1,71) = 4.30, p < .05$.

In Study 2, we replicate the findings of Study 1 using another manipulation of financial constraint. Further, we rule out an alternative explanation that the increased focus on duration in study 1 was due to the fact that budgeting artificially increases a consumer’s focus on the future.

The study uses a 2(income change: increase, decrease) by 2(response type: planning, feeling) between-subjects design. To manipulate financial constraint, participants are asked to imagine that their income has either increased or decreased by thirty percent. In the planning conditions, participants are asked to devise a plan or budget for how they would live on their new monthly income, whereas in the feeling conditions, participants are asked to write what kind of emotional response they would have to the new income. Participants then complete a shopping task similar to the one used in Study 1. We present participants with possible reasons for each of their choices and ask them to indicate which ones they considered. As predicted, participants who imagine an income decrease are more likely to prefer the material option than participants who imagine an income increase, $F(1,252) = 21.01, p < .001$. Neither response type nor the interaction of response type with income change has any effect on choice (all Fs < 1). We show that this shift in choice is mediated by participants’ increased focus on duration while making their choice (95% CI = .2521, .6349; N = 160; 10,000 re-samples) (Preacher and Hayes 2008).

Study 3 aims to show the relationship between financial constraints and preference for material options by highlighting participants’ actual financial constraints. Instead of manipulating participants’ perceived financial situation, we manipulate the extent to which participants consider their own financial constraints while making their choices. To do so, half of the participants are asked to consider their current financial situation before completing the shopping task. As in Study 2, we present participants with possible reasons for each of their choices and ask them to indicate which ones they considered. As predicted, participants who are asked to consider their financial constraints are more likely to prefer the material options than participants in the control condition, $F(1,160) = 3.89, p = .05$. Replicating Study 2, an increased focus on duration mediates the effect of the manipulation on preference for the material options (95% CI = .2398, .9392; N = 160; 10,000 re-samples) (Preacher and Hayes 2008). Thinking about one’s financial situation shifts participants’ focus towards duration, which in turn leads to an increased preference for the material options.

Finally, using data from The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we show that in quarters of higher unemployment, when financial constraints are greater, consumers spend disproportionately more on material items (goods) than experiences (services), $\beta = .06$, $t(210) = 5.25, p < .001$. This analysis provides real world support for the hypothesis that during times of greater financial constraints, consumers shift their expenses toward material goods.

The present research indicates that consumers facing financial constraints are more likely to choose material purchases over experiential purchases when making discretionary expenditures. Ironically, it appears this shift is driven by a belief that material goods will provide longer lasting benefits – even though prior research suggests that long-term happiness is better served by investing in experiences.

**Squeezed: Effects of Constraint on Consumer Planning**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

This research investigates the relationship between different types of consumer planning and resource constraint. The connection between resource constraint and planning has been acknowledged in previous research (Lynch et al. 2010; Spiller 2011) but has not been explored or analyzed in detail. Furthermore, in contrast to the notion that planning is a unidimensional phenomenon (Lynch et al. 2010), we differentiate between two psychologically distinct types of planning: “efficiency planning” and “priority planning.”

Efficiency planning is intended to yield resource savings by accomplishing a goal as efficiently as possible, with the aim to avoid opportunity costs entirely. For instance, consumers’ “trip-chain” to accomplish several shopping goals without wasting travel time (Brooks, Kaufmann, and Lichtenstein 2004).

In contrast, priority planning requires deciding what to forego given current constraints and necessities directly consideration of opportunity costs. Whereas efficiency planning concerns local considerations relevant to the current goal, priority planning weighs countervailing goals against one another. For instance, given only an hour to accomplish numerous shopping goals, a consumer might decide that not everything can get done and forego visiting the shoe store.

These two kinds of planning are connected in that both are responses to resource constraint (or lack of resource slack; Zauberman and Lynch 2005). The difference is that efficiency planning is relevant when savings in the resource are precious, but there is no consideration of competing goals. Prioritization comes when one realizes that the resource is so constrained that tradeoffs have to be made.

Because efficiency planning does not involve incurring opportunity costs but priority planning does, consumers should begin with efficiency planning, switching only when increasing resource constraint requires that they do. Thus we predict that the type of planning consumers tend to do should vary with resource constraint.

Moreover, if efficiency and priority planning are indeed discriminable constructs, there is reason to believe that engaging in one type will inhibit the other type. Local concerns associated with efficiently accomplishing a single goal may crowd out global concerns related to competing goals (as in the planning fallacy; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Buehler, Griffin, and Peetz 2010). More generally, generating a plan of one-type may lead to output interference for other types (Alba and Chattopadhyay 1985). From a motivational...
In study 1, 153 mTurk participants answered a series of questions about holiday gift shopping and reported their financial constraint level. We show by confirmatory factor analysis that efficiency and priority planning are distinguishable constructs, and find that the share of priority plans made to efficiency plans increases with constraint.

In Study 2 we manipulated constraint level rather than measuring it. We asked 102 mTurk participants to list what they planned to buy each of five people over the holidays, then asked them to report how they would change their holiday gift shopping plans in reaction to a small, moderate or large financial shock in the form of an unexpected bill. Blind coders categorized responses into ‘priority’ (e.g., ‘give up on the gift’, ‘buy something different’) and ‘efficiency’ (e.g., ‘shop sales’, ‘use coupons’). Corroborating study 1, the proportion of priority plans relative to efficiency plans increased with constraint. Moreover, participants were significantly more likely and faster to generate a plan of the same type as their previous plan as compared to a plan of the other type, supporting the idea that engaging in one type of planning interferes with the other.

A weakness of studies 1 and 2 is that they cannot shed light on the dynamics of planning as it unfolds in real time. Therefore, in studies 3 and 4 we utilized a virtual environment that simulates a shopping trip in a mall. Undergraduate participants completed a shopping list by visiting stores and purchasing items from their list. Maps positioned in the mall indicated the location of different store types throughout the mall and the items available in each store, allowing participants to save time by viewing the map and engaging in efficiency planning. This paradigm allowed us to manipulate time constraint and the presence of a priority structure, so that we could observe planning in a setting that resembles how behavior unfolds in real time.

In study 3, we varied the time allowed to complete a series of shopping trips, providing a separate time budget for each trip. The key result was that participants (N=41) engaged in more efficiency planning (i.e., map viewing) under constraint.

In study 4, rather than giving a separate time budget for each shopping trip, participants were given a single time budget to cover trips to three malls shopped in sequence. As in Study 3, participants (N=62) were paid for each item they located and purchased off an 8-item shopping list for that mall, with an additional payment if they purchased all 8 items in the mall. A priority structure was induced by doubling the payments at the third mall. Thus, if all three shopping lists could not be completed, participants would earn more by being sure to purchase all eight items at the third and final mall, abandoning shopping at the first two malls if that was required under conditions of higher constraint. We found that with increasing constraint, more time spent efficiency planning in the earlier malls reduced priorities of higher constraint. We found that with increasing constraint, more time spent efficiency planning in the earlier malls reduced priorities of higher constraint.

The four experiments provide converging evidence about how different types of planning are influenced by resource constraint. Ironically, the attempt to save a resource by being efficient can sometimes lead people to get caught up in local considerations, neglecting a course of action that may be preferable when considered in the context of other, more important goals.

REFERENCES:


Exploring the Dynamics and Durability of Stigma
Chair: Stephanie Feiereisen, Cass Business School, University City London, UK

Paper #1: Sexual Script Development in the Media
Elizabeth Crosby, University of Wisconsin La Crosse, USA

Paper #2: Stigma and Accommodation to Consumption Loss
Cristel Antonia Russell, American University DC, USA
Hope Jensen Schau, University of Arizona, USA

Paper #3: The End of Stigma? Understanding the Dynamics of Legitimization in the Context of TV Series Consumption
Stephanie Feiereisen, Cass Business School, University City London, UK
Dina Rasolofoarison, Aston Business School, UK
Kristine de Valck, HEC Paris, France
Julien Schmitt, Aston Business School, UK

Paper #4: Factionalized Fatshionistas: Dynamics within Collectives of Stigmatized Consumers Engaged in Marketplace Change Efforts
Eileen Fischer, York University, Canada
Daiane Scaraboto, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile

SESSION OVERVIEW
Goffman (1963) describes stigma as the possession of an attribute that has a negative connotation, and that deviates from what is considered normal in a specific category of people. Prior work in consumer research has looked at stigma in relation to low-literate consumers (Adkins and Ozanne, 2005), coupon redemption (Argo and Main, 2008), senior citizen discounts (Tepper, 1994) and subcultures (Henry and Caldwell 2006). However, the focus of this research has primarily been on stigma management, and the strategies that consumers use to deal with the negative effects of stigma, while the dynamics of stigmatization remain largely unexplored. In addition, bearing in mind the extent to which technology impacts consumers’ lives, it is surprising to note that little effort has been made to examine the relationships between stigma and the media (see Kozinets, 2001 for an exception). Specifically, what roles do the media and media consumption practices play in the dynamics of stigmatization, including the perpetuation of existing stigmas and creation of new stigmas? What consequences are associated with the end of a stigma, either when the stigmatized practice ends, or when it gains greater legitimacy in the marketplace?

Overall, in line with the conference theme ‘Making a difference’, the proposed aim of this special session is to make a difference by going beyond stigma management and exploring the complex dynamics at the nexus of stigma, consumption, and the media.

The session will begin with a focus on the role of television in the context of the stigmatization of African American women. Elizabeth Crosby will present her work on the impact of sexual stigmatization on African American women. The findings suggest that the media play an active role in perpetuating sexual stereotypes, sometimes resulting in their internalization into women’s sense of self. The focus of the session will then shift to stigmatized media consumption practices, and particularly the consequences of the cessation of a stigmatized media practice. Cristel Russell and Hope Schau draw on a longitudinal research program addressing consumers’ experience of four discontinued television programs to develop a model of consumer loss accommodation and find evidence that stigma associated with some TV series impairs consumer loss accommodation. Stephanie Feiereisen, Dina Rasolofoarison, Kristine de Valck and Julien Schmitt also examine the consequences for consumers of the end of a stigma, but in a different context: the legitimization of the stigmatized media practice (watching TV series). The authors investigate the tensions in consumer narratives arising from traditionally negatively-laden television consumption and the positive evaluations of current television series viewing, gained from increasing legitimization processes of TV series such as Mad Men. In line with this research, Eileen Fischer will present her work with Daiane Scaraboto which also looks at the dynamics of stigmatization and legitimization in the marketplace. Fischer and Scaraboto draw on longitudinal online archival research in the network of Fatshionistas to examine the consequences for a collective of stigmatized consumers, of engagement in efforts to gain greater legitimacy in mainstream markets.

Jezebels, Gold Diggers, and Hoes: African-American Women’s Experiences with Sexual Script Development
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
African-American women continually face sexual stigmatization. Scholars observe that African-American women are often viewed as promiscuous (Collins, 2000). This research unpacks the relationship between sexual stereotypes and consumption. Specifically, I examine how consumption can perpetuate sexual stereotypes and create sexual scripts. Additionally, I investigate how sexual stigmatization affects African-American women and how they manage the stereotypes. As part of a larger study exploring African-American women’s experiences with stigma, I conducted 23 interviews. Informants also constructed collages. All informants live in a small city in the Midwest. They come from a variety of social classes and are between the ages of 19 and 56. All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed, yielding more than 650 pages of text. In analyzing both the collages and the written text from the depth interviews, I searched for emergent themes while also engaging in dialectical tacking (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Although I did not initially intend to focus on sexual stigmatization, the prevalence of it in the narratives prompted me to further explore the stereotypes. Sexuality is an important component to an individual’s identity. People are often defined in part by their sexuality (Foucault, 1978). Simon and Gagnon (1984) argue that sexual identity frameworks can be viewed as sexual scripts. They help build people’s attitudes and beliefs about their own and others’ sexuality. These scripts are developed through exposure to sexual stereotypes. African-American women’s sexual stereotypes have evolved into very particular sexual scripts, such as the promiscuous Jezebel or “hoe”, gold digger, and welfare mother. These scripts are often reinforced through consumption. Informants argue that their sexuality is criticized more than women of other races, especially in the media. Sonya argues that African-American women are portrayed as promiscuous or as gold diggers in sharp contrast to other races. Another informant, Shenelle, says “It’s always in the media that we are gold diggers.” Informants also note that music-related products can increase these stereotypes through lyrics and videos that frequently portray African-American women as sexual objects. Because of the stereotypes, society expects African-American women to make certain consumption decisions. For example, informants argue that they are expected to dress in provocative clothing. These fashion expectations are reinforced through the media. African-American women also face the welfare mother stereotype. While the primary characteristics of this stereotype are...
associated with economics, there is a sexual component, in that the welfare mother is portrayed as promiscuous and willing to have children with multiple men to increase her standard of living. Informants discuss how the welfare mother is often a negative caricature in the media. The sexual stereotypes denigrate African-American women, reinforcing negative perceptions. With these sexual scripts being constantly reinforced, some African-American women accept the stereotypes and incorporate it into their identity, in a process known as stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson, 1995). The existence of the ascribed sexual scripts actually results in its internalization into the women’s sense self. This outcome is something that my informants admit battling. On informant, Sherry, discusses how the prevalence of the gold digger stereotype in the media, makes it hard to resist. Other informants note that they know African-American women who fall victim to stereotype threat. The reinforcement of these sexual scripts is especially influential to adolescents, significantly affecting how they view their own sexuality and what is acceptable sexual behavior. This can lead to significant negative health consequences for African-American women as these sexual scripts may encourage them to engage in unsafe sexual practices. For example, African-American women run a higher risk of adolescent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases than women of other races (Centers for Disease Control, 2013).

However, some African-American women fight against the stereotype and refuse to internalize it. There are several ways that informants combat sexual stereotypes. Many informants stress the importance of education in reducing stereotypes. Paige designs programs to educate people about African-Americans so society learns that they are not reducible to a set of stereotypes. Mentoring other African-American women is also important. Sonya describes the advice that she gives young African-American women: “I tell young women when you go on a date don’t feel like you have to have sex with someone... don’t dress in a way that is inappropriate. You can feel elegant and glamorous without feeling like you have to lower yourself by putting on hot pants.” Other informants refuse to buy products that promote stereotypes. Marissa says “I think [rap music] perpetrates a sexual stereotype ... I don’t like my kids to listen to it.” Similarly, Sonya purchases music that portrays African-American women in a more positive light and encourages others to do the same.

Informants feel that they need to constantly fight against society’s preconceived expectations. Elise says, “You need to be on guard to make sure that you don’t give the image that you are going to be in any way allowing yourself to be open to any funny business.” The constant battle to transcend the stereotypes can be arduous. Many informants say that it is “exhausting” and feel as though people are constantly watching them. These women need to constantly exhibit front-stage behavior (Goffman, 1959), which is tiring and makes them smoother part of their identity. This can lead to feelings of unfairness. Adele notes: “Women may feel they have to suppress part of themselves... [My grandmother] would say that people think black girls are fast or promiscuous so you have to be extra, extra careful to make sure you never give the impression that you are in anyway doing that. You need to be... an extra, extra, extra good girl in order to make sure no one thinks anything is going to happen.”

Sexual scripts can distort African-American women’s attitudes and beliefs about their own sexuality identity and how it should be expressed. Unfortunately, consumption plays a significant role in reproducing sexual stereotypes of African-American women. The sexual scripts that emerge in this research yield consumer welfare implications that demand serious consideration.

Stigma and Accommodation to Consumption Loss

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Stigma is a known impediment to identity expression and identity work (Goffman, 1963; Snow and Anderson, 1987). By examining four discontinued television (TV) series varying in cultural stigma attached to the series, we show how accommodation processes unfold and are affected by the countervailing effects of consumption sociality and stigma. Triangulating across data sources and methods (extended participant observation, long interview and online forum analysis), we find compelling evidence that consumers experience loss on multiple levels (personal, social and cultural) and that sociality affects practices available in the interconnected processes of intrapsychic transformation, psychosocial status transition, as well as the continuation of communal and symbolic connections. TV series were selected because consumers’ experience of TV series often spans several years and usually occurs in domestic space fostering intimacy through intense parasocial attachments, which form and evolve like interpersonal relationships (Russell et al., 2004). TV series are also often consumed socially, allowing assessment of the impact of brand withdrawal on social interactions and networks surrounding brand consumption like families experiencing the loss of a ritual-infused retail space (Otne et al., 2008) and fellow brand enthusiasts (Kozinets, 2001; Schau et al., 2009). Finally, TV series are intricately connected to the broader cultural environment which impacts consumers’ responses to withdrawals. For example, Star Trek fans experience social derogation stemming from mainstream North American attitudes about their brand devotion being “geekish” (Kozinets, 2001), which impacts their experience of brand loss. Loss accommodation is theorized to be anchored in culture, or the manner in which the broader community views the relationship with the lost person or object and sanctions ways to deal with the loss. When the general community provides sympathy and support for one’s loss, it acknowledges its legitimacy and facilitates the accommodation process (Kamerman, 1993). When loss is felt throughout a community, as in a natural disaster (Delorme et al., 2004), the sociocultural dynamics surrounding loss are essential to the meaning-making process and identity reconstruction that ensues (Bonsu and Belk, 2003). Conversely, if the broad culture does not recognize the validity of the loss, disenfranchisement can ensue. When the loss is a “socially undervalued relationship,” people may feel stigmatized and this stigma “contravenes or cancels out the meaning of the loss” (Fowlkes, 1990) impairing the accommodation processes. Stigma leads to disenfranchised grief because their affection for the product is not widely accepted and their grief is invalidated. Echoing previous research (Henry and Caldwell, 2006; Goffman, 1963; Snow and Anderson, 1987), we find different ways in which fans deal with the powerlessness resulting from this stigma: some withdraw into an enclave, mainly a virtual one, through the fan forums that offer a safe social space for expressing and sharing their grief; others instead, attempt to conceal their grief symptoms altogether and deny themselves the right to express it, even though this maladaptive strategy usually led to chronic grief; yet others distance themselves from the stigmatized groups and attempt to return to the mainstream (Snow and Anderson, 1987). In contrast, the Auckland Museum, an institution of high culture, celebrated the TV series OF and placed the brand at the center of New Zealand culture. The mainstream media contributed to the creation of a collective memory (Connerton, 1989), for viewers and non-viewers. The museum acted as a public forum where personal experiences of the brand became interlinked with collective experiences (Rowe and Wertsch, 2002). These highly publicized events served not only transformation and transition roles.
for the viewers but a connection role as well. The exhibit’s opening event was a commemorative one that allowed participants to celebrate the life of the series. But this connective role was missed by those of fans who were unable to attend because they live overseas. Unable to prepare for, attend, and then reflect on the event, they feel disenfranchised. We identify the countervailing roles of consumption sociality and consumption stigma in allowing or preempting access to transitive and connective resources, thus altering the ways in which loss accommodation unfolds. Consumption sociality is significant in consumers’ loss accommodation because kin collectives (immediate and extended families), proximal social networks (corporeal friends), and the broad cultural context offer access to practices of transition and connection that supplement the intrapsychic transformation process that has been the primary focus of previous research on loss. We find that consumers who hide their emotional connection to a cancelled series from the wider community are hindered in their loss accommodation. Their grief is never validated by the community and becomes a shameful affliction (Doka, 2002). Social media enable cultural bereavement by sustaining or creating communities of fans who feel safer from outsiders’ view and can grieve and mourn together (Sanderson and Cheong, 2010). Our findings that online communities grew up the discontinuation of soap operas echo an early study by Fischer, Bristor and Guiner (1996): we find unambiguous evidence that consumers seek out support in online environments when it is difficult to find proximal people dealing with the same issue (in their study it was families with Down’s Syndrome children). We find consumers seeking support for their loss in part because of perceived stigma from their proximal friends, who do not understand the loss. In contrast, online community forums offer the opportunity for reciprocal self-disclosure (Moon, 2000). As Sanderson and Cheong documented in the case of Michael Jackson’s death (2010), accessing social via social media enables consumers to create tributes and share them with receptive and sympathetic others. The sharing is therapeutic in that it allows for meaning reconstruction following the loss (Neimeyer et al., 2010). Thus, even when a consumption loss is stigmatized by the mainstream, consumers can access or even build sociality resources unavailable in their proximal social networks by turning to social media.

The End of Stigma? Understanding the Dynamics of Legitimization in the Context of TV Series Consumption

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

This research focuses on the consumption practices and meanings associated with television series. Specifically, we investigate the tensions in consumer narratives arising from traditionally negatively-laden television consumption and the positive evaluations of current television series viewing, gained from increasing legitimation and normalization processes. We show that these tensions generate complex dynamics through which legitimation is accompanied by the reproduction of existing stigmas and the creation of new stigmas.

TV watchers have been stigmatized for a long time. Collins (1993) reports that television has traditionally been regarded by scholars as the least legitimate form of popular culture, judged as a “bad object” despite increasingly sophisticated textual analyses and equally sophisticated audience research. Lodzjak’s assertion (1986) that heavy TV consumers cannot afford to do anything else is illustrative of this stigma. These early findings are echoed in Mitu (2011)’s recent work which shows that television is still regarded as a low-quality medium nowadays. However, while television remains stigmatized, TV series are widely popular. In 2011, fiction was rated the top genre worldwide (41% of the best performing programmes), and among fiction, TV series were the best performing format, accounting for 69% of the fiction entries (Cassi, 2012). Some TV series like Madmen have even acquired the status of cultural object in highly educated spheres (Glevarec, 2012). This suggests that perceptions towards TV watchers, or at least towards individuals who watch certain TV programs, are gradually shifting. Goffman (1963) argues that a stigma “refers to an attribute that is deeply discrediting”. According to Crocker, Major, and Steele (1998), stigmatization affects how individuals perceive themselves, but also how they feel others perceive them. Despite its relevance, consumer research on stigma remains limited and focuses mainly on stigma management (e.g., Adkins and Ozzanne, 2005; Tepper, 1994; Viswanathan, Rosa, and Harris, 2005; see Sandikci and Ger, 2010 for an exception). Particularly noteworthy is that stigmatization does not affect all TV series watchers in the same manner, as certain series are stigmatized while others are highly respected. For instance, to define “quality television” Thompson (1996) referred to Hill Street Blues or Moonlighting, while Knight Ryder and McGyver were classified as “regular television”. We interviewed 16 demographically diverse TV series watchers. The authors asked a mix of grand tour questions and floating prompts (McCracken, 1988). Following a general discussion, participants were asked to discuss the meanings they associate with series, their watching practices and whether they believe watching TV series is associated with social stigma. Interviews lasted from 25 minutes to 1h05 minutes, were audio recorded and transcribed. An initial identification of themes was developed, and theoretical categories were elaborated on during open and axial coding procedures. We then began a process of dialectical tacking, moving back and forward between our findings and the relevant literature to deepen our understanding of the practices and meanings associated with TV series consumption. Five key narratives were identified. First, the role of new practices in the legitimization process of TV series consumption emerged: Consumers watch TV series less on television than using streaming, downloads or DVD box sets. These practices allow watchers to engage in TV series consumption while distancing themselves from the negative connotations associated with television as a medium. Thus, consumer narratives replicate the cultural stigmatization discourses around television conveyed by the media and scholars, but at the same time, watching TV series part of an on-going normalization process. Second, this process is facilitated by a shift from consumers’ bond to TV channels’ schedule and agenda, to consumers’ perceived control of their viewing time, accessing series online or using DVD boxed sets. Third, a process of ‘reverse stigmatization’ was identified: Whereas TV series watchers used to be stigmatized, those who do not watch any TV series would now be stigmatized as outside the norm. Fourth, the normalization process does not apply to all TV series and is contingent on the low social status of the perceived audience. A recurring example of genre that remains stigmatized is soap operas. Non-soap-viewers distance themselves from soap-viewers, while soap-viewers’ narratives echo confession-like acknowledgement of their viewing practice, and engage in a strategy of concealment (Miller and Kaiser, 2001). Fifth, new stigmas are appearing as new practices develop. A key example of such practices is binge-watching i.e. watching several episodes of the same TV series in a row. Binge-watchers are stigmatized by non-binge-watchers, the latter considering the former as antisocial. Interestingly, stigmatization occurs among binge-watchers themselves. Tensions are particularly evident between those binge-watching socially versus individually. The social ones use an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse to legitimize their own behaviour. They present their binge-watching as a group activity, shared with friends or with their partner, which is considered as normalised whereas binge-watching alone is regarded...
as asocial and deviant. We contribute to prior work on stigmatization (Kozinets, 2001; Sandikci and Ger, 2011) by looking at the dynamics of stigmatization and normalization as social processes in the context of TV series. TV series seem to undergo a legitimization process followed by other popular genres in the past e.g., jazz; graphic novels; thrillers (Glevarec, 2012). This evolution is facilitated by the Internet which has profoundly reshaped the patterns of TV series consumption. However, we show that far from operating in a linear manner, the dynamics of legitimization are complex and accompanied by the reproduction of existing stigmas, i.e. soap operas, and by the creation of new stigmas, i.e. reverse stigmatization and binge-watching practices. Our informants’ narratives evince a degree of cognitive reflexivity that underscores their awareness of the complexities associated with the legitimization process. Consider Stefan’s comment: “For TV series it’s different because TV in a way is sort of stigmatized right now […]. I think for TV series it’s much more of a cultural thing. The fact that you don’t watch strictly on TV but you watch on a laptop, it’s different from watching on TV. And you find a lot of friends who feel cool when they watch TV series, but they don’t feel cool when they watch TV. That’s my thought”.

**Factionalized Fatshionistas: Dynamics within Collectives of Stigmatized Consumers Engaged in Marketplace Change Efforts**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Consumer researchers have typically studied stigmatized consumers as individuals facing powerlessness, constrained product choices, discrimination in customer service, and higher risk in mainstream markets (Adkins and Ozanne, 2005; Henry and Caldwell, 2006). The focus of this work has tended to be on understanding experiences of marginalization and the tactics individual consumers use to cope with stigma. Researchers have noted, for instance, that instead of withdrawing into an enclave, stigmatized consumers may challenge the stigma by making attempts to participate in mainstream markets (Henry and Caldwell, 2006). Recently, some attention has been directed toward understanding the factors that may lead stigmatized consumers who face marginalization in a particular marketplace to mobilize collectively and to engage in efforts to gain access to the goods and services they desire (Scaraboto and Fischer, 2013). Thus far, however, we lack an understanding of what happens to the collective of stigmatized consumers when they engage in market change efforts. In this study, we address this gap. We ask: What are the consequences, for the collective of consumers who consider themselves to suffer from the stigma, of engagement by stigmatized consumers in efforts to participate in mainstream markets? To address this research question, we have engaged in ongoing online archival research in the network of Fatshionista bloggers and followers that we studied in our earlier work. Fatshionistas are plus-sized consumers who want more options from mainstream fashion marketers (Scaraboto and Fischer, 2013). They are stigmatized within mainstream society in general, and the fashion industry in particular, because their body size exceeds that regarded as attractive and socially acceptable (Bordo, 1993; LeBesco, 2005). In earlier work, we monitored 10 blogs that discuss plus-size fashion regularly, from their first post through to December 2010. Since then, we have monitored blogs and responses for two additional years, and have collected media articles that discuss Fatshionistas’ engagement in the fashion market. Our analysis of this data was guided by our research question, and informed by concepts from relevant theories. From institutional theory, we consider the notions of legitimacy (the degree of which can vary across categories of actors within a market or field); institutional boundaries (distinctions perceived between categories of actors in a market or field [Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010]); and institutional work (actions aimed at creating, maintaining and/or disrupting institutions [Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006]). We also drew on concepts from actor-network theory, including its central premise that the success of any network relies on the ability of focal actors in the network to tie together the interests of multiple actors through processes of “translation.” Translation processes are those in which disparate actors are recruited to engage in alliances that help stabilize the network in a way that suits the focal actor’s interests. Our findings highlight three consequences for the collective of engagement by stigmatized consumers in efforts to ameliorate their marginalization in a marketplace: 1) Some members of the consumer collective – but not all of them – gain recognition for taking on institutional work that is supportive of the institutional norms and logics. In the case of Fatshionistas, this institutional work is the creation of fashionable “looks” with available plus-size outfits, and of fashion commentaries that are disseminated online through blog postings. This activity is in essence the same kind of institutional work undertaken by fashion photographers and fashion editors, and contributes to reinforcing the logic of art that is central to the field of fashion (Scaraboto and Fischer, 2013). However, while a few Fatshionistas gain recognition from others and attract an online following, most actors in the Fatshionista collective are not active in these kinds of institutional work. 2) Institutional boundaries emerge between members of the stigmatized collective. Those who have been most fully enrolled in the fashion industry are singled out from those who have been largely ignored by focal actors in that network. In the case of Fatshionistas, a boundary emerges that differentiates those who fit “the formula for mainstream media: white, cis(gendered), good looking, middle class, young and able-bodied,” (Perkins, 2013). These Fatshionistas tend to be at the lower end of the plus size range. This contributes to the formation of a boundary between the younger, smaller plus-sized consumers and those who are older and/or in the larger end of the plus-size range. The emergence of this division is in part due to the fact that mainstream marketers, when faced with pressure from Fatshionistas, cater to those in the smaller size ranges so as to concede conditional, or “phantom acceptance” (Goffman, 1963) to plus-size consumers. 3) Stigmatized consumers who are members of the more favored sub-group and who gain recognition for their institutional work may abandon – or may be perceived as having abandoned – the goal of promoting social transformation. This is especially likely if the stigmatized consumer can, and does, reduce the pervasiveness of her stigma. In the case of Fatshionistas, this can happen through weight loss and/or through the formation of a close alliance (e.g. paid employment) with a mainstream marketer. Fatshionistas who have neither lost weight nor allied closely with mainstream marketers may then publicly call into question the actions of those who have done so, labeling them as “sell-outs” who have been co-opted and have “let down” others who nominally share the same stigmatized status. Stigmatized consumers who continue to be neglected by mainstream marketers may further polarize schisms within the collective by reinforcing, in their fashion blogs, other issues of ongoing concern to the stigmatized group, such as medical negligence and employment discrimination. These bloggers consider gaining access to the mainstream fashion field as insufficient to fight the stigma of fat and “fear that the joining of oppressed and oppressor in brand relationships is not furthering fat activism” (Perkins, 2013). Our analysis suggests that these consequences can significantly destabilize an actor network anchored on a shared stigmatized identity. Whether this destabilization will impede stigmatized consumers from accessing mainstream markets should be the subject of future research.
REFERENCES


How to Enhance Value and Motivate Action: New (Counterintuitive) Perspectives

Chairs: Heather Barry Kappes, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Sam Maglio, University of Toronto, Canada

Paper #1: Implementing Intuitive Decisions
Sam Maglio, University of Toronto, Canada

Paper #2: Weak > Strong: The Ironic Effect of Argument Strength on Supportive Advocacy
Omair Akhtar, Stanford University, USA
David Paunesku, Stanford University, USA
Zakary L. Tormala, Stanford University, USA

Paper #3: Feeling Entitled Because of Who You Are
Heather Barry Kappes, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Emily Balcetis, New York University, USA

Paper #4: Wanting What Almost Wasn’t: Counterfactual Reflection Heights Valuation of Branded Products
Hal E. Hershfield, New York University, USA
Adam D. Galinsky, Columbia Business School, USA
Neal J. Roese, Northwestern University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Consumers and practitioners are often mistaken about the most effective ways to get motivated or to enhance perceived value. In part, their mistakes may be due to not recognizing the counterintuitive forces that operate on consumer value and motivation. This session will highlight the variety of counterintuitive ways that people come to see things as particularly valuable, and get motivated to act.

In the first talk, Maglio describes how consumers who rely on careful, rational reasoning end up making poor decisions. Remarkably, those who rely on their intuition feel more satisfied with their chosen options, leading them to pursue these options with larger investments of both money and effort. Next, Akhtar, Paunesku, and Tormala outline how using weak rather than strong arguments can motivate political advocacy. Weak arguments bolster supporters’ appraisals of their abilities to advocate effectively, making these arguments, surprisingly, more useful than strong arguments for rousing supporters. Third, Kappes and Balcetis find that focusing on the actions people have done makes them feel less entitled to rewards—although they apply the opposite criteria when judging others’ entitlement. Finally, Hershfield, Galinsky, and Roese show that, ironically, thinking about how a company almost didn’t make it (rather than how it was destined for success) makes its products seem more valuable. Counterfactual reflection on the company’s origin imbues it with meaning, which in turn heightens willingness to pay for its products.

While surprising at first, these interesting effects are, in fact, far from counterintuitive and instead derive from predictable psychological precursors to valuation and action. The papers included here show that the manner in which basic facts are framed steers the course for how they are processed and acted upon: feelings of satisfaction predicting donations (Maglio), feelings of efficacy predicting behavioral intentions (Akhtar et al.), feelings of self-worth predicting consumer demands (Kappes & Balcetis), and feelings of meaning predicting willingness to pay (Hershfield et al.). By focusing on the processes underlying valuation and motivation, these four papers provide a way forward for consumers and practitioners hoping to better understand surprising judgments of value and investment of resources.

Taken together, these papers ask: What are the larger themes that account for counterintuitive, and even ironic, consumer behavior? These studies highlight the fact that value and motivation depend not only on qualities of the product and of the person, but also on the way that the consumer approaches a decision. Since these decision processes are more malleable than product attributes or personality characteristics, they offer new insights into the precursors of purchase decisions, and into understanding counterintuitive consumer behavior.

Implementing Intuitive Decisions

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Deliberative decision strategies have historically been considered the surest path to sound decisions, but recent evidence suggests that intuitive strategies may be equally effective. By relying upon an *affec"t heuristic*, people use their feelings as a guide to decisions about choice options rather than weighing the individual pros and cons (Slovic et al. 2002). Such feeling-based choice has been shown to improve decision quality, leading people to more accurately choose among hypothetical cars and vacations (Mikels et al. 2011) and to more accurately predict real-world outcomes like stock prices and the weather (Pham, Lee, and Stephen 2012). However, an open question remains as to how feeling-based decisions are translated into action. Because intuition boosts choice satisfaction (Mikels et al. 2011), which in turn enhances effortful action (Locke and Latham 1990), we predicted that people would work harder toward decisions reached using gut feelings versus deliberation.

Study 1 assessed commitment to choice options as a function of decision strategy. Participants were presented with information about four different (ostensibly real) restaurants. Beforehand, they were randomly assigned to process the information based on either a “deliberative, rational analysis”, their “intuitive, gut feeling”, or with no explicit instruction. The information was presented in a grid format in which participants saw the 12 pieces of information defining the first restaurant for 10 seconds, then the 12 pieces of information defining the next restaurant for 10 seconds, and so on. We constructed the choice options such that one restaurant was the ‘best’ option in that it had more positive attributes (75%) than the others (50%, 50%, and 25%). After learning about the restaurants, they received 12 entries into a lottery in which they could win a $50 gift certificate. Participants indicated, for each of the entries, one of the four restaurants about which they had learned. They were free to allocate the tickets however they wished among the four restaurants. They were told that we would select a random entry (i.e., one participant + restaurant choice) to win $50 to the restaurant indicated on that specific ticket. Our dependent variable of interest was the number of lottery entries participants allocated toward the best restaurant. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants in the gut feeling condition allocated more tickets to the best restaurant than those in the rational or control conditions; the later two conditions did not differ from each other.

Study 2 used a similar paradigm to consider the relationship between intuition and effortful action. It also tested the moderating role of when decisions are implemented, as past research has suggested that a break between learning and choosing can compromise the benefits of intuition (Mikels et al. 2011). Participants were presented with information about four different restaurants (one at a time and for 10 seconds each), but they then choose the one they preferred. They were told that each participant would, by default, receive 5 tickets to the best restaurant than those in the rational or control condition; the later two conditions did not differ from each other.
Weak rather than strong arguments might motivate greater advocacy. The present research suggests that under some conditions—message processing), strong arguments produce more persuasion than do weak arguments. Petty, Rucker, Bizer, & Cacioppo, 2004). This vast literature supports the notion that it is driven by subjective feelings of increased efficacy, the effect is more likely to emerge when initial argumentation efficacy and attitude certainty are moderate or low. Individuals with high argumentation efficacy and high certainty generally advocate regardless of the strength of arguments received.

Study 1. Prior to the 2012 presidential election, participants were told that the researchers conducting the study were part of a new national initiative entitled Voter’s Voice. The initiative was ostensibly designed to inform Americans about why other citizens are motivated to support or oppose particular political candidates. All participants were told that the researchers were investigating the ways in which voters view and make sense of their fellow citizens’ reasons for supporting and opposing those candidates. All participants were also led to believe that the information they provided could be used in get-out-the-vote campaigns and political advertisements. Following this introduction, participants reported their attitudes towards Obama’s reelection campaign. They read either weak or strong arguments for Obama, and then they answered questions about their willingness to advocate (i.e., trying to persuade others, making phone calls for Obama, donating money to Obama’s campaign) and their subjective feelings of efficacy (i.e., knowledge compared to others, perceived argumentation effectiveness).

Results indicated that when participants received pro-attitudinal (i.e., pro-Obama) arguments, they ironically showed greater intention to advocate for Obama when those arguments were weak rather than strong. Perceived argumentation efficacy mediated this effect. In essence, when participants came to feel more efficacious at arguing for a cause than their like-minded peers, they displayed greater willingness to promote, endorse, and advocate for it. This subjective feeling of efficacy was derived from weak arguments. As expected, this pattern did not hold for counter-attitudinal participants, who had similar levels of advocacy regardless of whether they saw weak or strong arguments. Finally, the argument quality manipulation (even among pro-attitudinal participants) did not change participants’ attitudes or affect their voting preference.

Study 2. The primary objectives of Study 2 were to replicate the weak > strong effect among pro-attitudinal participants and to explore the moderating role of perceived argumentation efficacy. Pro-attitudinal participants went through the same paradigm as in Study 1, except that before seeing the weak or strong arguments, they completed an ostensibly unrelated task in which their argumentation skills were analyzed. Participants were given false feedback that their argumentation skills were either in the 91st percentile (high argumentation efficacy) or in the 53rd percentile (moderate argumentation efficacy). Results indicated that weak arguments led to greater advocacy for those who were told that they were moderately effective at arguing. Participants in the high argumentation efficacy condition had higher levels of advocacy regardless of the type of arguments they saw. As in Study 1, perceived efficacy mediated this effect. Thus, participants were more motivated to advocate for a cause more when they felt that they would be effective at doing so, whether that feeling came from our efficacy manipulation or the fact that their peers had made weak arguments.
Study 3. Our goals in the third study were to replicate the weak > strong effect in a completely different paradigm and to determine its relationship with a well-established, conceptually related moderator—attitude certainty. Participants were asked to imagine that their town recently proposed a policy that would make all school cafeterias vegetarian by law. After reporting their attitudes and attitude certainty towards the policy, participants were told that the town government was going to hold a town hall meeting before they made their decision. In this town hall meeting scenario, participants were exposed to either weak or strong arguments from other citizens against the policy (i.e., pro-attitudinal arguments as participants also were largely against this policy). After reading these arguments, participants answered questions about their willingness to advocate for their views (i.e., trying to persuade others, sharing their views with friends). Results indicated that pro-attitudinal (i.e., anti-vegetarian policy) participants who were low in attitude certainty showed the weak > strong effect, expressing greater intent to advocate when they saw others’ weak rather than strong arguments. By contrast, participants who were high in attitude certainty expressed high advocacy intentions irrespective of the quality of arguments others made.

Discussion. Taken together, these findings reveal that weak arguments can play an important role in motivating advocacy. They suggest, counterintuitively, that it might sometimes behoove advocacy groups to expose their supporters to weak arguments from others—especially if those supporters initially feel uncertain about their attitudes or about their ability to make the case for them. Weak arguments appear to be capable of bolstering such supporters’ subjective appraisals of their own abilities to advocate effectively, and perhaps also of the need to advocate in the first place. Ironically, then, motivating supporters to advocate on behalf of a cause might be facilitated by the strategic use of weak arguments. New questions for research exploring the intersection of attitudes, persuasion, feelings, and motivation will be raised, and implications for understanding self-efficacy and attitude certainty will be discussed.

Feeling Entitled Because of Who You Are

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumer behavior is driven in part by feelings of entitlement. Particularly when selecting goods and services that are not necessities, consumers may reward themselves with particularly desirable outcomes, and working a 60-hour week. A pre-study supported our supposition that people see others as entitled to desirable outcomes to the extent that they feel deserving. Although entitlement beliefs may therefore play an important role in consumption behavior, these beliefs are also associated with negative outcomes like acting selfishly in ways that take a toll on others (e.g., Campbell, 2001; Bernoulli, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004; Fisk, 2010; Harvey & Martin, 2009; Moeller, Crocker, & Bushman, 2009). The goal of the current research was to aid in understanding the source of entitlement beliefs.

Lerner (1991) defined entitlement as “the judgment, often tacit, that someone, or some category of people, is entitled to a particular set of outcomes by virtue of who they are or what they have done” (italics added; p. 13). Who people are, or their attributes, include personal characteristics like being smart, a hard worker, and experienced in a given area; what people have done, or their actions, are behaviors like having earned a degree from a prestigious university and working a 60-hour week. A pre-study supported our supposition that people see others as entitled to desirable outcomes to the extent that those others emphasize their actions rather than their attributes. We predicted, however, that this would not apply when people thought about their own entitlement. Instead, people should feel more entitled to desirable outcomes when they think about who they are than when they think about what they have done.

We tested this idea in four experiments by manipulating whether people focused on their attributes or their actions and then measuring entitlement. As dependent variables, we measured both general entitlement, using an established instrument, the Psychological Entitlement Scale (PES; Campbell et al., 2004), and also beliefs about specific outcomes that were deserved (e.g., salary).

In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to think about either “the kind of person that you are” (attribute focus condition) or “the kinds of things you do” (action focus condition) as they responded to a resource dilemma. Those in the attribute focus condition subsequently scored higher on the PES than those in the action focus. Control measures indicated that construal level (abstract versus concrete thinking) did not explain the effect.

In Experiment 2, law students read that many lawyers earn a high salary “because of who they are” (attribute focus condition) or “because of what they do” (action focus condition). Controlling for gender and the type of law participants were interested in practicing, those in the attribute focus condition had higher PES scores and also gave a higher number as the starting salary to which they believed they were entitled.

We next investigated mechanisms underlying entitlement beliefs. As the first mechanism tested, we asked whether perceived consistency of favorable inputs increases entitlement. Attributes describe more enduring behavior than actions (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Perhaps the attribute focus manipulations made participants think about their favorable inputs as being especially enduring or characteristic, and they rewarded themselves accordingly. Apart from this consistency mechanism, we tested a second mechanism. We asked if self-worth increases entitlement. Most people think of themselves as good and worthy people (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989), so the more that they base their judgments of entitlement on these global evaluations of the self, the more entitled they should feel. In this case, even information about an ancillary negative input might boost entitlement, if it leads people to focus on their attributes.

In Experiment 3, we tested both the effects of perceived consistency and self-worth on entitlement. Students completed a tattoo-drawing task and received positive or negative feedback that focused on their attributes or actions. Participants indicated how much (hypothetical) pay they deserved for their drawing. Both attribute-framed feedback and positive feedback increased entitlement to pay, and the effects of one factor did not depend on feedback valence. If consistency were the only underlying mechanism, then attribute-framed feedback would have increased entitlement when positive and decreased entitlement when negative, but there was no such interaction effect. Moreover, participants who received negative attribute-framed feedback also reported the highest PES scores of any condition. Thus, these findings provide support for the self-worth mechanism.

Further support came from Experiment 4, where participants were randomly assigned to complete a task that would induce temporarily low or high feelings of self-worth (Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001), before they wrote personal ads focusing on the “kind of person you are” (attribute focus condition) or on the “kinds of things you do” (action focus condition). PES scores as well as entitlement to a desirable romantic partner were highest in participants with high feelings of self-worth who focused on their attributes.

In sum, these four experiments shed light on the sources of high entitlement beliefs, which in turn have consequences for consumer behavior.
Wanting What Almost Wasn’t: Counterfactual Reflection Heightens Valuation of Branded Products

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Apple and Google were started in garages. Fedex took off with $27,000 in winnings at a Vegas blackjack table. Southwest was conceived on a cocktail napkin. The story behind a brand has always been important to its consumers; indeed when the above companies come up for discussion, references to their interesting starting points are often not far behind. These examples also suggest that some origin stories contain a particular twist, a fork in the road or a close-call with disaster, that make the current stature of the brand seem more valuable. If not for the improbable blackjack win that saved the company from bankruptcy, there would be no Fedex today, and this story may make the company seem, as a result, more valuable. The present research explores the impact of these “what might have been” reflections on brand perceptions and consumption experiences. We further explore whether a particular mechanism – the elevation of product’s meanings on brand perceptions and consumption experiences – might make the company seem, as a result, more valuable. If not for the improbable blackjack win that saved the company from bankruptcy, there would be no Fedex today, and this story may make the company seem, as a result, more valuable. The present research explores the impact of these “what might have been” reflections on brand perceptions and consumption experiences. We further explore whether a particular mechanism – the elevation of product’s meaning to the individual – underlies the counterfactual reflection effect on brand experience.

In Study 1, we tested the idea that counterfactual reflections are associated with greater preference for given brands at a very general level. If counterfactual reflection enhances brand attitude, then all else being equal, the salience of counterfactuals regarding brand origin might be associated with brand preference. To this end, we asked participants to list either their favorite or least favorite brand. We predicted that participants would be more likely to indicate that their favorite brand had a turning point or “fork-in-the-road” moment (i.e., a salient counterfactual embedded in the brand origin story) compared to their least favorite brand. In line with our hypothesis, a greater proportion of participants noted a fork-in-the-road moment (i.e., counterfactual connected with brand) for their favorite versus least favorite brand (32.3% vs. 22.1%), c1(1, N = 324) = 4.27, p = .039.

The goal of Study 2 was to test the causal impact of counterfactual reflection on brand valuation. We manipulated counterfactual reflection by creating two framings of the origin story behind a well-known brand (Gatorade), one inviting the participants to reflect on “what might have been” and the other sticking solely to factual events. We predicted that participants in the counterfactual condition would be willing to pay a greater amount for a correspondingly branded product than those in the factual condition. Indeed, participants in the counterfactual-reflection condition expressed a higher willingness-to-pay ($M = 2.14, SD = $1.18) than did participants in the factual-reflection condition ($M = 1.72, SD = $0.89), t(132) = 2.33, p = .021, d = .40. In short, highlighting the counterfactual origins of Gatorade led to a higher willingness to pay for a 20-ounce bottle of Gatorade.

Whereas Study 2 documented the impact of counterfactual reflection on product evaluation, Study 3 pushed further to examine consumption experiences. Specifically, in Study 3 we examined whether counterfactual reflection influences how much participants enjoyed consuming a product. If the counterfactual reflection makes evaluations of the brand more positive, this evaluative effect might spill over to consumption experience. To this end, participants in the counterfactual-origins condition read a description of a fictional chocolate company that highlighted the ways in which events could have turned out differently. Participants in the factual-origin condition read a description that simply discussed the origins of the company. All participants were then given a chocolate wrapped in silver foil ostensibly from Droese Chocolates to sample and rated the taste and flavor of the chocolate on 7-point scales, from which we created a composite taste-flavor score (α = .93). We predicted that reflecting on the counterfactual origins of a chocolate company would improve the very taste of its chocolates. An omnibus ANOVA revealed significant differences among the three conditions in ratings of the chocolate, $F(2, 38) = 4.35, p = .02,$ $h^2 = .19.$ As predicted, a contrast test revealed that participants in the counterfactual-origins condition rated the chocolate as having better taste and flavor ($M = 4.90, SD = .71)$ than did participants in the factual-origins condition ($M = 4.00, SD = .90)$ and the control condition ($M = 4.33, SD = .89$), $t(38) = 2.72, p < .01.$

Past research has found that people find meaning in mutability (Galinsky et al. 2005; Kray et al. 2010, Ersner-Hershfield et al. 2010). That is, counterfactual reflection increases the meaningfulness of an event or relationship. Study 4 tests whether perceptions of meaningfulness underlie the effect of counterfactual reflection on branded product valuation. We hypothesized that counterfactual reflection would lead to a heightened sense of meaningfulness, which would in turn heighten willingness-to-pay. To do so, participants read about a man who had nearly missed his flight (counterfactual condition) or missed his flight by a large margin (non-counterfactual condition), and then went on to having a meeting with a friend at an airport that led to the formation of a chocolate company. An outlier from the near-miss condition who was more than 2.5 SDs above the mean WTP price was excluded from the analyses that follow. In line with our hypothesis, participants in the near-miss condition were willing to pay significantly more for the box of chocolates ($M = $9.20, SD = $5.02)$ than were participants in the far-miss condition ($M = $6.87, SD = $3.98$), $t(30) = 2.19, p = .032, d = .51.$ Moreover, participants in the near-miss condition also saw Droese Chocolates as more meaningful ($M = 3.99, SD = .95)$ than did participants in the far-miss condition did ($M = 3.31, SD = 1.04$), $t(30) = 2.90, p < .01, d = .68.$ To examine the mediating role of meaningfulness, we regressed willingness to pay scores on condition and perceptions of meaningfulness. As hypothesized, when taking into account meaningfulness, condition was no longer a significant predictor of willingness to pay, $b = .15, t = 1.26, p = .212,$ whereas meaningfulness was a significant predictor, $b = .32, t = 2.76, p = .007.$

REFERENCES


Exploring the Self in Self-Regulation: Unexpected Impacts on Goal Engagement

Maferima Touré-Tillery, University of Chicago, USA
Ayeele Fishbach, University of Chicago, USA

Paper #2: What I Haven’t Done Can’t Hurt Me: The Effects of Imagined Future Failure on Goal Disengagement
Yael Zemack-Rugar, Virginia Tech, USA
Canan Corus, Pace University, USA
David Brinberg, Virginia Tech, USA

Paper #3: The Role of Goal Engagement in Self-Regulation
Minjung Koo, Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea
Aparna A. Labroo, Northwestern University, Canada
Angela Y. Lee, Northwestern University, USA

Paper #4: Self-Affirmation Can Enable Goal Disengagement
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Ji Kyung Park, University of Delaware, USA
Brandon J. Schmeichel, Texas A&M University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

This session is focused on the current ACR theme of “Make a Difference” by exploring how individuals can make a difference in their own lives, enhancing their abilities to pursue desired self-regulation goals, understanding the obstacles to self-regulation, and improving goal engagement and goal outcomes. Decades of research in both psychology and consumer behavior have attempted to identify behaviors that support and moderate self-regulation. A multitude of products and therapies have all targeted self-regulation goals, attempting to help consumers save money, exercise more, quit smoking, lose weight, and address dozens of other self-regulation goals. We address this critical domain by asking: when do consumers remain engaged with self-regulation goals, and when do they disengage? In particular, we explore this question from the perspective of the self through a focus on various moderators such as individual traits, self-perception, and self-affirmation.

In the first paper, Touré-Tillery and Fishbach focus on self-perception as driver of goal engagement. The authors show that when individuals perform actions that have a strong visual impact (e.g., writing a donation amount with brightly colored ink versus subdued ink) this leads them to perceive the behavior as more diagnostic of the self, thus increasing goal engagement as individuals seek to maintain a positive image of the self.

In the second paper, Zemack-Rugar, Corus, and Brinberg show that imagined or anticipated goal failure can sometimes impact goal engagement in the same way as actual, past goal failure, and at other times – differ from past failure. The authors explore moderators of goal engagement preceding or following goal failure including individual characteristics (one’s score on the “Response to Failure” scale) and the reason for failure (internal vs. external attribution).

In the third paper, Koo, Labroo, and Lee look at the role of self in self-regulation by examining how a potent individual difference – regulatory focus – affects goal engagement. The authors explore why a prevention (vs. promotion) focus is more effective at increasing goal engagement, and show that prevention oriented individuals succeed at self-regulation by focusing on goal-engagement, and not by focusing on avoiding goal-inconsistent behaviors.

In the fourth paper, Vohs, Park, and Schmeichel uncover unexpected effects of self-affirmation on goal engagements. The authors show that affirming the self can aid in goal-engagement when the goal is easy (consistent with prior research), however, self-affirmation can be detrimental to goal pursuit when the goal is challenging and individuals experience failure.

In summary, all papers address the role of self in self-regulation, presenting counter-intuitive findings, unexpected effects, new process theories, and new moderators. These papers (all in advanced stages of completion) further the field’s understanding of self-regulation and should be of interest to a variety of researchers focusing on goal behavior, sequential choice, individual differences, and self-regulation. This session provides great insight for consumers, marketers, and researchers alike as to how we can all “Make a Difference” and promote successful self-regulation goal pursuit.

Making an Impact on the Self: How Sounds and Colors Increase Goal Engagement

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Imagine completing a form to indicate how much money you want to donate to charity. Now imagine that, for some reason, you receive a bright orange pen to complete this form. Would this visually impactful ink color influence your donation? Would it influence how you see yourself?

People will make goal-consistent choices when they believe these choices matter for the goal outcome, or for their own self-concept (i.e., self-signaling; Bodner and Prelec 1996; Prelec and Bodner 2003). Thus, a person will donate money to charity because it will save lives, or because it will make her feel more generous—or both. Many factors can make a choice seem consequential for the self-concept. For example, explicitly linking a choice to an identity (e.g., be a voter; Bryan, Walton, Rogers, and Dweck 2011), or positioning a choice at the beginning or end of a sequence (Touré-Tillery and Fishbach 2012) promote adherence to goals by making choices seem more representative of the self, or self-diagnostic. These patterns of behavior occur because individuals are motivated to maintain a positive self-concept (Gao, Wheeler, and Shiv 2009; Schlenker 1985) and will “do the right thing” when it seems most telling of the self.

Research shows individuals for whom outcomes are typically experienced as dependent upon their own actions tend to develop an internal locus of control, and become more likely to exert themselves when engaged in important tasks (Rotter 1966). We propose the immediate perceptual effect of an action, although irrelevant for goal pursuit, will operate as a type of contingent outcome. Producing a visual contrast when writing with a bright color on a form printed in black, or producing sound while clicking through webpages will increase people’s sense of control and responsibility for that action. Thus, we hypothesize that actions with such visual or auditory impact will seem more self-diagnostic, and hence will increase adherence to valued goals, because individuals wish to maintain a positive self-concept. Three experiments confirmed our hypotheses for prosocial and voting goals.

In Experiment 1, we started with participants who generally value charity goals involving monetary donations (MBA students). Participants indicated their likelihood to donate to UNICEF on a survey printed in black ink. The study employed a 2 (visual impact:...
high vs. low) between subjects design. Participants in the low-impact condition received a black pen to fill out the survey, whereas those in the high-impact condition received a bright-color pen (orange, light blue, or purple) which contrasted more sharply with the survey print. We found participants were more likely to donate when using color (vs. black) pens. We argue visual impact made the decision appear more diagnostic for self-inferences about generosity, and thus promoted adherence to prosocial goals.

Experiment 2 used the same design and visual-impact manipulation to explore our hypotheses in the domain of civic goals and test the mediating role of self-diagnosticity. Participant (US citizens) wrote a short essay about their political views in color or black, and we assessed the perceived self-diagnosticity of this action by measuring perceptions of (1) political identity and (2) representativeness of expressed views. Participants also indicated their voting intentions for the presidential elections—a measure of goal adherence. We found writing in the visually impactful color (vs. black) pen seemed more self-diagnostic, and increased voting intentions. Finally, perceived self-diagnosticity mediated the effect of visual impact on voting intentions.

In Experiment 3, we extended these findings to real giving behavior and auditory impact, and tested the moderating role of the “need to self-signal.” The 2-part experiment employed a 2 (need to self-signal: high vs. low) × 2 (auditory impact: high vs. low). First, participants indicated how frequently they engage in various charitable acts. The scales provided to answer these questions constituted our manipulation of need to self-signal. In the high need to self-signal condition, participants used a high-frequency scale designed to make them feel selfish; but the low need to self-signal condition featured a low-frequency scale meant to make them feel generous. In a presumably separate study, a computerized dictator game, participants allocated money between themselves and an anonymous other. In the high-impact condition, participants heard computer sounds when clicking to move to the next screen, whereas the computer volume was off in the low-impact condition. We found participants with a low need to self-signal were unaffected by auditory impact. By contrast, participants with a high need to self-signal shared more in the sound (vs. mute) condition, suggesting the auditory impact made their decision seem more diagnostic for inferences about their own generosity, and thus promoted adherence to prosocial goals.

Taken together, these studies show actions producing a minor visual or auditory impact are deemed more diagnostic for self-inferences, and therefore promote adherence to prosocial and voting goals. These findings suggest marketers and public policy makers can promote adherence to important goals by incorporating subtle perceptual effects into consumers’ decision making processes. For example, having consumers fill out retirement planning paperwork in ways that produce visual contrasts or sounds might improve saving decisions.

What I Haven't Done Can’t Hurt Me: The Effects of Imagined Future Failure on Goal Disengagement

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Prior research has identified a phenomenon called the “What-the-Hell Effect” in which consumers who experience initial goal failure respond with goal disengagement, and enact further counter-goal behaviors (Cochran and Tesser 1996). Recent research has qualified these findings, by demonstrating that the tendency to enact this disengagement response is based on an individual difference, and that a scale (the Response-to-Failure scale) can be used to predict who will respond to failure with goal disengagement and who will respond with resumed goal efforts (Zemack-Rugar, Corus, and Brinberg 2012).

In the present research we extend these findings by looking not at the response to real, past failure, but rather the response to imagined, future failure. Whereas previous research has explored the effects of imagined future virtues on current behavior (Khan and Dhar 2007) and the effects of other self-regulation plans or intentions (Baumeister, Masicampo, and Vohs 2011), no research has explored the effects of imagined future vices on current behavior.

Yet, anticipating failure is quite common in consumer lives. For example, if a consumer is expecting to attend a conference during which they are unlikely to be able to adhere to their health/fitness goals, they face a decision in the days leading up to the conference—should they engage with the goal and try to lose a few extra pounds to allow for the upcoming, inevitable weight gain? Or should they disengage from the goal, give up, and indulge in the days leading up to the conference? We explore the similarities between anticipated future failure and past failure (studies 1 and 2), and the differences between the two (study 3).

In studies 1 (food domain) and 2 (budget domain) we show that anticipated future failure can lead to the same behavioral patterns as past failure, thus, response to future failure can be predicted by the Response to Failure scale. We conduct a one factor (future failure/ no future failure) between subjects design, with a second measured factor of Response-to-Failure scale. Prior research shows that individuals high (low) on this scale tend to respond to past failure with more (less) goal disengagement. We predict that the same pattern will occur in response to anticipated, future failure.

In both studies, participants were presented with a scenario that either had an anticipated future failure described or had no future failure, followed by a self-regulation choice in the present (i.e., at a time preceding the future failure). After indicating their choice, participants completed the Response-to-Failure scale. As predicted, we found a two way interaction of the scale by future failure condition in both studies (ps < .05). When no future failure was expected, the scale did not predict choice; when future failure was expected, individuals with high (low) scores indulged more (less), enacting more (less) of the “What the Hell” effect (i.e., disengaging from the goal) even when failure had not actually occurred (i.e., was in the future). These findings indicate that imagined future failure and actual past failure can give rise to similar emotions and cognitions, and that these emotions and cognitions have similar predictive power relative to sequential behavior.

Study 3 explores whether and when past and anticipated failure may differ. We argue that the key difference between anticipated failure and past failure is the perception of changeability (Gilbert and Ebert 2002). When failure is in the past, it cannot be changed. Thus, the cause of failure is not important; only the fact of having failed matters. We thus predict that when past failure has occurred (regardless of cause) individuals high (low) on the Response-to-Failure scale to enact more (less) goal disengagement. In contrast, when failure is in the future it can be perceived as changeable. Thus, individuals will focus on the causes of failure, perceiving that if they are the cause of failure (i.e., internal attribution) they could somehow change things and perhaps avoid or mitigate failure. Given that individuals might perceive they could avoid failure, we expect they would not enact the “What the Hell” regardless of their Response-to-Failure scale score, and will remain engaged with the goal.

In contrast, if individuals perceive that someone else is the cause of failure (i.e., external attribution) they would feel failure is less changeable or avoidable; thus, they will respond to future failure in the same way they would respond to past failure, with those...
The Role of Goal Engagement in Self-Regulation

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

One of the ways to frame goal engagement is through a simple but elegant two category model, distinguishing between promotion and prevention self-regulatory orientations. Prior research has shown that a prevention orientation is associated with better self-regulation relative to a promotion orientation (Chen et al. 2005; Freitas et al. 2002; Sengupta and Zhou 2007; Shah et al. 2002). The present research looks at why this occurs.

Prior work would suggest that prevention-oriented people would prioritize resisting temptations as the strategy for goal attainment. However, there are reasons to believe that a prevention orientation may not necessarily entail active avoidance of temptation. Instead, we propose that a prevention orientation heightens the engagement with the goal overall, thus leading to self-regulation success. In particular, given prevention-focused individuals’ sensitivity to negative outcomes, the possibility of goal failure looms large for them. When faced with self-control dilemmas, their vigilance is heightened, and their attention focuses on what is most important—to engage with or approach the goal — rather than necessarily on avoiding temptations that may thwart successful goal pursuit. In contrast, promotion-oriented individuals focus on preventing errors of omission; this leads to a multifocal strategy of engaging in goal pursuit by both approaching the goal and countering temptation simultaneously. Despite the fact that multipronged approaches would, on the surface, seem to predict more successful outcomes, this approach may ironically undermine self-regulation.

As a result of this goal-engagement strategy, prevention-oriented individuals will be more successful at self-regulation than promotion oriented individuals.

We tested these hypotheses in four studies. In Study 1, we focus on the role of self by looking at regulatory focus as an individual difference (Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda 2002). Participants were asked to indicate which self-regulation strategies they would use to resolve a self-regulation dilemma of studying versus spending time with friends. We found that the more prevention-oriented participants were more likely to adopt a goal-centric strategy that moves towards the goal and were more likely to succeed at self-regulation (i.e., to stay home and study).

In Study 2, we sought more direct evidence for the different self-regulation strategies by assessing participants’ reasoning of self-regulation choices. Participants tasted and evaluated two sample products: a granola bar (health goal-compatible) and a chocolate bar (temptation). After the test, participants chose one of the sample snacks as a token of appreciation, and indicated the strategy they used to choose their snack by selecting one of the following: 1) “going for the sample that is healthy” (goal-engagement strategy); 2) “not choosing the sample that is unhealthy” (temptation-avoidance strategy); 3) “going for the sample that is tasty” (goal-disengagement strategy) and 4) “not choosing the sample that is not tasty” (goal-avoidance strategy). Finally, we measured participants’ regulatory orientation. We found that the more (less) prevention-oriented participants were, the more (less) likely they were to deploy the strategy of “going for the healthy option,” which led to a higher likelihood of choosing the granola bar.

In Study 3, we primed participants with different regulatory orientations, and presented them with the same self-regulation dilemma as in Study 1. Then, we asked participants to list all the factors they considered when making their decision. We found that participants in the prevention (promotion) condition generated more (less) thoughts that focused on academic success, which in turn led to a higher likelihood of their deciding to stay home to study, reflecting better self-control.

In Study 4, we instructed individuals to adopt a goal-engagement strategy or a temptation-avoidance strategy, and explored the effects on promotion- versus prevention-oriented individuals; a control (no thought) condition was also included. As predicted, among promotion-oriented participants, those who followed the goal-engagement strategy were more likely to choose the healthy salad, demonstrating better self-control, relative to those in temptation-avoidance or control conditions. Among prevention-oriented participants, those who followed the temptation-avoidance strategy were less likely to choose the healthy salad than those in the goal-engagement or control conditions.

These findings provide convergent evidence regarding the role of self in self-regulation and the importance of goal-engagement. The findings show that individuals who are higher on prevention orientation are more successful at self-regulation, consistent with previous findings. What is more, the data further show that the reason for this is not avoidance of temptation or counter-goal behavior, but rather goal-engagement and approach towards goal-congruent behaviors. Our research counters what is currently thought about what it means to be promotion- and prevention-oriented, which opens up new avenues for insights and exploration.
Self-Affirmation Can Enable Goal Disengagement

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Research indicates that affirming core values helps to bolster the legitimacy of the self and promotes reacting with equanimity to threats to self-regard. Self-affirmed people accept information about their personal flaws as credible and view those flaws as plausible causes of future problems. They have been shown to react to these humbling realizations by intending to bring the self in line with more virtuous standards (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Thus, an open acknowledgment of one’s personal characteristics (perhaps especially one’s flaws) is central to how self-affirmation helps regulate goal-directed behavior.

In contrast, we propose that engaging in self-affirmation can sometimes dampen performance and motivation. We predicted that compared to non-affirmed individuals, self-affirmed individuals will react to initial task failure with goal disengagement. In particular, because self-affirmation can increase openness to negative information about the self, we reasoned that being self-affirmed before failing at a task could lead individuals to take the negative feedback of failure more to heart, thus lowering their perceptions of self-efficacy. In turn, self-affirmed individuals who failed at an initial task might exert diminished effort and show reduced motivation on a subsequent task related to the same goal.

Experiment 1 was a 2 (self-affirmed/not) by 2 (failure/no failure) between subjects design. After a self-affirmation (or no self-affirmation) manipulation, participants were instructed to move individual pieces of rice with chopsticks. In the failure condition participants were instructed to perform quickly and well, a goal likely to result in failure due to the difficulty and unfamiliarity of the task. In the no-failure condition participants were expected simply to give the chopsticks a try, without performance expectations. After an initial attempt at the task we measured three outcomes: performance expectations and actual performance on subsequent attempts, and interest in attempting another rice-moving task.

We found that when failure had occurred, affirming core values led to reduced performance expectations and actual performance and less desire to engage in a subsequent chopstick task (ME = 4.04, MPerformance = 5.66, MInterest in another attempt = 4.34) relative to the no-affirmation condition (ME = 5.34, MPerformance = 9.80, MInterest in another attempt = 5.37). In contrast, when no failure had occurred, participants who self-affirmed showed improved performance expectations and actual performance and a greater desire to engage in a subsequent chopstick task (ME = 6.21, MPerformance = 12.03, MInterest in another attempt = 5.77) relative to non-affirmed individuals (ME = 4.53, MPerformance = 6.47, MInterest in another attempt = 5.00). This latter finding is consistent with prior work on the benefits of self-affirmation (Epton & Harris, 2008). These effects suggest that initial failure caused self-affirmed individuals to disengage from a goal.

Experiment 2 utilized a 2 (affirmed/not) by 2 (attainable/not) between subjects design. Once again, participants self-affirmed (or not), and then completed two tasks: (1) the chopsticks and (2) the RAT task (RAT; Mednick, 1968); the tasks were said to measure “thinking on one’s feet.” In the attainable (unattainable) condition, participants were given the impression that achievement of the tasks was likely (unlikely). As predicted, in the unattainable goal condition having affirmed cherished values reduced effort expended on the chopstick task, intended effort on another attempt at the chopsticks tasks, and performance on the RAT task (self-affirmation condition: M Effort = 4.97, MIntended effort on another attempt = 5.90, MRAT performance = 8.30, non-self-affirmation condition: M Effort = 5.65, MIntended effort on another attempt = 5.81, MRAT performance = 10.06). In the attainable condition, being self-affirmed (vs. not affirmed) led to enhanced effort and performance (self-affirmation condition: M Effort = 6.2, MIntended effort on another attempt = 6.64, MRAT performance = 10.92, non-self-affirmation condition: M Effort = 5.50, MIntended effort on another attempt = 5.40, MRAT performance = 9.10).

Experiment 3 further explored the process underlying the effects of self-affirmation. We posited that people who are self-affirmed and fail at a goal would downgrade their ability to reach the goal and therefore adopt a more negative attitude toward the self. We predicted that this drop in perceived self-efficacy would statistically account for ensuing poor performance. We tested this hypothesis by conducting a 2 (failure/not) by 2 (affirmation/not) between subjects study in which participants were asked to rate their competence, responsibility, capability, and work ethic. Participants first affirmed/not, and then were given either easy (no failure) or difficult (failure) versions of RAT. Participants were then asked to rate their self-efficacy (using the measures above) with respect to a subsequent (moderately difficult) RAT task; performance on this task was also measured.

Participants who self-affirmed and did not experience failure (easy RAT) rated their self-efficacy as being higher and performed better on a subsequent version of the task relative to those who did not self-affirm. In contrast, participants who self-affirmed and experienced failure (difficult RAT) evaluated themselves unfavorably relative to those that did not self-affirm. These individuals also performed worse on a second version of the task, an effect that was statistically accounted for by changes in self-efficacy.

These results suggest that what self-affirmation does to affect goal-directed behavior, it does through changes to the working self-concept. Affirming the self can lead people to internalize the implications of failure, which in turn leads to disengagement from unattainable goals. This research helps move the field toward a fuller understanding of the nature of self-regulation by exploring how self-affirmation works in dynamic choice. The effects of self-affirmation are shown here to differ depending on whether prior task experience was positive or negative.

REFERENCES


The Psychology of Being Untrue: The Processes and Consequences of Consumer Dishonesty

Chairs: Yajin Wang, University of Minnesota, USA
Deborah Roedder-John, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #1: What Hiding Reveals: Ironic Effects of Withholding Information
Leslie K. John, Harvard Business School, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA

Paper #2: Faking It with Luxury Counterfeit Products: How Social Feedback Can Make Us More or Less Dishonest
Yajin Wang, University of Minnesota, USA
Deborah Roedder-John, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #3: The Effects of Construal Level on Consumers’ Anticipations Involving Dishonest Behavior
Nelson Amaral, University of Minnesota, USA
Joan Meyers-Levy, University of Minnesota, USA

Paper #4: Brand (In)Fidelity: When Flirting with the Competition Strengthens Brand Relationships
Irene Consiglio, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Daniella Kuper, Stanford University, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA
Francesca Gino, Harvard Business School, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

Although we would like to believe that dishonest behavior is limited to a small group of unscrupulous individuals, the fact is that most of us engage in these behaviors (Ariely 2012). This session explores three overarching and important questions about dishonesty: (1) What are the interpersonal dynamics that influence dishonest behavior? (2) What are the psychological processes that govern unethical behavior? (3) What are the consequences of dishonest behavior? Existing research, published in marketing and psychology, has not explored this combination of themes. Further, we examine these questions in consumer situations, such as using counterfeit products, failing to disclose information on surveys, and being unfaithful to a favorite brand.

The first two papers examine interpersonal dynamics and consequences. Both papers examine how people respond to situations where being honest might elicit negative judgments from others. John and Norton show that individuals prefer to withhold information (e.g., recreational drug use) that could cause others to judge them in a negative way. But, paradoxically, individuals who chose to withhold information (and not tell the truth) are judged more negatively than individuals who chose to reveal the information. Wang and John examine the use of counterfeit luxury goods, and explore how consumers respond when others either compliment (“That looks nice on you”) or question (“Is that real?”) the counterfeit user. Compliments encourage more dishonest behavior (hiding the fact it’s a counterfeit; interest in buying more counterfeits), whereas a simple question deters subsequent dishonest behavior.

The last two papers examine psychological processes and consequences. Amaral and Meyers-Levy study how construal level influences expectations of unethical behavior. When judging an unknown person, individuals adopt a high construal level, leading them to anticipate this person will engage in more unethical behavior. However, when individuals consider their own behavior, which encourages an extremely low construal level, they anticipate much less unethical behavior. Consiglio, Kuper, Norton, and Gino explore a new type of dishonest behavior—being unfaithful to one’s favorite brand by flirting with a competing brand. They find that flirting with a competing brand raises arousal levels, and arousal is misattributed to their favorite brand, which results in an even greater desire for the brand. Interestingly, being “unfaithful” to the favorite brand has a positive impact on one’s relationship with the brand.

Taken together, this set of papers opens up several new avenues of research on dishonesty. Each paper includes a completed set of experiments. Given the variety of settings and questions, this session is likely to appeal to a broad set of conference attendees interested in morality and ethics, self-presentation, social signaling, and branding. Further, this session fits well with the theme of the 2013 ACR conference, “Making a Difference.” Dishonest behaviors are pervasive among consumers, yet there is a need for further understanding of how these behaviors emerge, and how they negatively impact individuals.

What Hiding Reveals: Ironic Effects of Withholding Information

EXTEDNED ABSTRACT

Imagine being asked about your recreational drug habits by your employer, and realizing that in order to be completely truthful you’ll have to admit that you have occasionally indulged. In four experiments, we show that people believe that the best way to deal with such situations is to opt out of answering at all – but that this strategy is costly, because observers often infer the very worst when consumers choose not to answer such questions: “If he refuses to even answer this question, he must have a serious drug problem.” The internet has created a fundamental shift toward openness, and with this shift, consumers are increasingly facing choices of whether to share or withhold information. Previous research shows that consumers tend to ‘infer the worst’ about products when marketers fail to provide information on the products’ key attributes (e.g., Kivetz & Simonsohn 2000; Huber & McCann, 1982; Simmons & Lynch 1991). In contrast however, we focus on consumers’ decisions of whether to share or withhold their personal data – and the wisdom or error of such decisions.

In Study 1, participants were asked which of two individuals they would prefer to date. They were shown, side-by-side, each “prospective date’s” response to multiple choice questions about their frequency of engagement in six taboo or illegal behaviors (such as failing to inform a partner about a sexually transmitted disease): the response options were “never,” “once,” “sometimes,” “frequently,” and “choose not to answer.” One of the prospective dates answered all six questions; the other prospective date answered four questions but selected “choose not to answer” for the remaining two. We also varied the prospective dates’ responses to the questions: in the “never” condition, for example, one of the prospective dates endorsed “never” for all six questions, while the other prospective date endorsed “never” for four questions and “choose not to answer” for the other two. We included similar conditions using “once,” “sometimes,” and “frequently.” In all conditions, participants expressed greater interest in the prospective date who had answered all six questions – even in the “frequently” condition. In other words, relative to a prospective...
date who had left two questions blank, participants were more interested in dating someone who had admitted to frequently neglecting to tell a partner about a sexually transmitted disease and to frequently stealing goods worth more than $100.

Study 1 shows that omitting information can lead to more negative judgments; Studies 2A and 2B begin to address whether consumers understand this process, or erroneously believe that leaving questions blank is an effective impression management strategy. In Study 2A, participants were asked to indicate how frequently, if at all, they engage in two behaviors – one desirable (donating to charity), the other undesirable (fantasizing about doing terrible things (e.g., torturing) others). They were told that their response to only one of the questions would be shown to a rater, who would rate their attractiveness as a date. The other question would simply be displayed without the participant’s response. Participants were asked which of the two responses they would like to display. The majority of participants (62%) chose to display their answer to the desirable question, leaving the undesirable question blank.

Study 2B tests whether this choice is a mistake. Both questions from Study 2A were displayed and participants were shown how a prospective date had answered one of them (the modal response from Study 2A was used); the other question was purportedly left blank by the prospective date. We manipulated whether the desirable or undesirable question was unanswered. In contrast to choices in Study 2A, participants in Study 2B expressed greater interest in the prospective date when s/he had answered the undesirable question, relative to when s/he had answered the desirable question (and left the undesirable question blank). Moreover, when we asked participants to guess the prospective date’s answers to a series of new questions, results were consistent with the dating interest ratings, suggesting that non-disclosure may have enduring effects on person perception. Taken together, Studies 2A and B show that ironically, participants choose to opt out of answering questions about undesirable behaviors even though doing so makes them less attractive in the eyes of others.

Finally, Study 3 tests a moderator for observers’ negative judgments of non-disclosers. We predicted that people who have recently withheld information – and therefore are more likely to understand that nondisclosure may not be driven only by desires to hide horrible information – are less likely to subsequently judge non-disclosers harshly. Participants were first asked to answer sensitive questions about themselves; for each question, they had the option of selecting “choose not to answer.” We manipulated participants’ propensity to select “choose not to answer” by varying the other available response options (i.e., sometimes / frequently / always VS. never / once / sometimes); participants were more likely to select “choose not to answer” for the former response scale than the latter. Next, participants were shown a prospective date’s answers to the same questions and rated their interest in dating the person. We again manipulated whether the prospective date had chosen not to answer some of the questions. As predicted, the negative judgments of prospective dates who had left questions blank were buffered when the raters themselves had been induced to leave questions blank.

Taken together, these results suggest consumers can be prone to withholding information when they would be better off sharing it, and point to situations in which this tendency may be exacerbated (e.g. when those who are judging them have not, themselves, recently withheld information). Moreover, the internet’s fundamental shift toward openness may exacerbate these issues, as withholding information becomes more anomalous, and hence, more conspicuous.

**Faking It with Luxury Counterfeit Products: How Social Feedback Can Make Us More or Less Dishonest**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Purchase of counterfeit luxury goods is a worldwide phenomenon. Past research in marketing has mostly focused on why consumers purchase counterfeit luxury goods (e.g., Han, Nunes, and Dreze 2010; Wilcox, Kim and Sen 2009). However, little attention has been directed toward understanding how consumers feel, think, and respond to wearing luxury counterfeits. A notable exception is research by Gino, Norton and Ariely (2010), who found that wearing luxury counterfeits made users feel less authentic and resulted in more subsequent episodes of cheating.

We examine the social context of wearing luxury counterfeit goods. We propose that consumers feel and respond differently to the experience of wearing luxury counterfeit goods when it takes place in a social context. The first two experiments (Study 1A & 1B) show the social context of purchasing luxury counterfeits influences the way people feel about wearing counterfeits. We find a reversal of Gino, et al.’s results when consumers purchase counterfeits in a social setting. The next two experiments (Study 2 & 3) show that social feedback from others regarding luxury counterfeits influences whether users will engage in further dishonest behavior. We find that consumers engage in further dishonest behaviors—lying about the luxury good being real and being interested in buying more counterfeits—only when others compliment them on their fake luxury product. When others ask a simple question (“Is it real?”), we show a reversal of Gino, et al.’s results. Subsequent dishonest behavior is diminished.

**Study 1A & 1B**

In study 1A, female participants were randomly assigned to wear (1) an authentic Tiffany’s bracelet (2) an authentic Tiffany’s bracelet labeled as counterfeit or (3) control unbranded bracelet. Participants wore the bracelet for 15 minutes while filling out a survey of filler questions. After 15 minutes, participants rated themselves on different personality traits, including “honest” and “genuine” (focal measure), on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Results replicate previous research (Gino, Norton and Ariely, 2010), showing participants in the counterfeit condition felt less honest and less genuine than participants in the authentic condition (M = 6.41 vs. 6.12, p < .05).

In study 1B, we followed the same procedure, except participants were told to imagine the bracelet was purchased while overseas in a study abroad program (social setting). We expected the social setting would provide a way for users to rationalize their purchase of a counterfeit, which would eliminate negative feelings about themselves. As predicted, we found no differences in feelings of “honest” and “genuine” between participants who wore the counterfeit versus authentic Tiffany’s bracelet (p > .90). Interestingly, participants in the counterfeit bracelet condition reported themselves to be significantly more honest and genuine than participants wearing the control bracelet (M = 6.05 vs. 5.50, p = .01). Thus, the results from Study 1A and 1B suggest that wearing counterfeits without a social context elicits negative self feelings, but wearing counterfeits purchased in a social setting eliminates these negative feelings.

**Study 2**

In this study, we examine how social feedback while wearing counterfeits influences subsequent dishonest behavior. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the following experimental conditions: 2 (bracelet: counterfeit vs. control) x 2 (social feedback: com-
The bracelet conditions and basic procedures were the same as Study 1B. However, after wearing the bracelets for a period of 20 minutes, all participants were asked to imagine themselves wearing a counterfeit Tiffany’s bracelet to a shopping mall, where they were approached by a salesperson who comments on the bracelet in a complimentary way (e.g., “I really like your Tiffany bracelet. It looks so cute on you!”) or a questioning way (e.g., “I really like your Tiffany bracelet. Is it real?”). Participants were then asked to write down how they would respond to the salesperson, and these responses were coded in terms of honesty on a 5-point scale (1=confess it’s a counterfeit; 3=intentional ambiguous response; 5=lie and hide the fact that it’s counterfeit). Results showed that social feedback mattered. For participants in the counterfeit bracelet condition, those receiving a question (vs. complement) were more likely to be honest and confess the bracelet is not real (M =3.26 vs. 1.55, p < .001). Moreover, these participants were also more likely to confess than participants in the control condition who received a question from the salesperson (M=3.26 vs. 2.47, p = .04). Thus, receiving a compliment while wearing a luxury counterfeit product encouraged users to engage in more dishonest behavior.

Study 4

We continued to examine how social feedback influences subsequent dishonest behavior. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: compliment, question, or no feedback (control). Each participant was brought to a private interviewing room and was asked to wear a Burberry scarf (which was labeled as a counterfeit) and complete filler tasks. After 15 minutes, a female confederate entered the room pretending to look for a lost cell phone. The effect of construal level on consumers’ anticipations involving ethical behavior

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Despite the many lapses in ethical behavior that have attracted widespread attention in recent years, little is known about the cognitive processes that shape people’s (un)ethical behavior and expectations of when it will occur. This lack of understanding exists despite substantial research on this topic within marketing. One factor that has contributed to this state of affairs is that most of the research has focused simply on the practical implications and applications of ethics in marketing. Limited attention has focused on theory-driven inquiry.

This research offers an initial attempt to fill this void by drawing on a corpus of work concerning both psychological distance and construal level theory (Liberman and Trope 2008). Psychological distance refers to the gap that often exists in time, space, or likelihood that separates an event or object from the personally experienced reality of the here and now. Moreover, variations in psychological distance have been found to affect people’s construal level, which refers to the level of abstraction at which people think about and mentally represent an event in memory (Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak, 2007). Increases in an event’s psychological distance (e.g., an event will happen in the more distant future or to a person other than oneself) prompts individuals to think about an event in a more abstract, less detailed manner, while decreases in psychological distance elicits thoughts about the event in a more concrete or specific manner. Social distance would seem to be of importance in ethical situations for at least two reasons. First, ethical issues generally emerge in social contexts, making it likely that variation in social distance could be germane in ethical situations. Second, and more critically, because psychological distance regards the self, here and now as its lowest endpoint or anchor, assessing one’s own behavior should stimulate exceptionally concrete representations of the situation.

Importantly, prior research has demonstrated that adoption of a high construal level prompts people to place greater priority on the desirability of pertinent end-states or goals. In contrast, adoption of a low construal level leads people to place higher priority on the feasibility and means used to achieve the end-state or goal. We found these observations particularly pertinent to ethical contexts because in such contexts people aspire to achieve a desirable end-state or higher level goal by employing a means that is unethical. The theory that underlies our hypotheses integrates the preceding two notions, namely, (a) a high (low) construal level increases the relative importance assigned to desirability (feasibility) aspects of ethics-related situations, and (b) a focus on desirability encourages unethical behavior by fostering a desire to attain end-states/goals irrespective of ethical considerations, yet a focus on feasibility/means promotes more ethical behavior by heightening the salience of unethical actions. Combining the aforementioned premises we derived the following hypotheses. When individuals consider the behavior of an unknown (distal) person and thereby adopt a relatively high construal level, they should anticipate that this person will engage in more unethical behavior when the event’s psychological distance is greater. But when individuals consider the behavior of the self -- an individual that fosters adoption of an extremely low construal level -- they anticipate that the self will eschew unethical behavior, irrespective of other less potent factors that alter construal level.

The first two experiments found support for this hypothesis in nine different ethical scenarios that varied construal level in a number of ways. In both experiments, construal level was manipulated by altering the focal actor (i.e., social distance: the self or an unknown other). In experiment 1, it was also manipulated through the temporal distance (i.e., close vs. far distance) of the event; in experiment 2, changes in temporal distance were replaced by a fluency manipulation that varied a novel dimension of psychological distance (see Alter and Oppenheimer 2008). In both experiments a significant two-way interaction revealed that for an unknown other, a higher construal level (i.e. more temporal distance or reduced reading fluency) increased the expectation of unethical behavior, but expectations that the self would behave unethically were low regardless of variation in the event’s temporal distance or fluency.

Experiment 3 sought to extend our research from the cognitive to the behavioral domain. This was accomplished by providing participants with an opportunity to behave dishonestly (Gino and Ariely,
In this experiment, participants were primed to process information at a higher or lower level through a series of categorization tasks (Fujita, et al., 2006). The results indicated that participants who were exposed to the high (low) construal-level prime cheated more (less).

Finally, study 4 sought evidence of the mechanisms that underlie the preceding effects. Consistent with our theorizing, by relying on a design very similar to that used in experiment 1, we found that participants generated more desirable-related thoughts when the expected behavior concerned an unknown other and a temporal distance manipulation prompted participants to further process the scenarios at a higher construal level. But, participants produced more feasibility-related thoughts (i.e., thoughts about the unethical means) when the event concerned one’s own anticipated behavior (i.e., which prompted use of a very low construal level), and this occurred regardless of variation in the temporal distance factor. Further, analyses of mediated moderation and mediation found that the number of participants’ desirability and feasibility related thoughts accounted for the effects of the social and temporal distance factors on participants’ expectations of unethical behavior.

**Brand (In)fidelity: When Flirting with the Competition Strengthens Brand Relationships**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

The consequences of infidelity are detrimental to the continuity of romantic relationships. In order to shield themselves against temptations, individuals who are committed to a relationship devalue the attractiveness of alternatives or pay less attention to them (Johnson and Rusbult 1989; Lydon, Fitzsimons, and Naidoo 2003). Such defensive tactics are more difficult to implement in the context of marketing relationships. In the marketing world, numerous brands are available and actively try to lure consumers away from their competitors by means of commercials, promotions, free samples, and other attempts to win consumers’ preferences. Even the most loyal customers are exposed to positive information about attractive alternatives, and may even find themselves appreciating other products and brands that compete with their favored brands. What happens when loyal consumers are tempted by other brands? In five studies, we demonstrate that a temporary interest spurred by a competitor positively impacts committed brand relationships. We propose that flirting with a competing brand induces arousal, and this arousal increases consumers’ commitment with their favorite brands through a misattribution process: consumers who flirt with a competitive brand feel more aroused than participants who do not flirt, and they misattribute this arousal to their favorite brand.

We test the positive effect of being unfaithful to brands in a series of studies using a diverse array of paradigms. In study 1, we show that appreciating a competing brand’s favorable characteristics induces loyal participants to consume greater amounts of their favorite brand in the near future. We presented participants with four favorable features of a soft drink and asked them to evaluate each of them. As predicted, participants loyal to Coca-Cola (Pepsi) who rated favorable features of Pepsi (Coca-Cola) intended to consume more of their favorite soft drink in the upcoming week, compared to loyal participants who rated the same favorable features of Coca-Cola (Pepsi).

In study 2, we provide initial evidence in support of the misattribution hypothesis by examining if the effect of flirting depends on the similarity between one’s favorite brand and a competing brand. The reason for this prediction is that flirting with a similar brand may facilitate the misattribution of flirting-induced arousal from the similar brand to the favorite brand. Participants listed their favorite beer as well as other five beers, and then ranked these five other beers from the most similar to the most dissimilar to their favorite beer. Subsequently, they were asked to imagine that their favorite beer, a beer that was similar or dissimilar to their favorite beer, or red wine (control) was chosen by experts as the best beverage to complement a plate of smoked meats in a food tasting event. Analysis revealed that loyal participants who read a positive scenario about a similar beer expressed even greater love for their favorite beer compared to participants who read the same scenario involving their favorite beer, a dissimilar beer, or wine.

In study 3a and 3b, we investigated the role of perceived agency in flirting, and examined whether the brand flirting effect could influence real behavior. In both studies 3a and 3b, participants in a control condition were instructed to watch a 30-second advertisement for their non-preferred brand. Participants in the experimental condition were given a choice between watching either a 10-minute advertisement for a favorite brand or a 30-second advertisement for a competing brand in the same product category. We predicted that the vast majority of participants in the experimental condition would choose to watch the shorter advertisement – in other words, we predicted the majority of participants would choose to flirt with a brand competing with the brand to which they were loyal. The 30-second advertisements presented in the experimental condition and control condition were identical. Specifically, participants in study 3a watched a 30-second advertisement for their non-preferred soft drink (either Coca-Cola or Pepsi). As additional compensation for their participation in the survey, participants were then instructed that they would be entered into a lottery to win a 2-Liter bottle of a soft drink. Participants indicated whether they would like to receive a bottle of Coca-Cola or Pepsi if they won the lottery. In study 3b, participants watched a 30-second advertisement of Starbucks or Dunkin’ Donuts and were told that they would be asked to watch another advertisement later in the survey, and that they could choose which one of two 30-second advertisements they preferred to watch. Participants were further instructed that one of the advertisements was for Dunkin’ Donuts, and that the other advertisement was for Starbucks. In both studies, participants expressed a greater preference for their favorite brand when they chose to watch an ad for a competitive product, compared to when they were forced to do so, indicating that perceived initiation of flirting is an important antecedent of its effect.

Our last study shows that excitement mediates the effect of flirting on the desire to consume one’s favorite brand. In this study, participants were asked to imagine consuming their favorite potato chips, or a similar brand of potato chips. Participants next indicated how exciting it would be to eat those chips and the extent to which they intended to consume their favorite brand of chips in the near future. Consistent with the proposed misattribution process, mediation analysis indicated that flirting with a similar brand elicits excitement, and this excitement, in turn, leads to higher desire to consume a favorite brand in loyal consumers.

In short, this research offers important new insight into the consequences of flirting with a non-favored brand on consumers’ subsequent attitudes and behavior. Taken together, our findings suggest that being unfaithful does not damage committed brand relationships - on the contrary, it can even strengthen the bond between loyal consumers and their favorite brands. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for competition dynamics and customer retention.
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Paper #1: Default Effects under Pay-What-You-Want: Evidence from the Field
Hannah Perfecto, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Minah H. Jung, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Leif D. Nelson, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Ayelet Gneezy, University of California, San Diego, USA
Uri Gneezy, University of California, San Diego, USA

Paper #2: Modeling Scale Attraction Effects: An Application to Charitable Donations and Optimal Laddering
Kee Yeun Lee, University of Michigan, USA
Fred Feinberg, University of Michigan, USA

Paper #3: Working out Consumption: Designing a Robust Information Intervention for Healthful Eating
Indrani Goswami, University of Chicago, USA
Oleg Urminsky, University of Chicago, USA

Paper #4: Single Option Aversion
Daniel Mochon, Tulane University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers try to make optimal decisions and companies want those decisions to be optimally profitable. In pursuit of that optimization, companies carefully calibrate how to present information to consumers. Although rational economic theory suggests that it should not matter how the information is structured, work in social psychology and economics have found dramatic effects on consumer behavior. This session features research on key aspects and novel applications of choice architecture, bringing to light new means to substantially affect consumer decision making. Together, they seek to answer the question of how each part of the decision can be most effectively structured to maximize welfare for all parties.

One well-documented means of influencing choice is posting reference prices. In the first talk (Perfecto, Jung, Nelson, Gneezy, & Gneezy), Perfecto will discuss four large field data sets (N = 124,193) and two large-scale field experiments (N = 4,119) from online companies, which examine the efficacy of defaults and anchors in a pay-what-you-want setting. In this context of maximal consumer flexibility, Perfecto finds that reference prices do influence behavior, but not always as previous lab research would suggest.

Not only are certain choices (e.g., defaults) important in decisions, but their order of presentation is important as well. In the second talk (Lee & Feinberg), Lee will propose a model of attraction effects, applied to appeals scales in a donation context (e.g., several suggested donations and an “other” option). Lee’s 3.5-year quasi-experiment suggests that scale points do exert significant attraction effects, and that these effects vary across different donors. Lee’s model also has consequences for “laddering,” in which charities alter their requests depending on individuals’ donation histories.

Regardless of the order of choices, the information that accompanies them is critical in decision making. The third talk (Goswami & Urminsky) will show how posting the exercise equivalent (e.g., the number of minutes biking needed to burn the calories in the item) is more effective and helpful metric to consumers looking to eat healthily. One field study and two lab studies reveal that, compared to no information, including the exercise equivalent significantly reduces caloric consumption, whereas including caloric information yields only a negligible reduction.

Finally, the previous talks have examined situations in which there are many options. Mochon will begin the session by discussing the opposite problem: choice sets of one. With five studies, Mochon demonstrates people’s strong aversion to having only one option, aside from deferral. He shows that this effect is not due to the additional information a larger choice set provides, and that it disappears when the deferral option does not include further searching.

In summary, this session addresses some of the gaps and shortcomings in the choice architecture literature. The issues examined in this session have important implications for policy and societal well-being, as well as basic scientific understandings of how people make decisions. As a result, this session will appeal to researchers interested in the prosocial behavior, health psychology, judgment and decision making, as well as those interested in policy or charitable giving. This session speaks to the theme of making a difference in a number of ways: all four talks challenge the status quo in their respective literatures. Some, such as Perfecto and Lee do so methodologically, with novel methods testing the robustness of longstanding findings. Others, such as Mochon and Goswami, do so theoretically, by probing the boundaries of their respective fields.

Default Effects Under Pay-What-You-Want: Evidence from the Field

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Pay-what-you-want pricing is a flexible pricing system which allows consumers to pay any price they want, typically including very small amounts or even $0. A classically selfish consumer might be expected to pay the lowest price possible, exploiting the opportunity to acquire goods or services for free. However, real-world examples of online companies adopting pay-what-you-want indicate that people frequently choose to pay more than the minimum. In fact, we observe that customers are heavily influenced by suggestions offered (implicitly or explicitly) by the company. In this research, we investigate the power of these suggestions in the forms of reference prices and defaults under pay-what-you-want with a new level of precision.

Reference prices can be powerful in the context of pay-what-you-want. Some references can be implicit, such as when a company donates some of their profits to charity (Gneezy, Gneezy, Brown, & Nelson, 2010). Other references can be explicit prices: for example, when customers learn about the average price paid by others, that information eliminates the otherwise significant influence of anonymity (Gneezy, Gneezy, Reiner, & Nelson 2012). Such a reference price may contain information about what is “fair”, “appropriate”, or simply “common”. A plausible consumer approach might be to find such a reasonable cue and adjust (down) to a preferred amount. The weakest type of reference price is in the provision of a simple default. Research on default effects in various contexts suggests that a majority of people follow the default choices set by companies (Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Bernartzi, 2004; Johnson et al., 1993). By studying reference prices in the maximally flexible environment of pay-what-you-want, and by doing so through collaborating with three online companies, we can investigate the influence of reference price with precision.

To achieve this, we analyzed the sales data from three online companies: a board game company, a video game retailer, and an
ebook retailer. In Study 1, we analyzed data from the board game company’s promotion of a small expansion set of cards under pay-what-you-want pricing (N=74,592). Customers saw an unexplained default price of $5.00 on a sliding scale and told customers that it costs them $3.00 to make and ship the cards. Both of these prices proved to have substantial effects on consumer behavior: 56.1% paid the default price of $5, and 7.7% paid $3, the cost to the company per product. 21.1% paid nothing, but the promotion was still quite profitable, earning over $70,000.

Although the board game company allowed its customers to pay $0, their product was physical and therefore difficult to pirate illegally, unlike other online goods (e.g., digital music). Perhaps the pull of piracy would overwhelm this success if the product were purely electronic or sold at a nonzero price. In Study 2, we looked at an ebook retailer that employs pay-what-you-want pricing and has both of these factors at play. The company sets a default price and each bundle features one to two additional, bonus books, which are unlocked by paying more than a set price. We find a similar pattern of payments across their four promotions (N=10,615): roughly 30% paid the default, 33% paid a lower reference price (the minimum price for bonus books), and 15% paid the minimum price ($1).

These findings indicate that a substantial proportion of customers choose to pay a default price. Perhaps people think that the default or reference price are somewhat fair. How does a high default price perform when there are other competing reference prices? Also, what price do customers settle in the end if they are adjusting from a reference price? To answer these questions, in Study 3 we collaborated with an online video game store that sells a single computer game. Our field data set (N=44,042) includes the company’s 35 pay-what-you-want promotions. The default price was $5.00. The company also features two additional reference prices: $1.00 and $1.60. Customers choose to pay a default price. Perhaps people think that the default price of $5, and 7.7% paid $3, the cost to the company per product. 21.1% paid nothing, but the promotion was still quite profitable, earning over $70,000.

In summary, reference prices and defaults heavily influence consumer decisions under pay-what-you-want. People like paying in round numbers. More people choose to give and they pay more when the charity is opt-out. Depending on the other available reference prices, the high default price can produce higher payments.

REFERENCES

Modeling Scale Attraction Effects: An Application to Charitable Donations and Optimal Laddering

EXENDED ABSTRACT
The charity industry is substantial ($300B annually), expanding rapidly, and presently accounts for over 2% of US GDP. Intriguingly, individual, non-corporate giving comprises the lion’s share of this total, nearly three-quarters in 2012. To obtain these individual-level donations, charities nearly universally present an “appeals scale” when contacting potential donors. In the charity sector, the appeals scale refers to a list of “scale points” (specific suggested amounts) and an “other” category, allowing the respondent to donate any amount not on the scale. Orthodox economic theory might therefore suggest that the points used on the scale “should be” irrelevant, since one can ignore them without penalty or effort. But it remains an empirical question whether, behaviorally, respondents are indeed influenced by these sorts of commonly-used scales and, if so, in what ways.

Choosing scale points well is an important decision for charities: overly high scale points can be ignored as being “outside my comfort zone”, or even potentially alienate donors who feel they are being pressured for much more than they’re prepared to give. Worse for the charity, overly low scale points may actually pull donations downward. Despite their widespread use, such scales seem to be designed in a one-off manner by individual charities, and to date there have been no formal models in marketing to help guide them, based on data they already possess. To that end, we develop a comprehensive model of scale attraction effects that describes in detail how each scale point ‘pulls’ a donor away from the latent, intended dona-
tion amount; and moreover, how the pulls of each of the points on the scale accumulate to influence the final, observed donation.

Our model is grounded in a variety of behavioral theories, mainly from the traditions of pro-social influence (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004), specific manipulations in charitable contexts (Weyant and Smith 1987, Shang and Croson 2009), the use of both internal and external referents (Mayhew and Winer 1992), assimilation-contrast (Schwarz and Bless 1992), as well as prior modeling work in charitable giving specifically (e.g., Diepen et al. 2009). This is accomplished in several stages. First, each potential donor is presumed to have some personal propensity to comply with a donation request that is either higher or lower than what they might have otherwise given; the “compliance degree” is 100% when the asked amount is the same as the intended amount (if one is asked for what one intended anyway, compliance should be perfect), and decreases with the distance between these. Second, the “pulling amount” captures how much influence is exerted by a scale point. The model intrinsically captures a “Goldilocks Effect” where asking for a bit more is likely to be successful, and asking for much more is unlikely to be, but the best course of action is somewhere in between; and we can then estimate this “optimal” ask point for each individual. Lastly, an “accumulated pulling amount” provides a number of possible mechanisms for the multiple scale points’ pulls to work together.

Using panel data from a unique 3.5 year quasi-experiment, we provide a joint account for both whether a donation is made (incidence) and, if so, its size (amount). This allows us to resolve, on a household basis, a conundrum present in all donation drives, as well as prior research: how are the act of asking for donations and the amount received statistically intertwined? The model incorporates heterogeneity across donors in scale attraction effects, and this is critical: otherwise, we would presume that every household is equally susceptible to scale attraction effects. Estimating a variety of models allows us to empirically choose, for the first time, in a donation context, among previously-posted operationalizations of both internal and external reference effects.

Results suggest that scale points do exert substantial attraction effects, and moreover that these vary markedly across donors. In addition, there is a strong asymmetry in the size of pulling effects: donors are more easily persuaded to give less than more, roughly three times as much. Seasonal donation patterns are pronounced, and these too differ across the donor pool. A significantly negative error correlation (-0.387) between (latent) donation propensity and (observed) donation amount highlights the importance of accounting for unobserved correlation in these quantities, and that merely modeling donation amount alone would provide an insufficiently rich basis for charities to optimize their appeals. Regarding reference point theory, for these specific data, the “internal” referents were best captured by the average of all prior observed donation amounts; “external referents”, by including all five scale points, as opposed to a particular subset on which respondents might anchor.

One advantage of our method is the ability to conduct a “counterfactual” analysis, whereby possible appeals scale policies can be compared. We examine three of especial interest: finding an optimal request for each household, finding one for each donation “group” provided by the charity, and simply allowing people to continue at their habitual donation levels. Results suggest that, compared to “no appeal”, the “group appeal” is 24.4% better, and “individualized appeal” 27.1%, in terms of yearly expected donation amount. This in turn provides some preliminary guidance on “laddering”: how much charities should increase amounts subsequently requested of individual donors, based on their donation histories.

REFERENCES

EXENDED ABSTRACT
Providing consumers with calorie information has received a great deal of attention, as municipalities such as New York City have mandated greater disclosure and retailers (including Panera and McDonalds) now provide calorie information on their menu boards nationwide. However, tests of providing decision makers with information on the calorie content of food has yielded very mixed results (Bollinger, Leslie, & Sorensen, 2010; Elbel, Gyamfi, & Kersh, 2011; Loewenstein, 2011). Using the idea of channel factors (Leventhal, Singer, & Jones, 1965), we develop a low cost and robust mapping intervention (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) which makes the welfare consequences of choices more easily evident to the decision maker.

In a field study conducted at the end of December and beginning of January, museum visitors (n=1127) were offered a choice of candy bars before completing an unrelated survey as a compensation for their time. The survey was about gift card preferences, and a few demographic questions were asked at the end. Visitors chose between four different candy bars whose calorie content ranged from 70 to 280 calories in increments of 70 calories (Snickers, 280; Hershey’s, 210; Chips Ahoy, 140; M&Ms 70). Notably, the candy bars all disclose calories on their packaging. The museum patrons chose a candy bar from one of four boxes which either showed in large font (a) just the names of the candy bars, (b) the names and calorie information, (c) names with calories and “exercise equivalents” (e.g., number of minutes of running or biking required to burn the calories). Ordinal regression revealed that, compared to the no information disclosure condition, visitors consumed significantly fewer calories, on average, in the conditions where exercise equivalents were additionally made available (mean = 177 calories vs. 199 calories; Wald=9.4, p<.01). However, the reduction in calorie consumption was only marginally significant when calorie information alone were disclosed. The effect of exercise equivalents was robust across age, income, and gender.

The two waves of data collection in our field study provided an opportunity to contrast the effects of informational interventions with a natural experiment on goal-setting. Prior research has re-
ported that making New Year’s resolutions facilitates success in goal pursuit (Norcross, Mrykalo and Blagys 2002). We find that nearly a third of our January sample made a New Year’s resolution, and 80% of the resolutions were health and fitness related. In a separate initial question about general goals asked in both waves, we also find a higher rate of health goals in January than in December (73% vs. 65%, p < .01). However, despite the effect of New Year’s on setting health goals, we find no main or interaction effect of December vs. January on the calories of the option chosen. Likewise, collapsing the December and January data, we find no direct or moderating effect of having a self-reported health goal. Participants with and without either health goals or New Year’s resolutions were equally likely to take a high-calorie candy bar in the control condition, and were not differentially affected by the informational interventions.

In two additional hypothetical-choice studies we replicate the effect of the exercise equivalent information (although mere calorie information had similar effects in these studies) and find no effect of health goals or New Year’s resolutions. We do find that the exercise equivalents intervention is more effective for those higher in food guilt (Cepeda-Benito, Gleaves, Williams, & Erath, 2001) or who score higher on restrained eating (Polivy, Herman, & Howard, 1988). To put it another way, higher guilt and restrained eating significantly predict lower calorie consumption when exercise equivalent information is present, but not otherwise.

Our studies provide strong evidence that providing exercise equivalents along with calorie disclosure is a robust and effective way to reduce calories in unplanned consumption opportunities. Our results highlight the need for informational interventions to be salient and interpretable, and demonstrate a surprising advantage in effectiveness of well-communicated informational interventions over spontaneous goal-setting.

REFERENCES


### Single Option Aversion

**EXENDED ABSTRACT**

This work documents an effect labeled ‘Single Option Aversion’ where the choice share of an option increases (relative to deferral) when a competing attractive option is added to the choice set, contrary to the predictions of rational utility based models of search (Weitzman 1979), and recent work in consumer behavior on choice conflict and choice deferral (Dhar 1997; Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Tversky and Shafir 1992). A series of studies demonstrate this effect, and establish some of its boundary conditions.

Experiment 1A demonstrates the existence of single option aversion. In this study, participants were presented with a decision scenario where they were asked to imagine that they were looking to buy a DVD player. Participants in the *Sony* condition were shown a Sony DVD player, and were asked whether they would buy that option, or continue searching. Participants in the *Philips* condition saw a similar setup, except with a Philips player. Participants in the *Both* condition were presented with both options and the option to continue searching. Participants were reluctant to choose a DVD player when only one option was presented, as 9% chose to make the purchase in the Sony condition and 10% in the Philips condition. However, when both options were presented together, the choice shares of each of the alternatives significantly increased (32% chose the Sony and 34% chose the Philips; p’s < .05). Experiment 1B replicates this effect using the same design, but with real choices involving candy bars.

Experiment 2 demonstrates that single option aversion is not driven by the additional information available in the two option condition (e.g. Hsee et al. 1999; Moorthy et al. 1997). Rather, there is something psychologically unique about being presented with the choice between a single option and deferral. In this study, participants were asked to imagine that they were looking to purchase a camera. Three of the conditions replicated the conditions in Experiment 1. Participants were presented with either a Sony, a Canon or both of these cameras, and were asked whether they would pick one of the options available or continue searching. In the fourth condition, participants were presented with both cameras, and were asked to pick the one they preferred. Following this forced choice, they were presented with the camera they chose and were asked whether they would purchase that model, or continue searching. Thus participants in this ‘single option plus comparison’ condition had all of the information available in the ‘both’ condition, but ultimately had to make a choice from a choice set containing only one option. Replicating the prior studies, participants chose both the Canon and Sony cameras less often when presented alone than when presented together (p’s < .01). Importantly, participants were also less likely to pick these options in the ‘single option plus comparison’ condition (p’s < .01) than in the both condition. Thus, even holding the information constant, participants were reluctant to pick an option when the final choice set involved a single option. Interestingly, these results suggest that single option aversion doesn’t just depend on the total number of options available, but also how these are partitioned. Temporarily isolating one of them can dramatically increase deferral.

Experiment 3 examines whether single option aversion occurs only when the deferral option involves further search, or whether consumers avoid single options regardless of what the deferral option is. In this study participants were asked to imagine that they...
were looking to buy a new dishwasher. They were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions based on a 2X2 between subjects design. Half of the participants were presented with one option, while the other half were presented with two options. For half of the participants, the deferral option involved further search (as in the prior studies) while for the other half the deferral option involved not choosing any of the options presented. While single option aversion was replicated in the ‘search’ conditions, this effect was eliminated in the conditions where the deferral option did not involve search. Therefore single option aversion is moderated by the framing of the deferral option.

Experiment 4 tests whether single option aversion has any lasting effects on choice. It examines what choices participants who choose to defer in the single option condition make, once more options are added to the choice set. In this study, participants got to decide which charity received a $1 donation. Participants in the single option condition were initially presented with the choice between donating their dollar to the American Red Cross or deferring to see what other charities were available. If they deferred, the Wounded Warrior Project was added to the choice set, and they had to decide whether to pick one of the two charities available or to continue searching. If they deferred again, a third charity was added to the choice set and they were forced to pick one of the three options. Participants in the two option condition were initially presented with both the American Red Cross and the Wounded Warrior Project, and if they chose to defer, the third option was added and they were forced to pick one of the three options. Replicating the prior studies, participants were less likely to donate their dollar to the American Red Cross when this was the only option presented than when it was presented with a competing option ($p < .05$). Importantly, participants in the single option condition continued to be reluctant to pick an option even after the second charity had been added to the choice set. Indeed, participants in this condition were significantly less likely to donate their money (relative to those in the two options condition) to both the American Red Cross and the Wounded Warrior Project ($p’s < .05$), once this second option had been added to the choice set. Thus single option aversion can have lasting effects on choice. Once participants have been exposed to a single option and begin to search, they continue search even after more options are added.

REFERENCES
What Thoughts Count? Some Ways in Which Gift Selection Affects the Giver
Chair: Adam Duhachek, Indiana University, USA

Paper #1: Forgive by Remembering or Forgive by Forgetting: The Temporal Match Between Victim Motivation and Apology Gift Preferences
Christina I. Anthony, University of Sydney, Australia
Elizabeth Cowley, University of Sydney, Australia
Adam Duhachek, Indiana University, USA

Paper #2: Sweet Protection: Using Sweets to Manage Relationships
Ann E. Schlosser, University of Washington, USA
Joshua Beck, University of Washington, USA

Paper #3: Ask and You Shall (Not) Receive: Close Friends Prioritize Relational Signalling Over Recipient Preferences in Their Gift Choices
Morgan Ward, Southern Methodist University, USA
Susan Broniarczyk, University of Texas at Austin, USA

Paper #4: Mental Stealing Effects on Purchase Decisions for Others
Esta Denton, Northwestern University, USA
Derek D. Rucker, Northwestern University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
The familiar maxim about gift-giving, “it’s the thought that counts” assumes that simply demonstrating a desire to give is enough – the gift itself does not matter. This session presents research challenging the assumption that giving is always altruistically-motivated and provides evidence that the gift presented communicates more about the giver than just his/her desire to give (Belk 1979; Caplow 1982; Sherry 1983; Ward and Broniarczyk 2011). The gift giver may hope to achieve many goals with his/her gift, ranging from the altruistic desire to provide joy to more egotistically-motivated reasons that benefit the giver. These motivations often interact with the goals of the recipient to determine the effectiveness of the gift and its impact on the relationship. Extant consumer research on gift giving has primarily focused on the exchange of dyadic gifts from the giver to the recipient for purposes of interpersonal relationship maintenance and as a means of symbolic communication in relationships (Belk 1979; Caplow 1982; Sherry 1983; Belk and Coon 1993). In this session, we focus on instances in which the purpose of giving is to affect change on the relationship (Anthony, Cowley, and Duhachek) influence relationship closeness (Broniarczyk and Ward; Schlosser and Beck) or to avoid guilt by spending appropriately (Rucker and Denton). Across the four papers, some important aspects of the gift purchase process are considered, investigating the key questions of: How much to spend and what should the giver spend it on? What will be the impact of the gift on the relationship now and over time?

First, Anthony, Cowley, and Duhachek investigate the selection of an appropriate gift to facilitate forgiveness for a previous transgression from the perspective of the giver. In related work, Broniarczyk and Ward examine the impact of gifting as a function of the social distance between giver and recipient. The authors demonstrate that givers may ignore a recipient’s gift requests in favor of a gift that demonstrates how well the giver knows the recipient. Schlosser and Beck corroborate this notion and demonstrate that the selection of a gift is based on what it says about the giver. Specifically, they show that a sweet gift is given in the hope of leaving a positive impression, or at least avoiding a negative impression of the personality of the giver. Finally, Rucker and Denton provide evidence that the purchasing process can partially be driven by the desire to avoid feelings of guilt on the part of the giver. In each of these cases it is the thought that counts, but the thoughts may not be what the recipient, nor the giver, might have expected.

The four papers in this session offer interesting synergies that should be of broad appeal not only to researchers in the area of gift-giving, but also researchers working on social distance and network effects, motivation, regulatory focus, emotions and anticipatory emotions, mental accounting and relationship marketing.

Forgive by Remembering or Forgive by Forgetting: The Temporal Match Between Victim Motivation and Apology Gift Preferences

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Gift giving involving a reparative motivation has received limited attention in the consumer behavior literature. However, using gifts to encourage forgiveness is so common there are websites dedicated to apology gifts, apology cards, and forgive-me gifts. There is even an apology gift buying guide in Shopwiki.com with suggestions for consumers based on the severity of the transgression: itty-bitty mistakes, big mistakes and absolutely massive mistakes. Their premise is that the severity of the transgression should determine gift selection. The other tip offered is that the more luxurious or decadent the gift the better. We agree that choosing the right gift may be a worthwhile investment as research has found that simple apologies are not always effective (e.g. Fehr and Gelfand 2010). However, we argue that the most effective type of apology gift is one that matches the temporal focus that is activated by the victim’s motivation following an interpersonal transgression. In other words, luxurious and decadent may not always be the answer.

Consumer researchers have made a distinction between hedonic goods that induce pleasure and alternatives that are more functional/ utilitarian in nature and instrumental to achieving another goal (e.g. Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Straathofitz and Myers 1998). Whereas hedonic alternatives are associated with the attainment of immediate pleasure, utilitarian goods provide delayed benefits and thus are conducive with a longer-term focus (Loewenstein, Read and Baumeister 2003; Wertenbroch 1998). Gifts offered as a form of apology following an interpersonal transgression, may also vary along this dimension such as offering the victim a voucher for an aromatherapy massage known to be a relaxing experience (hedonic gift) or a deep tissue massage known to relieve back ache and pain (utilitarian gift).

We propose that the victim’s preference for either a hedonic versus utilitarian apology gift, will vary given the victim’s motivation for forgiveness, and in turn, the temporal focus activated by their motivational goal. Specifically, we argue that if the victim is motivated to forgive the transgressor by avoiding thoughts about the problem (i.e. an avoidance motivation) - a ‘forgive by forgetting’ mentality- we propose that a hedonic gift should be preferred as it will help to maintain the short-term focus necessary to distract the individual from thinking about the transgression incident thereby facilitating temporary mood regulation. Consequently, the resulting positive mood should signal that all is well, and that no changes to the relationship need to occur (Schwarz and Clore 1983), which may encourage relationship reparation. Alternatively, rather than forgetting about the incident, the victim may be motivated to forgive the
transgressor by thinking about the incident (i.e. an approach motivation) via engaging in a more problem-focused style of coping (Carver 1989). In this case, the victim’s motivation to ‘forgive by remembering’ will require a long-term focus to remember the past and consider the future, such that the transgression incident can be integrated into the bigger picture of the relationship. This in turn, should lead to a preference for a utilitarian apology gift, which is consistent with a longer-term focus and will encourage the victim to maintain the broad focus necessary to understand how the transgression is an isolated event.

Study 1: The Reparation Gift Preference Effect
Eighty-one university students participated in a study comprising a 2 (victim motivation: avoidance, approach) × 2 (apology gift: hedonic, utilitarian) mixed-design with the last factor as a repeated measure. Participants were first instructed to imagine that a close friend had revealed a secret of theirs to a large group of people. Participants were then given an explicit motivation to avoid or think about the incident. Next they were told that the friend wanted to offer them an apology gift. As hypothesized, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 79) = 10.50, p < .005). Participants with an avoidance (approach) motivation preferred hedonic (utilitarian) gifts to a significantly greater extent.

Study 2a and 2b: Measuring Temporal Focus
The purpose of study 2a and 2b was to provide evidence that victim motivation activates a differential temporal focus, which in turn, affects gift preference. In study 2a, 80 university students were randomly assigned to a 2 (victim motivation: approach, avoid) × 2 (gift type: utilitarian, hedonic) between-subjects design. Victim motivation was manipulated using an implicit priming word-puzzle and temporal focus was measured using a reaction time task (with average time to respond on neutral words as a covariate). The results revealed a significant interaction for the primed factor (F(1, 77) = 3.97, p < .05). Participants primed with an avoidance (approach) motivation responded more quickly to words associated with a short-term (long-term) focus, and tended to prefer hedonic (utilitarian) apology gifts (F(1, 76) = 4.08, p < .05).

In study 2b we replicated the effects using the Construction of Narratives Questionnaire (Liberman, Trope, Macrea and Sherman 2007) as a measure of temporal orientation. We also provide evidence that when an avoidance (approach) motivation is activated, participants reported they would spend less (more) time thinking about the transgression (r (1, 39) = -2.44, p < .05). Hence, supporting our ‘forgive by forgetting and forgive by remembering’ claim.

Study 3: Manipulating Temporal Focus
In study 3, to provide direct causal evidence for our claims temporal focus was manipulated with 175 university students randomly assigned to a 2 (temporal focus: near, far) between-subjects design. When the primed temporal focus was consistent with the temporal focus that naturally occurs with victim motivation (avoid – short-term focus, approach – long-term focus), the pattern was consistent (F(1, 171) = 2.91, p = .09).

Discussion
Choosing the right apology gift is important as it may serve to encourage forgiveness if made appropriately, and may be detrimental to relationship reparation if made inappropriately. We show that a match between the temporal focus of the victim’s motivation and the consumption benefit of the gift is an important determinant of forgiveness and relationship repair. Buyer beware, gift selection is not simply a matter of matching the purchase price to the severity of the transgression, nor will a hedonic gift always get you out of jail free.

Sweet Protection: Using Sweets to Manage Relationships
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Gifting food is a common consumer behavior. For instance, when going to a Superbowl party, an individual may bring a bag of chips or cookies. Likewise, one may choose a gift box of assorted nuts or chocolates, or a gift basket of coffee or cocoa. In all of these instances the gift involves an indulgent food. Yet we propose that the taste of the food will influence its likelihood of being given as a gift, especially when the giver’s motivations are to avoid negative evaluation.

Individuals manage relationships to balance self-other connections and to self-protect. Because foods with sweet (vs. other) tastes carry prosocial associations (Meier et al. 2012), individuals may give sweet gifts in order to communicate that they are metaphorically sweet (agreeable) or to buffer against potential negative evaluation—sweeten the recipient. Thus, our goals are twofold: to examine (1) whether sweet foods are given more often as gifts, and if so, (2) whether this is motivated by self-presentation or self-protection.

Our first goal motivated study 1, in which we randomly assigned 160 undergraduates to either a sweet or salty condition. Those in the sweet (salty) condition were asked to think of foods such as chocolates and cookies (chips and pretzels). Next, participants rated their agreement with the following statements: “I give these foods as gifts,” “I often celebrate with others by having these foods,” “I give these foods as a ‘thank-you.’” As expected, there was an overall effect of taste on associations with gift-giving (F(1,158) = 108.89, p < .005). Those in the sweet condition rated foods more strongly associated with gift-giving (M=4.86), celebrations (M=5.42), and thank-you gifts (M=4.78) compared with those in the salty condition (M=2.28, 3.87 and 2.52, respectively). Thus, evidence supported our prediction that sweets are used more during gift/social exchange than a different (salty) taste.

If sweet foods are given to manage relationships, then giving foods with sweet (vs. other) tastes should vary depending on (1) whether the gift-giver is primed to think of oneself as agreeable (i.e., as a caring person), and (2) how close the giver is to the recipient. Our second study thus builds on the first by examining this as well as why sweets are given as gifts. In particular, we assess whether the underlying mechanism is to (a) convey one’s own sweetness (a self-presentation motive) or (b) buffer against negative evaluation (a self-protective motive). We expect that fear of negative evaluation—sweeten the recipient. Thus, our goals are twofold: (a) to give these foods as a ‘thank-you’ and (b) to buffer against negative evaluation.

In study 2, 203 undergraduates were randomly assigned to a condition in a 2 (agreeableness: high vs. low) × 2 (social distance: far vs. close) design. To manipulate agreeable self-perceptions, participants in the high (low) agreeableness condition were asked to recall and describe one time (15 times) in the past when they did something nice for someone. Logic suggests that increasing the number of recalled occasions should increase the difficulty of completing this task, and this recall difficulty should reduce perceptions one is agreeable (Schwarz et al. 1991). Next, participants rated how caring, nice, and supportive (α=92) they perceived themselves to be. Then in a purportedly unrelated study, participants
in the close (far) social distance condition were asked to imagine they were attending a birthday party for a close friend (former roommate) with whom they had a good (strained) relationship. They were told this person enjoys gourmet chocolate and asked to choose one from among four bars to give as a gift. The bars differed in taste: sweet berry, sour berry, sea-salt, and bitter espresso. Prior research (Beck and Schlosser 2013) shows that although all options are sweet, the sweetest option (sweet berry) had the strongest prosocial association.

Next, participants rated the extent to which they wanted to be perceived as prosocial (helpful, friendly, dependable, and kind; \( \alpha = .74 \)) in addition to other decoy positive items such as intelligent, strong, assertive, logical, attractive, and dominant (Leary and Allen 2011). Following this, participants rated their agreement with three items from a fear of negative evaluation scale (\( \alpha = .89 \)) that included “I am afraid that others will not approve of me” (Leary 1983). After this, as a manipulation check, because the IOS (inclusion-of-other-in-self) scale reflects social distance (Ijzerman and Semin 2009), participants were asked to rate how close the fictitious person is to themselves using the IOS scale (Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992). The results supported the effectiveness of both our agreeableness and social distance manipulations.

As expected, we found a significant interaction between level of agreeableness and social distance on sweet gift choice (Wald’s \( \chi^2 = 4.04, p < .05 \)). As predicted, in the close condition, those feeling more agreeable were significantly more likely to give sweeter gifts (77%) than those feeling less agreeable (50%; Wald’s \( \chi^2 = 7.49, p < .01 \)). There were no differences between levels of agreeableness in the far social distance condition (61% vs. 61%; Wald’s \( \chi^2 < 1 \)).

This interaction is suggestive that individuals give sweets to mitigate the fear of negative evaluation. To test this more directly, we modeled both direct and indirect interactions on both the mediator and dependent variable. Importantly, using the bootstrap analysis (Preacher and Hayes 2008), we found support that the indirect effects of agreeableness on choice through fear of negative evaluation occur when social distance is close (95% CI: .11, .75) but not when social distance is far (95% CI: -.05, .36). We did not find evidence for a mediating role of self-presentation (95% CIs included zero across levels of moderator).

This research makes at least three contributions by (1) identifying how metaphors serve a symbolic function in gift exchange (Belk and Coon 1993), (2) demonstrating how relational context (McGraw et al. 2003) influences the selection of gifts with certain tastes, and (3) isolating the mechanism—fear of negative evaluation—influencing sweet gift choice.

**Ask and You Shall (Not) Receive: Close Friends Prioritize Relational Signalling Over Recipient Preferences in Their Gift Choices**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Imagine your birthday is approaching and a friend asks you what you want as a birthday gift. You consider for a moment, then tell your friend exactly what you want. When your birthday arrives, does your friend present you with the gift you suggested or an alternative item that s/he has chosen especially for you? This familiar scenario brings to light the persistent tension in communal relationships between the opposing forces of behaving altruistically (doing things that benefit the other without concern for oneself) versus egoistically (responding to others’ needs to ensure one’s own relationship needs) (Clark and Mills 1993; Batson 1987; Sherry 1983). In the context of gift gifting, givers may select gifts altruistically, resulting in the choice of an item that matches the recipient’s expressed preferences, or egoistically, resulting in the choice of an item that allows the giver to demonstrate his/her knowledge of the recipient, thereby signaling the relationship.

In the context of a gift registry we consider the difference between how close versus distant friends manage these conflicting goals as prior research has identified social closeness to account for many of the differences in gifting behavior (Belk 1976; Gino and Flynn 2010; Ward and Broniarczyk 2011). One might expect a close friend, who is particularly concerned with the needs of the recipient, to choose altruistically an item that satisfies the recipient’s explicitly expressed preferences. However, we show that close (vs. distant) givers are also more sensitive to the social and interpersonal expectations that underlie gift exchanges and are likely to choose egoistically instead.

In three studies, we demonstrate that close (vs. distant) givers are more likely to experience a conflict between their competing goals. A pilot study confirmed that givers endorse their two main goals to be to choose 1) an item that matches the recipient’s preferences and 2) expresses the relationship between them. Ultimately, givers resolve this conflict by distorting their perceptions of the gift options, enabling them to favor the egoistic (over the altruistic) gifting goal, and relationally signal (Balcecis and Dunning 2006; Kunda 1990). In contrast, distant friends ironically are more likely to choose altruistically.

**Study 1**

In our first study we examine givers’ two opposing goals of choosing a gift that matches the recipient’s expressed preferences versus making a free choice that allows the giver to relationally signal. In a single factor design, using giver-recipient dyads composed of actual close or distant friends, we simulate a realistic registry choice in which half of the participants are designated recipients and the other half, givers. The recipients create their own individual registries from a set of lamps, which reveal their true preferences to the giver. Subsequently, givers choose a gift from among the lamp options. The results reveal a main effect of social closeness on givers’ likelihood to choose one of the non-registry lamps (\( \chi^2 = 5.9, p < .01 \)) such that 61% of close friends versus 23% of the distant friends chose a non-registry gift.

**Study 2**

Next, we examine how close friends justify diverging from the registry to a potentially less liked gift. Specifically we look at how close friends’ perceptions of the degree to which three gifts fulfill their gifting goals change depending on whether the giver assesses or chooses the item. We predict that when close givers are simply assessing the gift (without any intention of making a choice), they are objective about its match with recipients’ preferences. However, when close givers have to make a choice, they are encumbered with their concerns about how the gift will behave as a signal to the recipient about the relationship. By interpreting the relational signaling gift as most liked by the recipient, the close giver may resolve the goal conflict and choose this gift without sacrificing his/her important goal to choose altruistically.

We manipulate whether participants chose or did not choose a gift. The gift choice set was specifically designed such that choice of a particular lamp gift was indicative of a specific gifting motivation to 1) match recipient’s preference (the Registry gift) or 2) relationally signal. Thus the study design pits the relationally signaling gift against the Registry gift. As predicted, those in the Non-choice condition were significantly more likely to think the Registry gift would be liked by the recipient (M= 5.08) while those in the Choice condi-
tions indicate that the relationally signaling gift will be preferred by recipients (M = 4.18, F (1, 107) = 13.40, p < .01).

**Study 3**

Lastly, we investigated close (vs. distant) givers’ propensity to persist in gift search to resolve their goal conflict and whether having an additional registry item diminishes or exacerbates givers’ likelihood of choosing a relationally signaling gift. Givers were presented with the same gift lamps described in Study 2. After looking at the lamps close (vs. distant) participants were asked if they wanted to choose one of the lamps as a gift for the recipient or continue looking at an additional product category which included another item that the recipient had put on his/her registry and two other non-registry products. We expected close (vs. distant) friends to feel more conflicted and persist in looking at additional gift options that could satisfy both objectives. We find the predicted interaction between givers’ choice strategies and the social closeness to be significant, X² (5, N = 156) = 44.37, p > .0001 indicating that social closeness influences givers’ choice strategies. Yet, ultimately, close givers were even more likely to choose the relationally signaling classic gifts (60%) than registry gifts (22.5%) (1, N=156), t = -4.11, p > .0001. Conversely, in the distant friend condition, givers were far more likely to choose registry items (68.4%) than make a relationally signaling classic choice (11.84%) (1, N=156), t = 7.69, p > .0001 across both choice sets.

These studies demonstrate that close (vs. distant) givers are more likely to experience a conflict between their competing goals resulting in the choice of egoistically motivated gifts rather than altruistic gifts.

**Mental Stealing Effects on Purchase Decisions for Others**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Past research on mental accounting has focused on how consumers create budgets for themselves to control the flow of resources (Thaler 1980; 1999; Thaler and Johnson 1990). This research examines how consumers’ creation of a mental account, or budget, for another person affects the consumers purchase decisions for that other. Although some prior research suggests might focus on finding a good gift, we predict that the formation of a mental account for another can sometimes lead to consumers avoid optimizing on the best gift. Instead, consumers will spend in a manner to avoid feeling as if they have stolen from another person’s account, an experience we term mental stealing.

Mental stealing is defined as a sense of guilt due to an individual feeling that they are stealing from another individual by spending less money than they had cognitively committed to the person in their mind. The creation of a mental account may lead consumers to be averse to spending significantly below the budget due to the feeling that they are stealing resources that have already been given to the other person. In experiment 1, we predict that aversion to mental stealing can lead to decreased purchase intentions towards gifts that meet gift criteria but which are priced significantly below the budget. In experiment 2 we examine whether a mental account must be created for mental stealing to occur, as well as the mediating effect of self-reported guilt. Finally, experiment 3 examines a moderator of the mental stealing effect based on a consumer’s ability to make future reparations.

**Experiment 1: Does Mental Stealing Occur?**

Undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 3 Gift Price ($10, $25, $50) x 2 Recipient (self, other) between groups design. Participants were asked to imagine they were shopping for a gift for themselves or a friend. The creation of a mental account was manipulated by instructing all participants that they had not decided how much money they wanted to spend, so they have budgeted and set aside $50 dollars in available funds for this gift. Subsequently, all subjects were asked how likely they would be to buy a $10, $25, or $50 gift. Gifts were described as well-made and of good quality, and participants were told that the gift recipient was sure to like the gift and would not know the amount paid. A significant interaction emerged (p < .01). Participants shopping for a friend were significantly less likely to buy the $10 gift compared to the $25 gift and $50 gift (p < .05). In contrast, participants shopping for the self were significantly more likely to buy the gift in the $10 condition compared to the $25 gift condition and $50 gift condition (p < .05). These findings are consistent with concerns for mental stealing as the discrepancy between the $50 mental budget and $10 gift was sufficient to elicit concerns for keeping too much money from another person’s account for oneself. These effects did not emerge when consumers are buying for the self, working against an anchoring interpretation and consistent with the idea it is harder to steal money from the self than from others.

**Experiment 2: Does the Creation of a Mental Budget Matter?**

Undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 2 Mental Budget (no mental budget, $50 mental budget) between-group design. All participants were instructed that they were shopping for a friend. The creation of a mental account was manipulated by giving participants in the $50 mental budget condition the same prompt as in Experiment 1. All subjects were asked how likely they would be to buy a $10 gift, as well as asked to rate their current experience of guilt. A significant main effect for the creation of a mental budget on purchase likelihood emerged, (p < .001). Participants who created a $50 mental budget were significantly less likely to buy the $10 gift than participants who did not create a mental budget. This finding suggests that the creation of a mental budget was critical to observing the declined purchase intentions. In addition, we found a significant main effect for the creation of a mental budget on self-reported guilt (p < .001). Overall, participants with a $50 mental account reported higher self-reported guilt than participants with no mental budget consistent with mental stealing concerns. Finally, we found evidence that self-reported guilt mediated participants’ lower willingness to pay when having created a mental budget versus not.

**Experiment 3: Ability to Make Future Reparations Moderates Mental Stealing.**

Undergraduates were assigned to a 2 Mental Budget (no mental budget, $50 mental budget) x 2 Ability to Make Reparations (Yes, No) between-group design. All participants were instructed that they were shopping for a friend. We manipulated the ability to make reparations by instructing participants with the ability to make reparations that a second, unrelated gift occasion for the friend was coming up next week. Mental account was manipulated as in experiment 2. Subsequently, all subjects were asked how likely they would be to buy a $10 dollar gift. A significant main effect for the ability to make reparations emerged (p < .05). Participants with a $50 mental budget were significantly more likely to buy the $10 gift when given the ability to make reparations compared to those without the ability to make reparations. There were no differences in purchase likelihood between the no mental budget conditions (p > .10). Further contrasts revealed that guilt was significantly reduced for consumers with a $50 mental budget who were given the ability to make reparations.
compared to those without the ability to make reparations (p < .05) consistent with guilt being the main motivator for decreased purchase likelihood as a result of mental stealing concerns.

**Conclusion and Contributions**

Consumers shopping for others showed decreased willingness to purchase gifts priced significantly below the established mental budget, despite high gift desirability. This effect was mediated by guilt and moderated by participants’ ability to make future reparations. Implications for the mental accounting literature and how consumers purchase gifts for others are discussed.

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From Encoding, to Protecting, to Retrieving: Understanding the Interplay between Social Identity and Consumer Memory

Chair: Amy N. Dalton, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China

Paper #1: Memory for Advertising: When do Consumers Remember and When do they Forget Social-Identity-linked Ads?
Amy N. Dalton, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Rod Duclos, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Li Huang, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Paper #2: Savoring through Avoidance: Identity-based Strategic Memory Protection
Kathryn Mercurio, University of Oregon, USA
Americus Reed II, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Mark R. Forehand, University of Washington, USA

Paper #3: Identity Preservation: If I Can Remember It, You Can Have It
Karen Page Winterich, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA
Julie R. Irwin, University of Texas at Austin, USA

Paper #4: Sentimental Social Roles and the Objects that Elicit Them
Lindsay R. L. Larson, Georgia Southern University, USA
T. Andrew Poehlman, Southern Methodist University, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Marketing scholars and practitioners widely acknowledge that an understanding of consumer memory is vital to an understanding of consumer behavior. The literature on consumer memory has convincingly established that consumer behavior is shaped considerably by prior learning, and that consumer decisions are mostly memory-based (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991). It has linked memory to diverse responses, including attitudes, preferences, and decisions (Crowley and Mitchell 2003; Nedungadi 1990). Nevertheless, the literature on memory and consumption is dominated by a “cold cognition” approach that emphasizes the mechanics of memory, rather than a social or situated cognition approach, which would emphasize how social context and personal factors influence memory. Consequently, little is known about the interplay between memory and social factors of import to marketers.

One social construct of critical importance to marketers is social identity. Social identities, including gender, age, nationality, or racial group, can be central to consumers’ self-concepts and can be key determinants of preference and choice. Only recently, however, has research begun to examine social identity effects on memory (Mercurio and Forehand 2011). The objective of this special session is to bridge the gap between literatures on consumer memory and social identity. Collectively, the papers ask how social identities affect memory, and in turn, affects identity-related consumption behaviors (including preferences, product disposal, and product evaluation). This exploration into the interplay between social identity and memory results in a series of papers that nicely progress through the stages of memory processes, from encoding, to memory protection, to retrieval.

First, Dalton et al. examine memory encoding. Social identities affect memory by facilitating or inhibiting consumers’ attention to and encoding of identity-linked ads. The second and third papers examine memory protection. Mercurio et al. show that consumers protect identity-linked memories by avoiding further identity-related consumption. Winterich et al. show that consumers who protect identity-linked memories feel safe to sell/donate identity-linked products, but those who fail to protect identity-linked memories will instead throw away their products. Finally, Larson and Poehlman examine memory retrieval. Social-identity-linked products with sentimental value can bias memory for the past and thereby affect current consumer preferences.

As these papers will illustrate, the effects of social identity on memory do not necessarily map on to product evaluation and choice. This fact underscores the importance of studying the unique effects of social identity on consumer memory.

Memory for Advertising: When do Consumers Remember and When do they Forget Social-Identity-linked Ads?

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
What makes advertising memorable? One popular approach is to link ads to consumers’ social identities (e.g., gender, lifestyle, race). For instance, sales promotions routinely offer “10% discount to senior citizens” or “1 free drink for ladies” hoping that target-consumers will attend to and remember ads that are personally relevant (and financially beneficial). But despite the popularity of identity-linked advertising (ILA), evidence for its effectiveness is mixed (Reed 2002; Weigl et al.1980; White and Argo 2009). Thus, in the present work, we document when and explain why ILA can either help marketers (by attracting attention, thereby boosting memory for ads and desire for identity-linked products) or hurt marketers (by producing poor ad-memory and product avoidance). To guide our enquiry, we draw on two constructs well-established in identity research: identity distinctiveness (ID) and strength of ingroup identification (SOII).

Identity, or comparative, distinctiveness occurs when a person possesses a characteristic (e.g., a social identity) that differentiates her from others (McGuire et al. 1978; Wooten 1995). Because comparative distinctiveness allows one to feel special, individuals enjoy being part of distinctive minorities (Brewer 1991). Thus, identity distinctiveness is a common tactic used in ILA. For instance, hoping to peak women’s interest, a clothing ad may seek to activate female-identity by featuring a single woman amid multiple men.

As implied earlier, we argue that identity distinctiveness may actually backfire under certain conditions—specifically, among weak ingroup-identifiers. That is, the extent to which consumers connect with a given identity can vary greatly. For some women, being female is a mere social fact bearing little influence on how they define themselves. Other women, in contrast, very much feel and identify themselves. Other women, in contrast, very much feel and identify themselves.

To test this prediction, three experiments followed an ID (manipulated by altering the relative size of participants’ ingroup) by SOII (measured by Cameron’s (2004) 12-item scale) between-subjects design. Recruited to participate in a study about “media and market-
ing influences,” participants in a distinctive (non-distinctive) identity condition learned that 50 (150) students from their university as well as 150 students from another local university would be surveyed. After viewing 20 retail ads (8 of which were identity-linked: “10% discount for University X students”), participants completed a filler task before recalling as many ads as possible. Then they completed a recognition memory test for the ads. Similar results were obtained across measures, so we report recognition results. As expected, SOII moderated the effect of ID on ILA memory (t(189)=6.93, p<.001). Spotlight analyses (Aiken and West 1991) at 1 SD below/above the mean revealed that strong-identifiers recognized more IL-ads in the distinctive than non-distinctive condition (β= -3.54, t(189)= -7.08, p<.001) whereas weak-identifiers recognized fewer IL-ads in the distinctive than non-distinctive condition (β= -3.28, t(189)= -6.52, p<.001).

To explain the results, we theorized that ID facilitates (inhibits) attention to and encoding of ILA among strong (weak) identifiers. But poor memory is perhaps due to retrieval, not encoding, failure. To address this possibility, study 2 added a third IV: task sequence (control vs. reverse order). The control condition mirrored study 1’s procedure (i.e., ID Encoding Retrieval). In the reverse-order condition, the ID manipulation followed encoding (i.e., Encoding ID Retrieval). If, per our theorizing, ID affects encoding, study 2 should replicate study 1’s findings only when ID precedes encoding. If, in contrast, forgetting is due to retrieval failure, study 2 should replicate study 1’s results regardless of task sequence. As predicted, SOII moderated the effect of ID when distinctiveness preceded (t(72)=2.05, p=.05) but not when it followed encoding (p >.75). Spotlight analyses in the control condition replicated study 1’s results.

According to our theorizing, ID (e.g., being part of a minority group) makes a social-identity specialimportant to people who consider ingroup membership integral to the self (i.e., strong-identifiers; Brewer 1991). But for those who consider ingroup membership a mere social fact (i.e., weak-identifiers), being part of a small, under-represented group makes the given social identity unimportant. It follows from this theorizing that if a manipulation could make the ingroup seem more (less) important to weak (strong) identifiers, the effects documented in studies 1-2 should reverse. To this end, study 3 added a third level to the ID manipulation, a majority condition wherein participants learned that 150 students from their university as well as 50 students from another local university would be surveyed. Once again, spotlight analyses revealed that strong-identifiers recognized more IL-ads in the majority than control non-distinctive condition (β= 1.97, t(186)= 2.45, p=.02) but recognized fewer IL-ads in the majority than non-distinctive condition (β= -1.13, t(186)= 1.53, p=.13). Conversely, weak-identifiers recognized fewer IL-ads in the minority than non-distinctive condition (β= 1.99, t(186)= 2.50, p=.02) but recognized more IL-ads in the majority than non-distinctive condition (β= 1.42, t(186)= 1.94, p=.05). Mirroring the interactive effects of ID and SOII on old-new recognition of ILAs, study 3 also found that strong (weak) identifiers in the minority (majority) condition were more willing to buy identity-linked products (e.g., a stuffed animal wearing a university t-shirt) than counterparts in the equal and majority (minority) conditions.

This work makes several substantive and theoretical contributions. Aside from showing when and shedding light on why identity-linking leads to better/worse ad memory, our results add to the literature on social identity by suggesting that consumers do not always prefer being part of a distinctive minority. By examining identification strength, this research also furthers our understanding of weak identifiers. Little is known about the factors that affect their responses to identity-linked content. Finally, this work contributes to literature on memory. While most memory research to-date adopts a cold-cognition approach, we adopt a social-cognition approach to understand how social context and personal factors interact to shape memory.

Savoring through Avoidance: Identity-based Strategic Memory Protection

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Today marketers are keenly aware that our memories of a consumption experience can greatly impact whether we will consume a product or experience again in the future. Yet, there is very little consumer research about how memories of identity-related experiences will impact consumers’ future identity-related consumption choices. We build on the idea of strategic memory protection (Zauber et al. 2008) and propose that consumers will protect identity-relevant memories to help reinforce that identity. The protection of identity-related memories is likely due to the critical role of identity in consumer self-conception. Salient experiences related to one’s romantic identity or friend identity are almost by definition special and valued. Moreover, consumers tend to revisit these memories when the relevant identity is activated, as in “interactions with important others (e.g., friends or loved ones) or momentous events (e.g., graduations, child birth)” (Wildschut et al. 2006). Thus, it should hold that we do not just protect special memories but we protect the memories experienced with special people.

One method consumers use to protect strong identities is to delay new experiences that could potentially weaken the link between memory and identity. Such delays allow consumers to savor the memory and thereby reinforce the identity. Although some consumer research has examined the effect of delayed consumption of products on evaluations of enjoyment through the process of savoring (Chew and Ho 1994; Lavallo and Kahneman 2000; Nowlis et al. 2004), and other research has begun to connect identity and memory (Mercurio and Forehand 2011), the identity reinforcement related motivation and process is important yet understudied (Reed et al. 2012).

To assess whether consumers with strong identities will delay new experiences that might interfere with identity-linked memories, we conducted two studies investigating behaviors related to consumer romantic identities. In study one, we asked married individuals to report the year and destination of their honeymoon and measured their romantic identification. Participants were then asked them to imagine that they were planning a vacation within the next year and had to choose between returning to their honeymoon destination and going someplace new. We hypothesized that both weak and strong romantic identifiers will attempt to reinforce their romantic identity, but will use opposing methods of doing so. Weak romantic identifiers will be drawn to the honeymoon locale to re-establish their identity and this desire should increase as their honeymoon became a more distant memory. In contrast, strong romantic identifiers will try to maintain their romantic by waiting a longer period of time to return to the honeymoon locale in order to not dilute the memory. Consistent with our hypothesis, a binary logistic regression showed a significant closeness (strength of identity measure) x year of honeymoon interaction (χ²(1) = 4.2, p = .04). We interpret this finding that those with strong and weak romantic identities are more likely to want to return to the original location but there may a process difference as to when they want to return and their motivations for returning.

To further investigate when consumers engage in behaviors to build or reinforce identities, we examined how consumers behave
Identity Preservation: If I Can Remember It, You Can Have It

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Possessions can define the self and become a part of one’s identity even to the extent that the loss of possessions can threaten self-identity (Belk 1988). Given the attachment consumers feel to their possessions, they often struggle to dispose of their possessions (Ferraro et al. 2011; Haws et al. 2012). Yet, little is known about how consumers could be encouraged to dispose of special possessions in a way that allows them to retain the memory associated with the product and minimize any identity threat from giving up their possession. One notable exception is Brough and Isaac’s (2012) work demonstrating that buyer usage intent influences consumers’ selling price when product attachment is high. Selling was the only product disposal method examined, but there are various other disposal methods such as throwing the product away, giving it away (to a friend or family connection associated with the self), and donating it. Not only is it important to understand what may aid consumers in product disposition, but it is also important to understand when consumers will dispose of their product in a method that may be beneficial to others rather than harmful to the environment (e.g., donate or sell versus throw away). Given the extent to which consumers strategically seek to retain their memories (Zauberman et al. 2009), we propose that memory preservation strategies assist consumers with disposal of identity-relevant products. Moreover, engaging in memory preservation will increase disposal through donating or selling items rather than throwing them away.

In the second study, we replicated this effect and examined an alternative memory preservation method. Undergraduate participants imagined they had a special college t-shirt that they wore to a memorable football game that reminds them of this special event and wrote down what they imagined the shirt meant to them. Then, participants either engaged in memory preservation (e.g., taking a photograph) can enhance the perceived retention of product memories, increasing consumers’ willingness to sell or donate the product rather than giving or throwing it away.

We argue that consumers prefer not to sell or donate the product without memory preservation because they do not want another individual (not affiliated with the self through a friend or family connection) to use their identity-relevant product, as this, in some way, takes their identity. Memory aids do not influence giving to friends or family members because these recipients are already part of the extended self, so there is no concern that part of the self will be “taken” with the product. Memory aids do not influence throwing the product away because there is no risk of losing part of one’s identity when no one else will use the special possession.

In the second study, we replicated this effect and examined an alternative memory preservation method. Undergraduate student participants imagined they had a special college t-shirt that they wore to a memorable football game that reminds them of this special event and wrote down what they imagined the shirt meant to them. Then, participants were informed that they were moving and had to get rid of this t-shirt and were assigned to one of three conditions: personal memory aid (similar to study 1 photograph), memory sharing (attach something to the shirt when they dispose of it to help the next person understand how special the shirt was and their memories associated with the shirt), or control. Participants then indicated their disposal preferences and the extent to which their identity would be preserved depending on if they did or did not have future exposure to the prod-
This shift has seen women’s primary social role change from being attendants—domains once seen as male-dominated (England 2006)—and women now make up the majority of the labor force and college female gender roles have changed enormously in the last 30 years. Evoke different (i.e., more traditional) gender roles. In particular, products and modern products is the extent to which they should have formed that vintage design refers to designs under 80 years but anthropology since the early 20th century (De Saussure 1915) and identity preservation. These open the door for future research regarding product disposal and personal aids or sharing, can increase consumers’ likelihood of selling or donating their possessions. Notably, the type of memory preservation does impact the extent to which the identity is preserved when individuals see another person using their product. These studies open the door for future research regarding product disposal and identity preservation.

Sentimental Social Roles and the Objects that Elicit Them

The history of objects as carriers of culture has been noted by anthropologists since the early 20th century (De Saussure 1915) and that objects have a social meaning for their possessors and users has continued on to become one of the central tenets of consumer research (Belk 1988). Objects themselves are known to reflect, elicit and signal identities (Levy 1959; LaBoeuf et al. 2010), prime specific motor movements in muscle (Larson et al. 2012) and elicit social roles by their mere presence (Kay et al. 2004). Further, many objects produced in—or in fashion during—particular eras become associated with the time periods they represent (the “Flapper” dresses of the 1920s, bell-bottomed jeans from the 1970s) and one repeating trend in design is calling back to those eras with “vintage” design elements. Interesting work (though surprisingly little) has been done by researchers to understand what creates interest in these vintage items (Loveland et al. 2010), but the current work seeks to examine the impact the vintage items themselves have on their beholders. While research on implicit racism (Greenwald et al. 1998) and sexism (Rudman et al. 2001) has implied historical, quasi-anthropological origins for unsavory attitudes, recent research into less politically-charged subjects like North-South distinctions in American behavior (Nisbett and Cohen 1996) and implicit Puritanism in Americans (Uhlmann et al. 2011) has attempted to link current attitudes and behavior with specific historical periods. This work attempts to extend similar insights into the realm of consumer behavior and vintage products (there is no precise definition of terms like “vintage,” but consensus has formed that vintage design refers to designs under 80 years but over 30 years old).

One striking aspect of the differences between ‘vintage’ era products and modern products is the extent to which they should evoke different (i.e., more traditional) gender roles. In particular, female gender roles have changed enormously in the last 30 years and women now make up the majority of the labor force and college attendants—domains once seen as male-dominated (England 2006). This shift has seen women’s primary social role change from being ‘homemaker’ to ‘breadwinner’ and women are perceived as becoming more agentic in society (Diekman and Eagly 2000). However, men’s roles are generally not seen as modified and society does not expect an opposing move from men into lower-earning, lower-status, feminine roles in the future (Diekman et al. 2004). Together, these attitude shifts allow the possibility that, for women, vintage products might elicit social identity cues tied to the era in which they were produced, and that those cues would be distinct from modern era products. Yet, because men’s roles have not changed as much, they may be unaffected by behavioral cue differences in vintage and modern-era products. The current work, in fact, hypothesizes just this: 1) Because of the more substantial change in societal roles for women in the last half-century, vintage products will be a more powerful eliciting cue for women than for men in terms of idealizing accompanying behaviors. And 2) priming traditional gender identity will lead women, but not men, to enhance valuation of gender-stereotypic products with vintage design features because vintage-design positively biases women’s memory for the past.

In Study 1, we examined the effect of vintage vs. modern product design on how people idealize their behavior. Undergraduates were shown a range of products (either stereotypically feminine—e.g., a mixer—or masculine—e.g., a barware set—verified by pretest data to be gender stereotypic) with either vintage or modern design (pretests confirm this distinction). Following presentation of the products, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point scale (1 = “not at all”; 7 = “all the time”) how much they currently did the activity associated with the product (i.e., baked, made cocktails) and then how much they would like to do that activity in their ideal life. The ‘current activity’ score was subtracted from the ‘ideal activity’ score to give an ‘Idealization’ index for every participant. After averaging idealization scores for each of the four product types (masculine vs. feminine; modern vs. vintage), two interactions emerged that supported our predictions. First, with respect to idealization of activities associated with traditionally female products, participant gender and design era interacted ($F(3,173)=5.12$, $p=.025$) such that women idealized the activities more after seeing a vintage-designed product rather than a modern one, $F(1,173)=12.41$, $p=.001$. Men, however, did not idealize these activities. Conversely, with respect to masculine consumer products, participant gender and design era interacted ($F(3,173)=12.01$, $p=.001$) such that women showed more idealization for modern products than vintage masculine products, $F(1,173)=19.12$, $p=.001$ while men showed no preference for products as a function of design era. These findings suggest that vintage-design products can positively bias memories of times-gone-by and thereby affect current preferences.

Study 2 was designed to test whether gender role activation underlies the effects in Study 1. Using a manipulation from Shih et al. (1999) we primed participants with gender roles. Because we hypothesized these roles are central in vintage product valuation for women—but not men—we expected gender primed women provide better evaluation of, and higher valuation for, vintage products as compared with modern products. We again expected no effect for men. Consistent with our predictions we found, in females, an interaction between gender role prime and preference for products, such that women primed with traditional gender roles evaluated vintage (but not modern) products when they were gender stereotypic (e.g., a mixer), but lower (compared with modern items) when they were seen as generally masculine items (e.g., a cocktail making set; $F(3,65)=3.41$, $p=.023$). Importantly, we also find that vintage design makes women remember the past as being more positive for women, and this biased memory for the past mediates these effects. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that products from the same era can evoke different social identities and behavioral ide-
als. Women, who have seen vast role changes since the design era of the vintage products, seem to carry with them two era-specific sets of associations whereas men only carry one.

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The Uncertain Consumer
Chairs: Y. Charles Zhang, Boston College, USA
Gülden Ülkümen, University of Southern California, USA

Paper #1: Distinguishing Two Forms of Consumer Uncertainty
Gülden Ülkümen, University of Southern California, USA
David Tannenbaum, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Craig R. Fox, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

Paper #2: Known Unknowns in Judgment and Choice
Daniel J. Walters, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Craig R. Fox, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Philip M. Fernbach, University of Colorado, USA
Steven A. Sloman, Brown University, USA

Paper #3: (Over-)Optimism in Two-stage Choice
Y. Charles Zhang, Boston College, USA
Rajesh Bhargave, University of Texas San Antonio, USA
Abhijit Guha, Wayne State University, USA
Amitav Chakravarti, London School of Economics, UK

Paper #4: The Unlikely Middle: Overestimation of Most and Least Likely Outcomes
Oleg Urminsky, University of Chicago, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW
Consumers are frequently called on to make choices without knowing in advance what their consequences will be. For example, the decision to purchase a mutual fund or a product warranty must be made without knowing whether the investment will beat the market or the product will fail. Consumers are also frequently called on to make judgments of uncertain quantities. For instance, setting budgets and formalizing contracts require assessments of how much one expects to spend or the likelihood that a contractor will complete good work in a timely manner. The current session brings together four papers that break new ground in the study of consumer choice under uncertainty—including such topics as consumer forecasting, budgeting, financial decision making, and simple games of chance. Across four papers, we discuss theoretical questions including a) mechanisms underlying systematic judgment biases such as over/underestimation, overconfidence, and hindsight biases, and b) how consumer knowledge, meta-knowledge, and attributions of predictability affect biases in consumer judgment and choice.

The first paper by Ülkümen, Tannenbaum, and Fox proposes that uncertain events can be distinguished by the extent to which the event is deemed inherently knowable (epistemic) or stochastic (aleatory). They demonstrate that such categorization shapes people’s evaluation of the uncertain outcomes, mediates hindsight bias, and affects their budget estimates for the uncertain events. The second paper by Walters, Fox, Fernbach, and Sloman explores the role of metacognitive awareness of “known unknowns” in consumer judgment and choice. They suggest that the illusion of understanding leads to over-confidence in judging uncertain events and making choices under uncertainty. The capacity to spontaneously consider known unknowns (and thereby minimize the illusion of understanding, overconfidence, the comparative ignorance effect) is predicted by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). They also find that consumers can be induced to consider known unknowns by inducing them to make detailed causal explanations of complex household products (thereby piercing their general illusion of understanding). The third paper by Zhang, Bhargave, and Guha pushes the role of knowledge one step further. In the context of two-stage choice, they find that merely anticipating to know extra information before the 2nd stage decision, people would become optimistic about the uncertainty and consequently prefer more uncertain options when making the decision for the 1st stage. The final paper by Oleg Urminsky documents a basic bias in probability estimates for uncertain events. Specifically, his finding shows that, in coin flip games, low probability outcomes get overestimated and high probability outcomes get underestimated.

Opening remarks will introduce the pivotal role of uncertainty in various contexts of consumer choice and preview papers to be presented; the session will close with an open integrative discussion. Consistent with the theme of “Making a Difference,” the primary goal of this session is to develop is to explore how consumers perceive uncertainty, how this affects their important judgments and choices, and how various interventions can make a difference in improving consumer welfare.

Distinguishing Two Forms of Consumer Uncertainty

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Probability is a janus-faced concept. Probability can be conceptualized either as the quantification of stochastic events (aleatory uncertainty) or as subjective degrees of beliefs (epistemic uncertainty) (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011). In this talk, we develop a novel Epistemic and Aleatory Uncertainty Scale (EARS), demonstrating that consumers meaningfully distinguish between these two variants of uncertainty. Along the way, we show that these representations of uncertainty have important consequences for various facets of consumer judgment and choice, including attributions of credit and blame, hindsight bias, and budgeting decisions.

EARS Development and Attributions of Credit and Blame

Many consumption activities require an explicit or implicit evaluation of expert forecasting. For example, consumers trust financial advisors to manage their savings partly because they believe advisors can skillfully predict market conditions in ways that help grow their investments. In our first study, we examined if people reliably distinguish between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty, and if these variants of uncertainty are differentially implicated in judgments of praise and blame.

We presented 116 participants with four scenarios that varied in their degree of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty: (i) predicting the answer to a trivia question (High Epistemic, Low Aleatory), (ii) predicting the outcome of two dice rolls (Low Epistemic, High Aleatory), (iii) an predicting where a hurricane will first make landfall (High Epistemic, High Aleatory), and (iv) predicting whether the US will elect a gay president within the next 30 years (Low Epistemic, Low Aleatory). For each scenario, participants learned that the protagonist either made a successful or unsuccessful prediction, and subsequently rated how much credit/blame and luck/unluckiness should be attributed to the correct/incorrect forecast. Lastly, participants rated each scenario in terms of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty (EARS). For epistemic uncertainty participants were asked to rate each forecast along dimensions such as the degree the outcome was “in principle knowable in advance” or “something that becomes more predictable with additional knowledge or skills”. For aleatory
uncertainty they rated items such as the degree that the outcome “could play out in different ways on similar occasions” or had “an element of randomness.”

First, people appeared to distinguish between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. Both scales showed adequate reliability (Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .72 to .94) and differentially predicted attributes of praise/blame and luck/unluckiness. For both successful and unsuccessful forecasts, perceptions of epistemic uncertainty uniquely predicted judgments of credit (epistemic: p < .001; aleatory: p = .395) while perceptions of aleatory uncertainty uniquely predicted judgments of luck (aleatory: p < .001; epistemic: p = .957). Furthermore, judgments of epistemic and aleatory judgments were not merely opposites of one another. For example, participants viewed the task of forecasting the location of where a hurricane first makes landfall as both high in epistemic and aleatory uncertainty, and thus attribute both credit and luck to the forecaster.

Hindsight Bias

One of the most robust judgmental biases is that outcomes appear more predictable in retrospect than in prospect. This hindsight bias has been shown to have important implications for consumer choice, such as how policymakers and consumers evaluate equipment malfunctions and product recalls (Ben-Shahar, 1998; Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999). We speculated that the hindsight bias may result from a shift in how uncertainty is represented over time. In particular, we expected that once an outcome is known, perceptions of aleatory uncertainty would become less salient while epistemic uncertainty would become more salient. To examine this hypothesis, we recruited a sample of 118 participants two days prior to the U.S. presidential election and asked them to estimate the likelihood of Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, or some other third candidate winning the election. Two days after the election, we sampled a new group of 202 participants to postdict each candidates’ chances of winning (i.e., what their likelihood estimates would have been two days prior to the election). Both before and after the election, participants also completed our EARS measuring the degree of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty associated with predicting a presidential election.

We find that prior to the election, the average likelihood of Obama winning was 59%; after the election, the average likelihood of Obama winning was 68%, t = 5.08, p < .001 (hindsight bias). Importantly, representations of uncertainty also shifted over time. Participants viewed the prediction as more epistemic, and considerably less aleatoric, once the outcome was known (epistemic ratings: M = 4.31 vs 4.05, t = 1.96, p = .051; aleatory ratings: M = 3.91 vs 4.47, t = 4.25, p < .001). In other words, the outcome felt more inevitable in hindsight than in foresight. Also note that the shift in uncertainty was larger for aleatory uncertainty, consistent with Fischhoff’s notion of “creeping determinism.” Both perceptions of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty mediated the hindsight bias, together accounting for 23% of the increase in likelihood judgments from time 1 to time 2.

Budgeting Decisions

One of the most important consumption domains influenced by uncertainty is budgeting. Uncertainty regarding future spending involves both a predictable (epistemic) component that is based on consumers’ plans, and a stochastic (aleatory) component that is due to external influences that are mostly unpredictable from the consumers’ point of view. Consistent with prior work on prediction in general (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), and specifically on budget estimates (Ülkümen et al, 2008), budget estimates rely disproportionately on plans and do not spontaneously incorporate the necessary adjustment for unplanned expenses. If this is the case, then budget estimates should be influenced by epistemic uncertainty, but not by aleatory uncertainty.

Eighty-nine undergraduate students were asked to estimate their total budget for the month of April (the study was conducted in the beginning of March). Participants also completed a version of EARS modified to assess uncertainty regarding expenses. We counterbalanced the order of the two tasks. We regressed log transformed budget estimates on epistemic and aleatory ratings. The results suggest that budget estimates were influenced positively by epistemic ratings (b = .24, t = 2.13, p < .05), but were independent from aleatoriness ratings (b = -.04), t = -.40, p > .50.

Taken together, these studies show that epistemic and aleatory components of uncertainty, as measured by EARS, have important downstream consequences for consumer judgment and choice, including attributions of credit and blame, hindsight bias, and budgeting decisions.

Known Unknowns in Judgment and Choice

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Many consumer judgments and choices are made under conditions of uncertainty—from budgeting, planning and contracting to investing and insuring. Such activities require not only predictions of relevant outcomes, but also metacognitive awareness of the adequacy of such predictions. In this presentation I’ll review a series of studies that investigate various illusions of understanding in which consumer metacognition fails, and explore interventions designed to improve consumer judgment and choice.

Rozenblit and Keil (2002) report that people tend to be overconfident in how well they understand how everyday objects like toilets and combination locks work. Inducing them to generate a detailed mechanistic explanation shatters this sense of understanding and leads judges to decrease their rated confidence in their own understanding (see also Alter, Oppenheimer, & Zemla 2010; Keil 2003). We argue that this illusion of understanding reflects a more general tendency for consumers to focus on known facts and present information and ignore or underestimate unknown facts and missing information, similar to the What You See Is All There Is (WYSIATI) phenomenon discussed by Kahneman (2011). We find that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) is a valid indicator of the tendency to spontaneously consider “known unknowns”.

In Study 1 we find that the illusion of explanatory depth only affects consumers with lower CRT scores. We adapted Rozenblit and Keil’s (2002) method in which participants rate their understanding of a number of common household objects (e.g., a toilet). Next they are asked to generate mechanistic explanations for a subset of the objects and then re-rate understanding. An illusion of explanatory depth exists if the pre-explanation rating of understanding is higher than the post explanation rating. We find a highly significant interaction between timing of the judgment and CRT score. The effect was driven by low CRT scorers providing higher ratings of understanding pre-explanations. Because all participants showed the same understanding after the task, it appears that this effect is driven by differences in metacognitive awareness, rather than differences in actual knowledge about how these products work.

In Study 2 we sought to confirm CRT is an indicator of metacognitive awareness by measuring it directly. We asked participants to estimate various quantities (e.g. the number of visitors in 2010 to the Great Wall of China) and then to give a range for their estimate such that they were 90% sure the true answer lay within the range. Soll & Klayman (2004) provide an analysis that allows for the dissociation of two sources of overconfidence: failures of knowledge...
and failures of meta-knowledge. A failure of knowledge refers to providing an estimate that is far from the true value. A failure of meta-knowledge refers to generating a range that is too small. We predicted that low CRT participants would be more overconfident than high CRT participants and that this difference would be driven by a failure of meta-knowledge. We also expected that low CRT participants would be more susceptible to failures of knowledge, i.e. they would provide estimates further from the truth, though this was not our main interest. Confirming our hypothesis, high CRT scorers showed greater knowledge, and significantly greater meta-knowledgeable.

In Study 3 we explore awareness of known unknowns in the context of the comparative ignorance effect (Fox & Tversky, 1995). A recent study of consumer financial decisions, from willingness to participate in a 401(k) program to willingness to invest in mutual funds, can be diminished by asking consumers difficult question about investment or providing them with information that is more difficult to process (Hadar, Sood, & Fox, 2012). In this study we explored whether individuals with a greater tendency toward cognitive reflection would exhibit more stable assessments of their subjective knowledge and be less affected by spurious attempts to manipulate their subjective knowledge. Following Fox and Weber (2002), we asked participants whether they wanted to gamble on the inflation rate in Chile (or receive a certain return). One group of participants were provided economic data that in principle could be used to predict the inflation rate (GDP growth, interest rates, unemployment). Fox and Weber (2002) found that people were less willing to gamble when provided the objectively useful economic data, presumably because it made them feel subjectively less knowledgeable. Consistent with our hypothesis we find that this effect is significantly more pronounced among low CRT scorers than high CRT scorers.

In Study 4, we investigated whether we could nudge participants to more actively consider known unknowns when assessing 90% confidence intervals. We attempted to shatter the illusion of understanding for one group of participants by asking them to describe the causal mechanisms influencing outcomes of complex policies (e.g. cap-and-trade policy for curbing carbon emissions). In prior work (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox & Sloman, in press) this manipulation was found to reduce confidence in the understanding of relevant policies, and pilot work indicated that this shaken confidence may extend beyond the focal topic. In Study 4 we found, consistent with our prediction, that this manipulation reduced overconfidence when assessing 90% confidence intervals on unrelated topics. Again, using the method of Soll & Klayman (2004), we found that shattering the illusion of understanding improved metacognitive knowledge (i.e., width of confidence intervals relative to their accuracy) rather than merely improving knowledge (i.e. accuracy of the center of confidence intervals). Also, the benefactors of increased metacognitive knowledge were higher CRT scorers, suggesting meta-knowledge improvements may be facilitated by a greater capacity for cognitive reflection.

In Study 5 we found that piercing the illusion of understanding (by inducing mechanistic explanations of household objects as in Rozenblit & Keil, 2002) eliminated the comparative ignorance effect for all participants, both high and low in CRT.

In summary, we find the failures in metacognitive knowledge are linked to increases in overconfidence, the illusion of understanding, and the comparative ignorance effect. We propose that increasing metacognitive awareness (e.g. by inducing detailed causal explanation) will increase attention to known unknowns and can provide a useful tool to improving consumer judgment and choice.

(Over-)Optimism in Two-stage Choice

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

When facing multiple choice options, decision-makers often adopt a two-stage choice strategy. Specifically, they first select some options to form a consideration set (the screening stage), and then make a final choice among this set (the choice stage). Past research has shown that a piece of information may receive different weights in the screening stage versus the choice stage (Beach 1993; Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkümen 2006). However, past work has not examined how screening influences decision makers' weighting of uncertainty. Many everyday decisions involve uncertainty, from choosing among new restaurants, to choosing among a set of risky investment plans. We investigate how anticipating to receive information during a two-stage decision process affects people’s preference for uncertain options.

In two-stage decision processes, consumers may utilize and attend to different information in the choice stage versus the screening stage (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkümen 2006). Additionally, decision-makers may search extra information after forming the consideration set (Ge, Haübl and Elrod 2012). In cases where the choice options involve uncertainty (such as new restaurants, investment plans, etc.), sometimes – but not always – the extra information obtained between the screening and the choice stage could (partially) resolve the uncertainty of the options. Thus, during a screening stage, decision-makers may feel that they will resolve uncertainty in the final choice stage.

People are generally averse to uncertainty during decision making. In Ellsberg's two-urn problem (Ellsberg 1961), people win a prize by drawing a certain colored ball from an urn. In this setup, people prefer to draw balls from an urn containing 50 red and 50 black balls than from an urn containing a total of 100 red and black balls, with exact split unknown. In other words, people feel more optimistic about obtaining a positive outcome (e.g., drawing the preferred color) when the situation is less uncertain (or, per Ellsberg’s term, less ambiguous). Past research has focused on how presenting information can reduce perceived uncertainty, leading to greater optimism. However, we contend that merely anticipating additional information could also lead to greater optimism, thereby influencing decision-makers' preferences. More specifically, we argue that because decision-makers feel that they have an opportunity to resolve uncertainty later by acquiring additional information, they are less averse to uncertainty during screening.

In our investigation, we compare people’s chosen options in a direct choice versus two-stage choice. We show that people are more optimistic about uncertain outcomes in screening than in direct choice (study 3). Moreover, and consistent with this notion, they prefer options that have a greater range of possible outcomes (study 1-3) in two-stage (vs. direct choice). We further demonstrate that this reduced aversion to uncertainty is not driven by the number of options to select (single vs. multiple; study 2 and 3), and only occurs when people believe that there will be extra information before they make their final choice (study 3).

In study 1, participants (n = 202) chose to trade in their computer among four shops, which provided price quotes with the same midpoint but different ranges. Some participants made final choices directly; others (two-stage choice condition) were told that the two shops with smaller-range quotes were in location A and the two shops with wider-range quotes were in location B. They would decide on the location first, get a final quote from both shops at that location, and then decide between them. Consistent with our predic-
tion, the choice share of the two wider-range shops (i.e. location B) was significantly higher in the two-stage condition.

Study 2 replicated the effect in a real choice context. Participants (n = 98) in a lab were required to complete a tedious word recognition task, but could choose among four versions of this task. For two versions, the task was estimated to contain 80-120 words; for the other two versions, the task was estimated to contain 50-150 words. As a between-subjects manipulation, participants were asked either a) to choose one version of the task directly, or b) to shortlist two versions between which they would make the final choice after seeing both versions, or c) to shortlist two versions of the task but with the final assignment between the two determined by other people. We found that participants preferred the wider range versions (50-150-word documents) in screening than in direct choice, but only when the final choice would be made by themselves instead of others. This study further confirmed that the tendency for choosing more uncertain options in screening was not due to the act of picking multiple options (vs. a single in direct choice), but due to participants’ expected opportunity to make a final choice in the second stage. In study 3, participants (n = 152) were asked to choose among four 50-50 lotteries, each having a different combination of high and low payoffs. They were told that the outcome of the lottery would be determined by drawing a ball (white vs. red) from a bag containing 100 balls, with exact color split unknown. In a three-condition between-subjects design, some participants were asked to choose one lottery directly; the rest were instructed to shortlist two lotteries, with or without being told that the exact color split would be revealed before their final (2nd-stage) choice. As a result, shortlisting shifted the general preference toward the more uncertain lotteries (the lottery with higher and lower probabilistic payoffs), but only among participants who expected to learn the exact color split later. To maximize the potential payoff in this condition, one should go for the most uncertain options plus the most certain option in the first stage. However, in our study, only the choice share of the former, but not the latter, was higher when comparing by whether participants knew the color split in advance. Further, these participants expected to earn more from this lucky draw than participants in other conditions expected by predicting higher likelihood to draw the high-payoff ball, reflecting a pure optimism without rational bases.

Taken together, this research shows that anticipating information during decision-making affects sensitivity to uncertainty. These findings are important for advancing existing knowledge on how people respond to uncertainty and how decision structure affects preferences.

**The Unlikely Middle: Overestimation of Most and Least Likely Outcomes**

**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Assessing of the probability of future outcomes is central to most forward-looking behaviors, from an investor assessing the risk of a portfolio to a consumer assessing how a currently available price is likely to compare to future prices. There is a large literature on how people make probability judgments and risk estimates and the degree to which such estimates are biased (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, Gigerenzer 1994, Slovic 2000, Loewenstein et al 2001, Krizan and Windschitl 2007, etc.). One limitation in this literature has been that probabilities are often estimated in isolation or merely rated based on subjective risk. In this paper, we present a new task in which participants jointly estimate the probability of mutually exclusive events that can be objectively calculated, but which is difficult to do so. The goal is to test the accuracy of people’s probability judgments and whether biases in perceived probability would extend to this context.

In the studies, a simple and intuitive situation is described to participants, e.g. “In the game, you would flip a fair coin 10 times and you would show the experimenter the result each time. Each time that it comes up heads, you win $1, and each time it comes up tails, you get nothing.” Participants are then asked to estimate (using different elicitation methods) the probability of each of the possible outcomes (getting $0 to $10) simultaneously. By jointly eliciting the probabilities, and enforcing the provision that they must add up to 100%, we avoid the separate issue of subadditivity in probability judgments (Tversky and Koehler 1994).

In Study 1, attendees at the 2012 Judgment and Decision Making Conference read the game scenario and either were asked to draw a histogram (N=58) or to choose one of six histograms (N=31). Participants’ drawn histograms differed significantly from the actual binomial distribution, overestimating the probability of unlikely outcomes (0,1,2,8,9,10) and underestimating the more likely outcomes (3,4,5,6). Of participants presented with six histograms, only 42% chose the correct one.

In study 2 (N=85), MBA students in a marketing research course read about a population in which exactly half the people preferred Coke to Pepsi, and half preferred Pepsi to Coke. They were asked to estimate, for a randomly drawn sample of 10 people, the probability of each of the eleven possible outcomes (from none prefer Coke over Pepsi to all ten prefer Coke). If their estimates did not sum to 1 their estimates were divided by the total such that the standard estimates summed to 1. The elicited distributions significantly from a binomial distribution, significantly over-estimating both the least likely outcomes (0,1,2,8,9 or 10 Coke choosers) as well as the most likely outcome (5) and underestimating the intermediate outcomes (3,4,6 and 7).

In Study 3 (N=200) participants did one of four tasks: (a) the coin flipping game, estimating probabilities, (b) the same game, but estimating frequencies among 100 players, (c) a soccer scenario equivalent to the coin game, estimating probabilities or (d) the coin flipping game where participants could either win or lose a dollar, estimating probabilities. All estimates were made using a bar chart slider tool. Overall, we again find significant overestimation of low probability outcomes (0,1,2,8,9,10) and underestimation of intermediate probability outcomes (3,4,6,7). We find no differences based on probabilities vs. frequencies (a vs. b) or framing the game as coin flips vs. soccer (a vs. c). However, we do find an optimism bias, with significantly higher average estimates when the outcomes could involve losses (i.e. less estimates of losses than of equivalent small gains). In this study, participants were also asked to estimate the distribution of height in the US, using the same tool. Their height estimates, unlike their probability estimates, are approximately normally distributed, suggesting that the elicitation method is not suppressing beliefs about normal-shaped distributions.

In Study 4 (N=355) we replicate our findings and test both the optimism bias and illusion of control (Langer 1975). Participants read the scenario with the same outcomes framed as either starting with $0 and winning $1 for each tails (gain frame) or starting with $10 and losing $1 for each tails (loss frame). In addition, each scenario either described the respondent flipping the coins while the experimenter observed (high control) or the experimenter flipping the coins while the respondent observed (low control). Combining the four conditions, we find significant overestimation of low probability outcomes (0,1,2,8,9,10) and underestimation of intermediate probability outcomes (3,4,6,7) as well as underestimation of the most likely outcome (5). Comparing across conditions, we
find that participants are more optimistic about avoiding losses than about getting gains when control is low (p < .01). However, there is no difference in the mean of the reported distributions when control is high (interaction p=.12). For accuracy, we find a main effect, such that estimated distributions are closer to the actual binomial probabilities in the loss versions (both p’s < .001). We also find an interaction, such that people are the least accurate in the low control, gain-framed version (p = .05).

In the last study (N=88), participants completed the task in an online survey with either a more arousing red background or a less arousing blue background (Vosgerau 2010). Overall, we find significant overestimation of low probability outcomes ($0, $1, $2, $9 and $10) and underestimation of intermediate outcomes ($3, $4, $6, $7). We find directionally higher (and more accurate) mean estimates from distributions elicited in the lower arousal blue background condition ($4.42 vs. $4.11). More importantly, we find that the distributions in the blue condition have significantly higher variance than the distributions in the red condition.

We discuss the implications of our findings for research on probability estimation as well as, more broadly, how inferences about people’s choices may be distorted by biased in their subjective likelihood judgments.

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Consumers’ Prosocial Motives and Decision-Making

Chairs: Leif D. Nelson, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Minah H. Jung, University of California, Berkeley, USA

Paper #1: Powering Up with Indirect Reciprocity in a Large-Scale Field Experiment
Erez Yoeli, Federal Trade Commission, USA
Moshe Hoffman, University of California, San Diego, USA
David G. Rand, Yale University, USA
Martin A. Nowak, Harvard University, Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, USA

Paper #2: Signaling Virtue: Charitable Behaviors Under Consumer Elective Pricing
Minah H. Jung, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Leif D. Nelson, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Ayelet Gneezy, University of California, San Diego, USA
Uri Gneezy, University of California, San Diego, USA

Paper #3: Benefiting from Inequity Promotes Prosociality
Yoel Inbar, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Emily Zitek, Cornell University, USA
Alexander Jordan, Dartmouth College, USA

Aleixandra Barasch, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Emma E. Levine, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Jonathan Z. Berman, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Deborah A. Small, University of Pennsylvania, USA

SESSION OVERVIEW

People are motivated to care about others. This motivation often reflects their social goal to be perceived positively by others and themselves. To achieve this goal, people live their lives expressing concern toward the welfare of others and helping others who are in need. This session brings together contemporary research that examines the motives behind consumers’ prosocial behaviors. Four papers portray the intricacy of consumers’ prosocial motives and decision-making in varying social contexts. Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, and Nowak examine how consumers’ concerns for reputation can foster cooperation in preserving public goods. In a large-scale field experiment (N=1,408) in collaboration with a major electric utility company, they investigated the effect of observability in increasing participation in an energy efficiency program. Participants in the observable treatment were three times more likely to participate than those in the non-observable treatment. Observability was also four times more effective than offering a $25 incentive. Jung, Nelson, Gneezy, and Gneezy investigate how consumers respond to an opportunity to signal their generosity under pay-what-you-want pricing in four field experiments (N=58,501). When people paid what they want and a portion of their payment goes to charity, they paid more but more people opted-out of engaging in the transaction entirely. Customers were sensitive to the presence of charitable signals but insensitive to the scale of charitable signals. Inbar, Zitek, and Jordan show that people’s prosociality is influenced by their desire to maintain a sense of equity. Across three studies, participants who were over-rewarded subsequently acted more prosocially than those who were rewarded fairly. When participants were over-rewarded, they donated more to charity, volunteered more time for a good cause, and were more willing to help others. People are motivated to “balance out” their unearned fortune by behaving more prosocially towards the world at large. Barasch, Levine, Berman, and Small demonstrate that the strength of positive emotion towards charitable giving signals authenticity, therefore, is perceived deserving charitable credit. Participants judged a donor to be more authentically motivated when the donor felt a strong emotion from giving. However, when a donor explicitly stated a utilitarian motive or emotional benefits from giving, they were perceived to be less authentically motivated. Taken together, this session contributes to the understanding of consumers’ prosocial motives. In contributing to public goods, consumers are more responsive to a reputational incentive than to a monetary reward. Consumers pay more for a product when a portion of their payment benefits charity but fewer consumers engage in such transactions. They are not sensitive to the scale of their charitable contribution. People are motivated to maintain a sense of equity and behave more prosocially when they are overly rewarded. People perceive a strong positive emotion towards charitable giving to signal an authentic motivation that deserves charitable credit.

Powering Up with Indirect Reciprocity in a Large-Scale Field Experiment

EXENDED ABSTRACT

The evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity has been a topic of great interest in recent years. Mathematical models and computer simulations have demonstrated the power of indirect reciprocity for promoting cooperative behavior (1-23). This body of theoretical work is supported by behavioral experiments where subjects play economic games in the laboratory. People are substantially more cooperative when their decisions are observable, and when others can respond accordingly (24-43). Subjects understand that having a good reputation is valuable in these settings (32), and so are willing to pay the cost of cooperation. Observability particularly increases cooperation when the prosocial nature of the cooperative choice is made salient (38, 44). Moreover, experimental evidence indicates that indirect reciprocity is deeply entrenched in human psychology: subtle cues of observability have large effects on cooperation levels (45-48), and our initial impulse to cooperate in one-shot anonymous settings is likely the result of adaptation in a world dominated by reputational concerns (49, 50). These laboratory experiments generate powerful insights into human psychology, and provide clear evidence for the importance of indirect reciprocity. However, they typically employ abstract economic games and involve the interaction of only a handful of subjects. Thus the question of whether observability effects large-scale cooperation in real world settings outside of the laboratory remains largely unexplored (exceptions include (51-53)). The extent to which findings from theory and the lab generalize to natural field settings is of great importance, both for scientific understanding and for public policy (54). We address this question by running a large-scale field experiment on the effect of observability in a public goods game. We collaborated with a major electric utility company to enroll consumers in a “demand response” program. This program helps to prevent blackouts by reducing excessive use of air-conditioning during periods of high electricity demand. The cost of electricity production can spike hundreds-fold during demand peaks. Yet the price consumers pay is typically constant across time. Thus during peak periods there is a dramatic mismatch between price and actual cost, leading to excessive energy use. This reduces grid reliability, drives up energy costs, increases the risk of blackouts, and is of great interest to both industry and government. The evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity has been a topic of great interest in recent years. 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outs, and harms the environment. In recent years, reducing excessive peak energy use has become a target of regulatory efforts to increase efficiency in the electricity industry. To explore the effect of observability on this real-world public goods problem, we solicited residents of 15 homeowners associations (HOAs) to participate in a demand response program. Residents who volunteered for this program allowed the utility to install a device that remotely curbs their central air-conditioners when necessary: on days with unusually high demand or in the case of an unexpected plant or transmission failure. Residents who volunteered, therefore, contributed to a public good by improving the stability of the electrical grid in all of California, at the cost of some personal inconvenience. We solicited volunteers by delivering mailers to residents and asking them to participate. Sign-up sheets were posted in a communal area near their home, usually by a shared mailbox kiosk. In our primary manipulation, we varied whether residents’ neighbors could tell who had signed up for the program. We did so by varying whether the publicly posted sheets required residents to print their name and unit number (observable treatment) or only a code that does not reveal their identity (anonymous treatment). We find that residents in the observable treatment are nearly three times as likely to participate in the demand response program as residents in the anonymous treatment (Fraction of residents participating: anonymous = 0.030, observable = 0.088, p < 0.01, N = 1408). All statistics presented are from Probit regressions including various controls, with standard errors clustered at the HOA level; for details and regression tables, see Supporting Information (SI). The effect of the observable treatment is nearly five times that of offering a $25 incentive (the estimated effect of the incentive is 0.099; a Wald test rejects that the coefficients on observability and the $25 incentive are identical, p = 0.024). The observable treatment is also more effective among populations where ongoing relationships and reputations are expected to play a larger role. Observability increased participation among those living in apartment buildings (Fraction of residents participating: anonymous = 0.048, observable = 0.114, p < 0.01, N = 582), while it had little effect on the inhabitants of row houses or individual homes (Fraction of residents participating: anonymous = 0.024, observable = 0.038, NS, N = 826; yielding an estimated interaction of 0.052, p = 0.04). Additionally, observability dramatically increased participation among owners (Fraction of residents participating: anonymous = 0.024, observable = 0.099, p < 0.01, N = 1015) but had little effect on renters (Fraction of residents participating: anonymous = 0.045, observable = 0.059, NS, N = 393; yielding an estimated interaction of 0.046, p < 0.01). Finally, we provide evidence that the effect of observability is unique to public goods. An additional 1005 subjects received exactly the same treatment as described above, except that the mailers they received were stripped of any language that framed the demand response program as a public good. The effect of observability was dramatically reduced in this cohort (Fraction of residents participating: anonymous = 0.061, observable = 0.086, NS, N =1005; Estimated interaction between observability and the public good message in a pooled regression is 0.035, p = 0.047). We have shown that indirect reciprocity promotes cooperation in a real-world public goods game effecting thousands of people. Indirect reciprocity offers a powerful tool for promoting cooperation in contexts of great societal importance. Developing interventions that harness indirect reciprocity is a promising direction for future public policy initiatives.

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**Signaling Virtue: Charitable Behaviors under Consumer Elective Pricing**

**EXENDED ABSTRACT**

People want to be seen as kind, fair, and generous, and that goal influences their decision-making. Pay-what-you-want pricing highlights those goals by allowing consumers' to express their social preferences in a diagnostic transaction environment. This paper investigates how the opportunity to signal social identity influences consumer behavior under pay-what-you-want pricing.

In a large field experiment, Gneezy et al. (2012) found that when people pay-what-they-want and a portion of their payment goes to charity, they are less likely to buy, but pay substantially more when they do. The authors attribute this behavior largely to people's identity and self-image concerns. People want to pay a low price, but when a purchase looks like charitable giving, they also want to avoid looking greedy, either by paying a generous amount or simply not purchasing. These behaviors highlight two related questions. First, how important are the relative concerns for self-signaling and social signaling? Second, the logic above contrasts a quantitative concern (finding the right low price) with a qualitative one (feeling like a nice person). If that is correct, then we might expect to see high sensitivity to charitable giving, but low sensitivity to the extent of that giving. In four field experiments we manipulating the presence and magnitude of charitable signals to understand how these forces operate. In Study 1, we sold gourmet coffee at a farmers' market in California. All participants (N=18,672) saw a sign indicating they can pay-what-they-want for coffee and that 50% of their payment goes to a local charity. Purchasers (N = 406) were randomly assigned to one of four payment conditions as they approached the cashier. To manipulate whether the signal was social, some people were told to pay anonymously (by placing their payment in an envelope and dropping it in a sealed box) whereas others paid the cashier directly. We also
manipulated the value of the external signal by placing either a commercial (the coffee vendor’s logo) or a charity logo on the coffee cup. Highlighting the value of self-signaling, people paid no more when paying directly than when paying anonymously ($M_{direct} = $2.76 vs. $M_{anonymous} = $2.81). People paid more when they saw the charitable logo on the cups than when they saw the commercial logo ($M_{charitylogo} = $3.00 vs. $M_{coffeelogos} = $2.59). Perhaps the charitable logo induced higher payments because people were reminded of the substantial proportion of their payment (50%) going to charity? Would the same influence persist if a trivial proportion (e.g., 1%) went to charity? In Study 2 we again investigated the value of the external signal of the product by manipulating the observable logo. In addition, we looked at sensitivity to the scope of the charitable signal by manipulating the amount going to charity. For this field experiment we sold reusable shopping bags in front of an organic grocery in San Francisco. As in Study 1, we manipulated a charitable vs. commercial signal by selling bags with either the grocery store logo or a local charity logo. We also manipulated what percentage of the payment would go to a local charity (0% vs. 1% vs. 50%). People (N=12,394) who entered the grocery store saw a sign indicating the randomly assigned condition. The bag logo had no effect on either purchase rate or purchase price. There was, however, a significant effect of the percentage going to charity. Replicating Gneezy et al. (2010), people were less likely to buy, but paid more, when a portion of their payment went to charity. Notably, this was true even when only 1% was going to charity; customers were significantly less likely to buy (3.65% vs. 4.94%), but paid more for a bag compared to the strict PWYW condition ($M_{PWYW} = $2.43 vs. $M_{PWYW + 1% to Charity} = $1.41). There were no differences in purchase rates between the 1% and 50% conditions, but customers in the 50%-to-charity condition, paid a higher price. In Study 1 and 2, people approached our shop after seeing a shop sign clearly indicating it was a pay-what-you-want shop and that a portion of their payment went to charity. It is entirely likely therefore that difference in purchase prices is a pure reflection of self-selection. If we remove this selection bias, will people still show sensitivity to the proportion of charitable giving? In Study 3, we returned to the same gourmet coffee vendor as in Study 1. This time, customers (N = 150) did not see a pay-what-you-want sign, but instead, after saying that they wanted coffee, were told that they could find out the price of coffee by drawing a piece of paper out of a box. The box contained three different types of prices: Pay-what-you-want, pay-what-you-want and 10% going to charity or pay-what-you-want and 50% going to charity. We found that when the selection bias was removed, people did not pay more for a small charity proportion (10%) than no charity condition (M=$2.31 vs. M=$2.18), but they still paid more when 50% went to charity (M=$3.23). Even though a 1% or 10% contribution is financially much more similar to 0%, people opt out of purchase at similar rates to the 50% contribution. Their payments show some incomplete sensitivity to the contribution percentage (Study 2 and 3). How sensitive will people be as the proportion increases? In Study 4 we sold reusable shopping bags in front of a traditional supermarket in Oakland, California. People (N=27,285) were randomly assigned to one of five different pay-what-you-want pricing conditions, each reflecting a different percentage going to charity (0% vs. 1% vs. 50% vs. 99% vs. 100%). The first condition is pure pay-what-you-want, the latter is pure charitable giving. Signs clearly indicated the condition (randomized every 50 passersby) outside the store entrance. Again we replicated Gneezy et al. (2010): people purchased less frequently but paid significantly more when they saw the sign with a charitable proportion than when no proportion went to charity. However, the purchase rates and average payments did not differ across the four charity conditions: People were highly sensitive to whether or not a charity was benefiting, but almost entirely insensitive as to whether that benefit was 1% or 100%. In summary, consumers exhibit varying degrees of sensitivity to social signals under pay-what-you-want pricing. This is observed in how they respond to the types of signal (charitable vs. commercial), the magnitude of the signals, and their payments. People show clear sensitivity to the qualitative social value of a purchase, but much less sensitivity to the quantitative social value of a purchase.

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Benefiting from Inequity Promotes Prosociality

EXENDED ABSTRACT

People care about fairness. In our interpersonal relationships, we strive to maintain an equitable balance of costs and benefits (Fiske, 1991), and even in economic games with strangers people are reluctant to maximize their earnings at equity’s expense (Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). Indeed, a concern with equity may be part of our evolutionary heritage, as an inclination to return favors can confer adaptive benefits when individuals’ reputations are known (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). The central role that notions of equity play in our relations with others suggests that feeling that one has been treated inequitably should have important consequences for behavior. Indeed, feeling that one has been the victim of inequitable treatment can license people to act more selfishly. In one study, for example, people who had just unfairly been denied a bonus payment allocated themselves a larger portion of a shared payment on a hypothetical subsequent task (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010). This research is consistent with the notion that just as people seek equity in their interpersonal relationships, they may also strive to maintain “equity with the world” (Austin & Walster, 1975). According to this view, people expect to get what they deserve (and to deserve what they get) not just in relation to specific others, but also across different relationships. Being unfairly denied a deserved bonus therefore justifies one in “balancing the scales” by subsequently taking more from others (Zitek et al., 2010; see also Nisan, 1990, 1991). Most relevant for the current research, this perspective predicts that those who have benefited from unfair treatment—by, for example, receiving an overpayment or undeserved bonus—should subsequently act more generously, because they have received an undeserved benefit that must now be “balanced out.” Some evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from a study in which people were led to believe that based on their qualifications they were either being over-paid or equitably paid for an interviewing job. When pay was hourly, the over-paid completed more interviews per hour than the equitably paid; when pay was piece-rate (i.e., per interview), the over-paid conducted fewer interviews per hour (Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962). The authors argued that the over-paid participants were motivated to reduce the discomfort of iniquitous overpayment by working faster (in the hourly-pay condition) or more thoroughly (in the piece-rate condition). However, there is as yet no evidence that—as the equity with the world account would predict—over-rewarding leads to generalized prosocial behavior in addition to attempts to directly compensate the over-rewarding
party. Here, we report such evidence. In three studies, we examine the effect of two different manipulations of over-rewarding on three different prosocial behaviors and consistently observe that people seek to “balance out” undeserved rewards by acting more prosocially. In Study 1, we tested the effect of over-rewarding on prosocial behavior by giving all participants the same £3 bonus, which they received in addition to the research credit that they had been promised for participating in the study. The circumstances under which they received this bonus, however, varied. Some participants were told that the reward was based on their superior performance on a lab task, some were told that the reward was distributed randomly, and a final group was told that due to a technicality they would receive the reward despite their poor performance. We expected the final group—those who had received their rewards despite supposedly poor performance—to subsequently give more generously when asked to make a charitable donation. Indeed, participants in the over-rewarded condition donated more than those in the fairly-rewarded condition, and more than those in the randomly-rewarded condition. The latter two conditions did not differ significantly from each other. Study 2 used the same paradigm but omitted the randomly-rewarded condition. Conceptually replicating Study 1, participants were more willing to volunteer their time for a good cause when they had been over-rewarded rather than fairly rewarded. Finally, in Study 3 we used a different over-rewarding paradigm: participants were told that a “gender correction” would be applied to their scores (purportedly because gender was related to performance on the task). Those in the over-rewarded condition were told that without the gender correction they would not have qualified for the full reward, whereas those in the fairly-rewarded condition were told that they earned the full reward regardless of the gender correction. As in Study 1, we also included a randomly-rewarded condition. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, over-rewarded participants were more helpful when the experimenter “accidentally” knocked a cup full of pencils off the desk at the end of the study. Across the three studies, we also tested (and ruled out) a variety of possible alternative explanations for this effect, including more positive mood (Isen & Levin, 1972), reduced feelings of entitlement (Zitek et al., 2010), gratitude to the experimenter (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; DeSteno et al., 2010), and fear of being envied (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2010). We believe most plausible explanation for our findings is that people feel motivated to “balance out” their unearned good fortune by behaving more prosocially towards the world at large. That is, they attempt to maintain “equity with the world” (Austin & Walster, 1975)—an equitable balance of burdens and benefits between themselves and other people in general.

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Selfish or Selfless? On the Signal Value of Emotion in Altruistic Behavior

EXENDED ABSTRACT
Emotions are both a motivating force and a consequence of consumer prosocial behavior. The debate over whether people are truly altruistic has often focused on the direction of emotion that someone feels when engaging in prosocial behavior. While some argue that the emotions people feel can genuinely involve empathic concern (e.g. Batson 1987), others argue that emotion-driven prosocial behavior is at odds with altruism because emotional actors reap intrapersonal rewards, such as a boost in positive affect (Andreoni 1990), or a reduction in negative affect (Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent 1973).

In the current research, we find that naïve theories run counter to theories that decry emotions as selfish. We predict that because emotions are perceived as spontaneous and natural (Tiedens 2001) and reflective of an actor’s true motives (Arnes and Johar 2009), expressing emotion in the context of prosocial behavior signals information about a consumer’s true character. Our results demonstrate that lay people view emotion as reflecting genuine altruism despite recognizing that those who feel good about doing good reap intrapersonal rewards.

In Study 1, participants were asked to evaluate the survey responses of a fictitious donor who had supposedly given to the African Children’s Fund. The donor filled out a post-donation survey that included his answer to the following question: “When you think about children in Africa, how emotional do you feel?” Participants were randomly assigned to view one survey that had one of the five possible responses to that question (not at all emotional, slightly emotional, moderately emotional, very emotional, or extremely emotional). Participants then rated the donor on a 12-item Charitable Credit scale (altruistic, moral, sincere, etc.), a 6-item Authentic Prosocial Motivation scale (e.g., “The donor sincerely cares about
children in Africa,"), and a 2-item Emotional Benefits scale (e.g., “How much will donating improve the donor’s mood?”). All α’s > .7.

Regression results demonstrate that the more emotional the donor felt, the more participants granted him charitable credit (β = .34, t(211) = 5.19, p < .001), the more he was judged as authentically motivated (β = .31, t(211) = 4.72, p < .001), and the more he was thought to reap emotional benefits from donating (β = .35, t(211) = 5.45, p < .001). Thus, the signal of emotional benefits did not lead to any discounting of charitable credit.

In Study 2, we examine whether reason-based motives can substitute for emotion by comparing emotional donors to those motivated by utilitarian concerns. In Study 2, the post-donation survey included the additional question: “Please tell us more about why you donated.” Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the emotion condition, the donor checked “very emotional.” In the no-emotion condition, the donor checked “not at all emotional.” Finally, in the no-emotion-utilitarian condition, the donor checked “not at all emotional,” but responded to the question with: “I donated because I wanted to help as many people as possible.”

Consistent with our predictions, we find a significant effect of emotion condition on charitable credit, authentic prosocial motivation, and emotional benefits (all F’s > 17, p’s < .001). Participants viewed the donor as significantly more charitable in the emotion condition compared to the no-emotion condition and no-emotion-utilitarian condition. Participants also viewed the donor as more charitable in the no-emotion-utilitarian condition than the no-emotion condition. This pattern of results also held for measures of authentic prosocial motivation and emotional benefits. These results show that reason does not substitute for emotion. Once again, participants in the emotion condition were given the most credit, despite being perceived as reaping intrapsychic benefits from giving.

In Study 3, we directly manipulate emotional benefits by manipulating how happy the donor felt after their donation. Specifically, on the fictitious survey, donors responded to the question, “How much did donating make you feel happy?” We also replaced the African Children’s Fund with Nothing But Nets (an organization which distributes mosquito nets to families in Africa) to examine robustness across charities. In addition, we investigate whether or not charitable credit is conferred upon donors who describe their motivation for doing good explicitly in terms of emotional benefits to the self. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: no-emotion, emotion, and emotion-benefits-motive. In the no-emotion condition, the donor checked “not at all” while in the emotion and emotion-benefits-motive conditions, the donor checked “very”.

Finally, when asked about why they donated, in the emotion-benefits-motive condition the donor wrote, “I donated because I wanted to feel better.”

Consistent with our predictions, we find a significant effect of emotion condition on charitable credit, authentic prosocial motivation, and emotional benefits (all F’s > 14, p’s < .001). Participants viewed the donor as significantly more charitable in the emotion condition compared to the no-emotion and emotion-benefits-motive condition. There was no difference in charitable credit between the no-emotion condition and the emotion-benefits-motive condition. This pattern of results also held for authentic prosocial motivation, except that the emotion-benefits-motive condition was seen as less authentic than the no-emotion condition. In other words, feeling happy as a result of donating led to increased credit, unless a donor explicitly stated that they donated in order to feel happier.

In all studies, we predicted that authentic prosocial motivation would mediate the effect of emotion level on charitable credit. Using bootstrap analyses, we find a significant indirect effect across all studies, suggesting that emotional donors were given the most credit because they were seen as having a more authentic motivation to donate to charity.

The present research offers novel insights into psychological lay theories of prosocial consumer behavior. Whereas people are often suspicious and discount charitable credit if they suspect a selfish motive, emotion fails to elicit suspicion even when the consumer attains hedonic benefits. Moreover, by articulating the mediating role of authenticity in evaluations of moral character, our findings provide a deeper understanding of how others make attributions about traits from behaviors.

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ABSTRACT
Consumer behavior theory is grounded in the here and now, yet consumers may be influenced by beliefs concerning the hereafter. How might our theories be altered, if consumer projections of the world-to-come could be factored in? The present study examines the beliefs consumers have about possessions and behaviors available in the afterlife. Using depth interviews with a diverse set of persons, we investigate the possibility that conceptions of heaven may be structured according to earthly cultural patterns, including those concerning the marketing system. We find that both cognitive and cultural patterns relevant to current consumption practices are projected into narratives of the afterlife and that these may be usefully employed by theorists.

Cognition, Culture and Consumption in the Afterlife
Recent empirical research suggests that pre-existing cultural and cognitive patterns may be determinantive of humans' ability to imagine their lives, both on earth and in the afterlife. This would imply that to some extent individuals are constrained both in their behavior as consumers and in their interactions with the marketplace by cultural and cognitive templates – our imaginations are bounded (e.g., Boyer, 2001; Smith, 2009; Wright, 2009).

The present study proposes that by examining the beliefs consumers have about the world-to-come, we may learn much about how consumption patterns their current circumstances here on earth. For instance, what ‘perfections’ might heaven offer that current life does not? Does consumption continue in the afterlife? If so, would brands be available? Do consumers' believe their preferences, attitudes, and beliefs about brands and products will be the same as in mortal life?

The present study is intended to address these issues through the use of depth interviews with consumers who recently lost a loved one. The narratives they create regarding the afterlife existences of their loved ones provide us with access to human's capabilities to construct desired images of an afterlife and also indicate the significance which consumption may play in this realm – and the improvements desired in both.

Theorizing the Afterlife: Cognition, Culture and Marketing
In their Introduction to Religion, Anthropology and Cognitive Science (2007, p. 5), Whitehouse and Laidlaw present the central crux upon which our present study turns:

‘When… Claude Levi-Strauss shifted his area of interest from kinship and social organization to mythology, it was on the grounds that the relative lack of material constraint would allow the structure of thought to express itself more freely…’

Images of the afterlife should be limited only by consumers’ mental capacity to conjure up ideas within the frameworks learned from those around them. And ideas would seem to be potentially unlimited, like the infinite range of possible sentences in a natural language (Chomsky 1965). However, recognizing the variety of potential ideas about the afterlife has to be counterbalanced by acknowledging the many recurrent features of religious thought found across the world (Whitehouse and Laidlaw 2007). The constancies across religious beliefs over different times and places may be due to the way human brains are constructed (Tremlin 2006).

Boyer (2001, p. 17) puts forward an evolutionary anthropological argument which is heavily reliant on the assumption that humans share a set of automatic, inferential cognitive processes. Smith (2009) criticizes Boyer’s proposed theory as being too mechanistic and as overlooking intra-cultural and inter-cultural variations not only in religious beliefs, but more broadly in political structure, value systems, and levels of interpersonal cooperation and competition. The findings from our study provide further support for her argument.

Yet while Smith’s points are well-taken, they do not seem to undermine Boyer’s central thesis that religious and/or spiritual thought, which are features of every human society, represent a species-wide characteristic and are therefore likely to be present in some mental substrate of the human mind. Atran (2002) proposes that humans construct religious beliefs in an effort to cope with aspects of the world that we wish were otherwise. In the present inquiry, we anticipate that consumers may view the afterlife as a place where the consumption inadequacies found on earth no longer exist.

Walter Burkert in Creation of the Sacred (1996) moves beyond the conceptualizations of Boyer and Atran, as well as other evolutionary-cognitive theorists, by recognizing not only the causal-predictive potency which religious beliefs provide to humans, but also their intrinsically normative nature. Burkert proposes that humans believe in afterlives not only to understand events, but also to uphold personal and cultural standards of justice, morality, and right and wrong; (Boyer terms this intuitive morality.) In a world full of unhappy events, often beyond the individual’s control, notions of supernatural justice, of a cosmic morality, become both cognitively and emotionally compelling.

Empirical Support
Unfortunately, these fertile insights have not been matched by convincing efforts to empirically test their proposition (see e.g., Barrett and Keil 2006). There is an imbalance between theoretical speculation concerning religion, culture and cognition and actual empirical documentation. Whitehouse (2007), for example, suggests that we must look to more ethnographic and historical research for a better understanding of views on the afterlife. Smith (2009, pp.48-49) makes a plea for combining naturalistic approaches to the study of religion with psychological studies of behavior, cognition, and culture involving religion.

Research Questions
Neither cognitive nor cultural researchers have investigated what contemporary consumers’ notions of an afterlife might be and how persons are believed to function within it. For instance, if the deceased are hungry, what do they eat? If they enjoyed music and dancing on earth, do they continue these activities in the afterlife? Do they live in the same style of house and wear the same types of...
clothing, as when they were living? If current theories are correct, then consumers will project directly from their earthly experiences and cultural knowledge to construct visions of the afterlife. Certainly consumption theory, which stands at the intersection between people and the fulfillments of their earthly desires, would benefit greatly from a deeper understanding of how we imagine paradise.

METHOD

In-depth interviews were conducted with adult consumers who had recently lost a loved one over a 2-year period. In the first round of interviews, 60 adults ranging in age from 22 to 81 were interviewed by trained graduate students. The interviews were part of a research project for which the students received credit. Each student was instructed to interview (with permission) a friend or family member who had lost a loved one. The interviewee was asked to describe in detail “What do you think [the decedent] is doing now?” Follow-up questions were used only if the interviewee requested specific guidance as to content. Most interviewees simply launched into a narrative describing what they believed the decedent was doing in the afterlife with little or no additional prompting. No direct inquiries were made as to the religion or ethnicity of the interviewee or decedent, although these were often noted by the interviewer upon submitting the interviews. This was labeled the Unprimed Condition, because no explicit mention was made regarding religion, ethnic background, age, social class or any other cultural identifiers prior to or during the interview.

A year later, a second round of interviews was conducted with 58 different subjects using the same format as before. However, in this second effort the interviewers were requested to follow an interview protocol [Exhibit One] which asked about the interviewee’s and decedent’s religious affiliation, ethnicity, social class, age and occupation. This was termed the Primed Condition and permitted us to see if there were any effects on the respondents’ afterlife narratives due to being reminded of earthly cultural structures. The resulting transcripts were read independently by the three researchers who periodically discussed the emergent themes.

FINDINGS

Unprimed Afterlife Narratives

Perhaps the most significant initial finding from the first interview set is that the deceased loved one was usually described as using the same products, eating the same foods, and enjoying the same pastimes she/he did on earth – with one very important difference; those aspects of earthly existence deemed by the interviewee to have been unhappy, stressful or damaging to the deceased loved one are now absent in the afterlife. In other words, “life” goes on as before, but only the positive aspects are present; all sources of negativity are removed. Notably, the marketing system was deemed to be functioning in heaven, but absent any delays, surly salespeople or price tags – consumers could largely obtain whatever they wanted whenever they wanted it.

For example, one young woman, whose father recently passed away, now sees him in heaven dressed in his favorite button-down plaid shirt, smiling, and wearing his Transition® eyeglasses. She pictures him “doing all the things he loved doing in life: floating in the middle of the pool, talking on his cell phone, sitting in his favorite chair watching the news, eating his favorite foods.” She believes his present home in heaven is a replica of his former house on Earth, because “he would want to stay in the house he loved so much”. Another woman believed that her recently deceased Grandma Clare, an excellent cook on Earth, is “without a doubt still cooking away today; perhaps she even has her own bakery up in heaven” (Anne-Marie). In these narratives the respondents clearly are envisioning their loved ones having a life structured very much in keeping with their earthly existences. There is little evidence that novel social or cognitive schemas are being invoked; rather current experiences are being projected forward.

In contrast, a middle aged woman reported that her mother’s soul was now in Heaven together with the soul of her father. Having a somewhat “ghostly appearance”, her parents do not feel pain, hunger, thirst, or anxiety about employment or paying bills, and do not experience time pressure. In this person’s narrative we see the suspension of ‘normal’ earthly life patterns and the substitution of images likely drawn from religious and cultural texts about the afterlife.

Another unprimed example is provided by a male respondent whose mother “lived hand-to-mouth in Kartarpur [India].” Her son, who has immigrated to the United States, believes that his deceased mother is presently making clothing, specifically Indian saris “which she gives to children, close friends and the poor.” He reports that she got great joy during her lifetime from creating the saris, designing each one to suit the unique taste of the individual for whom she was making it. This same woman, her son believes, “is supporting the local bazaar (in heaven), hand embroidering art work, waking at 4 a.m. to perform poojas at the [heavenly] temple and then returning home where she reads the Ramayana, Mahabharata, and the Gita.” He believes she also celebrates all the traditional Hindu festivals in the afterlife and maintains her strict vegetarianism (Bhalla). In this narrative, the decedent’s earthly religious practices, as well as consumption practices, are projected as being a part of her heavenly existence. Notably, this occurred in an unprimed state, where no advance suggestion of religion had been made prior to the interview. This suggests that those consumers who were deeply involved in religious practices here on earth are seen by their loved ones as continuing this involvement in the afterlife – it is an integral part of their identity.

These unprimed narratives provide initial support for the theoretical propositions of Boyer (2001) and Atran (2002) that consumers’ cognitions would be directed toward constructing an afterlife that is similar to the life preceding it, but more perfect. The narratives also support their hypothesis that culture and personal learning structure consumer conceptions of the supernatural. In a larger theoretical sense, then, our data document that humans are able to personally imagine more perfect worlds – and believe that they exist – but the contents of those worlds appear to be constrained by each individual’s pre-existing cognitive schemata. To our awareness, we are the first researchers to provide empirical documentation supporting these propositions in a contemporary setting. From a consumer behavior standpoint, this initial finding is also very significant. We can now document that consumers’ favorite possessions, activities and dwelling places are deemed to be sufficiently central to the self to be required in the composition of their ‘ideal’ life-after-death. We have also provided evidence that earthly anxieties about financial obligations, maintaining one’s home, and job performance, which often seem to ‘haunt’ consumers here on earth, are believed to be absent in the afterlife.

Beyond life experiences

Another highly significant finding is that several unprimed respondents created narratives that permitted the deceased loved one to venture beyond his/her consumption experiences on earth – yet still we found that these were governed by cultural norms and earthly expectations. For example, one young woman, whose grandfather died recently from a degenerative illness, believes that “he is now in excellent health and is definitely attending all of the Washington
Redskin’s practices, meetings and games...I believe his living space [home] in heaven is decorated with tons of Redskins’ paraphernalia.” In heaven she believes his father is either wearing khaki shorts, sneakers and a Redskins cap, or his police officer uniform. (Shannon). What is interesting in the narrative above is that the normal marketplace “rules” do not seem to apply – the father is now not only able to attend all his favorite team’s games, he also has gained entrée to their clubhouse meetings and team practices. Such afterlife fantasies may possibly serve as guides for marketers to increase their clients’ happiness here in the present day.

A more materially grandiose view of the afterlife, which extends far beyond the deceased’s earthly experiences, is reported by a young woman whose mother raised her amidst impoverished conditions in the Philippines. Describing how her recently deceased mother is now living in heaven, the daughter reported that in the afterlife she has “a beautiful new home with granite countertops, marble floors and modern décor; her new kitchen includes a stovetop island and extensive wine bar; a chef and housekeeper are available fulltime.” In her mother’s walk-in closet “is overhead lighting which illuminates racks of designer dresses, purses and other apparel. She is driven about by her chauffeur and flies in private jets.” This narrative –although it provides the deceased with a much more affluent lifestyle than that experienced on earth – appears to still be bound by earthly conventions about luxury products and services. The family’s relative deprivation compared to the material grandeur of American celebrity lifestyles appears to have made these earthly luxuries seem perfect or ideal in a Platonic sense (see e.g., Shrum, Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2005).

There is also evidence to support Boyer’s (2001) and Burkert’s (1996) proposals that afterlife cognitions would be formulated according to cultural constructions of ‘just outcomes’ or intuitive morality. Several respondents spontaneously commented that certain rewards in their loved-one’s afterlife are due to his/her ‘deserving’ them; that is, their rewards were justified based on righteous earthly deeds. For instance, one self-identified Muslim informant stated,

Our faith is Islam and our background is Egyptian, which has a huge influence on our view of the afterlife...[My] father is in heaven due to all the great deeds he has done for society and the dedication he had towards his faith, family, and work...[In heaven] Father would have good health, youth, and would never sense pain...Eventually, [our family] will be all gathered again...in a huge mansion full of furniture and luxury we always dreamed of owning...[We] would be able to spend quality time together every hour of the day...Material things that were unattainable to my father in life would be at his hands in the blink of any eye...Alcohol would be allowed...Trees will be growing around my father’s mansion, and as soon as his appetite causes him to crave a specific food, it will grow on the trees. Food will...not cause my father to feel too full or sick (Sheren).

In this narrative, the informant spontaneously introduced aspects from the Qur’an regarding the characteristics of the afterlife experienced by the righteous. In the Islamic tradition, all wishes are fulfilled in heaven and there is never any unpleasant or unhappy experience for those dwelling there (Blair & Bloom, 1991). In this instance, the rewards of a devout life are taken to a further extreme in that sacrifices and denials due to religious proscriptions in life are compensated in the afterlife – one was forbidden alcohol in mortal life, but can partake of this in heaven; one might overeat in mortal life, but never suffer from over-indulgence in the hereafter. The imagined removal of earthly proscriptions and penalties for the righteous is a theme that occurred elsewhere in our data with Christians.

Other examples among the unprimed interviews documented the continuation of the loved one’s personality traits and preferences into the afterlife, as well as explicating additional aspects of Intuitive Morality. In particular, persons who died ‘before their time’ were seen as appropriately receiving special rewards in the afterlife, due to their uncompleted lives on earth. One informant, describing a relative who died of leukemia at age 41, believed that his uncle now, “watches soccer games and [being] a big Elvis fan, finally got to meet him up there” (Luis). A 40-year-old man is reported to have

...loved music to the day he passed away...[He] is in the afterlife playing with famous musicians and surrounded by people who share his passion for music. He is now riding through the universe on his new motorcycle...listening to the bands that influenced him” (Greg).

In these passages we glimpse the hoped-for fulfillment of lives which ended ‘too soon’. To die in the middle of life is not only tragic, but viewed as unjust: the person did not receive his/her full due of earthly happiness. To assuage this sense of injustice, these deceased friends and relatives are envisioned as living out their immortals lives in fulfillment of their earthly dreams (Boyer, 2001; Burkert, 1996).

**Primed Condition**

In the Primed condition, interviews were conducted using the questionnaire described earlier. This was done to see how or if afterlife narrative content was altered when the interviewee was asked to recall both his/her own religious beliefs, ethnicity and social class and those of the deceased loved one. Our reasoning here was that this priming might result in a stronger presence of these socio-cultural structures in the narratives produced. This did turn out to be the case. We also found explicit informant commentaries on social/cultural values (such as anti-materialism) which were not present in the unprimed condition. This suggests that in future studies it is important to distinguish between responses obtained when the informant is simply asked to construct a personal narrative or is specifically requested to do so within the context of his/her religious, ethnic or social heritage.

A Roman Catholic Puerto Rican informant believes both her deceased mother and father are “looking over” all their children and grandchildren. She attributes the survival of two young nephews involved in a serious traffic accident to the protective powers of her deceased parents. This informant’s narrative stated that the afterlife is “filled with white clouds and all the inhabitants are dressed in white... It is filled with light, purity and calmness.” The narrative seems to be grounded in the Hispanic-Catholic values of family-centeredness and draws upon traditional depictions of heaven as being atop the clouds and occupied by angels in white gowns (see e.g., Fox 1997). A Pentecostal African-American woman’s description of her mother’s afterlife states that she is acting as a “guardian angel” and that heaven, itself, is “exactly as the Bible says it is: white lights, streets paved with gold and mansions.” She believes her mother “no longer suffers from obesity, arthritis or back problems...” Notably, the detailed consumer behavior descriptions seen in several of the unprimed narratives are absent from both of these respondents’ narratives and more literal Biblical descriptions are invoked.

The narratives collected in the primed condition also exhibited much greater idiosyncrasy and inter-informant variation than was found for the unprimed condition. For example, Brandon, who was raised a Roman Catholic, does not believe in heaven, per se. Rather he believes that “the universe is infinite and multi-layered.
There are other places where life exists in the galaxy…” Brandon believes his father (who recently died) is one layer of life ahead of him and they will be reunited when Brandon dies. What is particularly interesting in these idiosyncratic images is that they still appear to have conceptual ‘anchors’ in cultural texts and experiences.

We found Atran’s (2002) speculations that human religious cognition could be used to construct “better worlds” are supported by some of our narratives, and that these extend into several normative areas of contemporary social structure – but not all. For example, some respondents conjectured about sex roles in the afterlife, noting that earthly sex roles often were constraining to women, especially of older generations, and expressing the hope that women in the afterlife would experience more personal freedom.

Other afterlife narratives envisioned large-scale normative social structure changes, as compared to earthly life. Both Alicia and Maia believe the afterlife where their fathers now dwell is a place where “everyone is equal, there are no social classes and no gap between rich and poor” (Maia). Notably, both these informants were the children of immigrants to the U.S. (from Indonesia and China, respectively) whose parents had faced discrimination and employment problems upon their arrival in America. Thus, the priming of ethnic and class identity may cause consumers to become more aware of personal disadvantages and envision a world-to-come where these are removed (Ger and Belk 1996).

**DISCUSSION**

The present study provides empirical documentation that both supports and casts doubt upon portions of prior theorization. We find that some contemporary adults believe their deceased loved one is able to experience sensory pleasure in an afterlife – eating, drinking, talking with others, playing music, riding in vehicles, cooking and singing, among other prior earthly pursuits. Further, these deceased persons are viewed as maintaining the same personality traits, preferences and attitudes that characterized them prior to death. Often they wear the same type of apparel as during their earthly lives. The primary difference between the conceptualized afterlife and the decedent’s earthly existence, in the reports we collected, is that all negative emotions, stresses and events are now absent – the loved one is immortal and happy, yet still himself/herself.

The results of the present study open multiple novel pathways for future research on consumption phenomena. For example, it would be very interesting to investigate if consumers who have vivid conceptions of their loved one’s afterlife consumption patterns have similarly detailed and emphatic views of their own consumption patterns. Does the marketing system – and all the goods and services it offers – loom larger in the lives of these individuals? Does consumption serve as a central organizing cognitive structure for some people? We view this issue as existing apart from current research and theorization on materialism, per se (see e.g., Shrum et al, 2005). Materialism research usually concerns itself with the importance of goods and activities to the consumers’ sense of well-being (see e.g., Belk 1985; Richards and Dawson 1992; Richards and Mick 2004). What we advocate is studying to what extent the consumer’s sense of self and the world is grounded in the marketplace.

Second, by examining the ‘improvements’ characterizing the afterlife (among those persons who believe such a place exists), we may gain deeper knowledge of what the inadequacies, shortcomings and failures are seen to be by those same consumers here on Earth, both in terms of what they currently possess and what they believe it should be possible to acquire under perfect or ideal conditions. If life – and consumption – ‘gets better’ in heaven, how is this made manifest in the consumer’s imaginations? By delving into the heavily consumption ideal, we may come to better comprehend the constraints and inadequacies of earthly consumer realities.

**REFERENCES**


Barrett, J. L. (2004), *Why Would Anyone Believe in God?*, Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira


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**EXHIBIT ONE**

1. Please tell me a little about yourself. What is your religious background and current practices?
2. Tell me about your family. Who has been most recently born? Who has passed away?
3. If someone were to describe your family, what social class label do you think they would use?
4. What recently deceased family member do you remember most vividly. Can you tell me about that person’s life, job, religious beliefs and personality.
5. Now that _____ is no longer here, do you believe he is experiencing any kind of an afterlife?
6. Tell me about how his afterlife is similar or not similar to the life he had.
7. Who do you think Barry is with in his afterlife? Do you think he is having reunions or is making new friends?
8. What do you think he eats or drinks?
9. Do you think he works or sleeps in his afterlife?
10. Do you think he is influencing anything or anyone on earth?
11. Do you think he is influencing his relatives here on earth or your life?
12. What is place _____ is now in called. Where is it and what is it like? If someone took a picture of it, what would it look like?
13. If you could provide any advice to _____ in his afterlife, what would you say?
Using Bibliometrics to Evaluate the Journal of Consumer Research: Suggested Future Consumer Research Directions
Brian R. Chabowski, The University of Tulsa, USA
Charles M. Wood, The University of Tulsa, USA
G. Tomas M. Hult, Michigan State University, USA

ABSTRACT
The academic discipline of consumer research continues to develop and grow. Many recent trends offer to enrich and enliven the field in almost endless ways, and a renewed sense of the field’s scope and direction has been proposed recently (Deighton et al. 2010; MacInnis and Folkes 2010). Such future-looking views are needed to advance the field. It has been 21 years since Hoffman and Holbrook (1993) published their bibliometric study of the Journal of Consumer Research (JCR) that helped to solidify the unique contributors and intellectual structure of consumer research. This provided a foundational understanding of influential consumer research that set the tone until today. More recently, an examination of 20 years of research highlighted the emergence of “consumer culture theory” (Arnould and Thompson 2005, 868). However, uncertainty about the future direction and unique contribution of consumer research is ever present. As such, our understanding of its intellectual structure as a field requires a fresh take on the uniquely important and significant theoretical perspectives in the domain.

In that spirit, we conduct a complete analysis of all JCR articles from 1998 through 2011. The purpose of this study is to reliably assess and establish the scope and contribution of mainstream consumer research and to offer suggestions concerning promising opportunities and emerging directions based on past research. We base our bibliometric analysis on 27,510 citations from 651 JCR articles and rely on the sociology of philosophies literature to provide a basis for interpreting our findings and offer possible suggestions to researchers. Our study follows the rationale of intellectual historians who seek to identify and track the key networks of ideas that have shaped disciplines over time to provide important information to researchers, editors, reviewers, and academic leaders of a discipline. Collins (1998) stated, “Creativity is not random among individuals, it builds up in intergenerational chains…. The social structure of intellectual attention is fluidly emergent … and can be seen only in retrospective mode” (6, 15). This applies to the advancement of consumer research, as well. Only by examining past contributions in a systematic way can past research contribute to future work. With the study’s limitations in mind, our research offers a review of consumer research that is anchored in multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis.

Such an approach is important because consumer research has evolved into its own epistemic community of shared knowledge. At the outset, the historical analysis of the discipline has developed over time and has served an important part of the field’s development (Hoffman and Holbrook 1993). For example, Wells (1993) discussed the relative positioning of JCR among the top marketing journals, citing its strong business orientation and its increasingly interdisciplinary nature. Tellis, Chandy, and Ackerman (1999) evaluated JCR and found it historically less diverse than other top marketing journals. In fact, they called for research to determine whether the emerging pattern of diversity using naturalistic inquiry would hold up over time. A rejoinder stated that “JCR articles are more likely to rely on sources that are more conceptually distinct from marketing and business” (Bettencourt and Houston 2001, 313) but called for more research to confirm this claim and to include an expanded time frame. Responding to these expressed concerns and using a conceptual thinking approach critical to the advancement of any research domain (MacInnis 2011), the discipline itself is the object of analysis in this study.

METHOD
To evaluate the intellectual structure of recent consumer research, we used 27,510 citations from 651 articles published in JCR from 1998 through 2009. Importantly, we excluded 2010–2011 which allowed us to examine recent published works in JCR by evaluating this two-year period in light of our established findings. Additionally, standard protocol in intellectual structure research was carried out and the data were gathered from the Thomson Reuters Web of Science (WOS) database. Ancillary research material was excluded to focus the study on developments in mainstream peer-reviewed consumer research.

To effectively illustrate the recent intellectual structure of JCR, the citation data required purification and development for co-citation analysis. This step is critical since the conclusions gleaned from citation data on their own are minimal. In contrast, co-citation analysis allows researchers to evaluate the interrelationships between distinct units of analysis (e.g., articles or ideas). Though authors (Hoffman and Holbrook 1993) and journals (Baumgartner and Pieters 2003) have been levels of analysis in previous research, this study emphasizes the thematic relationships between the most influential publications in JCR. This is distinct from other types of analysis. Though other approaches such as content analysis are valuable in evaluating a research domain, the importance of MDS is that the method allows for the relational analysis of published articles. In other words, the ability to determine the closeness or distance between research ideas permits additional understanding of the nature of consumer research.

We were able to identify the 27 most cited influential works during the period of this study. The basis for this analysis configuration is two-fold: (1) unequal citation patterns among influential works and (2) maintaining the period’s stress value below the accepted threshold to retain good fit. The stress value for the co-citation data used was .09, thus providing a clear indication that the period had good model fit (Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro 2004).

In addition, to maintain interpretability of the results, a standardized distance of .275 was used to indicate influential publications and cliques in the MDS results. Typically, research groups are comprised of two publications and note an integral research topic within a general intellectual structure (e.g., JCR). Research cliques are known as an advanced form of research group as they possess three or more influential publications in a given research domain (Alba and Moore 1983; Tsai and Wu 2010; Wasserman and Faust 1994). The terminology used in our study for research groups, cliques, and areas is based on: (1) the influential publications themselves, (2) the JCR articles citing the included influential publications, (3) the influential publications found in the same or related research groups, and (4) the JCR thirty-year subject index.

RESULTS
Similar to the citation-based tradition evaluating JCR (Bettencourt and Houston 2001; Cote, Leong, and Cote 1991; Hoffman and Holbrook 1993; Leong 1989; Tellis et al. 1999; Zinkhan, Roth, and Saxton 1992), we build on recent research providing boundar-
ies and opportunities to consumer researchers (MacInnis and Folkes 2010). In fact, by using bibliometric analysis for this study, we survey the predominant research themes published in JCR over 14 years (Deighton et al. 2010; Kuhn 1962). As indicated in the Table and Figure, three broad research areas were found during the 1998–2009 period. To permit this generalization of mainstream consumer research, we extend our application of the bibliometric method used, the connectedness of research groups was the basis for determining each distinct research area.

Table 1: Overview of Generalized Research Areas and Related Research Groups in JCR, 1998-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Area</th>
<th>Research Groups</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Information Processing &amp; Mediation Effects</td>
<td>Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Baron and Kenny 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Adaptive Decision &amp; Mediation Effects</td>
<td>Baron and Kenny 1986; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Adaptive Information Processing</td>
<td>Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Contextual Choice Models</td>
<td>Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982; Simonson 1989; Simonson and Tversky 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Consumer Culture and Consumption</td>
<td>Firat and Venkatesh 1995; Schouten and McAlexander 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Consumer Culture and Advertising Effects</td>
<td>Mick and Buhl 1992; Schouten and McAlexander 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Brand Community and Advertising Effects</td>
<td>Mick and Buhl 1992; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Relational Consumer Branding</td>
<td>Fournier 1998; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Relational Consumer Branding and Identity</td>
<td>Belk 1988; Fournier 1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Generalized research areas are indicated in **italic** text while their respective related research groups are indicated below each research area.

Research cliques are indicated in **bolded** text; *one research group identified in research area (research area bears name of specified research group).

helped develop sociological analysis and symbolic consumer behavior research.

As shown in the Figure, the three general research areas can be identified as comprised of individual research groups. First, one research area included five specific research groups: (1) information processing and mediation effects (Group 1), (2) adaptive decision mediation and application effects (Group 2), (3) adaptive information processing (Group 3), (4) contextual information processing and choice models (Group 4), and (5) contextual choice models (Group 5). Supported by two research cliques, the combined focus of these research groups indicates a research area emphasizing information processing and choice models.

The second area of research consists of a single research clique. The emphasis of this distinct research topic relates to behavioral decision theory and choice. Driven by both economic and consumption considerations, this topic incorporates the behaviors and risks related to consumer choices that can be made in a competitive landscape.

Finally, the last research area includes seven research groups. The themes for this research topic relate to: (1) sociological analysis and postpositivism (Group 7), (2) sociological analysis and consumer culture (Group 8), (3) consumer culture and consumption (Group 9), (4) consumer culture and advertising effects (Group 10), (5) brand community and advertising effects (Group 11), (6) relational consumer branding (Group 12), and (7) relational consumer branding and identity (Group 13). In effect, these research groups indicate a research area emphasizing sociological analysis and symbolic consumer behavior.

**DISCUSSION**

The implications related to the MDS findings covering can be discussed in two distinct sections. First, the broad-based set of results points to the development of an integrative consumer research framework on which to base possible studies in the future. Based on recent recommendations concerning the development of consumer research (Deighton et al. 2010; Maclnnis and Folkes 2010), we relate this framework to the research areas of consumer research identified in the 1998-2009 period: (1) information processing and choice models, (2) behavioral decision theory and choice, and (3) sociological analysis and symbolic consumer behavior.

Second, we develop suggestions for possible future consumer research by indicating gaps to date in published JCR articles. After evaluating research published in JCR through 2011 for this portion of the study, the potential research syntheses are presented as opportunities based on the foundations and recent trends of consumer research. Taken together, this provides the basis for continued theory-based consumer research development and suggests possibilities for innovative research insights yet to emerge (Kuhn 1962).

**An Integrative Consumer Research Framework**

**Information Processing and Choice Models.** JCR articles confirm this research area and point to the need for expanded consumer research on the topic. For instance, some research indicates that information structure is more predictive of information overload than information amount (Lurie 2004). Findings related to this topic indicated that information processing mediates the relationship between information structure and overload. Also, based on an analysis of consumer responses to websites, the influence of priming and external search has been assessed in novice and expert consumer choices (Mandel and Johnson 2002). As such, results indicate that, in a networked environment, novice consumer choices are mediated by external search while experts’ are not. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of information flow control in consumer decision quality, memory, knowledge, and confidence are very applicable to information processing and choice models (Ariely 2000). In fact, while consumers may make better decisions in contexts of information flow control, consumer information processing can be compromised when information demands exceed capacity. Taken together, these recent research developments support the changing and adaptive nature of consumer processing in an increasingly networked economy. Therefore, its place as the first dimension in our parsimonious consumer research framework indicates its continued importance.

**Behavioral Decision Theory and Choice.** One example of the application of behavioral decision theory and choice relates to perceived value differences among buyers and sellers (Carmon and Ariely 2000). More specifically, the focus of loss aversion as well as the willingness to exchange was found to be different between buyers and sellers. Another recent article indicated the prevalence of internal budgetary parameters typically used by consumers on purchase visits to the grocery store (Stilley, Inman, and Wakefield 2010). The two different aspects of a consumer’s mental budget (itemized and in-store slack) reflect the behavior and decisions made in the marketplace. Taken further, the balance between monetary and temporal costs in consumer purchases has been examined (Soster, Monga, and Bearden 2010). Findings indicate that monetary costs are considered across time while temporal costs terminate at the end of a specified time cycle. Further, the shift of a tangible attribute to zero creates ambiguity in the consumer choice process (Palmeira 2011). Based on these developments, the nature of consumer-firm exchanges shows that behavioral decision theory and choice must be included as the second dimension in our framework.

**Sociological Analysis and Symbolic Consumer Behavior.** Though the extent of this research area in elite consumer-focused research is considerable, current articles in particular synthesize both aspects of this research area to denote its importance as a dimension in integrative consumer research. First, a conceptual overview of consumer culture theory provides a clear indication of the domain’s boundaries (Arnauld and Thompson 2005). However, recently, JCR research has emphasized the importance of sociological analysis and consumer symbolism. For instance, themes such as the role of inner dialog in consumer decision-making (Bahl and Milne 2010), the relevance of a signature as an indication of self-identity with a product or consumption group (Kattle and Haubl 2011), and the altered practices of an individual vested in a particular consumption community (Arsel and Thompson 2011) show this continued examination. However, equally prevalent has been a focus on different facets of a consumption community. The latest issues have related to the use and meaning of objects (Epp and Price 2010; Fernandez and Lastovicka 2011), the formation of consumption beliefs in light of an established legal or belief structure (Humphreys 2010; Karababa and Ger 2011), and the construction, development, and advancement of a consumption community when different perspectives and interpretations may exist (Belk 2010; Berger and Ward 2010; Luedicke, Thompson, and Giesler 2010; Sandici and Ger 2010). Taken together, it is obvious that this research area is critical to an inclusive consumer research perspective.

**Possible Integrative Research Directions**

Based on the bibliometric-supported framework suggested, we build on established consumer research areas to advance the field (Deighton et al. 2010). By emphasizing the recombination of sub-disciplines in this domain, we suggest a generalized perspective from which to develop future research (Maclnnis and Folkes 2010). However, since the primary co-citation analyses were conducted through 2009, it is imperative to evaluate the most current consumer
research as well. Accomplishing this will provide critical information concerning two main issues with regards to establishing our suggested research directions: (1) it allows us to categorize recent consumer research and assess the extent that our framework has been used already, and (2) it permits us to identify the possible gaps in current research such that future framework-related topics may be suggested. Additionally, we acknowledge limitations related to the research conducted. However, first, we examine the current consumer research trends published in JCR assimilating specific elements of our integrative framework. Then, we suggest future research opportunities which may encourage the advancement of the field. The result is a clarified perspective on the possibilities which exist in the consumer research domain.

The first combination which has been integrated to some degree would relate to aspects of the information processing and choice models as well as the behavioral decision theory and choice research areas. First, after comparing situations of increased and decreased consumer options, results indicated that the relationship between assortment and choice is moderated by product availability (Chernev 2003). Also, findings have shown that an increased frequency of price discounts tends to increase consumer processing errors but can lead to increased firm profitability as well (Chen and Rao 2007). Another area regarding the competitive marketplace reflects recent findings that consumers opt for product specialization choices even in cases of identical product attributes between specialized and all-in-one products (Chernev 2007). Lastly, results indicate that the role of important and unique categorical product attributes in dominated consumer options can reduce the attraction effect (Ha, Park, and Aln 2009). Taken together, these studies have combined various elements of information processing, behavioral decision theory, and choice.

The second integrative topic is one which examines the sociological analysis and symbolic consumer behavior as well as the behavioral decision theory and choice research areas in tandem. One example studied the importance of consumer time with (rather than consumer money spent for) a product (Mogilner and Aaker 2009). By evaluating consumer perspective as well as experience after the purchase has been made, increased temporal understanding of the consumer experience is critical to assessing long-term relational (as well as branding) considerations. Another recent study showed that the establishment of relational norms between two consumers tended to increase the willingness of a partner to accept the terms of a consumer exchange with a firm (Aggarwal and Zhang 2006). This identifies the social element to consumer interaction and provides richness to the purchase context not possible when evaluating only the consumer-firm interaction. In addition, pricing and social interaction were explored to find variation across four distinct relational types: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing (McGraw, Tetlock, and Kristel 2003). These findings indicated that market pricing provided the most stable results to support the notion that other relational types seeking to improve on consumer pricing have complex ramifications yet to be fully examined. Also, a genetic basis for consumer judgment and choice has been forwarded as requiring focused research (Simonson and Sela 2011). However, heritable effects have not been detected to any significant degree. Instead, a construct related to risk aversion (“prudence”) has been advanced as showing future research potential.

Another combination of two research areas includes sociological analysis and symbolic consumer behavior and integrates facets of information processing and choice models. However, contrary to the other advances in consumer research, this facet appears to have mainly conceptual and qualitative underpinnings. For instance, one approach acknowledges that consumer knowledge can become a form of human capital. With this in mind, the knowledge possessed by consumers is related to life cycle patterns and various aspects of consumer behavior (Ratchford 2001). In addition, another approach presents a framework to examine the opportunities regarding perfect product-consumer fit. By evaluating the likelihood of a holistic experience, examining and quantifying heightened consumer intimacy appears to have been established (Allen 2002). As such, the combination of these two research areas has yet to be fully realized. Undoubtedly, this creates considerable opportunity for future research.

Granted, there are many possibilities not discussed here to integrate consumer research in different ways. However, we focused only on particular exemplars which synthesized research based on the framework suggested in this study. Undoubtedly, there are other generalized opportunities and exemplars which may best spur future integrative studies, as well.

LIMITATIONS

As with any study, there are limitations to this research. First, the interpretation of MDS results can be subjective and based on the researcher’s own perspective. As such, there could be multiple interpretations to the data summarized in the Table and displayed in the Figure. Therefore, other researchers may come to different conclusions regarding the specific nature of the research groups, cliques, and areas identified in our analysis.

The second limitation identified in this study relates to the method used. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the intellectual structure and the most influential research topics as published in the premier peer-reviewed consumer research journal. A widely accepted approach to accomplish this is to use MDS as a basis for analysis and discussion. Still, there are many different types of analysis which may be used to evaluate the nature of JCR. For example, content analysis may be used to gain an idea of the major themes in the journal. Similarly, to evaluate JCR’s intellectual structure, factor analysis or cluster analysis could be used instead of the MDS approach employed here. As such, there are a variety of distinct methods which may be used to evaluate the influence of specific topics in consumer research.

Finally, another limitation in this study is based on the sample drawn for analysis. As the objective of this study was to evaluate JCR in specific, there may be other influences in consumer research which went unnoticed. Specifically, related yet distinct consumer research is published in other leading journals. Therefore, to gain a better understanding of the domain’s intellectual structure, future researchers may seek to include journals such as the Journal of Consumer Psychology or Journal of Personality and Social Psychology which are known to publish quality consumer research. This would allow for a more complete understanding of the domain’s intellectual structure and could provide additional insights for subsequent analysis.

REFERENCES


Turning to Brands When Close Others Turn Away: The Hydraulic Relation between Social Support and Brand Reliance
Lili Wang, Zhejiang University, China
Steven Shepherd, Duke University, USA
Tanya L. Chartrand, Duke University, USA

ABSTRACT
The findings of the four studies showed that social support was inversely influence individual’s brand choice that low social support should predict more brand reliance, particularly for those who place a high value on belonging and being accepted by others. This is because social support satiated the need to express self-worth, thus eliminating the need to rely on brand to achieve self-worth. Furthermore, this negative relationship was robust when taking into consideration of individuals’ price sensitivity.

Social Support and Self-Worth
There is strong empirical support to suggest that, for better or for worse, an individual’s self-worth is strongly affected by those around them (Crocker and Wolfe 2001). Sociometer theory (Leary and Baumeister 2000) posits that self-esteem is ultimately interpersonal-ally based, with self-esteem serving as a barometer for one’s value to others; when one is doing well interpersonally, they feel good about themselves, and when the quality of their relationships is under threat, self-esteem subsequently decreases.

Social support comes from numerous significant others in our lives throughout the lifespan, all the while contributing to our sense of self-worth. Frequency of social support – from authorities such as parents and teachers, to peers such as classmates and close friends – predicts one’s self-concept and self-worth (Cauce et al. 1996; Demaray, Malecki, Rueger, Brown, and Summers 2009; Robinson 1995), with parental support predicting self-worth longitudinally, and peer support predicting self-worth concurrently (McMahon, Felix, and Nagarajan 2011).

While forging strong relationship with others is an important source of self-worth, sometimes these relationships fail to serve this important psychological function. Conditional love by parents and neglect serve to create the expectation in people that they will be rejected by others (Downey and Feldman 1996; Downey, Khouri, and Feldman 1997; Park, Crocker, and Vohs 2006). This kind of parenting style contributes to creating an anxious attachment style in children, which is associated with a negative self-views (Kim and Horowitz 1991; Levy, Blatt, and Shaver 1998; Park et al. 2006), and a sense of self-esteem that is strongly contingent on the approval of others (Collins and Read 1990). Similarly, outright unloving and malicious parenting is associated with a fearful attachment style, which is leads people to see themselves as unworthy of love, as well as other people are unloving and indifferent (Kim and Horowitz 1991; Levy et al. 1998).

Brands as Surrogates for Social Support and a Source of Self-Worth
Previous research has shown that people do indeed find a sense of self-worth in brands, and use brands as a means of expressing themselves and their identity (Banister and Hogg 2003; Dalton 2008; Grubb and Grathwohl 1967; Shachar et al. 2001; Shepherd et al. 2011).

Research also suggests that brands are also substitutable for more traditional means of achieving a sense of identity and self-worth. Those who are chronically lonely show an increased tendency to anthropomorphize (i.e., attribute consciousness and free will) products and non-conscious objects (Eppeley, Akalis, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2008). Conversely, reminding people of supportive others decrease the amount that people are willing to pay for larger choice sets, and decreased the appeal of having more choice (Ybarra, Lee, and Gonzalez, 2012). The substitutability nature of brands and significant others’ is also illustrated in the bi-directionality of these effects; the more people value materialism, the less then tend to value having close relationships with others (Richins and Dawson 1992).

The substitutability nature of brands and traditional sources of self-worth is further illustrated in how materialism and valuing brands develops over the lifespan. As mentioned above, parents and peers groups play an important role in shaping a child’s sense of self-worth (Cauce et al. 1996; Demaray, Malecki, Rueger, Brown, and Summers 2009; Downey and Feldman 1996; Downey, Khouri, and Feldman 1997; Kim and Horowitz 1991; McMahon, Felix, and Nagarajan 2011; Park, Crocker, and Vohs 2006; Robinson 1995). At the same time that these significant others are shaping a child’s sense of self-worth, so too are these relationships shaping the child’s materialistic orientation. For example, teenagers whose mothers are cold and less nurturing tended to see their self-worth as hinging on the possession of money or financial success (Kasser, Ryan, Zax, and Sameroff 1995). Conversely, supportive parents and peers decrease a child’s perceived need to turn to material goods to develop a positive sense of self-worth (Chaplin and John 2010).

CURRENT RESEARCH
While past work is suggestive of brands and close others as being interchangeable in their ability give people a sense of self-worth, in the current research we seek to fully test the substitutability of brands and social support. Specifically, we predict that individuals who are either a) chronically perceive low levels of social support, or b) are primed with low social support, will show increased brand reliance – that is, the extent to which a branded product is preferred over unbranded products or products that without a recognizable national brand (Shachar Erdem, Cutright, and Fitzsimons 2011).

EXPERIMENTS AND FINDINGS
In Study 1a and Study 1b, we established a direct, inverse, relationship between relationship between social support and brand reliance by both measuring and manipulating social support. In Study 2 we replicate this effect while also showing that it still exists even when controlling for the inherent price differences between branded and unbranded products. In Study 3 we show that the need to belong is a theoretically-relevant moderator of this effect. Finally, in Studies 4a and 4b, we find that the extent to which one derives a positive sense of self from branded products mediates the effect of social support on brand reliance, such that social support corresponds with lower levels of brand-based self-worth, and that self-worth then predicts brand reliance (see table 1).

CONCLUSION
Our research centers on the role of social support in individuals’ brand choice. Our research answers who really relies on brand from a different perspective-interpersonal relationship to. We further explore the moderator and mediator of the impact of social support on brand reliance. We believe that our research extends the research on social support and brand choice and provides a new research perspective for social support and brand choice.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Objectives of the Study</th>
<th>Results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>Measuring social support to test the relationship between social support and brand reliance</td>
<td>Social support was negatively related to brand reliance: ( \beta = -0.04, t(262) = -2.69, p = 0.01 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 1b</td>
<td>1): Manipulating social support to confirm the casual relationship between social support and brand reliance 2): Ruling out the confounding effect of materialism and religious commitment</td>
<td>Main Effect of social support, ( M_{social\ support} = 4.9, SD = 0.9; M_{control} = 6.22, SD = 0.40; F(1, 104) = 5.62, p = 0.02 ) Covariant: Materialism, ( F(1, 104) = 11.83, p = 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Confirming the impact of social support on brand reliance by taking into consideration of price sensitivity</td>
<td>Main effect of social support: ( F(1, 138) = 3.766, p = 0.05 ) Main effect of price sensitivity: ( F(2, 210) = 29.260, p = 0.000 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>Testing the moderating role of Need to belong</td>
<td>Interaction between social support and need to belong: ( \beta = -1.57, t(69) = -2.35, p = 0.02 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>Measuring social support to test the underlying process of the impact of social support on brand reliance</td>
<td>Social support ( \rightarrow ) Brand Reliance: ( \beta = -0.05, t(121) = -2.08, p = 0.04 ) Social support ( \rightarrow ) Brand-based self-worth: ( \beta = -0.03, t(121) = -3.78, p &lt; 0.001 ) Social support ( \rightarrow ) Brand Reliance (with mediator): ( \beta = -0.02, t(120) = -0.08, p = 0.38 ) Bootstrapping: 95% CI = -0.05721 to -0.0085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 4b</td>
<td>Manipulating social support to confirm the results from study 4a is causal relationship</td>
<td>Social support ( \rightarrow ) Brand Reliance: ( \beta = -0.41, t(65) = -2.20, p = 0.03 ) Social support ( \rightarrow ) Brand-based self-worth: ( \beta = 1.59, t(65) = 4.04 p &lt; 0.001 ) Social support ( \rightarrow ) Brand Reliance (with mediator): ( \beta = -0.76, t(65) = -1.21, p = 0.23 ) Bootstrapping: 95% CI = -1.54 to -0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REFERENCES**


### Table 1: Summary of Studies and Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Objectives of the Study</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>Measuring social support to test the relationship between social support and brand reliance</td>
<td>Social support was negatively related to brand reliance: ( \beta = -0.04, t(262) = -2.69, p = 0.01 )</td>
</tr>
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<td>1): Manipulating social support to confirm the casual relationship between social support and brand reliance 2): Ruling out the confounding effect of materialism and religious commitment</td>
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a Design Research project investigating the cultural worlds found on Cuba Street in Wellington, New Zealand. The work demonstrates that the known culture of Cuba in the geographic location of the Gulf of Mexico has been adopted, adapted and essentially, hijacked by Wellingtonians and is therefore argued as a postmodern spectacle. To begin, a brief discussion is presented on the culture of Cuba where the cultural essence of this geographic location is argued as pre-modern (Sutherland and Denny 2005). From there, in seeking to demonstrate the hijack of Cuban culture in Wellington’s Cuba Street, postmodern theory is applied as an analytical framework. In contrast to the pre-modern cultural essence of Cuba, the culture of Cuba Street located in Wellington New Zealand is shown to hold the cultural essence of postmodernism.

THE PRE-MODERN CULTURE OF CUBA

The culture of Cuba as captured and described by Sunderland and Denny (2005) in their photographic essay is shown to be a culture of juxtapositions. Cuba is described as “a place of movement where time has stopped” (Sunderland and Denny 2005: 292); a place where the cultural and consumption practices of the past are current and vibrantly present; a place where resourcefulness demanded of suffering and poverty is combined with cultural fantasies and global tourism. Quoting Dopico (2002: 452-454), Sunderland and Denny emphasize the visual elements of the Cuban culture as a metaphorical window and state that the imagery of Cuba is “a contrasting and broken-down background for first-world travelers and their luxuries.” Decaying colonial structures and vintage vehicles are representative of the sentimental essence of an idealized era. Accordingly, Sunderland and Denny (2005: 305) describe the Cuban culture as a “romance of the pre-modern.”

POSTMODERNISM

In reviewing various postmodern theories, Firat and Dholakia (2006) argue five conditions of postmodernity: hyperreality, fragmentation, decentering, juxtaposition, and difference.

Hyperreality is about the social and cultural construction of reality where the distinction between the real and fantasy is evident in our orientation to surroundings rather than the nature of the surroundings. The experience of a long queue at Disneyland for example is a fantastical experience where the magic of the Disney experience overrides the inconvenience of the queue (Pettigrew 2011). More than that, the spectacle (Kozinets et al 2004) that is the Disneyland servicescape is arguably co-constructed by the consumers within that fantastical experience.

Fragmentation is about the playful but critical engagement with different modes of being. The study of the experiential meaning of Harley-Davidson by Schembri (2009) shows consumers at play (Holt 1995) to be co-constructing the postmodern spectacle of the HOGs (Harley Owners Group) but simultaneously to be professional workers and ordinary suburban folk. As Firat and Dholakia (2006) argue, postmodernism is a return to communities, both multiple and simultaneous therefore fragmentation may entail finding meaning in the experience of multiple selves. One way to enact such multiple selves is through participation in various communities, such as brand communities (Schau et al 2009).

Decentering as a condition of postmodernism is about the blurred and complicated relationship between subject and object. While modernity held clear cut lines as to what constitutes the subject and what constitutes the object, in postmodernity this clarity is decentered. Toyota’s Japanese advertisement for the 2013 Auris for example, depicts the back view of a model wearing a sleek black jacket and red bikini bottom strutting down the runway. The model allows the jacket to fall away and the back view shows the model to be topless. When the model arrives at the end of the runway and stops to turn beside the Auris, the front view shows the model as not female but possibly transgender and quite definitely stunning nonetheless. In effect, this clever ad is not only a transcendence of gender but also objectification. What becomes the object; the car or the model? And what of the subject; transport innovation and hybrid engines, or the increasing acceptance of transgender individuals? This playful spectacle is evidence of the marketer as the archetypal trickster as per Grayson (1999).

The element of juxtaposition in postmodernism is well demonstrated within architectural design. Paradoxical oppositions are evident in architecture with contrasting textures, colors and other aesthetics. However, spectacular postmodern juxtapositions are also evident in the ideological oppositions of for example, hospitals undertaking an aggressive marketing campaign and moral oppositions such as a CEO confessing the dishonor and responsibility of a corporate crisis.

Difference as a condition of postmodernity is about the experimentation with and tolerance for different multiple orders. In other words, difference is allowed and more than that, difference is encouraged. Multiculturalism for example is not only tolerated but welcomed and globalization is questioned in terms of the detrimental effects on culture. Having now examined each of the five conditions of postmodernism as per Firat and Dholakia (2006), the discussion turns to the context of application, Cuba Street.

CUBA STREET

Cuba Street in Wellington New Zealand, is considered by many as ‘the soul of Wellington’ with many local businesses using this statement as a tagline in their promotional efforts. In terms of structure, the street is a shared zone of foot traffic and vehicular traffic, with part of the street designated as Cuba Mall where cars are prohibited and pedestrians only allowed. But the entire street is open air, with no overhead roof anywhere in the street despite the high wind and rainfall of the area.

At the most basic level, Cuba Street can be described as a vibrant place filled with colorful characters. But as ‘the soul of Wellington’ - what does that mean? In seeking to uncover that meaning and decipher what to do with that uncovered meaning, the research question formulated for this industry project was to understand how to leverage the soul of Wellington as a local experience.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design of this project is Design Research (Koskinen et al. 2011; Laurel 2003; O’Grady and O’Grady 2006). A concise background on the contemporary discourse about Design Research is provided by Nigel Cross (2006) in his book, Designing Ways of Knowing. However as Wassan (2005) highlights, the field of design is all about innovation and the field of design ethnography is in its
infancy. Consequently, as awareness grows, the importance of rigor is noted.

This Design Research project began with a rapid (visual) ethnography conducted on Cuba Street and the findings of that rapid ethnography were taken through an ideation process of in-house brainstorming. The outcome of the in-house ideation process was a developed prototype, which was taken back to the street for the purpose of arriving at a refined concept. The following discussion elaborates on each of these stages in the research design.

In the field of design, ethnography has a narrower and somewhat different meaning than it does in anthropology (Wassan 2000); research is done quickly and typically with limited theoretical contextualization.

In this Design Research project, the rapid ethnography combined fieldwork with a visual component. The fieldwork involved two days of participant-observation in Cuba Street, which provided the opportunity to capture more than 450 images such as Figure 1. During these two days, 15 field interviews were conducted with a diversity of participants; each interview between 15-45 minutes in length. In terms of analysis, design ethnography is associated more with the collection of textual evidence than with the analysis of that text (Wassan 2000). However, the emphasis here is on rigor and hence some detail is provided. For this ethnographic component of the project, the bulk of the text to be interpreted was visual text. This visual text was considered in the context of field notes and interview text. The contextual text was considered by the team of researchers who queried and questioned each aspect, emergent pattern, and suggested dimension. In a hermeneutical manner, this analytical task was both an individual and collective effort. Having the text as visual text enabled the research team to work either individually and/or collective at different times during this analytical process. The goal was to arrive at stability in this sort and resort, question and query process of reading and treating the text.

**Figure 1: The Corporate Suits with an Eclectic Twist**

**FINDINGS OF THE RAPID ETHNOGRAPHY**

There are many aspects that make Cuba Street what it is, but this research has identified four dimensions: the people, the space, the art, and the culture.

The people theme begins with the comment that “the people make this place what it is.” In the context of Cuba Street, there is a diversity of people; young and old, gay or not, punk and conservative, the alternative people and the corporates. Many people emphasized that part of the appeal of Cuba Street is that “we all get along, there is no violence!” However, the contrast is evident between the alternative people and the corporate people and a quote that captures this contrast is, “there are two worlds on Cuba Street, the alternative world and the suits.” The alternative people are those individuals more willing to live simply, consume less, and dress in a manner that reflects a non-conventional way of life. Many of the buskers and beggars on Cuba Street fit this description. In contrast, the retail and corporate workers (referred to as suits) dress more formally, and are typically in transit either on their way to or from work. The suits are professionals who choose to engage in the culture of Cuba Street in more subtle ways than that of the alternative people. More specifically, the suits wear formal corporate wear with an eclectic twist, which might take the form of a bright red vest teamed with an old school time piece, or an oversized cross worn with a little black dress and knee high rainbow socks for example. The suits told the story that “Cuba Street is the local people, with a local style making a local stamp.”

Like the people theme, the space theme also involves contrast and juxtaposition. There is a juxtaposition of old with new architecture where some of the older buildings have received more refurbishment than others. There is also the juxtaposition of the high end restaurants with the more casual cafes, and then there is the juxtaposition of mainstream retail with retro retail. Notably, the retro style is evident not only in the predominance of retro retailers but also in the Art Deco architecture as well as the decor of both high end restaurants and casual cafes.

The art theme is evident on Cuba Street in the high end galleries as well as many unexpected places. While there are many large and authorized artworks on Cuba Street, there are also many unauthorized artworks on Cuba Street that beautify even the most mundane street aspects. Cuba Street is an artistically vibrant street where local artisans choose to display their talents. The artistic works on Cuba Street is also not only found in the physical art pieces such as painted works and sculpture but also the music. The artistic expression and musical talent is further evidenced on the street with the many and varied buskers who choose to share their talent publicly. With a cluster of independent music specialists located on Cuba Street, vinyl devotees are well serviced and musician venues well attended. More than that, there are iconic nightlife venues on Cuba Street that generate a heavy duty after dark party. One of the iconic retailers, Cosmic, closes off a section of their central retail outlet to platform a live DJ on the weekend after trading hours. Conversely, one of the popular alternative bars known as The Fringe Bar doubles as a retro fashion retailer during weekend business hours.

The culture of Cuba Street is therefore described as a counter culture with an overwhelming Bohemian style that is most apparent with the alternative people and more subtly demonstrated by the suits. A common ground between this counter culture and corporate sector is the coffee culture. The coffee is served strong in Wellington, reflecting the strength of the coffee culture itself. As well as a bridge between the alternative and corporate worlds, the Wellington coffee culture is also a bridge between the business hours and nightlife of Cuba Street.

Table 1 summarizes these findings and articulates the four dimensions that show Cuba Street as the soul of Wellington. Having detailed these four identified themes, the overall summative finding of this Design Research project is that Cuba Street is a rich untapped cultural resource. As a local experience there is much that can be done to leverage the Cuba Street experience.
With this in mind, the prototype developed is outlined in Table 3. The purpose is to deliver on each of these three purposes. For the Culture Generators, the purpose and priority is simply sustenance and for the Culture Voyeurs, the maintenance of public space. For the Culture Generators, the purpose and priority of any prototype for the Council will be to enhance the vibrancy of Cuba Street, they predominantly watch from a safe distance rather than directly engage.

### THREE POINTS OF VIEW AND A PROTOTYPE

With regards to the practical implications of this work, the perspective of the local Council is an important consideration. But, as well as the Council perspective, there is a need to consider the people of Wellington and their perspective as users of the space. In seeking to accommodate both the Council’s perspective as well as the people’s perspective, the following points of view were developed. However, rather than aggregating all the people into one group the alternative people are segmented from the corporate people as set out in Table 2. Note that in Design Research, when developing a point of view, the task is to state who the user is, what they need, and why. Also, the alternative and corporate segments are given labels indicative of their purpose within the Cuba Street scene. Accordingly, the alternative people are labeled Culture Generators and the corporate suits are labeled Culture Voyeurs because while they appreciate the mundane aspects of Cuba St.

The cultural dimensions of Cuba St is described as a counter culture with an overwhelming bohemian style that is most prominent amongst the alternative people and more subtly expressed by the corporate suits. However, common ground is evident in the strong coffee culture that permeates Cuba St.

#### Table 1: Summary of the Four Identified Dimensions of the Culture of Cuba St

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The cultural dimensions of Cuba St</th>
<th>The people</th>
<th>The space</th>
<th>The art</th>
<th>The culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are two worlds of people on Cuba St: the</td>
<td>The space of Cuba St entails a juxtaposition of both old and new architecture, high end restaurants and casual cafes, as well as retro and mainstream retail.</td>
<td>The artistic element has a strong presence in Cuba St in both authorized and unauthorized forms. High end art galleries are complemented by the street art that beautifies even the most mundane aspects of Cuba St.</td>
<td>The culture of Cuba St is described as a counter culture with an overwhelming bohemian style that is most prominent amongst the alternative people and more subtly expressed by the corporate suits. However, common ground is evident in the strong coffee culture that permeates Cuba St.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 2: Summary of Developed Points of View

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wellington City Council (WCC)</th>
<th>Culture Generators</th>
<th>Culture Voyeurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...provides public benefit with limited resources and requires community confidence to be re-elected</td>
<td>Young street performers, broke and transient musicians and artisans who need space for creative expression because this is their currency</td>
<td>Career focused professionals proudly wearing an eclectic twist who look for a momentary escape and safe cultural experience because this provides social capital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TAKING IT TO THE STREET

As a Design Research project and having a developed prototype in hand, the next step was to take the prototype back to the street to gauge public/user response. In taking this next step, another two days was spent in ethnographic mode back on Cuba Street. The researcher spoke to another 15 participants, where an overwhelming positive response was received from all but two of the 15 participants. From this second group of participants however, several improvements and refinements were suggested and the prototype was revised accordingly to arrive at the finalized concept as per Table 4.

#### Table 4: The Final Concept

- WCC sponsors a street art competition where street performers/ artisans/ musicians nominate themselves
- During a 2-wk period, the public votes for the ‘The Best’ performer/ artist/ musician
- Winner takes home $5,000 and Top 5 get $1,000 each
- Winner and Top 5 are recognized as ‘artists-in-residence’ on Cuba Street for the following month

Some of the refinements incorporated into the prototype on the advice of the participants included, dropping the initial monetized incentive by allowing the performers, artisans, and musicians to nominate themselves and removing the initial public vote. Rather than a four week performance period, the performance period is reduced to two weeks, during which time the public vote for ‘The Best’ performer/ artist/ musician. Then, in addition to giving the winner $5,000, the next top five performers are each given $1,000. This way six winners rather than just one are honored as ‘artists-in-residence’ on Cuba Street for the following month.

### DISCUSSION

Relating these findings and outcome to the postmodern literature, the following discussion addresses how each of Firat and Dholakia’s (2006) five conditions of postmodernity apply.

In terms of hyperreality, this work reports two worlds co-exist on Cuba Street where the people found in each of these worlds interpret and experience the same reality in different ways, through different cultural lenses. The Culture Generators (the alternative people) make Cuba Street what it is and if they are not sustained, they will move on. But the Culture Generators demonstrate an extreme type of communal production, where what is being produced is a counterculture designed to resist market forces (Goulding and Saren, 2007). In this socially and culturally constructed reality, the corporate suits live in a different world but on the same street. Effectively, the Culture Generators construct the postmodern spectacle of the counter-culture that is observed from afar and co-constructed by the Culture Voyeurs. With fragmentation tightly linked to hyperreality, people who live in Wellington and frequent Cuba Street negotiate this cultural site in fragmented ways. More specifi-
cally, while the alternative people generate the spectacle of Cuba Street the suits as observers and voyeurs are another fragment of this same spectacle. However, in terms of decentering, rather than the corporates holding the power as usual, in this context, the Culture Generators hold the power because without the alternatives, there is no culture for the Culture Voyeurs (ie. suits) to observe.

The many spectacular juxtapositions found on Cuba Street include moral oppositions, aesthetic and artistic oppositions, retro and contemporary oppositions. The cultural values held by the Culture Generators entail anti-consumerism and anti-corporatism, whereas the Cultural Voyeurs are corporate and career oriented. The aesthetic oppositions are evident in the juxtaposition of old and run-down buildings, located beside refurbished Art Deco buildings, sitting beside new character buildings. Artistic juxtapositions are apparent in the upmarket galleries and authorized artwork positioned beside unauthorized pieces of artwork. Similarly, the upmarket restaurants reside alongside more casual cafes and yet there is the commonality of the retro style carried throughout, which is most evident in the coffee culture.

CONCLUSION

In the spirit of pre-modern Cuba, Wellington New Zealand is shown to have adopted and reshaped this culture in a more sophisticated and postmodern manner. The cultural complexities documented in this research show this cultural hijack to entail complexities evident as four dimensions: the people, the space, the art, and the counter consumer culture that include a strong coffee consumption element. As shown in the visual elements of this Design Research project, the culture of Cuba Street can be described as a postmodern spectacle. In effect, this work offers a theoretical contribution as application of Firat and Dholakia’s (2006) postmodern framework as well as an extension of Kozinet et al.’s (2004) theory play and retail servicescapes as spectacle. More practically, this work showcases the research design of Design Research.

REFERENCES


Emerging Market (Sub)Systems and Consumption Field Refinement

Sofia Ulver, Lund University, Sweden
Jon Bertilsson, Lund University, Sweden
Marcus Klasson, Lund University, Sweden
Carys Egan-Wyer, Lund University, Sweden
Ulf Johansson, Lund University, Sweden

ABSTRACT

In the popular culture of critical journalism (Klein 1999; Schlosser 2001), the detailed unpacking of specific market systems in terms of institutional details, organizational structures and their effects has, as pointed out by Thompson (2007), contributed with the rare but important scholarship needed to understand the functions, ideologies and complexities of how market systems work. In recent years an increased, holistic understanding of whole market systems has been called for in consumer culture theory, CCT (Arnould and Thompson 2005), as a needed complement to researchers’ (occasionally) too strong a focus on phenomenological lived experience (Askegaard and Linnet 2011), as the pivotal core of market evolution (Giesler 2008), and as a manifestation of larger social relations and structures (Ustün and Thompson 2012). But in contrast to the journalistic works mentioned above, academic consumer culture research lacks detailed empirical work that identifies and contextualises these structural relationships according to cultural dynamics and norms, ideological conditions, social structures and historical conditions. The need has indeed been identified (Askegaard and Linnet 2011; Giesler 2008; Holt 2003) but the methodological implications remain vague or even non-existent. What does Holt (2003: 49) mean in practice when he calls for knowledge that “doesn’t come from focus groups or ethnography or trend reports—the marketer’s usual means for ‘getting close to the customer’”? Holt (2003: 49) suggests that this knowledge might come “from a cultural historian’s understanding of ideology as it waxes and wanes, a sociologist’s charting of the topography of contradictions the ideology produces, and a literary critic’s expedition into the culture that engages these contradictions”. But, given that research in CCT seldom engages in these expeditions, we argue that we lack guidelines on how to integrate it with our more usual phenomenological consumer focus.

Regardless of how imperative it is to highlight concrete methods with which CCT researchers can empirically explore the dynamics of market systems, we first need to refine the conceptual frameworks in order to do so. The frameworks used today to explain market dynamics are typically grand (and sometimes unclear), which is probably one reason why it is difficult to find empirical research on the matter (other than from journalists, who do not suffer under the institutional demand of theoretical contribution). Holt’s (2002) dialectical model of branding and consumer culture is a typical example of a macro-level model that tries to supply grand theoretical explanations for the development of a market system. Holt’s analysis is based on consumers’ micro-level stories about their consumption and, although his historical analysis is theoretically appealing, the leap he makes from micro-level consumer stories to macro-level model is very long. This not only raises methodological questions regarding the trustworthiness of this type of analysis but also, and perhaps more importantly, generates questions about how to conceptualise the development of a market system on a meso-level. Schau, Mühliz and Arnould (2009) take a more meso-level approach in their analysis of the value-creating practices of brand communities. We agree with their assertion that “value is manifested in the collective…rather than firm-consumer dyads” (2009:41). However, as Schau et al focus on individual brands, their findings cannot sufficiently explain market subsystems that consistent of diverse brands and products. The purpose of this conceptual paper is therefore two-fold: firstly we introduce a (tentative) theoretical framework to conceptualise the development of market systems on a mid-range (or meso-) level; secondly, we spell out methodological suggestions for how to study such development.

INTRODUCING THE CFR FRAMEWORK

In this section we introduce the Consumption Field Refinement (CFR) framework with the aim of conceptualising the development of market systems on a meso-level.

A market system consists of a physical collection of commercially connected entities as well as a symbolic collection of cultural meanings and interactions, hence a market culture. In addition to Giesler’s (2008) and Holt’s (2002) conceptualizations of the evolution (rejuvenation) of a market culture as a dialectical interplay between two macro-entities—the branding paradigm and the contemporary consumer culture—we suggest that on a mid range level the market system consists of several subsystems, or consumption fields, that together make up the entire (macro-) market system. Consequently, in order to understand how the entire market system and the entire consumer culture develops; we need to understand the development of its constituting subsystems—the various consumption fields. We propose that the development of each consumption field is propelled by the actions of three main entities: the consumers; firms/brand owners; and media, where consumers and their interest may also influence the evolution of consumption fields, for instance by encouraging, discouraging or outlawing types of consumption. However, as we do not believe that the state is a necessary entity in the evolution of consumption fields, we will leave this complicated area to other researchers.

We hereby introduce a (tentative) theoretical framework, which we refer to as Consumption Field Refinement (CFR) to conceptualise the development of market systems on a meso-level, see figure 1. In the following sections, we will further explain the different elements of the framework.

Figure 1: The CFR Framework
DRIVING FORCES OF THE CFR FRAMEWORK

In this section we develop our ideas and outline the various elements constituting the Consumption Field, which is the centrepiece of the CFR framework.

The Consumption Field refers to a consumption-oriented interest around which consumers gather and organize. The concept is heavily influenced by Bourdieu’s (1984) idea of social fields (see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)—a concept that has been widely used in CCT (Arsel and Thompson 2011; Holt 1997; 1998; Üstüneter and Holt 2010; Üstüneter and Thompson 2012). A social field can be seen as a micro-cosmos of the social organization of society itself where people strive for status and power—thus playing the status game—by drawing upon resources that Bourdieu (1984) refers to as various forms of capital: social, cultural and economic (see also Veblen [1899]1994). More capital (as a combination) provides higher status and power, making the presence of status hierarchies, rules and norms quite obvious. Bourdieu (1984) and Holt (1997; 1998) see society being comprised of an aggregation of separate macro-level fields—e.g. the field of consumption, the field of art, the field of religion, and so on. Consumption then is seen as a single field that encompasses all consumer interests, whether in food, furniture, fashion or something else. We, like Arsel and Thompson (2011), would rather envisage each of these macro-fields as a collection of different meso-fields. In our CFR framework, the field of consumption encompasses several separate consumption fields, each of which relates to a different consumption interest. Each of these meso-fields is “roughly equivalent to prior conceptualizations of subcultures of consumption” (Arsel and Thompson 2011: 793). Like Arsel and Thompson, we refer to these meso-fields merely as consumption fields.

Here we would like to emphasize that consumption fields draw together multiple—rather than single—product categories and commercial experiences via a dialectic interplay between consumers and the various commercial actors that see opportunities to capitalize on an emerging consumption field. We have, for some time, observed how consumers convene around particular brands to form communities and subcultures as a result of a common interest in those brands (Belk and Tumbat 2005; McAlexander, Schouten and Koenig 2002; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Muniz and Schau 2005; Schouten and McAlexander 1995). However, what we, here, refer to as a consumption field may consist of many, sometimes interlinked, types of communities or subcultures, and thus pertain to a wider form of consumer interest than that ascribed to one single community. The Foodie Culture is one example (Cairns, Johnston, and Bauman 2010). It is its own little system with its own culture that involves many different product categories and industries (e.g. food, equipment, books, competitions) without being exclusive like a members club. Over time, the consumption field has been so refined and internally interlinked that it can be broadly defined as a sub-system situated in a larger social organisational scheme. In these respects a consumption field is conceptually tighter than both Bourdieu’s (1984) aggregated social class lifestyles and Holt’s (1998) “tastes and consumer practices across a variety of popular cultural categories”, but broader than specific product categories, brands, or brand communities—although such distinct formations are, no doubt, at the core of the broader formation, the system and the culture. We may therefore have something to learn from studies of value co-creation in brand communities (e.g. Schau et al 2009). But we believe that previous research on status hierarchy formation in communities (Kozinets 2001; Ostberg 2007; Schouten and McAlexander 1995) should be more relevant in this discussion, as we believe that it is status that drives the consumer interest on which a consumption field thrives.

Consumer Interest in a certain consumption area is central to the emergence and development of a consumption field. Without consumer interest, there is no development. However, there is a dearth of theory on how and why consumers develop interest in a particular consumption category and thus, how and why new fields emerge. The formation of fields is not addressed by Bourdieu (1984) or Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992). The emergence of the field of art was described by Bourdieu (1996) but no theoretical framework was proposed. We suspect that any consumption category that has not yet been colonized by consumer cultivation as a means to form identity and gain status may constitute a viable and attractive opportunity for such motives. As more traditional lifestyle consumption categories have been exploited by consumers looking to obtain recognition and status, middle class consumers increasingly look for new fertile areas to utilise for identity construction (Belk 1988; Bertilsson 2009; Elliott and Wattanasawwan 1998; Hirschman 1980) and distinction (Holt 1998; Thompson and Haytko 1997; Ulver-Snieistrup 2008). Since product categories such as fashion/clothing (Bertilsson 2009; Thompson and Haytko 1997), cars (McAlexander et al 2002; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001), motorcycles (Schouten and McAlexander 1995), computers (Belk and Tumbat 2005; Muniz and Schau 2005) and TV-shows (Kozinets 1997; Kozinets 2001) have already been over-exploited by consumers with a desire for aesthetization and distinction, we argue that consumers tend to (consciously or otherwise) look for unexplored consumption fields—which are less “product-focused and more interest-focused. Consumption categories that were previously considered mundane, every-day or boring may be a last resort for consumers who find that all other areas have already been colonized.

Consumers immerse themselves within these unexplored consumption fields, and develop extensive knowledge and experience, thus becoming what Holt (1998) refers to as high cultural capitals within that field. In this way, consumption fields develop and are refined. For example, running, as consumption field, has developed immensely in recent years: as more consumers have taken them up, certain types of running have become more mainstream while more niche forms have gained popularity. Marathon running is no longer quite so unusual as it once was, but other forms of endurance running have become more popular as media of distinction (e.g. triathlons and ultra-running). The type of running one does (barefoot versus ordinary running), the distances and other challenges one includes (marathons, ultra-runs, triathlons), and the equipment one purchases to participate; these are all potential sources of status and opportunities for distinction. We would argue then that it is consumers’ need for recognition and status that drives interest within a consumption category, and consequently the development of new consumption fields.

Refinement Materials are resources in the form of products, brands, symbolic material, services and information, which may be contributed by firms/brand owners or media, as well as consumers. They feed consumers’ newly acquired consumption interests, and are therefore essential in order for consumption fields to develop and be refined. Holt’s classic (1998) CCT article suggests that accumulated cultural capital is consumers’ main resource for positioning themselves in consumer culture. While we agree that various forms of symbolic capital are at work in newly formed consumption fields, we also argue that other resources are required in order for new fields to emerge. For this reason, we concentrate on less abstract resources in our CFR framework.

Wilk (2006) supplies an interesting description for how water has developed from a market obscurity and a commodity to a cultural consumer product as a response to an increased consumer interest and the actions of marketers. We argue that the actions of
three different entities are necessary to ensure consumer interest and consumption field refinement. Firms/brand owners, media, and consumers must all contribute refinement material if a new consumption field is to emerge and take-off. Firms might feed a new consumption interest by developing and marketing a widening range of products, innovations and brands. Consumers then cultivate themselves via the consumption of these products, innovations and brands, and the refined knowledge and taste they develop in relation to them. Media might also contribute resources in the form of expert knowledge and cool advocates supplied through lifestyle magazines or trendy TV-programs. Media resources help to convey the newly developed consumer interest to the overall audience, which includes both consumers and firms. Consumers might contribute refinement material in the form of blog posts, recipes, and so on, that serve to inspire interest in other consumers or to reinforce the importance of the growing consumption field in the eyes of media and firms. It is worth noting here that there may be overlaps in our framework’s categories. Consumer bloggers may also be considered media. Celebrities might straddle the line between media and firms/brand owners. Jamie Oliver, celebrity chef, could be considered media but his range of saucepans, garlic crushers and flavour shakers may also make him a brand owner.

Consumer interest need not necessarily be initiated by consumers themselves. It is possible to imagine a scenario where firms or media use their refinement materials to purposively create a consumer interest in a certain consumption activity. However, such an undertaking would probably require fairly heavy resource investment. And there is no guarantee that consumer interest would be piqued. Regardless of which entity initiates the consumer interest, from our perspective, consumption field refinement can only occur, and new consumption fields develop, if all three entities—consumers, firms/brand owners and media—interact, perform their parts and contribute their refinement materials.

COMPLETING THE CFR FRAMEWORK

In this section, we outline how consumers, firms/brand owners and media fit into the CFR framework and suggest how we might go about finding out more about their roles in consumption field refinement. As stated, we see these entities as the most important forces in consumption field refinement and market evolution (i.e. in constructing, destructing or reforming market (sub)systems for the development of new consumption fields).

Consumers as Entities in the Market (Sub)System. Although the consumption field itself consists of consumers’ practices and engagements, consumers, as entities, should be conceptually lifted out of the consumption field triangle as they must be analysed like the other entities in the market (sub)system. Within the CFR framework, consumers may organize themselves or act as individuals—although this can still be objectively patterned (Holt 1997; 1998). It is among consumers that refinement processes, or nerdidification, is manifested and hence researchable. Research questions that could be asked are: How and when do consumers pick up on or start new consumption fields? How does the dialectic process look from their perspective? How are hierarchies, or other power structures, patterned? What is construed as cool and why? How do meaning structures evolve? How do consumers become part of (non)co-productive processes of meaning and culture with other entities?

Firms/Brand Owners as Entities in the Market (Sub)System. Firms and brands can be regarded as another key entity. Their main role is in providing refinement material to the consumption field. Firms/brand owners are interested in discovering and effectuating new ways to capitalise on consumer interest. Their dialectic and longitudinal relationship (Giesler 2008; Holt 2002) with consumers makes active coproduction with consumers a possibility (Arvidsson 2005; 2008; Humphrey and Grayson 2008; Schau and Muniz 2009). This creates opportunities to speed up consumer desire for new and refined products and experiences. This is where “innovation” is most often initiated. Potential research questions could be: How and when do firms/brand owners pick up on or start new consumption fields? How does the dialectic process look from their perspective, e.g. market research, shops, or campaigns? How are consumption fields discovered and capitalized upon? How are consumer meanings retrieved and acted upon in communication and product development? What power structures emerge?

Media as Entities in the Market (Sub)System. TV, blogs, magazines, pop culture and social media are normally regarded as intermediaries in the dialectic process between consumers and firms. However, if one wants to investigate consumption field refinement, media must be emphasized as an entity on its own. The media may benefit itself by being a main player in creating a new consumption field that grows and is refined. We argue that the media itself may initiate a new consumption field even before consumers and firms have identified it. From that perspective it then becomes interesting to pose research questions such as: How and when do media pick up on or start new consumption fields? How does the dialectic process with consumers and/or firms look from media’s perspective? How do media fit into power structures and what does this mean for social relations?

The process of CFR has logically been simplified for the purposes of the framework and we are well aware that real-life emergence and refinement of fields is likely to operate in a more nuanced and less linear fashion.

INVESTIGATING CFR

In this section, we identify methods to explore the dialectic and co-productive CFR process.

CCT researchers often have ambitions to contribute with “higher context” understandings (Askegaard and Linnet 2011). However, methods for how to investigate these higher contexts are seldom offered. Although some of the methods we outline below have been empirically demonstrated by consumer behaviour researchers (Scott 1994; Stern 1994), there is a dearth of concrete explanations and summaries of such concepts and methods. These, we argue, are needed if the idealised integration of individuals, structures and ideologies is to be realised.

Identifying the entities and their relationships within the consumption field. This approach involves obtaining a rough idea of what the market (sub)system is, including some kind of identification of what entities are involved. For example, who are the brand owners, producers, consumers, and media actors? This part of the investigation would be the closest to what Naomi Klein, and other journalists have done in their investigations of whole industries. This would be pure and simple footwork in terms of finding, calling, travelling and interviewing informants. The key entities, as well as less obvious ones we need to be identified. One could then engage in real life (Elliott and Jankel-Elliott 2003) or netnographic (Kozinets 2001) longitudinal observations of and interviews with consumers. Interviews among commercial entities could also be pursued along with collection of material documents (e.g. marketing material, magazines, blogs). The purpose is to find out exactly what is happening here.

Defining the consumption field. According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), a specific social field can only be defined empirically. Üstüner and Thompson (2012: 799) add that a relational and structural analysis would be required to map out “the network of relations that position social actors in a given, historically shaped
field of power and status competitions over valued forms of capital”. Hence, once one has identified the actors and their relationships, one can start defining the field. Power structures can be described based on the flows, exchange, and guarding of economic, social and cultural capital. This does not necessarily need to be in quantitative categories, as Holt (1998) did with cultural capital, but could rather be in comprehensive, relational and qualitative terms. For example, a baker offers sour dough bread to a consumer in exchange for money (economic capital), but because this specific consumer is connected to a clique of leading food bloggers (social capital), he also offers some expert narratives (cultural capital) that he knows will score highly in the bloggers’ informal connoisseurship hierarchy and hopefully lead to goodwill and publicity.

**Investigating the historical context.** Holt (2003: 49) argues “that when the national ideology crumbles and is then reinvented, new contradictions form”. Holt criticizes academics and practitioners for not understanding these contradictions and for wrapping themselves up in the social-psychologically-informed “consumer insight” paradigm when trying to understand social trends in consumer society. Instead, he proposes three historical approaches that we develop briefly below (2003:49):

I. A cultural historian’s understanding of ideology as it waxes and wanes: A cultural historian uses historical material in order to identify dominant ideologies in specific cultural contexts and times. A good example from CCT is Karababa and Ger’s (2010) sociohistorical (and cultural historical) investigation of the formation of the consumer subject in the development of the Ottoman coffeehouse consumer culture from the sixteenth century onward. They use a “critical documentatist approach to make sense of what a particular document might have meant at the time it was produced” (ibid: 740). They collect and analyse, for instance: expert analyses of poetry, interviews with historians, decrees from cultural authorities, poems, chronicles, books on morality and etiquette, price lists, miniatures, and drawings. One just has to use one’s imagination to realize that equivalent modern day sources can be found in printed media, as well as television and radio archives. Giesler’s (2008) examination of the evolution of the contemporary music market is a good example. Apart from doing longitudinal interviews, he also collects historical material including court documents, newspaper articles, press releases, and activist material. In a similar vein, Holt (2002) makes use of historical advertisements to show how certain brands developed into cultural icons by supplying brand myths that resolved cultural contradictions.

II. A sociologist’s charting of the topography of contradictions the ideology produces: The poststructuralist cultural history approach used by Karababa and Ger (2010) is closely related to sociological charting. They use their data to form a historical representation by recording historical events chronologically, and then attain a macroscopic view by studying the relations between the consumption, demographic, economic and social structures found in these representations.

III. A literary critic’s expedition into the culture that engages these contradictions: Literary critics typically use texts and images from selected cultural products. These products can be books, newspapers, magazines, movies, television shows, or web sites (Hollows 2002; 2003a; 2003b; Hommerberg 2011). The social constructions, discourses, ideologies, arguments, and narratives found in these texts can be analysed as representation of culture, and its inherent contradictions.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

In this paper we argue that CCT lacks an integrated conceptual framework for the development of a market system from a mid-range perspective. We therefore, introduce a conceptual framework, which we refer to as Consumption Field Refinement (CFR), to represent such development. Central to our framework is the idea that the market system consists of several interlinked consumption fields and, as consumers develop a particular interest in a certain consumption activity (that has not yet been over-explored by other consumers) and strive for refinement within that area, the market subsystem—with the consumption field at its heart—evolves. However, in order for consumer interest to gain momentum and for refinement to occur, the consumption field requires refinement material from the firms/brand owners (e.g. increased product development both in width and depth); from media (e.g. expert knowledge, advocates); and from consumers (e.g. blog posts, recipes). The market system then evolves incrementally as consumption field after consumption field evolves due to consumer interest and refinement.

We believe that investigating CFR will have important implications for future research, as it will encourage a stronger focus on theoretical explanations and descriptions of meso-level consumption phenomena. We have suggested some concrete methods for researchers to work with meso-level conceptualizations, which we argue will complement prior macro-level conceptualizations derived from micro-level data. The CFR framework also implies that it is perhaps not only brands and services that are co-produced by firms and consumers but that these two entities, together with media, are co-producers in the development of new or existing market subsystems and industries.

**REFERENCES**


ABSTRACT

A significant amount of food produced ends up as waste. It has been estimated that up to a half of all food purchased by households is thrown away (Imeche.org 2013). This is alarming from the point of view of the environment, and relates to the negative consequences of Western overconsumption (Achrol and Kotler 2012). It has also been found that intentions of not wasting food do not correlate with actual food waste. Instead, routine practices of food purchasing and provisioning are more significant (Ropke 2009; Stefan et al. 2013). These practices are often unreflected upon by consumers yet they have a big impact on sustainability. Therefore, it is essential for research to focus on these practices in order to make a difference: to understand how waste emerges and to find ways to reduce it.

The purpose of this study is to examine consumer practices aimed at actively reducing food waste. These practices, consisting of materials, meanings and competences (Shove, Panzar, and Watson 2012), are investigated through a netnographic study of a Finnish food blog campaign. Special attention is paid on how consumer bloggers and their audience turn reducing food waste into a collective project of innovation, making these practices more socially acceptable and even trendy.

SUSTAINABILITY AND DISPOSITION PRACTICES

Sustainable consumption has received increased interest among consumer researchers in the past few decades, for instance manifested in TCR movement (Mick 2006). However, previous research has concentrated on consumer choices, whereas the full consumption cycle, with the exception of recycling, has often been overlooked (Prothero et al. 2011). Secondly, it has been acknowledged that more attention should be paid to empowering consumers as citizens (Prothero et al. 2011). As Trentmann (2007, 155) states, “examining washing, watching television, shopping and so forth as practice could provide a useful additional perspective for our understanding of the dynamics between consumption and citizenship.”

This study uses practice theory as a theoretical lens. It shifts the focus from individual intentions, attitudes, and behavior toward collective and shared practices. A practice is a routinized form of behavior consisting of a combination of elements that are interconnected (Reckwitz 2002). As people engage in a wide range of practices in their daily lives, the practices are carried on and maintained. It has been suggested that the way to change unsustainable practices would be to break certain links between the elements of the practice and replace them with new, more sustainable linkages (Hargreaves 2011). Food consumption takes place amidst a web of intersecting practices, which is why it becomes essential to study the elements of these practices and the context where they are performed by consumers.

Due to increasing environmental concerns, consumer disposal of goods has become even more central (Black and Cherrier 2012). It has been realized that disposition is not necessarily the end stage of a commodity’s life-cycle and it may have an interesting role in consumers’ lives as objects are moved along and re-valued (Parsons and Maclaran 2009). Practices of disposition identified include sharing, donating, exchanging, recycling or ridding (Albinsson and Perera 2009). While disposition practices in general have attained increasing attention, the realm of everyday life and particularly food consumption has not been studied very thoroughly (Cappellini 2009; Cappellini and Parsons 2009; Evans 2012; Munro 1995). Yet in terms of sustainability, household consumption patterns are in a central role. Disposition of food is also different from the disposition of more durable consumer objects, because after a certain time, the only option is to throw it away. Moreover, food waste is not related to any single behavior but it is caused in the intersection of several different influences: the way food industry produces, stores, packages, delivers and promotes food, the way food is purchased and stored at homes, personal values and habits, social and cultural norms, knowledge and skills as well as facilities and resources available for consumers (Quested et al. 2011). Cappellini (2009) and Evans (2012) have studied households’ food disposition practices ethnographically. Their findings reveal the socio-material contexts and routines wherein food waste emerges, but do not focus on how consumers actively attempt to reduce it.

This study is conducted in the online context, in consumer blogs. Social media has become a central social site for consumers to discuss and share their consumption practices. Online communities have also become arenas for collective innovation (Kozinets, Hemetsberger, and Schau 2008). It has been argued that cultural practices related to ecological consumption can be fruitfully studied in online communities where people constantly negotiate them (Rokka and Moisander 2009). For ordinary consumers, blogs give an opportunity to seek an audience for their acts of consumption (McQuarrie, Miller, and Phillips 2013) and a way to manifest opinions, share experiences, and represent taste and know-how (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). Thus for researchers, blogs offer an insightful and fruitful context to observe consumer practices as they are explicitly reflected and verbalized. The collective context means that consumers are likely to also influence each others’ practices, especially in the role of esteemed bloggers.

METHOD

The data for this study was generated by netnographic observation and analysis of a blog campaign initiated by consumers to avoid food waste. Netnography is a methodology developed for the study of online communities that pays attention to their social and cultural aspects (Kozinets 2002, 2009). The ongoing blog campaign was started in Finland in May 2012 by a food blogger who had read about the food waste statistics and become concerned about the issue: “The amount of food we throw away is staggering... We are connected... We are one large community. We must change things. We must reduce food waste. We can do it...” (Salt and Honey). The bloggers were committed to reduce food waste and transform their consumption from commodity to delicacy. The campaign was named From Waste to Delicacy: A blog initiated by Finnish consumers to avoid food waste and transform their consumption for sustainability. The campaign lasted for nine months during data generation and analysis. The data for the study is generated by netnographic observation and analysis of a blog campaign initiated by consumers to avoid food waste. Netnography is a methodology developed for the study of online communities that pays attention to their social and cultural aspects (Kozinets 2002, 2009). The ongoing blog campaign was started in Finland in May 2012 by a food blogger who had read about the food waste statistics and become concerned about the issue: “The amount of food we throw away is staggering... We are connected... We are one large community. We must change things. We must reduce food waste. We can do it...” (Salt and Honey).

In general, every one of us carries food to the garbage bin with both hands. Together with about thirty other food bloggers, we decided that something must be done... We want to inspire rather than lecture you all to magically transform waste into delicacy and at the same time reduce our own food waste (From Waste to Delicacy Blog Manifesto, Salt and Honey blog).

The data for this study was generated by closely following the blog campaign for nine months during data generation and analysis. All blog entries (293 entries between May 2012 and Jan 2013) with the campaign tag, along with the audience comments were downloaded and analyzed. Permission was asked from each blogger to conduct the study. The textual data from the blog entries and comments are approached as cultural text that gives access to cultural forms and understandings according to which people make sense of the world and perform their practices (Rokka and Moisander 2009).
Thus, the focus is not on individual consumers but on the collectively shared practices as they emerge from the online interaction.

We analyzed the data according to a practice theoretical framework developed by Shove et al. (2012) – categorizing the data into elements; materials, meanings and competences. This framework focuses on the changes taking place in practices as links between elements are made and broken.

**FINDINGS**

We present the findings beginning with practices related to cooking from food waste and continue with related practices such as shopping, storing, and preserving food. The elements that are particularly related to changing the bloggers’ and their audience’s practices into more sustainable ones through reducing food waste are highlighted.

*Materials.* Materials consist of “objects, infrastructures, tools, hardware and the body” (Shove et al. 2012, 23). They gain a significant role in consumers’ discussions of their food waste practices. Certain kitchen appliances are found useful in terms of reducing food waste, such as the freezer, the toaster and the blender. Consumers describe detailed procedures of using these appliances to reduce food waste. Procedures are also shared and spread through blogs, since many bloggers quote one another’s recipes and procedures, and the audience members also thank bloggers for their advice and tips:

> When reducing food waste, baking flatbread is handy because you can use yesterday’s boiled potatoes or mashed potatoes, just adjust the amount of water... When you have baked the flatbread, the toaster helps you to reduce waste. The flatbread is of course at its best on the baking day but it tastes good for several days when you toast it. (Salt and Honey)

I have to get that device for myself too! As I was cutting apple ringlets to dry, I wondered why I have not bought that kind of a slicer. (Comment in Apples and Honey)

The bloggers also introduce dishes that are easier to make with leftovers, such as casseroles, soups or pies where the ingredients are processed again. These dishes are not downgraded by the bloggers. In contrast, their positive aspects are brought forth in very enthusiastic words.

> My favorite leftover dish is the pie. In addition to making art out of varying the fillings (walnut-banana-blue cheese vs. dandelion-smoked bream-potatoes) the dough can also be varied; you can make it vegan or low-carb, it tastes good both cold and heated, you can take it with you to the office as lunch and you can even freeze it! (Gobbler)

In addition to sharing recipes and dishes that are easy to make with leftovers, the bloggers also discuss specific ingredients that are easier to make use of (e.g. cheese, milk products) or more difficult such as items that are bought in large quantities but only needed in small amounts (e.g. celery). Acquiring a selection of certain basic ingredients that help make dishes out of leftovers is also suggested.

> Besides discussing the practices related to cooking, the bloggers also report and reflect upon the material elements related to other practices that intersect with food waste. Regarding the practices of shopping food, package sizes are quoted several times as problematic.

> If you want newly baked bread with your salad or soup, you have to buy the whole bread and the half that does not get eaten tends to cause problems... (Jokihaika Cooks)

Consumers reflect upon their daily practices and schedules in relation to food waste, such as how much time they spend at home versus in restaurants or how travelling impacts their food waste. Some bloggers are also conscious that because of their blogs, they have to purchase more food than they need. However, food blogging can also be a way to be more systematic in purchasing food and therefore have more influence on reducing waste. Regarding the storage and preservation practices, bloggers report having inadequate space to store food, causing it to go bad quicker. However, tips are eagerly shared about making practical arrangements, such as organizing the fridge differently by making a map of the space or marking food that is put in the freezer.

I am a very visual kind of person and I have made a so-called freezer map. It charts the sections of my freezer on a sheet of paper and then I use small (4,5 x 1,5 cm) post-it notes to mark what I have in each section and how many portions. This system has enabled me to get the frozen stuff moving very well. Without the map they would no doubt be forgotten in the darkness of the freezer. (Comment in In the soup)

*Meanings.* Meanings represent the “social and symbolic significance of participation” (Shove et al. 2012, 23). Bloggers describe leftover food as tasty in addition to saving the environment and money. Making dishes from leftovers is considered as a sign that the person is accomplished and skilled as well. Thus, food bloggers are actively breaking the link between the association of food waste and leftovers with bad taste and lazy cooking. They are re-associating it with being a good cook and making tasty food:

> The salmon pie is actually really good and it is not just a desperate attempt to minimize the damage caused by too much food hoarding! (Salt and Honey)

> I think that a master chef can be identified from the way he or she can use the even not-so-delicious parts of ingredients and magically turn waste into delicacies! (In the Soup)

The bloggers’ efforts seem to be successful, because they receive a lot of enthusiasm from their audience. Some of them even wish they had leftovers so that they could try the recipes.

Part of the food blogging practice is photographing food and laying it out in an aesthetically pleasing way. This aspect is not lost when the bloggers post about food waste either. In many blogs, words like ‘magic’, ‘sorcery’, and ‘wizardry’ are used in connection with making new dishes out of leftovers and avoiding food waste. Thus, food waste practices are associated with innovation, imagination and superior skills. Related to this is also the aspect of trusting one’s own competence rather than blindly following recipes or taking the expiry dates in food packages literally.

> I absolutely love leftovers and the challenge to conjure up something new to eat instead of just warming it up and eating it as such. (On the Foodie’s Plate)

I’m not too faithful to the expiry dates. I try to trust my sense of smell more. (Belly Upside Down)

Regarding meaning elements that are not strictly related to cooking but to other practices, bloggers also break the taboo of serving leftover food to guests. In previous research (Cappellini 2009), consumers considered leftover meals somewhat lower quality and reserved them for family members only. However, in this study, the bloggers encouraged their audience to act differently; to take the dishes to their neighbors or to the workplace to be shared with others.
I have taken my dishes to friends and family, neighbors, my hairdresser and the nearest flower shop keeper. You don’t have to take a whole pie or cake every time; after your own family has had their share, you can spread the rest along. Try it out: I bet the store owner or service provider will be happy to receive a piece of pie or a cupcake that is made with love! (Heleen’s Hobbies)

Besides sharing recipes and tips for dealing with food waste, the bloggers also report about practices that prevent food waste from emerging. The pursuit of reducing their food waste is portrayed as a personal fight or a heroic deed that requires sacrifices such as eating too much, or having to plan shopping much more carefully:

Inspired by the “From waste to delicacy” theme, I decided to be a superwoman and in addition to saving my own kitchen, save the nearby food stores from threatening waste. I managed to save my wallet from threatening emptiness too since the stores often give discount for those products that have expiry dates coming. (Gobbler)

For a carefree person as I who cooks whatever pleases me, it has taken some effort and extra labor to be this systematic… I’m putting on the saint’s crown here because the result is so much better than what I could even dream of…but it has not come without pain. (Salt and Honey)

On the other hand, the bloggers also publicly acknowledge and admit that they are not immune to the bad habit of wasting food. According to Evans (2012), there is a lot of anxiety involved in the disposition of food. Consumers try to avoid throwing food away, but also regularly purchase more than they need, causing waste. This is largely due to social and material contexts of food practices such as time constraints, different tastes, conventions, family relations, and domestic divisions of labor. Also the bloggers in this study use language that refers to guilt and bad behavior regarding food waste:

I myself admit that I belong to the group that wastes the most; single women. I felt a sting in my heart when I heard about this issue. I cannot preach and point my finger to others because I need to look myself in the mirror first. (Soul Kitchen)

One reason for my naughtiness is that I live in a one person household – giant packages of food end up as waste sometimes – and the other reason is my own stupidity and laziness. I almost always eat whatever I please and what I feel like eating. If leftovers do not interest me, they go to waste. (Italian Evening)

One must eat vegetables, for sure. This thought comes to mind apparently much more often in the store than at home. Too often I pull wilted, blackened or even moldy vegetables from the fridge. (Salt and Honey)

Competences. Competences consist of understanding and practical knowledgeability (Shove et al. 2012, 23). As discussed above, food bloggers share detailed descriptions of how they have reduced food waste or made delicious food from leftovers. Techniques of freezing and drying food as well as boosting leftover dishes are shared in detailed manner.

I use wilted vegetables and fruit well; either they go to the blender to make drinks or they are used into making pastes or new delicacies with the dryer. I even use the peels of oranges for an efficient washing detergent. (Oranges and Honey)

Bloggers also share their know-how regarding how to tell good waste from waste that can no longer be used in cooking, or how to adapt recipes:

You might as well use leftover boiled potatoes to cook the omelet, even though most recipes tell you to put raw potatoes on the pan. (Belly Upside Down)

Using creativity is part of food blogging in general, and it suits the project of reducing waste well. Becoming a better and more innovative user of leftovers is considered a skill worth pursuing. The empty fridge becomes a sign of success rather than financial trouble. New and innovative practices also include transforming the category of a dish, such as making smoothies out of salad. Ideas also move from the audience to bloggers:

I got an excellent tip from a reader. She had made a profound inventory of her cupboard and conjured self-made muesli from the scrapings of many kinds of flakes, cereals and dried cranberries. I followed her example right away! (Belly Upside Down)

Bloggers also develop their competences in using leftovers and avoiding food waste through becoming more reflective of their shopping practices and storing practices. It includes avoiding impulse purchasing and planning more in advance, as well as learning how to tell good fruit from too ripe ones in the store, for instance. Bloggers also engage in making public promises and challenges:

The situation is much better when the fridge is organized and with just one glance you can draw a mental image and shopping list of what you need to buy from the store. (Scallop)

Before going to the store I promise to look in my fridge in case there’s something I can use. I will make a shopping list and plan in advance in order to avoid impulse buying. I won’t go to the store feeling hungry… If I make a lot of food, I will serve it to friends or neighbors. Doggy bags for the guests if they want, but not forcing it! (Terhi’s Kitchen)

Bloggers also engage in new practices that help them achieve their goals, such as counting the amount of food that goes to waste every week and trying to reduce that number, or intentionally emptying the freezer.

CONCLUSION

The study is situated within the recent stream of research that uses practice theory to study consumption, and in particular, ecological consumption (Gram-Hanssen 2011; Hargreaves 2011; Rokka and Moisander 2009; Ropke 2009). Several contributions are provided to studies on food disposition practices, sustainability and blogging. Firstly, our analysis highlights consumers’ active role in diminishing food waste. In contrast to earlier studies about food disposition practices in households (Cappellini 2009; Evans 2012), bloggers made their practices public and shared them with their audience. As bloggers engage in reflecting about their practices in order to blog about them, they become more aware of the sustainability of their food purchasing, storing, cooking, and preserving practices. While previous research has emphasized the reasons why food waste emerges and the routines and socio-material contexts wherein this happens, our study focuses more on how consumers actively attempt to change their practices and reduce food waste.

In our study, bloggers countered the negative meanings related to food waste with more positive ones, such as innovation, imagination, trends and aesthetics. Reducing food waste became a collective
project of innovation. Our results can be reflected with Fernandez, Brittain, and Bennett’s (2011) study on dumpster diving, where consumers also engaged in turning the meaning of trash into something valuable. The bloggers in our study endeavored in becoming the most innovative, imaginative and skilled user of leftovers and waste. Thus, it can be argued that our results complement previous studies on collective innovation in online communities (Kozinets et al. 2008) by showing how bloggers can become the leaders of innovation inspiring a larger crowd to creatively change their consumption practices. Our study also complements earlier findings on fashion bloggers who act as taste leaders for their audience and accumulate cultural capital (McQuarrie et al. 2013) as well as change markets (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). Besides acting individually, bloggers can make a difference and mobilize other consumers collectively, such as through campaigns where they interact with other bloggers. Investigating these collective efforts in more detail is a fruitful option for further research.

Our study has implications for companies within food industry, policy-makers and consumers themselves. According to practice theory, the key to changing behavior is not in changing people’s attitudes or influencing their individual decisions regarding sustainability (Ropke 2009). Rather, focus should be moved toward collective practices; habits and routines as well as socially and culturally shared patterns of action (Evans 2012; Hargreaves 2011). In addition to influencing policy-making and through government-initiated campaigns such as Love Food Hate Waste in the UK (http://www.lovefoodhatewaste.com/), practices are transformed and changed in the daily interactions between consumers. Blogs appear as a specific social site where consumers can reflect, discuss and attempt to change their practices related to food waste. Future research might focus more on the long-term impact of online collective innovation and especially short-term blog campaigns on consumers’ everyday practices.

Table 1: Summary of the Empirical Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practices/Elements</th>
<th>MATERIALS</th>
<th>MEANINGS</th>
<th>COMPETENCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practices related to cooking from food waste</td>
<td>Kitchen appliances, specific recipes, Dishes and ingredients</td>
<td>Food = delicious, Cook = professional, skilled, competent Cooking = aesthetic, imaginative, innovative, magical</td>
<td>Techniques (boosting, freezing), Know-how to recognize good waste and to innovate Transforming dish category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other practices intersecting with food waste (shopping, storing, preserving, sharing)</td>
<td>Food packages Schedules (allocation of time) Storage and preservation facilities and materials</td>
<td>Sharing waste food as gifts Reducing food waste is heroic and requires effort Guilt reported publicly</td>
<td>Reflecting and developing shopping and storing practices Listing goals and promises Challenging others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REFERENCES


Green Consumption and the Theory of Planned Behavior in the Context of Post-Megaquake Behaviors in Japan

Sumire Stanislawski, Waseda University, Japan
Yasushi Sonobe, Takachiho University, Japan
Shuji Ohira, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to analyze Japanese consumers’ decision-making processes for environmentally friendly products. Using consumers’ market and non-market behavior after the Great East Japan Earthquake to group them, intersegment differences in decision-making are analyzed using the theory of planned behavior (TPB). The Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident on March 11, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as “3.11”) shocked the nation. In the weeks following, energy saving and alternative energy became immediate and pressing social issues. In a wider context, environmental consciousness and a sense of social responsibility were also heightened, resulting in shifts in consumption and normally uncommon charitable behavior. Though Japanese typically do not donate or volunteer as much as in the West (Japan Fundraising Association 2012), post-3.11 saw a groundswell of such behavior, with an unprecedented number donating and volunteering for disaster-hit areas. In addition, many firms undertook cause-related marketing (CRM) where a portion of revenues were donated to reconstruction efforts. 3.11 acted as a catalyst for Japanese consumers to gain insight into how consumption choices could contribute toward social issues.

Before 3.11, the idea that social issues could be addressed through consumption was not widespread. For example, low consciousness of solving social issues through consumption was described by the Cabinet Office in Japan (2008). Though many consumers purchased some environmentally friendly products, these decisions were driven primarily by economic incentives (i.e., energy and cost-saving in the long-term). Also, the availability of environmentally friendly, organic, CRM, and other such products with social and environmental implications was limited. After 3.11, products to aid reconstruction efforts became widely available. This phenomenon was expressed as omen (aid) consumption by the media, and included supporting businesses in affected areas. Also, rolling blackouts and the ongoing threat of nuclear meltdown heightened awareness of energy-saving devices, organic food, and other environmentally friendly products. By purchasing these products after 3.11, Japanese consumers experienced and gained understanding of consumption in the context of addressing social issues.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Previous research on green consumers can be divided into their characteristics and decision-making. Studies analyzing their characteristics employed market segmentation methods using demographic and psychographic variables (e.g., Kinnear et al. 1974; Roberts 1996; Diamantopoulos et al. 2003). Some studies further observed hierarchies of consumers using cluster, factor, and discriminant analysis based on these characteristics (e.g., Roberts 1995). These studies found three to five clusters and assessed intersegment differences.

Though few studies address the characteristics and percentage of green consumers in Japan, around 60% of Japanese are reported to be environmentally conscious (e.g., Yamamura et al. 2010, 2011). However, such studies focus on environmentally friendly behavior overall, and purchase behaviors were shown to be lower than other related behavior (e.g., recycling). Therefore, actual green consumers are likely to be a lower percentage than previous research suggests.

Many studies on decision-making processes of green consumers utilize the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen 1980) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1991; Ajzen and Madden 1986). TPB assumes that attitude toward behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control influence intention, which then influences behavior. Attitude toward behavior is composed of beliefs and evaluation of these beliefs. Subjective norm addresses the influence of others and is based on beliefs about what others think. Perceived behavioral control is related to a person’s “confidence in their ability to perform [the behavior]” (Ajzen 1991, 184). Some studies have added original variables including: self-identity, perceived consumer effectiveness, knowledge, sense of responsibility, past behavior, and habit (e.g., Berger and Corbin 1992; Kaiser et al. 1999; Knussen et al. 2004; Sparks and Shepherd 1992). However, the majority of research do not address differences in decision-making among segments, leaving practitioners with little insight into how to target environmentally friendly products to various segments. (There are some notable exceptions: Bamberg 2003; Li 2009; Knussen et al. 2004.)

Though there are many studies on green behavior in Japan, only a few clarify decision-making processes of green consumers (e.g., Ohtomo and Hirose 2007). These studies used TRA/TPB while adding additional constructs including: perceived consumer effectiveness, cost-benefit evaluations, ecological involvement (Nishio 2005), social responsibility, and man-nature orientation (Li 2009). In this paper, we first consider the standard TPB model while dividing perceived behavioral control into internal factors related to self-efficacy (perceived consumer effectiveness) and external factors related to potential barriers (perceived availability) in line with Sparks et al. (1997) and Vermeir and Verbeke (2007).

Hypothesis 1: Attitude toward behavior, subjective norm, perceived consumer effectiveness, and perceived availability positively impacts intention to purchase environmentally friendly products.

Ajzen (1991) noted past behavior as a predictor of future behavior. Sparks and Shepherd (1992), Cheung et al. (1999), Biswas et al. (2000), and Knussen et al. (2004) have verified the use of past behavior as an addition to the TPB model. Thøgersen (2002) interprets past behavior as direct experiences of consumers, and consumer culture theory notes the importance of purchase experiences in influencing consumer consciousness (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). We propose that consumers who undertook socially beneficial consumption after 3.11 also gained understanding of the meaning behind these products (Hirschman 1980; Richins 1994), and that these experiences influence their current decision-making.

In addition to past consumption, this study also considers non-market charitable behaviors (i.e., donating and volunteering), because consumers are also citizens in society who undertake actions to solve social issues outside of the marketplace (Harrison 2005). As such, those who wish to solve social issues may undertake both market and non-market behaviors toward this end. In the aftermath of 3.11, many Japanese people gained deeper understanding of how market and non-market behaviors can help solve social issues. Con-
consumers who engaged in post-3.11 aiding behaviors are likely to have higher intention to continue to do so as these behaviors have become more salient since the disaster. In fact, our previous analysis of data provided by a Japanese firm found that post-3.11 green consumption was highly correlated with other post-3.11 market (CRM and ouen consumption) and non-market (donations and volunteering) aiding behaviors (Ohira et al. 2013). Furthermore, the same research found that clustering based on post-3.11 aiding behavior resulted in statistically significant differences between demographic and psychographic variables in line with previous findings on hierarchies of green consumers. Thus, it is proposed that clustering based on post-3.11 behavior is likely to result in intersegment differences in decision-making.

Hypothesis 2: Differences in past aiding behavior will influence the structural paths of the TPB model, resulting in distinct decision-making by segments clustered by these behaviors.

**METHOD**

An online survey was administered in August 2012. Of 2589 invites sent to an online panel, 1073 surveys were collected with sex and age evenly distributed. From this, 757 useable responses were obtained (29.2% useable response rate), with 51.1% male, 64.3% married, 56.1% with children, 69.6% with post-high school education, and a mean age of 44.23 (range 20–60). Items to measure the TPB constructs were based on past research (attitude and subjective norm: Taylor and Todd 1995; perceived consumer effectiveness: Ellen et al. 1991; perceived availability: Vermeir and Verbeka 2007; intention: Ajzen and Madden 1986; and past behavior: Knussen et al. 2004) with adjustments made for the Japanese context. Responses were made on a 7-point scale labeled from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” on items of the TPB constructs.

**Attitude toward behavior.** [1] I like environmentally friendly products (M = 4.43, SD = 1.09) [2] I am interested in environmentally friendly products (M = 4.50, SD = 1.12) [3] When I buy environmentally friendly products, I feel like I did something good (M = 4.51, SD = 1.11) [4] Buying environmentally friendly products is cool (M = 4.01, SD = 1.16) [5] I am interested in environmental issues (M = 4.83, SD = 1.12).


**Perceived consumer effectiveness.** [1] If I buy environmentally friendly products, it will lead to resolution of environmental issues (M = 3.80, SD = 1.19) [2] An individual’s consumption cannot solve environmental issues [reverse-scored] (M = 3.52, SD = 1.33).

**Perceived availability.** [1] I have many opportunities to buy environmentally friendly products (M = 3.71, SD = 1.05) [2] It is easy to buy environmentally friendly products (M = 4.10, SD = 1.00).

**Intention.** [1] I do not plan to buy environmentally friendly products [reverse-scored] (M = 3.78, SD = 1.29) [2] I would spare no effort to buy environmentally friendly products (M = 3.69, SD = 1.10) [3] I intend to buy environmentally friendly products (M = 4.10, SD = 1.00).

**Past behavior (post-3.11 aiding behavior).** After 3.11, how many times did you: [1] make donations (including those unrelated to 3.11) (M = 2.29, SD = 1.91), [2] volunteer (including those unrelated to 3.11) (M = 0.48, SD = 1.36), [3] buy environmentally friendly products (M = 1.89, SD = 2.19), [4] buy CRM products (including those unrelated to 3.11) (M = 1.32, SD = 1.92), [5] do ouen consumption (M = 2.20, SD = 2.37)? Responses were made on a 5-point scale labeled from zero to more than 6 times.

**RESULTS**

Factor analysis (principal factor method with pro-max rotation) was conducted. Subjective norm [2] (friends and acquaintances) had factor loading over 1. As this item and subjective norm [1] (family) had high correlation (.871), they were made into the composite variable “People I know” to resolve this issue. Also, post-3.11 volunteering was removed due to low communality (.10). All remaining items loaded above .40 with an absence of cross-loadings. Cronbach’s alpha values were: past behavior .783, attitude .892, subjective norm .795, perceived consumer effectiveness .594, perceived availability .664, and intention .782.

**Figure 1: Theory of Planned Behavior Model of Environmentally Friendly Products (Overall Sample)**

The theoretically assumed model of the structural relationships between TPB constructs was tested in Amos with all paths significant at p < .005. Attitude toward behavior, subjective norm, perceived consumer effectiveness, and perceived availability positively impacts intention to purchase environmentally friendly products, supporting hypothesis 1. The model had good fit statistics (χ² = 216.655, p = .000, RMR = .057, GFI = .960, AGFI = .934, CFI = .974, RMSEA = .056).

To further analyze intersegment differences in decision-making, past behavior was used to cluster the overall sample. Three clusters were created using post-3.11 market (green, CRM, and ouen consumption) and non-market (donations) behaviors as dependent variables, where the number of clusters was determined by two-step, and final clusters were obtained by k-means clustering. (Volunteering was excluded here also.) The three clusters were labeled as: 1. Greens (20.3%); 2. Yellow Greens (34.6%); and 3. Browns (45%).
These clusters were tested for differences in demographic variables (chi-squared tests) with statistically significant differences for sex ($p = .000$, age ($p = .000$), marital status ($p = .000$), children ($p = .000$), and education ($p = .009$) among segments. Greens tend to be female (61.0%), older ($M = 46.88$), married (67.9%), children (66.9%), and have post-high school education (72.7%). They have the most experience across all behaviors. Yellow Greens also tend to be female (53.1%), older ($M = 48.56$), married (71.4%), have children (66.9%), and have post-high school education (72.6%), though to a lesser extent than Greens. Their experience is mainly with donations and own consumption (both were behaviors stimulated by 3.11). Browns tend to be male (59.8%), comparatively younger ($M = 40.24$), less likely to be married (58.4%) or have children (51.0%), and have less post-high school education (66.1%). They tend to have little to no experience across all behaviors. This is in line with our past research (Ohira et al. 2013) and also shows similarities between the Greens and the Japanese LOHAS segment, which consists of approximately 25% of the Japanese market (Nishio 2010).

Mean structure analysis was used to compare the intention construct across clusters (Kano and Miura 2003; Sörbom 1978). The mean and variance of Greens’ intention constructs were fixed to 0 and 1. Comparing against this, Yellow Greens’ mean and variance is -0.64 and 0.71, and Browns’ mean and variance is -1.17 and 0.96. Going from Greens to Browns, intention to purchase environmentally friendly products decreases.

Next, multiple group analysis was carried out to analyze differences in structural paths between the three clusters with good fit statistics ($\chi^2 = 384.153$, $p = .000$, RMR = .072, GFI = .933, AGFI = .892, CFI = .965, RMSEA = .035). Results are summarized in table 1 and show support for hypothesis 2. Greens had two statistically significant paths to intention: attitude ($p = .000$), and perceived availability ($p = .003$). All paths to intention were significant for Yellow Greens: attitude ($p = .000$, subjective norm ($p = .022$), perceived consumer effectiveness ($p = .011$), and perceived availability ($p = .020$). Perceived availability to intention was not significant for Browns, but the remaining paths were: attitude ($p = .000$, subjective norm ($p = .003$), and perceived consumer effectiveness ($p = .028$).

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**DISCUSSION**

Since 3.11, consumption to help solve social issues has become more notable in Japan. In order to encourage this movement, decision-making processes behind this phenomenon must be understood. Toward this end, we grouped consumers based on post-3.11 behavior to gain insight into each segment’s decision-making to purchase environmentally friendly products. Past behavior was shown as a useful indicator for marketers to analyze markets for these products. Analysis of the overall sample showed that the TPB model had an explanatory ability of $R^2 = 0.65$ for Japanese consumers’ intention to purchase environmentally friendly products. An unexpected finding was that subjective norm did not have much influence on purchase intention, even though Japan is a collectivist society. This may be due to the fact that the survey did not specify a product category (a limitation of this study), and respondents may have imagined privately consumed products, such as energy-saving household devices, when answering.

Across all groups, an individual’s attitude had the strongest influence on intention. This was most notable for the Greens, whose decisions were influenced by their attitudes, followed by perceived availability. This indicates that their positive attitudes may be translated into action as long as the behavior is accessible. This simplified decision-making is ripe for further research, which could consider the effects of high involvement or habits (Knussen et al. 2004; Chan...
In addition, the strong impact of attitude may be assessed in the context of attitude formation. The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1981) theorizes on how attitudes are formed and changed through central and peripheral routes depending on motivation and ability of consumers. Petty et al. (1981, 1983) showed that the level of consumer involvement influences attitude formation and change. Greens are likely to have higher involvement and knowledge—potentially indicating formation of attitude through central routes. Yellow Greens and Browns may have low involvement and knowledge, thus forming attitude through peripheral routes. Differences in attitude formation processes may explain why fewer variables influence Greens’ purchases. It can be construed that their attitudes are already firmly formed, resulting in heuristics-based decision-making. Further understanding of Greens may be obtained by clarifying their attitude-formation process. For example, past research into consumers who are highly concerned with ethical issues have focused on values, self-identity, and ethical obligation (e.g., Shaw and Clarke 1999; Shaw and Shiu 2003).

The influence of perceived availability was highest for Greens, diminished for Yellow Greens, and not significant for Browns. This may be due to the fact that Browns have little experience with green consumption, resulting in a lack of understanding of the actual availability of these products in the marketplace. The influence of perceived consumer effectiveness was highest for Browns, diminished for Yellow Greens, and not significant for Greens. The lower groups may have skepticism about how these products are related to solving social issues, resulting in lower evaluation of perceived consumer effectiveness and lower intention. The influence of subjective norm was also highest for Browns, diminished for Yellow Greens, and not significant for Greens. This is likely because Greens are the “influencers” in this marketplace (rather than being influenced) as they lead the way in consumption of environmentally friendly products. To better understand these possibilities, we are currently undertaking research into skepticism and word-of-mouth in the marketplace for environmentally friendly products in Japan.

The three-cluster solution offers insight into segments that are of interest to marketers wishing to expand the reach of environmentally friendly products. Compared to the indifferent Browns, Yellow Greens are more likely to respond to marketing activities to persuade green consumption. Attitude has the highest impact on Yellow Greens, followed in order by perceived consumer effectiveness, perceived availability, and subjective norm. While marketing strategies to build and reinforce positive attitudes would be effective for all segments, Yellow Greens will particularly benefit from marketing strategies that boost perceived consumer effectiveness and perceived availability (i.e., perceived behavioral control). Browns are also influenced by their lower attitude and perceived consumer effectiveness. As such, increasing perceived consumer effectiveness may be vital to increasing green consumption among those who are currently less likely to purchase environmentally friendly products. Research to understand barriers to the formation of positive attitudes and perceived consumer effectiveness (e.g., lack of information regarding actual environmental impact resulting from product choices) would help improve the appeal of these products. If these lower groups can be persuaded, then environmentally friendly products will have more distribution in the marketplace, improving perceived availability, which could then stimulate consumption across segments.

Past research observed the existence of various segments of green consumers, but differences in decision making among them have seldom been addressed. Our research shows intersegment differences do exist, with these differences having implications for marketing strategies. Though this study used both market and non-market past behavior to segment consumers, non-market behaviors (volunteering and donating) were shown to have less impact. In Japan, 1995 (the year of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake) is often considered the first year that volunteerism took off, and very little time has passed since it has gained wide social recognition. Similarly, it is noted that donating had not taken root in Japanese culture prior to 3.11 (Japan Fundraising Association 2012). The results of this study were affected by such cultural constraints, but in societies where charitable behaviors are common (e.g., the United States), non-market behaviors may be shown to help predict purchase intentions for environmentally friendly products. Replicating this study with consumers in other cultures could help refine the framework used here.

One underlying meaning of environmentally friendly products is to help solve environmental issues through consumption of these products. Green consumers, who are motivated and able to interpret such underlying meaning in their consumption experiences, exist among consumers who purchase these products. In that sense, experience can be considered an important factor in green consumers’ decision-making. This suggests the need to capture decision-making processes more dynamically by integrating rational decision-making theories, such as TPB, with an understanding of the meaning of consumption, as found in consumer culture theory, to obtain deeper understanding of green consumers. To this end, focus groups and in-depth interviews are currently under way by the authors to obtain such insights. Future research into the meanings of green and other socially beneficial consumption among consumers across various cultures is likely to provide fertile ground for international comparative research.

REFERENCES


Is a Picture Always Worth a Thousand Words? Attention to Structural Elements of eWOM for Consumer Brands within Social Media

Ernest Hoffman, University of Akron, USA
Terry Daugherty, University of Akron, USA

ABSTRACT

Consumer attention has long been known to influence evaluations of, and responses to, advertising stimuli in meaningful ways (e.g., Krugman, 1971; Morrison & Dainoff, 1972). Indeed, behavioral eye-tracking studies have been utilized for quite some time to link attention to outcomes of interest such as product recognition (Kroebel-Riel & Barton, 1980), recall (Krugman, Fox, Fletcher, Fischer, & Rojas, 1994; Rosbergen, Pieters, & Wedel, 1997), and product sales (Trostman & Gregg, 1979). Although tremendous insights have been gained from this work, the context of consumer attention has changed dramatically in at least two ways that necessitate novel exploration.

First, the emergence of social media (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, Pinterest) has created a context where massive amounts of image and text-based messages compete for consumer attention like never before. According to a recent report (Bennett, 2012), consumers share more than 600,000 pieces of content and create over 25,000 social media posts every sixty seconds. In such an over-saturated environment, text and image elements must compete to get noticed at all. This is significant because in order for message elements to have an impact on consumers (i.e., make a difference), they must first be noticed. Yet, attention is typically studied in offline contexts, such as print (e.g., Lohse, 1997; Pieters & Wedel, 2004), where the number of visual and textual stimuli competing to get noticed is substantially more limited.

Second, the growing influence of consumer-generated electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) has given consumers an unprecedented stake in product advertising (Chu & Kim, 2011; Riegner, 2007; Zhang & Daugherty, 2009; Henning-Thuran, Gwinner, Walsh, & Gremle, 2004). In general, word-of-mouth (WOM) is a critical component of marketing (Brown & Reingen, 1987; Buttle, 1998) with user-generated reviews perceived as more credible and less biased than company-generated advertising (Dellarocas, 2003; Ha, 2006; Keller, 2007; Phelps, Lewis, Mobillo, Perry, & Rammon, 2004). In fact, new customer acquisition (Doyle, 1998), increased sales (Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006), and product-use decisions (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995; Godes & Mayzlin, 2004) have all been directly linked to WOM communication. Marketers now have the opportunity to initiate and influence WOM unlike ever before on a large scale quickly and efficiently. Subsequently, interest has grown regarding the conditions that dictate whether or not consumers pay attention to WOM (Daugherty and Hoffman in press).

One area of consumer attention that is broadly affected by these changes pertains to structural differences in message presentation, including the strategic use of image versus text-based elements. In traditional offline contexts, where advertising is driven by corporate marketing, image-based elements have been shown to capture attention more than text (e.g., Pieters & Wedel, 2004). However, this may not always be the case in social media contexts where product reviews are consumer-driven, creating an element of uncertainty regarding message valence. In particular, the emergence of negative word-of-mouth (NWOM) introduces the possibility of product reviews being harmful as opposed to promotional.

To further explore these dynamics, we first review the existing literature regarding consumer attention to structural elements of eWOM. We then provide a theoretical rationale for presuming that a more complex relationship unfolds in a social media environment where product information is consumer-generated. A series of testable hypotheses are presented, and an eye-tracking study is undertaken to better understand how visual elements, message valence and brand type interact to influence consumer attention within social media. Implications and managerial recommendations are then discussed on the basis of our findings.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Two prevailing paradigms are used to study how consumers attend to structural elements of advertising. One paradigm is concerned with optimizing the effectiveness of ad component presentation. Factors such as size or location are manipulated to maximize the impact of text or image on attention. For instance, Kroebel-Riel and Barton (1980) manipulated the positioning of text-based elements and found that locating text at the top of an ad leads to better information acquisition. A similar approach was taken by Garcia, Ponsada, and Esteban (2000), who found that image positioning matters, but only when pre-existing product involvement is low. Other studies have considered text and image elements together, manipulating the use of color and graphics (Lohse, 1997) or size and location (Drezes & Hushsherr, 2003) to determine the type of presentation that is most likely to capture attention.

A second approach has sought to compare the effectiveness of images and text in capturing consumer attention. Pieters and Wedel (2004), for instance, found that attention to pictorial elements of ads is superior to text-based elements regardless of manipulations in size. In an earlier study, these authors determined that attention fixation to brand and pictorial elements of ads led to better memory of the brand, whereas text fixations did not. To date, a long line of research has established the relative superiority of images in evoking attention (e.g., Rossiter, 1981; Singh, Lessig, Kim, Gupta, & Hocutt, 2000).

Social media has changed the manner in which consumers are exposed to product-related information. Specifically, it is now possible for products to be linked to multiple different images and textual reviews by eWOM generators, rather than a select handful of marketer-driven formats. To our knowledge however, a comparative integrated paradigm has yet to be adopted within the unique context of consumer-generated content. One major difference in this venue is the greater propensity for consumer-generated message elements to vary in the extent to which they endorse a brand. Nevertheless, without accounting for more complex dynamics (as we do below) we suspect that image-based elements will continue to appear as if they capture more attention amongst social media users than text-based elements.

Qualifying Attention to Structural Elements: Brand Luxury

Brands are frequently distinguished in terms of having either utilitarian or hedonic value (Sen & Lerman, 2007). Utilitarian brands are evaluated by consumers in terms of their usefulness or practicality (Strahilevitz & Meyers, 1998) while hedonic brands are judged in terms of the extent to which they satisfy consumer wants (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982). Research has shown that assessments of utilitarian brands are cognitively-driven and rooted in objective information about specific product features (Drolet, Simonson, & Tversky, 2000;
Park & Moon, 2003). In contrast, hedonic assessments are grounded in emotional assessments of subjective content, particularly as consumer involvement increases (Park & Moon, 2003).

A notable feature of consumer-generated content such as eWOM is its subjective basis. A series of experiments conducted by Sen and Lerman (2007) shed light on this phenomenon. In these studies, consumers were asked to read a series of textual, web-based product reviews for utilitarian and hedonic products. For hedonic products, negative reviews were attributed to the subjective bias of consumer reviewers. In contrast, unfavorable reviews of utilitarian products were attributed to product characteristics. Integrating these insights, we see that consumers a) utilize subjective content to form their judgments of hedonic products and b) believe that consumer-generated content regarding these products is more subjective. Thus, it stands to reason that consumer-generated text will evoke more attention in the case of hedonic products as opposed to utilitarian products. In the word-of-mouth literature, the utilitarian/hedonic distinction is often talked about in terms of luxury versus non-luxury brands (e.g., Berry, 1994; Patrick & Haugtvedt, 2009). In particular, luxury brands are often identified in terms of their hedonic attributes, while non-luxury brands are framed in terms of their utilitarian functionality. We adopt the luxury/non-luxury distinction here and suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Attention to image versus text-based elements of eWOM will be qualified by the brand. Specifically, consumers will pay more attention to eWOM for a) image-based elements of non-luxury brands and b) text-based elements of luxury brands.

Further Qualifying Attention to Structural Elements: Word-of-Mouth Type

As mentioned previously, consumer-generated eWOM may include evaluative judgments (Buttle, 1998; Carl, 2008), non-evaluative information sharing (Richins & Root-Shaffer, 1988), and communal “buzz” (Dye, 2000). In contrast to traditional modes of advertising, eWOM is believed to be particularly influential due to its naturalistic source (Keller, 2007), the speed with which it is transmitted (Juryvetson, 2000; Mohr, 2001), and the ease with which it is retrieved (Bakos, 1997; Hoffman & Novak, 1997). Further distinction is drawn between positive word-of-mouth (PWOM), or favorable reviews of products and services, and negative word-of-mouth (NWOM), or unfavorable reviews (see Luo, 2009). Meanwhile, neutral word-of-mouth has an informational tone, yet can still be persuasive by virtue of facilitating consumer awareness.

Sen and Lerman (2007) note that consumers possess an attentional bias towards negative eWOM (see also Ahulwia & Shiv, 1997). This is because the relative scarcity of negative informational cues (in comparison to positive and neutral) makes them more salient, engendering increased attention (see Zajonc, 1968). These authors subsequently demonstrate that subjects engaged more with negative reviews of hedonic (luxury) as opposed to utilitarian (non-luxury) products. It appears that this was due to the fact that negative reviews of luxury products were more expectation-inconsistent (and thus, attributed to rater biases) than negative reviews of utilitarian products, which were feasible, and thus attributed to product characteristics. Notably, the reviews presented to subjects were predominantly text-related. However, Sen and Lerman (2007) neither measured attention directly (i.e., behaviorally) nor included product images, which are frequently utilized by consumers in a social media context. Based on these findings, we suggest the following three-way interaction will occur:

Hypothesis 2: Attention to image versus text-based elements of eWOM will be qualified by message type. Specifically, consumers will pay more attention to eWOM text elements for luxury brands containing negative word-of-mouth (NWOM).

METHOD

To test these hypotheses, a within-subjects 2 x 3 x 2 factorial design experiment was conducted (see Table 1). Consumer attention was measured using eye-movement tracking across a series of consumer-generated eWOM social media pages with structural elements (text vs: image), message valence (negative vs: positive vs: neutral) and brand type (luxury vs: non-luxury) serving as the independent variables. Consumer research on attention typically utilizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III sum of squares</th>
<th>df</th>
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<th>F</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>105010.71</td>
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<td>Luxury x WOM Type</td>
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<td>107326.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxury x Text/Image</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOM Type x Text/Image</td>
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<td>Luxury x WOM type x Text/Image</td>
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<td>53224.63</td>
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<td>.001**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a within-subject design (e.g., Lohse, 1997; Pieters & Wedel, 2004) as a means of ascertaining differences in attention to various categories of stimuli by the average consumer.

**Participants.** A total of twenty-eight undergraduates enrolled at a Midwestern university in the US took part in this study. This sample was chosen based on research suggesting that eWOM is most likely to impact the purchase decisions of 15-24 year-olds (Wallace, Walker, Lopez, & Jones, 2011).

**Stimuli.** We constructed a series of web-pages containing consumer-generated product reviews using the popular social media platform Pinterest. This platform functions as a virtual pin board, enabling users to search the internet for images, "pin" them to thematic "boards" or pages, and add any comments they may have about the images they post. Other Pinterest users have access to these boards, and are free to "re-pin" the images and comments that they like. Pinterest stands apart from other social media platforms by juxtaposing images and text. Furthermore, one of its explicit emphases is consumer-driven eWOM, as evidenced by a recent survey (Boticca.com, 2012) indicating that consumers referred to product websites from Pinterest spent an average of $180. Facebook users, in contrast, spend an average of $85.

Numerous product categories were considered for this experiment. We chose to use restaurants based on recent evidence (Harris Interactive, 2006; cf. Allsop, Bassett, & Hoskins, 2007) that eWOM pertaining to restaurants is sought out and provided online more than any other product category. Specific representatives of luxury and non-luxury restaurants were chosen on the basis of previous research recommendations for studying the luxury/non-luxury distinction (see Arora, 2012). In this instance, Hyde Park Prime Steakhouse was selected to represent the luxury (hedonic) category, while Applebee's was selected as a non-luxury (utilitarian) counterpart offering a comparable type of cuisine.

Separate product pages were constructed and pre-tested using Pinterest for each brand and designed to be viewed on a single computer screen, eliminating the need for subjects to scroll or navigate to other locations. The text for the positive, negative, and neutral eWOM stimuli were adapted from actual social media content and combined with product images corresponding with standard consumer-generated eWOM on Pinterest. Images chosen by consumers to coincide with product reviews included restaurant logos, the interior/exterior design of the restaurant, staff representatives, and prepared meals. Eight image/text pairs were selected for each of the two brand pages, resulting in a total of 16 image/text pairs that were randomized in order to minimize the influence of order effects. A pilot study (n = 56) was done to validate the brand type and message valence stimuli. Paired comparison t-tests indicated significant mean differences between the luxury ratings of Applebee’s and Hyde Park Prime Steakhouse (m_{Applebee’s} = 2.73, m_{HydePark} = 5.69, t = 9.86). For message valence, subjects were asked to evaluate the 16 text/image pairs and rate the extent to which they represent a) positive, b) negative, and c) neutral (e.g., restaurant hours, location) word-of-mouth using a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 = not at all positive, 7 = very positive). Within-subject ANOVA results indicated that participants viewed PWOM combinations as more positive in nature than negative or neutral (F_{2, 54} = 256.09, p < .001). Consistent results were found for the negative (F_{2, 54} = 182.75, p < .001) and neutral (F_{2, 14} = 47.14, p < .001) text/image pairs.

**Dependent Measure.** Consumer attention was measured as the dependent variable and operationally defined as the total number of times participants fixated on pre-identified Areas of Interest (AOIs). Fixation frequency was measured using the Multi-Analysis of Psychophysiological and Performance Signals (MAPPS) eye-tracking system produced by eyesDx. To pinpoint consumer attention, each restaurant page was coded in terms of 16 AOIs (8 images, 8 text elements). Once relevant AOIs are identified, the eye-tracking software monitors and records participant eye movement and fixation frequency within the AOIs and data is subsequently aggregated for analysis.

**Procedure.** Subjects first completed a brief online survey designed to collect background information on each participant. Next, a script was read to participants introducing the eye-tracking software followed by an eye-movement calibration exercise. Calibration is an important step in eye-tracking research in that it syncs participant eye movements with the monitoring equipment (see Hornof & Halverson, 2002). Subjects were then instructed that the purpose of the study was to record their evaluation of a series of consumer-generated brand-related Pinterest pages. Participants proceeded to view the stimulus pages for two minutes per restaurant, with a ten second interval between pages. Following this phase of the experiment, subjects completed another brief online survey and were thanked for their participation.

**RESULTS**

The sample consisted of 7 males (25%) and 21 females (75%) with an average age of 24.9. Samples of 20-30 participants are fairly typical for eye-tracking, which a) are less susceptible to human error/bias due to their physiological basis and b) produce a large number of within-subject data points (i.e., several thousand). Consistent with the pre-test, subjects rated Hyde Park Prime Steakhouse as more luxurious than Applebee’s (m_{Applebee’s} = 1.43; m_{HydePark} = 4.25; t = 7.20, p < .01). To rule out any brand preference bias, we assessed brand attitudes using a 7-item scale developed by Shamsadani, Stanaland, and Tan (2001). Differences in attitudes towards the two brands were non-significant (t = 0.309, p = .760).

**Hypothesis Testing.** Hypothesis 1 predicts a significant two-way interaction of structural elements and brand luxury. In particular, subjects were expected to fixate more frequently on a) the image-based elements of non-luxury brands and b) the text-based elements of luxury brands. A statistically significant interaction was found (F_{1, 27} = 27.54, p < .001). More specifically, participants paid more attention to image-based (m = 236.64 fixations) as opposed to text-based (m = 150.95 fixations) elements of non-luxury restaurant reviews. In contrast, attention to text-based elements (m = 218.24 fixations) was greater than attention to image-based elements (m = 203.26 fixations) for reviews of the luxury restaurant. Thus, hypothesis 2 was supported.

Hypothesis 2 predicts a significant three-way interaction of structural elements, brand luxury, and word-of-mouth type. Attention to text was expected to be pronounced for luxury brands that were evaluated with negative word-of-mouth. The results indicated a statistically significant three-way interaction (F_{2, 54} = 7.81, p < .001), such that attention to the text-based elements of luxury restaurant NWOM (m = 350.32 fixations) was greater than attention to the image-based elements of this condition (m = 256.86 fixations). In contrast, mean levels of attention to image-based elements as opposed to text-based elements was higher in each of the remaining conditions, as Figure 1 illustrates. Thus, hypothesis 3 was supported.

**DISCUSSION**

Consumer attention to structural aspects of eWOM is especially important within a social media context, where image and text-based elements of products differ and compete to get noticed. With the aid of behavioral eye-tracking, we have demonstrated empirically that notable attention-based differences do exist as a function of struc-
tural elements, brand type and message valence for eWOM. More specifically, our findings suggest that image-based elements may not be the most attended to in every condition. It is important to note that two types of findings can support this assertion, since both are reflected in our results; a) significantly greater attention to text-based elements and b) non-significant differences in attention to images versus text.

Our findings also provide support to the notion that consumer-generated eWOM should not be ignored by marketers in favor of product promotion opportunities that offer more direct control (Daugherty & Hoffman, in press; Graham & Havlena, 207; Jepsen, 2006). Indeed, while numerous suggestions for leveraging eWOM have been made to marketing firms (see Mason, 2008) we add to this list by suggesting more structure-related strategies. An image-based example of this strategy is the recent “Show us your pizza” campaign launched by Dominos pizza (Alfs, 2013). Using social media, this company encouraged customers to take and post pictures of the pizzas that were delivered to them. The results of our study predict that positive images of pizzas (a utilitarian, non-luxury product) would be more attended to than text-based reviews. The reported success of this campaign (Alfs, 2013) appears to support this notion.

Framed in terms of making a difference, our findings have a number of intriguing implications. As alluded to above, social media users that advocate difference-making could be encouraged by marketers to communicate their perspective in strategic ways that maximize the odds of their content being attended to. For instance, difference-making can be framed in hedonic and luxury-based terms (e.g., a formal benefit dinner) or in more utilitarian terms (e.g., acts of community service). Difference-makers could also be prompted to post compelling pictures (image-based stimuli), moving stories (text-based stimuli), or both as a function of the difference-making activity and how it is perceived (i.e., hedonic or utilitarian). Final-
ly, negative word-of-mouth could be leveraged as a valuable tool to bring attention to important issues where difference-making is needed. For instance, our findings suggest that writing a negative review of luxury items on the basis that their business practices are unethical would be attended to more than a negative image of the brand. In short, it may be possible to leverage structural attention dynamics to optimize the impact of difference-making solicitations through social media.

Despite the strength of our findings, some important limitations merit mentioning. By using Pinterest as the platform for our study, we held constant other structural elements of eWOM presentation such as size (Pieters & Wedel, 2004). Additional work is needed to assess the unique contribution of these elements to attention within a social media environment. Related to this, an important aspect of online environments is the ability to navigate between social media pages. We limited participant attention to four contrived Pinterest pages so that Areas of Interest could be coded, a key component of eye-tracking research. Future studies could utilize other approaches to coding AOIs that give participants control over what they view.

CONCLUSION

The growth of social media and eWOM make it more important than ever to understand dynamics of consumer attention. As such, existing models of eWOM are incomplete without taking into account the consumer attention process within social media. Although much remains to be done, our work provides support for a long-held supposition; that communication effectiveness is not just bound by the content of a message, but also delivery effectiveness. Presumably, consumers invest their time and energy into generating eWOM on social media because they desire to make a difference by influencing product awareness and decisions made by other consumers. The managerial implications of our results are immediate as the ability to build brand relationships via social media represents the future of marketing. We call for additional research designed to aid consumers and product marketers alike in utilizing structural aspects of eWOM to their fullest potential.

REFERENCES


ABSTRACT

Interest in mindful consumption and its practices has increased among consumer researchers in recent years (e.g., Bechwati and Baalbaki, 2011; Sheth, Sethia, and Srinivas, 2011) because of a trend among consumers showing that many of them have become aware of their consumption patterns and their impact on society and nature. Many consumers have begun to take more time to consider what—and whether—to buy and to think harder about the value they get from their spending (Salzman, 2010). Instead of constantly accumulating various products and services, some consumers now search for a sustainable, self-sufficient way of living in the belief that this approach offers true happiness (Salzman, 2010).

To understand mindful consumption, Sheth et al. (2011, p.27) define the concept as consciousness in thought and behavior about the implications and consequences of consumption. The main elements of mindful consumption are mindful mindset and mindful behavior (Sheth et al., 2011). Mindful mindset comprises a sense of caring and thinking about the future and the consequences of one’s actions toward oneself, community, and nature, while mindful behavior involves behaving and making decisions with the aim of increasing a consumer’s personal, economic, and social well-being to an optimal level (Bechwati and Baalbaki, 2011; Sheth et al., 2011).

As a concept, mindful consumption has been developed to solve two main problems of consumption: underconsumption and overconsumption (Sheth et al., 2011). Underconsumption exists when consumers have insufficient purchasing power to meet their basic consumption needs. The majority of the world’s population, particularly people in developing countries, often experience underconsumption and its negative effect on personal and social well-being. Individuals may consume competitively, to the point of fighting among themselves, to gain resources for survival.

In contrast, overconsumption exists when the rich minority of the world’s population consumes too much as it exploits resources to fulfill its desire to acquire luxury products and services. Sheth et al.’s (2011) study focuses mainly on overconsumption in the U.S. that is associated with acquisitive, repetitive, and aspirational consumption. They argue that underconsumption is declining as businesses increase their attention to enter this untapped market. Nevertheless, in developing countries, underconsumption remains a major social problem that needs to be addressed. It is possible that the concept of mindful consumption can be broadened to examine its practices and consequences in order to address the underconsumption problem. To investigate the mindful consumption process and how the relationship between a caring mindset and mindful behavior has an effect on solving this problem, we draw on the sufficiency economy framework.

Stemming from remarks by Thailand’s His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the sufficiency economy is a holistic concept that acknowledges interdependency among people, society, and nature. It calls for balanced and sustainable development to reduce poverty and achieve a healthy community (Sathirathai and Piboolsravut, 2004). Sufficiency emphasizes Buddhism’s principle of following the middle path, which refers to a person fully satisfied with what one has and is at peace with the self. Under this principle, consuming too little or too much for pleasure leads to unhappiness, especially when consumption cannot fulfill expectations. The sufficiency economy is conditioned by basic need, not greed, and restrained by a conscious effort to consume moderately (Krongkaew, 2003).

The sufficiency economy framework comprises three components and two underlying conditions (Piboolsravut, 2004). Its first component, moderation, involves controlling one’s desires to avoid greed for things one does not need. It also refers to feeling compassion and the joy of sharing with others (Calkins, 2008). The second component, reasonableness, pertains to considering the cause and effect of events and being aware of what one is doing and why (Calkins, 2008). The final component, immunization, refers to the cultivation of inner resilience to deal with changes in internal and external factors. The two underlying conditions for sufficiency are (1) acquiring and applying knowledge (local wisdom and/or modern technological advancement) in every step with great care, and (2) maintaining morality with perseverance, harmlessness, and generosity (Piboolsravut, 2004).

This study sheds the light on mindful consumption (see also Sheth et al., 2011) in order to understand how consumers react to the underconsumption. We employ the concept of sufficiency economy to understand the process of developing mindful consumption and identify factors that influence the sense of caring in mindset and temperance in behavior. Empirical evidence will demonstrate how consumers engage in mindful consumption and how it can help solve underconsumption.

METHOD

The data in this study were collected using qualitative research methods. Different data sets were employed to explore the data’s richness and achieve full understanding (Wallendorf and Arnould, 1991). This study used purposive sampling to gain access to informants who were in sufficiency economy community. Tonyuan District of Suratthani Province, Thailand, was chosen as the place to conduct this study because it was cited for best practices as a Sufficiency Economy Community. In 2005, it also won the Green World Award from the Green World Foundation. Comprising 12 rural villages, Tonyuan District was one of the communities in Thailand facing the poverty issue. For the first data set, in-depth interviews were conducted with 20 members of Tonyuan District. Eighteen of them were farmers and 17 were male. All of them were married with one or two children. Each informant was interviewed for about 30 minutes at his or her village home.

The second data set was conducted using a focus group with a district chief and six village chiefs to understand the history of Tonyuan District and its community development. Additionally, the participatory observation technique was employed at the community meeting hall and at informants’ houses. The authors wrote a report of their interviews and observations as field notes. Their notes contained sequential descriptions of actions and interactions as well as context. The three data sets were combined for triangulation. All interview data were conducted, transcribed, and analyzed in Thai.
Thematic process was employed for data analysis (Attride-Stirling, 2001). Initially, the authors analyzed the data independently as suggested by Miles and Huberman’s (1994): data transformation, data display, conclusion drawing, and verification. Basic themes began to appear from the data and these were used to code the transcripts for further detailed analysis. The authors reread transcripts, provided code, and recoded to complete the iterative process of interpretation (Thompson, 1997).

RESULTS

This study provides empirical evidence to show that the notion of mindful consumption can be expanded to address underconsumption. By employing mindful mindset and behavior through the sufficiency economy, consumers can overcome the problems of underconsumption (e.g., difficulties in earning income, unaffordable basic necessities, and poor family diet). As found with the Tonyuan District informants, engaging in mindful consumption raises awareness of living and consumption patterns. The informants began to consciously adopt positive and avoid negative attitudes and behavior as these can affect their personal and collective well-being. This study also demonstrates the whole process of developing mindful consumption. We strongly believe that practicing mindful consumption is a major contribution to transformative consumer research (see also Mick et al., 2012).

Around 90 per cent of Tonyuan District members grow rubber trees, oil palm trees, local fruits and vegetables, and work on animal farms. The community has practiced His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s “Sufficiency Economy Philosophy” since 1984. Many households in Tonyuan District employ the sufficiency economy in their daily lives. They began to adopt this concept to alleviate their poverty, whose main cause was low agricultural yield due to outbreaks of crop pests and the high cost of fertilizers and pesticides. In addition, they sometimes experienced poor weather conditions, all of which led to their lack of capital and accrual of debt.

To effect this principle, they began to learn and practice organic farming. They had to change their mindset and behavior to produce and consume sufficiently within their family and community, which is one of Sufficiency Economy characteristics. Furthermore, they tried not to buy products and services from outside their community. Their interdependency within the community helped reduce their spending significantly. Furthermore, when they had excess produce, they could sell it outside the community to increase their economic well-being. To secure itself from debt, the community formed many local groups such as a community savings group, local tourism group, grocery shop, and basic healthy volunteer group. Their self-sufficiency activities enjoyed such success that the community received the Green World Award from the Green World Foundation in 2005, and was recognized for its best practices as a Sufficiency Economy Community.

As shown in Figure 1, the process of mindful consumption consists of four main elements: willingness, training, practicing, and showing and sharing. We propose that the sufficiency economy is paralleled with mindful consumption when consumers are aware and concerned about the impact of their production and consumption toward themselves and society (see also Sheth et al., 2011). When combined with the investigation of how the community adopted the sufficiency economy to maintain their livelihood, this study’s empirical data present the process of mindful consumption.

Willingness: It is a very basic element, but one of the most important factors for living in a mindful manner. Informants carefully and intentionally integrated the sufficiency economy into their daily lives. Recognizing its importance and benefits, they, therefore, were willing to participate in the sufficiency economy program. The District Chief mentioned that:

Chief: “…at the initial stage, 30% of households in Tonyuan District volunteered to adopt sufficiency economy models in the District. Gaining monetary benefits was not our first priority. We actually wanted to improve our quality of life. We focused on reducing our cost of living by raising basic vegetables to consume within our families. The rest we sell…”

The following example shows the awareness and familiarity of a community member with the sufficiency economy concept:

Dee: “…doing sufficiency economy is like appreciating what we naturally do. It is the local wisdom and experience I have learned from my family. I help my parents grow vegetables, feed pigs and poultry, and collect eggs to use for our meals… We don’t follow sufficiency economy as people follow a fashion trend. We practice it because it is the way we now live.”

Dee and other informants employed “tacit knowledge” to behave mindfully in growing food for their families and community. This practice contributes to their healthy and wealthy lives. They can consume what they produce and be assured that it is good for health. They can increase revenue by selling their excess produce outside their community. Dee elaborated on this issue below:

Dee: “…I have been told that brown rice can cure beriberi, so I went to the supermarket to buy brown rice to try it. Unbeliev-

Figure 1: The Mindful Consumption Process

- Willingness
  - Way of life
  - Intrinsic intention

- Training
  - Acquiring knowledge
  - Apprentice

- Practicing
  - Insight
  - Leadership

- Showing & Sharing
  - Knowledge management
  - Reciprocity
The Development of the Mindful Consumption Process through the Sufficiency Economy

In the Tonyuan Sufficiency Economy (SE) community, the development of the mindful consumption process is closely linked to the sufficiency economy philosophy. This process is not only about acquiring knowledge but also about experiencing real-life situations, which is crucial for the development of a mindful mindset. The following conversations demonstrate the importance of practical engagement in learning.

Training: Although agriculture is commonly practiced among community members, some informants still need to acquire skills, knowledge, and experience because they come from different backgrounds. Some of them may not deeply understand how to conduct organic rice or animal farming; these members needed new knowledge and experience as mentioned by the District Chief:

Chief: “...we welcomed all community members to join our sufficiency economy program. They [community members] needed to understand the main idea of sufficiency economy and gain relevant skills, such as how to plant vegetables and fruits, how to feed animals, and so on, including how to farm rice [a staple food among Thais]. They needed to learn more...”

Engaging in sufficient economy required members to master many skills necessary for running their farms and small businesses. Therefore, District Chief built the “Tonyuan Sufficiency Economy Learning Center” for supporting and encouraging community members to gain various skills. Novices learn particular skills from community veterans, similar to how experienced members in online communities support new members (Pongsakornrungsilp and Schroeder, 2011), which strengthens relationships within the community. Moreover, Tonyuan District members want to sustain this way of living for the next generation. They agreed to create the “Sufficiency Economy Apprentice” project. Their caring for their community’s future and seeking ways to build its strength show the importance of mindful mindset and behavior. One member mentioned that:

Butt: “...We recruit children of about 12 – 18 years old from each village to teach them the principle of sufficiency economy and train them how to grow plants and feed animals. They learn to become friends to the environment. They then can share our local wisdom and notions with future generations.”

Butt and other informants believe that the sufficiency economy’s success needs more than classroom learning; it must include real-life experience. The following conversations demonstrate another strategy for passing the sufficiency economy philosophy onto the next generation.

R: “Do you teach your children about sufficiency economy?”
Ban: “Yes, I do. We can’t let our kids learn just from what is in books or classrooms. They need to learn by doing. For example, I asked my boy to help me plant vegetables. I grabbed one watering can and asked him to grab another. He learned through that process. Besides, when he saw those vegetables become our home-grown food or when we sold them to local shops, he was proud of what he had done.”

R: “So, he enjoys these activities.”
Ban: “Yes, why not? I plant two plots of vegetables. We each chose one and set up a mini competition. We watered them daily and watched to see which plot grew better. He learned and absorbed sufficiency economy philosophy naturally.”

As mentioned by Ban, younger generations of Tonyuan District residents were trained as “apprentices” to acquire necessary skills and knowledge. In this process, it related to the cultural capital that young consumers gain through domestication by their parents (Bourdieu, 1986). This process is relevant to the affective stage in the hierarchy of effect model (Belch and Belch, 2005), whereby consumers perceive the sufficiency economy and may develop their mindset and decide to participate. As mentioned by Sheht et al. (2011), young community members need to be educated about mindful mindset in order to take mindful action.

Practicing: Learning and training are necessary stages for skill and knowledge acquisition. However, sufficiency economy cannot be sustained unless participants practice it in real life. Such practice helps them gain “insight” into the sufficiency economy philosophy and helps secure them from poverty. The following quote is an example of the results of such practice:

R: “What do you learn from your practice?”
Som: “I am happy. I eat the best foods and live the best life. I may not be rich, but I have my own land to earn enough to buy what I need.”
R: “Are you still buying products or services from outside the community?”
Som: “Yes, I am. I have the same needs as others, but practicing sufficiency economy makes me think harder when I go to buy things. I don’t consider just the price. Instead I’m concerned whether my consumption will make trouble for others, even for myself, my family or my village. For example, I can buy an expensive DVD home theater and play it at the loudest sound because I’m happy. That is, however, not the principle of the sufficiency economy...”

As mentioned by Som, her mindful consumption benefits both her physical and emotional well-being. The more she practices sufficiency economy, the more she is mindful of her behavior. This mindful behavior is similar to how consumers pursue meditation (see also Pongsakornrungsilp and Posakhrkit, 2011): the more consumers practice meditation, the more aware they can be of how their minds function. Additionally, mindful consumption also helps establish the relationship within the family and within the community as mentioned below.

Wi: “…My life has changed significantly. I used to rely on buying things, but now I prefer doing things myself. When I do something, the whole family comes to help. This creates a bond among our family members. We also help other community members by supporting and sharing what we have, so the relationship among community members is very strong.”

Leadership also played an important role in initiating and supporting community activities. The District Chief was a key person to take on this role. His focus on reducing the reliance on external sources and improving the efficiency of internal sources contributed to the Tonyuan District’s sustainable growth. Many district members saluted their leader for improving their quality of life. The community’s strongly belief and willingness to follow their leader have been the main factors to surviving from poverty; therefore, the District Chief has gained “symbolic capital” – worthy to be listened to and followed (see also Bourdieu, 1986). This helps drive the community’s development through the sufficiency economy.
Showing and Sharing: To promote the sufficiency economy to other members, Tonyuan District persuades and educates members through employing “Knowledge Management.” Members do not see new learners as competitors. They are willing to provide knowledge and information so they can build a larger and stronger network. By employing techniques of showing and sharing, members mindfully think of social benefits rather than personal benefits.

Wi: “We share knowledge and skills with other members at community meetings such as the housewife group meeting, Tonyuan District Learning Center meeting, and so on. We also share resources across villages… Our network was created to serve each other. Even when prices of rubber or palm oil fall, it doesn’t affect us because we co-develop unique products for each village to sell in the market…”

Pom: “We share knowledge, which we create or develop by ourselves, with other members interactively at our houses or markets. By sharing knowledge, we become experts in our field.”

Reciprocity is another important factor in expanding the concept of mindful consumption. While knowledge providers receive recognition for their services from the community, new members must reciprocate the knowledge providers by sharing their knowledge with others. Knowledge is not for taking, but for giving. This process contributes to the Tonyuan District culture of members sharing all resources with others as found in online communities (see also Mathwick et al., 2008).

Reciprocity Tonyuan District members have to learn how to take and give to others through the apprentice project. A future study can examine this process with other consumer groups to see whether this process holds true. Moreover, future research should also investigate the factors that influence and motivate mindful consumption. It would be beneficial to study when and why consumers mindfully purchase, use, and dispose of products. In addition, the barriers to engage in mindful consumption should be examined.

Table 1: The Summary of Empirical Findings

<table>
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<th>Process</th>
<th>Sub-Theme</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>Willingness</td>
<td>Way of life</td>
<td>Sufficiency economy is not a new issue; it is a way of life that consumers pursue daily.</td>
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<td>Intrinsic Intention</td>
<td>The mind that drives a consumer to be conscious and would like to join the sufficiency economy program.</td>
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<td>Training</td>
<td>Acquiring Knowledge</td>
<td>Community members need to gain new knowledge and experience because practicing sufficient economy requires different skills that are necessary for their living and running their businesses.</td>
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<td>Apprentice</td>
<td>Community members persuade and educate new generation to live sufficiently through the apprentice project.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practicing</td>
<td>Insight</td>
<td>Practicing in real life shapes members to become experts and broaden their perspectives on sufficiency economy philosophy.</td>
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<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leaders need to support resources and encourage the community to engage in this practice.</td>
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<td>Showing and Sharing:</td>
<td>Knowledge Management</td>
<td>Tonyuan District members employ knowledge management to enrich resources.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Tonyuan District members have to learn how to take and give to others through showing and sharing their knowledge.</td>
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ABSTRACT

Ethical consumption has long been considered a direct result of positive ethical attitudes and intentions of consumers. Ethical consumers have been classified as those who hold positive attitudes and intentions towards ethical concerns such as environmentalism, animal issues and human rights infringements, and purchase related ethical products (e.g. Vermeir and Verbeke 2008; Carrigan, Szmigin and Wright 2004; Auger and Devinney 2007). In the literature, they are described as mostly middle-aged with higher income, above-average education and well-informed about societal concerns (Maigman and Ferrel, 2001; Roberts, 1996; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001). Ethical consumption is defined as consumption that is based on decision making which is strongly influenced by the consumer’s societal responsibility (Meulenberg 2003). Research suggests that the percentage of people engaging in ethical consumption is on the increase (Co-operative Bank Ethical Consumerism Report 2010; Berry and McEachern, 2005; Davis, 2006; Harrison, Newholm, and Shaw 2005). Yet extant literature demonstrates that there is a very large “attitude-intention-behaviour gap” in ethical consumption wherein consumers who hold ethical attitudes and intentions rarely purchase ethical products (e.g. Auger and Devinney 2007; Carrigan and Attalla 2001; Follows and Jobber 2000; Shaw et al 2007). Indeed, sales in this area still represent less than 6% of the overall consumer market of some £600bn (Macalister, 2007).

Authors attempting to bridge the “attitude-intention” gap have frequently investigated why consumers do not buy ethically instead of why they do (e.g. Bray et al. 2010). However, we believe that to increase the consumption of ethical products, it is essential to understand the motivations behind such consumption rather than focus on the barriers to consumption. Extant literature speaks about the “warm glow” or moral satisfaction that arises from altruistic behaviors such as ethical consumption (Andreoni 1990; Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). Yet, ethical products have multiple attributes and are likely to be purchased for a diverse and complex set of motivations in addition to moral satisfaction. The need to bridge “attitude-intention” gap is becoming more imperative as more multinationals buy into ethical marketing and sell ethical products such as fair-trade, sustainable or recycled (Haddock, 2005; Beattie, 2006; Willman, 2007). However, this cannot happen unless the motivations behind such consumption are better understood. In the area of ethical consumption, theory development is in its early stages and accepted frameworks for the decision making of ethical consumption are yet to be developed (e.g. Carrington, Neveille and Whitwell 2010; Starr 2009; Nicholls and Lee 2006). In this paper, we aim to further theory in this under-examined aspect of consumer behaviour (Newholme and Shaw 2007) by investigating the different motivations behind the consumption of ethical products. We then offer recommendations as to how this understanding can be used to encourage more ethical consumption.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

It has been argued that in more affluent societies, people are freed from basic needs and become more responsible for their consumption behaviour (Etzioni, 2004; Dickinson and Carsky, 2005). Ethical models of consumer behaviour suggest that the purchase intentions of these people are driven by values, norms and ethics and tend to be more socially-aware (e.g. Shaw and Shui 2002; Vermeir and Verbeke 2008). In these scenarios, ethical consumption is motivated by the need for moral self-realisation or self-actualisation and to help consumers develop a virtuous identity (Kozinets and Handelman, 1998; Langeland,1998; Bamett et al., 2005). Researchers often draw from the Theory of Planned Behaviour to better understand ethical consumption and assert that attitudes to ethical behaviour are antecedent to the purchase of ethical products (Ellen 1994; Shaw and Clarke 1999). However, it is important to note that ethical products have multiple attributes (e.g. fair-trade chocolate is often marketed as both ethical and of higher quality) and consumers consider more than one attribute during the decision-making process (Auger 2010; D’Astous et al 1997). Thus, to better understand ethical consumption, it is essential to investigate which product attributes are most salient in the decision-making process.

During a consumption episode, consumers consider both tangible attributes (e.g. characteristics of products such as quality and price) and intangible attributes (e.g. social aspect of the product such as how much farmers are paid) (Auger 2010). An aspect in the demand of ethical products is the trade-off between tangible and non-tangible product attributes that consumers have to make. Price, quality, convenience and the overall value of the product are main buying criteria and consumers display a willingness to buy ethical products only if they do not have to compromise on these attributes (Roberts 1996: Berger 1993; D’Astous et al 1997). Dupuis (2000) argues that food is particularly salient for researchers in ethical consumption because it highlights the inherent selfishness in consumer decision-making. Indeed, research demonstrates that food consumption is almost completely based on value for money, health concerns, taste, appearance and convenience, rather than being driven by ethical motivations such as animal welfare and care for the environment (Institute of Grocery Distribution, 2002; Foods Standards Agency, 2000). Applying these findings to ethical consumption in general would translate into negligible ethical consumption, which is certainly not the case. So why do consumers buy ethically? In this paper we investigate whether the multi-attribute nature of many ethical products effectively counteracts the “selfishness” of consumers by offering added value in terms of health, quality, taste, appearance or convenience. We also examine whether this is more relevant for ethically-minded consumers who appreciate the non-tangible aspects of products.

METHOD

The aim of this paper was to attain in-depth insight into consumer ethical purchase motivations and a qualitative approach was deemed to be appropriate as it allowed a focus on events in their natural setting and supplied detailed descriptions that provided valuable insight (Miles and Huberman 1994; Gray 2004). We used diary-interviews because they are adept at unearthing consumer motivations, and conflicts and better recognize complex details of phenomena that are difficult to uncover with other methodologies (Malhotra and Birks 2006; Arksey and Knight 1999).

47 interviews were conducted with consumers residing in the West Midlands, UK. A three-tiered purposive sampling technique was used to recruit participants (Gray 2004; Morgan 1997). First, an email shot was sent out to 305 consumers residing in the West Midlands who had previously registered to participate in general consumer behaviour research via an online research company (Valued
Opinions). These included male and female British citizens of all ages (over 18) and all income levels. These consumers were invited to keep online shopping diaries (including online purchases) over a period of 3 months. To encourage truthfulness, these consumers were also required to keep all their receipts as proof of purchase. 121 consumers responded to this email shot and expressed their willingness to participate. Further details were then provided about how the online diary worked.

After 3 months, the diaries were used to calculate the number of ethical purchases undertaken by the participants as described in the Co-operative Bank Ethical Consumerism Report (2010), i.e., ethical food and drink, ethical household products, eco-travel and transport, ethical personal and ethical finance. Only 96 diaries were valid and the others were dismissed due to missing information. The examination of the remaining diaries showed that 69 consumers had purchased over 15 ethical products in the period under investigation, 20 consumers had purchased between 5 and 10 products and the rest had purchased less than 5 ethical products. The 69 consumers who had purchased the most ethical products were invited for interview. 47 participants agreed to be interviewed, 27 of whom were female. The respondents were aged between 21 and 63; 25 were higher-income (over £30,000 per annum) and 22 were average-income (£20,000 to £29,000 per annum) as defined by the Office of National Statistics (2009). The participants also represented a small cross-section of cultural and educational backgrounds.

Each interview lasted between 1 and 3 hours. Diary entries were first confirmed against receipts to ensure authenticity of data. Participants were then questioned in depth on each of the ethical purchases to gain insight into purchase motivations. The purchases were not labelled as ethical at any point in the interviews to allow consumers the freedom to express their purchase motivations on their own terms. Further, to distract consumers from the real focus of the interview, they were interviewed on a number of other non-ethical products that they purchased. All interviews were transcribed and each transcript ran between 10 and 20 single-spaced typed pages. Transcripts were first read through to note the main emergent themes that arose from the interviews (Cozby 2007; Morgan 1997) and then subjected to more in-depth thematic analysis supported by the use of Nvivo computer software. The software was used to identify those themes that provided relevant and significant insights into the phenomenon under investigation (ethical products; ethical consumption; consumption motivations; product characteristics such as quality, taste, health-benefits, etc.) The analytical process followed the ‘Framework’ model, which generates themes based on five stages, i.e., familiarization, identification, indexing, charting, and mapping (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). Framework analysis was deemed appropriate because it is heavily driven by the original accounts of participants, allows amendment throughout the process and is comprehensive and rigorous in nature (Archer et al. 2005; Srivastava and Thomson 2009).

**DISCUSSION**

In their diaries, consumers reported a number of motivations behind the consumption of ethical products. Follow-up interviews were conducted to further corroborate diary entries and obtain a more in-depth insight into such motivations (See Table 1 below for sample quotes).

*Desire for Health.* Diary entries frequently emphasised ‘health’ as the main motivation behind the consumption of certain ethical products. This was most obvious in food consumption where ethical foods such as free-range meat and eggs or organically grown fruit and vegetables, were purchased not because of their ethical credentials but because they were perceived to be healthier. Heasman and Mellentin (2001) believe that many people today are very nutritionally-aware and choose foods which allow them control over their own health and wellbeing. This came across strongly in the interviews and many respondents asserted that organic or free-range foods were the obvious choice for people seeking to live longer healthier lives. Extant research has previously considered health as a motive for the purchase of organic products but has offered conflicting results. While some authors believe health to a strong predictor of attitudes and purchase intentions towards organic foods (Schifferstein and Oude Ophuis, 1998; Magnusson et al 2003), others have refuted such findings (Honkanen et al. 2006; Tarkiani and Sundqvist 2005). In this paper, we find that not only is health one of the primary reasons behind the consumption of organic foods, but it is also a primary motivator for the consumption of other ethical products such as free-range eggs and meats, foods which have previously been considered to be purchased for ethical reasons (McEachern et al. 2007). Many of the interviewees admitted they were willing to pay a premium for these products specifically for health reasons, making them an important target market for retailers selling ethical products. Further probing revealed that while some of these respondents held positive ethical attitudes, the majority had no interest in the ethical credentials of the product. These consumers did not have negative attitudes towards ethical consumption. Instead, they simply did not consider the ethical attributes of the product during the decision-making process. This demonstrates that positive ethical attitudes are not necessary for the consumption of ethical products and the desire for moral satisfaction, or ‘warm glow’ is not always a primary motivation for consumption. Instead, positive attitudes towards other tangible attributes of the product might be antecedent to purchase, both for ethically and non-ethically minded consumers.

*Fear of Illness.* Among the products that consumers reportedly purchased for health, were items that were purchased more out of fear of illness, than a desire for wellbeing. While the difference might appear subtle, products purchased for health elicited positive discussions about being empowered whereas products purchased to avoid disease elicited discussions with a negative undertone of fear and distress. Many participants explained that they were very worried about the large number of dangerous chemicals used in a multitude of everyday products. Some spoke of media coverage (e.g. social marketing for breast cancer) that illustrated the connection between such chemicals and certain types of cancer. These respondents purchased a number of cruelty-free, non-animal based and organic products including foods, make-up and other cosmetics and household products (e.g. kitchen sprays), as a means of avoiding contact with harmful chemicals. This is an important finding because while some research, albeit scarce, has considered how chemical-free credentials can motivate consumption in organic markets (Yee et al. 2005; Krystallis et al. 2006), these diary-interviews reveal that fear of chemicals is stronger than expected and goes beyond the purchase of organic food. Indeed, for some people it appears to be the primary motivating factor for the purchase of foods, cosmetics and household products, overshadowing ethical motivations. Many of the interviewees whose consumption was motivated by fear expressed no ethical attitudes and some were even unaware that they had purchased products which were environmentally-friendly or cruelty-free. Respondents aware of the ethical credentials of the products conveyed moral satisfaction but revealed that these products would have been purchased even without these attributes. This demonstrates that in the consumption of ethical products consumers are often less motivated by altruism than by self-interest and this needs to be acknowledged in the marketing of ethical products.
<table>
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<th>Table 1: Sample Quotes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Desire for Health</strong></td>
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<td>&quot;They (organic fruit and vegetables) have more vitamins than other veg. I think it’s healthier to buy them...&quot; (Emily, 28)</td>
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<td>&quot;I’ve been getting this (organic meat: pork and chicken) for a while now. They don’t feed the animals any c*** as far as I know and that makes the meat a lot healthier...they cost a lot more but I think health should come first when you shop for food.&quot; (probing) Yes animal welfare is important but firstly when you have a family you should look at health’ (Stephen, 28)</td>
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<td>&quot;I try to buy the healthiest products around - I do shop around a lot...I avoid processed foods and try to get organic because they’re good for you,&quot;” (Mike, 52)</td>
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<td>&quot;My mum once told me they wash vegetables in chlorine and kill all the nutrients, so I now buy organic veg. when I can because they have more vitamins in them and they’re better, especially for my kids,”” (Paula, 36)</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;I always buy organic fruit, veg. and meat. I hate all the chemicals they put into food nowadays, and I know that most of them can make you really sick, like cancer and such. It’s worth paying the extra money to put good things in your body,&quot;” (Simon, 49)</td>
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<td>&quot;I buy (ethical brand) because they have less chemicals... I use this (branded kitchen spray) all the time and I started to worry about all the chemicals we were breathing in and touching all the time’ (Tania, 42).</td>
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<td>&quot;It started with fears that aluminium in antiperspirant gives you breast cancer. I know that many women don’t care but I do. So I started researching and looking around...finally I realised that the best way was to buy organic antiperspirant.... it’s not as good as the ones with aluminium but I still buy it.... well, then I started reading up on all the other chemicals that they put in all cosmetics, like sodium laurel sulphate and how bad that is, and I decided to switch shower gel too.... finally, decided to get most stuff organic cause they’ve no chemicals’ (Amelia, 34)</td>
</tr>
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<td>&quot;I once read somewhere that sunscreen can actually cause cancer?!...I started to buy organic sunscreens because of that...(probing) No didn’t know they were cruelty-free or recycled, if I’m totally honest... yes, I would still buy them if they weren’t ethical. I wouldn’t want to risk me or my family getting a serious disease” (Mike, 52)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fear of Illness</strong></td>
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<td>&quot;The yolks of free-range eggs are much more orange and taste better and actually the more expensive they are, usually the better they are. They taste much better. (Probing) Yes I know they’re higher welfare...no, that’s not the main reason I get them, I cook a lot and I always look for the best quality ingredients,’ (Tania, 42).</td>
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<td>&quot;I only ever buy corn-fed free range chicken. It’s almost yellow colour and tastes a lot...well, like firmer... than regular chicken. It’s better than the cheap stuff.’ (Christine 54).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;That cream (non-animal based, organic) is the best I’ve tried. I have tried a lot of them, believe me and that’s really good. I recommend it to my friends.....(probing). No, I didn’t know it was not tested on animals, but that’s a good thing right?’ (Christine 54).</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘...there’s a reason they cost more (talking about free-range eggs and chicken)...they taste better .. (probing) Yes I guess it’s good for the chickens (chuckles) but I would buy them anyway cause they taste better,” (Brian, 40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I used to always buy ethical make-up and face cream but it was never good enough...(probing) For example, all the ethical creams I tried dried up my skin...the mascara was never good enough either.” (Debbie, 37)</td>
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<td><strong>Desire for Quality</strong></td>
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<td>&quot;I always buy ethical products when I can....mainly stuff to do with animals. I read a lot about how animals are treated and it really upsets me. So as far as I can afford I buy ethically....(what products do you buy?) free range chicken, pork and eggs; non-animal tested cosmetics....when I bought quilt and pillows I made sure it had no duck-down in it...it’s horrible what they do to the ducks...” (Emily, 28)</td>
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<td>“I always buy fair-trade coffee in the morning...(probing) To be honest I go to (coffee shop brand) with a number of colleagues and they all buy fair-trade so I just go along with it, I guess.” (Mark, 31)</td>
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<td>&quot;My kids hound me to buy free-range eggs because they learnt about it in school.’ (Cindy 36)</td>
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<td>&quot;I know it’s more expensive (non-animal tested mascara) but I still buy it – I saw a photo of a rabbit that had its eyes tested on and I never bought another cheap mascara again!’ (Helen, 38).</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Yes, if they were of good quality. I would consider the ethical version...but I think I’ll always look for the best quality I can afford, you know?&quot;(Brian, 40).</td>
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Desire for Quality. Diary entries revealed ‘quality’ to be a very strong motivator for the consumption of many ethical products. In the case of food, for example, consumers chose free-range meat and eggs, organic fruits and vegetables, fair-trade coffee and chocolate, because they perceived them as being of higher quality and better tasting. Other products such as fair-trade clothes (e.g. softer materials), ethical banking products (e.g. higher interest rates) and cosmetics (e.g. smoother on the skin) were also regularly purchased because they were perceived to be of premium quality. Research demonstrates that consumers often associate quality with certain products and subsequently purchase them for this reason (Faiers, Cook and Neame 2007). For instance, organic and free-range are often perceived as representing higher quality and therefore better taste (Padel and Foster 2005). Further, the fact that ethical products often cost more than equivalent brands also encourages people to perceive higher quality and higher prestige (Husic and Cicic 2009).

Again, both ethically and non-ethically minded consumers bought a large number of ethical products because of the tangible attributes of the product. Interestingly, some self-proclaimed ethical consumers admitted to having bought ethical products in the past but quickly replacing them with non-ethical substitutes when these were proven to be of lower quality. Such behaviour was not perceived as unethical and some interviewees explained that “all things being equal” (Emily 28) they would always try to choose ethical products as long as this did not mean settling for lower quality. Indeed, these consumers placed the blame squarely on the manufacturers and declared that they should “up their game” (Amelia, 34) if they want to compete effectively with other non-ethical products. Such comments offer new insight into ethical consumption and highlight the sense of entitlement that consumers feel when it comes to negotiating between tangible and non-tangible product attributes. If the attitude-behaviour gap is to be bridged, marketers need to acknowledge that many ethically-minded consumers are not willing to concede tangible attributes such as quality. However, the fact that ethically-minded consumers do try ethical products in the first instance strongly suggests that, given comparable tangible attributes, they are likely to choose ethical products over non-ethical varieties. This is optimistic for the future of ethical consumption.

Desire for Virtue? The discussion above demonstrates that marketers need to highlight the tangible aspects of ethical products if they are to bridge the attitude-behaviour gap and also target non-ethically minded consumers. However, this does not mean that they should undersell the ethical credentials of their products. First, whereas the majority of consumers expressed non-ethical motivations for the purchase of ethical products, a few did genuinely buy these products because they are more socially-aware. Second, the interviews did uncover that the non-tangible aspects of ethical products are sometimes used to help consumers decide between homogeneous products, i.e., the ethical credentials were an added value that motivated product selection. Finally, the interviews revealed that interpersonal relationships can be a strong motivator for ethical consumption and that some consumers purchase these products for social assimilation, concern for social norms, or to appease significant others. A number of interviewees, for example, disclosed that their children pestered them to purchase ethical products after learning about ethical concerns in school. Others admitted that they purchased fair-trade products (especially coffee in public places) due to a ‘bandwagon’ effect and a desire to fit in. Hence, while ethical attributes might not be wholly responsible for consumers buying ethically, when combined with other tangible attributes they might tip the balance in favour of more ethical consumption.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we offer further insight into motivations behind ethical consumption. First, we demonstrate that consumers negotiate between many tangible and non-tangible attributes during their consumption scenario and ethical credentials are often not the priority for many consumers. Indeed, even for ethically-minded consumers who actively seek out ethical products, tangible aspects such as quality and health are often non-negotiable and might result in non-consumption. This means that marketers cannot hope to encourage consumption of ethical products if these do not compare favourably with other products on the market. Conversely, the positive tangible attributes of many ethical products regularly encourages consumption even among non-ethically minded individuals, thus creating a whole new segment for these products.

Vermeir and Verbeke (2004, p.8) attest that consumption is often a consequence of “the need to save money and time, to give priority to health (i.e. security, certainty, protection, stability), to feel part of a social group (i.e. following social norms), to distinguish from others, to fulfill the need to try out new technologies or to look for the most easy and comfortable way of living”. Similarly, we reveal that in addition to ethical reasons, desire for health, fear of illness and desire for quality are the main motivations behind the consumption of many ethical products. Many such products offer multiple attributes which consumers value very highly and these encourage both ethically- and non-ethically minded people to consume them. In the past decade, for example, consumers have become more sophisticated and savvy in terms of their consumption and have developed a deeper understanding of the mass-production of foods and other products and the role that chemicals play in such processes (Heasman and Mellentin 2001). This has motivated many consumers to choose products which are produced, stored and processed without synthetic chemicals (Lockie et al. 2002; Padel and Foster 2005). Indeed, many consumers purchase ethical products because these offer superior quality and health benefits when compared to alternatives. This means that the tangible attributes of ethical products, if marketed carefully, can motivate both ethically-minded and non-ethically minded consumers to purchase them. Thus, by understanding the motivations behind ethical consumption, and developing marketing communications that emphasise both tangible and non-tangible product attributes, retailers can establish and cultivate whole new markets for ethical products.

We conclude by raising the questions as to whether researchers in the field should continue to focus on bridging the attitude-behaviour gap or alternatively concentrate more on how they can increase ethical consumption. This would shift the focus from ethically-minded consumers who do not consume ethically, to non-ethically-minded consumers who do. By freeing themselves from boundaries which delineate which consumers should be investigated, researchers might be better able to help marketers develop strategies which target different kinds of consumers who have different motivations to buy ethical products. This might require researchers to consider whether they feel it is important that consumers buy ethical products for exclusively ethical reasons, or simply that people buy ethical products.

Limitations and Future Research: This study is mainly exploratory and limited by the qualitative nature of the enquiry. However, the aim was to gain an in-depth insight into why consumers purchase ethical products and we felt that diary-interviews would be the best route to achieve this. While the findings cannot be generalized across the population, they provide some valuable insights which further our understanding of ethical consumption and can be used by marketers to encourage more ethical consumption. While
care has been taken to avoid social-desirability bias (e.g. interviewer discussed different types of products not just ethical ones with participants), in-depth interviews are susceptible to such bias and this is acknowledged as a limitation of the study. Further research should attempt to validate our findings by undertaking larger-scale quantitative research. We believe that experimental design would lend itself well to this type of research and would be an effective follow-up to this investigation.

REFERENCES
ABSTRACT
Does anger reflect deep meaning of attachment and integration? In an effort to explicate the above notion and to capture the rapidly evolving consumer behaviour in the digital virtual terrain, the paper investigates the responses of fans to a break-out phenomenal from Japan, the virtual celebrity Hatsune Miku (HM) to a controversial report from CBS news (see Johnson, 2012). The meteoric rise to fame of HM, a Crypton Media-produced Vocaloid character which resembles a 16-year girl, is demonstrated by the sales of total HM brand goods reaching 10 billion yen (approximately $104 million USD), and by more than 350,000 vocaloid videos on YouTube and 92,600 such videos on Niconico douga - a Japanese YouTube-like site (Wikia, 2012; Santos 2011). On one side, the responses from fans to inaccurate claims by CBS news are replete with furious, cynical, and sarcastic comments that not only defend the credibility of HM, but also brutally criticize the validity of the proposed “fake-ness” of HM. Such comments even go beyond attacking the author of the article, and retaliate with attacks on America as a nation in response to a perceived attack on Japan within the article itself. On the other side, the responses unveil the deep adoration and love of fans to HM and the meaning, the aestheticism, and the values that HM gives to these fans and co-creators globally.

With the ignited deep anger from HM fans due to the CBS report opening an unprecedented view of the “inner thoughts” of HM from “her” fans, this paper contributes to the domains of virtualized consumption and consumer emotion by exploring HM fans’ responses, extracting a number of key concepts and themes, and examining the link between them, including her real-ness and desired experiential rewards that the fans claim to truly enjoy.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Virtualized consumption
Enjoying HM can be seen as a form of virtualized consumption (see Denegri-Knott & Molesworth, 2010) that signifies the experiential pleasures it brings to consumers neither from materialised consumption nor a tangible encounter. Such virtualized consumer experiences with objects that hold limited material existence challenge classical theories of consumption based on rational or utilitarian needs (Firat and Dholakia 1998). Similarly Kline, Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter (2003) proposed that virtualised consumption represent the latest stage in an ongoing, subtle transformation of consumption practices from utilitarian emphasis to one of pursuing aesthetic, emotional, symbolic and experiential value. As such, as consumer culture increasingly moves away from the material, the experiential orientation places individual consumers as the main creative power who in turn reconfigures the process, output and the types of consumption practices. Hence, virtualised consumption can be seen as rooted in experiential consumption theory that signifies feeling, fun and fantasy as essential elements of experiential consumption making it distinct from utilitarian consumption (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). Similarly related work (e.g. Baudrillard, 1970, Campbell, 1987, Featherstone, 1992; Lee, 1993) conceptualize consumption as a symbolic, aesthetic, imaginary experience.

Adopting three characteristics from the literature, this paper conceptualizes the virtualized consumption as a consumption characterized by a hybridized experience, stimulatory-actualizing-experimenting nature, and co-creative harmony between provider and consumer.

Hybridized Experience
Digital virtualised consumption can be seen as a hybridization of the material and the virtual that allows individual consumer to enjoy the hybridized experience that Burbules (2004, 163) refers to as “both material and imaginary,” or what Shields (2000, 2003) terms as “liminal,” meaning “in between”. This hybridization process operates when there is a complementing state between the actualizing potential of the material with the idealizations of the virtual (Shields 2000, 2003; Burbules 2004). The rich and salient experiential opportunites and stimuli available in the digital virtual product obviously attract individuals to buy, try and explore a whole new array of exotic “ideal” functionalities (digital capacities) based on their desired abstract ideas. Putting this into the context of HM, while the stimuli and features from the digital software (e.g. HM vocalizing synthesizer) provides the contextual hybridized experiential environment, conceptually enjoyable virtual consumption possesses essential processing characteristics as explained in the following section.

Stimulatory – experimenting – actualizing essence
The hybridized state of this virtualized consumption experience conceptually operates when there is stimulating–experimenting–actualizing process within the experience (e.g. Denegri-Knott & Molesworth, 2010), and this determines how an individual consumer encounters and enjoys virtual rewards. Enjoyable virtualized consumption is simultaneously (1) Stimulating – activating their creative virtual capabilities; (2) Experimenting – prompting consumers in such a liquidity to explore, speculate, and combine different available features; and (3) Actualizing – enabling consumers to bring their dreams into the ideal end result.

In the case of HM, the hybridized state of virtualized consumption, indicates harmony between marketers (the providers) and the market (consumers) that enable consumers individually and in connection with like-minded consumers to co-create, co-develop and share the final experiential products innovatively and harmoniously (see also Bauman 1988; Lee 1993). Additionally, the emergence of HM highlights how the market now provides not only the source material for the imaginary consumption and the activities for enjoying it (e.g. the music production and the performance), but also the creative power that enable consumers to generate their desired aesthetic experiential experience different from other creators. Conceptually the three processing aspects of hybridized-virtualized experience might be related to the complex, inductive inference processes of anthropomorphism: acquisition-activation-application, and the corresponding determinants: Sociality-Effectance-Elicited agent knowledge (Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007). The hybridized-virtual experience of HM does take place in the agentic, anthropomorphic environment that leads to complex, rich and salient essence of its socio-psychological aspects.

Virtualized consumption process and consumer emotion
The creative, fantasy-laden process of developing such virtual experiences provides rich and salient space for in-depth involvement of the emotions of the engaged individuals (e.g. Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). Not only do such emotions colorize the personal
process of virtual production, but the emotional connection built through this process become deeper and more intense because the individuals who co-create virtual characters become personally connected to their creations and profoundly treasure these characters as if they were their own flesh and blood. This connection between virtual consumption and the emotions that arise from this process is fundamental for the contribution of this paper.

METHOD

The authors analyzed all 159 comments posted on the CB-SNews website in the 12 months between Johnson’s April 2012 “World’s Fakest” article and March, 2013. In order to better understand the comments that were posted, we also observed other corresponding online sources, such as youtube, Facebook, niconico douga, and mikubook.com which in combination provided us with rich consumer data and information to enable our analysis of their views, opinions, feelings, emotions, thoughts, ideas and expectations. In this regard, our paper employed an exploratory analytical approach that combined related perspectives not only from consumers’ point of view. Despite the fact that demographic details were not provided in a straightforward manner, some of them could be identified within the contents of their comments. More importantly, the freedom that individuals had in expressing their personal views provided valuable insights into the nature, meaning and symbolic values of HM, that would have been extremely difficult to collect in a more structured environment.

We chose to employ a Grounded Theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1994; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) approach to this research study because Grounded Theory requires focused data collection and analysis prior to theory development. Because this is the first academic study of Hatsune Miku or other Vocaloid characters, such a grounded approach was deemed appropriate. By approaching the data in this way, we were able to examine the responses and focus on the profound emotions, thoughts and aspirations by repeatedly reviewing the entirety of individual responses, their wordings, capital letters and punctuations used. After inputting all HM’s fan comments into a qualitative data analysis software package, we then scanned the whole data for coding and search key themes and concepts. We used these to organize and code all comments to arrive at a structured list of core constructs outlined below and generate a summary map. As a large number of respondents are Japanese, unsurprisingly their responses contained some Japanese words, which also helped us to approach the meaning of HM to fans.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

With more than 172 mentions within the entire set of responses, the word “fake” (and fakest) was a powerful influence to ignite the anger of HM fans. This key word – fake – are so important that we use them as the pivotal starting point to identify and classify the strengths and types of anger from HM fans and link these to their unveiled insights of HM. We analyzed and interpreted the relative strength of anger levels by examining the intensity of emotions exposed in the responses and classified these into strong and moderate intensity categories. We also analyzed the types of anger expressed into positive and negative categories based on the concepts expressed by individual fans. We re-categorized the contents of responses into two broad anger meta-constructs of “the positivity”: the meaning, the aestheticism, and the values that HM gives to these fans; and “the negativity”: criticisms and accusations towards the report, the journalist and America at large. In doing all these, we also attempted to explore and identity anthropomorphic representation and meaning, including simple metaphoric statement but with strong intense.

At the end, from our interpretive process, a clear framework emerged to identify and link the two core meta-constructs: (1) anger, and (2) love/adoration.

Positive Anger

Within the positivity anger meta-construct, three major constructs were identified followed by eight linked concepts.

Positivity anger construct 1: “Real”-ness

The positive construct of real-ness comes at strong anger intensity. When the CBS journalist argued that HM is fake, or in fact the “fake-est” star (Johnson, 2012), the majority of fans responded strongly that they did not only disagree but strongly felt that labeling HM as fake was completely misleading.

“She’s a real singer for me!! and she is IMMORTAL!” (Mikou-san)

“... it is a real voice, a real talent and a REAL PERSON” (MRWALRUS)

Within this construct, it was also suggested that that HM’s real-ness was connected to Japan’s cultural and religious heritage: ‘souled idolation ontology’ – in which everything has a soul.

... I’m a native Japanese in Japan. To come to the point, you are totally ignorant on Japanese culture and thinking. We have a special affection for human-shaped objects under the influence of Shinto culture. In Shinto everything and anything in the universe, both animate and inanimate, even the artificial material, has its own “soul” or “spirit” in it...This can be one of the reasons why Japanese people love virtual idols. I hope my poor explanation would be an access to better insight on Japanese culture (Damesuke, Japan)

Both Johnson’s CBS article and the fan responses confirm that HM is more than a computer program or hohologram, and is in fact a powerful “star” and idol. Her fans lovingly call her “Uta Hime” which can be literally translated into English as “Princess of Song”. Praising HM as Princess of Song goes beyond ordinary pop star status.

“Whatever, guys. Ya’ll don’t know nothin. She’s utahime and that’s that.” (FX9095)

“Miku is not a pop star she is a utahime” (YNOP)

Positive anger construct 2: “human” celebrities are “more” fake

This positive anger construct emerged at moderate anger intensity demonstrated by a more moderate emotional tone. This construct exhibits a disagreement with labelling HM as fake and rebuts that there are so many “real” celebrities who behaves fake or pretend to be someone else. These respondents further argue that HM has nothing deceptive – she is genuine. HM has tapped into a deep and resonant chord with her creators and fans that unveils the latent desire to exhibit no pretense – no deception life. The adorable genuine kind of life “she” has garnered is evident in many fan comments and is energizing.

“The world is filled with fake celebrities, pretending to be something they are not, remade by image consultants, keeping up appearances with a polished veneer. Hatsune Miku is none of these things. She is exactly what she appears to be, with no pretence or deception. She is the sum total of the hopes and

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Positive anger construct 3: Acceptance to the “un-reality” being of HM

The un-real-ness construct emerged at a moderate intensity level of anger. This construct also highlights the creative and innovative nature of HM, as many fans defended HM in terms of the creativity and innovativeness that this Vocaloid technology and database enable. HM is seen as one of the superb achievements of Japan. HM is obviously about music and the enablement of musical expression, giving artists the ability to put a “voice” to their music without the need for a physical singer.

“Everybody who loves miku and other Vocaloids already know they are not real people but also know that they’re part of a real program, a real instrument that an artist can use to create a fabulous new things.” (SUZUMIYA_KAI)

In addition to the creative-innovative side of HM, one extra construct of special note emerged related to the attention placed upon the co-creative business model that is at the heart of HM. The holographic image of HM has performed multiple sold-out concerts in her home country and in many countries around the world. Projected on a screen and supported by a live band, Miku sings and dances according to the direction of programmers who “designed” the concert in advance.

“The point is that Hatsune Miku isn’t actually a pop star at all if you want to analyze her, she is the product of her fans, literally. Her songs are made by individual artists, her appearance is as fans illustrate her. The only thing which belongs to her is her voice, and that is by Saki Fujita … She is much greater than a person. We call her an idol or a goddess specifically because she is less an individual than an collective abstraction. She is Hatsune Miku, and nothing else (Kakisho)”

The un-real-ness construct also pointed to real productions that HM participates in, but is unharmed by this participation. HM was celebrated for her innocent life both within Johnson’s CBS article, and within the fan responses to it.

“So she’s not real as we know it, because she’s a program. However It’s a really neat thing to go see if you’ve ever seen one of their shows. She also endorses products just like any other celebrity. The only thing she can’t do is go out and ruin her life, or get hooked on drugs, and end up in rehab. (DisH12)

Negative Anger

Within the “negativity” anger meta-construct, all with strong anger intensity, three constructs were identified.

Negativity anger construct 1: Offensive

A majority of the fan comments included at least some shade of anger or frustration in their response. The passion within such responses can be best shown in the following two comments:

“I was literally flipping tables when I read this, I’m a die-hard Vocaloid fan, and I thought only Fox news was bullsh*t.” (ANI-MAN)

“THINK BEFORE YOU ******** WRITE A ARTICLE!! I’ve already gotten some Miku haters on my youtube channel because of this.” (Hatsunemikufan_101)

Negative anger construct 2: Mocking

Because many of the proposed “facts” within the article were in fact not true (i.e. HM “is a hologram….more accurately she is a digital avatar.”), and the author openly stated that she used Wikipedia as her main source of research, many fan responses mocked the author and CBS in terms of their credibility.

“CBS needs to do some research. Yeah I wouldn’t called looking on Wikipedia ‘research’ for a multi billion dollar company.” (LUCCHINI2)

“If CBS wants to bash on Miku and the Vocaloids, then by all means, you might as well glorify Jersey Shore and encourage teenagers to quit school to get drugged up and pregnant. I commend you, CBS.” (XYINXYANGXYOUKAIX)

Negative anger construct 3: America-bashing

As the content of Johnson’s original article positioned HM as different, strange and something purely Japanese, many responses took offense to this and turned to anti-American sentiment in return:

“How wonderful is it that other countries in the world actually have the ability to create something wonderful and 10th Generation for entertainment compared to your drug Fu***ed society.” (IGNORANT_JOURNALISTS_SUCK)

Non-Fans’ positivity construct: Sympathy – Solidarity

We also found non-fans’ comments and repeatedly throughout the commentary by HM fans, the concept of a larger group or community, in its most positive, collaborative sense was mentioned and often celebrated.

“I may not be a hardcore fan of Miku like my other friends, but even then I feel like this article just shoved at me a bunch of narrow-minded critiques said with no thought at all. I can’t even imagine the anger this article has caused to Miku’s fans.” (NinjaAutobot101)

“Even if the person does so or not, it doesn’t change that you have offended millions of people over the world.” (Sakura772)

As a summary, figure 1 entails all identified construct into one conceptual map.

Figure 1: Conceptual Map of HM
Note: Utahime means Princess of Song
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Our analysis brings to several key categorical findings. First HM is “real” because it represents the collective creativity of artists, illustrators, business entities and fans. Second, the co-production nature enhances on how strongly HM truly comes alive inside her fans. Third, the creative capability enables those individuals without music composition capabilities to join this new consumption culture. Fourth, HM is simultaneously stimulating, actualizing, experimenting and collaborating. HM is stimulating because it gives the desired freedom for consumers using resources and experiences so that they can obtain an (representative) ability to sing. In terms of actualizing, consumers actualize their latent desire in the form of songs they like others to listen and not yet expressed in any other manner. Lyrics, types of music and dancing style performance are the productions where consumers may enact their dreams of musicality and singing realms. Consumers actualize idealy possible imaginings or fantasies, like being a great composer or a choreographer that possess the ability to compose a fantasy song and to create a singing performance. Regarding experimenting, consumers enjoy experimentally exploring and combining different features available, including adopting different kinds of music, lyrics and voices, even possible for unable music individuals. All these give consumers some sort of status in HM society. These also give consumers space for expressing their esteem (personal values) like being a serious musician and choreographer. Fifth, exploring the anthropomorphic essence and perspective, there emerges from the fans the supreme perception of HM as Uta Hime (Princess of Song) without fail, supreme representation of HM as the symbol of innovation confirming Japan dominating US, and supreme protoplasmic, integrated consciousness between HM fans and HM as their created darling. The first and the latter definitely contain much emotive elements, especially love and adoration. More specifically, the personification (or humanization) of HM into her fans reflects the harmonized dispositional, situational, developmental and cultural integration of HM as the fans’ anthropomorphic agent, cognitively – ability of the fans to express and perform the elicited HM knowledge - and motivationally – strongly motivated to explain the complex stimuli of HM effectively (termed as effectance, Epley et al 2007) and strongly motivated to socially defend HM and her fandom community with respect to her realness authenticity and contribution (termed as sociality, Epley et al 2007).

IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings imply that virtual consumption enables profound emotional connection between co-creating consumers and their virtual character, perhaps due to the co-creation nature of HM that individual consumer may take significant role in final production of HM. Taking further the discussions above, with the summary map of the society, acceptance of change and combining different features available, including adopting different kinds of music, lyrics and voices, even possible for unable music individuals. All these give consumers some sort of status in HM society. These also give consumers space for expressing their esteem (personal values) like being a serious musician and choreographer. Fifth, exploring the anthropomorphic essence and perspective, there emerges from the fans the supreme perception of HM as Uta Hime (Princess of Song) without fail, supreme representation of HM as the symbol of innovation confirming Japan dominating US, and supreme protoplasmic, integrated consciousness between HM fans and HM as their created darling. The first and the latter definitely contain much emotive elements, especially love and adoration. More specifically, the personification (or humanization) of HM into her fans reflects the harmonized dispositional, situational, developmental and cultural integration of HM as the fans’ anthropomorphic agent, cognitively – ability of the fans to express and perform the elicited HM knowledge - and motivationally – strongly motivated to explain the complex stimuli of HM effectively (termed as effectance, Epley et al 2007) and strongly motivated to socially defend HM and her fandom community with respect to her realness authenticity and contribution (termed as sociality, Epley et al 2007).
Childhood Obesity: Is Advertising The Culprit?
Stephan Dahl, University of Hull, UK
Debra M. Desrochers, University of Westminster, UK

ABSTRACT

The role of marketing in the global rise of obesity to children has been the subject of heated debates in the past decade. In this paper we review recent studies to contribute to the debate surrounding further regulation of advertising.

‘Polemic and Panic’ Around Advertising and Childhood Obesity

Much of the public debate focuses singularly on advertising, exemplified by claims of concerned participants portraying advertising to children as “by its very nature, exploitative” (Kunkel et al. 2004, 11) and as “inherently misleading” (Graff, Kunkel, and Mermín 2012, 392). There are frequent calls for “governmental action to protect young children from commercial exploitation” (Kunkel et al. 2004, 23), including recent calls for stronger regulation, or a complete ban of advertising in the UK and Canada (Joseph 2013; CBC News 2013). While much of the public debate often includes different promotional, pricing and distribution tactics, traditional media “advertising seems to have been effectively scapegoated as the villain of the piece” (Young 2003, 25).

The industry has responded that advertising bans are counterproductive, have no effect on obesity levels and result in “serious social, cultural and economic ramifications”, such as “reduced sales, job cuts, decreased consumer choice, stifled innovation and barriers to competition and market entry” (World Federation of Advertisers 2013).

Policy reactions inevitably vary by country (see Young 2010 for a more extensive discussion). In the US, the Federal Trade Commission started to regulate advertising to children since the 1970s, coupled with industry self-regulation. Some countries, such as Sweden and Quebec, have banned all media advertising to children, while others, for example the UK, have banned only certain types of advertising (such as those for foods high in fat, sugar and salt) during programs aimed primarily at children.

Academic Contribution

Mirroring the passionate public discussion, the academic debate surrounding the effect that food advertising has on childhood obesity has been similarly polarized. Cautionously, Young et al. (1996) concluded in an early review of the evidence relating to the effect of advertising on the rising obesity levels among children, that advertising is only one of many factors influencing children’s food consumption.

Taking the opposite view, Hastings et al. (2003) conclude that current food promotion, alongside television consumption, “significantly influences children’s food behavior and diet independently of other factors” (p.18). Similar to Hastings et al. (2003), later reviews, such as a report by the Institute of Medicine (2006), a report by the British regulator Ofcom (2004) and a further report by Livingstone and Helsper (2004) all conclude that the direct effect of advertising is moderate, but harmful.

The contradictory conclusions can be explained, at least in part, by the selection criteria for inclusion of studies: Young et al. (1996) excluded experimental or laboratory based studies, arguing that these types of studies are too far removed from reality. Hastings et al. (2003) and the later reports for Ofcom (2004), the Institute of Medicine (2006) and Livingstone and Helsper (2004) on the other hand, draw their conclusions mainly based on experimental studies. These later reports argue that overall television-viewing habits must be taken into account when considering the impact of advertising exposure, i.e. they equate high television viewing with high exposure to food advertising and resultant obesity.

The equation of high-television-viewing with a direct advertising effect, however, is challenged by Desrochers and Holt (2007). Based on US data, they show that obesity levels among children have risen dramatically in the last 20 years, in line with television-viewing and total exposure to television advertising. Nevertheless, children’s exposure to food advertisements decreased over the same time. Moreover, in 1977 children were exposed to more advertising for cereals and desserts and sweets than in 2004. It is safe to say, that the presented arguments remain controversial and much contested.

The point on which both sides agreed, however, is that too little is known regarding the size of the direct effect of advertising itself. For example, the Hastings et al. (2003) report only one study examining a direct relationship between advertising and snacking frequency (i.e. not merely a link between television viewing in total and food choice). The study (Bolton 1983) is, however, almost 20 years old, and therefore may no longer adequately represent today’s media consumption patterns. Bolton (1983) concludes that “long-run effects of television food advertising are detected, but their impact is found to be very small in comparison with that of other effects” (p. 173). The study quantifies the effect of television food advertising as explaining 2% of the observed variance in snacking behavior among children. For comparison, parental snacking frequency explained 29% of the variance in children’s snacking behavior.

Because of the lack of evidence regarding a direct link between advertising and obesity in children, both sides in the argument draw conclusions on the basis of a narrative evaluation, relying on circumstantial evidence regarding food promotions, largely relying on experimental data, or arguing on the basis of a link between television viewing and obesity levels.

In the past few years, several researchers have attempted to examine the link between advertising exposure and food choice. However, this research has not been systematically reviewed or entered the public policy debate.

The current debate is, therefore, often based on data that rarely explicitly address the directly attributable effect that advertising has on consumption, leaving the industry to conclude “it is not possible to draw any meaningful conclusions on the impact [of advertising] on longer-term dietary and health variables” (World Federation of Advertisers 2006, 3). With the majority of regulatory efforts and public discourse being directed towards regulating (or even banning) media advertising, the question is, whether this effort is misdirected.

This paper contributes to the debate by analyzing studies from different fields that have attempted to examine the direct link between advertising and food choice, establishing what the size of the effect of advertising on childhood obesity is likely to be, based on the available evidence. In doing so, we investigate two interrelated research questions:

RQ1: Based on recent evidence, what is the reported effect of advertising on food choice?

RQ2: Does the study design effect the outcome?
**METHODOLOGY**

To address both questions, we conduct a meta-analysis of recent studies (conducted in the past 10 years). To identify studies for inclusion in the meta-analysis, we conducted a keyword search using the terms children, advertising and effect or effectiveness using **Business Source Elite, Emerald and Google Scholar**, following the recommendations by Hunter and Schmidt (2004), and similar to steps taken in earlier meta-analyses published in the marketing literature. In order to include only studies that were conducted recently, we limited the inclusion to peer-reviewed studies published in the last twelve years (2000-2012).

The search resulted in 15 studies from the business, health and psychology fields. As this study aims to examine the direct effect of advertising on consumption, only studies which gave empirical evidence of direct advertising effectiveness on food choice were included. Studies which measured other marketing effectiveness measures, such as advertising recall, brand awareness, or brand preference amongst children were excluded. Of the 15 studies, 6 were removed because they relied on general media exposure rather than advertising exposure, one because it solely measured recall of specific advertising elements (Maher, et al. 2006) and one (Dhar and Baylis 2011) because it was based on data from 1984 to 1992.

The remaining manuscripts (marked by asterisks in the references) were included in the meta-analysis, covering a total sample size of 17,431. In cases where the studies did not provide all the details required to calculate effect sizes, we contacted the authors to obtain the relevant details. The ages of the children studied ranged from 3-12 years old, and all studies included both male and female children.

Most studies reported single effects, i.e. effect of advertising on a single food or drink item, with the exception of a study by Andreyeva et al. (2011), which reported four effect sizes. Because of the multiple effect sizes reported by Andreyeva et al. (2011), 10 effect sizes were used for the meta-analysis. In order to consider a weight for the multiple measures for this study, each sample size was weighted by the ratio 0.25 to the number of effect sizes reported, as suggested by Hunter and Schmidt (2004). All other studies, which reported a single measure for the dependent variable, were weighted 1.0.

We selected the correlation coefficient (r) effect size for the analysis. Consequently, numbers closer to 1 indicate a strong, positive effect of advertising, while numbers closer to 0 indicate no effect. Numbers closer to -1 would indicate a negative effect.

**RESULTS**

The resultant meta-analytic correlations (applying the random-effects model) are given in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Study</th>
<th>Number of Studies</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>CI Upper</th>
<th>CI Lower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RQ1 Combined</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17431</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ2 Experimental</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ2 Observational</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11820</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to answer RQ1 the result, taking into account all studies irrespective of study type, shows that advertising has a small, but significant effect on children. The mean for all studies is $r = 0.160$, with 95% confidence intervals (CI) between $CI_{Upper} = 0.376$ and $CI_{Lower} = -0.056$ for all studies. According to Cohen (1977) this effect is considered small. This finding is therefore similar to the finding of Bolton (1983), and adds further evidence that any direct effect of advertising, independent of being short- or long-term, is at best limited.

In order to answer RQ2, we also calculated the meta-analytic correlations for the different types of studies included i.e. if there are differences in reported effect sizes between experimental and observational studies. We classified as experimental all studies which evaluated children’s food choices following advertising exposure by means of an experimental setup, while observational studies were those that calculated advertising effects based on market data in conjunction with advertising exposure data. The results show that the study design clearly has an influence on the reported outcome, with the difference between reported effect sizes significant ($z = 59.20$, $p < 0.005$).

As can be seen from Table 1, only experimental studies showed significant effects, while observational studies failed to demonstrate any effect. However, only two experimental studies reported a moderate effect above 0.3 (Cohen, 1977). Conversely, all observational studies report effect sizes well below the threshold of a small effect size (between 0.021 and 0.002).

**DISCUSSION**

The results from the meta-analysis suggests that media advertising alone may have only a very small effect in the short term, for example, immediately after watching an advertisement, such as in a laboratory experiment. Therefore, there is still no persuasive evidence to support any long term, direct effect of advertising on children’s food choices. Further, the experimental studies find significant effects which may, in turn, influence policy, yet their results are not consistent with the ‘reality’ exhibited in the observational data studies. This provides additional support for Young’s (1996) rationale to remove experimental studies.

This finding has important consequences regarding the current calls for more regulation, or even bans of advertising. These initiatives are likely to be misdirected as they will have only a very limited impact. This does not mean, of course, that marketing has no role to play in addressing obesity among children. However, by singularly focusing on advertising as a potential remedy, advocates may be diverting the regulatory effort away from areas that matter more in the fight against obesity.

For researchers, there are several areas that would benefit from more attention. First, it is clear that more research is needed regarding the direct impact of advertising on consumption. Further, the relatively limited data available that is not experiment based also opens up avenues for future research to more clearly determine long-term effects.

A second issue is that academics should be clear that television advertising is unlikely to be the sole culprit, and they can play a leading role by advancing knowledge, and examining the need for regulation in areas other than traditional media advertising. For example, we know that playing advergames has an effect on preferences for products (Mallinckrodt and Mizerski 2007), yet this area is a virtually unregulated. Likewise, food pricing has been shown to influence consumption significantly (cf. Wansink and Payne 2012) but, again, receives only marginal attention in the debate about regulation. Moreover, more work is urgently needed comparing advertising effects with effects of other promotional tools.

Finally, since no marketing campaign is based on television advertising exclusively, the impact of coordinated forms of communications needs to be investigated and included in the debate. There are already some studies of the effects of other marketing techniques, but they are often ‘siloed’, studying only the effects of the technique...
under consideration and missing the opportunity for looking at the wider picture. Although the effects confirmed in this study may be small, such effects may be significant and cumulative over a longer period of time, especially if these are compounded by simultaneous media use (Schultz, Block, and Raman 2012; Bardhi, Rohm, and Sultan 2010) and exposure to multiple promotional vehicles. In a unique study, brand recognition and packaging have been found to have a significant influence on children (Levin and Levin 2010).

But the buck does not stop with academia and policy makers: The industry itself needs to ask itself what effect their behavior has on the debate. Specifically, as the public debate often conflates behavior in regulated and unregulated areas, several studies have shown less than exemplary behavior by some industry members, particularly regarding promotions using new media forms (e.g. Dahl, Eagle, and Baez 2009; Quilliam et al. 2011). A failure from industry members to show commendable behavior in all areas is likely to fuel further calls for the imposition of greater restrictions on marketing for all members.

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The Vintagescape as Embodied and Practiced Space
Katherine Duffy, University of Strathclyde, UK
Paul Hewer, University of Strathclyde, UK

ABSTRACT

Vintage is not a new concept. Second-hand markets and the selling and trading of clothing, bric-a-brac and unwanted goods have been a constant presence throughout consumer history. Previous research around this concept has been explored in the CCT literature from flea markets (Belk et al., 1988; Sherry, 1990), to the notion of thrift shopping (Bardhi 2003; Bardhi and Arnauld 2003), and alternative spaces of consumption (Belk et al. 1991; Roux and Korenia 2006; McGrath et al. 1993). For CCT researchers, markets are seen as social and cultural constructs, with the marketplace unpacked in terms of the collective efforts to sustain and perform such marketplaces (Arnould and Thompson 2005; Geiger et al. 2012). To contribute to such previous work we theorise the vintagescape as a form of social politics in action and movement. Considering vintage as a socially and culturally malleable frame, it is useful to theorise vintage and its associated practices in terms of their potential for movement, that is, enacted strategically by both buyers and sellers to bring forth a marketplace which fuses a mythical idealised past with a fast paced consumer present.

Theorising Vintage Practices and Performances

To suggest that vintage practices bring forth movement may strike the reader as a truism or too marginal a contribution for an advance in consumer research. However, such an approach takes us to the central theme of our paper, the contemporary character of what Bourdieu in Outline to a Theory of Practice (2010, orig. 1977: 7) refers to as the ‘dialectics of strategies’ whereby the urgencies of time must be included as a central constituent of everyday practices. Such a sense of time takes a number of forms but makes explicit the ways that practices are structured temporally. Notions of tempo and rhythm take us closer to the notion of the vintagescape as a form of temporal invigoration. Such an assertion on the time-like qualities of practices must be understood as unfolding within particular parcels of temporal invigoration. Such an assertion on the time-like qualities of everyday practices bring us closer to the notion of the vintagescape as an ensemble of practices orchestrated and oriented around notions of time. Our turn to movement makes explicit the routines of practices. We are not alone in this sensibility to contexts. For example, Nash (2000) calls attention to the notion that “dance is taught, scripted, performed and watched” and that performativity is not just a singular act, but also a repetition of assumed norms. It is through this constructed space that an understanding of vintage practices as a “structured movement system” (Kaeppler, 1985) begins to emerge; what Williams would prefer to visualise as a ‘structure of feeling’.

To theorise time as significant to the constitution of practices forces us to also consider the value of particular consumption spaces. For Warde (2005) and Appadurai (1986), the link between spaces, objects and practices is of central importance. In a similar fashion, De Certeau (1995) considers space as “an intersection of moving bodies” and of it being a practiced settlement. Hereby understanding of everyday practices is enriched through understanding consumers as moving entities in time and space, through which notions of fixed structures are questioned, and a more nuanced appreciation of agency begins to emerge, perhaps best thought of in terms of the ability to “negotiate movements within those structures” (McDonald 2004: 200). In focusing on this performative enactment of vintage, it can be seen to be a social entity grounded in the temporality and

spatialities of commodity journeys, with vintage as the outcome of this embodiment and consumer action (Gregson and Crewe, 2002).

Our final ingredient for an appreciation of everyday practices is that of objects and artefacts, how they are used in practice and “the intermediation work they perform” (Nicolini, 2013: 220). For as Nicolini makes explicit: “Practices only exist to the extent that they are enacted and re-enacted. Focusing on practices is thus taking the social and material doing (of something: [where] doing is never objectless.” (Ibid: 221). Unlike the ‘Diderot effect’ (McCracken 1988) in which a change in one object leads to multiple transformations with the whole set, Hui (2012) argues in her study of mobile practice networks that previously discarded things are reclaimed easily when mobilities change. Focusing on these moments of travel, consumption therefore can be suggested to occur during performances in relation to objects of practice that are used thus forming ‘symbiotic chains’ (Lury, 1997: 77). When consumption is understood as part of social practices the movement of the objects and how this movement shapes the moments of consumption, sensitivity to time and space become critical. As with all recipes other ingredients can be added, but ours is forged on the notion of considering practices within time and space, through a turn to objects.

METHOD

This paper draws insights from the context of the Glasgow, UK vintage marketplace. This ethnographic research explores the practices between consumers, spaces and objects in the enactment of the vintagescape. With a particular focus on the transient, ‘pop-up’ markets that unfold across the city, the findings reflect two years absorbed in the vintage scene. With the researcher performing as ‘bricoleur’ and taking inspiration from Schroeder’s (2004) ‘image economy’, the photographs allowed a focus on the modes of visual enactment of vintage. A researcher diary complemented and enhanced our appreciation of this context through sensitizing us to the reflexive aspects of the lived experience of meaning in motion in the marketplace. The researcher in this way gained access to the market through attending regularly and building relationships with key characters of the scene. Twenty-five ethnographic interviews (McCracken, 1988 b) were used to gain an emic perspective of vintage practices. The interview data supplemented the observational data and provided practitioner perspectives on the actions and practices of ‘performing vintage’ in the marketplace. Our findings are organized around two themes: The Vintage Marketspace in Action and Organization; and ‘Looks’ and the Performance of Inclusion.

The Vintage Marketspace in Action and Organization

The first motif we explore is that of marketspace as revealed through action and organization. The afternoon of the market can be seen as a continual shift between time, space and actors, with a changing rhythm and tempo that marks the passage of the day. This time-space dynamic nods to Giddens (1979: 3) in that the dichotomy is inscribed in all social interactions. To start with there is an air of urgency as vendors arrive. The most pressing demands at this time are the practices of setting up the table, unloading stock and securing the transport of such stock to the venue. Having moved such stuff, vendors busy themselves in dealing with the urgencies of time and their calculations over spatial display:

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“Vendors arrive to be shown to a rectangular wooden table, a lamp and a chair. From these objects they have to create their own area that showcases their wares and establishes themselves as different from their close neighbours. The unpacking and setting up process seems to be crucial in the cultivation of a vintage look. The more seasoned vendors arrive early and with a careful system unpack daintily embroidered table clothes dressing the wooden table as they go, cake stands, hat boxes, weathered suitcases all revealed to store treasures and present them to the awaiting crowd.” (Fieldnote, February 12th 2012).

The setting up one’s table to best display stock is itself an art of practising, an exercise in staging and performance through objects. Vendors place objects to best display their items, sometimes constructing a front and back stage through the layering of the table to best attract the attention of mobile customers, and thereby encourage them to linger (see figure 1):

“You start to learn what makes your stall attractive, sometimes it is through trial and error or being inspired by seeing how someone has put their stall together. We try really hard to make it easy to see the stock but also to get across some of our personality, so it is never going to be too ‘done’ it will always be a bit like a dressing up box...” (Charlie)

For this seller, the table provides a ‘showcase’ but also creates an opportunity to present the consumer (and themselves) with a space for play and experimentation. With an almost child-like reverence of ‘the dressing up box’ the objects of the stall are used strategically to produce forms of invitation to explore and stage a personality for the interaction beyond the confines of what may be understood as mainstream selling. Building on Holt’s (1995) consumption as play typeology, within the vintagescape play and the unveiling of difference are bound by the financial rewards to be gained by the seller for creating such an immersive space. This communicative staging in the ‘look’ of the table and ones’ self is rehearsed and refined by the seller in the course of their career in the market space through the practice of organising their stall and ‘prepping’ for the event. In the subtle and unspoken cycle of production and destruction, this active process is critical in creating acceptance in the market. This links to Entwistle’s (2000) work, as the staging of the space allows for the enactment of fashion capital in the marketscape (Bourdieu 1984, 1985). Vintage here should not be understood as an end result or fixed vantage point but as a continual and ongoing process of improvisation in which competences are developed through play and performance. The market offers a space for engaging with objects, a stage for play with the material and exploring the boundaries of the marketscape to trial more “episodic selves’ (Stafford 2007).

Once the vintage sale commences an air of expectation and anticipation can be felt. To start with there is an air of urgency as vendors arrive and final preparations are made to ‘look’ and ‘feel’ of the organization of items. The market day itself is punctuated by moments of action and inaction:

“The day ebbs and flows as consumers enter and move through the space. Throughout the day this rhythm changes as the audience alters: inner members of the collective arrive early and eagerly anticipate rummaging for “treasures”, with the Sunday strollers of mid-afternoon creating a more relaxed and less exclusive scene, with newspapers tucked under arms and hushed tones of ‘don’t touch’ to children. The crescendo of the day falls mid-afternoon as the sounds of consumers’ chat hums in the air, the beats of the 1960s pop music
sets the tempo, with long conversations between stall holders and consumers ensuing in which the past is continually invoked as a reference point for understanding and interaction to hurried exchanges in which objects are inspected and paid for. As the end of the day approaches the pace slows, stallholders chat to one another about their ‘take’ for the afternoon and attentions turn to carefully packing and organising and the act of deconstructing the stall” (Fieldnote, 15th April 2012).

As a transient marketplace the ‘vintage look’ has to be created and staged on every occasion. Market routines and conventions produce a creative environment in which values of independence and othering from conventional market selling are emphasized:

“We are quite laid back about it, people want to tailor the space to their own needs and to highlight their own stuff that they are selling, it isn’t really something we dictate. I would say we are pretty flexible and are really here to oversee and help if anything comes up.” (Elena)

The material conditions and aesthetics along with the presentation of the objects, establish an atmosphere of something organic and without strict boundaries that is often contrasted with market norms. Elena’s quote encapsulates the idea that the physical environment of the market is haphazard and is a product of its temporal nature. By achieving ‘the look’ and through calculations over objects to bring and discuss, the market becomes a showcase for oneself. The construction of this market ‘look’ adds credibility to both seller and consumer’s encounters allowing them to interact with others of a similar taste and mindset. The marketspace is a communal setting, which is enlivened by the social bonds of the collective. When asked why the markets were important Lisa explains:

“What I think about is selling that object, discussing with the customer about the item, building a relationship with them and thinking about what new lease of life they will give it... I love those interactions...I have made so many friends in this line of work and

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<th>Motif</th>
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<td>Marketspace revealed through action and organisation</td>
<td>Highlights the network of materiality of the marketspace, which is bound in time and space and is enacted by practitioners.</td>
<td>1. “Vendors arrive to be shown to a rectangular wooden table, a lamp and a chair. From these objects they have to create their own area that showcases their wares and establishes themselves as different from their close neighbours. The unpacking and setting up process seems to be crucial in the cultivation of a vintage look. The more seasoned vendors arrive early and with a careful system unpack daintily embroidered table clothes dressing the wooden table as they go, cake stands, hat boxes, weathered suitcases all revealed to store treasures and present them to the awaiting crowd.” (Fieldnote, February 12th 2012).</td>
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<td>Vintage ‘looks’ and a performance of inclusion</td>
<td>A communicative staging of the vintage ‘look,’ which is a practiced performance, through which the social role of the marketspace is illuminated.</td>
<td>1. “What I think about is selling that object, discussing with the customer about the item, building a relationship with them and thinking about what new lease of life they will give it... I love those interactions...I have made so many friends in this line of work and</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. “I expect someone to acknowledge that I have entered their space, it almost feels like quite a private space, whether that’s with a nod or a smile or starting to make chat, but it almost feels like you need their permission to touch things and through saying hello it feels like you get the go-ahead.” (Lisa, August 26th 2012).</td>
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I always thought that I was alone in how I valued vintage stuff over new things…"

When asked about the vintage scene she comments that the markets allow for a marketplace to be created that isn’t just about profit but is about the people. This social role of the market and the physical proximity of the marketspace enforce the relational nature of the exchange and in turn enlivened a stronger feeling of community. For the sellers, the undertaking of their business involves this ‘hanging out’ and absorption of the scene. Much of the knowledge distribution in the collective was dependent on ‘being there’; within the face-to-face interactions of the marketplace. Such knowledge was in turn integrated as second nature into their practices and performances.

As Hanna (1979) draws distinctions between competence (internalised rules for dancing) and performance (what someone does on the basis of knowing such rules) and creator (choreographer) and imitator (Hanna et al., 1979; 315), rules of etiquette in the marketplace were brought to the foreground. As Jess spoke of the etiquette of the vintage scene: that it should be “work”, “a little bit scary” and “not overly accessible to outsiders.” This language of exclusivity and drawing boundaries between insiders and outsiders in the collective conveyed the knowledge needed to adequately partake in the vintagescape. The stall table again acted as a main focal point for consumers: the interaction, accepted behaviour and vendor reaction, as Jess explains:

“I expect someone to acknowledge that I have entered their space, it almost feels like quite a private space, whether that’s with a nod or a smile or starting to make chat, but it almost feels like you need their permission to touch things and through saying hello it feels like you get the go-ahead.”

This excerpt portrays the created space around the table as a private area, almost as a homely sphere that has established practices that must be acknowledged before progression can be made. The consumer acts as willing participant to be led through the process by a knowledgeable tutor, they seek acceptance to continue onto the next step of being able to interact with both the objects and the possible exchange.

CONCLUSION

For L.P. Hartley in his 1950s classic The Go-Between, ‘the past is a foreign country’; such nostalgic resonances abound in troubled times, but the notion of a go-between is useful to theorise the value of practices for bringing a sense of rhythm and tempo to the everyday. Practices as we have sought to reveal are an invaluable perspective for capturing the sense that actions unfold in space and time; and it is through such a practice turn that we capture a sensitivity to the time-like qualities of everyday practices bring us closer to the particular parcels of temporal invigoration. Such an assertion on the time-like qualities of everyday practices bring us closer to the notion of the vintagescape as an ensemble of practices orchestrated and oriented around notions of time and space through which making difference reveals itself as practice-based.

REFERENCES


Social Conflict and Consumption: A Meta-Analytical Perspective
Katharina C. Husemann, University of Innsbruck, Austria
Marius K. Luedicke, Cass Business School, University City London, UK

ABSTRACT
Social conflict is an important and inevitable part of human relations (Coser 1972 [1956]; Simmel 2006 [1908]). It is commonly defined as an interaction relationship between two or more parties that pursue mutually exclusive or incompatible goals (Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Mack and Snyder 1957). As such, social conflict is a core social mechanism to (re-)vitalize, (de-)stabilize, and cure anything from interpersonal to international social relations (Bonacker 2005; Coser 1957; Dahrendorf 1958).

Social conflict also emerges in consumption contexts, and often with considerable consequences. Consider, for example, the group of fur-trade protesters that occupied the entrance of Burberry’s London flagship store last autumn to blame the corporation for its “bloody fur trade” (caft.co.uk); imagine critical consumers spitting at Hummer SUVs to protest against the consumption of “gas-burning monsters” (fuh2.com); or think of Apple computer enthusiasts being denounced by Internet authors as “skinny-jeans wearing Hipsters” and “sickened Yuppies” (stupidedia.org).

Consumer culture research has approached such conflict dynamics from multiple perspectives in studies about consumer movements (Dameron 1941), consumer boycotts (Friedman 1985; Garrett 1987; Simon 2011), consumer resistance (Fournier 1998; Herrmann 1993; Holt 2002; Peñaloza and Price 1993; Rumbo 2002; Ulver-Sneistrup, Askgaard, and Kristensen 2011), consumer emancipation (Kozinets 2002; Murray and Ozanne 1991; Murray, Ozanne, and Shapiro 1994), marketplace drama (Giesler 2008), and consumer conversion (Firat and Venkatesh 1995), new social movements (Kozinets and Handelman 2004), or anti-consumption (Chertoff 2001, 2002; Luedicke et al. 2010; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Rumbo 2002; Schouten and McAlister 1998; Giesler 2008; Kozinets 2001, 2002; Luedicke et al. 2010; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Rumbo 2002; Schouten and McAlister 1998; Thompson and Arsel 2004; Thompson, Rindfleisch, and Varman 2007; Varman and Belk 2009). These studies commonly focus on conflicts arising from power imbalances between producers and consumers, and often focus on cases of proactive consumer emancipation or heroic resistance.

However, as Honneth (1992), Simmel (2006 [1908]) and our introductory examples of conflicts circling around the (anti-)consumption of brands such as Hummer and Apple show, social conflict is not limited to courageous individuals fighting against (class) domination, suppression, or corporate exploitation. Social conflict also, and potentially even more so, emerges in mundane interactions between humans that strive for individualization and differentiation (Simmel 2006 [1908]). More recently, consumer culture theorists have begun to address these low profile types of social conflict. Authors explored, for example, competition and conflict in brand communities (de Valck 2007; Ewing, Wagstaff, and Powell 2013; Hickman and Ward 2007; Luedicke 2006; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001), studied how consumers fight for consumerist morals (Luedicke, Thompson, and Giesler 2010), and explained how consumers defend their field-dependent cultural capital (Arsel and Thompson 2011).

The growth of consumption-related social conflict research implies that conflict may be one of the important forces that shape contemporary practices of consumption. In this state of theoretical development, a systematic reflection and theoretical consolidation of existing research may prove useful for structuring and advancing this inspiring field of inquiry.

To contribute to this goal, we first review the classical writings on social conflict in sociology that set conflict research in our field into a broader theoretical perspective. We then use insights from this first step to propose a conceptual framework particularly suited for analyzing social conflicts in consumption contexts. Finally, we engage this framework for exploring if—and how so—consumption conflicts are socio-culturally patterned. With this three-partite research we hope to contribute a useful next step for advancing theory on social conflict in consumption contexts.

RESEARCH METHOD AND PROCEDURE
We followed a three-step research procedure. First, we traced sociological thinking from Marx and Engel’s (2009 [1848]) first works on class struggle, to Simmel’s (2006 [1908]) thoughts on “Streit”, to Hirschman’s (1994) analyses of social conflicts in market societies. From these authors we distilled the common conceptual markers of social conflict.

Second, based on these theoretical insights we developed a conceptualization and analytical framework particularly suited for studying social conflicts in consumption contexts. We refer to this specific type of conflict as “consumption-mediated social conflict.”

Third, we identified 27 consumer culture research studies that are broadly related to consumption-mediated social conflict research by means of electronic keyword search (key words: Consumer Movement, Consumer Activism, Consumer Boycott, Consumer Resistance, Consumer Emancipation, Anti-Consumption, Conflict) (mainly) in the Journal of Consumer Research and the Advances of Consumer Research. After a careful review, 13 of these studies remained that explicitly address consumption-mediated social conflict as defined by our conceptual framework (Arsel and Thompson 2011; Dobscha 1998; Giesler 2008; Kozinets 2001, 2002; Luedicke et al. 2010; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; Rumbo 2002; Schouten and McAlister 1998; Thompson and Arsel 2004; Thompson, Rindfleisch, and Arsel 2006; Ustüner and Holt 2007; Varman and Belk 2009). We performed a pattern analysis on the conflict-related data that are presented in these 13 studies to identify similar compositions of conflict parties, conflict objects, conflict behaviors, and consumption mediators. These procedures yield the conceptually synthesized and meta-theoretical findings (MacInnis 2011) that we present next.

FINDINGS
The Sociology of Conflict
The sociology of conflict must be considered a quite mature field of research. Social conflict theory has emerged at the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century through the writings of Hobbes, Marx, Weber, and Simmel (Bonacker 2005) and has experienced a second wave of interest in the 1950’s and 1960’s through Bernard (1957, 1965), Dahrendorf (1958), and Coser (1957, 1972 [1956]). These theories made inspiring and convincing efforts to advance more holistic theories of social conflict. A third wave of conflict research has evolved during the 1990’s and is still rolling. Hirschman (1994), Huntington (1997), and Dubiel (1998), for example, reflect on the types, roles, and (potentially detrimental) consequences of social conflicts in Western democracies induced by individualization, mobilization, migration, and the expansion of mass media communication. Conflict research, today, no longer aims at building one integrative theory of social conflict, but acknowledges that conflict is interdisciplinary and dependent on specific theoretical...
perspectives such as politics, sociology, social-psychology, anthropology (Bonacker 2005), and, as we will argue, consumption.

Social conflict is commonly conceptualized as an interaction relationship between two or more parties that pursue mutually exclusive or incompatible goals (Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Mack and Snyder 1957; Simmel 2006 [1908]). From the sociological literature we can distill three key conceptual markers that qualify a relationship as conflictual; that is conflict parties (Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Mack and Snyder 1957; Williams 1970), a conflict object (Aubert 1963; Hirschman 1994; Kriesberg 1973, 2007), and an interactive conflict behavior (Coser 1972 [1956]; Gamson 1968; Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Tyrell 1976; Williams 1970).

Conflict Parties. Social conflict requires two or more conflict parties with at least a minimum of mutual visibility and contact (Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Mack and Snyder 1957; Simmel 2006 [1908]). Conflict has the tendency to occur between two, rather than multiple, opponents. This bipolarization tendency is ascribed to the high degree of attention and energy that must be directed towards an opponent (Mack and Snyder 1957; Tyrell 1976). The opponents can also be, and often are, groups rather than individuals. Conflict groups differentiate themselves and their mutually exclusive or incompatible goals through fostering group boundaries. This occurs through sanctions in form of social rewards and punishments (Mack 1965, 394). Visibility and contact are necessary for conflicts to emerge, but do not have to be “face-to-face” (Mack and Snyder 1957, 218).

Conflict Object. To emerge, social conflict requires a conflict object that typically either has the form of a scarce material resource, or concerns incompatible norms or values (Aubert 1963; Hirschman 1994; Kriesberg 1973, 2007). Sociologists differentiate conflict objects with regards to their underlying goals (Aubert 1963; Kriesberg 1973, 2007). When a conflict revolves around the (re-)distribution of scarce resources such as money, power, prestige, or sexual achievements, conflict parties pursue the same goal (e.g. receiving/keeping power, money, prestige). Conflict parties have a consensus. When social conflicts, in contrast, arise from parties’ different views on the application, standardization, or evaluation of social norms, values, or attitudes, then these parties seek different goals (Aubert 1963; Kriesberg 1973, 2007). Conflict parties have a dissent. A conflict that is based on ideological incompatibilities is typically more difficult to resolve peacefully than a conflict in which parties pursue the same goal. That is why sociologists tend to consider ideological conflicts as more destructive (Hirschman 1994; Huntington 1997).

Interactive Conflict Behavior. Where parties pursue mutually exclusive or incompatible goals, interactive conflict behaviors sometimes follow, and a conflict emerges (Gamson 1968; Williams 1970; Kriesberg 1973, 2007; Coser 1972 [1956]; Tyrell 1976). According to Kriesberg (1973, 2007) one party induces another party to change its behavior, adjust its opinion, or leave its position by coercing, persuading, or rewarding the other party. Coercion refers to behaviors that “injure or threaten to injure” the opposing party (Kriesberg 1973, 96). Persuasion refers to one party convincing the opposing conflict party to comply with the persuader’s interests because (according to the persuader) both parties share the same interests (Kriesberg 1973, 2007). Rewarding conflict behavior refers to positive sanctions. A conflict party pursues its interest by rewarding the opposing party for compliance rather than punishing it for not doing so (coercion).

A Theoretical Framework of Social Conflict in Consumption Contexts

Building on the theoretical knowledge about the sociology of conflict, we next outline a theoretical framework that is tailored for analyzing social conflicts in consumption contexts. For our purposes, we define consumption-mediated social conflict as an interaction relationship between two or more (groups of) market participants that have mutually exclusive or incompatible goals regarding certain consumption resources and ideologies.

Based on this conceptual extension we can argue that consumption-mediated social conflict is present in empirical cases in which we are able to identify conflict parties, a conflict object, interactive conflict behavior, and a consumption-mediator. For a given party, a consumption-mediator can, for example, be a controversial product, a transgressive advertising campaign, an illegitimate corporate behavior, or an unwanted consumption practice. The consumption-mediator is central to the conflict as it brings out the underlying conflict object and gives rise to interactive behaviors aimed at resolving the underlying resource scarcities or ideological incompatibilities.

Except in very specific contexts, the consumption-mediator is typically not the focal object of the conflict (e.g. who of the two parties will get the thing that both want), but rather a proxy for a larger conflict object regarding scarce resources and incompatible ideologies.

Consumption resources such as power, money, or natural resources are typically scarce, but also divisible. Conflict parties strive to possess (or access) these resources and ideally resolve the conflict by distributing it more fairly. The conflict about Hummer driving, for instance, is not about who owns the Hummer, but how other scarce resources such as fresh air, oil, and road security are distributed. Consumption ideologies such as moral views towards certain lifestyles or consumption practices, in contrast, are not scarce and they cannot be precisely quantified. Because ideological conflict objects cannot be re-distributed for settling a conflict, parties often struggle with bearing incompatible socio-cultural beliefs.

Three Patterns of Social Conflict in Consumption Contexts

Our literature analysis and conceptual synthesis of the 13 studies that address—according to our conceptualization—consumption-mediated social conflict reveals three prevalent consumption conflict patterns that we term emancipatory, ideology-advocating, and authenticity-protecting conflict. A conflict pattern is defined by a reasonably similar constellation of conflict parties, objects, interactive behaviors, and consumption-mediators. Table 1 summarizes the markers of the three conflict patterns.

Emancipatory Conflict. The first, and most frequently studied, type of consumption-mediated social conflict is marked by conflict parties seeking to emancipate from, or regain power in, market relations (Dobscha 1998; Giesler 2008; Kozinets 2001, 2002; Rumbo 2002; Thompson and Arsel 2004; Thompson et al. 2006; Varman and Belk 2009). This type of conflict has been investigated under labels such as consumer resistance, consumer emancipation, and anti-consumption and we refer to it as an emancipatory conflict.

Emancipatory conflict tends to emerge between (groups of) discontent consumers/activists and corporate market agents. The conflict unfolds when consumers feel dominated or exploited by market forces and presumably unethical corporations. These conflicts are typically animated by two related conflict objects. The first is a consensual object, which is typically market power. That is, consumers reach for regaining independence and self-control from corporations that they consider too powerful. This consensual conflict object is informed by a dissentual object, which refers to the participating consumers’ and producers’ different moral positions in the marketplace (e.g. desirability of commercial vs. communal interests in the market). Interactive conflict behaviors that occur in this type of conflict
tend to be both violent and non-violent coercion. The consumptionmediator is typically a company or its products, brands, or styles.

To illustrate this description, consider Varman and Belk’s (2009) study of the anti-Coca-Cola movement in India. These authors address a full-fledged emancipatory conflict between anti-Coca-Cola activists and the Coca-Cola corporation (conflict parties). Conflict parties fight over scarce resources such as water, selling prices of the products, wages, number of jobs, and power/freedom from Western corporatism (consensual conflict object). This consensual conflict object is further informed by an ideological conflict object. Conflict parties have incompatible moral views about Western consumerism and the nationalist Indian ideology of “swadeshi” (Varman and Belk 2009, 686) (dissentual conflict object). Activists distribute anti-Coke pamphlets and booklets, and organize public protests (non-violent behavior), whereas Coca-Cola engages in rather violent responses (e.g. vandalism), to non-violent coercion (e.g. rude gestures, ridiculing practices), to persuasion. Hummer owners and antagonists use both the Hummer and the Prius brand as mediators to negotiate legitimate vehicle choices and consumption practices. However, the consumption mediators only make visible and manifest their opposing consumer ideologies.

**Authenticity-Protecting Conflict.** The third conflict pattern that permeates consumer cultural conflict research concerns conflict that revolves around a consumption object or practice that (groups of) consumers share. In this pattern, consumers fight about how this object is (not) supposed to be consumed. Thus, consumers protect those parts of their identity that are tied to the consumption object (Arssel and Thompson 2011; Kozinets 2001; Schouten and McAlexander 1995). We refer to this conflict pattern as authenticity-protecting conflict.

Authenticity-protecting conflict is particularly evident within consumer communities and subcultures. These conflicts tend to unfold when consumers lay opposing claims to ownership on the same consumption object or practice or when community members use different criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of consumption within the community. In particular consumers who consider themselves core-members of a community tend to protect their field-dependent identity investments against undesirable associations with inauthentic people and practices (Arssel and Thompson 2011). The conflict object is the dissent between (groups of) consumers about what constitutes an authentic/legitimate consumption practice for a consumption object. The dissent is grounded in incompatible attitudes towards the specific consumption object or practice, differences in tastes, or different lifestyles. The interactive conflict behavior tends to manifest in both violent and non-violent coercion. The consumption object/practice that consumers share is the consumptionmediator.

Schouten and McAlexander’s (1995) study of the Harley Davidson subculture of consumption depicts an authenticity-protecting conflict. These authors show how hard-core bikers, sometimes aggressively, defend their Harley Davidson motorcycles and subcultural meanings against “rich urban bikers” (Schouten and McAlexander 1995, 49) that they consider inauthentic free-riders on the Harley rebel brand myth. The conflict emerges between core-members of

### Table 1: Three Patterns of Consumption-Mediated Social Conflict

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<tr>
<th>Conflict Parties</th>
<th>Ideology Advocating Conflicts</th>
<th>Authenticity Protecting Conflicts</th>
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<tr>
<td>Consumer (discontent consumer, activist, avoider) vs. corporate market agent (market, industry, corporation)</td>
<td>Consumer vs. (non-)consumer of a specific consumption object</td>
<td>Consumer vs. consumers of the same consumption object/practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus (money, power, natural resources, labor) informed by dissent (values, morals in the marketplace)</td>
<td>Dissent about moral superiority/desirability of ideologies in consumption, attitudes towards or lifestyle through consumption</td>
<td>Dissent about what constitutes an authentic/legitimate consumption style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent and violent coercion</td>
<td>Coercion and persuasion</td>
<td>Violent and non-violent coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate market adversary or its products, styles, etc.</td>
<td>Contested/favored consumption object/practice</td>
<td>Consumption object/practice that parties share</td>
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the Harley Davidson subculture, the so called “outlaws” (Schouten and McAlexander 1995, 44), and those members who occupy a more peripheral or newcomer status in the Harley Davidson hierarchy (conflict parties). Conflict parties struggle about incompatible ideas about how to pursue an authentic Harley Davidson consumption (life-) style (dissensual conflict object). Facing the thread of diluting identity investments and resolving authenticity of their subcultural consumption, outlaws sometimes draw on violent coercion practices such as motorcycle thefts and physical violence against other bikers (interactive conflict behavior). The Harley Davidson brand and its manifestations operate as consumption-mediators in this conflict pattern.

DISCUSSION

This study offers a conceptual synthesis of sociological conflict theories, a conceptualization of “consumption-mediated social conflict” tailored to the analytical requirements of consumer culture research, and a preliminary answer to the question if consumption-mediated conflicts are socio-culturally patterned. We hope that these reflections contribute four relevant insights to consumer research literature on social conflict.

First, we show that three conceptual markers—two or more conflict parties, a conflict object, and interactive conflict behaviors—are useful for characterizing a relationship as conflictual. We argue that for a specific conflict to fall into the domain of consumer research, the interactive behaviors must have been induced by a consumption-mediator (e.g. a controversial product or consumption practice) and emerge between two or more market participants with mutually exclusive or incompatible goals regarding specific resources scarcities or ideological incompatibilities that the consumption-mediator represents.

Second, our interpretive literature analysis and conceptual synthesis of 13 consumer culture studies reveals that social conflict in consumption contexts tends to unfold in three distinct patterns that we label emancipatory, ideology-advocating, and authenticity-protecting conflict. Emancipatory conflict emerges when consumers feel dominated or exploited by firms or by broader, intangible market forces. Ideology-advocating conflict, in turn, tends to arise between consumers that try to enforce incompatible ideological views of legitimate consumption objects and practices. And authenticity-protecting conflict emerges between consumers that lay opposing claims to ownership on the same consumption object or practice.

Third, our review suggests that conflict has become one focal site for social conflict in cultural realms in which both individual and group identity construction draws largely on consumption practices (Arnould and Thompson 2005). Even though the consumption-mediator is most often a material object (e.g. a product), existing studies rarely report about consumers fighting over the legitimate owner of a desirable object (except on Black Friday in the U.S.). Instead, these consumption-mediators tend to spark conflicts about much broader cultural and material issues that the consumption object represents. For example, American Hummer SUV owners are frequently criticized for contributing disproportionately to resource depletion and American oil dependency, but not for purchasing a vehicle that someone else should own (Lueckie et al. 2010). This intricate and ubiquitous overlap of physical, cultural, and ideological matters turns consumption-mediators into prominent provocateurs of social conflicts in consumer cultures.

Lastly, we found that consumer (culture) theory on social conflict has over time moved from exploring conflicts that are based on resource scarcities (e.g. Dameron 1941; Herrmann 1993) towards conflicts that are induced by ideological or identity-relevant incompatibilities (e.g. Arsel and Thompson 2011; Lueckie et al. 2010; Üstünler and Holt 2007). This development is only natural in social contexts in which a “capitalism-friendly social reality” prevails (Paulson and O’Guinn 2012, 50) and cultural/identity-based consumption is generally on the rise (Cross 2000). Considering the ideological conflicts’ potential for destructiveness (Hirschman 1994; Huntington 1997) the investigation of their sources, interactions, and outcomes in consumption contexts appears worthwhile.

Our theoretical investigation of social conflicts in consumption contexts illuminates some potentially important paths for future research. For instance, little research has been conducted on social conflicts arising in service consumption contexts (e.g. in contexts of entertainment or tourism industries), or resulting from existential social threats and anxieties (e.g. in contexts of migration or acculturation). Migration dynamics, for instance, have the potential to irritate consumers’ sense of security or identity and thus produce conflicts that might differ in type from the emancipatory, ideology-advocating, or authenticity-protecting conflicts. Identifying conflict patterns is only a first step on the way of gaining knowledge about consumption-mediated social conflict. Further research will have to explore to which extent certain consumption contexts, objects, or parties lean towards provoking more than one conflict pattern (e.g. Kozinets 2001; Giesler 2008; Adam and Raisborough 2010); which conflict patterns are problematic (or productive) for consumers, marketers, and society; which consequences these conflicts have for parties involved; and how conflicts can proactively be used for progressive social change.

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Gender and Sexual Experiences of Tourism
Nacima Ourahmoune, Reims Management School, France

ABSTRACT

“Although prostitution may involve an immoral exploitation of human beings (Hirschman 1991; Truong 1990), and sex slavery certainly does so (Aisbett and Malan 1993; Hornblower 1993; Sherrill 1993), the patronage of prostitutes is plausibly the oldest form of consumer behavior. Nevertheless, prostitution has been studied to a very limited degree by consumer researchers (Ostergaard 1993)” (Belk, 1994).

The growth of sex work reflects the power of increasingly globalized flows of capital, policy, directives and information to draw places that were once “off the map” into very closer networks of commodified trade and exchange. Men’s and women’s experiences of tourism have been understood very differently, especially their experiences of sex tourism. This is partly due to a rather commonly held assumption about sex tourism that suggests western men travel to foreign countries to engage in sexual relations with (younger, Other) local women (Cohen, 1982; 1986; Enloe, 1989; Cohen, 1993; Seabrook, 1997; Philip and Dann, 1998; Jeffrey, 2003). There has been some acknowledgement that western women can also engage in sexual relationships with foreign men as part of their holiday experience. However, discussions around women who engage in similar sexual activities have been much more debated within the social sciences and strikingly absent from our field - although research on gender in consumer research is established and its dissemination widespread through ACR and ACR gender conferences.

Why do foreign women go “crazy” about local men? This is a question much heard among tourists and local townspeople during my long ethnography in the Dominican Republic. This question in itself contains a set of assumptions about the incongruence of situations where female sexuality might be seen as unusual and even problematic. In this research, I try to map the plural female consumer representations and lived experiences of heterosexual desires outside their cultural group and mediated by the global tourism industry, especially in the context of a third world country where local men are definitely seen as questionable sexual partners for foreign women. This is to move from the biological deterministic explanation of female sexuality to material and social conceptualization of sexuality – a construct much lacking investigation in consumer research.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Travel and gender

Travel has been historically constructed as a masculine activity (Kaplan, 1996; Mills, 1991, Smith, 2001). Masculinity has been even a necessity to be socially allowed to travel, while femininity was connected to domesticity and home (Enloe, 2000). Discourses of masculinity have been the basis of the cultural logic of travel (Smith, 2001). Then the “male” gendering of travel had important implications for women, impeding them to travel and making it difficult for the ones who do travel (Wolff, 1993). Since the 19th Century, travel echoed modernity and the “freeing of women”, bourgeois women who traveled eschewed romance and sexually explicit behaviors to uphold social respectability (Smith, 2001). During the 21st century, representations of men traveling far from home without family became of a masculine gender ideology. But since, the number of females equals or even surpasses the male travelers (Harris and Wilson, 2007), it is claimed in particular within global feminist discourses, that women’s travel is therefore an inherent form of empowerment (Kaplan, 1995).

Sex tourism and gender

Sanchez Taylor argues that ‘The stereotypical image of the “sex tourist” is that of the Western man who travels to Thailand or the Philippines in order to pay for sex with Go Go bar/prosthetic prostitutes’ (2001, p749). This stereotypical masculine traveler, this male sex tourist, is seen in much of the literature on sex tourism practices, academic and journalistic accounts of sex tourism. It tends to focus on the western men who travels to sun-drenched foreign locales to engage in sexual relations with Other women. While there has been some debate in the literature about issues such as intentionality and the nature of sexual relationships with regards to male sex tourism (Ryan and Kinder, 1996; Oppermann, 1999) and some important contributions on issues related to power and privilege (Crick, 1989; O’Connell Davidson, 1996; Pettman, 1997; Kempadoo, 1998; Cabezaz, 2004), by and large sex tourism is often seen as an extension of prostitution, where men are configured as ‘users’ of prostitutes.

Elsrud (2001) suggests that female tourists are empowered by their risky encounters in developing countries, and their understanding of the ‘third world’ and the subalterns that occupy these risky spaces as ‘primitive’ or ‘poor’ (2001, p598). Indeed, this understanding of Others in tourism is often a problematic area within tourism studies (Sanchez Taylor, 2000; Gibson, 2001; Wilson, 2004). Sanchez Taylor (2000) argues that consuming difference is a critical component of the tourist experience, and that exotic Others are positioned as markers of cultural authenticity. Consuming difference means that local people are often positioned as authentic tourist objects, and their bodies become a way for tourists to consume the difference that is such an important part of the tourist experience.

The consumer element of the sex tourism experience is also a point of intersection with wider tourism processes, as the exotic Other becomes the object of the tourist gaze (Desmond, 1997; Bishop and Robinson, 1998; Edmondson, 2001; Urry, 2002). The desire for the exotic Other is a common tourist trope, and the importance of consuming difference enters into tourism discourses. The bodies of young Caribbeans men in particular have become situated as the suitable objects of the tourist gaze and Ryan and Hall argue that “…it is of little surprise that because of the marginality of location, peoples and the exoticism ascribed to those people, sex tourism has become a sustainable force at the commencement of the twenty-first century’ (Ryan and Hall, 2001, p.13).

The Gendered Sex Tourist Gaze

The ways in which (gendered) tourists consume particular spaces/places through particular modes reveals something about the nature of host/guest interactions. Tourism literature acknowledges that travelers (both male and female) are often situated as visual consumers, as powerful watchers of the different/exotic Other (Urry, 2002; Shellhorn and Perkins, 2004; Maoz, 2005). Chi (1997) suggests that tourism is the scopophilia of modern consciousness, with the ‘eye’/seeing taking precedence over other forms of touristic understanding. When people are on holiday they often “look at the environment with interest and curiosity...we gaze at what we encounter”; the gaze is both socially organized and systematized (Urry, 2002, p.1). Indeed, part of being a modern day tourist means that one gazes upon a variety of scenes, people, and places that are “out of the ordinary” (Urry, 2002: 1).

The gaze focuses on local features that are marked off as unusual, or different to everyday, quotidian encounters and revolves
around the collection of signs and symbols. Tourists often search for the authentic or the real as part of their travels and they (visually) consume these authentic scenes with the tourist gaze (Urry, 2002). Men and women do not have equal access to space as some spaces are ‘off-limits’ to women, particularly sexualized spaces (Hubbard et al, 2008; Hubbard and Whowell, 2008). Women and men often use and consume space differently as part of their tourism practices, and their use of space may well impact upon the types of activities they engage in, the types of spaces they visit, and the types of Others they come across. Wearing et al (2010) suggest that tourists and hosts co-create tourist spaces and imbue particular sites/sights with meaning, and that within these tourist spaces women are able to create their own meanings and interpretations of tourist sites as they engage in feminized tourism practices.

Women’s experiences of travel have been reconceptualized within this gendered framework, and the tourism practices of women (particularly solo female travelers) have been seen as journeys of liberation and independence from traditional feminine roles (Kinnaird and Hall, 2000; Elsrud, 2001; Gibson, 2001; Wearing et al, 2010). Western women seem to be empowered by their travel experiences, and their journeys in some ways allow them to redefine their gender identity for themselves (Gibson, 2001; Elsrud, 2001).

**METHOD**

Understandings of sex tourism (for both men and women) often focus on the physical nature of the sexual interactions between a ‘couple’, i.e. a sex tourist and a local sex worker. However, defining sex tourism as the consummation of ‘commercial sexual relations’ is problematic and further ‘...is an overt simplification and arguably excludes many other cases and settings’ (Oppermann, 1999, p252). This paper engages in a wider conversation in consumer research by including the ‘couple’, i.e. a sex tourist and a local sex worker. However, defining sexual tourism as the physical nature of the sexual interactions between a ‘couple’ is problematic and further ‘...is an overt simplification and arguably excludes many other cases and settings’ (Oppermann, 1999, p252). This paper engages in a wider conversation in consumer research about how sexuality and gender are constructed, produced, and imbue particular sites/sights with meaning, and that within these tourist spaces women are able to create their own meanings and interpretations of tourist sites as they engage in feminized tourism practices.

In thinking about sexual subjectivity, the author is concerned about how consumption processes, in this case tourism and related desires are lived through the body and thus are enacted through emotions, affects, senses, and bodies marked by gender, race, class and nationality.

More specifically, this research focuses on how people’s intimate relations and subjectivities are shaped by global, local, and transnational processes. I am interested in the lived experiences and “negotiation” of gender, sexuality, and intimacy, bound up with race and class, in the context of human movement across borders, modernity, late capitalism and multiculturalism. How do people decipher and grapple with different and often competing cultural gender and sexuality norms? How does human sociality and subjectivity change through travel? In what ways are local sexual cultures affected by global tourism?

This research is part of a larger fieldwork- A total of 6 months ethnography in the Dominican Republic (Punta Cana and Sosúa) over 5 years (2006-2011), involving participant observation in touristic places (hotels, discos, tours) with western tourists, western residents and with locals and immigrants (Haitians). In-depth interview following McCracken (1988) recommendations were also carried out with all the set of actors involved in the field (Dominicans, Haitians, Tourists, Foreign residents, Male and female in each case with a wide range of backgrounds and ages), they lasted 1 to 3 hours were recorded, transcribed. The 21 long interviews with western female tourists and a few residents inform more specifically this paper (see Table 1). The author stayed in contact with informants over phone and social media allowing for presenting the preliminary results to those women and updating their situation to date regarding the Dominican Republic and their intimate relationships therefore to increase the validity of the research.

**FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION**

**Relationships lived as Transgression**

My informants’ stories convey how transnational sex was made meaningful through cultural assumptions and tacit rules about sexual propriety and intimate sociality. Sexual relationships between foreign women and local men were played out in diverse arrangements, from one-night or weekend affairs and casual vacation flings to long-term transnational back-and-forth relationships together with some, but not many, marriages, as well as other configurations. What characterizes most of the stories is a feeling of instant intimacy that women interpret romantically while local men interpret it more pragmatically - although most of the informants report that they are romantic: “Here it is all different from home, because very quickly you share all the domestic aspects and problems with your man, from the very start of the relationship, the dating process does not really exist...I like it because you feel close to your partner rapidly and you feel important in your partner’s life but you get confused about what stage of the relationship you are in” (Nathalie, 34, France, Police Officer)

“Many stories report the disappointment of foreign women due to a misunderstanding...I mean everyone comes with her own background and it is part of the experience to try and make it work despite the problems, it is not because the man tells you you are the woman of my life ‘it means you are all life long may be just a few days and in his perspective this is fine...’” (Helen, 25, Canada, Insurance Employee)

There were many tensions and contradictions in women’s narratives since, for the women, sharing intimacy with Dominicans was a cultural transgression in terms of social position, skin color... For instance, the level of the men’s formal education (often they had not finished high school) was a problem for some women with university backgrounds. Although the relationship was going very well in many aspects, suddenly realizing that reading a book or writing for-

<table>
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<td>Nathalie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serena</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Works in the tourism industry</td>
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Table 1: Female tourists interviewed
mal documents was a problem for the partner, was quoted as raising tension and doubts in women about the viability of their romance:

“I remember when...S looked like a young child trying to decipher my car rental contract, I realized how far apart we were...I mean so far I was admiring his ability to manage everything so smartly and...and I assumed reading was not an issue...you know, it is not easy…” (Chiara, 23, Italy, Museum Guide)

Such disparities created boundaries, which were exciting to cross but also created conflicting feelings in terms of Western heteronormative discourses about hierarchies of preferred intimate partners. Another major transgression that emerged from the field is racial or ethnical. From my earliest conversations, I gathered that many people viewed these relationships as completely unrestrained, attributing ‘Caribbean culture’ and ‘black male sexual prowess’ as the impetus that ‘drove’ foreign women to behave in ‘unusually licentious’ ways. There is a prevalent binary construction of black Afro-Caribbean men as lascivious, and white North American and European women as sexually predatory. Many informants stated how the skin color of their partner was a problem for their family and friends in their home country, who immediately considered the relationships in terms of stereotypes, considering them merely in terms of the “sexual nature of the local men.”

Therefore, even in Sosúa or Punta Cana, sexual relations between tourist women and local men appear as both ‘rampant’ and ‘escondido’ (hidden). A palpable local discourse frames sexual relations between local men and tourist women as overabundant, unchecked, uncontrollable, ‘wild,’ mutual erotic desire. At the same time, this discourse is muffled, in order to downplay the presence of such relationships, in part because women’s sexuality is more generally hidden in Latino nations, (Arroba, 2001) and because the relationships are viewed by many as scandalous. For complicated reasons, tourist women are also protective of local men’s sexual infidelities. Many also remain discreet to circumvent the reaction of a jealous boyfriend. Foreign women as sexual subjects are scrutinized perhaps even more closely than Dominican women, and stereotyped as ‘promiscuous’ by local surveillance mediated through religious beliefs and cultural moral discourses about femininity, masculinity, and sexuality. For these intricate reasons, sexual secrecy pervades the social-sexual contours of the island.

However, believe systems about gendered expressions of desire and intimacy are never fixed and the cosmopolitan and global context offers opportunities for defining new types of relationships:

“Before I came here, I was really different, for me there were some criteria for choosing my partners that were way too strict, I don’t know, he has to behave like and like that, but now it is different, I have gained more experience and I have learned that here people live things differently, what matters is being happy together no matter the standards, if my partner is a bit younger, is it such a problem as long as we are happy together? Today is today and tomorrow is another day but at last I am happy!”

Women refer to those experiences as times when their identity changed, especially those who get involved in long-term interaction with Dominicans who speak about “identity transformation”. Some women choose to have casual sex with locals on a regular basis; it is often after being extremely disappointed in a previous relationship. Although, a number of women choose to have casual sex with locals without too much commitment, playing secrecy games and covering men’s infidelities, they often deny they use strategies regarding their intimate relationships on the island. For instance, most of the women will confess that their relationship with local men “just happened” that they did not plan to have sexual relationships during their stay on the island.

**Women strategizing about their sexual encounters…**

However digging deeper into their narratives, some signs like systematically bringing condoms when visiting the Dominican Republic or confiding that they had felt intuitively that if they stayed longer on the island “they knew they would be sexually active” contradict their initial statement of being “surprised” by the relationships. It is the standard female sexuality, built on an absolute necessity of connecting sex with feelings that prompts them to justify these relationships as totally surprising and unplanned. According to my informants they always start very romantically – so as to conform to social expectations. So it is very rare for women to voice, as men do, the fact that they also come to the Dominican Republic to have sexual encounters with locals, knowing that as westerners their economic capital will lead them to obtain sex easily. However, one of my informants crossed the line after the third interview, when I met her again unexpectedly during one of my stays in Sosúa. She admitted that after several stays on the island, in this place she knew exactly how to attract the right sexual partner when she went to the disco. Knowing that Dominicans are unfaithful, and that “they use white girls to obtain sex and money, why should I not play their game? So I use them as well but I give just enough, for example two or three drinks at the disco, for them to think I am like all the European girls and then they are adorable as they know how to be very sweet at the start of the relationship…and once I have what I want I am the one who stops the relationship before it turns into the nightmare of cheating and money issues…”

And my informant adds “you know Dominican girls, they do the same, so No I don’t feel bad, is it sex tourism? I don’t know, it’s just adult relationships, I don’t force anyone”. In this discourse, I hear a sort of acculturation in terms of Dominican relationships starting at the disco, pretending or feeling love, expecting one of the partners to take care of the other and pay for them as a sign of interest…and also, a clear conscience of the use of economic and skin capital as mediators of sexual pleasure just like male sex travelers…However, it is quite controversial to depict women as potential exploiters of under-classed populations in third world countries for their own pleasure.

This controversy is due to a number of factors: firstly there are arguments within feminism about the extent to which women are victims vs. agentic/capable of exploiting, which can also be seen in broader debates around prostitution (Segal and MacIntosh, 1993; Raymond, 1995; Barry, 1996; Chapkis, 1997; Jeffreys, 1997; Nagle, 1997; Campbell and O’Neill, 2006; O’Connell Davidson, 2006). Secondly because sex tourism is often defined in such a narrow way - as directly related to prostitute use and commercial sexual relationships, this has made it much more difficult to talk about female sex tourism as a phenomenon because women are not generally associated with using prostitutes, nor are they generally connected to commercial sexual exchanges (Ryan and Hall, 2001). Research into female sex tourism is still a disputed area; situating women’s position within the sex tourist spectrum is not straightforward, and problems arise within academic discourses around sex tourism on how to define what exactly constitutes sex tourist behavior, and further what defines sex tourism practices.

In contrast to male sex tourists who are often understood to be exploiting local women, the actions of female sex tourists have sometimes been presented in a more benevolent, but also a more contradictory way. They are sometimes seen as rather innocent ‘romance tourists’ (Meisch, 1995; Pruitt and LaFont, 1995; Dahles and Bras, 1999), or even understood as romantic dupes being exploited by local men (Jeffreys, 2003). Although those narratives appear clearly in the data, the research supports some critique of this rather essentialist understanding of western female tourists’ sexual behav-
More specifically, this research provides a critique of this understanding of women’s interactions with local men, and suggests that female ‘romance tourists’ should not be simply understood as women ‘who buy meals and gifts for their local sexual partners and are enjoying a “romance”: not using a prostitute’ (Erika, Resident in Punta Cana, German, English Instructor, 37). Tourist women are often seen as ‘passive innocents, “used” by local men who are actively seeking money, a ticket off the island and maybe love, as well as sexual experience. My data supports the argument that sex tourism is not simply about male patriarchal privilege and female powerlessness. Rather, the findings support that female tourists’ sexual-economic relationships with local men are predicated upon the same global economic and social inequalities that underpin the phenomenon of male sex tourism. The fact that parallels between male and female sex tourism are overlooked reflects and reproduces weaknesses in existing theoretical and commonsense understandings of gendered power, sexual exploitation, prostitution, and sex tourism.

CONCLUSION
This analysis of sex tourism - a thematic much missing in consumer research- takes gendered relations into account, but also provides a critical reflection about other types of power - economic, social, racial, and class - that are often obscured by focusing so exclusively on the power/gender dyad. Analyses of tourism often look at issues relating to racial and global inequalities, and there has been some evidence to suggest that the processes that govern tourism and sex tourism are intrinsically related (Bishop and Robinson, 1998; Ryan and Hall, 2001). However much of the analysis of sex tourism practices still relies on gendered understandings of sex and sexual relationships, rather than exploring the other inequalities that might exist between hosts and guests of any gender.

A more nuanced picture begins to emerge around the set of issues that underlies women’s sexual engagement with local men if we begin to understand women tourists also: ‘as being motivated by racist sexual stereotypes and using sex tourism to bolster their privileged race and class status’ (Jeffreys, 2003, p25). By employing this understanding it is possible to analyze female sex tourism without focusing exclusively on gender injustices, and instead other crucial structural inequalities such as race and class can also be included.

SELECTED REFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
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| Types of sexual arrangements - sex tourism is not restricted to prostitution | • One night  
• weekend affairs  
• casual vacation flings  
• long-term transnational back-and-forth relationships  
• not many, marriages (although limited they encourage tourists and locals to step into a relationship). |
| Tourists feelings of transgression when starting intimate relations with locals | • A disrupted capital game (economic, cultural, social and skin capital) as unfixsed creating exciting to cross boundaries yet conflicting feelings in terms of Western heteronormative discourses about hierarchies of preferred intimate partners. |
| Identity transformation                                               | • Self concept: empowerment, expressing true self  
• Learning new things about one self and others  
• Changing its own perspective regarding intimate relationships and the meanings of happiness |
| Perceptions of sexual relationships between western women and local men | • There is a prevalent binary construction of black Afro-Caribbean men as lascivious, and white North American and European women as sexually predatory |
| Sexual strategies and vivid contradiction due to incorporated social norms regarding women’s sexual subjectivities | • The romantic start: women need to justify Sex did not start without a minimum of romanticism as a manifestation of social expectations in women’s discourse  
• The discourse about surprise: ‘It ‘s just happened’, ‘Not Expected relationships’, while in fact some women maintain this statement although they did bring with them condoms every time they visited the Dominican Republic for instance  
• Western tourist under Locals surveillance  
• Western women covering local men’s infidelity… |
| Women’s sexual agency                                                  | • Women-usually after a love deception in the DR- decide not to commit and have casual sex with locals  
• Who is using who? “I know how to get Local men, I play their game”  
• Acculturation to locals customs in terms of intimate relationships  
• Parallels between male tourist and female tourists sex behavior while traveling |


The Two Sides of the Gold Medal: Paradoxes of the Olympic Experience

Sabrina Gabl, University of Innsbruck, Austria
Verena E. Stoeckl, University of Innsbruck, Austria
Andrea Hemetsberger, University of Innsbruck, Austria

INTRODUCTION
Mega-sporting events like the Olympic Games, the Soccer World Cup finals, or the Super Bowl have become high-profile global consumption phenomena that attract the attention of massive spectator crowds. In the case of the Olympic Games, every four years, hundreds of thousands of spectators gather for about two weeks to experience thrilling sporting competitions, entertaining side-shows, and how the “fastest-highest-strongest” from more than 200 countries compete for Olympic gold (Toohey and Veal 2007).

For spectators, the Olympic Games offer a unique consumption experience that exhibits characteristics of skill, spectacle, and festive performance (Arnould 2007). The staging of sports skill performance in a naturalistic setting offers the passive consumer a spectatorial product. Yet, the Games also produce elements of spectacular performance through the extravagant presentation of moral values and fantastic environments. Also, consumers become integral parts of the festive performance; they co-create the atmospheric arena and produce cultural narratives (Arnould 2007). What participants of this study call a “once-in-a-lifetime” experience, resembles an extraordinary consumption experience in its various exceptional social interactions and “intense, positive, [and] intrinsically enjoyable” activities (Arnould and Price 1993, 25).

While this unique positioning has set the Olympics apart from other sports events, this popular spectacle is also vulnerable to public criticism and controversial media debates (Toohey and Veal 2007). On the one hand, critical cultural analysts mark an intensifying commercialization displayed by celebrations of consumption in Olympic Parks and streets (Tomlinson 2005) or financial pressures on athlete performances (Rahman and Lockwood 2011). On the other hand, they praise the Games as a cultural epicenter, exhibiting authentic athletic performances, accumulating cultural resources, furthering social cohesion and peace promotion, and encouraging active healthy lifestyles (Maguire et al. 2008; Papanikolaou 2012; Rahman and Lockwood 2011).

Evidently, these spectacularized mega-sporting events offer the spectators experiences laden with opposing meanings—or paradoxes (Luscher, Lewis, and Ingram 2006; Mick and Fournier 1998; O’Driscoll 2008)—that are negotiated in discourse. Research on extraordinary consumption experiences and consumption of spectacular and festive environments has acknowledged before that dialectical elements of staged spectacles create tensions and competing discourses (Arnould 2007). This study applies a paradox perspective that emphasizes the interdependencies of opposing elements in discourse rather than interpreting them as contradictions. Adopting a paradox perspective allows to accept paradoxes as critical components of consumer discourse on consumption experiences.

This study reviews theoretical perspectives on paradoxes and empirically examines how paradoxes, crystallizing in the narratives of spectators of the London Olympic Games 2012, both dispute and enrich the Olympic experience. We detail the characteristics and dynamics of four paradoxes and discuss their contribution to unique consumption experiences.

THEORY

Nature and dynamics of paradoxes
The notion of paradox revolves around the idea of two opposing elements appearing simultaneously (Mick and Fournier 1998; O’Driscoll 2008). Unlike a dialectic approach that tends to polarize into either/or propositions, a paradox perspective uses both/and constructs (Lewis 2000; Westenholz 1993). It goes beyond dialectical thinking and adds to it in two ways.

First, a paradox theory not only highlights the simultaneity of the elements, but also their unity when taken together (Derrida [1976] 1997; Lewis 2000; O’Driscoll 2008). Thus, it guides researchers to investigate both ends simultaneously and pay attention to their interdependencies (Lewis 2000). It is the unity with the counterpart—Derrida ([1976] 1997) calls it “supplementarity”—that helps to better understand the phenomenon. The opposing element helps to delineate, and at the same time complements the element itself. A paradoxes approach opens a new way of thinking in that it suggests to look at the counterpart, consider how the elements overlap and interact and, eventually, cannot be separated.

Second, a paradox perspective brings a dynamic component to the phenomenon under study. Paradoxes can paralyze (Burkean logic, as cited in Czarniawska 1997), lead to reinforcing cycles which enforce tensions, or virtuous cycles which enable change, transformation, or creativity (Cameron and Quinn 1988; Lewis 2000; Ropo and Hunt 1995; Smith and Berg 1987; Smith and Lewis 2011)—thus, paradoxes ask for a reaction and initiate action, even if this action is suppression or acceptance of the paradox. Especially organization theorists, like Cameron and Quinn (1988), praise paradoxes as a “powerful framework for examining the impacts of plurality and change, aiding understandings of divergent perspectives and disruptive experiences” (Lewis 2000, 760). Literature suggests several strategies on an individual, group, and organizational level that allow for a successful “management” of paradoxes in order to turn them into opportunities rather than threats. Among others, researchers list accepting (Lewis 2000; Poole and Van de Ven 1989; Schneider 1990), confronting (Lewis 2000; Smith and Berg 1987; Vince and Broussine 1996), and transcendence (Lewis 2000)/paradoxical thinking (Westenholz 1993)/reframing (Lewis 2000; Smith and Berg 1987; Westenholz 1993). Only recently, Smith and Lewis (2011) detail the evolution of paradox in a dynamic equilibrium model of organizing, in which they regard tensions as inherently present and depict their cyclical responses to the paradox as a “constant motion across opposing forces” (386). Several authors propose not to resolve, but rather to embrace paradoxes (Czarniawska 2001; Firat and Venkatesh 1995; Handy 1994; Lewis 2000; Smith and Lewis 2011; Westenholz 1993).

Paradoxes in Marketing and Experience Literature
In marketing and consumer literature, some researchers apply related concepts, such as dialectical tensions (Thompson and Haytko 1997), contradictions (e.g., cultural contradictions Holt 2004), or ambivalence (Ottes, Lowrey, and Shrum 1997); others use the term paradox in diverse contexts and with different foci. The authenticity paradox, for example, is about the contradictions involved in communicating and creating authenticity through advertisement (Stern 1994). The expression “staged authenticity,” coined by Mac-
Cannell (1973) and further used in tourism literature (Wang 1999), describes this paradox. In their study on reality television Rose and Wood (2005) are also concerned with authenticity; however, they reveal a paradox between the real and the fantastic. In their paper on the technology paradox, Mick and Fournier (1998) conceptualize the postmodern paradox and detail individual responses (in form of coping strategies) to them. Others point at the paradox that lies within modern communication technologies (Christensen 2000; Sproull and Kiesler 1992), arguing that modern technologies not only further, but also constrain interactive communication. Caruana, Crane, and Fitchett (2008) discuss the paradox of consumer independence and find that consumers mediate the tension between “the myth of the independent traveler” (269) searching for the authentic and the mass-mediated, commercialized tourist destinations. Newholm and Hopkinson (2011) investigate the paradox of the construction of individuality when participating in mainstream consumption. Ulver-Sneistrup, Askegaard, and Kristensen (2011) investigate the paradox of consuming while at the same time exhibiting mundane brand resistance. They find that consumers legitimate bad consumption by “embracing myths of craftsmanship” (215). Overall, while paradoxes are widely used in literature, the notion of paradox is not systematically defined, or used; the paradox mostly serves to denote variants of contradictions in different consumption contexts that individual consumers are concerned with.

Research on extraordinary consumption experiences investigate opposing structures in extreme situations (Arnould and Price 1993; Kozinets 2002; Tumbat and Belk 2011). Tumbat and Belk (2011), in their research of the Mount Everest experience, approach their data with a Turnerian structure/anti-structure perspective and find that participants “negotiate” both ends of the dialectic “in their pursuit of extraordinary consumption experiences” (Tumbat and Belk 2011, 57). This finding points at the co-existence of both ends and, ultimately, towards the existence of a paradoxical structure. Whereas Tumbat and Belk (2011), in response to an overly positive framing of consumption experiences in consumer research literature, critically interpret their findings as marketplace tensions and duality of elements/concepts, this study aims to uncover the dynamics and interdependence of this duality.

**METHODOLGY**

To get insights on the nature and dynamics of paradoxes of the Olympic experience, we applied an interpretive approach consisting of participant observation and narrative elements. One of the authors participated as spectator at various Olympic events before and during the Olympic Summer Games 2012 in London. Covering an observation period of one month, we kept detailed written field notes, took over 400 photographs, and engaged with dozens of spectators. Additionally, we conducted 17 semi-structured interviews of 20-60 minutes with spectators. We recruited participants at Olympic venues and conducted the interviews after sporting competitions or other events. To include multiple perspectives we chose to recruit both national residents of Great Britain, and international spectators, making up half of the interviewees. Prior to, during, and after the event we collected photographs, on- and offline articles, and other relevant data on the Olympic experience. We analyzed data according to constant comparative method (Charmaz 2006). In several circles of reflection, we identified mixed messages (O’Conner 1995; Lewis 2000) that mark inconsistencies across the data.

**FINDINGS**

Our data on the Olympic experience exhibits four recurring paradoxes, “union and disunion,” “repletion and void,” “the real and the staged,” and “the spirit and the rational.” They are not mutually exclusive but complementary in forming a comprehensive narrative framing of the Olympic experience. Table 1 gives an overview of the identified paradoxes, discursive themes, and dynamics.

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**Table 1: Paradoxes, discursive themes, and dynamics in the context of the Olympic experience**
Union and Disunion

The (dis-)union paradox is most pervasive across the data and manifests itself in various ways. Spectators mainly recognize the uniting element of the Olympic Games. Helene (31, German), for example, explains that to her, the Olympic experience is “about coming together and to stand for something which unites everyone” and Maaïke (40, Dutch) describes how a commonality among the spectators creates bonds. However, union simultaneously creates disunion—especially at the Olympic Games: Whenever a union or group of people forms, this group also always creates boundaries, which have a disuniting effect. At the Games, these group boundaries are extremely volatile and temporary, as commonalities uniting various groups change rapidly. Data shows that the “I” of spectators often changes into a “we” that sometimes stand for a group of spectators supporting the same athlete, a nation, all participants of the event, or even humankind. This volatility of union becomes evident in the case of Helene, who later explains that “it is also about showing commitment to maybe your home country.” The competitive nature of the Games only contributes to the formation of group boundaries and thus, fosters as well union and disunion. Stefanie (26, US American) refers to this paradox of simultaneous union and competition when she says that it “feel[s] like [the Olympic Games are] the only thing that you see that unites the entire world in a healthy and competitive way.”

What we can also witness at the Olympic Games, is an underdog effect (Paharia et al. 2011); a solidarization with the less “privileged”. Spectators reported how amazed they were by the relentless support offered to those athletes that were far from winning one of the precious medals. So, paradoxically, the fact that only an incredibly small number of athletes win does not necessarily create disunion, but union among and with those who never win a medal.

We find that the paradox of union and disunion is similar to paradoxes of belonging, which denote the complex relation between the individual self and group membership (Smith and Berg 1987; Lewis 2000); our findings exhibit processes of shifting boundaries and temporary and fluid constructs of groups. People are constantly searching for commonalities with others, quickly trying to become a member of a group—before group boundaries are shifted again. These processes, that we like to put under the heading of solidarization, resonate with Maffesoli’s ideas (2007), when he recognizes mechanisms of solidarity to be at work in the rituals and participation around sporting idols and other archetypes. The “collective sensibility” (Maffesoli 1996, 18) emergent in this process leads to a common sentiment of belonging to an open, yet unstable emotional community. Also, our data supports the idea that international sporting events act as a “global nationalistic forum” (Lee and Maguire 2009, 6) as they both reinforce passionate nationalistic expressions, and simultaneously promote cosmopolitan identification between nations (Barnard et al. 2006; Maguire, et al. 2008).

Repletion and Void

“Once it is finished, you know, it will feel like an empty void” (Catherine, 44, British).

The Olympic Games are oriented towards a dense spatial and temporal aggregation. Spectators are keen for these sparse moments to come and, as soon as they are there, they need to be ready and seize them as intensely as they can, “soaking up the atmosphere” and enjoying peak moments. This repletion of the Olympic Games is also marked by a joining of the modern and innovative with heritage and tradition. The Games simultaneously mirror the past and create the future, when traditional elements of the Games, such as the opening ceremony, are held in newly built stadiums and are realized with the help of cutting-edge technology. Paradoxically, spectators not only recognize this repletion, but also a nothingness of the Olympic experience. For Helene (31, German), for example, the Olympic experience is “everything and nothing” and for Catherine (44, British), the event’s inevitable perishability seems to be omnipresent: “There is nothing to look forward to. I mean we have done it. It’s finished, it’s over, and it’s like empty.” In this verbatim, Catherine, using present tense, drags her expectations of the future into her perception of the present.

Discourse reveals an interesting interdependence of repletion and void. Andy (30, Austrian) refers to one facet of this interdependence when he explains that, if time in between the events were shorter, his desire for the upcoming event would be diminished. Desire for the experience, a “primarily positive” feeling (Belk, Ger, and Askegaard 2003, 343), grows in times of void; repletion can only be experienced together with void, and vice versa. The spatiotemporal distancing from the everyday mundane life in the Olympic experience, reminiscent of Maclaran and Brown’s “sense of displace” (2005, 320), is pervaded by a critical awareness of nothingness, which—paradoxically—enriches it. Simultaneously, repletion easily leads to saturation, which further leads to boredom (Prisching 2008). Also, the awareness of the void leads to the wish to capture moments of repletion, visible in picture-taking and the collection of manifestations, in order to conserve them for times of void. Thus, the paradox of repletion and void initiates processes of preserving the moment and delineating the experience from the mundane that are able to powerfully vitalize and energize the extraordinariness of the Olympic experience in a continuous oscillatory circle.

The Real and the Staged

“Ah, it was amazing, you know. If you [sat] at home you would never understaND how that, how it was. I mean, it’s only possible for yourself [to understand]…how amazing that moment IS” (Brian, 58, British)

Spectators of the Olympic Games consider themselves to be in an exclusive position; they are the insiders experiencing the vibrant atmosphere and spectacular environment. Not sitting behind their screens, they expect to experience the immediate. They are aware of the staged setting, reflect upon it, and want to look backstage in order to get a glimpse of the truly real (Goffman [1959] 1973; Holt 2002). However, they are not always satisfied with what they find. Paradoxically, some spectators explain that, being at the live event, they feel much more detached than sitting behind their TV sets and watching close-ups and slow motions. The media offers proximity to the event through a focus on the spectacular and provides a diversity of options. In other cases, the media forms expectations that cannot be met in reality. A special paradoxical example in this context is the hero. Pauline’s (34, British) example of how she “started cuttInG out all the stories from the papers about, oh, on ‘this athlete is doing incredible work to get out here, because they have fought this disease’...” shows how heroes are created by the media. However, in real life, athletes may not be able live up to their fictional portrayals—which makes the truest hero the fictional hero (Goethals and Allison 2012).

Our findings of the real and the staged suggest that the staged induces the real and vice versa. Without the hype generated by the mediation of the staged, no such desire for the real could be initiated. And of course, without an immediate real, there is nothing to be mediated. However, just like Rose and Wood (2005), we find that consumers negotiate both elements of the paradox. Through this
The Olympic Games offer a unique experience comprised of paradoxical juxtapositions of competing yet, interdependent elements. Our empirical analysis of spectator discourse on the Olympic experience has revealed paradoxes of “union and disunion,” “void and replétion,” “the staged and the real,” and “the spirit and the rational.” These two sides of the gold medal exist simultaneously in this unique consumption experience of skill, spectacular, and festive performance. Their interdependencies become visible as we flip the medal and look at the other side of the same.

Paradoxes spark dynamics of constant negotiation processes of the respective opposing elements and shed light on the “‘other’, the ‘unrepresentable’ and the unfamiliar” (Caputo 1997, as cited in Dhokia and Venkatesh 2006, 132). However, none of the prevailing paradoxes are resolved in discourse; rather, they trigger dynamic processes. The constant motion across temporary uniting and disuniting discourses reveals the latent grounds of a variety of social solidarities; the interplay of discourses on replétion and void intensifies and energizes the extraordinary character of the spectacle; the dense juxtaposition of discourses on the real and the staged exponientes perspectives in the contest for possible truths; and finally, the complementary discourses about the rational and the spirit initiate an authentication of the commercial foundation of the Olympic Games.

Until now, consumer research has mostly directed its attention to either overly positive, communal, enchanting characterizations of consumption experiences, or anti-structural characteristics and dialectical tensions in extraordinary experiences. Corroborating Tumbat and Belk (2011), we find negotiation processes and add to their research in specifying their underlying dynamics.

While we have investigated the nature and dynamics of paradoxes during the Olympic Games, we encourage further research to go beyond that restricted time frame. A longitudinal perspective would enable researchers to explore potentially vicious or virtuous cycles over time and thus characterize and understand the evolution of paradoxes.

Adopting a paradox perspective on a discursive level opens new perspectives for further disentangling the complexities of extraordinary consumption experiences and sheds light to the flip side of the same gold medal. It enriches our understanding of paradoxes in consumer discourse as important ingredients of unique consumption experiences.

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper we investigate the impact of perceived advertising creativity and price information on advertising effectiveness. More specifically, we investigate if the effects of ad creativity found in previous research hold up when price information is communicated in the same advertisement. In so doing we combine advertising creativity research (e.g., Sassier and Koslow 2008) with the literature on soft-sell vs. hard-sell in advertising (e.g., Okazaki, Mueller, and Taylor 2010), thereby contributing novel perspectives to both sets of literature.

Advertising creativity is at the heart of the advertising industry. The effects of advertising creativity on brands are fairly well documented (for a review see Sassier and Koslow 2008). Creative advertisements, defined as ads that consumers perceive as novel yet relevant, have been shown to enhance advertising effectiveness in two ways: directly by signaling effort and ability on behalf of the sender (e.g., Dahlén, Rosengren, and Törn 2008; Rosengren and Dahlén, 2012) and indirectly by enhancing ad processing (e.g., Smith, Chen, and Yang 2008; Till and Back 2005). More specifically, the direct (signaling) effects occur as consumers interpret advertising creativity as a sign of product and brand quality whereas the indirect effects occur based on enhanced processing having a positive effect primarily on brand awareness and knowledge. Less research has, however, been conducted with regards to the effects of advertising creativity on sales. In fact, when purchase intentions have been included (as indicators of potential sales effects) the results are inconsistent (Smith et al. 2008). As a consequence, although the signaling and processing effects of advertising creativity have received rather consistent empirical support, any purchase effects of ad creativity are less known.

In part, this can be explained based on the common distinction made by both researchers and practitioners between hard-sell and soft-sell advertising (e.g., Okazaki et al. 2010). The distinction reflects what seems to be a common belief that advertising can be crafted either to boost sales or to build a brand. Hard-sell advertising typically encourages a quick sale, usually boosted by different price promotions, whereas soft-sell advertising focuses on building brand with more subtle and indirect creative solutions (Okazaki et al. 2010). Given this distinction it is not surprising that advertising creativity research has mainly focused on branding rather than purchase effects. Advertising creativity has thus mainly been investigated in terms of soft-sell and consequently no price information has been included in the ads used to study its effects. In this research we are interested in whether the effects of advertising creativity hold up when price information is included.

In the current study we make two contributions to advertising creativity research. First, we add price as a factor in more or less creative advertisements and second, we study purchase effects in addition to the previously documented signaling and branding effects. Our research thereby answers calls for more research on the potential moderating effects of advertising creativity (e.g., Yang and Smith 2009; Sasser and Koslow 2008). It also offers a first step to test advertising creativity in relation to price promotions and thus pit two long-standing advertising strategies against each other (Yang and Smith 2009).

SIGNAL EFFECTS OF CREATIVITY AND PRICE

Research on marketing signals shows that the very employment of various marketing elements, such as warranties (long-lasting) or advertising investments (high confidence), sends signals that consumers use in evaluating and selecting products (e.g., Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Kirmani and Wright 1989). The logic is that consumers implicitly associate certain marketing behaviors with a corresponding level of quality. Given that it might be hard to evaluate products up front, such signals are thus used to form opinions about brands and their offers.

Both advertising creativity and price have been found to function as marketing signals. When it comes to advertising, research has shown that advertising that consumers perceive as more expensive or “better” than average increases quality perceptions by signaling that the advertiser thinks the product is worth a greater effort (Ambler and Hollier 2004; Dahlén et al. 2008; Kirmani and Rao 2000). Making an effort in advertising implies that quality must be high; otherwise the firm would not recoup the expenditures.

When it comes to price, Rao and Monroe (1989) find a statistically significant relationship between product price and perceived quality. However, although a higher price typically signals higher quality (due to the consumer inferring from the higher price that the brand trades off current volume in exchange for future repeat purchases) they also point out that the strength of this relationship is highly dependent on the product itself. Later research has also found limited empirical evidence for price as a signal of quality (Gerstner 1985; Kirchler, Fischer, and Holzl 2010). In fact, this latter research suggests that the price signal functions primarily in expensive categories. In low involvement, non-expensive categories the effect is not as pronounced or even non-existent.

In the current study we are investigating the effects of ad creativity and price in a low involvement setting. Thus in line with previous research on advertising creativity (Dahlén et al. 2008) and price (Gerstner 1985; Kirchler et al. 2010), we hypothesize that creativity will be a more potent advertising signal than price:

Hypothesis 1a: In a low-involvement setting, advertising creativity will have a signaling effect. More specifically, higher advertising creativity will lead to higher perceptions of product quality than lower advertising creativity.

Hypothesis 1b: In a low-involvement setting, price will not have a signaling effect. More specifically, there will be no difference in perceptions of product quality for different price levels.
BRANDING EFFECTS OF CREATIVITY AND PRICE

Advertising creativity influences brand attitudes indirectly both by increased processing and ad liking (e.g., Smith et al. 2008) and by signaling higher quality with regard to the brand (e.g., Dahlén et al 2008). More specifically, consumers use their perceptions of creativity as a signal that the brand has put more effort and expense behind its ad and therefore consumers are likely to perceive the brand itself as of higher quality (e.g., Dahlén et al 2008). Thus we expect advertising creativity to have a positive branding effect.

Research on price promotions usually measures the effect price reductions have on choice, perceived value, or perceptions of product quality (Yi and Yoo 2011). Very few studies have measured the effects on brand perceptions. One exception is Yi and Yoo (2011) who show that monetary sales promotions have a negative effect on brand perceptions in the long run. One reason might be that lowering prices signals that a brand produces weaker products (or else they would not have made a price reduction).

However, we believe that any negative effects on brand perceptions caused by a lower price might depend on the level of creativity in the advertisement. As consumers use different signals we think that under the low creativity condition a price reduction has a negative effect on brand evaluation, while in the high creativity condition it has a positive one. The reasoning stems from Darke and Chung (2005), who show that consumers might make negative inferences about a brand unless they have other assurances of its value. One such assurance could be creativity. Thus a lower price could (in the absence of other signals of assurance such as ad creativity) be taken as a signal of brand weakness, while under the creative condition (a signal of brand strength) it might have a positive effect on brand perceptions as consumers might reason that they get both a high quality product and the brand at a bargain price. Consequently, advertising creativity will have a greater branding effect at lower price points when the price in itself does not work as an assurance of brand and product quality.

In line with this reasoning we hypothesize that advertising creativity has a positive branding effect and that there is an interaction effect between creativity and price, which moderates the effect price has on brand perceptions.

Hypothesis 2a: In a low-involvement setting, advertising creativity will have a branding effect. More specifically, higher advertising creativity will lead to higher brand attitudes than lower advertising creativity.

Hypothesis 2b: In a low-involvement setting, there will be an interaction effect between price and advertising creativity. More specifically, lower price will have a positive effect on brand attitude under the high advertising creativity condition, but no effect under the low advertising creativity condition.

PURCHASE EFFECTS OF CREATIVITY AND PRICE

The studied effect of advertising creativity on purchase intentions has resulted in mixed conclusions (Smith et al. 2008). One explanation might be found in the above reasoning about how consumers use different signals to form an opinion and expectations about a brand. As creativity signals product quality and brand quality it is reasonable to believe that creativity should also have a positive effect on purchase effects. However, at a high price point consumers might draw the conclusion that the brand is more premium and thus they might expect a more creative advertisement. Consequently, if consumers are exposed to a higher price, advertising creativity might not be of such importance in their purchasing decisions. However, at a low price this signal of brand premium does not exist and consumers are left to form their opinions using other signals, making the creativity in the ad stand out more and thus having a stronger impact on the consumers’ purchase decisions. Thus we expect advertising creativity to have an effect on purchase intentions, but expect it to be significantly stronger at lower price ranges. Furthermore, although price cannot be expected to influence quality (hypothesis 1b) and have a mixed effect on brand attitude (hypothesis 2b), it should affect purchase intentions positively in the short term as consumers should be more prone to buy at a lower price. This has also been found in previous studies (see Yi and Yoo 2011 for a table of the relevant studies).

Thus, we hypothesize that advertising creativity and price will have a purchase effect. In addition, we argue that there is an interaction between creativity and price which implies that the effect of advertising creativity will be strongest at a low price point. More specifically, although a low price will be attractive in terms of purchase, it will not bring any quality or branding benefits. Given that advertising creativity has been found to have such benefits, we would expect the effects of creativity to be most important at low price points.

Hypothesis 3a: In a low-involvement setting, advertising creativity will have a purchase effect. More specifically, higher advertising creativity will lead to higher brand purchase intentions than lower advertising creativity.

Hypothesis 3b: In a low-involvement setting, price will have a purchase effect. More specifically, a lower price will lead to higher brand purchase intentions than a higher price.

Hypothesis 3c: In a low-involvement setting, there will be an interaction effect between price and advertising creativity. More specifically, advertising creativity will have a stronger effect on purchase intentions at lower rather than higher prices.

METHOD

The hypotheses were tested in an experimental study using a 2 (high/low creativity) * 3 (high/medium/low price) design. In addition, to avoid idiosyncratic effects two product categories were used.

We chose two different low-involvement products (chewing gum and bottled water) for the study. The reason is that we wanted the respondents to be familiar with the category and to have a preexisting knowledge of the reference price, something that is helped by using a frequently purchased item. In a pretest, 31 respondents of the target population rated their price perceptions (1 = very cheap – 7 = very expensive) for various prices in both categories. Three price levels corresponding to low (mean approx. 2.0), normal (mean approx. 4.0), and high (mean approx. 6.0) price points were identified in each category.

To make sure that preexisting knowledge of the brands did not interfere we used unknown (foreign) brands. We then
Hypothesis 1a states that in a low-involvement setting, advertising creativity will function as a signal of product quality. This is confirmed by the data as advertising creativity has a positive effect on product quality ($M_{high\,creativity} = 4.57$, $M_{low\,creativity} = 4.09$, $F = 9.49$, $p < .01$). Hypothesis 1b states that in a low-involvement setting price will not function as a signal of quality. This is also supported by the data ($M_{high\,price} = 4.22$, $M_{medium\,price} = 4.29$, $M_{high\,price} = 4.47$, $F = .86$, ns).

Hypothesis 2a states that in a low-involvement setting, higher advertising creativity will lead to better brand attitudes than lower advertising creativity. This is supported by the data as advertising creativity has a significant positive effect on brand attitude ($M_{high\,creativity} = 4.99$, $M_{low\,creativity} = 4.25$, $F = 30.11$, $p < .01$). Hypothesis 2b states that in a low-involvement setting, there will be an interaction effect between price and advertising creativity and that lower price will have a positive effect on brand attitude under the high ad creativity condition, but no effect under the low ad creativity condition. The interaction effect found support in the MANOVA analysis ($F = 3.05$, $p < .05$). We then split the data between the high and low creativity conditions and ran a one-way ANOVA to test price on brand attitude in each condition. The hypotheses were supported as price was shown to have a positive effect on brand attitude under the high advertising creativity condition ($F = 4.69$, $p < .01$) and no significant effect under the low advertising creativity condition ($F = .66$, ns).

Hypothesis 3a states that in a low-involvement setting higher advertising creativity will lead to higher brand purchase intentions than lower advertising creativity. This is confirmed by the data as advertising creativity has a positive effect on purchase intentions ($M_{high\,creativity} = 3.89$, $M_{low\,creativity} = 3.31$, $F = 7.75$, $p < .01$). Hypothesis 3b states that in a low-involvement setting a lower price will lead to higher brand purchase intentions than a higher price. This is also supported by the data ($M_{high\,price} = 3.31$, $M_{medium\,price} = 3.51$, $M_{high\,price} = 3.99$, $F = 3.67$, $p < .05$). Hypothesis 3c states that in a low-involvement setting, there will be an interaction effect between price and advertising creativity and advertising creativity will have a stronger effect on purchase intentions at lower rather than higher prices. Both a visual observation and the data points in this direction but we did not find significant support for this ($F = 2.05$, ns).

**DISCUSSION**

This paper set out to investigate the effects of perceived advertising creativity and price information in advertising. More specifically, we investigated the signaling, branding, and purchase effects of advertising creativity at different price points. In line with our hypotheses, advertising creativity was found to have positive effects on perceived product quality, brand attitudes, and brand purchase intentions regardless of price level. In line with our expectations price level also was found to affect brand attitude (in the high creativity condition) and brand purchase intentions. Furthermore, the results give support to our proposition that ad creativity is most important at a low price point as indicated by a significant interaction effect on brand attitude.

The current study contributes to research on marketing signals (e.g., Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Kirmani and Wright 1989) by showing that advertising creativity is a more potent signal of brand quality than price in a low involvement setting.

Price thus seems to have little effect on perceived product quality in a low-involvement advertising setting. This is in line with previous research (Gerstner <1985; Kirchler et al. 2010). However, our research shows that at the same time, price has an impact on brand attitude and purchase intentions, especially under a high creativity condition.
This has managerial implications as marketers have to be aware about the signals they provide to the consumers. Apparently, consumers use both price and ad creativity in order to make judgments about the product and the brand. Future research should explore these results further and potentially add other marketing signals such as brand name (Erdem and Swait 1998) or advertising expenditures (Kirmani and Rao 2000) to advance knowledge further.

This research also adds to the literature on hard- vs. soft-sell advertising appeals, which has been debated in the advertising industry for over a century and has gained new attention recently (e.g., Modig, Dahlén and Collander forthcoming; Okazaki et al. 2010). It sheds some light on the possible managerial dilemma of choosing between a creative and a sales-focused advertisement. The results suggest that marketers might have to pay even more attention to the creative design of their ads when offering a price reduction. This notion challenges the traditional distinction between price promotion (hard) and creativity (soft) and has implications for advertising practice. Creativity might be even more important when employed on an advertisement with low price. This might explain why previous research has found conflicting results when measuring advertising creativity’s impact on purchase intentions (Smith et al. 2008). The distinction between high and low price, as well as high and low involvement and brand position (budget vs. premium), could be included in future advertising research in order to shed more light on these results.

This paper is one step in the pursuit to investigate the combined effects of different marketing signals in advertising. The findings correspond with recent research on advertising signals that shows that consumers’ perceptions of how much effort and expense a brand puts into its advertising influence their attitude to and interest in the brand (Modig, Dahlén and Collander forthcoming). Both these findings and the results from the current study suggest that brands that focus too much on hard-sell advertising might harm the brand equity in the long run. By pitting advertising creativity against price promotions this research suggests that the best strategy both to increase sales and to keep brand equity might not be to choose between the two, but to combine them.

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Re-Fashioning Kate: The Making of a Celebrity Princess Brand
Ashleigh Logan, University of Strathclyde, UK
Kathy Hamilton, University of Strathclyde, UK
Paul Hewer, University of Strathclyde, UK

INTRODUCTION

“What a frenzy for a girl from the shires, in her sensible shoes and ladder-less tights. On anyone else, her sober style might seem inconsequential – certainly to those in the creative, crazy world of high fashion. But on Kate, because she is the saviour perhaps of our monarchy as well as our style industry, even so-so clothes can seem delectable” (Spencer 2011).

Kate Middleton, formally known as the Duchess of Cambridge, is the newest member of the British Royal Family and the subject of increasing media attention. Various headlines present her as a style icon who can singlehandedly secure a future for British fashion retailers. If we take Rojek’s (2001, 10) simple equation that “celebrity = impact on public consciousness”, then there is little doubt that Kate Middleton has reached celebrity-like status. Instantaneous sell outs, inundated websites and waiting lists are just some of the benefits brands can expect when Kate decides to step out in one of their offerings. This phenomenon is known as the ‘Kate effect’. Drawing on the ‘Kate effect’ as the context for our discussion, we focus on the following research question: what is the role of fashion in supporting the transformation from ordinary person to extraordinary celebrity? Previous studies on celebrity culture have focused on Hollywood Stars (Wohlfeil 2013), artists (Schroeder 2005; Kerrigan et al. 2011), sports personalities (LaVoie 2012), or popular music celebrities (Peñaloza 2004; Hewer and Hamilton 2012) and therefore provide the “after they were famous” perspective. In contrast, we seek to analyze the transformations necessary in the movement towards ‘extraordinary’ status and how such forms of cultural authority must still rest upon populist foundations.

THEREOSING THE CELEBRITY SYSTEM

The culture industries continue to manufacture consumer needs and desires by constructing cultural frames that are represented and disseminated through various media outlets for mass consumption (Turner 2004). Celebrity is an effective vehicle through which these cultural frames are transmitted (Peñaloza 2004; Brownlie and Hewer 2007). Celebrities are commodities, ‘things’ manufactured for mass consumption (Cashmore and Parker 2003) and many of the meanings and associations embedded in the celebrity brand are shaped by the very power structures that govern our society (Baudrillard 1981).

Whilst traditional media outlets remain authors and distributors of cultural meanings constructed by underlying governmental or commercial powers (Turner 2004), new media or what Marshall (2010) refers to as ‘self-presentational media’ i.e. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr etc., has the ability to mediate the manufacture of cultural phenomena to not only ‘serve incumbent economic social interests’ but also to “empower insurgent interests” (Deighton and Kornfeld 2010). New media outlets therefore enable commonplace individuals to achieve instantaneous fame as they disseminate constructed interpretations to position their own observations and actions, or, those of others, as being somewhat ‘extraordinary’ (Deighton and Kornfeld 2010; Arsel and Zhao 2010; McQuarrie et al. 2013). In this way, the mundane aspects of everyday life are celebritized to create new social and cultural systems of meaning that, in some instances, benefit ‘ordinary’ individuals by providing them with social influence and/or economic gain. The economic and social forces leveraged to craft this new found fame also profit from the perceived creation of a democratic system in which consumers become creators of new marketplace meanings when, in actual fact, consumers are empowered by the very media channels assembled and sustained by the media system.

Transforming the ‘ordinary’ into the ‘extraordinary’ is not necessarily a new phenomenon. Previous research has considered how already famous celebrities reach even greater heights. O’Guinn’s (1991) Touching Greatness phenomenon unveiled the ways in which consumers interpret and negotiate celebrity meanings and associations projected in popular media outlets and award sacred and ethereal characteristics to Barry Manilow an individual who they perceive to be their ‘messiah’. Other studies view celebrity as a cultural agent for channeling a particular social lifestyle into the lived experience of ordinary individuals through mass media advertising (Powell and Prasad 2010). They focus on how celebrities like Madonna leverage their extraordinarily influential celebrity status to epitomize otherwise underrepresented taboo marketplace beliefs and transform them into accepted, ‘ordinary’ cultural practices (Peñaloza 2004; Brownlie and Hewer 2007).

Celebrity studies do not, as of yet, offer a complete taxonomy of fame as the parameters for distinguishing different celebrity classifications are somewhat borderless (Pringle and Benet 2005). Rojek (2001) has been criticized for his simplistic categorization of celebrity status as: ascribed (inherited through blood relation or marriage), achieved (through open competition) or attributed (by the media). Turner (2004) suggests that Rojek fails to consider the importance of wider societal interests that influence the consumption of celebrity. Nevertheless, his typology has informed sociological and consumer based approaches to the study of celebrity.

Ottes, Crosby and Maclaren (2010) draw on ‘ascribed’ celebrity in their study of service personnel’s perceptions of the way in which various British Royal Family (BRF) members are portrayed as ‘celebrities’. Their findings reveal that service personnel position the BRF brand as a human brand that is entwined in the shared historical and contemporary fabric of our culture. Balmer (2011) suggests that, like corporate brands, the monarchy’s sense of value resides in the brand communities’ attachment to and sense of identity derived from the brand. This places the BRF firmly ‘above’ the status of ordinary celebrity (Ottes et al. 2010). However, this “above celebrity” status does not stop media interest. One need only think of the worldwide fascination with Princess Diana “whose body, emotions and intimate relationships were under continual scrutiny…she literally lived on a faultline between the public and the private” (Lumby 2006, 541). Similar to Kate Middleton, Diana was also a global fashion icon, and was often referred to as the fashion princess (Hammer and Graham 1988). The evolution of her style over the years was a source of constant media attention from the buzz surrounding her wedding dress to the famous feature in Vanity Fair magazine in 1997 that showcased a collection of images (including the front cover) taken by celebrity fashion photographer, Mario Testino.

The fashions celebrities adorn impact on the ways in which cultural beliefs are disseminated in the media (Barron 2007). For example, since the early 90’s Kate Moss’ ‘grungy’ style has continued to challenge and revolutionize the ways in which feminine cultural ideals are constructed in the media (Entwistle 2002; Schroeder 2006). Fashion tastes and trends often signify underlying
cultural and temporal ideological tensions between individuals and society (Thompson and Haytko, 1997). Subgroups such as ‘metrosexual males’ or ‘fatshionistas’ act as cultural reference points for identifying, negotiating and challenging social-standing, gendered identity, and tensions between social constraint and personal emancipation (Thompson and Haytko 1997; Rinallo 2006; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). Fashion and celebrity are, therefore, interchangeably entwined in our kitsch culture (Rojek 2001).

METHOD

This study takes a bottom-up perspective that considers how fashion choices can facilitate celebrity status. We examine media talk on Kate Middleton’s appropriation of fashion to understand the process through which fashion transforms an ‘ordinary’ individual into something ‘extraordinary’. This is achieved through an interpretive content analysis (Krippendorff 2012) of articles, images and text within contemporary popular women’s monthly lifestyle magazine Cosmopolitan UK. From November 2010 to July 2012, 35 articles and 56 images of Kate were examined. This time frame incorporates the social, cultural, political and historical significance of the hype before William and Kate’s ‘fairy-tale wedding’ (April 2011) as well as Kate’s media portrayal in the lead up to the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee (June 2012) and the London 2012 Olympics (July 2012). Each issue was reviewed sequentially, moving back and forth between issues. Both text and images in articles and advertisements were analyzed. As print copies of Cosmopolitan UK are published and consumed monthly, to maintain the richness, depth and breadth of understanding of the happenings and goings-on at and around momentous events, the constant stream of updates on the Hearst International Cosmopolitan UK online article archive was explored simultaneously in the same way.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

Like other celebrities (Cashmore and Parker, 2003) Kate Middleton’s public persona is manufactured behind the scenes by a team of highly influential tactically selected cultural intermediaries. This team includes a former US ambassador, SAS commander, and well-known publicists. The meanings and associations embedded in Kate’s persona are, as Baudrillard (1981) suggests, produced and controlled by the various actors and institutional forces that exist within the culture industries. At the same time, such meanings and associations are negotiated by those institutions who disseminate contemporary fashion trends and tastes and, ultimately, by the individuals who decide to emulate these suggested practices. In this way, the “interchangeability” of the meanings embodied by the celebrity (Marshall, 1997, 12) - here Kate Middleton as a normal girl, fashion icon, and celebrity princess - are continually negotiated by Cosmopolitan magazine who through the process of ‘meaning transfer’ (McCracken 1989) attach and detach these meanings to add value to and ‘humanize desire’ (Rojek, 2001) for the brands that Kate wears:

“Doesn’t purple look marvelous with a bronzed glow? Here’s Kate looking sensational in her purple Issa dress, up-do and chic, black accessories. Block colour looks fabulous on K-Mid-dy” (Cosmopolitan Online July 2011)

Here we witness how Cosmopolitan gains a discursive voice and power of influence over popular consumer fashion tastes and trends (Marshall 1997) through the use of colloquial language, Cosmopolitan subtly endorse Kate Middleton’s fashion choices. Through such utterances the media position themselves to be like the aspiring consumer or adoring ‘fan’ in order to secure consumer buy-in around the celebrity brand. Whilst Rojek (2001, 190) acknowledges that “one of the most significant developments in the growth of capitalist society was the reduction in the balance of power between the monarch and society in favour of the latter”, like new media (Deighton and Kornfeld 2010; Marshall 2010), traditional print magazine Cosmopolitan, shifts towards celebrating the ordinary and mundane aspects of Kate’s fashion to make her relatable to and within ‘reach’ of the consumer masses. This creates an opportunity for consumers to participate in the Duchess’ lifestyle, and thereby acquire their own cultural capital through the consumption of brands and goods that are infused with her ‘royal’ aura. At the same time, as British Royal Family members are perceived by BRF service providers to be ‘above’ the status of celebrity as their royal roles are entwined in historical and contemporary fabric of society (Otnes et al. 2010), the process through which an ‘ordinary’ girl is transformed to an ‘extraordinary’ celebrity princess fit for purpose can be witnessed through Cosmopolitan’s strategic talk around the fashions and brands that Kate Middleton ‘selects’ as her mentors prepare her for her emergent royal role. A role, that Balmer et al. (2006) suggest, involves supporting the societal and cultural welfare of the commonwealth. Throughout this transition process, from November 2010 to July 2012, we identify ‘five’ faces of the celebrity princess brand: “Girl Next Door Kate”, “Fairy-tale Princess Kate”, “Humble Kate”, “Regal Kate”, and “The People’s Kate” (Appendix A). Such transformations mark the passage of the celebrity princess brand and the way that media, brand and retail interests feed off such changes.

“Girl Next Door Kate”

From October 2010 until the day of the royal wedding, St. Catherine’s day April 29th 2011, Kate’s apparel choices depict her as the cute, innocent, fun-loving girl next door. Her relaxed off-duty looks signify her youthful femininity as she appears relaxed and carefree, making personal visits to high street stores. Prehoneymoon, Kate visits Warehouse, Kings Road, London where she acquired a:

“lace trim blouse, feather print asymmetric dress, tropical bird print sundress and bright bandeau frill frock” (Cosmopolitan Online April 2011).

Celebrity culture is closely connected to the aestheticization of everyday life (Rojek, 2001) and fashion is central to this process; here we see Kate offering consumers styles that they can easily participate in.

As the royal wedding drew closer, in March 2011 the Charlotte Todd dress – which has so little fabric to it that it was originally intended as a skirt – worn by Kate a fashion show at St. Andrews University sold for £78,000. This action secured Kate’s status as an ‘achieved’ iconic fashion celebrity. This is because the dress worn in her first public appearance, in the making of Kate, is given a financial value that far exceeds its production value. Celebrity objects are believed to possess ‘contagion’ or rather aspects of the personalities and characteristics of the stars that owned them and this often enhances their value (Newman et al. 2011). In this way, Kate’s dress became a symbolic, historic artifact that signifies the beginnings of both Kate and William’s relationship and a young, relatively normal girl’s emergence into the public eye as a potential future monarch and highly influential contemporary fashion icon. The purchase of the dress signifies the end of “Girl Next Door Kate” and the beginning of something much greater.
“Fairy-Tale Princess Kate”

The royal wedding is a watershed moment in the transition from an ‘ordinary’ to ‘extraordinary’ celebrity brand. Kate, ‘a normal girl’, has her dream wedding and makes a life commitment to her ‘true’ love and is simultaneously elevated to royal celebrity on the global fashion stage:

“When Kate Middleton got out of the car in that Sarah Burton for Alexander McQueen wedding dress the world gasped with sheer delight. She couldn’t have looked more beautiful, not even if she tried” (Cosmo Online April 2011).

Cosmo talk here presents the Duchess’ choices as ‘effortlessly sophisticated and individualistic’, which is aggrandized by her decision to remain true to her heritage by wearing British couture design:

“[the gown] was demure but so stylish - with lace sleeves and a modest train...The 2m70cm train, the lace appliquéd sleeved bodice and the [1936 vintage] tiara-secured veil were all the right side of sexy and sophisticated.” (Cosmo Online April 2011).

The royal wedding is undoubtedly a media spectacle and the idealized images of the ‘fairy-tale princess’ captures global attention perhaps because she embodies “wishes and fantasies that are ubiquitous in popular culture” (Rojek 2001, 110). The birth of “Fairy-tale Princess Kate” also has a dramatic impact on the fortunes of the British high-street:

“Kate Middleton’s wedding frock was the lacy creation that launched a billion girls’ dress dreams” (Cosmo Online June 2011).

With consumers coveting the gown, budget high-street retailers such as Peacocks are quick off to the mark to profit from such attention offering an affordable Kate Middleton inspired alternative:

“Since the royal wedding, we [Peacocks] have seen a new trend for sweetheart necklines and lace in our occasion wear. Catherine’s dress had elements that translated well for our customers, the classic neckline with the overlay of lace, and full skirt, were not only classically beautiful but also flattering for a womanly figure” Antonella Bettley Head of Peacocks Ladieswear (Cosmo Online June 2011).

Consumers inspired by Kate in their fashion choices, appear to be appropriating her image and brand selections via more affordable high-street options. The manufacture of celebrity inspired goods, as Cashmore and Parker (2003) suggest therefore, permits consumers to acquire an otherwise unattainable slice of the celebrity dream and envisioned good life at knockdown prices.

“Humble Kate”

Post Royal Wedding, from June 2011, Kate returned to dressing as a “normal” late-twenty to early-thirty-something girl, consulting and seeking inspiration from the British high-street. Undoubtedly, the Duchesses’ most famous and “Humble Kate” piece of high-street attire for the Canadian and US Tour in July 2011 was the camel Shola Reiss dress. Kate wore this to meet Michelle Obama, who is often photographed wearing affordable mass-market high street brands because she simply ‘likes them’ (Yermack 2011). Acting as a UK royal ambassador at such an important meeting with a central and influential political and public figure and well-established fashionista, Kate shocked the rest of the world by wearing a British mid-range, high-street designer. This meeting is significant, and symbolizes a key moment in Kate’s initiation from ‘normal girl’ to celebrity fashion icon. As the two influential fashion figures crossed paths their fashion styles were compared across the global mediascape launching Kate into the ‘spotlight’ as a potential successor to Michelle’s iconic fashion status. The ‘charisma’ possessed by both personalities, affords them “supernatural, superhuman or at least superficially exceptional qualities” (Weber 1968, 329), this enables them to offer value, order and stability in a society where social standing is no longer necessarily as relevant (Prasad and Powell 2010). They re-enforce their leadership as ‘agents of change’ by challenging the traditional notion of fashion ‘hegemony’ as they allow the masses to easily replicate their affordable fashions, and in doing so, acquire cultural capital through the consumption of these goods.

Kate through her brand choices remains humble, and, the brand, rather than distancing itself, seeks to cultivate an ideology that it is the: ‘same as the rest of us’. Unlike celebrities that engage in conspicuous consumption, Humble Kate retains her populist credentials through a penchant for thrifting and brand eclecticism.

“Regal Kate”

Such populist credentials however nestle against another side to the celebrity brand, that of ‘Regal Kate’. With Remembrance Sunday November 2011 marking a watershed moment in the transformation of the brand as a sophisticated, more mature, more tailored, and high-fashion couture look is cultivated for Kate’s new royal role. As 2012 beckoned, with the Royal Jubilee, the Order of the Garter Royal Procession and the Olympics; the Duchess stepped up to dress the part. At the Diamond Jubilee Pageant in June 2012, “Regal Kate” is discussed as looking “ravishing in red”, with a tailored, scarlet pleated Alexander McQueen dress, headpiece and nude heals chosen to represent this new style and look; and, at the Order of the Garter Royal Procession – the senior and oldest British order of chivalry founded by Edward III in 1348 – in June 2012, Kate’s fashion credentials are once again the talk of Cosmo. A pale yellow Alexander McQueen dress coat is chosen, coupled with “a regal looking hat by esteemed milliner Jane Corbett” (Cosmo Online July 2012). The brand is a heady concoction of luxury adorned.

This sophisticated ‘Regal Kate look’ thus combines talented couture British designers with elegant fashion forward headpieces crafted by skilled British milliners. Acting in her royal role, Kate’s decision to wear British Couture designer and local millinery pieces not only re-fashioned her own brand, but also boosted the trade of artists, heritage and creative industries, as consumer fashion “moved on” from fascinators “to bigger headpieces and hats” (Cosmo Print July 2012). While the regal attire worn by Kate is far-removed from the flamboyant and rather impractical clothing worn by other female celebrities, her ‘choices’ are clearly designed to demonstrate how she possesses the social and cultural competence demanded of her position.

“People’s Kate”

But cultural authority now rests on less secure foundations than the poles of attraction of yesteryear. Royalty and its traditional basis of authority must now be supplemented with more populist appeals. As Kate fulfills her royal role attending and endorsing social and cultural events throughout 2012, the Duchess dresses in particular mid to high level high-street fashion brands. From her
role as ambassador for the London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics, to her charity visit with children in the countryside, Kate dresses glamorously, but arguably, in a way that is still affordable and within reach of the ‘average’ consumer. For example, fulfilling her royal role as ambassador, in March 2012, Kate welcomed the Great Britain Olympic women’s hockey team in London and revisited her schoolgirl days at Marlborough, as she played hockey in a grey hoodie, trainers and skinny coral Zara jeans. Weber (1978) observes that consumers desire to emulate the elite, by consuming the same goods as them, even if in the form of more affordable substitutes. Kate’s attire launched the 2012 spring coral jean trend - a look emulated by millions and sales of Asda coral jeans, an even more affordable alternative, increased by 471% (Hall, 2012).

“The People’s Kate” as a brand tries hard to flag up that despite its’ riches and fame it remains “like the rest of us”, as it recycles staple fashion items. Kate Middleton thus becomes a champion of LK Bennett nude heels, as she appears in six of the 56 photographs analyzed throughout 2011-2012. The Duchess’ first, formal public speech at the East Anglia Children’s Hospice in Ipswich on the 19th March 2012 is probably her most well-known re-usage of an item of fashion apparel - a momentous and significant event, at which the Duchess finds her voice. In this moment the Duchess’ decision to wear a royal blue Trina style Reiss dress, which was first worn in 2008, and then replicated by mum Carole at Royal Ascot in 2010, symbolizes Brand Kate as just like any ‘normal’ girl, who, wracked with nerves, seeks the comfort and security of a tried and tested fashion piece as sealed with the approval of mum. By wearing this dress, Kate not only reconnects with ‘humble’ roots but also, more importantly for the brand’s fortunes, we witness how she becomes an example of achieved celebrityhood in action, a celebrity princess fashionista and precious commodity manufactured to fulfill a royal role and public duty.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper extends Rojek’s (2001, 10) work on how celebrities influence fashion tastes and trends by adopting a bottom-up approach that instead charts the emergence of a celebrity princess brand through fashion and brand choices. Cultural authority can no longer rest simply on royal foundations. Here we witness how fashion and brand selection are harnessed to re-fashion Kate as governing stock. Building on existing research (Peñaloza 2004; Brownlie and Hewer 2007; Powell and Prasad 2010), we illustrate the way in which media discourses, through their praising commentaries, construct a particular lifestyle and ensemble of marketplace myths which draw upon the discourses of celebrity, fashion and branding. Specifically, the processes through which a celebrity’s appropriation of fashion transforms the celebrity brand from being ‘ordinary’ ‘just like us’ to something extraordinary which rests on the myth of being: ‘just like us’. Such a transformation is achieved during critical moments in which finding difference through consumption practices is paramount. Lastly, we build on Ottes et al.’s (2010) work on the British Royal Family (BRF), and their suggestions that BRF members are above ordinary celebrity as their roles are entwined in the social and historical fabric of our society by exploring how the British Royal Family brand sustains and reinvigorates its appeals through marrying itself with the ‘Kate effect’.

REFERENCES

### Appendix B Summary of Key Findings and Key Themes

| Theme                        | Temporal Significance | Caption                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Analysis                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Girl Next-Door Kate”</td>
<td>Pre-Royal Wedding</td>
<td>“At the brand’s Kings Road store in London she picked up this lace trim blouson (£55), feather print asymmetric dress (£45), tropical bird print sundress (£65) and bright bandeau frill frock (£45).”</td>
<td>Kate dresses in a way that enables consumers to participate in her cute, down to earth, untouched, youthful, feminine style.</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Fairy-Tale Princess Kate”</td>
<td>Royal Wedding April 2011</td>
<td>“When Kate Middleton got out of the car in that Sarah Burton for Alexander McQueen wedding dress the world gasped with sheer delight. She couldn’t have looked more beautiful, not even if she tried”</td>
<td>Kate Middleton is elevated from an ordinary girl to an extraordinary celebrity princess. Her new ‘elevated’ celebrity princess status is signified by the mass production of an affordable high-street interpretation of Kate’s ‘fairy-tale princess’ gown.</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Humble Kate”</td>
<td>Post Royal Wedding May 2011</td>
<td>“What does one wear to meet the Obama family? Reiss of course. Kate looked gorgeous having just returned from her honeymoon. So pretty!”</td>
<td>Kate through her brand choices remains humble, and the brand rather than distancing itself seeks to cultivate an ideology that it is the: ‘same as the rest of us’. Unlike celebrities that engage in conspicuous consumption, Humble Kate retains her populist credentials through a penchant for thrifting and brand eclecticism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Regal Kate”</td>
<td>Remembrance Sunday November 2011</td>
<td>“All eyes were on the Duchess of Cambridge as she arrived to pay her respects on Remembrance Sunday, she wore an all-black ensemble and a double poppy at her button hole to show her respect for those who have fought and died for Britain. The poignant service was held at The Cenotaph in London.”</td>
<td>A sophisticated, more mature, more tailored, high-fashion couture look is cultivated for Kate’s new royal role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The People’s Kate”</td>
<td>The making of the celebrity princess brand: from November 2010 – July 2012 and beyond…</td>
<td>“Didn’t Kate Middleton look absolutely gorgeous when she swapped her usual elegant dressed-up style for the sports luxe trend? Our fave Royal fashionista donned a pair of coral skiinnies, trainers and a marl grey hoody when she played a game of hockey with Team GB... and we loved it! This look definitely proved that Kate can work any trend and any occasion.”</td>
<td>Despite riches and fame, performing her new royal role, Kate is positioned to remain ‘like the rest of us’. Royalty and its traditional basis of authority is supplemented with more populist appeals.</td>
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Spencer, Mimi (2011) ‘We want what Kate’s wearing! The sellout effect of the high-street Duchess’, Daily Mail, 30th June.


ABSTRACT

The concept of potential is central to a number of decisions, ranging from organizational hiring, to athletic recruiting, to the evaluation of artistic performances. While potential may often be valued for its future payoffs, the present studies investigate whether people value potential even when making decisions about goods and experiences that can only be consumed in the present. Experiment 1 demonstrates that potential makes people more likely to consume inferior performances in the present (e.g., attending a ‘mediocre’ art exhibit). Experiment 2 demonstrates that this effect is due to the ability to imagine the person’s performance in the future, such that merely moving the performance into the past negates the effect of potential. And Experiment 3 demonstrates that the effect of potential only holds when valuation is tied to abstract, hedonic dimensions (e.g., watching a film), but not when valuation is tied to concrete, utilitarian dimensions (e.g., getting one’s car repaired).

Potential: The Valuation of Imagined Future Achievement

Assessments of potential play an important role in many kinds of decisions. Undergraduate and graduate admissions focus not only on objective measures of past performance, but also on how candidates are likely to perform in the future. In hiring and promotion decisions within organizations, it is common to classify candidates based on their likelihood for future success. And a critical factor in athletic recruiting is the degree to which a player is likely to improve (Berri & Simmons, 2011; Kuzmits & Adams, 2008; Massey & Thaler, 2005; Quinn, Geier & Burkowitz, 2007).

While some research suggests that the bias towards future performance is so robust that it can dominate objective criteria (e.g., Massey & Thaler, 2005), in many cases, the valuation of potential is understandable—the recruitment of exceptional, one-of-a-kind talent is attractive to any organization. Moreover, identifying individuals with potential may present a “great buy” for organizations, as they are able to hire individuals at a fraction of their future value.

More puzzling is a class of consumption decisions for which potential seems relevant, and yet there is little ability to “profit” from the future success of those individuals. For example, there are many videos on YouTube of prodigious children singing, dancing, or playing instruments, and these videos tend to be more popular than similar (and often superior) performances by adults. Why do people choose to spend their time watching performances by children when they could instead watch better performances by adults?

One explanation might be novelty. Perhaps it is novel or unexpected to watch children play pieces of music that are typically associated with adults. Another explanation may be the inherent ‘cuteness’ of the performance; or, perhaps the popularity of such videos stems from a sense of ‘awe’ (Rudd, Vohs & Aaker, 2012) or even religious wonder as viewers speculate about the origins of such talent.

While the appeal of YouTube videos per se is likely multiply determined, here we suggest that this type of phenomenon is importantly related to considerations of potential. Specifically, we propose that consistent with a literature on ‘conceptual consumption,’ individuals consume not only the item or performance in question, but also their ideas about it (Ariely & Norton, 2009). In the case of child prodigies, those concepts may include imagining the child’s superior performance in the future—e.g., “If the child is this good now, imagine what they will be like as an adult.” In turn, the positivity associated with imagined future achievements provides a source of value in the present. Therefore, we suggest that prodigious or early-emerging talent may lead people to imagine an individual’s future achievements, and the act of imagining those future achievements may increase one’s likelihood of consuming goods or experiences that are associated with that individual.

To date, relatively little research has focused on potential or “pre-peak” consumption. Research on NFL drafts has found that teams tend to overvalue the potential of rookies relative to known performance of players on their current roster (Massey & Thaler, 2006). Another recent paper (Huang & Burgh, 2008) examined “pre-peak” consumption in the domain of mating goals and found that participants primed with mating goals showed a preference for fruit that was earlier in the ripeness cycle. There is also some support for the notion that ambiguity of information can have positive effects in person perception. For example, both Norton, Frost and Ariely (2007) and Bargh, McKenna and Fitzsimmons (2002) found that when people are given less (rather than more) information about social targets, they tend to ‘fill in’ social information about that person in an idealized, overly positive way.

To our knowledge, however, previous research has not examined whether beliefs about potential influence decisions about goods and experiences that can only be experienced in the present. This is important because it helps to dissociate effects of potential that are related to “future payoffs” (e.g., purchasing the artwork of a talented child artist in the hopes that it will appreciate in value) from those that are unrelated to future rewards (e.g., attending an exhibition of a talented child artist). Therefore, the goal of the present studies was to examine contexts where an individual’s future performance offers no direct benefits to test whether merely imagining better performance in the future increases consumption of things that are experienced in the present.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

Experiment 1 demonstrates that potential makes people more likely to consume even inferior performances in the present. Experiment 2 demonstrates that this effect is due to the ability to project performance in the future, such that merely moving the performance into the past negates the effect of potential. Experiment 3 demonstrates that the effect of potential only holds when valuation is tied to concrete, utilitarian dimensions.

Experiment 1: Consuming Inferior Performances

The goal of the first experiment was to test whether people are willing to consume inferior performances in the present based on beliefs about an individual’s potential.

METHOD

Participants were 111 adults ($M_{age} = 30.4, 41\% \text{ female}$), who were recruited from Amazon’s mTurk website in exchange for $0.50.
(USD). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 3 between-subjects conditions.

We presented participants with two paintings: One ‘superior’ painting (a pretest indicated a mean liking of 5.4 on a 7-point scale), and one ‘inferior’ painting (M<sub>initial</sub> = 3.5 out of 7; t<sub>55</sub> = 8.13, p < .001). Between participants we varied the biographical information about the artists’ ages. The superior painting was always said to have been created by an adult (age 42), and across conditions we varied whether the inferior painting was said to have been created by a child (age 7) or another adult (age 37). A third control condition varied whether the inferior painting was said to have been created by people more likely to consume even inferior goods/experiences. In turn, this can make the person’s imagined future achievements. In turn, this can make people more likely to consume even inferior goods/experiences.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

Liking of the superior painting did not change across conditions (M<sub>s</sub>=5.69, 5.82 and 5.41, p=.24. However, liking of the ‘inferior’ painting increased when it was said to have been created by a child (M<sub>c</sub>=4.65, SD=1.69) compared to when it was created by an adult (M<sub>a</sub>=3.53, SD=1.38), t(77)=3.22, p=.002, or the artists’ ages were not mentioned (M<sub>AN</sub>=3.72, SD=1.44), t(69)=2.44, p=.017. Analogously, participants reported that they were significantly more likely to attend the ‘inferior’ art exhibition when the painting was created by a child (M<sub>c</sub>=3.97, SD=1.74), compared to when both artists were adults (M<sub>aa</sub>=2.83, SD=1.71), t(77)=2.96, p=.004, or when no age information was provided (M<sub>AN</sub>=2.41, SD=1.34), t(69)=4.18, p=.001.

These results suggest that beliefs about potential per se can increase the evaluation of goods in the present, which is consistent with the notion that such items may be positively associated with the person’s imagined future achievements. In turn, this can make people more likely to consume even inferior goods/experiences.

**Experiment 2: Consuming the Future, Now**

The results from the first experiment suggest that considerations of potential may lead people to consume inferior performances in the present. However, it may instead be that artwork produced by children is simply more novel, rare, or ‘awe inspiring.’ Or, one might argue that this effect could be interpreted as a preference for natural talent over learned skill (Tsay & Banaji, 2011). Therefore, the goal of Experiment 2 was to provide a second test of the theory that addressed these potential alternatives.

We hypothesized that if the effects observed in Experiment 1 result from imagining the individual’s future achievement, then reducing the ability to project achievements into the future should attenuate the effect. To test this hypothesis, participants in Experiment 2 were asked to evaluate a book of poetry. Between subjects we varied the age of the poet as well as whether the book was published recently (one week ago) or in the past (20 years ago). If participants merely have a preference for things created by children (for whatever reason), then they should express greater interest in the 9-year old’s book regardless of whether it was published in the present versus the past. However, our prediction was that merely moving the publication of the book into the past should reduce the ability to imagine the poet’s future performance, and thus, the preference toward the child’s poetry. In this experiment, we also directly asked about the perceived potential of the poet with the expectation that ratings of potential should mediate willingness to purchase the poet’s book.

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2 None of the pretest participants recognized the “superior” painting, or identified the artist who made it.

3 The names of the artists and the side on which each painting appeared were counterbalanced across participants.

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**METHOD**

Participants were 106 adults (M<sub>a</sub>= 35.1, 45% female), recruited from Amazon’s mTurk website in exchange for $5.50 (USD). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (age) X 2 (present vs. past) between-subjects design.

Participants were asked to read a brief vignette about a book of poetry (see Appendix). Between participants we varied the age of the poet (9 vs. 39) and when the book was published (one week vs. 20 years ago). After reading the vignette, participants were asked to indicate their general interest in reading the book (1=not at all interesting; 7=very interested) as well as how likely they were to purchase it (1=not at all likely; 7=very likely). Participants also indicated how much potential they thought the poet had (1=none at all; 7=very much).

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

A 2 (age) X 2 (time framing) ANOVA revealed a significant two-interaction, F(1,102)=7.83, p=.006. As predicted, when the book was recently released, participants were more interested in reading the 9-year-old’s book (M<sub>9</sub>=5.71, SD=1.32) than the 39-year-old’s book (M<sub>39</sub>=3.77, SD=1.41), t(51)=5.11, p<.001. By contrast, when the book was released 20 years in the past, participants were equally interested in reading the 9-year-old’s book (M<sub>9</sub>=4.76, SD=1.28) as they were the 39-year-old’s book (M<sub>39</sub>=4.30, SD=1.34), p=.22.

Participants’ willingness to purchase the book followed an identical pattern. An analogous 2 (age) X 2 (time framing) ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction, F(3,102) = 3.97, p=.049. As predicted, when the book was recently released, participants were more likely to purchase the 9-year-old’s book (M<sub>9</sub>=5.19, SD=1.62) than the 39-year-old’s book (M<sub>39</sub>=3.18, SD=1.26), t(51)=4.87, p<.001. By contrast, when the book was released 20 years in the past, participants reported that they were only marginally more likely to purchase the 9-year-old’s book (M<sub>9</sub>=4.27, SD=1.44) than they were the 39-year-old’s book (M<sub>39</sub>=3.45, SD=1.64), t(51)=1.92, p=.06. Thus, for ratings of purchase intent, moving the performance into the past did significantly reduce the influence of potential, though it did not completely attenuate the effect.

We then conducted a bootstrap mediation analysis to determine whether in the “present” conditions (one week ago) ratings of potential mediated the effect of the poet’s age on willingness to purchase the book. This analysis indicated that there was a significant indirect effect of poet’s age on willingness to purchase their book, b=.33, SE=.14 (95%C1=-.01 to .67).

**Experiment 3: Hedonic and Utilitarian Domains**

We propose that the effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2 resulted from imagining the individual’s future achievements. Consistent with this, Experiment 2 found that the ability to project into the future plays a key role in the valuation of potential.

In Experiment 3 we examined the role of imagining those future achievements. Specifically, we reasoned that the effect of potential should hold for domains where value is abstract and subjective (such as artwork or poetry) but not in domains where value is more concrete and objective (such as tool-making). To test this, we asked participants to read short vignettes about both young vs. older individuals who offered goods/services in either hedonic or utilitarian domains. We predicted that for hedonic goods/services, participants should show greater interest in the products of young vs. older people, while in utilitarian domains that preference should be attenuated.

In addition, this experiment helps to address yet another alternative explanation which may account for the previous findings. It may be that people value potential because of a sort of “bragging
right” associated with discovering talent before others. This alternative, however, predicts that there should be no difference in the valuation of potential across domains.

METHOD
Participants were 206 adults ($M_{age}=33.2$, 52% female), recruited from Amazon’s mTurk website in exchange for $0.50 (USD). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2(age) X 2(domain) between-subjects design. Participants read about either 4 hedonic products/services (watching a television show written by the person, watching a movie directed by the person, listening to music produced by the person, reading a book written by the person) or 4 utilitarian products/services (taking pain medication made by the person, having your car serviced by the person, having your boat serviced by the person, having a tool repaired by the person). In all cases, the products/services were described as high quality and having received recognition (e.g., a major television network had agreed to make a show written by the person). Between-subjects we also varied the age of the person to be either under 15-years-old (youth condition) or over 40-years-old (adult condition).

Following each vignette, participants reported their likelihood of purchasing/consuming the product or service described (1=not at all likely, 7=very likely). The specific wordings of these items varied for each item. Participants also indicated how much potential they thought the individual had (1=none at all; 7=very much) as well as how good they expected the person would be at their trade 10 years in the future (1=worst, 10=best). This latter measure directly tested whether people are imagining the future growth of the individual. Both measures of potential were included to a test specific serial mediation model where beliefs about high potential lead to a prediction about better future performance which in turn leads to increased valuation.

Finally, we were concerned that one additional difference between the hedonic and utilitarian items may be that people think that performance increases with age in utilitarian domains more so than in hedonic ones. To address this, at the end of the survey participants indicated for each of the 8 products/services (e.g., script writing), the extent to which they thought (in general) ability increased as a function of age.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A 2 (age) X 2 (domain) ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction, $F(1, 202)=5.56$, $p=.02$. As predicted, when the domain was hedonic, participants indicated they were more likely to purchase/consume the young person’s good/service ($M=5.07$, $SD=1.21$) compared to the adult’s ($M=4.55$, $SD=1.23$, $t(106)=2.21$, $p=.03$. However, when the domain was utilitarian, participants showed a slight preference for the adult ($M=4.59$, $SD=1.39$), over the young person ($M=4.25$, $SD=1.39$), though this difference was not statistically significant, $p=.23$, ns.

We then conducted a serial bootstrap mediation analysis to determine whether the effect of age on valuation was mediated through the indirect effects of potential and predictions about future ability. We examined the hedonic and utilitarian items separately. This analysis indicated that full serial mediation model (age→potential→future performance→valuation) was statistically significant for the hedonic domain items, (95%CI=[.06 to .31]), but not for the utilitarian domain items (95%CI=[-.05 to .22]).

Finally, for all of the products/services examined, people thought that in general, ability improved with age (all $M$s were significantly greater than the midpoint, $p<.001$) and there was no difference between the hedonic and utilitarian items.

The results from this study were consistent with the prediction that when value is tied to hedonic dimensions, potential has a positive effect on consumption. However, when value is predominantly tied to utilitarian dimensions, and a product’s imagined components play less of a role, the effect of potential is attenuated.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three experiments investigated the concept of potential and specifically, the notion that people are willing to consume certain goods or services in the present based on an individual’s imagined future achievements. Experiment 1 demonstrated that potential leads people to consume even inferior performances in the present. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the ability to project achievements into the future plays a key role in preferences based on potential; simply indicating that a young poet’s book had come out 20 years ago (as opposed to one week ago) significantly reduced the effect of potential. And, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the effect of potential obtains in hedonic domains, where value is associated with abstract, subjective dimensions, but not in utilitarian domains where value is concrete and objective.

One interesting avenue for further research may be to investigate the situations in which imagining the future either increases or decreases valuation. For example, it is well known that people inflate their predicted happiness for future positive events (e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; Wood & Bettman, 2007), and that they are overly optimistic about the future state of the world (Weinstein, 1980). Therefore, it may be that thinking about the future always increases value. Alternatively, it may be that imagining the future only has positive effects for entities that are associated with ‘growth.’ For example, it seems difficult to imagine that thinking about a new and better iPhone would make the current iPhone more valuable—perhaps it is quite the opposite.

In sum, the goal of the present paper was to examine the concept of potential and its role in immediate consumption decisions. Our preference for potential is likely multiply determined, drawing from our ability to profit from it in the future, novelty, a sense of awe, a preference toward innate skill or natural talent, and perhaps reputational benefits associated with “discovering” talent. Nevertheless, the present studies demonstrate that even when you eliminate the relevance of these factors, there remains a clear preference for potential that is tied to imagining the future achievements of individuals. Critically, we find that this conceptual aspect of potential exerts an influence on consumption decisions that are only experienced in the present, which provides empirical support not only for the existence of potential effects free from their payoffs in the future, but also for the notion of concepts per se can provide an important source of value.

APPENDIX
Stimuli from Experiment 2
When poet Jason Allen White first published a book of poetry one week (twenty years) ago he was a 9 (39) years old. Upon publication, the book penned by the Philadelphia native immediately met with acclaim from the local press and has gone on to achieve more widespread recognition. One simply needs to read a few pages in this brilliant book to understand the staggering writing skills he possesses.

REFERENCES


Motivated Recall and the “Rosy View” in Retrospective Evaluations
Robert Latimer, New York University, USA
Priya Raghunir, New York University, USA

ABSTRACT
Academics and stand up comics alike have noted the sometimes extraordinary divergence of retrospective evaluations from an actual experience. Academics, for their part, have presented ample evidence for experiences ranging from spring break vacations (Kemp, Burt, & Fumeaux, 2008; Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, & Diener, 2003), trips to Disneyland (Sutton, 1992), and bike trips across California (Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, & Cronk, 1997). For these experiences and others, the bulk of research suggests that changes in evaluations are directional; people have a “rosy view” of their past (Mitchell et al., 1997; Wirtz & Kruger, 2002). There are exceptions, however. Wirtz et al. (2003) reported an increase in negative affect from online to retrospective reports, although overall evaluations did improve. Anecdotally, people also exaggerate negative aspects of experiences, sacrificing accuracy for entertainment value. Any theory attempting to explain these shifting evaluations of vacations must account for how the fish you caught grows larger over time, the local food more savory, and the already staggeringly incompetent mountain guide even less adroit.

There are several lines of research how memories and their associated affect change over time. Evidence from attitudes research suggests that evaluations could become polarized (e.g. Tesser, 1975; Srull & Wyer, 1981) or diluted (e.g. Linville, 1982; Millar & Tesser, 1985; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) over time as a result of many factors ranging from the complexity of the topic to the need for justification. A substantial body of work also deals with how people feel before or after an experience and retrospective evaluations may be based on current feelings (Ross, McFarland, & Decouville, 1989). Wilson and Gilbert’s (2003, 2008) AREA (Attend, React, Explain, and Adapt) contends that people react emotionally only to self-relevant events that they do not understand. Taylor’s (1991) mobilization-minimization account suggests that people will have strong initial reactions to negative experiences, but that their impact will fade with time. Research derived from Pennebaker’s (1997) clinical work has demonstrated that writing about a traumatic experience will reduce negative feelings upon later recall of the experience. Walker and colleagues (e.g. Skowronski & Thompson, 2003; Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997) have extended this finding to recall of everyday pleasant and unpleasant experiences and demonstrated an asymmetry they labeled the Fading Affect Bias. Negative affect associated with unpleasant experiences fades faster than positive affect associated with positive experiences. Further, the authors suggest that the Fading Affect Bias is driven by social recall – talking about an experience with peers (Skowronski et al., 2004). Just as the feelings evoked by memories can change, so too can the actual contents recalled. Cognitively focused psychologists have demonstrated that depending on how a story is told, the details of that story may change when recalled later (Dudokovic, Marsh, & Tversky, 2004; Huston & Marsh, 2005; Marsh & Tversky, 2000). When participants write about a scenario from one perspective, their memories will reflect that perspective’s bias. Finally, research on motivated retrieval in self deception suggests that details recalled can change depending on the desires of the person reminiscing (e.g. Kunda,1987, 1990; Klein & Kunda, 1992).

In this paper we focus on the interplay between three of the above lines of research to clarify the role of detailed recall in creating retrospective evaluations that diverge from online experience. The Fading Affect Bias illustrates the power of social retellings, motivated retrieval provides a mechanism through which bias can enter recollections, and perspective taking demonstrates that biased recall will change later memories. We contend that when people recall past experiences in detail they selectively retrieve certain components of the experience. When people are later asked to evaluate an experience, their evaluations are colored by the earlier selective retrieval. Our desire to be seen by our peers as wise, interesting people who do fun things combined with the frequency of social detailed recall ensures that the color is usually “rosy”. Motivated retrieval, perspective taking, and the Fading Affect Bias happily converge to provide an account for changes in retrospective evaluations through detailed recall. The Fading Affect Bias provides direction for how memories will change over time, perspective taking provides a mechanism through which memories can change, and motivations provide the perspective, suggest the moderating role of ambiguity, and a reason for the typical “rosy view” phenomenon. We present three experiments. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that detailed recall can improve retrospective evaluations. In Experiment 2, we reverse the effect and suggest a role for selective retrieval of pleasant or unpleasant components, rather than a change in the construal of those components. Finally, Experiment 3 tests the motivational account against competing interpretations by changing participants’ motivations during detailed recall.

EXPERIMENT 1
Firms habitually ask customers to recall their consumption experience by administering surveys. We asked participants to provide a description of a complex experience: their last trip by airplane. Participants also provided ratings on pleasantness and satisfaction for the best and worst moments of the experience, as well as the overall experience. We anticipated that ratings for the components of the experience would follow the pattern of the Fading Affect Bias. Participants who spend longer retelling the story of their trip should rate the (presumably unpleasant) worst moment of their trip as more pleasant, but the (presumably pleasant) best moment of their trip should receive similar ratings from both groups. The Fading Affect Bias literature does not provide predictions for the impact of detailed recall on complex experiences with both pleasant and unpleasant moments, but if the worst moments improve with detailed recall and the best moments remain constant with recall, the overall experience should become retrospectively more pleasant.

METHOD
Participants. Twenty-four students enrolled in an introduction to marketing course completed the experiment for partial course credit.

Materials & Procedure. All participants were asked to provide the basic information: the month and year when they last took a trip by airplane, as well as the departure and destination airports. Eleven of the participants were then asked to “describe very briefly the last time you took a trip in an airplane. Begin with your arrival at the starting airport and end with your departure from the destination airport. You have 2 minutes to write your description of the trip, try to use all of the time.” The remaining thirteen participants received identical instructions, with the exceptions that they were asked to “describe in as much detail as possible” and were given 15 minutes.
to provide their descriptions. After completing their descriptions, all participants were asked to rate the pleasantness of the trip on a 1 to 3 (very unpleasant to very pleasant) scale and their satisfaction with the trip on a 1 to 7 (not at all satisfied to completely satisfied) scale. Participants provided ratings on both of these scales for the overall experience, the best moment of the experience, and the worst moment of the experience.

RESULTS & DISCUSSION

The ratings were submitted to a 2 (Minutes writing, between subjects) X 3 (Component, within subjects) mixed ANOVA. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, so we can assume that differences between groups in the recalled pleasantness of and satisfaction with the flights were caused by the manipulations. Spending more time describing the past airplane trip made the trip retrospectively more pleasant, F(1,22) = 5.175, p = .033, and marginally more satisfying, F(1,22) = 3.211, p = .087. The longer descriptions had their intended effect; Delta would be well advised to get me to describe my trip if they want to keep my business. Not surprisingly, the overall experience, best moment, and worst moment differed in their retrospective pleasantness, F(1,22) = 39.10, p < .0005, and rated satisfaction, F(1,22) = 34.43, p < .0005. However the interaction between the length of the description and moment did not reach significance, p > .1.

EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 1 demonstrated that detailed recall can result in improved retrospective evaluations, but the source of the effect is uncertain. Participants who extensively recalled the flight may have selectively retrieved a greater number of pleasant components of their experience, changed their construal of the components they did retrieve, or retrieved components from a larger experience (i.e. their whole trip rather than just the flight). In order to test the effects of detailed recall in a more constrained setting, we restricted recall to a single component of a flight experience, either pleasant or unpleasant.

METHOD

Participants. Seventy eight undergraduate marketing students participated for partial credit in their introductory course.

Materials & Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants were first asked to describe some basic information about the last flight they had taken, including their destination, airline, and the recency of the flight. Participants were then asked to list a single aspect – either pleasant or unpleasant depending on condition – of their most recent flight. On the next page of the questionnaire, participants were asked to provide a detailed description of either the aspect they had just listed or a product they had purchased recently (control). After finishing the description, participants completed several unrelated studies for approximately 40 minutes. Finally, they rated the pleasantness (1 very unpleasant – 7 very pleasant), enjoyableness (1 not at all enjoyable – 7 very enjoyable), and their satisfaction (1 very dissatisfied – 7 very satisfied) with both the aspect of the flight they had listed and the flight overall.

RESULTS & DISCUSSION

The evaluations were combined into two scales, evaluation of the aspect (α = .97) and of the flight overall (α = .92). The two scales were submitted to a 2 (aspect valence) X 2 (recall aspect/describe product) Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA). Not surprisingly, when participants were asked to list a pleasant aspect they evaluated that aspect more positively than when they were asked to list an unpleasant aspect (F(1, 74) = 93.0, p < .0005).

EXPERIMENT 3

Experiments 1 and 2 relied on participants’ innate motivation to take the rosy view of an experience. In Experiment 3, we provide participants with explicit motives during recall in order to provide another demonstration of how recall can change retrospective evaluations and examine some alternatives to the motivational account. In particular, Gilbert and Wilson’s (2003, 2008) AREA model of affective adaptation suggests that recall with a focus on explanation should reduce the intensity of all affect associated with an experience, while the motivational account predicts a strong reduction in negative affect for unpleasant experiences, particularly when social pressure is salient.

METHOD

Participants. Four hundred and five participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Participants were compensated $0.25 for an average of 14 minutes participation in a survey advertised as taking between 15 and 20 minutes. 137 participants were excluded from the analysis for failing to read the body text of a test question or for failing to describe an experience. Excluding these participants did not change the direction of the results.

Materials & Procedure. Participants were asked to list a single experience from their lives that happened in that last three months, lasted between one hour and 24 hours, that they were present at (e.g. not a news story), and that was either overall positive, negative, or mixed in valence. Participants in the detailed recall conditions were then asked to describe this experience and told that their descriptions would be evaluated by a judge later. The fictional judge’s criteria varied by condition. He would evaluate participants for how “fun and interesting you would be as a friend”, how “successful at explaining things you would be as a teacher”, or how “reliable you would be as a witness”. After providing their descriptions, participants listened to and rated a series of four 40 second sound clips that served as a buffer between the description and the evaluations of the experience. Finally, participants asked to evaluate the experience they had described earlier for its pleasantness, the extent to which they enjoyed it, and their satisfaction (1 not at all – 7 very). Participants were instructed that their evaluations were for control purposes only and that they would not be viewed by the judges.
RESULTS & DISCUSSION

Participants’ ratings of the described experience were combined into a single scale ($\alpha = .941$). This scale was submitted to a 4 (detailed recall: none, friend, teacher, witness) X 3 (Experience valence: positive, negative, mixed) between subjects ANOVA. As expected, there was a main effect of valence, with participants evaluating a negative experience ($M = 2.4$) less positively than a mixed ($M = 4.8$) or positive ($M = 5.8$) experience ($F(2,256) = 89.7, p < .0005$). Neither the interaction nor the main effect of detailed recall was significant, $p > .1$. We also executed three planned contrasts. For the negative experience, participants who recalled believing they would be evaluated as a friend evaluated the experience more positively ($M = 2.9$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 2.0$) ($F(1, 256) = 5.82, p < .05$). The planned contrast for the AREA model failed to reach significance however, with participants who believed they would be judged on the quality of their explanation not seeing an increase in evaluation in the negative condition and a decrease in the evaluation in the positive condition over the control participants, $p > .1$. Finally, when all detailed recall conditions were pooled, they did not produce a significant improvement in evaluations over the control condition, $p > .1$. The results of Experiment 3 show a remarkable correspondence to the Fading Affect Bias, but for retrospective evaluations rather than evoked affect. To test for selective retrieval of positive aspects of the experience, participants written descriptions were coded by two raters blind to the experiment’s hypotheses. Participants with a social motive during detailed recall listed more positive aspects compared to negative aspects ($M_{positive - negative} = 0.76$) than participants with accuracy ($M_{positive - negative} = -0.73$) or explanation ($M_{positive - negative} = -0.61$) motives, all $p < .05$. Negative experiences are improved by detailed recall, but only when that detailed recall takes place with the goal of appearing fun and interesting as a friend - a goal that is doubtless very common in everyday recall.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

I have presented evidence that detailed recall – particularly social detailed recall – has the power to improve retrospective evaluations of experiences, adding a rosy tint to experiences that initially seemed negative. Experiment 1 provided an initial demonstration of the effect in the context of evaluations of a past trip by airplane. Experiment 2 clarified that individual components of an experience are unlikely to be reconstrued with detailed recall, but that an overall evaluation is influenced by the components that are recalled, positive or negative. Next, Experiment 3 demonstrated that detailed recall with the motive of seeming “fun and interesting” improves evaluations for initially negative experiences, mimicking the results from the Fading Affect Bias.

This paper presents empirical evidence for the influence of detailed recall on retrospective evaluations, drawing its predictions from the intersection of past work on the Fading Affect Bias, perspective taking, and motivated retrieval. These three lines of research complement each other to produce predictions for the plasticity of memory with broad theoretical and managerial relevance. For example, in order to encourage pleasant memories of the experiences they provide, firms might combine satisfaction surveys with social media. Consumers who believe that their satisfaction report will be seen by their peers are likely to list more positive aspects of the experience. The positive aspects listed will have a double benefit to the firm: (1) improving retrospective evaluations of the consumer and (2) increasing the positivity of word of mouth disseminated by the consumer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Summary of Studies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
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<td><strong>IV</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Primary DV</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Result</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Implication</strong></td>
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REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION
Consumers prefer to maintain a balance in how they spend money and time among different categories because both are critical but limited resources (Wertenbroch and Dhar 2000; Sheldon, Cummins, and Kamble 2010). However, with longer working hours, imbalance lifestyles are endemic and precious minutes remain for other activities such as exercising, cleaning, and socializing with family (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone 2004). Not only do consumers spend more or less resources between different categories for self but they also allocate more or less money and time on categories for self vs. friends and family. For example, instead of buying gifts for others, 32% of holiday shoppers said they would rather spend money on themselves (White, 2012).

The current research investigates the influence of two types of spending imbalances of time and money on happiness and spending reallocation decisions: 1) within-self imbalance in which a consumer, for example, spends more time watching TV by self but less on exercising or traveling; and 2) self-others imbalance in which a consumer, for example, spends more money buying clothes for self but less on buying gifts for family. Prior research alludes to the idea of within-self imbalanced spending of money and how consumers deal with it by either spending less in the same category (Heath and Soll 1996) or categorizing the expense in a loose fashion (Cheema and Soman 2006). The growing research in time versus money has documented several differences between these two critical resources such as ambiguity in cost consideration (Okada and Hoch 2005; Soman 2001; Soster, Monga, and Bearden 2010), mindsets in goal of spending (Devoe and House 2012; Liu and Aaker 2008), and personal connection with the product (Mogilner and Aaker 2009). We contribute to prior research by showing the influences of self-others imbalanced spending on happiness, reallocation to, and substitution in favor of underspent categories are different from those of within-self imbalanced spending and how those effects differ for time versus money. These are important issues to investigate because consumers spend time and money on activities and things that they believe will make them happy but imbalanced spending can sabotage their happiness.

Prior research has established that in comparison to time, money is more tangible (Okada and Hoch 2005) and involves less heuristic decision making (Saini and Monga 2008). Those primed with money choose to spend more time on work (Mogilner 2010) and behave more functionally (Vohs et al. 2012). More importantly, thinking about money evokes a self-sufficiency mindset in which people prefer to be monetarily independent of others and expect others to not depend upon them and desire unambiguous satisfaction from spending money (Liu and Aaker 2007; Vohs, Mead, and Goode 2006). In contrast, thinking about time activates an emotional orientation which encourages people to focus upon the experiences of social connection (Mogilner 2010; Schwarz and Clore 1996). Those primed with time choose to spend more time with friends and family (Mogilner 2010) and savor happiness through charitable donations (Liu and Aaker 2007). This suggests that self-others (within-self) imbalance should be more bothersome for time (money) than for money (time).

Hypothesis 1: Within-self imbalanced spending will result in greater unhappiness for money than for time

Hypothesis 2: Self-others imbalanced spending will result in greater unhappiness for time than for money

STUDY 1: IMBALANCED SPENDING AND HAPPINESS
We tested above hypotheses in a 2 (resource: time, money) X 2 (imbalance type: within-self, self-others) between-subjects design in which 127 undergraduates were asked to imagine a scenario in which they recently graduated with a $30,000 job and spent their discretionary money (time) (in imbalanced fashion) among different listed categories (see Appendix A). Next to their imbalanced spending distribution, subjects were shown the (balanced) spending distribution of an average consumer in their age group as per the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. We identified spending categories and calibrated balanced distribution from the U.S. BLS data (2010) and journal articles (Cheema and Soman 2006; Kahneman et al. 2004). For the sake of brevity, the detailed procedure adopted to generate the four imbalanced spending distributions is included in Appendix A. After exposure to the distributions, participants reported their happiness on four 7-point items (happy—unhappy; satisfied—dissatisfied; excited—less excited; pleased—less pleased; Van Boven and Gilovich 2003, α = .95) and rated how balanced they thought their spending distribution was on two 7-point items (balanced—imbalanced; even—uneven, α = .92).

Appendix A
The detailed procedure we adopted to generate the within-self imbalanced and self-others imbalanced spending distribution is as follows:

i) We identified the distinct spending categories and spending allocations from prior research (Cheema and Soman 2006) and from the (BLS or) Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. This became the within-self balanced distribution.

ii) Using within self balanced distribution, we conducted a pre-test (n = 36) which revealed that subjects believed 80% of discretionary spending on self and subject felt 20% on others represented an ideal self-other spending distribution.

iii) The allocation with 80% for self and 20% for others became the self-others balanced distribution. The 20% spending on others was allocated on two plausible categories (e.g., electronics and entertainment monetary expenses for friends/family as gifts).

iv) We calculated the standard deviation of two balanced distributions (e.g., 4.8 for money at self-others balanced condition).

v) Both within-self imbalance and self-others imbalance distribution were developed by increasing the standard deviation of the balanced distributions (in iv) by 50% (e.g., 7.2 for money at self-others imbalanced condition).

vi) A similar approach was followed to generate within self imbalance and self-other imbalance for time condition. We ensured that the two imbalance categories remained as close as possible to those in money condition.

Manipulation checks confirmed that participants found their “scenario” spending distribution to be more imbalanced than the one from BLS (p < .00; not listing the means for sake of brevity). More importantly, their scenario spending distribution was rated to be equivalently imbalanced for both resources (within-self imbalance...
Manipulation of Study 1
Spending Money Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description of expenses</th>
<th>Within-self</th>
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<td>B</td>
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<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dining out (dinners at restaurants, pizza deliveries, beers and foods at bars, etc.)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clothes and accessories (pants, t-shirts, caps, scarfs, perfumes, bags, etc.)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Entertainment (going to movies, concerts, games, etc.)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Exercise and gym (golf, yoga, fitness camp, etc.)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Consumer electronics (tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, etc.)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Home leisure (satellite TV/ cable, CDs/ downloads, video games, books, etc.)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Travel and vacation</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pay for the entertainment expenses of your friends/ family as special treats (going to movies, concerts, games, etc.)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pay consumer electronics as gifts for your friends/ family (tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, etc.)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total amount of money | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100%
Standard Deviation 6.5 9.8 4.8 7.2

Note. B = Balanced; ImB = Imbalanced

Spending Time Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description of activities</th>
<th>Within-self</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>ImB</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Resting (napping, lazing, not doing anything, etc)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Volunteering</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Watching TV</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Surfing on web</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Out of home entertainment (going to movies, concerts, game, etc.)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Health and self-maintenance (exercising, eating, washing, etc)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Spirituality or religion (meditation or spiritual/ religious duties)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Watching TV with your friends/ family</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Out of home entertainment with your friends/ family (going to movies, concerts, game, etc.)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total amount of time | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100%
Standard Deviation 8.5 12.8 5.6 8.7

Note. B = Balanced; ImB = Imbalanced
TABLE 1

Summary of Mean Numbers Across Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-others Imbalance</th>
<th>Within-self Imbalance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reallocation (%)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution (%)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy to make decision</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reallocation (%)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution (%)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-sufficiency</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social connection</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>5.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-others imbalance only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reallocation (%)</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-sufficiency</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social connection</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>6.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-self imbalance only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reallocation (%)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * = significant at .1 level; **=significant at .05 level

ance: = 2.50 vs. = 2.50; t(1, 59) = .00, n.s.; self-other imbalance: = 2.29 vs. = 2.77; t(1, 64) = -1.62, n.s.). Analysis revealed a significant interaction of resource x imbalance type (F(1, 123) = 8.25, p < .05). As expected, subjects were more unhappy for self-others imbalanced spending involving time than for money ( = 2.24 vs. = 3.75; t(1, 64) = -4.43, p < .05). Thus, H2 is supported. However, H1 was not supported because for within-self imbalance, there was no difference in the reported unhappiness for money and time ( = 3.19 vs. = 3.31; t(1, 59) = -.43, n.s).

STUDY 2: SPENDING IMBALANCE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Study 2 was conducted to i) test the robustness of Study 1 results by using different focal categories to create imbalanced distributions (e.g., clothes and accessories in place of consumer electronics) but having the same standard deviations as Study 1; ii) examine the influence of imbalance spending on two downstream corrective actions – extent to which subjects reallocated their current (imbalanced) spending and whether they would substitute spending their remaining discretionary resource (e.g., $80) from an overspent category to an underspent category; and iii) test the mediation of these effects by happiness. Thus, we further hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3: To correct within-self imbalanced spending, consumers will (3a) reallocate resource to the underspent category and (3b) substitute resource from the specific overspent category to the underspent category to a greater extent for money than for time

Hypothesis 4: To correct self-others imbalanced spending, consumers will (4a) reallocate resource to the underspent category for others and (4b) substitute resource from the specific overspent category for self to the underspent category for others to a greater extent for time than for money

Hypothesis 5a: The effects of within-self spending imbalances of time and money on resource reallocations (H3a) is mediated by happiness

Hypothesis 5b: The effects of self-others spending imbalances of time and money on resource reallocations (H4a) is mediated by happiness

Ninety-five undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 2 (resource: time, money) X 2 (imbalance type: within-self, self-others) between subjects experiment. We used the same procedure as in Study 1 but added three new measures of reallocation, substitution, and ease of making substitution decision (five 7-point items -- easy; quick; time consuming; conflict; confident, α = .95). Operationalization of reallocation percentage is best explained with an example. If a participant reallocated 65% of total discretionary expenditure to the combined five (underspent) categories which were earlier allocated 53% (in the imbalanced distribution), then reallocation percentage is 65-53/53 = 22%. For substitution, we asked subjects to imagine that their budget for discretionary money (time) was almost used up (e.g., only $75 left) and they encounter several scenarios in each of which they need to make a choice between one overspent
item and the other underspent item. Substitution ratio is assessed by calculating the percentage of people who chose the underspent item.

Manipulation checks confirmed imbalanced spending of time and money were perceived to be comparable, reasonable, and believable (not listing the means for sake of brevity). Analysis revealed a significant interaction between resource x imbalance type ($F(1, 91) = 14.43$, $p < .01$). Consistent with Study 1 results, subjects felt more unhappy for self-others imbalance involving time than money ($= 3.33$ vs. $= 4.53$; $t(1, 48) = -3.58, p < .01$). Further, H4a and H4b are supported because subjects reallocated to the underspent categories for others to a much greater extent in time vs. money condition ($= 800\%$ vs. $= 150\%$ increase; $t(1, 48) = 6.95, p < .01$). Similarly, chi-square analysis revealed greater percentage of participants substituting in time vs. money condition ($= 77\%$ vs. $= 35\%; \chi^2 = 15.75, p < .05$). Moreover, substitution decisions were much easier to make for time than for money when facing self-others imbalance condition ($= 6.3$ vs. $= 4.91; t(1, 48) = 4.71, p < .01$). Similar to Study 1, within-self imbalance results were insignificant and did not support H1 (and H3) (see Table 1 for details).

Mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986) of reallocation in self-other imbalanced spending (H4a) revealed that happiness is the mediator driving reallocation results in Studies 1-3 because subjects were constrained by how much numbers (i.e., $\$$ dollars and hours) instead of percentages in spending distributions (Appendix B); and iii) explore whether self-sufficiency and social connection ratings are consistent with our findings. We developed a 6-items self-sufficiency scale based on the presented ideas in Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) e.g., “I find it difficult to allow others to depend on me for money (time);” $1 =$ strongly disagree; $7 =$ strongly agree; $\alpha = .75$) and a 4-items social connection scale based on the presented ideas in Mogilner (2010) e.g., “For me, spending money (time) on family/friends helps me connect with them,” $1 =$ strongly disagree; $7 =$ strongly agree; $\alpha = .75$).

One hundred and seventy-eight undergraduates participated in a 2 (resource: money, time) X 2 (imbalance type: within-self, self-others) X 2 (target person: self, Joe) between-subjects design with the same procedure as in previous two studies. The insignificant three-way interaction on dependent variables rules out social desirability explanation ($F(1, 170) = .42, n.s.$), thus, we collapsed the data from two target persons conditions in the analysis. Consistent with findings from first two studies, results support H2 and H4 but not H1 and H3 (see Table 1 for details). Similar to Study 2 results and consistent with H5b, happiness is the mediator driving self-others imbalanced reallocation result (Sobel $z = -2.8, p < .05$) with indirect effect that was significantly different from zero (95% confidence interval [CI] = $-1.44, -.01$). Finally, process measure results are theoretically consistent with our findings in that subjects felt more self-sufficient for money than time ($= 4.89$ vs. $= 3.52; t(1, 46) = -4.01, p < .01$). In contrast, they felt more socially connected for time than money ($= 6.07$ vs. $= 4.83; t(1, 46) = 4.8, p < .01$).

**STUDY 3: PROCESSES AND SOCIAL DESIRABILITY EXPLANATION**

Results from previous studies show that spending time (vs. money) in the self-others imbalance condition makes people feel more unhappy, resulting in greater corrective actions of reallocation and substitution. However, the influence of within-self imbalanced spending does not differ between time and money (we identify and empirically provide evidence for a possible explanation for insignificant H1 and H3 in Study 5). Study 3 was conducted to i) rule out the social desirability explanation of whether consumers reallocated money to categories for others because not doing so would make them look bad; so, we compared the outcomes between two groups, one asked to make reallocations imagining themselves in the scenario (consistent with the first two studies) and the other asked to imagine that their friend Joe/Jane was involved in that scenario; ii) check robustness of results from Studies 1 and 2 by using absolute numbers (i.e., $\$$ dollars and hours) instead of percentages in spending distributions (Appendix B); and iii) explore whether self-sufficiency and social connection ratings are consistent with our findings. We developed a 6-items self-sufficiency scale based on the presented ideas in Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) e.g., “I find it difficult to allow others to depend on me for money (time);” $1 =$ strongly disagree; $7 =$ strongly agree; $\alpha = .75$).

One hundred and seventy-eight undergraduates participated in a 2 (resource: money, time) X 2 (imbalance type: within-self, self-others) X 2 (target person: self, Joe) between-subjects design with the same procedure as in previous two studies. The insignificant three-way interaction on dependent variables rules out social desirability explanation ($F(1, 170) = .42, n.s.$), thus, we collapsed the data from two target persons conditions in the analysis. Consistent with findings from first two studies, results support H2 and H4 but not H1 and H3 (see Table 1 for details). Similar to Study 2 results and consistent with H5b, happiness is the mediator driving self-others imbalanced reallocation result (Sobel $z = -2.8, p < .05$) with indirect effect that was significantly different from zero (95% confidence interval [CI] = $-1.44, -.01$). Finally, process measure results are theoretically consistent with our findings in that subjects felt more self-sufficient for money than time ($= 4.89$ vs. $= 3.52; t(1, 46) = -4.01, p < .01$). In contrast, they felt more socially connected for time than money ($= 6.07$ vs. $= 4.83; t(1, 46) = 4.8, p < .01$).

**STUDY 4: MORE VS. LESS RESOURCES IN SELF-Others IMBALANCED SPENDING**

Is it possible that consumers reallocated more time but less money to categories for others in the self-others imbalanced condition in Studies 1-3 because subjects were constrained by how much
Appendix B
Manipulation of Study 3

Spending Money Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description of expenses</th>
<th>Within-self</th>
<th>Self-others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>ImB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dining out (dinners at restaurants, pizza deliveries, beers and foods at bars, etc.)</td>
<td>$270</td>
<td>$190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clothes and accessories (pants, t-shirts, caps, scarfs, perfumes, bags, etc.)</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Entertainment (going to movies, concerts, games, etc.)</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>$410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Exercise and gym (golf, yoga, fitness camp, etc.)</td>
<td>$120</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Consumer electronics (tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, etc.)</td>
<td>$70</td>
<td>$150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Home leisure (satellite TV/ cable, CDs/ downloads, video games, books, etc.)</td>
<td>$90</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Travel and vacation</td>
<td>$260</td>
<td>$180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pay for the entertainment expenses of your friends/ family as special treats (going to movies, concerts, games, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pay consumer electronics as gifts for your friends/ family (tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total amount of money $1160 $1160 $1160 $1160
Standard Deviation 6.5 9.8 4.8 7.2

Note. B = Balanced; ImB = Imbalanced

Spending Time Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description of activities</th>
<th>Within-self</th>
<th>Self-others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>ImB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Resting (napping, lazing, not doing anything, etc)</td>
<td>30 hrs</td>
<td>20 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Volunteering</td>
<td>15 hrs</td>
<td>10 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Watching TV</td>
<td>75 hrs</td>
<td>95 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Surfing on web</td>
<td>30 hrs</td>
<td>20 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Out of home entertainment (going to movies, concerts, game, etc.)</td>
<td>60 hrs</td>
<td>80 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Health and self-maintenance (exercising, eating, washing, etc)</td>
<td>45 hrs</td>
<td>30 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Spirituality or religion (meditation or spiritual/ religious duties)</td>
<td>15 hrs</td>
<td>15 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Watching TV with your friends/ family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Out of home entertainment with your friends/ family (going to movies, concerts, game, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total amount of time 270 hrs 270 hrs 270 hrs 270 hrs
Standard Deviation 8.5 12.7 5.6 8.7

Note. B = Balanced; ImB = Imbalanced
money they earn (i.e., $30,000) but no such constraint operated for time (i.e., everyone has 24 hours)? To test this alternative explanation, we tested our hypotheses by doubling the income subjects earned (from $30,000 to 60,000) but had only ½ the discretionary time available (from 270 hours/month to 135 hours/month) compared to in Studies 1-3.

We randomly assigned 103 students into one of the four between-subjects experimental conditions involving 2 (resource: money, time) x 2 (amount: more, less). We followed the same procedure as in previous studies. Participants completed the same self-sufficiency (α = .68) and social connection (α = .76) scale items after the reallocation task. Results revealed the predicted main effect of resource (F(1, 102) = 21.12, p < .01) but insignificant main effect for amount and interaction (p > .1). More specifically, participants engaged in greater reallocation to underspent categories for others in time than in money condition ( = 334% vs. = 207%; t(1, 50) = -3.53, p < .01). Planned contrasts revealed that participants kept reallocating less toward underspent categories for others even when the amount of money was doubled ( = 334% vs. = 204%; t(1, 52) = -3.12, p < .01). Equally important is the finding that participants continued reallocating more even when the amount of time was reduced by half ( = 350% vs. = 204%; t(1, 52) = -3.07, p < .01).

Regardless of the amount of resources, participants in the money condition continued feeling higher self-sufficiency than those in the time condition ( = 3.51; F(1, 101) = 9.83, p < .01). Similarly, those in the time condition reported higher social connection than those in the money condition ( = 5.24; F(1, 101) = 12.15, p < .01) regardless of the amount of resources (see Table 1 for details). Thus, we can rule out the explanation “having less money and more time” for the reallocation of spending less toward underspent categories for others even when the amount of money was doubled. This mechanism is driven by the boundary condition of current effects on distant others (e.g., spending more on some categories by oneself but less on other categories) if the thought of “spending more money” available for self and thus, become more aware of how their spending among different categories on self was less balanced resulting in to greater reallocation to fix the imbalance. We did not expect this to occur in the time condition because evoking time fosters social connection thinking.

Nightly-eight undergraduates were randomly assigned to a 2 (resource: time, money) X 2 (salient: others absent, others present) between-subjects experiment. Following the same procedure as in previous studies, participants reported their reallocations, happiness, and how bothersome the imbalance made them feel. A 2 (resource) x 2 (salient) ANOVA on the extent of participants’ reallocations revealed the predicted (moderately) significant interaction (F(1, 94) = 2.87, p < .1). Planned contrasts revealed that there is no difference between two conditions of time ( = 67% vs. = 72%; t(1, 48) = -.48, n.s.). In contrast and more importantly, money participants in the others-present condition engaged in greater reallocation than in the others-absent condition ( = 18%; t(1, 46) = -1.85, p = .07). Consistent with these results, we found that participants in the money-others present condition were more bothered and felt more unhappy than those in money-others absent condition. These differences were insignificant in the time condition (see Table 1 for details). Again, happiness is the mediator driving reallocation results (Sobel z = 2.28, p < .05). The effect of imbalanced spending of money on reallocation in others-present (vs. others-absent) condition was reduced (from β = .116 to β = .042, n.s.) when happiness was included in the regression; however, happiness continued to be a significant predictor (β = -.05, p < .05).

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

The findings from five studies show that self-others spending imbalance (i.e., spend more on themselves than on others) is perceived to be more serious and reacted to accordingly when spending time, as compared to spending money. Consumers will feel more unhappy (Study 1) and, as a result, engage in a greater amount of time versus money reallocation to as well as substitution in favor of underspent others (Study 2 and 3). This effect appears to be driven by the social connection and self-sufficiency mindsets that consumers possess when spending time and money, respectively (Studies 3 and 4). Further, these findings cannot be explained by social desirability (Study 3) or the amount of resources that individuals have (Study 4). People genuinely do not want to allocate more money (vs. time) on others, even when they are capable to do so, like when doubled their current salary. Lastly, Study 5 demonstrates that consumers feel less unhappy and less bothersome by spending money in the context of within-self imbalance (i.e., spend more on some categories by oneself but less on other categories) if the thought of “spending on others” does not pop up in their heads. The same effects will not affect spending time as much simply because connection with others already exists in people’s mind.

These findings support the growing research suggesting that spending time versus money elicits two distinct mindsets (Liu and Aaker 2008; Mogilner and Aaker 2009; Mogilner 2010; Vohs, et al. 2006) and extend it by identifying the downstream effects while considering imbalanced spending. One insight gained is that time and money spent in a self-others imbalanced fashion will lead to negative emotion and that motivate individuals to take actions to correct that imbalance. Moreover, this research provided evidence for this mechanism by directly measuring these two mindsets; that is, money-evoked self-sufficiency and time-evoked social connection. Of important, these two mechanisms affect consumers’ behaviors regardless of the amount of resource constraints and the influence of social norm. In fact, making people think about spending imbalance between self and others encourages their pro-social behaviors (more for time than for money) Notably, the current research only focuses on others involving close social relationship so that exploring the boundary condition of current effects on distant others (e.g., colleagues or strangers) is a promising avenue.
Appendix C
Manipulation of Study 5

### Spending money condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description of discretionary expenses</th>
<th>BLS Allocation</th>
<th>Your Current Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Entertainment (going to movies, concerts, game, etc.)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Consumer electronics (tablet pc, digital camera, cell phones, computer accessories, etc.)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Clothes and accessories (pants, t-shirts, caps, scarfs, perfumes, bags, etc.)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Travel and vacation</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Remaining categories, including gym [and spending on friends/family]</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total amount of money</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: [ ] showed only at others salient condition

### Spending time condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description of discretionary activities</th>
<th>BLS Allocation</th>
<th>Your Current Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Out of home entertainment (going to movies, concerts, game, etc.)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Watching TV</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Health and self-maintenance (exercising, eating, washing, etc)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Resting (napping, lazing, not doing anything, etc)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Remaining categories including surfing internet [and spending with friends/family]</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total amount of time</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: [ ] showed only at others salient condition

### REFERENCES


ABSTRACT

While consumers often shop in outlets with large product assortments, having no prior experience or knowledge to predict a product’s efficacy can pose a significant challenge at the point of purchase. Indeed, the functionality of most consumer goods tends to be a bit of a black box, at least until consumed. Imagine a consumer trying to select a new face cream. The majority of the ingredients may as well be illegible, and the promotional campaigns, brand awareness, and product claims tend to sit on par with several competing products in the same category. So which product does the consumer choose? This is where consumers make heuristic judgments. They infer quality from price and visual aesthetics. According to Proctor & Gamble (P&G) shoppers make up their mind about a product in three to seven seconds, just the time it takes to note a product on a store shelf. P&G refers to this time lapse as the “first-moment-of-truth.” Hence, companies like P&G spend considerable resources to enhance the appeal of product packaging.

Indeed, the role of package aesthetics in enhancing product preference is well-documented (Bloch 1995; Townsend, Montoya and Calantone 2011, Berkowitz 1987, Hertenstein, Platt and Veryzer 2004). When consumers are faced with a choice between two products of equal price and equivalent function, they tend to prefer the more attractive option (Kotler and Rath 1984). Hence, it is not surprising that in the absence of prior use or knowledge of the product, consumers will make initial impressions based on package aesthetics (Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow and Young 2009). However, one cannot help but question why this happens. Most day-to-day purchases are not just for hedonic gain, but utilitarian value. Given the sheer efficiency of the first-moment-of-truth heuristic, it would be surprising if the judgment had absolutely nothing to do with the product’s functionality, particularly given the strong relationship between form and function (Berkowitz 1987; Hertenstein et al. 2004).

In exploring this question, we make several advances. First, we demonstrate that while consumers show preferences for more appealing packaging in general, their belief in the product’s efficacy seems to be a function of their level of awareness of the category and the product’s aesthetic appeal. Specifically, consumers who have limited knowledge of a category tend to judge how well a product will function based on how pretty its packaging is. Second, we demonstrate that these inferences translate into predictable and meaningful differences in purchase intent and choice. Finally, we go one-step further by showing that this effect is most pronounced in what we refer to as credence categories (products that promote outcomes that cannot be objectively evaluated). Hence, the story comes together to illustrate that with little knowledge to the contrary, consumers tend to assume that the beauty products work better if the product’s packaging is congruent with its positioning. Hence, the first-moment-of-truth heuristic may have more to do with beliefs in efficacy than with aesthetic preference.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Researchers have devoted considerable attention to models of processing that impact purchase intent (Bloch 1995, Park, Lennon and Stoel 2005, Orth and Malkewitz 2008, Deng and Kahn 2009, Chandon and Orabayeva 2009). It is well-documented that aesthetics in package design can augment product preference (Hoegg, Alba and Dahl 2010). Without prior knowledge, consumers use aesthetic cues to inform purchase intent (Raghubir and Greenleaf 2006). It has also been shown that aesthetic information plays a critical role in product trials (Childers and Jiang 2008, Wyer, Hung and Jiang 2008). Prior research has addressed several aspects of package design that influence purchase intention including packaging size (Do Vale, Pieters and Zeelenberg 2008), location (Deng and Kahn, 2009), color (Folkes and Matta 2004; Yang and Raghubir 2005), shape (Raghubir and Krishna 1999), graphics (Bone and France 2001), and feel (Eriksson and Larsson 2011, Krishna 2006). In the absence of any other information, or when prior information about a new brand is missing (Postrel 2003, Horsky and Honea 2009), visual information of a product or package (color, design, graphics, etc.) serves to set consumption expectations and make purchase decisions (Bloch 1995, Di Muro and Noseworthy 2013, Kotler and Rath 1984, Noseworthy and Goode 2011, Sujan 1985). Yet, when a consumer knows how a product functions, the symbolic, ergonomic and functional value as communicated by design (Hoegg and Alba 2011) becomes redundant. While research in this area has focused on the influence of package aesthetics on satisfaction, product usage, and consumption perception (Shiv et al. 2005), the effect of package appeal in determining efficacy of an unknown product has not been studied.

Past research categorizes products on store shelves in terms of how easy or difficult it is to evaluate the utility of the product (Hsieh, Chiu and Chiang 2005). Products that consumers have no objective way to evaluate are termed credence goods (Loveloock 2008, Brush and Arzt 1999, Klein 1998). The two other types of products are search and experience products. Search products are those that the consumer can obtain multiple levels of information on, upon which they would base evaluations. The experience products are those that consumers evaluate based on actual consumption experience (Darby and Karni 1973, Zeithaml 1988). Examples of credence products are beauty products whose utility is hard to evaluate. Despite evidence that packaging influences claim receptivity for credence goods, there is little empirical work examining how variations in packaging form affect the desirability of credence goods. The promise of “beauty in a bottle” is a compelling proposition to any consumer. We contend that, in the absence of opportunities for consumers to make quality evaluations, aesthetics in packaging cues the semantic link between the category and functional efficacy of beauty. We show that a key determinant of a product’s success is its efficacy or perceived product effectiveness, particularly when prior knowledge is either absent or low.

Brand awareness usually cues expectations of how the product will function when prior usage or trial is absent (Hoyer and Brown, 1990). Nedungadi and Hutchinson (1985) define awareness as the ability to bring a brand to mind. Awareness serves as a heuristic when consumers lack time or prior usage experience. Horsky and Honea (2009) note that in cases of inferior product quality, packaging biases a positive response to hedonic product experience in which consumers were more likely to accept credence claims (products whose utility impact was difficult for consumers to ascertain). Consumers show a marked preference for a high-awareness brand even when there were known differences in quality and price (Macdonald and...
Sharp, 2000). Nedungadi and Hutchinson (1985) note that any new information about a category is usually generalized asymmetrically between more- and less-known brands.

We contend, however, that in the absence of consumer awareness, the aesthetics of the product or the beauty-in-a-bottle promise serves as the first-moment-of-truth heuristic. This hypothesis is tested in study 1. Our hypothesis is that, in the absence of any other cues to a brand’s functionality, consumers look to packaging information to form purchase inferences, and this is mainly due to functional inferences based on appeal. Study 2 demonstrates that awareness or expertise in the category moderates this effect as consumers use the beauty-in-a-bottle heuristic only for low-awareness products. Study 3 is a field experiment that demonstrates the robustness of this effect across a variety of brands in the beauty and household category. The hypotheses tested are summarized as follows:

Hypothesis 1: In the absence of any other cues to a brand’s functionality, consumers look to packaging information to form purchase inferences and indicate a higher preference for more aesthetically pleasing packaging.

Hypothesis 2: Expertise in the category moderates the above effect as consumers use the beauty-in-a-bottle only in case of low awareness products to make functional inferences.

Hypothesis 3: The beauty-in-a-bottle effect is moderated by product category and only informs products in the beauty category.

STUDY 1

Design and Procedures. Participants (N = 75, 58% females; M_age = 36.5) were recruited via Amazon.com’s crowd-sourcing website. Mechanical Turk, to complete a brief (10 min) questionnaire on “product preferences” in exchange for a nominal fee ($0.20; see Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis [2010] for a validation of Mechanical Turk as a data source). Participants were told that we were interested in their shopping preferences, and were asked to imagine shopping in a store for a bottle of lotion. After simulating the scenario, participants were instructed that they would be asked to indicate their preferences for a fictitious lotion product whose package form was varied to be either high or low on appeal.

The operationalization of low and high appeal followed a similar procedure described in Noseworthy and Trudel (2011) to establish variations in product form. First, we compiled various images of the product category. A pretest (n = 66) then determined whether participants perceived the selected containers as more (less) appealing than their general expectations for the category. The packaging with the highest and lowest appeal ratings were then carried forward into the study. After viewing the target product, participants’ purchase intentions were capture by asking them to indicate, “if you were shopping for lotion, how likely is it that you would purchase this product?” (anchored: 1 = not likely at all; 7 = very likely). Following this, product effectiveness was captured by asking participants to indicate, “how well think the product will work?” (anchored: 1 = very poorly; 7 = very well). The task concluded with basic demographic questions.

Results and Discussion. Not surprisingly, participants were more willing to purchase the more appealing product (M = 2.55; t(73) = 2.72, p < .01). Critically, participants were also more likely to believe that the product with in a more appealing package functioned better (M = 4.53) than the less appealing package (M = 3.66; t(73) = 2.23, p < .05). Participants’ judgments of product efficacy fully mediated the effect that appeal had on purchase intent (Sobel z = 1.68, p < .05). The results of this study not only replicate previous studies on the effect of package appeal on purchase intent (Chandon et al. 2009), but extend these findings to illustrate that package appeal informs efficacy in determining purchase intent. If we are truly tapping an efficacy heuristic, then we should be able to test this by delineating conditions where the heuristic would be rendered irrelevant. Study 2 was designed for this specific purpose.

STUDY 2

Design and Procedures. Participants (N = 129; 64.3% females; M_age = 46.3) were recruited via Amazon.com’s crowd-sourcing website. Participants were randomly assigned one of four conditions in a 2 (form appeal: high vs. low) × 2 (product awareness: low vs. high) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were asked to imagine shopping in a store for a bottle of shampoo. After simulating the scenario, participants were then instructed that they would be asked to indicate their preferences for specific products. As before we captured purchase intention and perceptions of product effectiveness.

The product form manipulation followed study 1. In addition to rating the appeal of various package form manipulations, participants were asked to list and rate the familiarity of brand names (anchored: 1 = not very familiar; 5 = very familiar). The list included fictitious and well-known brands in the category. The brand names with the highest and lowest means ratings were carried forward into the study. All other measures remained consistent with study 1.

Results and Discussion. An analysis of variance with purchase intent as the key dependent measure, yielded a significant awareness × appeal interaction (F(1, 125) = 4.35, p < .05). Simple effects confirmed that when awareness was high, participants did not show a significant difference in purchase intent between the more appealing (M = 3.27) and less appealing product (M = 3.51; F < 1). However, when awareness was low, participants preferred the product with the more appealing packaging (M = 3.06) over the product in the less appealing packaging (M = 2.12; F(1, 125) = 5.35, p < .05). To determine whether perceived efficacy once again accounted for the increased desirability of less aware products, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Preacher, Rucker and Hayes 2007; Model 2). As predicted, perceived efficacy mediated the positive relationship between appeal and purchase intention when the product had a low awareness (B = .86, SE = .29, z = 2.96, p < .005) but not when brand awareness was high (z = -.18, p = .85). This finding supports the prediction that when awareness is low consumers use heuristics such as package design to determine product preferences, as consumers make efficacy inferences based on the appeal of the product, but when it comes to high awareness products, the heuristic is rendered irrelevant. Hence, consistent with literature on expertise, product awareness washed the heuristic. This raises the distinct possibility that this heuristic, like many others, is domain specific. That is, the link between beauty and efficacy might only exist for a credence good that is promoting beauty, as opposed to functional utility. Study 3 was designed to test this prediction, and also to check the robustness of our findings.

STUDY 3

This study uses a unique data set detailing 146 brand names of beauty and household products. It includes information about the products featured including images of the actual images of products
used in store. In this study the objective was to evaluate the role that category plays in the beauty-in-a-bottle heuristic. We predicted that the link between beauty and efficacy exists only for products for which it is hard to ascertain functionality or utility ahead of time.

BrandSpark International, in collaboration with SSI, conducted a nationwide online survey of over 50,000 American consumers (age 18+) who are involved in household shopping and provided the data for our study. The survey was weighted by gender, age, and region to conform to US MRI data and reflect the principal shopper. Of the individuals who participated in the nationwide survey 57,492 individuals (10.6% male and 89.4% female) participated in an additional survey that evaluated preferences to products that were either in the beauty (credence) or household (experience) categories. A total of 106 images of beauty products and household products were obtained from individual brand representatives who were Brandsparks clients. Images were all clients’ representations of the actual product package as used in store with the product against a white background. All images used were shown using the same approximate size and with clear resolution.

Independent Measures. Each respondent saw one image with the product description and then answered a series of questions such as: How appealing is the package to you? Prior to this survey were you aware of this product? Have you or have you not purchased this product before? Approximately how many times have you purchased the product? The first time you purchased this product, please indicate what had the most influence on your decision to buy the product? How much does the packaging of this product encourage you to purchase this product? Respondents would then see a different product and repeat the series of questions for the product presented. When repeated observations are collected on a set of individuals and the measurement occasions are not identical, such as measuring appeal, purchase intent and awareness of individual products, Raudenbush (2004) recommend treating multiple observations as nested within persons. We chose full maximum likelihood as the estimation method to compare the model fits across three nested models (Raudenbush, Bryk and Congdon 2002). In our model, each individual’s appeal rating is nested within products. We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Raudenbush, Bryk and Congdon 2002) to deal with multilevel data as it allows for simultaneous estimation of the relationship of variables at two levels, using iterative maximum likelihood estimation. We estimated a main effect model, an interaction model with main effects, and second and third order interaction with a random intercept and finally an interaction model with main effects, second and third order interaction with a random intercept and appeal. This final model allowed for individual variation in the level of product appeal.

Results and Discussion. The parameter estimates for all three models are contained in Table 2. Note that we report unstandardized coefficients. Model 3 had the smallest fit indices (AIC=1081349), suggesting a good fitting, parsimonious model. Given the sample size, we assumed this to be a reliable (Diamantopoulos and Sigau 2000). We found an effect of package appeal ($\gamma_{10} = 1.93, t = 157.82, p < .001$), awareness ($\gamma_{10} = .25, t = 16.15, p < .001$) and a marginal effect of category ($\gamma_{10} = -.02, t = -1.75, p = .08$). These main effects were qualified by a significant three way interaction ($\gamma_{10} = -.013, t = -6.56, p < .001$). In addition, a spotlight analysis at two standard deviations above and below the mean for appeal, and awareness were computed for beauty vs. household products. Consumers in the household category showed increased preference for high appeal package regardless of whether the awareness was high ($M_{low\ appeals} = 2.15$ vs. $M_{high\ appeals} = 5.64$) or low ($M_{low\ appeals} = 1.58$ vs. $M_{high\ appeals} = 4.75$). In contrast, while consumers in the beauty category showed a similar preference in a low awareness condition ($M_{low\ appeals} = 1.73$ vs. $M_{high\ appeals} = 5.12$) the effect of package appeal did not matter in the high awareness condition ($M_{low\ appeals} = 3.81$ vs. $M_{high\ appeals} = 3.81$). This field study highlights the schematic concept of beauty or package aesthetics being important when awareness of a product is low and which is more the case for credence goods. For products associated with the beauty category, we find that package appeal plays a critical role in the absence of brand cues to the quality or other characteristics of the product. A summary of findings are in table 1.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

Our research contributes to the literature on product aesthetics by showing how consumers use inferences based on package appeal to determine preferences of other heuristics to base preferences. Research has shown package form to play a critical role in persuasion tactics that marketers use by varying shape, visual graphics, materials, and proportions (Bloch 1995). Product form takes on multiple roles in communicating to the consumer (Hoeeg and Alba 2011), including attention, schematic mapping of product category, basic arousal, and usage-related and functional meaning. In this research, we demonstrate that inferences regarding performance are generated purely based on package appeal when considering products for which utility and hence functional value are difficult to evaluate. We also show that these inferences are critical in driving trial for products that are hard for consumers to evaluate, even after they have consumed or used them (credence goods). Thus, we contribute to existing knowledge in this area by evaluating the influence of appeal in consumer preferences for products that require expertise and are challenging to evaluate.

This research illuminates the nuances of inferences that consumers make based on appeal. We demonstrate that, although products in appealing packaging are preferred in general, it is only when there is a lack of expertise or awareness in a category that appeal cues functional inferences. Further, studies 1 and 2 show the utility of this heuristic with credence goods, such as those in the beauty category, wherein it is difficult to determine an objective means of evaluation. Finally, by combining empirical analyses of multiple brands across different product types, we bolster the generalizability of the results while highlighting the differences in implications for credence versus experience products. By drawing on the product aesthetics literature, including findings from statistical analyses of field survey data and controlled experiments, we further enhance our contribution to theory and marketing practice.

Certain limitations to this research should be considered. In studying credence goods, our research has focused on the beauty category, because the appeal metaphorically maps to the concept of beauty and hence to the “beauty-in-a-bottle” metaphor. This heuristic is certainly applicable to other areas of product aesthetics in which the limitations of credence goods or functionality of the product are difficult to evaluate. Further, while study 3 is useful in determining the limiting conditions of this phenomenon, future studies could explore the role that perceptions of efficacy play in different categories of credence goods. Future studies could also benefit by examining the moderating role of product awareness caused by lack of expertise, cross-cultural differences, gender differences, and cross-generational differences.

**REFERENCES**

Table 1 Mean Purchase Intent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Appeal</th>
<th>Low Appeal</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Appeal</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Appeal</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Field Study</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Awareness</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Awareness</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Awareness</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Awareness</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Table 2 Results of the HLM model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: $\gamma$ (SE)</th>
<th>Model 2: $\gamma$ (SE) Interaction model with random intercept only</th>
<th>Model 3: $\gamma$ (SE) Interaction model with random intercept and appeal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept ($\gamma_{00}$)</td>
<td>2.07 (.018**)</td>
<td>1.91 (.020**)</td>
<td>1.87 (.019**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal ($\gamma_{01}$)</td>
<td>1.75 (.004**)</td>
<td>1.87 (.012**)</td>
<td>1.93 (.012**)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aware ($\gamma_{02}$)</td>
<td>0.20 (.004**)</td>
<td>.22 (.015**)</td>
<td>.25 (.015**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category ($\gamma_{03}$)</td>
<td>-0.23 (.005**)</td>
<td>-0.047 (.012**)</td>
<td>-0.20 (.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal X Aware ($\gamma_{04}$)</td>
<td>.081 (.017**)</td>
<td>.069 (0.017**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware X Category ($\gamma_{05}$)</td>
<td>-0.007 (.018)</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.018**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal X Category ($\gamma_{06}$)</td>
<td>-1.59 (.014**)</td>
<td>-1.92 (0.013**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal X Aware X Category ($\gamma_{07}$)</td>
<td>-.151 (.021**)</td>
<td>-1.38 (0.021**)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ($\gamma_{08}$)</td>
<td>-.005(.009)</td>
<td>-0.009 (.009)</td>
<td>.004 (.009)</td>
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</table>

Fit Statistics

-2ResLL=1086552  -2ResLL=1085781  -2ResLL=1079925
AIC=1086566  AIC=1085803  AIC=1081349
BIC=1086629  BIC=1085901  BIC=1081465

*p<.05. **p<.01.

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The Means to Justify the End: How the Way in Which Decisions to Intervene Are Communicated to Users Can Combat Cyber Harassment in Social Media

Tom van Laer, ESCP Europe Business School, UK

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Cyber harassment does not only have harmful effects for social network sites, because victims tend to exit the service (Avery 2010; Martin and Smith 2008), but the emotional distress brought on by the online aggression has also caused victims to take their own lives (Parker 2012). At the same time, social media users are often upset when network providers intervene with the network and deem such an intrusion an unjust occurrence (Brunk 2012; Davis 2007; Pruitt 2003). The general aim of this paper is to answer the call for “making a difference” research that the Association for Consumer Research North American Conference 2013 has put out. Our intention has been to explore how the aforementioned catch-22 can be resolved through framing the ways in which decisions to intervene are communicated to users. This work expands on existing persuasion and victim identification effects.

First, we contend that a decision to intervene based on a story has a more positive effect on user perception that the decision is just than an analytical, factual format. We further distinguish two main components of identity: personal and social (Dollinger et al. 1996; Reid and Deaux 1996). We explore whether the effect of the story over the analytical format holds across both components.

Second, we further understanding of the mechanism underlying the presentation format effect. We examine whether the narrative transportation that people experience may lead to a justice perception that the story events imply.

Third, we move beyond the prediction that presentation format will be associated with justice perception by exploring an intrapersonal moderator that influences this relationship. The current research investigates why self-referencing may lead to either less or more positive justice perceptions under the framework of the story and analytical presentation format.

Study 1
Method
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine whether identity violation and presentation format of a decision to intervene interact in their effect on justice perception. Both identity violation and presentation format were manipulated. The study had a randomized 2 (identity violation: personal or social) × 2 (presentation format: story or analytical) full-factorial design.

Participants. Participants were 124 graduate business students.

Materials, Procedure, and Measures. Upon entering the laboratory, participants were informed that they would be asked to take part in a study aimed at understanding a decision the network provider of the business school’s social network site was in the process of making. Specifically, they were told a major issue at the school was how the network provider planned to limit cyber harassment on the site. Participants were told they would be asked to read a fictitious wall post from the network provider about how he planned to handle the cyber harassment situation. After the introduction into the study, the participants saw on a computer screen a fictitious wall post on the school’s social network site signed by “Patrick Franken, network provider” with an e-mail address of the school’s ICT service desk.

There were four conditions: Story presentation format & personal identity violation, story presentation format & social identity violation, analytical presentation format & personal identity violation, and analytical presentation format & social identity violation. After reading the wall post, participants responded to narrative transportation (Green and Brock 2000) (α=.89) and informational justice perception (Colquitt 2001) (α=.89) measures.

Results
Tests of simple effects on the adjusted means indicated that, in the personal identity violation condition, the difference in informational justice perception was significant for presentation format (see Table 1). In the social identity violation condition, there was no effect for presentation format (mean difference = .04, SE = .31, p = .901).

Table 1: Informational Justice Perception for Different Experimental Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Story format M (SD)</th>
<th>Analytical format M (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal identity violation</td>
<td>4.82 (1.21)</td>
<td>3.38 (1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social identity violation</td>
<td>4.86 (1.14)</td>
<td>4.82 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraged self-referencing</td>
<td>5.55 (.95)</td>
<td>2.64 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not encouraged self-referencing</td>
<td>4.86 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.53 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We bootstrapped the indirect effects of presentation format on informational justice perception. Narrative transportation mediated the relationship between presentation format and informational justice perception (point estimate = .42, bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI = .15 ± .76).

Study 2
Method
We examined the interaction between the format in which the decision is presented to users and whether the decision encourages self-referencing. Both presentation format and self-referencing strategy were manipulated. Study 2 was a randomized 2 (presentation format: story or analytical) × 2 (self-referencing: encouraged or not encouraged) full-factorial design.

Participants. Participants were 233 graduate business students.

Materials, Procedure, and Measures. This experiment was based on the same introduction as Study 1. A fictitious wall post on a computer screen followed the study introduction. The wall post began with the opening statement as in Study 1. The next part of the wall post introduced the presentation format manipulations. Self-referencing was encouraged through the use of “imagine” and “you” instead of “victim.” Following the manipulations, information was provided about the decision that the network provider made. After reading the wall post, participants were instructed to respond to a series of scales regarding the wall post they had read. The scales included narrative transportation (α=.89) and informational justice perception (α=.79) measures.
Results

There was a main effect of presentation format ($F_{1, 222} = 235.97, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .515$), qualified by an interaction between presentation format and self-referencing ($F_{1, 222} = 33.55, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .131$). Tests of simple effects on the adjusted means indicated that, in both the story and the analytical presentation format condition, the difference in informational justice perception was significant for self-referencing (see Table 1).

Discussion

Results from two experiments provide support for the proposed effect of presentation format. Further, the findings lend support for narrative transportation as an underlying mechanism for the effect. In addition, the findings from Study 2 suggest that decisions to intervene are more likely to be perceived as just when they are based on a story and encourage a self-referencing strategy. In summary, we extend research on the dilemma between one user’s right to freely construct an online identity and another user’s right to protection from cyber harassment by assessing decisions to intervene across identity violations, examining the role of presentation format, and examining self-referencing strategy as an explanatory factor. We suggest extending this research by studying prior real-life situations where social network sites have intervened.

REFERENCES


Retail Shopper Confusion: An Explanation of Avoidance Behavior at the Point-of-Sale
Marion Garaus, University of Vienna, Austria
Udo Wagner, University of Vienna, Austria

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Most store environmental literature focuses on how to generate positive consumer responses by manipulating in-store elements, rather than considering the potentially negative impact of the store environment on consumer behaviors. Yet shoppers may perceive an overly arousing store environment negatively (Kaltcheva and Weitz 2006). Machleit and Eroglu (2000) claim that two-dimensional measures of negative effects (i.e., positive vs. negative) fail to capture the broad spectrum of feasible emotions evoked by a store environment. In response to their call to investigate specific emotions to predict consumers’ in-store responses, we introduce and empirically investigate a new construct, retail shopper confusion (RSC), defined as a negative feeling that makes it difficult for consumers to select and interpret store environmental stimuli. It might be a facet of the general confusion construct that can arise in shopping situations (Walsh and Mitchell 2010), when product similarity, overload, and ambiguity drive confusion (Walsh, Hennig-Thurau, and Mitchell 2007). Even beyond products, the store environment (e.g., signage, Bitner 1992; visual merchandising, Mitchell and Papavassiliou 1997) can trigger similar confusion. Thus far, only social factors have been considered as drivers of store environmental confusion (Schweizer, Kotouc, and Wagner 2006). The influences of design and ambient factors on shopper confusion have not been investigated. To address this research gap, we examine antecedents and consequences of RSC and develop a measurement instrument for assessing RSC.

The RSC model is based on the environmental psychological model (Mehrabian and Russell 1974): The store environment evokes RSC, which leads to avoidance behavior. To identify RSC antecedents, we classify the store environment into ambient, design, and social factors (Baker 1987) but exclude social factors, because RSC is caused by the store environment. It is not the mere existence of these factors but their specific properties—variety, novelty, complexity, and conflict (Berlyne 1960)—that evoke confusion. In line with Bitner (1992), we assume that confused shoppers experience high arousal but low dominance and feel unpleasant. Because RSC evokes negative perceptions, shoppers react with avoidance: low search, patronage, and repeat shopping, little time spent, and few unplanned expenditures (Donovan and Rossiter 1982).

A three-study design tests the conceptual RSC model. Study 1 is explorative, using expert interviews and descriptive techniques to identify RSC causes. Variety, novelty, complexity, and conflict between ambient (acoustic stimuli, lighting, scent, temperature) and design (e.g., aisles, architecture, colors, materials, technology, visual merchandising) factors all trigger RSC. By way of illustration, many different light sources (variety), new or unexpected light (novelty), a complex lighting system (complexity) or inappropriate lighting (conflict) cause RSC. Complexity and conflict create more pronounced confusion potential, unlike product-related consumer confusion, for which variety and novelty are the dominant drivers. A preliminary explanation for this result is the far more frequent variations for product packages than for store designs (see Table 1).

Study 2 follows the suggestions of Walsh et al. (2007) to develop a scale assessing RSC through accompanying feelings. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses reveal a three-factor solution, consisting of helplessness, inefficiency, and irritation. A Chi Square difference test with the one-factor model provides further empirical support for our model. We find strong evidence of convergent validity contrasting the RSC scale against the pleasure-arousal-dominance scale (Mehrabian and Russell 1974). Two independent samples further validate the RSC scale (see Table 1).

The third study investigates five consequences of RSC with a causal research design. Respondents, randomly assigned to experimental groups, confirm all but one of the hypothesized RSC consequences: Confused shoppers do not strive for information or explore the store in depth; seek to escape from the confusing environment, which reduces their patronage intentions and time spent in the store; and try to avoid confusion in the future, resulting in lower repeat shopping intentions. However, they do not spend less money spontaneously than non-confused shoppers, which may be a factor of the analyzed product category: Grocery shopping typically is characterized by relatively urgent demand, so even confused customers might buy substitutes of necessary items (see Tables 1-3).

Table 1: Results of Study 1: Causes of RSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design Factors</th>
<th>Variety</th>
<th>Novelty</th>
<th>Complexity</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
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<tr>
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<td>SD</td>
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<td>SD</td>
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<td>3.09</td>
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<td>2.22</td>
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<td>Ambient Factors</td>
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</table>

Note: shaded cells highlight means greater than 3.50

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The store environment contributes to confusion evoked in shopping situations. Therefore, researchers and marketers must address not only product-related confusion causes but also environmental confusion drivers. Study 1 demonstrates that specific ambient and design factors trigger RSC; complexity and conflict are the main causes of environmental confusion. The development of a reliable, valid RSC scale enables assessments of confusion in empirical studies and periodic inspections of a store’s confusion potential. The many undesirable RSC consequences highlight the importance of avoiding confusing store designs. Some limitations should be addressed in further studies, such as supplementing the study 3 results with field experiments or considering other (e.g., more hedonic) product categories.

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Virtuous behaviors are behaviors that people believe they ought to do, but might find them difficult (Ein-Gar, Goldenberg, & Sagiv, 2013; Read, Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman, 1999). Understanding the effectiveness of requests to commit to virtuous behaviors is important theoretically and practically.

Past research suggests that activation of distant future mindset should encourage individuals to be more self-controlled, goal-driven in their behavior (e.g. Dhar & Kim, 2007; Fujita et al., 2006). Furthermore research on choice between “should” and “want” shows that when the execution of the choice is in the distant future, people make more “should” (i.e., virtuous) choices than when execution of the choice is in the near future (Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2010; Rogers & Bazerman, 2008).

This research suggests that contrary to past findings, consumers may be less likely to commit to a distant- (as opposed to a near-) virtuous behavior.

Temporal-construal-theory has laid the notion that distant future is construed more abstract while the near future is construed more concrete (Liberman, Sagristano & Trope 2002; Trope & Liberman, 2003). In line with this notion, in the distant future, one’s schedule is construed abstractly, while in the near future, one’s schedule is construed more concrete.

Research on information processing suggests that abstract information makes people more optimistic regarding the outcome of their actions (Chan, Sengupta & Mukhopadhyay 2013). Thus, when individuals’ schedule is abstract, they might optimistically believe they will find spare time for a given action, and hence be more likely to commit to it. Conversely, research has shown that concrete information provides more confidence in prediction (Camerer & Weber, 1992). Thus, when individuals’ schedules are concrete, they may be more certain of finding the necessary time to carry out the action, and hence might be more likely to commit.

This paper offers to reconcile these seemingly contradicting hypotheses by suggesting that commitment preference is dependent on one’s level of self-control.

It is argued that low self-control consumers prefer committing to the distant future, not only because they are more likely to procrastinate, but also because in the future time is vague and this vagueness makes them feel more confident they will find the time to complete their commitment. High self-control consumers prefer committing to the near future hand, not only because they want to “check things off their list” but also because the near future is concrete and this gives them a sense of certainty that they will be able to identify the necessary spare time.

Study 1: Demonstrated the effect for commitment to pro-environmental behavior. Student participants (n=60, M age=24) completed a self-control scale (DSC; α =.85; Ein-Gar et al., 2013; Ein-Gar & Steinhart, 2011), a filler task and then read about consumption of green products. Next, participants reported their willingness to hand out flyers encouraging consumption of green products, either the next semester (near-condition) or the next summer vacation (distant-condition). As expected low self-control participants were more willing to hand out flyers in the distant-future while high self-control participants showed greater preference in the near future (F(1,57)=10.11, p<.02).

Study 2: Tested the effect for pro-social behavior, when self-control is manipulated rather than measured. Adult participants (n=122, M age=28) were asked to recall an event in which they had overcome temptations, (high self-control condition) or had yielded to their temptations (low self-control condition). Next, participants read about a pro-bono project in which volunteers spend time with under-privileged children. The project was expected to take place either next month (near-condition) or in 6 months (distant-condition). Participants were asked to indicate the number of hours they would be willing to volunteer. Low self-control participants volunteered more hours in the distant-future. High self-control participants volunteered more hours in the near-future (F(1,119)=14.08, p<.01).

Study 3: Unravels the underlying effect of time availability certainty while testing commitment to a behavior with a personal benefit. Adult participants (n=386, Mage=32) completed the DSC scale (α = .90) and were then offered to join a 10-session coaching program for attaining a financially goal either in two weeks (near condition) or four months (distant condition). Participants were asked to indicate their intention to commit to a 10-meeting program and to indicate how certain there are they would find the necessary time to uphold their commitment. Low-self-control participants were more willing to commit in the near-condition while high-self-control participants reported greater commitment intentions in the distant-condition (F(1,132)=9.95, p < .01). Moderated mediation analyses showed that commitment was positively mediated by time availability certainty for low self-control participants (95% CI: 0.014 to 0.419) and was negatively mediated for high self-control participants (95% CI: -0.488 to -0.02).

REFERENCES


As such, the results of experiment 2 confirm our predictions that anxiety represents a discomfort in social interaction, thus motivating state (Henderson, Zimbardo, & Carducci 2010). Similarly, social avoidance of social situations (Pilkonis, 1977), is a universal emotional need to cool off in social situations as well. Shyness, or the tendency of overheating and the importance of cooling (Sutton, 1909; Caruso & Leonardelli, 2008) demonstrates that social exclusion leads to preferences for a temperature-regulating physical object, whereas consuming a cold or warm product induces a physical temperature change that leads to a preference for a self-regulating social consumption experience.

Four experiments examine the relationship between physical temperature, social warmth, and consumption experiences. Specifically, we demonstrate that certain consumptive behaviors (consumptive experiences and products whose attributes are interpersonal in nature) serve as a self-regulatory mechanism. Further, we show that this relationship is bi-directional in nature, in that experiencing a socially consumptive behavior leads to preferences for a temperature-regulating physical object, whereas consuming a cold or warm product induces a physical temperature change that leads to a preference for a self-regulating social consumption experience.

The results of experiment 1 suggest that social consumption setting affect perceptions of ambient temperature. Specifically, eating a meal alone (a low social consumption setting) led individuals to underestimate the actual ambient temperature of the room, while eating a meal with another individual (a high social consumption setting) led individuals to overestimate the actual ambient temperature in the room.

The results of experiment 2 provide two important findings. First, it demonstrate that a social product serve as a substitute for social interactions. Secondly, although previous research (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008) demonstrates that social exclusion leads individuals to prefer hot drinks, ostensibly in attempt to warm oneself, this research is the first to demonstrate that those who interact socially prefer cold drinks, seemingly in order to cool themselves down. Physiological research has long known the threats of overheating and the importance of cooling (Sutton, 1909; Caruso et al., 1992) and there is reason to believe that individuals feel the need to cool off in social situations as well. Shyness, or the tendency to avoid social situations (Pilkonis, 1977), is a universal emotional state (Henderson, Zimbardo, & Carducci 2010). Similarly, social anxiety represents a discomfort in social interaction, thus motivating individuals to “cool off” when situations becomes uncomfortable. As such, the results of experiment 2 confirm our predictions that individuals interacting with a social alarm clock desired a cold drink, whereas those that did not interact with the social product preferred the hot drink.

The results of experiment 3 provide convergent evidence that social products serve as a proxy for social interactions and that the relationship between social interactions and temperature is bi-directional. Furthermore the results of experiment 3 support the idea that those individuals who feel warm become less interested in social interactions, whereas those who feel cold are more likely to seek such interactions. The results of experiment 4 provide additional evidence that individuals self-regulate their temperature to combat both warm and cold situations through consumption behaviors. Specifically, the results demonstrate that individuals who feel cold desire consumption that included others, whereas those who were warm desired lone consumption.

Past marketing studies related to temperature primarily focus on retailers’ “servicescape”, specifically on how temperature affects ambient experiences (Hoffman and Turley 2002). For example, consumers perceive temperature in on-the-ground department stores as more stable than underground department stores (Chun and Tamura 1998). While these studies reveal the important role of temperature in consumer experiences, researchers lack the understanding of how temperature relates to social consumption contexts (i.e., consuming alone vs. consuming with others) or with social products (e.g., interactive features such as Siri in iPhones).

Our contribution is summarized by three statements. First, physiological experiences affect social consumption behavior as much as social consumption affects physiological reactions, confirming the bi-directional relationship of the socio-physio link. Second, instead of warmth promoting interpersonal affection and coldness promoting isolation, we find that people seek to achieve balance (e.g., desiring interactive products when cold and isolation when hot). This suggests that when one feels cold, people have increased social affiliative motives; when one feels hot, people seek relatively more social isolation. Third, and most importantly, we extend this framework into consumption scenarios and development of social products, providing managerial implications for marketers.

The findings benefit marketers in multiple ways. First, it is important for marketers to control environmental settings (e.g., room temperature) to initiate relational behavior. For example, it is often considered that live speed dating sites should operate in “warm and cozy rooms” to increase interpersonal affection for potential candidates. In contrast, we suggest that colder rooms may encourage individuals to desire social remedies, such as developing interpersonal relations, in order to self-regulate their physical coldness. This research is also relevant to marketers seeking to develop social products. For instance, an arcade (which may have many interactive games) may benefit from keeping their gaming area cooler to assist consumers in balancing their bodily system or retail stores trying to sell social products (i.e., interactive toys) may encourage individuals to seek out social products by keeping their stores cooler. On the other hand, retail stores trying to sell more non-social products (e.g. a bookstore) may benefit from keeping their area warmer.
REFERENCES


The Effect of Money Priming on Consumers’ Choice
EunKyoung Lee, Hanyang University, Republic of Korea
Hee-Kyung Ahn, Hanyang University, Republic of Korea
Myungwoo Nam, Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Previous research has revealed the significance of money cues on people’s behaviors and thoughts in diverse domains: People primed with money, compared with the control participants, persisted longer before requesting others’ help, reduced their time or money for others, and preferred to work or play alone (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). Reminders of money also alleviate people’s social distress and physical pain (Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009). One recent investigation highlighted that reminders of money also influence how people would respond to social influence attempts (Liu, Smeesters, & Vohs, 2012). Liu et al. (2012) demonstrated that people subtly primed with money did not conform to recommendations because they perceived social influence as a threat to their autonomy. Building on this investigation in the psychology of money, we propose that the effect of money priming on persuasion can be moderated by the degree of freedom in one’s choice. Those who are reminded of money are likely to react to the social influence and behave in opposition to the agent’s intent. We predict that suggesting an opinion with some degree of decisional freedom, such as a recommendation for a subcategory or a group, would mitigate the effect of money priming. Because recommending a subcategory of a category provides a certain amount of freedom in decision-making, it would not necessarily lead people to feel social influence as a threat. Hence, people who receive a subcategory recommendation are more likely to conform or comply with the opinion, even if they are money-primed.

We conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants were told that they would be involved in two unrelated studies. The first task was introduced as a survey. Through this procedure, we primed the concept of money or non-money (control group) by employing two different questionnaires: In the money priming condition, participants were told to estimate the appropriate amount of money in each hypothetical situation, and in the non-money-priming condition, participants were told to decide how much time they would spend with others such as loved ones and family.

Participants then carry out the second task, reading about a situation in which they imagined that they had to decide which coffee beans to purchase. We manipulated each subcategory to include two products. There were two subcategories (i.e. a coffee bean’s geographical region; 1) Africa and 2) Central America) and four products (i.e. a fictitious product; 1) Semplice, 2) Appassionato, 3) Grazioso, and 4) Vivace). ‘Semplice’ and ‘Appassionato’ belonged to the subcategory of ‘Africa,’ and ‘Grazioso’ and ‘Vivace’ were in the ‘Central America’ subcategory.

Participants then received either a recommendation for a subcategory (i.e. Central America) or a recommendation for a product (i.e. Grazioso) from a seemingly influential source of knowledge and experience (i.e., a power blogger). The degree of freedom in one’s choice was manipulated via different types of recommendations for purchase; the subcategory recommendation was employed as a manipulation of high-level of freedom because people could still choose what they liked even after being given a recommendation. However, the product recommendation was deemed as a social influence with a low-level of freedom because the recommendation explicitly told people what they should select. Finally, we measured which option money-primed and non-money-primed participants chose.

Eighty-seven undergraduates and MBA students (44 males, 43 females) participated in Experiment 1 in exchange for course credits. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (prime: money vs. non-money) x 2 (recommendation: subcategory vs. product) between-subjects design. The results of experiment 1 replicated previous findings that reminders of money in combination with product recommendation (i.e., low-level of choice freedom) would elicit reactance in participants’ choice. However, when the recommendation was a subcategory, participants were more likely to follow the expert’s recommendation even when participants were primed with money. Participants who were not primed with money followed the expert’s recommendation regardless of the type of recommendation.

In experiment 2, we tested whether this phenomenon would exist even with only one product in each subcategory. That is, when choosing a subcategory and choosing a product results in no difference, would consumers still feel reactance from a product recommendation and choose the option not recommended? We named this phenomenon an illusory category effect because there was no substantial difference between choosing a subcategory and choosing a product.

Eighty-six undergraduates participated in experiment 2. Participants were randomly assigned to the same conditions of a 2 (prime: money vs. non-money) x 2 (recommendation: subcategory vs. product) between-subjects design as in experiment 1. The procedure employed in experiment 2 was similar to that of experiment 1, but in this experiment we employed the wine category. We employed two subcategories (i.e. wine’s place of origin; 1) Bourgogne in France and 2) Piemonte in Italy) and two products (i.e. wine label; 1) Joseph Drouhin Gevrey Chambertin and 2) Pio Cesare Barolo). As explained above, each subcategory had only one product; Joseph Drouhin Gevrey Chambertin in a category of Bourgogne, France and Pio Cesare Barolo in a category of Piemonte, Italy. Participants then received either a subcategory recommendation (i.e. Piemonte in Italy) or a product recommendation (i.e. Pio cesare Barolo) from an agent (i.e. a manager of the liquor store).

As predicted, the agent’s recommendation for a specific product along with the money prime exerted a backfiring effect on participants’ final choice and purchase likelihood: When activated by the money cues, an agent’s influence attempt decreased the likelihood of choosing the recommended option. Specifically, participants who received a product recommendation tended to choose the option that was not recommended, whereas those who were provided with a subcategory recommendation were not affected by the agent’s recommendation. When participants were not primed with money, participants in the subcategory recommendation and the product recommendation condition showed no difference in terms of choice proportion of the recommended option.

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumer choices are typically presented in a sequence, and the presentation order has been observed to have an effect on choice where items first (primacy effect) and last (recency effect) in the sequence are preferred (e.g., Li and Epley 2009; Mantonakis et al. 2009; Sulmont-Rosse et al. 2008). However, the procedures used in these experiments may not accurately reflect what occurs in an actual retail environment. Sales associates may disrupt a consumer’s evaluation process by asking them to evaluate an option between samples (i.e., step-by-step procedure) or ask the consumer to compare a current sample to a previously sampled item (i.e., pairwise-comparison procedure). Results from two studies show that these common sequence presentation procedures may impact the possibility of order effects, with high and low product knowledge acting as boundary conditions for this effect.

Theory Development

It is believed that high and low product category knowledge consumers will have different preferred strategies (i.e., consumer scripts) for evaluating and making decisions from a sequence of options within a respective product category. Low product category knowledge consumers are suspected to engage in more simple decision strategies (Simon 1955), such as creating a global evaluation for each item before making a choice (i.e., step-by-step procedure). Conversely, consumers with high product category knowledge are believed to be more likely compare between samples, choosing a favourite and comparing each proceeding sample to that favourite (i.e., pairwise-comparison procedure; Mantonakis et al. 2009).

As described by script theory (Schank and Abelson 1977), engaging in behaviour that is congruent with a consumer script puts the individual on autopilot, not requiring much elaboration to make sense of the situation (Hsu and Chiang 2011; Shoemaker 1996). When sampling a sequence of items with low elaboration it is predicted that a consumer will revert back to a heuristic style of decision-making (e.g. “first-is-best” Sulmont-Rosse et al. 2008; or “saving-the-best-for-last” Li and Epley 2009) that could result in order effects. However, when these scripts become disrupted (i.e., not allowing participants to follow their natural consumer script), it will require more elaboration and effort on the part of the consumer to try to make sense of the situation (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). This increased elaboration devoted to understanding the situation is believed to reduce reliance on decisions heuristics and the order effects that would result.

From this, order effects are suspected to exist for low (but not high) product category knowledge consumers during a step-by-step evaluation procedure because this is how they naturally make decisions and it does not disrupt their consumer script. Conversely, order effects are suspected to exist for high (but not low) product category knowledge consumers during a pairwise-comparison procedure because this is how they naturally make decisions and it does not disrupt their consumer script.

Overview of Studies

To test this, participants tasted 5 samples of wine and were either asked to rate each wine on a ten-point scale between tastings (Study 1: step-by-step procedure), or asked to compare each new sample to a previously picked favourite (Study 2: pairwise-comparison procedure). The experimental focal point was the final wine choice after testing each sample.

Chi-square tests were used to verify that the observed end-of-sequence choice for each sequence length was reliably different from uniform probability. Since each sample was the same wine from the same bottle, each sample should rationally have an equal probability of being chosen as the favourite.

In analyzing the results of the step-by-step procedure, chi-square results were only found to be significantly different from uniform probability for low (but not high) wine knowledge participants ($\chi^2(4, N=29) = 21.17, p_{rep}=.87$). As wine knowledge increased, samples first and last in the sequence had a decreased likelihood of being chosen ($\beta = -.48, p < .05$). Conversely, in analyzing the results of the pairwise-comparison procedure, chi-square results were only found to be significantly different from uniform probability for high (but not low) wine knowledge consumers ($\chi^2(1, N=20) = 9.5, p_{rep}=.87$).
This time, as wine knowledge increased the samples first and last in the sequence had a greater probability of being chosen ($\beta = .58, p < .05$; see figure 1 and table 1).

**Conclusion**

High and low product category knowledge consumers are believed to evaluate and choose an item from a sequence differently. Where low knowledge consumers naturally engage in a step-by-step procedure, and high knowledge consumers naturally follow a pairwise-comparison procedure. Results show when the presentation of the sequence is congruent to how they would naturally evaluate and make a choice, then the situation will require little elaboration and order effects will result. However, when the presentation of the sequence disrupts how they would naturally evaluate and make a choice, the situation requires more elaboration and the probability of order effects dissipate.

**REFERENCES**


Cobrand-harm Crises and Consumers Attributions of Responsibility
Casey E. Newmeyer, Case Western Reserve University, USA
Julie A. Ruth, Rutgers University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Although product-harm crises are addressed in solo-brand contexts (e.g., Lei, Dawar, & Gürhan-Canli 2012) and cobranding research is growing, consumer response to negative cobrand events is not well understood. To address this gap, we focus on how consumers assign responsibility for retail cobrand performance (e.g., Chili’s Baby Back Ribs with Shiner Bock Beer BBQ Sauce, Cuisinart products made for Williams-Sonoma) in both a neutral and negative product-harm context.

Attribution theory explains how individuals assign credit or blame for observed performance (Folkes 1988). In retail cobrands, customers may identify as the source of good or bad performance the product brand, retailer, both brands jointly, or neither brand due to some extraneous factor. We propose that consumers’ perception of cobrand integration affects attributions of responsibility for product performance. Cobrand integration is how tightly the partnering brands are fused together in form, function, and service delivery. In low integration, consumers will perceive each brand’s contribution to the offering as relatively distinct (e.g., Disney toys in a McDonald’s Happy Meal). In high integration, each partner’s contribution to the offering is intertwined (e.g., Dairy Queen Oreo Blizzard). In high integration, we expect that joint responsibility will increase because the offering’s utility is dependent on both brands. For low-integration offerings, consumers are expected to attribute performance responsibility largely to the product brand. As joint responsibility increases, consumer perceptions of the product brand’s responsibility are expected to decrease and retailer responsibility to remain unchanged due to different roles played by retailers versus product brands (e.g., retailers gather an assortment of product brands).

Brand strength can affect responses to cobrands (e.g., Simonin & Ruth 1998). Based on research on attribution, branding, and retailing, we hypothesize that a strong versus weak product (retailer) brand will increase product (retailer) brand responsibility and that as product brand strength increases, consumers’ attributions of joint responsibility will decrease. In contrast, an increase in retailer brand strength will not affect consumers’ attributions of joint responsibility or product brand responsibility.

In neutral contexts (e.g., cobrand announcements), a pilot study which used real brands in a coffee shop and bookstore scenario showed that consumers are sensitive to cobrand integration: as expected, as cobrand integration increased, joint responsibility increased, product brand responsibility decreased, and retailer responsibility was unchanged.

Extending the theorizing and pilot study findings into a negative cobrand-harm event, we expect that the relationship of cobrand integration to joint, product brand, and retailer responsibility attributions will hold. Product brand strength and retail brand strength are expected to affect the same responsibility attributions but will reverse signs because of the shift to blame assessments (e.g., strength insulates brands from harm; Gürhan-Canli & Maheswaran 1998). We also examine subtyping judgments, or the extent to which a negative event is considered an exception because it is inconsistent with the brand’s existing schema. In solo-brand product-harm contexts, subtyping occurs more often for strong brands, because consumers have high expectations of the brands’ performance and quality (Lei et al. 2012). Because brand strength contains a signal about quality and, by implication, likelihood of a negative event, a cobrand-harm event will be perceived as more of an exception to the schema of a strong versus weak brand. These effects are expected to be more (less) evident in high (low) integration because a high-integration (low-integration) cobrand will be less (more) similar than the brand’s parent product and its original schema. In sum, consumers may consider a brand at fault for the cobrand-harm event, but not incorporate that information into brand beliefs because it is considered outside of the brand’s typical behavior.

We designed two experiments to test the effects of integration and brand strength in a cobrand-harm context. The first experiment manipulated integration and product brand strength and the second manipulated retailer brand strength and integration. Participants read information about a new cobrand involving a Greek yogurt brand and a restaurant retailer and were told that after eating the yogurt some customers became ill. The results showed that higher integration increased joint blame attributions but did not reduce consumers’ attribution of blame to the product brand, suggesting that integration is not protective for a product brand when a cobrand-harm event occurs. Further, as expected, consumers perceived the negative event as more of an exception for a strong product brand, especially in high integration.

In the second experiment, when retail brand strength information was available and a cobrand-harm event occurred, a stronger (weaker) retail brand lowered (increased) joint blame. Further, as expected consumers tapped into retail brand strength to make subtyping judgments, especially in high integration.

Our research extends previous research by considering multiple players in product-harm crises. While cobrand integration affects responsibility judgments, consumers rely on a strong versus weak brand to determine whether the event is an exception for both brands, the product brand, and the retailer. Our results indicate that consumers are more likely to “excuse” the brand for a crisis when the brand is strong and in a high-integration partnership. In high integration, both partners share rewards that come with good performance and risks associated with bad performance. Moreover, for high-integration cobrands, consumers are less likely to single out product brands for credit for good performance or shield them from blame for bad performance.

REFERENCES
The More Interest in the Product, the Merrier?
Yael Steinhart, Tel-Aviv University, Israel
Michael A. Kamins, Stony Brook University, USA
David Mazursky, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and Bocconi University, Israel
Avraham Noy, University of Haifa, Israel

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Studies have documented consumers’ everyday purchase-behavior as being influenced by the interest of others. Directionally mixed findings exist on the effect of others on one’s purchase behavior. On the one hand, ample evidence suggests the interest of others has a positive influence on product evaluations. Conversely, under certain conditions, research has shown the interest of others diminishes product sales, consistent with what Hellofs and Jacobson (1999) have termed a “loss of exclusivity.” Here consumers reportedly feel worse about the product and possibly about themselves through loss of image when the brand they are using expands to the interest of the general populace.

The current research aims to shed light on these seemingly conflicting effects of others on product interest, by considering whether the product is categorized as functional (i.e., when its evaluation is based on performance) or self-expressive (i.e., when its evaluation is based on the extent to which it reflects one’s personal tastes). Specifically, we suggest the interest of others increases attitudinal positive responses for functional products but negatively affects these same variables for self-expressive products, while decision regret is reduced for the former products and increased for the latter. Regret represents the unfavorable but important consequences of decisions, and studies have found it has a significant impact on consumer behavior. We hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1: Evaluation of a functional product increases and regret decreases under the condition of many versus few interested others.

Hypothesis 2: Evaluation of a self-expressive product decreases and regret increases under the condition of many versus few interested others.

Additionally, we examine a possible underlying process, via perceived product-quality, which is derived from both the interest of others and product type. The effect of others on product quality evaluations and purchase intention has strong foundations in past research.

Finally, we offer boundary conditions for the proposed effect of others. We postulate that the effect should be attenuated when the brand is known by its quality reputation (e.g., Rolex) or when a clear explicit indication about product quality is available (e.g., via Consumer Reports), or in the case of interested others with favorable characteristics. We hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3: In the presence of an additional trusted external quality signal, product-type will not moderate the effect of others.

Hypothesis 4: The interest of many others will increase rather than decrease evaluations of a self-expressive product when these others are desirable by nature.

Five studies were carried out to confirm our expectations. The first study explored in the context of online auctions the impact of product type and the interest of others on actual purchases. Its findings confirm the dual effect of others on actual purchases. Specifically, when we offered a self-expressive (functional) keychain, participants were willing to bid higher (lower) when few rather than many-others had already purchased the product.

The second study further shows that perceived-quality evaluation mediated the interactive effect of others and product-type on purchase-intention. Thus, when one is purchasing a functional (self-expressive) product, the interest of many-others increases (decreases) perceived quality evaluation and consequently the bid placed.

The third study replicates and extends the prior studies, with two major differences: (a) we included a condition in which product quality is explicitly presented through Consumer Reports’ ratings, and (b) we conducted the study outside the context of online auctions. The findings of the third study when Consumer Reports information was absent, replicated the results of studies 1 and 2. However, the effect of others was attenuated in the presence of Consumer Reports recommendations. In the latter case, buyers relied more strongly on the recommendations than on the number of others as a quality signal, and therefore ratings did not differ as a function of the number of others for either product.

The fourth study highlights another possible boundary condition for the effect of others, based on the degree of brand prestige. We assume prestige brands, such as Gucci, are known by their quality. Therefore, the presence of a prestige brand name is likely to play a similar role as the presence of an explicit quality signal. This study focuses only on self-expressive products, wristwatches, which by their nature are visible to others and make a statement about one’s tastes and characteristics. The findings of the fourth study show that consumers trust the brand name as a reliable indicator of product quality and do not need to search elsewhere for quality confirmation information.

In study 5, we demonstrate that the interest of many others in a product may be attenuated as a function of the social characteristics of these otheridders. Essentially we show that the unfavorable effect of interested others on a self-expressive product can be reversed when those interested in the product have positively perceived characteristics. Specifically, when the bidder views the interested others favorably, the interest of these desirable others may increase rather than decrease the subjective product value.

The differential effect of others has significant managerial implications. For example, a functional product, which is not yet popular, such as a new, recently launched product, should be positioned in self-expressive terms, if possible, to increase its appeal. Alternatively, when the same product becomes popular and many others express interest in it, describing it in functional terms would be better; thus the number of interested others would strengthen its perceived quality.

REFERENCES

Prominence versus Dominance: How Relationships between Alternatives Drive Decision Strategy and Choice

Ioannis Evangelidis, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Jonathan Levav, Stanford University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Firms develop product lines in order to meet the needs of consumers with different tastes. Products are then marketed along whatever specific attribute that firms—and their consumers—view as the determinant of quality; consumers are presumed to choose the product based on this dimension. In this research we argue that the firm’s product line can influence the extent to which consumers weight this prominent product attribute because it creates a decision context that can influence choice by triggering different decision strategies. In particular, we discuss one characteristic of the decision context that exerts a strong influence on choice: The presence or absence of dominance relationships between any of the options in the choice set.

We focus on decisions between two target alternatives that present a trade-off between two attributes, one of which is more prominent than the other. Normatively consumers should assign greater weight to the more prominent attribute relative to its less prominent counterpart. This implies that they should be more likely to choose the alternative that rates higher on the most prominent attribute than the alternative that scores higher on the least important attribute, ceteris paribus. However, we hypothesize that when the two target options are dominated by and/or dominate other (“decoy”) options in the choice set, consumers are more likely to evaluate the options in the set based on dominance relationships rather than attribute prominence. Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) suggest that individuals solve a decision problem using a three-stage process. First, the decision-maker assesses the presence of dominance relationships in the choice set. Second, if no dominance relationships are found, the decision-maker assesses whether one of the options has a “decisive advantage” relative to the others. Finally, if there is no decisive advantage, the individual solves the problem through a lexicographic strategy, where the option scoring high on the prominent attribute is preferred. In essence, the decision-maker assesses attribute importance only as a last resort, after failing to identify dominance relationships or the presence of a decisive advantage.

Building on this model, we expect the decision-maker to first express a stronger preference for the dominating alternative and a weaker preference for the dominated alternative relative to all the other options when making judgments within a set including the former alongside the two target alternatives presenting the trade-off. Further, to make an assessment of preference regarding the two target alternatives still requires an assessment of attribute prominence. However, we argue that the decision-maker’s initial strategy of using the dominance cue in this problem may persist even when he constructs his preference for these two options. We draw our prediction from research on various fields indicating that people remain overly faithful to an initially-adopted strategy even when the problem context changes and a different strategy would be more sensible or appropriate (e.g. Levav, Reinholz, and Lin, 2012; Luchins, 1942).

We conducted six experiments. In Study 1 we randomly assigned consumers to either a two-option set where they face a decision between two options that present a trade-off in two attributes one of which is more prominent than the other, or to a four-option set where a symmetrically dominating and a symmetrically dominated decoy are inserted. We found that relative preference for the option scoring high on the prominent attribute is higher in the two-option condition than in the four-option condition. In Study 2 we addressed the alternate explanation that after identifying the best option (dominating decoy) in the four option set, participants simply become indifferent between the two focal options. We addressed this possibility by including an additional condition in which the dominating decoy is an unavailable, phantom option. We replicated our effect; relative preference for the option scoring high on the prominent attribute dropped significantly even when the dominating decoy was not available for choice. Study 3 provided further evidence against this account by using only a dominated decoy. In Study 4 we demonstrated that our effect is robust across both compensatory (i.e., scale) and non-compensatory (i.e., rank order) response modes. We randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions in a 2 (number of options: two vs. four) by 2 (response mode: scale vs. rank) between-participants design, and observed a significant effect of number of options across both modes. Our data showed that, regardless of the elicitation mode, relative preference for the option scoring high on the prominent attribute decreased as a result of adding dominance cues. In Study 5 we provided evidence supporting the proposed mechanism; we moderated our effect by manipulating the salience of a prominence strategy. Specifically, we asked half of our sample to respond to an attribute importance measure prior to preference expression, and showed that these respondents were more likely to prefer the option scoring high on the prominent attribute over the option scoring high on the non-prominent attribute in the presence of dominating and dominated decoy options compared to participants who answered the attribute importance question after declaring their preference. We found that the responses to the attribute importance question are similar across all conditions, suggesting that prominence judgments do not change as the result of the dominance relationships. Rather, it appears that the use of attribute prominence as an input to preferences varies depending upon the choice set. Finally, in Study 6 participants made two successive choices. We manipulated whether the initial choice primes consideration of attribute prominence by having respondents either choose from a two-option set followed by a choice from a four-option set in a similar domain or choose from a four-option set followed by another four-option set in a similar domain. We found that people who chose between two options in the first decision were more likely to use a prominence strategy in the second decision relative to their counterparts who chose between four options in both decisions. Our findings represent a violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom because if one option is preferred over another, then the same should hold regardless of the presence of any additional options.

REFERENCES

How Time Flies When You’re Looking Forwards: Effects of Forward Progress Monitoring on Time Perception

Yanli Jia, Chinese University of Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Chinese University of Hong Kong, China
Jianmin Jia, Chinese University of Hong Kong, China

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Time perception is an integral part of daily life experience. However, people often have difficulty in estimating how long an experience lasts (Sackett, Meyvis, Nelson, Converse & Sackett, 2010). Numerous factors can influence duration estimates (Ornstein, 1969; Vroon, 1970; Ahn, Liu & Soman, 2009). In the present research, we investigated whether individuals’ estimates of a task’s duration depend on whether they monitor their progress retrospectively (in terms of the amount of work they have completed) or prospectively (in terms of the amount remaining).

Across four studies, we found that when people are asked to estimate the duration of a task shortly before completing it or immediately afterwards, they make shorter estimates when they have monitored their progress prospectively than when they have monitored it retrospectively. When they estimate the task’s duration shortly after beginning it, however, they make longer estimates of its duration in the former case. We attempt to explain why this is the case.

In the first experiment, participants performed a figure recognition task similar to that employed by Kim and Markus (1999). However, participants were interrupted after two minutes under the pretext that the time for the experiment was running short. Participants then completed a questionnaire, the first item of which asked them either to report the number of questions they had completed before being interrupted (thereby inducing a retrospective focus) or the number of questions they had not yet completed (inducing a forward focus). Finally, participants estimated (a) how long they felt it took to complete the test (in minutes), (b) how difficult they found the test to be, and (c) how favorably they felt about the test. Responses to the last two items were made along a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

As expected, participants estimated that the task had lasted a shorter time when they had thought about the number of items they still had to complete than when they had thought of the number they had already completed. Furthermore, participants’ focus on completed or uncompleted items had no effect on participants’ perceptions of task difficulty or the favorableness of their reactions to it.

In the second experiment, participants performed the same figure recognition task employed previously. In this case, however, participants’ disposition to focus on the number of items completed or the number to be done as manipulated by providing a “progress bar”, shown at the bottom of the page following each set of 6 items. In retrospective focus conditions, the bar indicated the proportion of items they had already completed, while in the forward-looking focus condition, the bar indicated the proportion they still had to do. After completing the test, they responded to the three questions used in Experiment 1. Nevertheless, the results of the two experiments were very similar.

In the first two experiments, participants estimated the duration of the task either after the task was completed (in Experiment 2) or very near to the end (in Experiment 1). According to our conceptualization, however, different results should occur when people estimate the task’s duration shortly after beginning it.

Experiment 3 therefore employed a 2 (progress monitoring: retrospective vs. forward-looking) × 2 (point of interruption: 1-min vs. 2-min) between-subject design. Participants performed the same figure recognition task employed in the first two studies, and their retrospective or forward focus was manipulated by providing a “progress bar” similar to that employed in Experiment 2. However, they were interrupted after either 1 minute or 2 minutes under the pretext that the time for the experiment was running short. Participants’ time estimates were then assessed. More importantly, they indicated which point they had primarily focused on when monitoring their progress along a scale from 1 (primarily the start point) to 7 (primarily the endpoint).

As expected, participants reported focusing to a greater extent on the end point in forward-focus conditions than in the retrospective-focus conditions. Interestingly, we found participants who were interrupted near the end of the task (i.e., 2-min interruption) perceived less time when they had a forward focus than they had a retrospective focus. In contrast, participants who were interrupted near the beginning of the task showed a reversed time estimates.

In the final experiment, we conducted a field survey recruiting respondents through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Respondents were told to imagine that they were attending an ascending auction that would last for 7 days. We manipulated both the point that participants entered the auction and their temporal focus. Specifically, some participants were told to imagine that the day of their participation was the first day of the auction whereas others were told that it was the final day. In each case, this information was framed either in a retrospective or a prospective manner.

After reviewing the information, respondents announced their own bid and then reported their feelings about the online auction, in which we measured how long the auction period seemed to them, how difficult they felt of winning the auction, as well as their estimates of the total number of bidders to the end of the auction.

Results found that participants perceived the auction to be subjectively shorter when the auction time was framed prospectively than when it was framed retrospectively, and this difference did not depend on whether participants entered the auction on the first day or the last day. In addition, participants made higher bids in forward-framing conditions than in retrospective-framing conditions, perceived that it was relatively less difficult to win the auction, and expected the number of bidders to be relatively smaller.

To sum up, we hypothesized in the present research that time duration could be subjectively undermined when a forward (vs. retrospective) focus is employed. We empirically validated the hypothesis in three lab experiments (Experiment 1-3), and a field survey under an online-auction scenario (Experiment 4). Furthermore, we found the proposed effect would only occur when people had already completed a task, or progressed to the end of the task. If they were very near to the beginning of the task, the effect would be reversed.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Many consumer decisions (e.g., apartment choice, airline ticket choice) may be structured as either a single-stage or a two-stage decision process (Beach 1993). That is, consumers either (i) directly choose an option (single-stage decision), or (ii) shortlist some options, and then choose from this shortlist (two-stage decision). This research demonstrates that two-stage decisions systematically increase preference for hedonic (vs. utilitarian) options.

A regulatory focus account explains this effect. Drawing on past work, we argue that screening helps to eliminate inferior alternatives that are below a minimum standard (Beach 1993, Ge, Haübl and Eldrod 2012), and thus partially addresses prevention goals. This, in turn, has an effect on the continued activation of prevention focus, such that prevention focus decreases post-screening. Prior work has found that advancing prevention objectives leads to deactivation of vigilance concerns in subsequent tasks (Förster et al. 2001, Van-Dijk and Kluger 2004). Consequently, this shift in regulatory focus can impact consumers’ preferences during the final choice. In general, a consumer’s operant regulatory focus has been shown to impact her relative focus on hedonic versus utilitarian attributes. Specifically, relatively lesser prevention focus has been shown to increase preference for options that are superior on hedonic characteristics (Chernev 2004). Therefore, we formally predict:

Hypothesis 1: In two-stage decisions (vs. single-stage decisions), consumers will have relatively lesser prevention focus during the final choice.

Hypothesis 2: In two-stage decisions (vs. single-stage decisions), consumers will (relatively) prefer hedonic (vs. utilitarian) options.

Hypothesis 3: Differences in hedonic choice share between single-stage and two-stage decisions will be mediated by differences in prevention focus during the final choice.

Multiple studies across different decision contexts and different shortlisting mechanisms illustrate the hypothesized effect on choice shares and support the proposed regulatory focus mechanism underlying this effect. In Study 1’s scenario, participants chose amongst four apartments, of which two pretested as hedonic and two pretested as utilitarian. Participants were significantly more likely to pick a hedonic apartment when asked to choose in a two-stage format (60.5%) than in a single-stage format (36.8%); binomial z = 2.13, p < .05. Choice share differences between these conditions were fully mediated by differences in prevention focus; a reduction in prevention focus in the second stage of the two-stage condition led to increased hedonic choice share during final choice. Other process measures from Study 1 (e.g. measures for degree of choice conflict) were inconsistent with competing explanations for this effect.

In Study 2, using the same apartment scenario, right before the final choice, participants were diverted into an unrelated task designed to measure regulatory focus: the RAT. This task was set up to involve a tradeoff between attempting more questions to earn more points versus attempting fewer questions in order to avoid penalties. Participants attempted significantly more questions in the two-stage decision condition (M = 6.59) than the single-stage decision condition (M = 5.38; t(75) = 2.00, p < .05), indicative of reduced prevention focus. This result is consistent with Study 1’s direct measures of regulatory focus along with past research on how regulatory focus impacts tradeoffs involving errors of omission and commission (Higgins 1997).

Studies 3, 4A, and 4B replicated Study 1’s results in (i) an airline ticket choice scenario, (ii) a tradeoff between granola bars and ice cream, and (iii) a tradeoff between fruit salad and cake. These studies demonstrate that the proposed effect holds in choice settings with various choice set sizes (e.g., Study 1 – 4 options, Study 3 – 54 options, Study 4A – 16 options, Study 4B – 4 options). Additionally, the effect even held when attribute information was not explicitly provided. These studies also provided process measures that were inconsistent with competing explanations, including ‘licensing’ (Monin and Miller 2001) and ‘balancing’ (Dhar and Simonson, 1999).

Study 5 examined a choice amongst mTurk tasks with a 2 (single-stage vs. two-stage) x 2 (control vs. prevention prime manipulation prior to final choice) between-subjects design. The control condition replicated Study 1’s results; choice share for the hedonic mTurk task was significantly higher in the two-stage condition (M = 50.79% vs. M = 33.33%, binomial z = 2.81, p < .05). However, under a prevention prime, choice share for the hedonic option was reduced in the two-stage condition, resulting in similar preference for the utilitarian option in both choice process conditions (M = 33.33% vs. M = 30%); binomial z < 1, p > .5).

This research documents a novel effect: two-stage decisions (vs. single-stage decisions), lead to a relatively greater preference for hedonic (vs. utilitarian) options. Using studies that involve both mediation and moderation, this research provides convergent evidence for the proposed regulatory focus mechanism that drives this effect. This paper makes two key contributions, connecting work on decision processes, regulatory focus, and hedonic versus utilitarian choices. First, this research finds that differences in the structure of the decision process can endogenously influence decision makers’ regulatory focus during final choice. In contrast, in most previous research, the drivers of regulatory focus were exogenous and operated at the start of a decision (Zhou and Pham 2004). Second, this research demonstrates that differences in the structure of the decision impacts hedonic-utilitarian tradeoffs. Past work on two-stage decisions has only shown how screening influences information processing, such as relatively lesser weighting of (i) information presented pre-screening (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ülkümen 2006, Ge et al. 2012) or (ii) attributes participants have already used to screen (Larson and Hamilton 2012). Past research has not found any effects of screening that differ by the type of attributes (e.g., hedonic vs. utilitarian) considered during decision making. Marketers may employ our findings to impact consumers’ choices by structuring the decision process in a way that increases preference for particular target options.

REFERENCES
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>-Demonstrates that effect is mediated by differences in prevention focus</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M_single-stage = 36.8%</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M_2-stage = $440</td>
<td>-Hedonic attributes were explicitly higher-priced</td>
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<td>M_single-stage = $390</td>
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<td>M_1-stage = 71.8%</td>
<td>-Involves an intermediate-size choice set</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M_single-stage = 48.4%</td>
<td>-Composition of shortlisted set and process measures do not support “balancing” or “licensing” alternative accounts</td>
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<td>4B</td>
<td>Snacks (Desserts)</td>
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<td>-Differences in hedonic preference occurred despite no differences on utilitarian levels between options</td>
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<td>M_single-stage = 57.5%</td>
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<td>M_single-stage = 33.33%</td>
<td>-Participant profile very different from undergraduates/ paid subject pool participants</td>
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** Differences significant at p < .05 levels


Towards an Integrative Theory of Anchoring: Evidence For a Selective Accessibility Mechanism Across Anchor Types
Sophie Chaxel, McGill University, Canada

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

For a decade, anchoring has been thought to be the product of two distinct processes: (a) the underadjustment associated with the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, when individuals provide their own anchors; and (b) selective accessibility, when an experiment provides an anchor. Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson (2010) challenged this distinction by demonstrating that the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic may underlie all anchoring phenomena. The present research uses procedural priming to demonstrate that selective accessibility may also account for most anchoring phenomena. Therefore, and in accordance with the integrative theory of anchoring (ITA) proposed by Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson (2010), the present findings show that the dichotomy conceptualizing selective accessibility and anchoring-and-adjustment as two distinct processes may be an over-simplification and that both should likely be thought of as and studied as interacting processes.

Study 1 compares the impact of selective accessibility on the processing of self-generated anchors and experimenter-provided anchors, when the direction of adjustment is known. To prime selective accessibility, the experimental procedure used by Mussweiler (2002) was replicated. Three hundred participants (75 in each cell) were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The design of the study was a 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) between-subject design. Following the priming task, the participants were then asked to answer a single numerical estimation question. Half of the participants were asked (Epley and Gilovich, 2001): “What is the freezing point of pure alcohol (in degrees F)?” The other half of the participants answered the following question (Strack and Mussweiler, 1997): “In what year did Einstein visit the USA for the first time?” They were also given the following indication: “Tip: It is after 1910.” In the former, the self-generated anchor was 32F, and the direction of adjustment was straightforward. In the latter, both the anchor and the direction of adjustment were provided by the experimenter. Participants’ responses were submitted to a 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis yielded a significant main effect of priming (F (1,287) = 4.90, p < .05). All the other effects were nonsignificant (p > .15).

Study 1 contributes to demonstrating that selective accessibility may drive anchoring not only in the case of experimenter-provided anchors, but also in the case of self-generated anchors. Study 2 aims at replicating the results of Study 1, not only varying the source of the standard of comparison, but also the direction of adjustment. A total of 401 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The design of the study was 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) × 2 (direction of adjustment: high certainty vs. low certainty). The participants’ responses were submitted to a 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) × 2 (direction of adjustment: high certainty vs. low certainty) ANOVA. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of priming (F (1,399) = 4.66, p < .05). All other effects were nonsignificant (p > .15). Participants who were primed with similarities overall gave answers that were closer to the anchor, independent of the knowledge of the direction to adjust.

Study 2 therefore not only replicates the main effect obtained in Study 1, but also demonstrates that the main effect holds independent of the knowledge of the direction of adjustment. In addition, it contributes to dismiss a potential competing explanation, i.e., participants primed with differences worked harder on the estimation than those primed with similarities.

The essence of the argument for the ITA comes from the role played by the effort in the anchoring process. According to Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson (2010), as adjustment-and-anchoring is always at play in anchoring, more effort will always lead to a reduction of the anchoring bias, as long as the direction of adjustment is known by the participant. Therefore, Study 3 aimed at investigating whether effort would actually interact with selective accessibility. If the ITA is correct, then participants who work harder should show less bias when the adjustment direction is known, despite the priming of selective accessibility. A total of 400 participants (50 in each cell) were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The design of the study was a 2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) × 2 (effort: control vs. low) between-subject design. To manipulate effort, half of the participants were made cognitively busy by having to memorize two strings of eight letters, one before each anchoring question (Gilbert, 2002; Kruger, 1999, Epley & Gilovich, 2006). The other half of the participants did not undergo this manipulation and solely answered the anchoring questions. Results confirmed a main effect of priming condition that the participants focusing on differences were less biased (Mdiff = .10 vs. Msimilarities = -.08, F(1,387) = 4.96, p<.05). Yet, importantly, the ANOVA also yielded a significant interaction effect between Priming and Load, indicating that participants who were under cognitive load actually were not influenced by priming (F(1,387) = 4.12, p<.05).

Therefore, and in agreement with results from the ITA, imposing a cognitive load for people who were certain about the direction of adjustment decreased the anchor-estimate gap. Through the three studies, this paper demonstrates that a selective accessibility process may be underlying the anchoring bias, not only in the case of experimenter-provided anchors, but also in the case of self-generated anchors, independent of the knowledge of the direction of adjustment. In addition, effort mitigates the results of the selective accessibility priming when the direction of adjustment is known. These findings are in accordance with the ITA, in which selective accessibility and anchoring-and-adjustment would operate together instead of acting separately.

### Table 1: Summary of Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) between-subject design</td>
<td>Priming selective accessibility impacts anchoring across contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) × 2 (direction of adjustment: high certainty vs. low certainty)</td>
<td>Priming selective accessibility impacts anchoring across contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>2 (priming: similarities vs. differences) × 2 (type of anchor: self-generated vs. provided) × 2 (effort: control vs. low)</td>
<td>Imposing a cognitive load increases the anchoring bias across anchor types</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

It is well-established that people under time pressure make decisions that are of inferior quality. But are there situations in which time pressure might improve decision quality? Prior research has suggested that stress – at least in moderation and in particular contexts – can be beneficial for decision-making. Moderate levels of arousal can improve performance in a variety of domains, as suggested by the Yerkes-Dodson law (Andrews and Farris 1972; Deffenbacher 1994; Verkes and Dodson 1908). Similarly, contexts in which effortful information processing is attenuated or non-existent, such as unconscious thought, can produce accurate and rational decisions (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006).

Drawing on three elements in prospect theory (reference dependence, loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity; Camerer 2000; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), we posit that loss aversion attenuates under time pressure – that is, people under time pressure no longer consider the hedonic impact of losses to be greater than that of gains, but roughly to be more equal, relative to those under no such constraints. This is because people consider time to be a resource, and the loss of time under time pressure is a loss of resource, placing them on the locally-convex portion of the value function. From this point, the hedonic impact of any further loss diminishes, relative to decisions from the status quo. In other words, loss aversion attenuates.

This proposition thus relies on the critical assumption that people consider time to be a resource. Thankfully, for our purposes, this assumption is well-supported – at least for Western cultures. That time is a resource that people can “lose” is consistent with the Protestant ethic that “time is money”. Some people may see time as a holder of endless possibilities and opportunities, but most others see time as something that they can not slow down, stop, or turn back. Time thus is a resource that people must structure, with a lack of structure meaning a loss of a valued resource with high opportunity costs (Bockstael, Strand, and Hannemann 1987; Case, Vukina, and Danielson 1995; Cesario 1976; Larson 1993; Shaw 1992).

In Experiment 1, we find that the endowment affect – a typical demonstration of loss aversion – attenuates under time pressure. That is, although sellers typically place a higher valuation on a transaction item than buyers, we find that this disparity in valuation disappears under time pressure. Mediation analyses suggest that this is because sellers under time pressure place less of an emphasis on the positive aspects of the transaction item under time pressure. In Experiment 2, we find that people under time pressure are less risk-averse to gambles involving both a chance of winning and losing, relative to those under no such constraints.

Meanwhile, that loss a version attenuates under time pressure assumes that people integrate the loss of time under time pressure with any subsequent loss. According to the hedonic editing rules and mental accounting (Thaler 1999; Thaler and Johnson 1990), people do not integrate losses when the losses occur on different days. Experiment 3 demonstrates that loss aversion attenuates under time pressure – but only when the loss of time under time pressure and the subsequent loss occurs on the same day.

In Experiment 4, we draw on the fact that people in Western cultures are more likely to be monochronic in that they see time as a resource that must be structured, relative to those in non-Western cultures that are more likely to be polychronic in that they see time as continuous that does not require structure. Thus, if loss aversion attenuates under time pressure because people lose time as a resource under time pressure, this effect should be stronger for monochronic people than polychronic ones. Experiment 5 uses the Time Structure Questionnaire (Bond and Feather 1988) to show support for these propositions. We also note that both Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that loss aversion attenuates under time pressure because people perceive the hedonic impact of losses to be less under time pressure than under no such constraints, with no influence of time pressure on the hedonic impact of gains.

The four experiments provide support for our proposition that loss aversion attenuates under time pressure. This provides an intriguing implication that is counter-intuitive to everyday assumptions about the influence of time pressure. But using a value function-based explanation, we show that our effect is actually consistent with the tenets of prospect theory. We note that prior research has suggested that stress – at least in moderation and in particular contexts – can be beneficial for decision-making. Moderate levels of arousal can improve performance in a variety of domains, as suggested by the Yerkes-Dodson law (Andrews and Farris 1972; Deffenbacher 1994; Verkes and Dodson 1908). Similarly, contexts in which effortful information processing is attenuated or non-existent, such as unconscious thought, can produce accurate and rational decisions (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006). A cognitive load can also increase normative behaviours by disrupting the pursuit of biased self-relevant goals (Drolet and Luce 2004) or by reducing uncertainty to engender rationality (Goldsmith and Amir 2012). Thus, to the extent that time pressure is a form of stress, these findings suggest that it may improve decision quality at least in certain instances.

REFERENCES


Strategies to Cope with Social Identity Threats: Defending the Self without Sabotaging Self-Control
Hristina Dzhogleva, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Nicole Verrochi Coleman, University of Pittsburgh, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers often encounter situations when important aspects of their identities are negatively evaluated and threatened. Imagine a sports fan who watches his beloved team lose to an objectively “worse” opponent. Or consider the experience of a college student majoring in business who reads that business students perform worse academically than engineering students. Situations such as these abound in the lives of consumers, devaluing key elements of their social identities, and causing them to seek effective ways to cope with these threats to the self.

Social identity threats cause aversive psychological consequences (Baumgardner 1990), which motivate consumers to repair their self-worth (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Unfortunately, coping with social identity threats negatively impacts consumers’ self-control and hinders their ability to act in accord with long-term goals (Inzlicht and Kang 2010; Inzlicht, McKay, and Aronson 2006). While the detrimental impact of social identity threats on self-control has been demonstrated, there are few insights as to whether different coping strategies are equally costly to self-control. An interesting question, then, is whether certain strategies are more damaging to consumers’ self-control than others. Might some strategies allow consumers to restore their self-worth following social identity threat without significantly undermining self-control?

The present research addresses this question and examines the impact of two strategies for coping with social identity threats on consumers’ self-control. Specifically, we study two social creativity strategies, which seek “positive distinctiveness for the in-group by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation” (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986).

The first coping strategy is referred to as superior self-aspects and involves “comparing the in-group to the out-group on some new dimension” on which the in-group is better (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Lalonde (1992) showed that hockey teams at the bottom of the league emphasized that top teams tended to play “dirty”; thus, those threatened hockey players changed the comparison dimension from game performance to ethical sportsmanship in order to restore their positive self-view. In practical terms, this strategy implies that implementing the inferior others strategy requires individuals to highlight other positive dimensions on which they are superior to the contrasting out-group. For instance, a sports fan who reads that fans of his favorite team are considered “ruder and more ignorant” than other fans might think, “we may not be polite, but we are more loyal and enthusiastic fans than them.”

The second strategy involves “changing the out-group with which the in-group is compared” to avoid using a higher-status out-group as a comparison point, and instead use an out-group that performs worse on the threatened identity dimension (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986). Rosenberg and Simmons (1972) provide evidence of this, finding that when African-Americans made self-comparisons to other African-Americans their self-esteem was higher than when Caucasians were used as a comparative frame of reference. In essence, this strategy (referred to as inferior others) suggests that consumers remain focused on the poor-performance dimension, but selectively think about other groups that perform even worse on that dimension. For example, the threatened NFL fan might acknowledge the crassness of his hometown fans but bring to mind fans of other teams who are even worse, thinking “Steelers fans might not be polite, but at least they aren’t as rude as Eagles fans—they have no decency at all!”

While other strategies for coping with social identity threats have been proposed, such as individual mobility or social competition (Tajfel and Turner 1986), we focus on the two social creativity strategies for theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, these two strategies are similar as they both involve cognitive processes aimed at changing elements of the comparative situation to restore the positive social identity. Practically, both strategies offer subtle and easily implementable cognitive forms of coping with social identity threats, which could be executed in almost any identity threatening situation and are more frequently used by consumers than other strategies (confirmed by a pilot study available from the authors).

We propose that a threat to a specific dimension of an individual’s social identity will activate and make this aspect of the self more accessible. Past research demonstrates that identity threatening situations lead to increased identity salience and stronger in-group identification (Christian et al. 1976; Forehand, Deshpandé, and Reed 2002). Furthermore, due to spreading activation (Anderson 1983), the activation of the threatened aspect of the self will lead to activation and increased accessibility of other aspects of consumers’ self-concept (Kleine et al. 1993; Markus 1977). In sum, after the experience of a social identity threat, an individual’s self-knowledge (i.e., all traits defining one’s identity) becomes accessible and active for use in further processing (Carver 1975; Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne 1998).

Once the social identity threat has registered with the consumer and activated his self-knowledge, he is motivated to cope with the threat and repair his social identity using one of the two strategies. The inferior others strategy requires individuals to think about out-groups that perform worse on the threatened dimension, creating a favorable intergroup comparison between the second-rate out-group and the in-group. This implies that implementing the inferior others coping strategy shifts thoughts from active self-knowledge to relatively inactive others-knowledge. Specifically, previous research has found that when the self becomes the focus of attention, individuals are particularly likely to behave in accordance with internal self-traits (Carver 1975; Macrae et al. 1998). Therefore, shifting away from active self-knowledge requires effortful, controlled processing (Greenberg et al. 1994) which depletes self-regulatory resources and increases self-control failures in subsequent situations (Ellis and Ashbrook 1989; Gailliot et al. 2006; Wegner et al. 1987). Thus, we propose that using the inferior others coping strategy requires consumers to effortfully shift their thoughts from the active self to the inactive others, reducing their self-regulatory resources and leading to subsequent self-control failures. In contrast, the superior as-pects strategy requires individuals to highlight other positive dimensions of the self, remaining focused on accessible concepts. As the social identity threat has activated both the threatened self-dimension and broader self-aspects, we predict that this coping strategy will not consume a significant amount of self-regulatory resources. Thus:

1 While both strategies involve changing one element of the comparison situation, we propose that changing the comparison attribute (superior self-aspects strategy) is easier for consumers than changing the comparison group
Hypothesis 1: Individuals using the superior self-aspects strategy to cope with a social identity threat will exhibit better self-control subsequently than those using the inferior others strategy.

We further predict that these differences in self-control occur because:

Hypothesis 2: A social identity threat will heighten the accessibility of self-knowledge.

Hypothesis 3: The shift in thoughts from accessible self-knowledge to inaccessible out-groups knowledge, required by the inferior others strategy, will consume self-regulatory resources; in contrast, the superior self-aspects strategy will not require self-regulatory resources to enact since it involves retaining the thoughts on the accessible self.

We test our predictions in one field study and seven experiments. Select studies are described in greater detail below.

Field Study

To take advantage of a naturally-occurring social identity threat, we conducted the study following two painful losses of the local NFL team (Team X). We intercepted participants at the entrance of a coffee shop and asked them to participate in a short study in exchange for $2. Respondents (n = 37, 37% female) were individuals who were fans of Team X and who had watched the game. The study used a 2 (Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) group design. To make the social identity threat salient, a poster invited participation in a survey about the “loss of Team X last night” and displayed the game score. In part 1 of the survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two coping strategies and were asked to complete five sentences in response to Team X’s loss. Participants in the superior self-aspects condition completed sentences beginning with: “Yesterday Team X made more mistakes than Team Y, but Team X were still better than Team Y at...” Respondents in the inferior others condition filled out five sentences beginning with: “Yesterday Team X made more mistakes than Team Y, but at least they did not mess up as badly as...” Participants could fill out as many sentences as they wanted (M = 4, no condition effects, p = .37). Participants then entered the café to make their purchases, after which they were asked to return and complete another survey. In part 2, participants answered demographic questions, provided their receipts, and received payment.

A one-way MANOVA on the total grams of fat and calories in participants’ purchases (r = .846, p < .0001) revealed a significant main effect of the strategy condition (multivariate F(2, 34) = 3.19, p = .05). The purchases of individuals in the inferior others condition contained more fat and calories (M_fat = 16.52g; M_cal = 463) than those of respondents in the superior self-aspects condition (M_fat = 8.87g; M_cal = 287; F(1, 35) = 5.19, p = .03 and F(1, 35) = 6.46, p = .02).

This field study provides evidence in support of H1 and shows that participants who used the superior self-aspects strategy made healthier food choices than those using the inferior others strategy. We note that these results were replicated in a lab experiment with a threat to participants’ business student identity; individuals who used the former strategy consumed fewer M&Ms (M = 20.13g) than those who used the latter (M = 38.25g, F(1, 41) = 5.25, p = .03).

Experiment 1 examines whether the effects of the two strategies on consumers’ self-control would emerge when both the social identity threat and strategy prompts are embedded in an advertising stimulus. Furthermore, in contrast to the field study which was conducted only with individuals who identified highly with the threatened in-group (only fans of Team X were recruited), the sample in the next study was more diverse and the extent to which participants identified themselves with the threatened in-group varied. Since past research demonstrates that social identity threats mainly affect those that identify closely with the threatened in-group (Ellemers et al. 2002), we anticipated that the predicted effects would emerge only for individuals with strong in-group identification but not for those with weak identification, for whom the social identity threat is less relevant (Maass et al. 2003).

Experiment 1

Experiment 1 used a 2 (Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) group design with participants’ in-group identification as a second continuously-measured factor. Participants (n = 47, 39% female) were college students, who completed two ostensibly unrelated tasks. First, participants rated their identification with NFL fans on a four-item scale (e.g., “I see myself as an NFL fan,” α = .95; Hogg and Hains 1996). They then evaluated and gave feedback about a NFL-related print ad designed by local high-school students. Respondents were randomly assigned to view one of two ads. Both ads contained the social identity threat: “People say football fans are more obnoxious, loud, and annoying than baseball fans.” Furthermore, each ad cued the use of one of the two strategies. The text of the superior self-aspects strategy ad read: “But c’mon! We know that they are plenty of positive sides to football fans too… Just think of a few of those: 1… 2… 3…”; while the text of the inferior others strategy ad was: “But c’mon! We know that they are plenty of fans that are more crude than you… Just think of a few of those: 1… 2… 3…”

In a subsequent “unrelated” task participants imagined that they would receive a snack for their participation and indicated their preference for different snacks on a 7-point scale (1 = “Not At All” and 7 = “Very Much So”). The list included both unhealthy (e.g., potato chips) and healthy (e.g., apple) options (Laran 2010). Participants also indicated their snack choice.

The coping strategy/ad condition was contrast coded (-1 = inferior others; 1 = superior self-aspects) and participants’ strength of identification with NFL fans was mean-centered (M = 4.85, SD = 1.76). A significant interaction of NFL fan identity and coping strategy was revealed on both the appeal of unhealthy snacks (b = -.33, t(43) = -2.64, p = .01) and the snack choice (1 = healthy; 0 = unhealthy snack; b = .44, Wald χ²(1) = 4.03, p = .04). For participants who identified strongly as “NFL fans” (+1 SD), those exposed to the superior self-aspects strategy ad found the unhealthy snacks less appealing (b = -.77, t(43) = -2.69, p = .01) and were more likely to choose a healthy snack than participants who saw the inferior others strategy ad (b = .88, exp(b) = 2.41, Wald χ²(1) = 3.43, p = .06). Participants who identified weakly with NFL fans (-1 SD) had no difference in self-control based on the strategy condition (p’s > .22).

The results of Experiment 2 provide convergent evidence for our theoretical propositions. However, in contrast to the previous experiments which used relatively strong manipulations of the social identity threat and coping strategy, this study embedded both the threat and strategies in advertising stimuli, demonstrating that our proposed effects even occur in practical situations and thus can benefit marketers as well. The next two studies provide evidence of the
underlying process: Experiment 2 shows that a social identity threat increases the accessibility of the self (H2); Experiment 3 shows that accessibility of out-group knowledge is driving the detrimental effects of the inferior others strategy (H3).

**Experiment 2**

Experiment 2 utilized a 2 group (threat vs. control) design. Participants (n = 69, 59% female) were business students at a large university. Participants in the threat condition were asked to read an article which contained the social identity threat (the article discussed how business students perform worse academically than engineering students), while respondents in the control condition read an article from National Geographic. Then all participants indicated their agreement with seven items (α = .83) assessing self-knowledge activation on a 7-point scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 7 = “Strongly Agree” (e.g., “The traits that describe ‘who I am’ are vivid in my mind now.”). Respondents also indicated the extent to which their self was activated using a visual measure in which different degrees of self-activation were signified by figures with increasing percentages of highlighting. Finally, participants rated their agreement with two private self-awareness items (α = .68; e.g., “While imagining the scenario, I was generally very aware of myself, my own perspective and attitudes;” Matheson and Zanna 1988).

Two one-way ANOVAs conducted on the two activation of self measures revealed that participants in the threat condition (Mscale = 5.11, Mvisual = 4.44) experienced greater self-activation than those in the control condition (Mscale = 3.37, Mvisual = 3.88; F(1, 66) = 60.30, p < .0001 and F(1, 67) = 7.04, p < .01). A separate one-way ANOVA run on the private self-awareness index also showed that participants in the threat condition possessed greater self-awareness (M = 4.15) than those in the control condition (M = 3.39; F(1, 66) = 9.73, p < .01).

Experiment 2 shows that experiencing a social identity threat activates individuals’ self-knowledge, providing support for the first link in the proposed process (H2). The next experiment seeks to understand whether activating others-knowledge will reduce the regulatory costs of the inferior others strategy and thus provide support for H3.

**Experiment 3**

Experiment 3 used a 2 (Strategy: superior self-aspects, inferior others) x 2 (Accessibility: self, others) between-subjects design. Participants (n = 73, 62% female) were business students at a large public university. Accessibility of the self and others was manipulated with a procedure from Gardner et al. (1999); participants in the self-accessibility condition read a paragraph and counted the first-person pronouns (e.g., “I”, “me”) while those in the others-accessibility condition read a similar paragraph and counted the other-people pronouns (e.g., “they”, “them”).

The social identity threat was manipulated using an article that discussed how business students perform worse academically than engineering students. After reading the article, participants were assigned to one of the two coping strategies and asked to imagine how they would respond to the criticisms of business students presented in the article. In both conditions participants completed five sentences designed to cue the coping strategy: superior self-aspects condition (“I might not be as intelligent as the engineering students but I am...”) and inferior others condition (“I might not be as intelligent as the engineering students but at least I am not as unintelligent as...”). The effectiveness of both manipulations was confirmed in separate pretests. Finally, participants were presented with the self-control scenario and asked to indicate their likelihood of purchasing an attractive but unnecessary item while shopping in the mall.

A two-way ANOVA on participants’ likelihood to indulge showed a significant interaction of the accessibility and coping strategy conditions (F(1, 69) = 6.87, p = .01). When the self was made accessible, results replicated our previous findings such that participants who used the inferior others strategy (Msuperior self = 7.20) were more likely to indulge than those who used the superior self-aspects one (Minferior others = 5.29; F(1, 69) = 5.55, p = .02). However, when others-related concepts were made accessible, there was no difference in the likelihood to indulge of participants in the two strategy conditions (Msuperior self = 6.27 vs. Minferior others = 5.18, p = .18). Finally, the negative impact of the inferior others strategy on self-control was significantly reduced in the others-accessibility condition relative to the self-accessibility condition (F(1, 69) = 6.28, p = .01); there was no difference in the self-control of participants using the superior self-aspects strategy between the two accessibility conditions (p = .23).

Experiment 3 provides evidence that accessibility is the process by which the two coping strategies impact consumers’ self-control (H3). When the accessibility of the self was heightened prior to the threat, our previous results replicated: individuals using the superior self-aspects strategy exhibited less self-control subsequently than those relying on the inferior others strategy. However, increasing the accessibility of others-related concepts significantly diminished the detrimental impact of the inferior others strategy on self-control. Another study also replicated these findings using a different manipulation of the accessibility of out-groups-related concepts.

**General Discussion**

The primary objective of this research was to compare two strategies for coping with social identity threats and their impact on consumers’ self-control. Our results demonstrate that the superior self-aspects strategy has a less detrimental impact on subsequent self-control than does the inferior others strategy. These effects hold using both real consumption and scenario-based measures of self-control in two important domains for consumers: eating and spending. Most importantly, our effects are robust even in real world settings, in situations involving naturally occurring social identity threats (loss of the favorite NFL team), and when both the social identity threat and strategies are embedded in advertising stimuli. Furthermore, the differential cost of the two coping strategies on self-control is noteworthy given their equal effectiveness at restoring the positive view of the self after a social identity threat. Finally, we examine the process underlying these differences: experiencing a social identity threat increases the accessibility of the self and as a result the inferior others strategy impedes self-control because its implementation requires a shift of thoughts from accessible self-concepts to inaccessible out-groups-related concepts, which taxes individuals’ self-regulatory resources.

The current research has significant practical implications for consumers, practitioners, and marketers. While our findings have implications for general consumer well-being, we believe that our work will be particularly beneficial to both individuals struggling with various self-control problems (e.g., obesity, credit card debt), as well as practitioners who wish to design effective interventions for overcoming such problems. For instance, it is possible that one of the

2 We rule out mood and self-affirmation as alternative explanations of these effects; more details available from the authors.

3 Effectiveness of the strategies was measured in three studies not reported here; results consistently show that the two coping strategies were equally effective at restoring the self after a social identity threat.
reasons why many people often fail at their attempts to start eating healthily is because they often encounter identity threats and cope with them in a sub-optimal way, which inevitably sabotages their self-control progress. Since such identity threats are common in consumers’ lives, it is essential for consumers to know not only that coping with such experiences can undermine their self-regulation, but also that there are ways to cope without damaging their self-control.

Finally, given that our effects are robust in real world settings, we believe marketers might benefit from our findings as well. For instance, marketers of both healthy and unhealthy foods may want to target consumers with specific social identities (e.g., sports fans, stay-at-home moms) and tailor their advertising messages in a way that prompts them to indulge or exercise self-control and thus increase the sales of their products. Moreover, marketers of sports team apparel and fan gear might be able to induce consumers to splurge on expensive items by embedding a social identity threat in marketing communication materials along with cues to use the inferior others strategy as a way to cope with the presented threat.

Taken together, this research makes contributions to the social identity and self-control literatures. First, existing work shows that coping with social identity threats depletes one’s self-regulatory resources (Inzlicht and Kang 2010; Inzlicht et al. 2006). We extend this research by showing that the negative impact of coping with social identity threats on self-control depends on the specific coping strategy that individuals use. Second, we highlight differences that exist among the various strategies for coping with social identity threats. Beginning with Tajfel and Turner (1979; 1986), researchers have studied the ways in which individuals cope with threats to their identities, from changing consumption (Gao et al. 2009), to changing evaluations of the threatened group (Doosje et al. 1995), to resisting the negative feedback and engaging in self-affirmation (Steele 1988; von Hippel et al. 2005). However, previous work has examined each coping strategy in isolation, focusing on its effectiveness at repairing the self, but none of its costs. This conceptual isolation has, to a certain degree, limited our understanding of the differences and similarities among the strategies, as well as their potential advantages and disadvantages. The present work moves toward addressing this gap by focusing on two coping strategies, examining their differences and similarities, and illuminating the process through which these differences occur.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Effect of Coping Strategy Condition</th>
<th>Interaction Superior Self-Aspects</th>
<th>Inferior Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Study</td>
<td>Fat (g) in purchase</td>
<td>F (1, 35) = 5.19, p = .03</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>16.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experiment 1</td>
<td>Appeal of unhealthy snacks</td>
<td>b = -.33, t(43) = -2.64, p = .01</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>4.98</td>
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<td>Strength of Identification (+1 SD)</td>
<td>b = -.33, t(43) = -2.64, p = .01</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>2.80</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strength of Identification (-1 SD)</td>
<td>b = -.33, t(43) = -2.64, p = .01</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>2.80</td>
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<td>Experiment 2</td>
<td>Accessibility of self-concepts</td>
<td>F(1, 66) = 60.30, p &lt; .0001</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>3.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experiment 3</td>
<td>Likelihood of indulging</td>
<td>F(1, 69) = 6.87, p = .01</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>7.20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Activated Self</td>
<td>F(1, 69) = 5.55, p = .02</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>7.20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Knowledge Others</td>
<td>NS (p = .18)</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>5.18</td>
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### REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Brand attachment has been defined as the strength of the bond connecting the consumer to the brand (Thomson, MacInnis and Park 2005). Consumers who feel strong attachment to a brand will be more loyal and less price sensitive. Because of its relevance to marketers, factors that increase brand attachment have become an important focus of research (Lastovicka and Sirianni 2011; Park et al. 2010; Thomson et al. 2005). Most of the research to date has demonstrated that the attachment process develops over time as consumers have numerous experiences with the brand. However, day-to-day life is filled with affective experiences that may not be directly associated with a particular brand but still involve them to some degree (e.g., fear caused by the horror movie and the brand of potato chips). Although not the cause of the experienced emotion, it stands to reason that the brand attachment process could potentially be influenced by these experiences. Prior research in affect transfer (MacKenzie, Lutz, & Belch, 1986) has demonstrated that the experience of negative affect can transfer to unrelated objects such as a brand. This transfer can lower brand attitudes and evaluations (Goldberg and Gorn 1987). This concern has led marketers to avoid associated their brand with negative content (e.g., timing of advertisements within T.V. shows or placement of products within movies).

However, literature on social psychology suggests that some negative experiences, specifically fear, are unifying; causing people to seek out affiliation with others. (Schachter 1959; Sarnoff and Zimbardo 1961). In some situations, these “others” could be brands. Consumers have been known to treat brands as if they were people and form relationships with and expectations of them (Fournier 1998). Therefore, it is possible that fearful experiences may have a positive impact on brand attachment.

First, we show that incidental fear experienced in the presence of a brand can facilitate initial emotional brand attachment. Second, we provide evidence that this attachment occurs due to a perception that the brand and the consumer shared the emotional experience (affiliation). As such our work provides some of the first empirical evidence that brand relationships are not merely metaphorical, but that people can make psychological, personal connections to brands. Third, we advance understanding of the construct of brand attachment. We demonstrate that while initial emotional brand attachment (Park et al. 2010) would only emerge at a later time (Time 2). Using a longitudinal design, participants went through the procedure from study1 at Time 1, with the exception of measuring both emotional and broader brand attachment. After completing the initial study, participants were given samples of a brand of chips to take home to try and answered a questionnaire about brand attachment and loyalty three days later (Time 2).

Results revealed that those participants who underwent the initial fearful experience not only felt higher emotional brand attachment at both Time 1 and Time 2, but only showed higher broader brand attachment at Time 2.

REFERENCES


Abstract Art as an Emotional Buffer
Lea H. Dunn, University of British Columbia, Canada
Rui (Juliet) Zhu, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, China

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Art plays an important cultural role by acting as a medium of communication for important sources of information. Given this role, it is not surprising that art has permeated consumption specific contexts like advertising (Hetsroni and Tukachinsky 2005), product decoration and even bolstering brands such as the iconic use of modern artists to promote Absolut Vodka (Lewis 1996).

While the use of art is commonplace in the modern Western world, there has been little empirical research on the impact of art on the consumer experiences (e.g., Hagtvedt and Patrick 2008a, 2008b, 2011). The few studies focused on how representational artwork (i.e., the artwork depicts something that is easily recognizable by most people) influence consumer perceptions and product evaluations. Yet, little is known about how other forms of artwork, such as abstract art, might influence consumer behavior. Considering that abstract art is used in marketing practice, the current research seeks to extend our understanding of how artwork can influence consumer information processing and judgments.

The current research seeks to explore the impact of abstract art on consumer processing. In particular, we examine different circumstances in which abstract art is detrimental and beneficial for product evaluations and consumer experiences. Building off research on verbalization (Wilson and Schooler 1991; Yamada 2009), we demonstrate that using abstract (vs. representational) art is beneficial when a brand or product evokes negative emotions which are low in uncertainty (e.g., sadness as induced by funeral homes). This happens because the disfluency caused by processing abstract art provides consumers with the opportunity to emotionally distance themselves from the negative context of the product and, thus, accept the information about the product. In contrast, we demonstrate how the use of abstract (vs. representational) art is detrimental when a brand or product evokes negative emotions high in uncertainty (e.g., fear as induced by a drunk-and-driving ad). This is because uncertainty appraisals lead consumers to seek out ways to decrease their level of uncertainty. However, due to its perceptual disfluency, abstract art does not allow consumers to reduce uncertainty, thus leading to lower evaluations. Representational art, however, has concrete elements for the consumers to anchor thoughts and has the potential to lead to a greater reduction in uncertainty and subsequently higher evaluations.

In study 1, we hypothesize that when abstract art is paired with a sadness evoking negative product, consumers will have more favorable attitudes and indicate greater willingness to pay for the advertised product. Four stimuli advertisements were created showing either a negative product (i.e., a funeral home) or a neutral product (i.e., dog/pet service) and featured either an abstract painting or a representational painting. After viewing the advertisements, participants were asked to evaluate the advertisement and the product as well as mood-related questions. If abstract art provides an emotional buffer against the negativity of the product class, we expect consumers viewing the negative product with the abstract art to report less negative emotions than those who saw the representational art. The results revealed that participants who viewed the sadness-evoking advertisement rated the both the product and the advertisement higher when it featured abstract rather than representational art. In addition, for participants in the negative product condition, those who saw the abstract art reported fewer negative emotions than those who saw the representational art.

In study 2, we examine the idea that abstract art provides an emotional buffer for processing negative products. In particular, we purport that abstract art pushes consumer to process information in a psychologically distant manner. In order to test this hypothesis, we used a 2 (art type: abstract v. representational) x 2 (psychological distance: close v. far) design and primed participants to think either in a psychologically close or far manner. If abstract art acts as an emotional buffer, only participants who are primed to think in terms of close psychological distance should prefer the negative product advertisement featuring the abstract art over those featuring representational art. Using only the sadness-evoking negative product advertisements, participants who were primed to think either in a psychologically close or far manner saw advertisements that either featured abstract or representational art. As predicted, there was no difference in advertisement attitude between participants who saw the representational or abstract art when primed for the far psychological distance. In contrast, only when participants were primed for close psychological distance was there an increase in advertisement attitude for the abstract art. Finally, an emotional buffer question index was shown to mediate the relationship between art type and attitude.

In study 3, we examine a boundary condition to the benefit of abstract art for negative products. In particular, we found that abstract art is beneficial only for negative emotions that are low in uncertainty (e.g., sadness) not for those emotions high in uncertainty (e.g., fear). Participants in this study rated advertisements that evoked sadness or fear and featured abstract or representational art. Results revealed that for sadness advertisements, participants who saw the abstract art rated the advertisement higher than representational art. However, when the advertisement evoked fear, participants preferred the representational art.

This research makes several contributions to marketing literature. Foremost, this is the first empirical study of the differential impact of abstract art on consumer product perceptions. Second, we identify that abstract art itself can motivate far psychological distance processing, allowing consumers to better comprehend certain types of negative products. Finally, we pinpoint a boundary condition of the beneficial effects of abstract art. Specifically, the disfluency associated with abstract art is detrimental when the negative emotional appeal evokes an uncertain emotion (e.g., fear; Smith and Ellsworth 1985).

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

A consistent finding in consumer research is that attitudes toward products, services, and consumption in general can be influenced by other people’s opinions (e.g., Bearden and Etzel 1982). Nonetheless, recent studies suggest that power may play an important role in determining how people respond to social influence (Galinsky et al. 2008). This line of research maintains that power increases consumers’ reliance on their own attitudes, and leads to evaluations that are largely unaffected by the opinions of others. In the present research, we propose that while power indeed enhances resistance to social influence, it is likely to produce different resistance outcomes, depending on the degree of certainty with which consumers hold their attitudes.

Attitude certainty refers to the subjective sense of conviction a person has about his or her attitude. Higher levels of attitude certainty are associated with reduced motivation to process external information (Tiedens and Linton 2001). Because power tends to magnify the influence of subjective experiences (Weick and Guinote 2007), we expect empowered individuals to be particularly sensitive to the effect of attitude certainty on motivation to process information. Thus, when feeling certain of their own attitudes, empowered consumers may be less motivated to process other people’s opinions, and as a result, may express evaluations that are uninfluenced by those opinions. This “immunizing” effect of power under high attitude certainty is conceivably what Galinsky et al. (2008) observed in their study. In contrast, when attitude certainty is low, we expect empowered consumers to attend more to other people’s opinions. Ironically, when attitude certainty is low, empowered consumers are also more likely to interpret these unsolicited opinions as undue pressure to conform and to express opinions that intentionally oppose those expressed by others.

We propose that this reactance effect arises because the subjective experience of uncertainty weakens empowered consumers’ confidence in their own sense of power. This sense that their power is in question, in turn, could make empowered consumers more susceptible to interpreting others’ unsolicited opinions as a threat to their freedom to express independent evaluations, which then triggers the reactant response (Brehm 1966).

We tested our predictions in two experimental studies. Study 1 featured a 2 (power: high vs. control) × 2 (attitude certainty: high vs. low) × 3 (feedback: positive vs. negative vs. none) between-subjects design. Participants’ sense of power was manipulated using a priming technique adapted from previous research. Attitude certainty was manipulated using direct versus indirect experience with the attitude object (puzzles). Participants were asked to indicate their evaluations of the puzzles on a feedback sheet containing either 10 positive feedbacks, 10 negative feedbacks, or no feedback.

As expected, there was a significant power × feedback × attitude certainty three-way interaction ($F(2, 190) = 5.46, p < .01$). Analysis of the low attitude certainty condition yielded a 2 (power) × 3 (feedback) interaction ($F(2, 190) = 13.26, p < .01$). Empowered consumers rated the puzzles more positively when exposed to negative feedback ($M = 8.57$) than in the baseline condition ($M = 7.00$, $t(30) = 3.04, p < .01$). They also rated the puzzles more negatively in the positive feedback condition ($M = 5.02$) than in the baseline condition ($M = 7.00$, $t(30) = 2.68, p = .01$). In contrast, low power consumers’ evaluations varied in the same direction as the evaluations of others ($F(2, 190) = 6.98, p < .01$). There was also a significant power × feedback interaction ($F(2, 190) = 4.33, p < .01$) in the high attitude certainty condition. However, the pattern of results was different from that in the low attitude certainty condition. Consumers with low power still conformed to the opinions of their peers, whereas empowered consumers’ evaluations did not vary across the three feedback conditions ($M_{Positive} = 7.35, M_{None} = 7.24$, and $M_{Negative} = 6.80, F(2, 190) = .70, p = .50$).

Study 2 was similar in design to study 1, but featured three important differences: (1) the evaluation object was a new product; (2) attitude certainty was manipulated by asking participants to generate either two or eight arguments in support of their attitude toward the product idea; and (3) we also assessed participants’ power certainty and their perceived threat to autonomy.

The results for evaluations were consistent with those found in study 1. In addition, to assess the proposed mechanism, we tested two mediation models. Focusing on empowered consumers, we first tested whether power certainty mediates the effect of attitude certainty on perception of threat when the consumer receives unsolicited feedback (moderated mediation model). We then tested whether perceived threat to autonomy mediates the interaction effect of power certainty × feedback on product evaluations (mediated moderation model). Consistent with predictions, the first model indicates that the indirect effect of attitude certainty on threat through power certainty is significant in the negative feedback condition (95% CI = -2.44 to -0.99), but not in the no feedback condition (95% CI = -0.62 to 0.43). Furthermore, the second model shows that the indirect effect of power certainty on product attractiveness, through threat is significant in the negative feedback condition (95% CI = -0.54 to -0.22), but not in the no feedback condition (95% CI = -0.13 to 0.04).

This research contributes to the literature on reactance and consumer conformity by delineating the intricate role of power as an important determinant of consumers’ response to social influence. It also adds to our understanding of the cognitive processes triggered by power. For example, prior research indicates that power acts primarily as a determinant of thought confidence. Our studies, however, show that power and attitude certainty can have independent as well as interactive effects on subsequent cognitions. Thus, while the powerful may generally be more confident in their thoughts, they also behave differently when their thoughts are held with more or less confidence.

REFERENCES


Do Others Influence What We Say? The Impact of Interpersonal Closeness on Word-of-Mouth Valence

David Dubois, INSEAD, France
Andrea Bonezzi, New York University, USA
Matteo De Angelis, LUISS University, Italy

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

A great deal of research in word-of-mouth (WOM) has aimed to understand whether consumers are more likely to share positive or negative information (Brown & Reingen 1987; Herr, Kardes, & Kim 1991). While some scholars have shown negative can trump positive WOM (e.g., Kamins, Folkes, & Pernes 1997), others have found positive WOM to prevail (e.g., East, Hammond, & Wright 2007). Yet, little is known about when consumers are more likely to share positive versus negative WOM.

This research explores the role of interpersonal closeness as one factor that can influence consumers’ tendency to share positive versus negative information. By interpersonal closeness, we refer to the perceived psychological proximity between two individuals (Gunia, Sivanathan, & Galinsky 2009; Miller, Downs, & Prentice 1998). Such perceived proximity can stem from social similarity (Latané et al. 1995), emotional closeness (i.e., tie strength; Gunia et al. 2009), or even spatial and temporal proximity (Liberman, Trope & Stephan 2007). For instance, the more two people share ties, occupy similar roles in society or share particular physical or physiological traits, the higher their interpersonal closeness.

We propose that high interpersonal closeness prompts individuals to share more negative information compared to high interpersonal closeness. Our hypothesis builds on the idea that high interpersonal closeness activates low-level construals while low interpersonal closeness activates high-level construals (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak 2007). Key to our theorizing, high-level construals increase the focus on positive information, whereas low-level construals increase the focus on negative information (Eyal et al. 2004; Trope and Liberman 2000; White et al. 2011). For instance, Eyal et al. 2004, showed that people tend to focus more on the cons (i.e., negative information), relative to the pros (i.e., positive information) of a certain an action, when the action is close in the future than when it is distant in the future. Thus, we hypothesize that low interpersonal closeness activates high-level construals, prompting senders to focus more on positive relative to negative information, whereas high interpersonal closeness activates low-level construals, prompting senders to focus more on positive relative to negative information. We tested this hypothesis across three experiments.

Experiment 1 tested our basic hypothesis that senders of a WOM message tend to share more negative information, relative to positive information, the closer they feel to the message recipient. Participants read a review of a camera containing four positive and four negative attributes. They were then asked to indicate the name of a close or distant other and the nature of the relationship with this person. Then, participants were asked to compose a message about the camera addressed to the person they indicated. Participants included more negative attributes in their message when addressing a close recipient than when addressing a distant recipient ($p < .01$).

Experiment 2 aimed at providing robustness, while also addressing a potential alternative explanation for our effect. In particular, individuals might be more motivated to protect close rather than distant others. Thus, they might communicate more negative relative to positive information to close others in order to warn and protect them from unforeseen negative consequences. To rule out this explanation, we asked all participants to send a WOM message to a friend and varied how far they felt from the message recipient to manipulate closeness. Participants read the same review as in Experiment 1 and sent a WOM message to a friend located in the same city (close condition), a different city (moderate condition) or a different country (distant condition). We computed a valence index, (number of positive thoughts minus negative thoughts divided by total number of thoughts), which revealed that participants wrote increasingly more negative messages as the intended recipient was geographically closer ($p < .01$).

Experiment 3 tested a consequence of this effect: namely, WOM messages become less positive across successive transmissions within chains of closely tied individuals. In contrast, messages become less negative across successive transmissions within chains of loosely tied individuals. Participants were placed into a “WOM chain” in which each individual acted first as a recipient and then as a sender of a message. To start the chain, participants occupying the first position in the chain were given a description of a hotel that included three positive and three negative features and were told to write a message to a friend with the goal of transmitting the information as accurately as possible. This yielded an initial set of WOM messages about a hotel. Participants in the second position received the message written by a participant in position one, and then transmitted it to participant in position three, and so on. Key to the experiment, participants in position 2 and 3 were assigned to one of two conditions. Specifically, individuals assigned to the weak (strong) tie condition were asked to imagine the review came from a distant (close) other, and prompted to send their review as if they were to write a message to a distant (close) other. We counted participants’ positive and negative thoughts in each message. Across strong ties, the number of negative thoughts was constant ($F < 1$) while the number of positive thoughts significantly decreased ($p < .01$). In contrast, across weak ties, the number of positive thoughts was constant ($F < 1$) while the number of negative thoughts significantly decreased ($p < .001$). These results are consistent with our proposition that positive information might be more prone to be lost in transmission among chains of strongly tied individuals, relative to negative information. In contrast, negative information might be more prone to be lost in transmission among chains of weakly tied individuals.

This research provides new insights on WOM diffusion by investigating how a central structural feature of WOM communication – interpersonal closeness between sender and recipient – influence the sharing of positive vs. negative information. We show that consumers tend to share more positive information with distant compared to close others. Furthermore we demonstrate important consequences of how positive versus negative information is differentially communicated in weakly versus strongly tied networks.

REFERENCES


**EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Nowadays, one can buy colorful cake lollipops, shower gels made of “magical leaves”, to enter a store selling human size LEGO just next to sex toys, and to sleep in hotels offering Batman’s bedroom... all during the same day. Once settled in the comfort of Batman’s couch, television will broadcast wizards’ adventures and super heroes saving the world against aliens or monsters on television. Considering those movies as anthropological mirrors (Kracauer 1966/2004; Morin 1956/2005), one can see an imaginary world underlying consumer society where consumers believe in what we have been taught to be “unbelievable” or out of what scientists and modernity call disenchantment “rationalization” (Weber 1919/2007).

Wonderland in Alice’s Adventures (Carroll 1865/1998) is a place where one has to think differently and forget about logic or natural order of things. Postmodernism is Wonderland and challenges the ideas of rationalization, reality, or truth. As Levy writes (1974/1999, 245), “everywhere yearnings, aspirations, and interpersonal relations are laden with magical, superstitious, mystical, and religious significance, with private imageries, sentiments”. It is possible to attend a posthumous show of the murdered rapper Tupac or to see Thomas Edison presenting a new technology at an auto show. Science is no longer reserved for technical developments, but for illusions and reenchantment. It is a new approach to reality in which consumers can fulfill their need for “extravagant expectations” (Boorstin 1962/1992), so long as they believe all these illusions and accept Wonderland as a serious alternative to what modernism called “reality”. Like a child would do.

Consumers can sometimes be seen as children in their way of consuming (Belk 2000). One just has to look at the “Harlem Shake” meme. And if advertising is already tempting consumers to let the inner child out (McDonald’s, Volkswagen, Ford, Mercedes, Subway, Haribo...), consumer research has never really paid attention to this phenomenon.

We conducted unobtrusive observation on the Internet. The two objectives were to make sure consumers feel sometimes like children, and to learn what “letting the inner child out” means to them. In order to do so, we selected 7741 comments to three Disney official messages which appeared on Facebook walls: “What do you do first when arriving at Disneyland?” “(Disneyland Paris), “When I first walk onto Main Street, U.S.A., I feel...” “(Disneyland California), and “Why do we have to grow up? Walt Disney” “(Disneyland California). Disney was not suspected of censorship since negative comments appeared on walls.

Based on Geertz (1973), data were interpreted using the iterative process of the hermeneutic circle, that is going permanently back and forth between the whole and the parts (Schleiermacher 1938). By carrying out “a continuous movement between individual transcripts and the emerging understanding of the entire set of textual data [...] Provisional understandings are formed, challenged, revised [...] and gradually developed in relation to a broader set of theoretical concerns” (Thompson 2005, 237).

Findings provide evidence of the “Homo puer’s rise”, that is a kind of consumer who is neither an adult nor a child--in a modern sense, neither a completely rationalized mind nor a polymorphously perverse mind. He/she is rather someone using consumption as a gateway to a fantasy world, in a similar way World of Warcraft gamers create and customize their avatars before immersing in a virtual world and role-playing (MacCallum-Stewart and Parsler 2008). **Homo puer** is the result of Prometheus’ reign where Dionysus was not allowed: he/she is the adult who has stayed adult for too long, and who sees his/her inner child coming out with an unbounded--and sometimes destructive--energy.

By adopting Homo puer’s vision, postmodernism should be considered as “liberatory” (Firat and Venkatesh 1995). Consumers act like children do when using transitional objects (Winnicott 1971/1982) or magic to get what they desire (Ferenczi 1955/1994). Consumption appears as a playful tool to customize constructed realities thanks to magic and imaginary. It is now a playground in which technological toys react to us, and allow to customize and expand the worlds--just like they change the nature of reality--according to our desires (Pesce 2000). Consumption has to be seen as a transitional phenomenon to “commute” between the several realities. And play is the key to such commuting.

What makes the Homo puer a different consumer is that he/she accepts his/her inner child and cannot live without it anymore. Consumer society relies on play, on illusion, and is “governed by a form of magical thinking” (Baudrillard 1970/1998, 31). Consumption became magical and made consumer society a Wonderland in which only Homo puer can have a fulfilling life.

We are far from the idea of an immature consumer who only wants to follow the pleasure principle. Homo puer could actually be the future psychological development of individual by representing the “higher and [more] complete man”, and a person born from the maturity of the adult man rather than an unconscious child one would like to remain (Jung 1952/2010, 95).

At a time when the Marketing Science Institute research priorities for 2012-2014 call for insight into people in their roles as consumers, or designing experiences, we consider this paper to bring a new perspective for consumer research and call for further research. It should be seen as an attempt to revise existing knowledge: What if hedonic consumption (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982) was one of the consequences of the Homo puer’s accession to the throne of consumption? Anthropomorphism (Aaker 1997; Fournier 1998; Kim and McGill 2011), extended self (Ahuvia 2005; Belk 1988), thematization (Firat and Ulusoy 2007; Ritzer 2010), desire (Belk, Ger, and Askegaard 2003; Campbell 1987; Gould 1991), fantasy (Belk and Costa 1998; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Rook 1988), and related topics are all about making our imagination richer. And why make our imagination richer if we are not able to believe in magic and play with this imagination like children do? Consumers are now telling about their adventures in Wonderland, especially online. They are also redefining the status of adult. More than listening to them, we should take part and let our inner child out to really understand what being a consumer is when hyperreality makes consumption the key to endless possibilities and infinite worlds.

**REFERENCES**


It’s The Journey That Matters: The Effect of Feelings of Movement Toward a Goal on Reward Value
Jongmin Kim, Singapore Management University, Singapore
Nathan Novemsky, Yale University, USA
Ravi Dhar, Yale University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Prior research has established how proximity to goal attainment impacts the motivation to pursue that goal. What is relatively unknown is how the desirability of an extrinsic reward associated with goal fulfillment is affected by movement toward the goal.

This research examines the effect of feelings of movement on attractiveness of a reward associated with goal attainment. Specifically, we show that perceived movement toward a goal results in higher valuation of an extrinsic reward. We build on the idea that there is a positive emotional response to moving towards a goal (Carver and Scheier 1998). Individuals are not generally aware of the source of these feelings, and the feelings can be misattributed to the reward. The evaluation of the reward is therefore affected by the presence and intensity of feelings arising from movement toward the goal. We demonstrated this effect by manipulating a sense of movement in various ways.

In study 1, we manipulated felt movement by endowing some participants with progress without them experiencing movement toward the goal. Participants engaged in a picture task where they had to find differences between two similar pictures. For half of the participants, there were 3 differences in the pictures (the unendowed condition). For the other half, there were 5 differences, but two of them were already marked. So participants found the remaining 3 differences (the endowed condition). Notice both groups put in the same effort to complete the task, but one should feel more movement as they complete the entire task themselves rather than just the last 60% of it. Upon completing the task, participants evaluated the chocolate that they were given as a reward. We found that participants in the unendowed condition were happier with the chocolate and also felt a greater sense of movement. The perceived movement mediated the effect of condition on evaluations of the chocolate.

Study 2 examined whether providing progress marker during goal pursuit can influence perceived goal movement. Since progress marker helps people to track and confirm their progress, we predict that having progress marker increases a sense of movement and the value of a reward. In this study, participants performed the picture task on a computer. In the progress marker condition, a progress bar expanded as participants found each difference, but in the no-progress marker condition participants did not receive any intermediate progress marker. After participants found all the differences, they were given one dollar as a reward. As expected, participants in the progress marker condition were happier with the reward than those in the no-progress marker condition.

Study 3 examines whether a rate of progress influences value of a reward. We predict that a high rate of progress will lead to a greater feeling of movement and thus result in a higher evaluation of a reward. Participants in this study were asked to solve 5 math problems expecting to get candy as a reward. Participants in the fast condition were given a calculator and instructed to solve the problems using the calculator. Participants in the slow condition were instructed to calculate the answers by hand. After finishing the task, participants were given the reward. Consistent with our predictions, participants in the fast condition valued the candy more than those in the slow condition.

We propose that people acquire pleasure from a sense of moving forward, and misattribute the pleasure to the reward. Once people are aware of their true source of feelings, however, they do not misattribute their feelings to other sources (Schwarz and Clore 1983). Study 4 directly tests this misattribution mechanism. Participants performed a picture task expecting to get a chocolate upon finishing the task. In the attribution condition, participants were told that most people enjoy making progress toward completing the task. Those in the movement condition did not see that sentence. Participants in both conditions completed the task, and then rated the chocolate they received. Participants in a control condition rated the chocolate before they engaged in the task. Results showed that participants in the attribution condition valued the chocolate less than the standard movement condition but did not rate the chocolate differently from the control condition. Once people were aware of the source of their feelings, they no longer raised the evaluation of the reward.

Our evaluation effects (e.g. study 1) are quite different from findings about motivation in goal pursuit. Starting closer to the goal increases motivation for goal pursuit (the goal gradient effect). However, we suggest that starting closer to the goal leaves individuals with less felt progress as they go through a smaller proportion of the goal path, and therefore lower valuation. In this study, we examine whether the same manipulation can both increase motivation and decrease reward valuation. Participants engaged in a picture task and were assigned to 4 conditions; 2 (Progress: endowed/unendowed) x 2 (Measure: valuation/motivation). In the unendowed condition, there were 3 differences in the pictures, and in the endowed condition there were 5 differences but 2 of the differences were marked. All participants were asked to stop the task before they found the last difference. Then, they either evaluated the chocolate or rated their motivation to complete the task. We found that participants in the unendowed condition valued the chocolate more than those in the endowed condition. However, participants were less motivated to find the last difference when they were not endowed with progress. The results suggest that endowed progress has different mechanisms for affecting motivation and valuation respectively.

In summary, we find that a variety of factors can influence perceived movement during goal pursuit. A greater sense of movement toward a goal induces pleasure, and consumers may misattribute this pleasure to the goal-related reward. Consequently, a greater sense of movement results in a greater valuation of the reward.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT:

“Ask yourself whether you are happy and you cease to be so” (Mill, 1909).

It is often thought that happiness cannot be pursued, but is a fortuitous byproduct of engagement in other activities. Indeed, in a short-term lab setting, people explicitly asked to maximize their happiness are less happy than those not asked to do so (Schooler et al. 2003). Such findings may be intuitively appealing as most recognize that certain goals cannot be pursued too directly. For example, trying too explicitly to fall asleep can be counter-productive. However, most of us also recognize that the likelihood of achieving a goal is greater when we accord it higher priority. Thus, a person who consciously (re)arranges aspects of his life so as to get a good night’s sleep will sleep better than one who does not. By the same token, it stands to reason that individuals who accord higher priority to the goal of being happy might make more happiness-enhancing choices, thereby becoming happier.

The main objective of the present research is to test whether, results from past research notwithstanding, it is possible to increase happiness by explicitly pursuing the goal of happiness. Specifically, we examined whether regularly making a happiness goal salient through introspection on one’s happiness could increase individuals’ happiness levels. Although our manipulation was similar to those employed by past research, in that it made a happiness-related goal salient, our experimental design differed from those used previously in an important way: whereas past experiments involved a fixed task assigned by the experimenter, our experiment allowed participants to engage in activities of their own choosing while focusing on maximizing their happiness. We predicted that individuals who introspected on their happiness would engage in more behaviors congruent with enhancing their happiness and would thus be happier than participants that did not regularly introspect on their happiness. We tested this prediction in two experiments.

Study 1 tests this using a three group between-participants design, where a happiness-related query (state-focused vs. behavior-focused vs. control) was the manipulated factor. All participants completed an initial set of questions, including a baseline happiness measure. Next, they were told that the experiment would involve fifteen minutes of “free time,” during which they could engage in the activities of their choice. Prior to beginning their “free time,” participants in two experimental conditions (state-focused and behavior-focused) were exposed to a manipulation that made the goal of happiness salient, by presenting them with a question about their happiness and asking them to keep this question in mind. The question in the state-focused condition was designed to direct attention towards monitoring their current affective state (“How happy are you?”) Mauss et al. 2011). The question in the behavior-focused condition, in contrast, was aimed at directing focus towards happiness goal-directed behavior (“Are you doing your best to be happy?”). Those in the control condition were not given any question to keep in mind. At the end of the study, participants completed a final set of questions, which included the same happiness measure administered previously. Our main dependent measure was the change in happiness. In line with prior work, we observe that those in the state-focused condition showed a significant decline in happiness as compared to the control ($M_{state-focused}=.145$, $M_{control}=.453$, $p<.05$). However, in line with our predictions we find that those in the behavior-focused condition increased their happiness significantly as compared to both the state-focused and control conditions ($M_{behavior-focused}=.775$, $p’s<.05$).

In support of our proposed process, we find behavioral change mediates the effect of condition on the change in happiness.

Having demonstrated our predicted effect, it is important to note that study 1 shares a limitation common to prior studies on happiness, in that it examines how happiness related goals affect happiness in a short-run, relatively controlled, experimental context. In order to better understand the longer term implications for happiness goals, study 2 was designed as a longitudinal field-study in which participants were prompted on a daily basis, over the course of one week to reflect on their happiness. All participants completed standard demographic questions along with the 4-item Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky and Lepper, 1999), which measures individuals’ subjective assessment of their global happiness. Participants in three experimental conditions received a question everyday via email (state-focused: “How happy were you today?"; behavior-focused: “Did you do your best to be happy today?"; control: “What day of the week is it?”). The happiness-related query (state-focused vs. behavior-focused vs. control) was the manipulated factor. At the end of the study, all participants were required to complete the same subjective happiness scale administered on day one. After completing the scale, participants were also asked to describe—in an open-ended format—how participation in the study changed their behavior (if at all) over the course of the experiment. The main dependent measure was participants’ change in subjective happiness, relative to the baseline measure.

We observed that the change in subjective happiness scores was significantly higher in the behavior-focused condition than in the control condition ($M_{behavior}=.255$; $M_{control}=-.055$, $p<.03$). There was no difference between the behavior-focused and the state-focused condition ($M_{state}=.125$; $p=.30$) or the state-focused condition and the control condition ($p=.22$). Further, those in the behavior-focused condition were the most likely to experience an increase in subjective happiness (and the least likely to experience a decrease in subjective happiness) as compared to the other conditions. The relationship between condition and happiness change was significant ($\chi^2(4)=4.2; p=.04$).

A mediation analysis supported the hypothesis that it is a change in one’s behavior, and not other factors, which causes an improvement in happiness after completing the experiment. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that, in contrast to prior work, happiness goals can be effective at improving happiness when they direct focus towards one’s behavior and motivate behavioral change, and further even happiness monitoring can have positive effects on happiness under certain conditions, such as longer durations.

<table>
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<th>Table 1: Change Scores From Pre To Post Results</th>
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<td><strong>Study</strong></td>
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumer behavior researchers have documented that individuals frequently try to avoid threatening information by engaging in compensatory consumption—the increased purchase of or actual consumption of goods in response to self-threats (Rucker and Galinsky forthcoming). However, compensatory consumption could potentially yield harmful consequences, such as overeating and overspending (Tice et al. 2001). Moreover, while compensatory consumption might temporally relieve emotional distress arising from self-threats, it can lead to post-consumption guilt (Arnow et al. 1992).

Here, we introduce a model of threat resolution illuminating that individuals might be able to reduce their reliance on post-threat compensatory consumption by changing their appraisal of threats from harmful to their self-worth (which would lead to defensive responses to protect their self-worth, e.g., compensatory consumption) to benign to self-worth (which would make defensive responses superfluous). We specifically focus on the role of unconditional self-acceptance (i.e., detaching one’s sense of self-worth from one’s current self-assessment: Chamberlain and Hagga 2001; Williams and Lynn 2010) in shaping threat appraisal, positing that those who practice unconditional self-acceptance (vs. those who do not) will tend to appraise otherwise threatening information as benign rather than as impinging on their self-worth. As such, we posit that these individuals will be less likely to try to protect themselves through engaging in compensatory consumption and more open to directly facing and improving on the threatened dimension.

Study 1 examined how a threat to one’s intelligence would affect consumption of products symbolic of intelligence (but do not actually boost intelligence) for individuals who varied in their degree of self-acceptance. Also, we sought to establish discriminant validity between self-acceptance and self-esteem.

All participants first completed the self-acceptance subscale from the Shortened General Attitude and Belief Scale (used to measure self-acceptance in MacInnes 2006) and then completed the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-subject conditions (intelligence-threat vs. no-threat). Half of the participants experienced a threat to their intelligence (via “a game that assesses intelligence”/negative feedback) while the other half did not experience any threat (same game framed as stimuli development/no negative feedback). Then, all participants were asked to indicate their willingness-to-pay for three intelligence-related products (DV=summed WTP).

We found that high (+1SD) self-acceptance individuals exhibited less compensatory consumption in response to threat than low (-1SD) self-acceptance individuals (p=.002). This relation was reversed for self-esteem, such that high self-esteem individuals exhibited greater compensatory consumption in response to threat than did low self-esteem individuals (p=.06). This is consistent with the previous literature that self-acceptance and self-esteem are related, yet distinct constructs. That is, self-acceptance reflects unconditional acceptance of one’s self, and therefore tends to offer protection against self-threats whereas self-esteem tends to be conditional on one’s successes and failures and hence, may entail a greater likelihood of defensive responding to protect the self than self-acceptance (Chamberlain and Hagga 2001).

In study 2, we manipulated, rather than measured, self-acceptance and examined a different form of compensatory consumption than in study 1, namely compensatory consumption intended to shift attention from the threat (Heatherton et al. 1991) rather than consumption intended to symbolically complete the threatened aspect of the self.

Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (self-acceptance vs. control) x 2 (intelligence-threat vs. no-threat), between-subjects design. Participants in the self-acceptance condition read a list of “thoughts” that help increase self-acceptance (e.g., “I can accept myself whether I win, lose, or draw.”), chose their favorite, and explained why that particular thought was their favorite and how they might apply it to their daily lives. Those in the control condition read through a list of daily activities, chose their favorite daily activity, and explained why that particular activity was their favorite. Then, after experiencing either a threat to their intelligence (different manipulation to that of study 1: a “test of intelligence”/negative feedback) or no threat (same test framed as stimulus development/no negative feedback), participants got an opportunity to consume M&M’s (DV=# of M&M’s consumed).

We found that participants in the self-acceptance condition did increase their consumption of M&M’s in response to an intelligence threat (vs. no-threat condition, p=.23), whereas participants in the control condition consumed more M&M’s in response to a threat (p=.038), indicating that those who exercised self-acceptance did not see the need to increase their consumption as a mean to avoid the threatened self.

Study 3 used a different type of self-threat (a threat to one’s power: Rucker and Galinsky 2008) and a different self-acceptance exercise to test whether consumers who practice self-acceptance would not only reduce their reliance on compensatory consumption but would also be more open to directly addressing the self-threat by seeking products that could help them improve on the threatened dimension.

Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (self-acceptance vs. control) x 2 (power-threat vs. no-threat) x 2 (threat-compensatory product vs. self-improvement product), between-subjects design. Participants in the self-acceptance condition read a short article on self-acceptance and wrote about why they believed self-acceptance to be important. Those in the control condition wrote about their last trip to buy groceries. Then, participants either experienced a threat to their sense of power (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee 2003) or did not experience any threat. Lastly, participants in the threat-compensatory product condition indicated their WTP for a magazine symbolic of status (“Elite Traveler”) whereas those in the self-improvement product condition indicated their WTP for a self-improvement book (“Power and Influence for Dummies”).

We again found that self-acceptance reduced participants’ post-threat WTP for a threat-compensatory product to no-threat level (F<1). Furthermore, self-acceptance increased participants’ post-threat WTP for a self-improvement product (p=.036). This finding helps converge on our account that self-acceptance leads to a relatively benign appraisal of threats and allows individuals to directly face and improve on the threatened dimension.

In sum, we provide convergent evidence for our model of threat resolution that highlights an important role for self-acceptance in...
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shaping how individuals appraise threats, which, in turn, reduces their reliance on compensatory consumption but increases their openness to facing and addressing threatening information.

REFERENCES

Table 1

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<th>Study</th>
<th>DV: summed WTP</th>
<th>Summary of Empirical Results</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Self-acceptance at -1SD (low self-acceptance): Intelligence threat condition ($M = 57.18$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 34.00$) $\beta = -11.60, t(110) = 2.05, p = .043$</td>
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<td>Self-acceptance at +1SD (high self-acceptance): Intelligence threat condition ($M = 14.81$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 15.03$) $\beta = -.73, t &lt; 1$</td>
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<td>Self-acceptance at -1SD (low self-acceptance): Intelligence threat condition ($M = 6.31$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 14.08$) $\beta = -2.22, t &lt; 1$</td>
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<td>Self-acceptance at +1SD (high self-acceptance): Intelligence threat condition ($M = 37.43$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 23.94$) $\beta = -10.23, t(110) = 1.80, p = .075$.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>DV: number of M&amp;M’s consumed</td>
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<td>No-internalization control condition: Intelligence threat condition ($M = 9.68, SD = 6.76$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 7.34, SD = 5.11$), $F(1, 203) = 4.34, p = .038$.</td>
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<td>Self-acceptance condition: Intelligence threat condition ($M = 6.86, SD = 5.27$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 8.28, SD = 5.84$), $F(1, 203) = 1.48, p = .23$</td>
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<td>Within intelligence threat condition: Self-acceptance condition vs. no-internalization control condition $F(1, 203) = 6.24, p = .01$</td>
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<td>Within no threat condition: Self-acceptance condition vs. no-internalization control condition $F &lt; 1$</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DV: WTP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Threat-compensatory product (Elite Traveler) No-internalization control condition: Power threat condition ($M = 30.80, SD = 39.40$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 10.76, SD = 22.83$), $F(1, 274) = 12.00, p = .001$</td>
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<td>Self-acceptance condition: Power threat condition ($M = 14.03, SD = 24.78$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 17.94, SD = 30.99$), $F &lt; 1$</td>
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<td>Self-improvement product (Power and Influence for Dummies) No-internalization control condition: Power threat condition ($M = 8.05, SD = 8.03$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 12.38, SD = 16.49$), $F &lt; 1$</td>
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<td>Self-acceptance condition: Power threat condition ($M = 19.89, SD = 28.09$) vs. No threat condition ($M = 7.74, SD = 8.26$), $F(1, 274) = 4.42, p = .036$.</td>
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The Top-Ten Effect: Consumers’ Subjective Perceptions of Rankings
Mathew S. Isaac, Seattle University, USA
Robert M. Schindler, Rutgers University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Lists of ranked items (e.g., Business Week’s top 25 MBA programs, Car and Driver’s top 10 cars) are ubiquitous in Western culture. From a consumption standpoint, there is considerable evidence that individuals find these lists informative and influential. Therefore, it is important to know exactly how the information provided in ranked lists is interpreted by users. Because a ranking is an ordinal scale of measurement, there is no technical reason why an information user should interpret items at adjoining ranks as having equal differences in the ranked attribute. Yet, in the absence of specific information about the ranked items, this equidistance seems reasonable for the information user to assume. In fact, even academic researchers have utilized linear functions that imply equidistance when modeling the effects of changes in an organization’s rank on the outcomes and policies of the ranked organizations (Monks and Ehrenberg 1999a, b).

In this research, we propose the existence of a cognitive bias that overrides the presumption of equidistance between adjacent ranks in the interpretation of ranked lists. This bias, which has important implications for consumer evaluations of items presented in a ranked list, emerges due to our tendency to see complex and uncategorized arrays, such as long lists of numbers, in terms of a smaller set of categories. A consequence of this tendency to categorize is an exaggeration of the perceived differences between items at adjoining ranks that cross category boundaries.

What are the possible categories that might be formed by consumers when processing uncategorized ranked-list information? One possibility, supported by research on multidigit numerical processing and price-response judgments (Poltrock and Schwartz 1984; Thomas and Morwitz 2005), is that individuals see ranked lists in terms of categories based on the value of a rank’s leftmost digit. For ranks up to 100, such place-value categories would consist of ranks 1-9 (0 as the tens digit), ranks 10-19 (1 as the tens digit), ranks 20-29 (2 as the tens digit), and so on. An alternative possibility is that individuals see ranked lists in terms of categories based on round numbers. In our decimal number system, round numbers are those that are multiples of 10 (such as 10, 20, 30) and halfway points between these multiples (e.g., 5, 15, 25). Support for this possibility is provided by the extensive evidence for the cognitive salience of round numbers (Coupland 2010; Dehaene and Mehler 1992; Jansen and Pollmann 2001). For ranks up to 100, such round-number categories would consist of ranks 1-5 (i.e., the top five), ranks 1-10 (i.e., the top ten), ranks 1-15 (i.e., the top fifteen), ranks 1-20 (i.e., the top twenty), and so on.

Across three studies, we provide evidence that information users do in fact spontaneously form categories to interpret uncategorized ranked lists. Furthermore, we show that round-number categories, and not place-value categories, are typically created when considering ranked lists. We refer to this as the top-ten effect since “top ten” lists are among the most prevalent round-number categories.

In Study 1, we used a longitudinal data set with 2,026,975 records provided by the Graduate Management Admissions Council (GMAC), the organization that administers the GMAT exam that is typically required prior to business school admission. We conducted a series of regressions to assess the relationship between yearly changes in a school’s rank on the U.S. News & World Report list and yearly changes in the number of GMAT score reports that were sent to the school by GMAC (a proxy for completed applications). We found a significant and direct effect of a positive round-number category shift on the year-to-year change in number of GMAT score reports sent to a particular school. Whereas traversing a round-number category boundary (e.g., improving one’s rank from number 21 to 20) affected the number of GMAT score requests (and presumably, the number of subsequent applications) that a school received, place-value category shifts of similar magnitude (e.g., improving one’s rank from number 20 to number 19) had no such effect.

Study 2 shows that evaluations of an identical target differ when its position on a ranked list is varied between participants. More specifically, when judging the math ability of a student with a rank of 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 on a list of 28 students, between-round-number category rank differences (i.e., 10 vs. 11) exerted greater impact on information users’ evaluations of the target than equivalently sized within-round-number-category differences (i.e., 8 vs. 9, 11 vs. 12). Further, we found no evidence that between-place-value-category rank differences (i.e., 9 vs. 10) exerted greater impact on evaluations than within-place-value-category rank differences.

In Study 3, we attempted to isolate a psychological mechanism underlying the top-ten effect. Given our hypothesis that the effect occurs because round-number categories (e.g., top 10) are cognitively accessible to consumers because of their prevalence in everyday communication, we made an attempt to eliminate the effect by reducing the accessibility of round-number categories. We implemented this by temporarily increasing the accessibility of ranked lists that highlight “sharp numbers” (Dehaene 1997) rather than round ones, such as the “top 101” or the “top 49” in a priming task. When the cognitive accessibility of round number categories was high, we replicated the effects of prior studies. However, as predicted, when the cognitive accessibility of round number categories was low, the top-ten effect was eliminated.

This research provides converging evidence that information users tend to form round-number categories (and not place-value categories) when presented with an uncategorized ranked list. This tendency to generate round-number categories results in an exaggerated difference in evaluations of items that traverse a round-number category boundary. Because consumers create mental partitions along round-number-category boundaries (e.g., top ten), the evaluative distance between adjacent items on opposite sides of this partition (e.g., 10 vs. 11) exceeds the distance between adjacent items that fall into the same round-number category (e.g., 9 vs. 10). In addition to enriching our understanding of categorization and numerical cognition, this research has important managerial implications because ranked lists are so pervasive in marketing communications.

REFERENCES


Charitable Giving to Controllable Misfortunes: The Role of Deliberation and Victim Identifiability
Yoshiko DeMotta, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA
Sankar Sen, CUNY Baruch College, USA
Stephen J. Gould, CUNY Baruch College, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Causal controllability is the degree to which an observer of another person’s misfortune perceives that misfortune to be the fault or responsibility of the person in need of help. When a person encounters another in need of help, the person spontaneously judges the causal controllability (Weiner 1985). When the need is caused by an uncontrollable circumstance, sympathy is elicited, and the perceiver is likely to help the victim; in contrast, when the need is caused by a controllable circumstance, anger and blame are evoked, and the perceiver is likely to withhold help giving (Weiner 1980).

Based on this theory, a nonprofit organization’s message is likely to be more effective if it communicates uncontrollability of the need. However, social causes that nonprofit organizations attempt to aid are not always uncontrollable. For example, causes having a mental-behavioral origin such as drug abuse and obesity are considered to be controllable (Weiner, Perry, and Magnusson 1988), and it is difficult to solicit donations for those causes because they tend to elicit perceivers’ anger and blame toward the victims. How can we decrease people’s negative evaluations toward the victim of the controllable misfortune and increase people’s willingness to help the victim? Drawing on the literature of the identifiable victim effect (Small and Loewenstein 2003) and the feeling- versus deliberation-based mode of processing (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004), we propose that when a cause is construed as controllable, a charitable request that excludes the victim’s personal information and evokes a potential donor’s cognitive deliberation will increase donations.

The identifiable victim effect refers to people’s greater helpfulness towards a personalized, single victim compared to an abstract, unidentified victim (Small and Loewenstein 2003). Research has shown that a perceiver’s affective reaction, whether it is sympathy or anger, is stronger toward an identified person (i.e., when the victim’s information such as a photo and name is available for the perceiver) than toward an unidentified person (Small and Loewenstein 2005). In order to lessen a perceiver’s negative reaction toward the victim of a controllable misfortune, exclusion of the victim’s personal information will result in not only the lesser degree of negative reaction, but also an increased opportunity to deliberate upon the controllable misfortune. Deliberation will yield the donor’s consideration of the misfortune in a broader scope (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004), and the donor’s perception of the misfortune as stemming from a societal failure rather than from individual failures (Piff et al. 2010), increasing the donor’s concern for welfare of the victim and help giving.

Study 1 (N=165) tests hypothesis 1, and also replicates the finding of Small et al. (2007). Participants first read a fictitious donation request from a nonprofit organization that provides medical care and support for the victims of severe car accidents. The request manipulated the levels of causal controllability, victim identifiability, and deliberation. Participants then indicated how much they would be willing to donate to the organization. The result of a 2 (victim identifiability) x 2 (deliberation) ANOVA predicting a donation amount revealed the significant interaction effect both in the low controllability condition (F(1, 80) = 3.83, p < .05), and in the high controllability condition (F(1, 75) = 4.58, p < .05). The result in the low controllability condition replicated that of the Small et al. study (2007) such that in the low deliberation condition, participants in the high victim identifiability condition donated more than those in the low victim identifiability condition (M_{high identifiability} = 2.19, M_{low identifiability} = .94, p < .05). Donation did not differ in the high deliberation condition (M_{high identifiability} = .94, M_{low identifiability} = 1.17, NS). Importantly, the ANOVA result in the high controllability condition supported hypothesis 1. In the high deliberation condition, participants donated more when the victim identifiability was low than when it was high (M_{high identifiability} = .53; M_{low identifiability} = 1.58, p < .05). Donation did not differ in the low deliberation condition (M_{high identifiability} = .52; M_{low identifiability} = .32, NS). Among participants in the low victim identifiability condition, participants who read statistics donated more than those who did not (p < .05).

Study 2 (N=83) examines the mediating role of sympathy (hypothesis 2). The design and procedure were similar to study 1. The differences were that we eliminated the victim’s photo from the description of the identifiable victim, measured participants’ sympathetic response, and used only the controllable misfortune condition. After reading a donation request, participants indicated the amount of donation and the extent to which they felt sympathetic toward the victim. The same ANOVA as in study 1 revealed the significant two-way interaction (F(1, 78) = 5.47, p < .05). Supporting hypothesis 2, the bootstrapping mediation analysis showed that the conditional indirect effect of victim identifiability on donation was significantly mediated by sympathy in the high-deliberation condition (β = -.38; 95% CI: -.99, -.08), but not in the low-deliberation condition.

Study 3 (N=73) increases validity of the findings in the previous studies using the different method to manipulate the degree of deliberation. The design and procedure were identical to study 2, except that the degree of deliberation was manipulated with a priming task. We first primed participants’ modes of processing information, either deliberation-based or affect-based (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004). Then participants read the donation request, and indicated their sympathetic response and donation amount. With the same analyses as in study 2, the result supported hypothesis 1 (F(1, 68) = 8.68, p < .01) and hypothesis 2 (β = -.51; 95% CI: -.21, -.17). This research contributes to the literature of the identifiable victim effect by demonstrating the moderating role of causal controllability on that effect. Our results show that the conventional belief is only true when people perceive the misfortune to be uncontrollable. Although deliberation is often discouraged in charitable appeals, when it comes to a controllable misfortune, deliberation can...
effectively lead to sympathy and increases donations. This paper also contributes on a practical level to nonprofit organizations that support controllable misfortunes by suggesting communication methods that reduce the negative evaluations from the perception of high controllability without losing the opportunity to communicate preventability of the misfortune.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In this paper, we investigate the effect of sensitive disclosures on the impressions one will form of others who made similar disclosures. Using both observational and experimental data, we find that, paradoxically, people who disclose a questionable behavior judge others who did the same more harshly as compared to those who did not disclose. This has important consequences especially for users of new technologies of information sharing.

Disclosures of sensitive information have become increasingly common in social media. In the face of such common disclosures, some have argued that social norms about privacy and acceptable boundaries of revelation of private information are changing. Yet, public disclosures are often the starting point people use to form an impression about others, as it occurs when employers pre-screen job applicants by checking out their online media profiles (Brown & Vaughn, 2011). Would changing social norms about what is appropriate to disclose affect how people react to similar disclosures made by others?

Since social norms about appropriate online disclosures are likely to change over time, information that today is categorized as embarrassing or harmful to one’s reputation may not receive as much attention in the near future as it does now. So, if most of us were to have questionable information about ourselves available on the Internet in a few years from now, similar information about others may not negatively affect our impressions about them. This may happen for different reasons. First, we may perceive others as similar to us because of our shared experience of disclosing personal information. Second, we may not judge them negatively since doing so would reflect poorly on us too, thus not allowing us to maintain a positive self-image. Alternatively, we may recognize the inappropriateness of the disclosures but still not express harsh judgments about others based on their disclosures so as to avoid being seen as hypocrite.

Contrary to this intuitive prediction, and consistent with cognitive dissonance research (Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957; Novak & Lerner, 1968; Taylor & Mettee, 1971), we suggest the opposite: questionable disclosures may lead to harsher judgments toward others who made similar disclosures. Our prediction also derives from recent behavioral ethics research, which found that people make harsher judgments of others’ immoral actions after recalling their own past immoral behavior than after recalling their own past moral behavior (Barkan, Ayal, Gino, & Ariely, 2012). In our research, besides reflecting on their own past behavior, participants disclose it to others.

We test our prediction in two studies by examining how people react to disclosures of others’ questionable behaviors (photos of one being drunk or using drugs) when they made similar disclosures about themselves. We consider both unprompted (Study 1) and elicited disclosures (Study 2). Both studies were online surveys with participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.

In Study 1, we use observational data (self-reported posting of sensitive information on online social networks) to test whether unprompted disclosure of a specific embarrassing behavior correlates negatively with the judgment of others who made similar disclosures; whether this effect vanishes when the target person was not personally responsible for the disclosure, which was made by someone else instead; and whether this effect could be explained by cognitive dissonance. We find that people who self-reported that their online records included embarrassing material, such as drunken photos, would be less likely to hire a qualified job candidate who had drunken photos on her social media profile than people who never posted such material in the first place. We also find evidence of regret (dissonance) as the triggering mechanism.

Since people choose whether or not to disclose certain sensitive information, Study 1 does not allow for causal inference about the effect of disclosure itself. In order to solve this self-selection issue, in Study 2 we manipulated the probability of disclosure experimentally by either providing or not providing strong privacy and confidentiality reassurances to subjects (Frey, 1986; Singer, Hippler & Schwarz, 1992), thus making privacy concerns salient or not. Hence, employing the same attitudinal measure used in Study 1 and using the random assignment to one of the two conditions as an instrument for disclosure, we tested, using an instrumental variable approach (Angrist, 1990; Angrist, Imbens & Rubin, 1996), whether embarrassing disclosures have a negative effect on impressions about a target person who also made similar disclosures. We find that people who admitted having tried drugs were less likely to hire a job candidate who had posted material related to her drug use on her social media profile, as compared to people who did not admit it.

Our work offers two main contributions. First, we contribute to impression formation research by examining the impressions people form of others based on their private disclosures. When forming impressions of others, one might consider a trait the target person possesses or a trait the target person decided to publicly disclose. In the former case, people will likely form an impression of the target person based on the trait itself; in the latter case, people will form an impression based on the disclosed trait. Though people may have no particular opinion about a certain trait or behavior of others, the very choice of publicly disclosing it may generate a negative impression. Therefore, we expect different reactions to information that the target person willingly decides to disclose, and information about the target that is disclosed by somebody else.

Second, our research makes an empirical contribution to the psychology and consumer research literature by testing our hypotheses using instrumental variable estimation, a regression-based approach that is particularly useful in cases where experimental manipulations leave a margin for non-compliance to participants. Though this approach is common in economics, it seems underutilized in consumer research and related fields.

REFERENCES


The Power to Control Time: How Power Influences How Much Time (You Think) You Have

Alice Moon, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Serena Chen, University of California, Berkeley, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Time is commonly described as the “ultimate resource.” Unlike other resources, such as food or money, time is constantly being spent and can never be replaced. Because of the irreplaceable nature of time and all of the things that people want to accomplish, people often complain that they don’t have enough time, and this time pressure is a substantial stressor. Though power has been defined as control over resources, time appears to be a unique resource that equalizes all people, high and low in power alike.

Although everyone objectively has the same amount of time, could power increase individuals’ subjective perceptions of the amount of time they have? We propose that power leads people to feel as though they have more control over their time, which results in more optimistic time-availability assessments. In fact, powerful individuals believe they have control over outcomes that they could not possibly control, such as the outcome of a die roll (Fast, Greunfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). If powerful individuals also feel they have control over their time, it stands to reason that they may also feel they have more time.

While no research has explicitly examined power and perceived time availability thus far, a growing literature on power and time-related phenomena converges with the idea that power may increase one’s perception of time. For instance, high-power individuals, compared to low-power individuals, have been found to be especially biased in underestimating the amount of time they expect tasks to take (Weick & Guinote, 2010). This effect could partly be due to an increased sense of available time. That is, if high-power individuals feel they have more time, this could result in optimistic predictions about how long tasks will take. Power has also been found to decrease temporal discounting (Joshi & Fast, 2013). Because past research has indicated that having an expanded time horizon (i.e., feeling as though you have more time) leads to less discounting (Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009), power could lead to decreased temporal discounting partly by way of an increased sense of available time. Although each of these studies has identified various separate mediators, all of these effects could potentially be cohesive-ly explained by the underlying mechanism of increased perceived time availability.

In the present research, we tested the hypothesis that power increases one’s perceived amount of time, due to increased perceptions of control over time. We tested whether perceived control over time mediated the power-time link both by measuring the mediator in Study 3 and by experimentally manipulating the mediator in Study 4 to examine its effects on perceived time availability.

Study 1

Study 1 ($N = 56$) examined the relationship between trait power and perceived time availability. Higher trait power was significantly associated with greater perceived time availability, $r(56) = .38$, $p = .004$.

Study 2

Participants were asked to visualize themselves in an interview scenario in which they were asked to imagine themselves as either the interviewer (evaluating the outcomes of the interviewee; high-power role, $n = 52$) or the interviewee (being evaluated by the interviewer; low-power role, $n = 52$). Participants were also shown a picture of an interview room and asked to imagine themselves in the chair that an arrow pointed to (a high-power or low-power chair). After this task, participants reported their state perceived time availability. As expected, high-power participants felt they had significantly more time ($M = 4.51, SD = 0.93$) than low-power participants ($M = 3.98, SD = 1.01$), $F(1, 96) = 7.10$, $p = .01$.

Study 3

Study 3 ($N = 103$) aimed to replicate Study 2 using a community sample (MTurk) and to investigate whether the underlying mechanism for the relationship between power and perceived time availability is perceived control over time. The procedure and materials for Study 3 were the same as Study 2 with the addition of a state measure of perceived control over time. High-power participants felt they had more control over their time ($M = 4.95, SD = 1.06$) than low-power participants ($M = 4.41, SD = 1.18$), $F(1, 94) = 5.48$, $p = .02$. Replicating Study 2, high-power participants also felt they had more time ($M = 4.74, SD = 1.25$) than low-power participants ($M = 4.16, SD = 1.12$), $F(1, 94) = 5.64$, $p = .02$. As hypothesized, perceived control over time fully mediated the effect of power condition on perceived time availability. That is, the effect of the power condition on perceived time availability was no longer significant when taking perceived control over time into account, and using bootstrapping indicated that the indirect effect was significant. Therefore, Study 3 provided evidence that power influences perceived time availability through increased perceived control over time.

Study 4

Though Study 3 offered correlational evidence that perceived control over time mediated the power-time link, in Study 4, we sought to provide experimental evidence for our mediator. Therefore, we used an experimental casual chain link as suggested by Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005). In particular, in Study 3, we found that power influenced perceived control over time. In Study 4, we manipulated perceived control over time to examine its effects on perceived time availability.

Participants were first asked to recall a time in which they had (high control condition, $n = 44$) or did not have (no control condition, $n = 57$) control over their time. Then, participants reported how much time they felt they had. Participants in the high-control condition felt they had more time ($M = 4.69, SD = 1.40$) than participants in the no-control condition ($M = 4.04, SD = 1.11$), $F(1, 99) = 6.57$, $p = .01$.

Table 1: Summary of Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trait power is associated with increased perceived time availability.</td>
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<td>Study 2</td>
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<td>Manipulating power increases perceived time availability.</td>
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<td>Perceived control over time mediates the power-time link.</td>
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Across four studies, we found that power leads to an increased sense of available time by boosting powerful individuals’ percep-
tions of their control over time. Increases in perceived time availabil-
ity has many important implications. In addition to decreased stress,
greater perceived time availability has been linked to more time spent helping others (Darley & Batson, 1973, Rudd et al., 2012),
consumption of more experiential (vs. material) goods (Rudd et al.,
2012), and increased willingness to commit to future engagements
(Mogilner, Chance, & Norton, 2012). Given the importance of sub-
jective time availability, future research should examine the implica-
tions of feeling like you have (or don’t have) time.

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Countervailing Influences of Consumer Animosity and Nostalgia on Purchasing Decisions
Justina Gineikienė, Vilnius University, Lithuania
Adamantios Diamantopoulos, Harvard University, USA & University of Vienna, Austria
Sigitas Urbonavičius, Vilnius University, Lithuania

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Introduction
In recent years, consumer animosity has received a lot of attention in international marketing literature (for a review, see Riefler and Diamantopoulos 2007). The construct is conceptually defined as “remnants of antipathy related to previous or ongoing military, political or economic events” (Klein, Ettensohn, and Morris 1998, 90) and has been repeatedly found to have a negative effect on consumers’ willingness to buy foreign products (e.g., Klein et al. 1998; Klein 2002; Shimp, Dunn, and Klein 2004). Animosity may also adversely impact product evaluations (Ettensohn and Klein 2005; Rose, Rose, and Shoham 2009; Shoham et al. 2006). Its influence has been found to be separate from that of consumer ethnocentrism, namely, the “beliefs held by consumers about the appropriateness and indeed morality of purchasing foreign-made products” (Shimp and Sharma 1987, 280), which has similar effects on foreign product buying behavior (for a review, see Shankarmahesh 2006).

In some purchase settings, there may be a countervailing force to animosity, namely nostalgia, reflecting “a preference (general liking, positive attitude, or favorable affect) toward objects (people, places, or things) that were more common (popular, fashionable, or widely circulated) when one was younger (in early adulthood, in adolescence, in childhood, or even before birth” (Holbrook and Schindler 1991, 330). Such settings typically occur when countries that experienced painful long-lasting occupation, become independent. For example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, dozens of new countries were established where consumers are exposed to products that are closely connected with consumers’ youth and past, but at the same time, they originate in a (now) foreign and disliked country. Under these circumstances, negative attitudes due to animosity may co-exist with positive attitudes due to consumer nostalgia and the question arises as to which construct has the strongest impact on consumer behavior.

Against this background, the purpose of the current study is to empirically examine consumer animosity and nostalgia as countervailing forces on consumer behavior in Lithuania, while controlling for the effects of consumer ethnocentrism. Lithuania provides a suitable setting for nostalgia and country animosity research as the country was occupied by the Soviet Union for five decades (1940–1990) and only regained its independence relatively recently. The Russian Federation is thus a target country for negative sentiments as it is a legal successor to the Soviet Union and an ex-controlling state of this union. Russian-made products may give rise to nostalgic feelings (as those products are connected with the past), but at the same time evoke animosity feelings due to historical events. The latter include mass deportation campaigns to Siberia, partisan resistance fights, and more recent independence fights (Laurinavičius, Motieka, and Statkus 2005). Attitudes towards products made in Russian Federation are thus probably simultaneously loaded both with (positive) nostalgic memories and (negative) animosity feelings.

Unlike most previous studies of animosity and nostalgia, the focus of the present study is not on intended, but on actual behavior (product ownership) as the key outcome variable. More specifically, two types of products are considered: nostalgic and non-nostalgic products. Both types of products are manufactured and imported from the Russian Federation, but originate from different time periods. Nostalgic products were already available during Soviet times, whereas non-nostalgic products have been launched to the market after Lithuania regained independence.

Conceptual Background and Hypotheses

Impact of Consumer Animosity
Animosity is theoretically expected to be negatively related to buying products from the offending country, since Lithuanian consumers’ animosity feelings are likely to bear on purchasing decisions, leading to the avoidance of Russian products. In a prior research, product ownership was assessed by Klein et al. (1998), who validated their willingness to buy measure with a measure of actual ownership of six consumer products (e.g., radios, cameras); by Shin (2001), who asked respondents to freely list all products of Japanese origin they possess; and by Klein (2002), who asked respondents to indicate whether they own a Japanese car. Shoham et al. (2006) used a change-in-purchase behavior scale that featured six actual product categories produced or marketed by Israeli Arabs, while Guido et al. (2010) observed animosity effects on purchases on two additional product categories. As all these studies empirically confirm that animosity negatively influences actual ownership, we also expect that:

Hypothesis 1: Consumer animosity is negatively related to actual ownership of Russian products.

In their seminal study, Klein et al. (1998) found that animosity toward a foreign nation affects negatively the purchase of products produced by that country independently of judgments of product quality. Thus, consumers may acknowledge the (good) product quality stemming from the offending country, but still avoid such products because the foreign country concerned has engaged in military, political, or economic acts that a consumer finds both grievous and difficult to forgive (Klein et al. 1998). While several studies subsequently confirmed the non-significant link between animosity and product judgment (e.g., Witkowski 2000; Shin 2001; Klein 2002), other authors found a direct negative effect of animosity on product judgment (e.g., Ettensohn and Klein 2005; Mostafa 2010; Shoham et al. 2006). Shoham et al. (2006) draw on the principle of cognitive consistency theory (Festinger 1957) and balance theory (Heider 1958). Researchers argue that consumers who feel heightened animosity will seek to restore the balance and be motivated to adapt their cognitions (product-quality judgments) downward. Thus, an increase in animosity levels will bring about a decrease in product-quality judgment to maintain the harmony. Moreover, the impact of animosity on product judgment may be country specific (e.g., Japan may be a target country of animosity, but, at the same time, it enjoys a positive image of economic health and advanced technology). In the current case, we expect that animosity will lead to a denigration of products made in the Russian Federation as the latter tends to be associated with a poor product quality stereotype. Thus:

Hypothesis 2: Consumer animosity is negatively related to product judgment of Russian products.
Impact of Nostalgia

Findings regarding the relationship between nostalgia and purchase behavior are mixed. For example, Sierra and McQuitty (2007) found that nostalgia positively influences consumers' intentions to purchase nostalgic products, while Ford and Merchant (2010) found that appeals for charity that evoke personal nostalgia have a positive impact on the charitable-donation intentions of consumers. In contrast, Rindfleisch, Freeman, and Burroughs (2000) found that nostalgia is a poor predictor of product preference and choice for such products as automobiles. Similarly, Lambert-Pandraud and Laurent (2010) concentrated on actual ownership of perfume and found that nostalgia does not offer a strong explanation of older consumers' tendency to use older perfumes.

The above mixed findings can (at least) partly be explained by differences in the level of specificity of the nostalgia scales used. Some aforementioned studies used Holbrook's (1993) general nostalgia scale (e.g., Rindfleisch et al. 2000) and linked to specific, but not necessarily nostalgic, brands. Other studies focused on nostalgic products and also used more product-specific items in their nostalgia measure (e.g., Sierra and McQuitty 2007). In the present case, since we explicitly consider both nostalgic and non-nostalgic products, we expect that:

Hypothesis 3: Nostalgia is positively related to actual purchases of nostalgic Russian products only.

Prior research has not addressed the relationship between nostalgia and product judgment. However, bearing in mind that nostalgia reflects a “yearning for yesterday” (Davis 1979, 18), one could expect that such a state of mind may lead to a harsher evaluation of the products of today. In addition, the scale used to measure nostalgia (product nostalgia factor) incorporate product judgment items (e.g., “They don’t make them like they used to”). The consumers who hold attitude that products were better in the old days will be more positive towards Soviet products (that originate from the old days). We thus hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 4: Nostalgia is positively related to product judgment of nostalgic Russian products only.

Impact of Consumer Ethnocentrism

As already noted, in the current study, consumer ethnocentrism serves as a control variable for the effects of animosity and nostalgia on product judgment and ownership. Ethnocentric consumers would consider purchasing imported products as being wrong because it hurts the domestic economy, causes loss of jobs, and is unpatriotic (Shimp and Sharma 1987). Whereas ethnocentrism is strongly linked towards preferences for domestic products and negatively related towards all foreign products, animosity is country-specific (Klein 2002; Klein and Ettonson 1999). A substantial body of research shows that consumer ethnocentrism has a significant negative impact on product judgment and willingness to buy foreign products (e.g., Klein 2002; Netemeyer, Durvasula, and Lichtenstein 1991; Sharma, Shimp, and Shin 1995). We, thus, expect that:

Hypothesis 5: Consumer ethnocentrism is negatively related to actual ownership of Russian products.

Hypothesis 6: Consumer ethnocentrism is negatively related to product judgment of Russian products.

Extant literature has not explicitly addressed the relationship among consumer ethnocentrism, animosity and nostalgia. According to Social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979, for a review see Hogg 2006), ethnocentrism is associated with a negative out-group bias toward foreign products in general and animosity—with negative out-group bias towards specific country. To the contrary, nostalgia is associated with in-group favoritism (Sierra and McQuitty 2007) and may assist in connecting with a desirable past and with other people who shared the same experience (Kleine, Kleine, and Allen 1995). As in our case we research specific country-made products and not foreign products in general, the effects of animosity and nostalgia may dominate the consumer choices in contrast to the consumer ethnocentrism (e.g., consumers might avoid buying foreign products in general, but this ethnocentric tendency is weaker than country specific animosity and country specific nostalgia).

Thus, in the case when specific country products are analyzed the specific attitudes should dominate general ethnocentric attitudes, therefore we propose that:

Hypothesis 7: Consumer ethnocentrism effects will be weak when animosity and nostalgia are also present

Since product judgment is well-known to be positively related to product ownership (e.g., Guido et al. 2010; Klein et al. 1998; Shoham et al. 2006), we further posit that:

Hypothesis 8: Product judgment of Russian products is positively related to actual ownership of Russian products.

Method

Data were collected through mall intercepts (Bruwer and Haydam 1996) in the biggest shopping mall of Lithuania in Vilnius by randomly approaching consumers entering the mall. A total of 419 questionnaires were included in the analysis. The sample includes almost equal numbers of male and female respondents. Just over 12% of the respondents were younger than 19 years of age, 45% fell into 20–29 years age group, 23.2% were between 30–39 years old, 9.8% between 40–49 and 9.2% were 50+ years old. In terms of household income, most respondents fell into three almost equal groups (each accounting around 29%), and only the lowest-income group was significantly smaller (12% of the sample). Compared to Lithuania’s general population, the sample consists of slightly younger, urban respondents with a higher income (Lithuanian Department of Statistics 2011).

To operationalize the study constructs, we adapted scales that had been validated in previous research. Consumer animosity towards Russia was measured with a three-item scale based on Klein et al. (1998) and adapted to the Lithuanian context (example item: I cannot forgive Russia for the mass deportation campaigns of people to Siberia). The scale focused on war animosity which captures the most relevant and sensitive aspect of animosity towards Russia in the survey country. Nostalgia was measured by four items drawn from Holbrook (1993). Consistent with prior research revealing two-dimensional nature of the scale (Borges and Boulyry 2003; Evans et al. 2010; Reisenwitz, Iyer, and Cutler 2004; Rindfleisch et al. 2000; Rousseau and Venter 1999, 2000), two of the items captured product nostalgia (example item: They don’t make them like they used to) and the other two progress nostalgia (example item: Technological change will ensure a brighter future). Consumer ethnocentrism was measured by the four-items scale used by Klein (2002) which is based on Shimp and Sharma’s (1987) original CETSCALE (example
item: It is not right to purchase foreign products, because it puts Lithuanians out of jobs). Product judgment was measured on a three-item scale based on items developed by Klein et al. (1998), Darling and Arnold (1988), Wood and Darling (1993) (example item: Products made in Russia are of good quality).

Product ownership was measured by asking respondents whether they had bought different Russian convenience goods during the last six months. As currently there is not many nostalgic products available that had been manufactured during the Soviet times, we included three brands that used to be the pride of Soviet manufacturing sector (black tea and mineral water). They are still manufactured by Russian companies, keeping the old brand names. Non-nostalgic products were represented by three brands currently manufactured in the Russian Federation but not available during Soviet times (dressing and cosmetics). Product ownership was measured as sums of all brands purchased in the nostalgic and non-nostalgic categories respectively.

Results
Measurement model
We investigated the dimensionality, reliability and validity of our construct measures via a confirmatory factor analysis (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Overall fit was satisfactory ($\chi^2 = 252$, $df = 85$, RMSEA = 0.065, CFI = 0.952, SRMR = 0.041). Composite reliabilities of measurement models ranged from .67 to .93, while average variance extracted (AVE) values ranged from .51 to .81. All AVEs exceeded the squared correlation between each construct with all other constructs (Fornell and Larker 1981).

Structural model
To test our hypotheses, we estimated a structural equation model with LISREL 8.8 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2007), which produced a satisfactory fit ($\chi^2 = 236$, $df = 85$, RMSEA = 0.065, CFI = 0.952, SRMR = 0.041). The relevant standardized parameter estimates and associated t-values are shown in figure 1. Supporting hypothesis 1, country animosity is negatively related to ownership of both nostalgic ($\beta = -0.09$, p < .10) and non-nostalgic ($\beta = -0.11$, p < .05) Russian products. Moreover, and consistent with hypothesis 2, animosity negatively impacts product judgment ($\beta = -0.40$, p < .01). In support of hypothesis 3, product nostalgia is positively linked to ownership of nostalgic Russian products ($\beta = 0.17$, p < .05); however, no such effect is observed for progress nostalgia. Moreover, neither product nor progress nostalgia are related to product judgment, thus offering no support for hypothesis 4. Surprisingly, and in contrast to hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6, consumer ethnocentrism reveals no significant impact on either product ownership or product judgment. As expected, consumer ethnocentrism effects are weak when animosity and nostalgia are also present and hypothesis 7 is confirmed. Finally, as predicted by hypothesis 8, product judgment is positively related to product ownership; this effect holds for both nostalgic ($\beta = 0.41$, p < .01) and non-nostalgic products ($\beta = 0.42$, p < .01).

Discussion and Conclusions
Our findings offer some evidence that consumer nostalgia may indeed act as a countervailing force to consumer animosity in certain settings. However, it is only product nostalgia that impacts consumer behavior and its influence is limited to nostalgic products. Indeed, with regard to ownership of the latter, nostalgia is a better predictor than consumer animosity; the opposite holds in the case of non-nostalgic products, ownership of which is affected by animosity but not nostalgia. Regarding product judgment, only animosity was found to be a significant predictor, as also observed by Ettenson and Klein (2005) and Mostafa (2010), among others. Given that product judgment also strongly impacts product ownership, it can be concluded that consumer animosity has a greater explanatory power than either nostalgia or consumer ethnocentrism. Indeed, the latter was unexpectedly found to have no significant effects on either product judgment or product ownership. In this context, some animosity studies found that consumer ethnocentrism is the dominant factor in choosing between a domestic good and a foreign good (e.g., Klein 2002). The current findings suggest that the relative strength of consumer ethnocentrism may be weak, when animosity and nostalgia also influence product purchases.

From a managerial perspective, the study findings have implications for advertisers, who normally benefit from positive consumer responses to nostalgia (Reisenwitz et al. 2004). Advertisers communicating products that strengthen consumers’ nostalgic responses should expect that nostalgia can produce a competitive advantage only when exploited in appropriate settings. In countries where nostalgic memories co-exist with animosity feelings, messages from the past should be used cautiously as they may elicit public outrage. A recent negative publicity example in Lithuania involves a supermarket chain which promoted food products carrying “Soviet” as a brand name during the commemoration of victims of the fight for independence day. The campaign not only provoked negative consumer responses, but also encouraged discussion at the political level that brand names with Soviet connotations have to be banned.

Regarding future research, three issues merit attention. First, the current study should be replicated in other settings in which both animosity and nostalgia may co-exist (e.g., other ex-Soviet countries, former Yugoslavia) in order to assess the generalizability of our findings. Second, instead of using Holbrook’s (1993) scale which captures nostalgia in general, future studies may develop scales that focus on some specific former period; this would make the measurement of nostalgia more comparable to measures of animosity which, by definition, focus on specific events (Riefler and Diamantopoulos 2007). Finally, a longitudinal study seeking to explicate the development the relationship between animosity and nostalgia over time would offer important insights on the dynamics of the constructs.
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Sensory consumption is understood to be consumption of products or experiences that engages the senses of the consumer; a consumption experience that is processed through one or more of the five sensory modalities of taste, vision, sound, smell and touch (Krishna 2011). In this research we investigate how consumers can use heightened sensory consumption as a means of restoration of their feelings of self-worth.

The relationship between need for status or self-esteem, and the use of conspicuous consumption as a compensatory mechanism is well established (Charles, Hurst and Roussanov 2009; Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009). In conspicuous consumption, compensatory consumption has involved a heightened engagement of only one of the five senses, vision, (Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2010, 2012).

In this work we investigate: 1) Do individuals facing self-threat only consume conspicuously when products have clear status-enhancing visual attributes like brand name and logo, or does this preference for visually conspicuous products operate at a more basic sensory level, void of contextual status-cues such as brand? 2) Do individuals facing self-threat also seek more conspicuous consumption along other sensory domains? Contrary to the spirit of conspicuous consumption which deals with visible consumption in the visual domain, we propose that a threat to one’s self-worth would result in compensatory effects even in consumption experiences which are not publicly visible, thus proposing that conspicuous sensory consumption- defined by us as need for heightened engagement across different sensory domains- may be a means for self-worth restoration as well (Sivanathan and Pettit 2010).

In a series of four studies, we test whether individuals under self-threat indulge in heightened sensory consumption in the domains of visual, auditory and haptic consumption. We find that when their sense of self-worth is threatened, individuals engage in conspicuous or heightened sensory gratification by showing a higher preference for more conspicuously designed products and louder volumes of music, and exhibiting a higher desire to touch products, even those for which touching is not considered instrumental in assessing product quality. We also find that engaging in a self-affirmation exercise negates the need to indulge in conspicuous sensory consumption. Thus, we propose that engaging in conspicuous sensory consumption may have a restorative effect on consumers’ feelings of self-worth.

Study 1 investigates the impact of self-threat on compensatory consumption in the visual domain, looking at consumers’ choices of visually conspicuous, “loud” product designs. Adapted from Han, Nunes and Dreze (2010) definition of brand prominence, we define “visual conspicuousness” as the extent to which a product attracts attention, as reflected in its visual properties, including its material composition, the use of prominent colors, sizes, shapes, and other conspicuous design elements. 84 students participated in this 2 (Self Worth: Low, High) X 2 (Visual Product Conspicuousness: Conspicuous, Discreet) experiment. Self-worth was manipulated by informing participants that they had performed among the lowest 5% (low self-worth) or highest 5% (high self-worth) of all participants in a problem-solving activity they completed (Sivanathan and Pettit 2010). Participants were told that they would be entered in a lottery to win one of two flash drives (pretested to differ only along a composite scale for “visual conspicuousness”, not on other measures like attractiveness). Subjects in the low self-worth condition liked the visually conspicuous flash drive more than the visually discreet flash drive (M_conspicuous=5.07, M_discreet=4.14, t=2.27, p<.05), had a higher purchase intention (M_conspicuous=4.04, M_discreet=3.19, t=1.97; p=.05), and were willing to pay a higher amount for it M_conspicuous=655.00, M_discreet=429.52, t=2.65; p<.05).

In Study 2 we investigated whether low self-worth consumers would still prefer visually conspicuous products after being given an opportunity to affirm themselves. 71 students participated in this 2 (Self Worth: Low, High) X 2 (Affirmation: Positive, None) experiment. Self-worth was manipulated as in Study 1, after which the participants were asked to either write about the most important value in their life (positive affirmation) or the least important value (no affirmation; Townsend and Sood, 2012; Sivanathan and Pettit, 2010). All participants then evaluated the visually conspicuous flash drive. For participants in the low self-worth condition with positive affirmation, evaluation of the conspicuous flash drive along all dependent measures was significantly lower than those not given an opportunity to affirm themselves (attitude: M_pos affirmation=5.25, M_no affirmation=4.11, t=2.68, p<.05; purchase intention: M_pos affirmation=5.13, M_no affirmation=3.00, t=3.87, p<.05; WTP: M_pos affirmation=631.00, M_no affirmation=338.00, t=3.39, p<.05). There were no differences in evaluation measures for any of the other conditions.

In Study 3 we investigate whether the desire for more conspicuous consumption under self-threat extends to other sensory domains like the auditory. 99 students participated in this 2 (Self Worth: Low, High) X 2 (Affirmation: Positive, None) experiment. Participants were exposed to the same self-threat and self-affirmation manipulations as in Study 2, following which they were asked to listen to and evaluate a piece of unfamiliar capella music. The key dependent measure was the volume level that participants chose when listening to the audio clip. Participants who were subjugated to self-threat but did not receive an opportunity for self-affirmation listened to the music clip at a significantly higher volume than those who were subjugated to self-threat but received an opportunity for self-affirmation (M_pos affirmation=5.69, M_no affirmation=4.44, t=2.68, p<.05). There were no differences in volume for any of the other conditions.

Study 4 seeks to extend our findings to a third sensory modality, that of touch. 92 students participated in this 2 (Self Worth: Low, High) X 2 (product touchability: low, high) experiment. Following the self-threat manipulation, participants completed some measures related to general shopping behavior which included latent need for touch (Peck and Childers 2003). After this participants were asked to evaluate a new product that would soon be launched in their area, which was either a water bottle (low NFT product) or a towel (high NFT product). The dependent measure was an index of how much they wanted to touch the product before purchase. Desire to touch even the low NFT product was significantly higher among participants subjected to low self-worth than those in the high self-worth condition (M_low self-worth=5.55, M_high self-worth=4.06; t=3.16, p<.05).

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Consumption and the Irish Recession: Tiger Tales of Consumer Abundance and Recession

Andrea Prothero, University College Dublin, Ireland
Andrew Keating, University College Dublin, Ireland
Marius Claudy, University College Dublin, Ireland

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In 2007 the global financial crisis led to a collapse of the Irish economy and ended the Celtic Tiger years (1995-2007). The recession took most people by surprise, and affected Irish consumers across all social strata and socio-economic backgrounds. While the economy had grown on average 5.8% annually (2000-2007), real GDP shrank by 4.8% annually from 2008-2011 (ESRI, 2012). While the effects of the recession are well documented on the macro-level, little is understood about the impact these have had on consumers’ identity and consumption practices. This study addresses this gap. Much has been written on impoverished consumers and various strategies they have utilised to cope with this (Lewis 1959; Hill and Stamey 1990; Hill and Stephens 1997; Lee, Ozanne and Hill 1999, Hill 2002; Baker, Gentry and Rittenberg 2005; Hamilton 2009). This study builds on this by focusing on consumers who have gone from living prosperous lives to their standard of living being negatively affected by the collapse of the Irish economy.

To explore consumers moving from a time of abundance to recession the researchers interviewed 12 Irish consumers during 2012-13. The participants were interviewed about their experiences, thoughts and feelings and the impact this had on them, their friends and families. Utilizing a phenomenological interviewing practice (Thompson, Pollio and Locander 1994), the focus was on eliciting accounts of experiences of life and consumption pre-recession and during the recession itself. Our participants were Irish citizens (28-63 years old) and had suffered some form of impact during the recession. Data was analysed using the hermeneutic circle method (Thompson, Pollio and Locander 1994) which lead to the identification, development, and refinement of themes focused on coping strategies.

In the findings it emerged that during the Celtic Tiger years, for many, spending and consumption was an activity that enriched their lives, it gave them meaning (Belk, 1988), and helped construct their identity (Arnould and Thompson 2005), but transitioning from a sense of wealth to a reduction in income led to a number of problems in what and when our participants could consume and also in their identity construction. Similar to existing literature on coping (Hamilton, 2009; Baker, Gentry and Rittenburg, 2005; Hill, 2002; Hill and Stephens 1997; Hill and Stamey, 1990) we found that participants used both emotional and behavioural strategies to cope with these changes, and a number of new categories also emerged. It is important to stress that each category is not necessarily mutually exclusive, and an emotional coping strategy can impact on behavioural responses and vice versa.

Within the emotional coping strategies there were five types of coping that emerged. These included disafflicting, distancing, and fantasy (all previously considered in existing literature), and new categories of resignation, and remembrance of times past. For example, in the emotional coping strategies participants discuss how the circumstances they find themselves in were not their fault and therefore beyond their control at both the macro and the micro level (resignation), which for some helped remove themselves from any blame. For example, a number of participants discussed how their circumstances would be have been radically different if they had qualified for their jobs a year prior. Other participants coped by reminiscing about the the good times they had during the Celtic Tiger boom including unique or peak experiences such as exotic holidays and weekend breaks, exorbitant nights out, and the purchase of high ticket items. Negative aspects were recalled, such as the over consumption and wastefulness participants felt had occurred and the detrimental impact the Celtic Tiger had on Irish identity. For some participants, the recognition of this they felt was leading to positive changes for themselves and Ireland.

Within the behavioral coping responses we identified nine different strategies. These included controlling potentially harmful behaviour, shedding oneself of reminders of an experience, seeking support (social and economic), engaging in deception (all previously discussed in existing literature), and new categories of economic cutbacks, making do with what you have, being creative/innovative, reconnecting (moving from the material back to the social), self-gifts, and understanding vs ignoring. To give a flavour of some of these new strategies we outline brief examples below. Participants discussed the economic cutbacks they made including changes in where, what, when, and how much they consumed. Some discussed the prioritization of, and discontinuing the use of certain goods (e.g. insurance, cars, groceries). Others mentioned how they had reconnected with their social environment by looking for new ways to spend time; instead of going shopping or for lunch they took up sports, began to reconnect and spend more time with their extended families and/or friends, and/or engaged in local community activities. Finally, some participants became innovative or creative in their consumption. For instance, one participant bought a sewing machine to refashion and rework her clothes, thus extending the life and use of these objects.

This study shows that going from a brief era of mass consumption and seeming abundance to one of austerity was difficult for participants, and the transition was exacerbated because they did not have the financial resources to consume their way out of the problem, as is typical within a consumer society (Baudrillard, 1998). Participants utilised a number of emotional and behavioral strategies to cope with new circumstances; sometimes these strategies had positive impacts on participants and their emotional well-being, other times they did not. While existing literature (briefly mentioned above) on impoverished consumers considers various coping strategies, our study includes additional strategies and adds to this literature by exploring consumers who suddenly find themselves with reduced financial resources. Our research focuses on the individual coping strategies of participants, and examines these within a wider institutional framework – by considering national and international events, which had a significant impact on behavior. During the Celtic Tiger this was seen through an era of “Consumption on Steroids” and was, almost overnight, turned to an “Age of Austerity”, shifting to an era of restricted and restrained consumption.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

How Do Predictions Affect Accuracy Perceptions? The Role of Depth of Information Analyses
Rajesh Bagchi, Virginia Tech, USA
Elise Chandon Ince, Virginia Tech, USA

Information is key to decision-making. However, seldom do consumers have the time or the ability to interpret information. Therefore, they often rely on forecasts that analysts (e.g., market researchers) make using this information. But how do consumers evaluate the accuracy of these predictions?

We propose a new cue: the forecast’s probability. We posit that when the forecaster makes a prediction (e.g., a 70% or 30% chance that a stock will increase in value), people will use the estimate (70% or 30%) to assess accuracy. This accuracy attribution occurs because people infer from a higher prediction that the forecaster has conducted more in-depth analyses of the available information when calculating the prediction. This arises from a naïve belief that a more in-depth analysis can increase prediction accuracy.

Because people infer that a higher (e.g., 70%) prediction reflects greater predictability relative to a lower prediction (e.g., 30%), individuals will believe that the forecaster has conducted a more thorough analysis when making a 70% prediction relative to a 30% prediction (H1). If higher (vs. lower) predictions signal that a more in-depth analysis has been conducted, then the resulting estimate should also be more accurate (H2). Furthermore, the relationship between prediction estimates and accuracy will be mediated by perceptions of depth of information analyses (H3).

Moreover, if higher predictions increase perceptions of depth of analyses and accuracy, then the benefits should extend to the forecaster. Thus, an analyst who makes higher predictions should be judged as being more reliable and trustworthy (H4). Finally, if lower (vs. higher) predictions signal that the forecaster has not conducted an in-depth analysis, perceivers may review existing contextual information carefully themselves, even if this information was included when deriving the probability estimates (H5).

In study 1, we presented a prediction from a basketball expert about an upcoming game between two teams, A and B, and manipulated chance to be high or low (N = 162). In the high (low) condition, the prediction of team A winning was 70% (30%). We obtained the predicted main effects: the prediction was judged to be more accurate when it was higher (Mhigh-chance = 4.24 vs. Mlow-chance = 3.54, F(1, 160) = 15.27, p < .001). In addition, with higher (vs. lower) predictions, participants perceived the expert as more reliable (Mhigh-chance = 4.77 vs. Mlow-chance = 4.13, F(1, 160) = 15.82, p < .001), more trustworthy (Mhigh-chance = 4.84 vs. Mlow-chance = 4.35, F(1, 160) = 7.58, p < .01), and more knowledgeable (Mhigh-chance = 5.78 vs. Mlow-chance = 5.28, F(1, 160) = 6.96, p < .01). Furthermore, these accuracy perceptions mediated the effects of chance on expert evaluations.

In study 2, we examine the effect of prediction framing on accuracy judgments. We expect that a higher chance of winning (losing) a game will lead to greater accuracy judgments relative to a lower chance of losing (winning). We used a 2 chance (high, low) x 2 prediction framing (winning, losing) between-subjects design (N = 161). The scenario was similar to that of study 1. In the winning (losing) framing condition, the expert predicted the chance of team A winning (losing). Replicating previous results, the accuracy scale elicited higher responses in the high (vs. low) chance condition (Mhigh-chance = 4.11 vs. Mlow-chance = 3.34, F(1, 157) = 19.73, p < .001). The chance by framing interaction was not significant (NS), suggesting that irrespective of framing (winning or losing), accuracy was higher when the predicted chance was higher (vs. lower). But, consistent with our hypotheses, participants reported that the forecast was more accurate when chance was higher versus lower; that is, a 70% prediction of winning was more accurate than a 30% prediction of losing (Mhigh-chance-winning = 4.05 vs. Mlow-chance-losing = 3.36, F(1, 157) = 8.15, p < .005), and, a 70% chance of losing was more accurate than a 30% chance of winning (Mhigh-chance-losing = 4.16 vs. Mlow-chance-winning = 3.31, F(1, 157) = 11.71, p < .001).

In study 3, we investigate the role of the forecaster’s depth of information analyses, and study its effects on outcome expectations. If the forecaster’s depth of analyses drives accuracy perceptions, with lower (vs. higher) predictions, participants will try to compensate for the lack of depth of analyses in the forecaster’s research by reanalyzing contextual details carefully themselves; therefore, we expect the contextual background to influence outcome expectations when predictions are lower. We used a 2 chance (high, low) x 2 market context (positive, negative) between-subjects design (N = 94). Participants imagined purchasing a company’s stocks; in the positive (negative) context, the industry was expected to grow (slow down). After considering all the pros and the cons, the analyst made predictions about the chance that the company would be successful. In the high (low) chance condition, the prediction was 70% (30%). When chance was higher (vs. lower), the forecaster was perceived to have conducted a more in depth analysis (Mhigh-chance = 5.15 vs. Mlow-chance = 4.65, F(1, 90) = 4.46, p < .05), and the prediction was judged as being more accurate (Mhigh-chance = 4.67 vs. Mlow-chance = 3.96, F(1, 90) = 8.76, p < .005). In addition, the chance by context interaction was significant (F(1, 90) = 5.53, p < .03). While context did not influence success expectations in the high chance condition (Mpositive = 4.53 vs. Mnegative = 4.37, F(1, 90) = .66, p > .41), when chance was lower, positive context led to higher success expectations (Mpositive = 3.76 vs. Mnegative = 2.87, F(1, 90) = 15.52, p < .001). Indeed, such kinds of predictions are made in a variety of contexts, such as those relating to sporting contests, economic recovery, prospects of new products, Presidential elections, and other events. Our finding that the magnitude of the prediction (high vs. low) is used to judge its accuracy is likely to have important implications for consumer judgments and decision-making (e.g., which stocks consumers buy, how much they buy, and which forecaster they believe in).
The Advertising of Experiences: Narrative Processing and the Importance of Consistency
Itigo Gallo, IESE Business School, Spain
Sanjay Sood, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Kathryn Mercurio, University of Oregon, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The marketing literature has traditionally differentiated among products, services, and experiences (Nelson 1970, Darby and Karni 1973). Given that these types of goods differ in important dimensions, it is reasonable to believe that there are also differences in the conditions for persuasive advertising. While there is some literature on service advertising (Mittal 1999), the specificities of the advertising of experience goods are less known. In this research we propose that narrative processing is an important component of the evaluation of experience goods (EG), and that – as a consequence – EG advertising can benefit from the key elements of persuasive narratives. Specifically, we examine the importance of consistency among the narrative elements.

The two characteristics of a narrative are that (1) they are organized in terms of a temporal dimension, and (2) they consist of goal-directed action-outcome sequences (Escalas 2004). EG (consider a trip or a restaurant meal) include these characteristics. We therefore propose that EG – and information about EG such as advertising – are processed narratively. Because one of the necessary conditions for a narrative to create meaning is consistency among the narrative elements (Cho, Shen, and Wilson 2012; Hall 2003; McKee 1997), we propose that the narrative elements in an EG ad (copy, image) need to be consistent in order for the ad to be persuasive. On the other hand, since search goods (SG) are not processed narratively, lack of consistency in a SG ad will not have a negative effect.

We use narrative transportation (Green and Brock 2000) as a measure for the immersion into the story that the ad is presenting. Narrative processing has already been used in consumer research (Escalas 2004; Phillips and McQuarrie 2010; Wang and Calder 2006). For instance, when subjects were asked to imagine themselves using the advertised product, narrative transportation mediated the favorable effect of that mental simulation on attitudes (Escalas 2004). We propose that lack of consistency between the copy and the image in the EG ad prevents the consumer from being transported, and is therefore less persuasive.

Hypotheses. Our main hypothesis is that the copy and the image in an EG ad need to be consistent to be persuasive. The elements in the ad need to point to the same narrative. On the other hand, consistency is not needed in the advertising of SG, since it is not processed narratively. We test this in two experiments.

Study 1. We focus on movie posters because movies represent a prototypical EG (Sood and Drèze 2006). Participants were first primed to process information either in a narrative fashion (“transport yourself into the narrative”) or in a thoroughly elaborative fashion (“consider the reasons why the studio has chosen this specific poster design”). Participants were then exposed to two different movie posters, sequentially. The elements in the posters (title, image) were either consistent or inconsistent with each other (from a pretest). Participants then responded to a number of behavioral measures capturing their intention to watch the movie and their level of narrative transportation and elaboration. As hypothesized, there was a significant interaction of type of processing and type of poster, so that inconsistency had a negative impact in the narrative processing condition, but not in the elaboration condition (F(1, 118) = 6.06, p < .05). Also, as hypothesized, bootstrapping analyses revealed that narrative transportation mediated the results. Participants who evaluated the non-consistent posters narratively were unable to transport. The different elements in the poster pointed at different stories, and this impeded transportation.

Study 2. Our second study intends to generalize the findings from study 1 by (1) comparing the effects of consistency across ads for EG versus SG, and (2) not priming any processing style but allowing participants to engage the ads naturally. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions depending on the type of good (EG: restaurant, spa; SG: shampoo, running shoes), and the type of ad (picture is consistent with the text versus inconsistent: text was kept constant). The pictures were pretested across conditions as equally attractive and fitting to the product category. The goods were pretested as EG or SG. We collected persuasion and purchase intent measures, as well as narrative transportation measures. As hypothesized, there was a significant interaction between type of good and consistency, so that lack of consistency harmed the EG ads but did not affect the SG ads (F(1, 213) = 7.32, p < .05). Also as hypothesized, narrative transportation mediated the effect. Again consumers are unable to transport in the non-consistent EG ads.

We contribute to consumer research in general and to research in advertising in particular by finding an important difference between experiences and products that influences the way advertising is processed. Because experiences are processed as narratives before consumption, the elements in the ad need to be consistent in order to be persuasive.

REFERENCES


Table 1: Summary of results across studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Consistent</th>
<th>Non consistent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: average of attitude towards the movie and intention to watch it (from 1 to 7)</td>
<td>Instructions to transport 3.85 3.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>Non consistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: average of attitude towards the good and purchase intention (from 0 to 100)</td>
<td>Ads for experiences 68 52</td>
<td></td>
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Effects of Resource Scarcity on People’s Sense of Control
Chiraag Mittal, University of Minnesota, USA
Vladas Griskevicius, University of Minnesota, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Acquisition of resources is vital for any individual’s survival and well-being. Failure to successfully harness resources from the environment is a threat and is undesirable. However, consistent access to resources is not a trivial task because availability of resources has been irregular since the dawn of human evolution (Chakravarthy & Booth, 2004). Even the modern life is rife with inconsistencies in resource availability. Not only does the economy continue to be characterized by periods of boom and bust, but there is a considerable inequality among people for access to resources at any given time. So, how do resource scarcity threats affect consumers’ everyday lives and their control beliefs? For example, do they feel that they are in charge of their lives during such threats or do they feel that they are helpless? Might these beliefs drive their financial impulsivity behaviors?

Drawing on life history theory, recent work indicates that resource scarcity cues lead people to respond in divergent ways as a function of their childhood environments (Griskevicius et al., 2013). In the present work, we add to this growing body of work by investigating the effects of resource scarcity on people’s perceptions of control. We hypothesize and provide evidence that resource scarcity cues lead individuals from relatively poorer childhood backgrounds to feel that they have less personal control. Consequently, this psychological sense of decreased control facilitates preference for smaller sooner rewards and task persistence.

Conversely, we show that resource scarcity cues lead individuals from relatively wealthier childhoods to feel that they have greater personal control. This psychological sense of increased control facilitates their willingness to wait longer for rewards and to persist more on a demanding task.

We conducted three experiments, including a behavioral study to test our hypotheses. In Study 1, we examine our basic prediction that resource scarcity cues produce different effects on people’s control beliefs depending on their childhood backgrounds and not their current economic conditions. We experimentally manipulated resource scarcity by having people read a news article about the recent economic recession or a control article. We then examined their beliefs regarding the extent to which they thought they were in control of their personal finances by responding to six items adapted from an established measure on a 7-pt scale (Dew & Xiao, 2011). Results revealed that for people who had relatively wealthier childhoods, the recession news article increased their sense of personal control. For example, under scarcity cues, they believed that they were more in control of their spending and saving behaviors. In contrast, among individuals who had relatively poorer childhoods, recession cues decreased their sense of personal control. Importantly, these beliefs did not vary as function of respondents’ current economic conditions.

In Study 2, we had two specific goals – 1) to replicate the results of Study 1 by using a different methodology to prime resource scarcity, and 2) to show that perceptions of personal control mediate the relation between resource threats and impulsive financial behavior. Resource scarcity was primed by exposing individuals to a slideshow of pictures indicative of a recession. Those in neutral condition saw pictures of objects frequently found in an office setting. Sense of control was measured using the same items as in Study 1. Financial impulsivity was assessed using a set of randomly presented lotteries (Green & Myerson, 2004; Griskevicius et al., 2013). Results indicated continued support for our initial predictions. Resource scarcity cues led individuals from relatively poorer backgrounds to feel a diminished sense of control, whereas the same cues led individuals from relatively wealthier backgrounds to feel an enhanced sense of control. Furthermore, our mediated moderation analyses revealed that the influence of resource scarcity cues on people’s impulsive behavior indeed seems to be mediated by their personal sense of control. The results provided evidence of full mediation.

Finally, based on prior work on perceptions of control and persistence (Bandura, 1989), we show that resource scarcity altered the amount of effort people were willing to expend on a challenging task. Past research has found that when people perceive that they have low personal control, they tend to withdraw, retreat, or otherwise become passive (Skinner, 1996). Therefore, we hypothesized that under conditions of resource threat, those who feel a loss of control should not be willing to persist on a task at hand. Resource scarcity was manipulated using an episodic recall task (Sharma and Alter, 2012). Results revealed that people who were raised in poorer environments tended to persist less under resource scarcity cues as compared to the neutral condition, just as predicted.

In summary, the current research substantially extends previous work on the effects of resource scarcity on people’s psychologies and behaviors. We not only show that scarcity cues produce divergent control beliefs in people as a function of their childhood environments, we also show that these beliefs drive their real-work impulsive financial decisions. Finally, we provide evidence that lower task persistence in the face of scarcity threats among relatively poorer people might be because of a low sense of control. This finding has important implications for policy interventions that wish to improve the future life conditions among the ones that are the most susceptible to the effects of resource scarcity. Our findings suggest that infusing a sense of personal control among such individuals may help in reducing impulsive financial behaviors, and may encourage them to persist more leading to greater benefits in real-world arenas such as education and professional work.

REFERENCES


The Role of Arousal in Schema-based Evaluation
Theodore J. Noseworthy, University of Guelph, Canada
Fabrizio Di Muro, University of Winnipeg, Canada
Kyle B. Murray, University of Alberta, Canada

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Introduction and Theoretical Background
From Nintendo’s Wii U to Apple’s rumoured iWatch to Ne- throne’s office workstation, marketers today are regularly challenged to design products that appeal to consumers while simultaneously being unique enough to create a distinct brand impression. Research has demonstrated that this can be challenging, as a product’s attractiveness varies with the extent to which it is congruent with the consumer’s product schema. Although a significant amount of research in marketing has examined this phenomenon, the results have been mixed (e.g., Campbell and Goodstein 2001; Jhang, Grant, and Campbell 2012; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). In this research we contribute to the extant literature by examining the interplay between a person’s state of arousal and the schema congruity effect.

Interestingly, the schema congruity effect suggests that an optimal level of arousal could be achieved when an object is just slightly incongruent (moderate incongruity) and thus the individual can successfully assimilate it into an existing schema held in memory (Mandler, 1982). However, when incongruity levels rise past a certain threshold (extreme incongruity), a person’s ability to make sense of the object diminishes exponentially (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). At the same time, although it has been well-established that the valence of consumers’ affective states influences choice (Kim et al. 2010), only recently has research demonstrated that a person’s level of arousal has analogous effects. Specifically, when a consumer experiences a pleasant affective state, they prefer more arousing products if their current arousal is high and less arousing products if their current arousal is low (Di Muro and Murray 2012). Given that incongruity increases arousal levels, consumers in a pleasant affective state who are experiencing high arousal should prefer moderately incongruent products to congruent products because they misattribute their current arousal onto the product. However, consumers in a pleasant affective state who are experiencing low arousal should not prefer moderately incongruent products to congruent products because they cannot misattribute their current arousal onto the product. Thus, if the schema congruity effect is indeed predicated on a misattribution of arousal, preference for moderately incongruent products should only manifest under high arousal. Our first study examines this prediction.

Study 1

Participants and Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (product congruity: congruent vs. moderately incongruent) × 2 (arousal: low vs. high) between-subjects design. The target product was a fictitious brand of wristwatch (Dali).

Procedures and Dependent Measures
Arousal was manipulated using music: participants were informed they would be listening to a selection of classical music to help get them energized (relaxed). Following the arousal manipulation, participants viewed the ad.

Results
When participants were put in an aroused state, they evaluated the moderately incongruent wristwatch more favorably than the congruent wristwatch. However, when participants were put in a relaxed state, evaluations did not differ by the level of congruity. A planned contrast confirmed that participants evaluated the moderately incongruent product more favorably when arousal levels were high rather than low.

It should be noted that Mandler (1982) argued that extreme incongruity often leads to frustration because the individual is unable to assimilate or accommodate the object into an existing schema without revamping the schema itself or developing an entirely new schema. In such a case, the act of discovery becomes too arousing, resulting in negative evaluations of the target (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). This affords a unique means to test our proposition. Where in study 1, an aroused individual appreciated moderate incongruity and a relaxed individual did not, study 2 was designed to explore whether the opposite will occur in instances of extreme incongruity. If the schema congruity effect is truly a misattribution of arousal, then putting an individual in a relaxed state should offset the tension that results from not being able to accommodate the object. Therefore, it is predicted that a relaxed individual will appreciate extreme incongruity more so than would an aroused individual, because there is no arousal overload and thus there is nothing to misattribute to the target.

Study 2

Participants and Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (arousal: low vs. high) × 3 (product congruity: congruent vs. moderately incongruent vs. extreme incongruity) between-subjects design. The target product was soft drinks.

Procedures and Dependent Measures
Several pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 1999) were used to manipulate physiological arousal. The subsequent procedures were identical to study 1.

Results
Pairwise comparisons confirmed that when arousal was high, participants evaluated the moderately incongruent soft drink more favorably than the congruent soft drink, but evaluated the extremely incongruent soft drink less favorably than the congruent soft drink. Once again, a planned contrast confirmed that participants evaluated the moderately incongruent product more favorably when their arousal level was high rather than low. However, in support of the core prediction, participants evaluated the extremely incongruent product more favorably when their arousal level was low rather than high.

Contribution
A major contribution of this work is that consumers’ state of arousal when examining incongruity will influence whether or not the schema congruity effect will manifest. This suggests that the schema congruity may indeed result from a misattribution of arousal. This is something that has been debated in numerous fields. The results demonstrated that consumers preferred moderate incongruity when their current level of arousal was high rather than low. This finding is consistent with the arousal congruity effect (Di Muro...
and Murray 2012), whereby a fit is created between an individual’s state of arousal and the arousal derived from the act of discovery. However, consistent with Mandler’s (1982) prediction that extreme incongruity can result in negative evaluations due to arousal overload, consumers preferred extreme incongruity when their current level of arousal was low rather than high.

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The Effect Chain From Corporate Reputation to Consumer Brand Equity Formation

Martin Heinberg, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
H. Erkan Ozkaya, California State Polytechnic University, USA
Markus Taube, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Despite the proposition that corporate reputation has an effect on product brand equity has been voiced by Keller (1993) two decades ago, no hypothesis testing has been undertaken. We aim to close this research gap by introducing a theoretical model based on signaling theory that tests (a) two mediating variables (corporate image and product brand value) and (b) three moderating variables (corporate brand visibility, trust, and distribution intensity).

Collecting responses from 1176 consumers in China, we cover 36 consumer brands in three cities. Our survey focused on the brand afflue population between 18 and 45 years of age. The model was analyzed with Mplus, employing structural equation modeling. The measurement model was rigorously tested for validity and reliability. We also undertook several tests to assess possible biases like a hierarchical data structure or effects from certain product groups that might be affected differently by already proposed moderators. Furthermore, the model shows excellent fit.

We were able to confirm the corporate reputation – product brand equity relationship and conclude that corporate reputation is used as a signal by consumers to add credibility to the product brand and reduce uncertainty concerning a product’s brand equity. More importantly, our two mediators help to shed light into the black box of this connection, as full mediation could be established. To be more specific, we show that corporate brand image at least partially acts as a filter that makes the reputation, which is more longterm oriented and complex, easier accessible for the consumer. Brand value comprises the benefits of the brand for the consumer (e.g., functional and/or social signaling value) and therefore contains the sources of value creation. Uncertainty limits the value of the brand for the consumer, because she is doubtful to what extend her relevant choice criteria are met. The signal of corporate reputation and corporate brand image is able to decrease this uncertainty, which raises the benefit of the brand for the consumer and then culminates into brand equity, which is the assessment of the brand value.

As another important contribution of this research, we were able to establish three moderators, which were developed using signaling theory. So far, only few moderators for consumer related corporate reputation research could be established (Walsh, Bartikowski, and Beatty 2012). Our findings confirm the moderating effect of corporate brand visibility on the corporate reputation – brand equity relationship. Therefore, the physical presence of the corporate brand can increase the signaling effect. This is in line with the findings of Berens, van Riel, and van Bruggen (2005) who have demonstrated that a more visible corporate brand makes the construct of corporate association more accessible to the consumer than a less visible corporate brand. Our findings display an insignificant direct effect of corporate brand visibility on product brand equity. This result indicates that the corporate brand’s presence does not automatically increase a product’s brand equity. The enhancement of a product’s brand equity facilitates only via the transfer of credibility by a sturdy corporate reputation. Therefore, a more presence of a corporate brand next to a product brand only has an effect on the product’s brand equity, if the company brand has already established a reputation in the consumer’s eyes. This finding helps to explain two opposite results in the literature (Saunders and Guoqun 1997, Laforet 2011) and suggests that future studies investigating the role of parent brands should control for corporate reputation.

Furthermore, we were able to establish distribution intensity as a moderator. Distribution intensity can increase product brand value directly, as it simplifies the buying process. Additionally we argue that a dense distribution can raise the receiver’s attention to the signal which may increase the perceptibility of the signal (Connelly et al. 2011). We suggest that a higher exposure to the brand through an intense distribution improves the consumers’ brand recognition and recall ability. This in turn leads to a rise in consumer awareness and extra attention paid to signals for the product brand’s quality.

Moreover, we have demonstrated the importance of trust for the effect chain. Trust in the brand not only stands for people’s beliefs in the credibility and benevolence of a target of trust, but also signifies their willingness to use that knowledge as a basis for action (McAlister 1995). It has been demonstrated, that trust reduces consumers’ uncertainty and perceived vulnerability (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992). Our results show that trust directly increases product brand equity and also has a moderating effect on the product brand value – product brand equity relationship. Trust into a brand increases the customer’s confidence in the ability of the brand to perform its stated function (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001) and thus decreases the uncertainty about one’s utility perception of the brand. Therefore brand value becomes a stronger predictor for brand equity.

We encourage further research in the corporate reputation – product brand equity relationship, especially in terms of different moderators that might be able to increase the perceptibility of the signal, for example advertising.

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TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CULTURE AND GOALS

Haiyang Yang, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Antonios Stamatogiannakis, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Amitava Chattopadhyay, INSEAD, Singapore

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

From deciding what dessert to order to choosing which airline to fly so that one can accrue more mileage points, consumer behavior is largely goal driven. Goals can be broadly dichotomized into attainment and maintenance goals: Whereas for attainment goals the actual state differs from the desired state (e.g., decrease one’s weight from 165 to 164 pounds), for maintenance goals the actual and the desired states match, and need to remain matched (e.g., keep one’s weight at 165 pounds or less). Although extant research examined how valuation of one’s labor (Brodscholl et al. 2007), satisfaction (Koo and Fishbach 2010), and perceived difficulty (Stamatogiannakis et al. 2010) differ between the two goal types, it is unclear under what circumstances consumers are more likely and more motivated to pursue each type of goal. It is also unknown whether and how consumers with different cultural background may behave differently towards the two goal types—an issue that impacts firms’ market segmentation and internationalization endeavors. The current research seeks to fill these gaps in the literature.

Cultural values are the shared, abstract ideas about what is good and desirable in a society (Williams 1970). An important dimension of culture is whether individuals value independence versus interdependence (Markus and Kitayama 1991): Individuals from Eastern cultures tend to have interdependent self-construals and uphold such values as maintaining harmony and social order. However, those from Western cultures tend to have independent self-construals and uphold such values as personal achievement and being distinct from others. Because independent cultural values often emphasize going beyond a current state (e.g., attain higher social status), they are likely to increase the appeal of attainment goals (e.g., increase one’s GPA at school). In contrast, interdependent cultural values often emphasize maintaining the current state (e.g., maintaining existing social order and harmony), so they are likely to increase the appeal of maintenance goals (e.g., maintain one’s GPA). Thus, we posit that individuals who value independence (interdependence) tend to be more (less) motivated to pursue attainment goals. Moreover, the independent and interdependent values can coexist within any person (Singelis 1994), and their accessibility can be temporarily increased by contextual factors (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Maddux et al. 2010). For such situationally activated cultural values, we expect to observe the same pattern of behaviors.

Whereas independent cultural values emphasize undertaking actions driven by one’s own will, interdependent cultural values emphasize sharing the vision of one’s social group (Markus and Schwartz 2010). Thus, framing an attainment goal as reflecting an individual’s own will (and hence highlighting the correspondence with independent values) is likely to boost the person’s motivation for that attainment goal. In contrast, framing a maintenance goal as reflecting the will of a close social group (and hence highlighting the correspondence with interdependent values) is likely to increase motivation to pursue that maintenance goal. Therefore, we propose that attainment (maintenance) goals tend to be more motivating when they are framed as reflecting one’s independent will (the will of one’s close social group).

We tested our propositions in five studies. Study 1 had a 2 x 2 design (weight and GPA goals) as the within-participants factor and goal type (attainment versus maintenance) as the between-participant factor. The results show a significant interaction effect (p < .002): attainment (maintenance) goals are more motivating for individuals from the USA (China).

Study 2 used a 2 x 2 design (weight and GPA goals) as the within-participants factor and goal type (attainment versus maintenance) between participants. The results show a significant interaction effect (p < .002): attainment (maintenance) goals are more motivating for individuals from the USA (China).

Study 3 used a 2 x 2 design with goal domain (weight and GPA goals) and goal type (attainment vs. maintenance). The results show a significant interaction effect (p < .002): attainment (maintenance) goals are more motivating for individuals from the USA (China).

In Study 4, participants were assigned to a 2 x 2 design with goal framing (for self vs. for close social group) and goal type (attainment vs. maintenance). The results show a significant interaction effect (p < .002): attainment (maintenance) goals are more motivating for individuals from the USA (China).

In Study 5, we tracked and analyzed 1,607 consumers’ weight goal pursuit behaviors in the field. Compared to individuals who value independence (and thus have fewer friends supporting their efforts), those who value interdependence (and thus have more friends supporting their efforts) were more (less) likely to adopt (p < .001), and more (less) motivated to pursue maintenance (attainment) goals (p < .03).

Taken together, the results of studies provided converging support for our proposition—cultural values interact with goal types to impact motivation for goal pursuit. This research contributes to theory and practice. Our work is amongst the first to bridge two important research streams in consumer behavior—goals and cultures. Our results suggest that the two types of goals should be leveraged differently across cultures to optimize motivation for goal pursuit. Managers, for example, can engineer consumption contexts to activate respective cultural values, nudging consumers towards goals congruent with firms’ marketing objectives.

REFERENCES

### Table 1: Summary of Key Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Significant effects &amp; means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National Culture</td>
<td>Motivation for Goal pursuit in 7-point scale</td>
<td>Goal type x cultural value (F(1,181) = 9.9, p &lt; .002). Planned contrasts: Americans: (M_{\text{attainment}} = 5.89 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{maintenance}} = 5.3, F(1,181) = 5.96, p &lt; .02) Chinese ((M_{\text{attainment}} = 5.46 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{maintenance}} = 5.85, F(1,181) = 3.92, p &lt; .05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Primed Cultural values</td>
<td>Motivation for Goal pursuit in 7-point scales</td>
<td>Prime x goal type (F(1,121) = 7.84, p &lt; .006). Planned contrasts: Interdependence prime: (M_{\text{attainment}} = 3.98 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{maintenance}} = 4.90, F(1,121) = 4.67, p &lt; .04). Independence prime: (M_{\text{attainment}} = 4.88 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{maintenance}} = 4.00, F(1,121) = 3.35, p &lt; .07).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chronic Cultural values</td>
<td>Motivation for Goal pursuit in 7-point scales</td>
<td>Goal type x independent-interdependent score ((\beta = -1.42, t(106) = 3.2, p &lt; .002)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Goal Framing</td>
<td>Motivation for Goal pursuit in 7-point scales</td>
<td>Goal type x goal framing (F(1,185) = 9.9, p &lt; .002). Planned Contrasts: Attainment goals (M_{\text{self}} = 5.04 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{group}} = 4.73, F(1,185) = 4.4, p &lt; .04). Maintenance goals (M_{\text{self}} = 4.75 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{group}} = 5.07, F(1,185) = 5.6, p &lt; .02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a</td>
<td>Number of Friends</td>
<td>Goal type preference</td>
<td>Individuals with more friends preferred maintenance goals (M_{\text{attainment}} = 1.56 \text{ vs. } M_{\text{maintenance}} = 4.48, z = 4.94, p &lt; .001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b</td>
<td>Number of Friends</td>
<td>Money at stake</td>
<td>Goal type x number of friends ((\beta = 71.12, t (1603) = 2.18, p &lt; .03)). (Spotlights: Users with many friends (p &gt; .10). Users with fewer friends put more money at stake when they had attainment versus a maintenance goals ((\beta = -440.2, t (1603) = 2.94, p &lt; .01).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995) identify two distinct implicit self-theories—entity vs. incremental theory. People who endorse entity theory (entity theorists) believe that their personal traits (i.e., personality and intelligence) are fixed, while people who endorse incremental theory (incremental theorists) view their personal traits as malleable. This line of research has found that individuals can extend their implicit self-theories to other people and even to brands/products (e.g. Yorkstone, Nunes, and Matta 2010; Park and John 2010).

Recently, Kwon and Nayakankuppam (working paper) find that individuals’ implicit self-theory orientation affects their attitude formation processes towards products/brands. Specifically, they find that entity theorists form attitudes with lower level of elaboration, but the strengths associated with the attitudes are greater, than incremental theorists. These findings are noteworthy because they suggest that the link between elaboration and attitude strength could be more complicated than the consistent finding in the attitude literature: strong attitudes are products of effortful cognitive elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo 1984; Petty and Wegener 1999).

In this paper, we examine the underlying mechanism of this strong attitude formation without high level of elaboration. We propose that, compared to incremental, entity theorists have lower thresholds to form strong attitudes: in contrast to incremental, entity theorists need smaller amount of information on the target objects when forming strong attitudes.

Study 1

Study 1 is a 2 (implicit self-theory: entity vs. incremental) by 2 (argument quality: strong vs. weak) between-subject design. We manipulate an individual’s implicit self-theory orientation using the generalized implicit self-theory manipulation technique (Chiu, Hong, and Dweck, 1997). We manipulate the argument quality of persuasive messages and examine if the level of cognitive elaboration is different between entity and incremental theorists when forming attitudes.

To test the threshold difference, we employed the dual task experiment practice. Participants were asked to complete two different tasks simultaneously. However, they were clearly instructed that one task is more important than the other. Their primary task was to form attitudes towards a new brand based on 10 arguments (all strong or all weak arguments depending on the argument quality condition) showing on a screen one at a time. The secondary task was to simultaneously monitor 10 unrelated statements from an auditory source, which served as distractors. After the dual task, participants were given true/false questions for every distracting statement (total 10 questions).

We predict that both theorists will focus on their primary tasks at the beginning. Later on, however, they will switch their focuses onto their secondary tasks if only they do not need any additional information on the attitude object because they have already formed and become certain about the attitudes (i.e. strong attitudes). As a result, we anticipate that participants are less likely to correctly remember the first few distractors, but more likely to remember the last few distractors. We expect that compared to incremental, entity theorists will form and become certain about their attitudes earlier (i.e. with fewer number of persuasive arguments). As such, they will switch their focus from the primary (i.e. processing persuasive arguments) to the secondary task (i.e. monitoring unrelated statements) faster than incremental theorists.

The results revealed that the percentages of correct answers for the first four (#1, #2, #3, and #4) and the last three (#8, #9, and #10) distracting statements were not significantly different between entity and incremental priming. The differences were found only in the middle range (#5: F (1, 119) = 5.00, p < .05; #6: F (1, 119) = 14.12, p < .001; #7: F (1, 119) = 8.35, p < .005). Entity theorists struggled to remember the first four distractors, but successfully remembered from the fifth, whereas incremental theorists struggled until seventh distractors and successfully remembered from the eighth. These results reveal that compared to incremental, entity theorists need smaller amount of information to form and be certain about their attitudes (i.e. strong attitudes). In order words, entity theorists have lower threshold in forming strong attitudes than incremental theorists.

More importantly, the analysis of the two-way, implicit self-theory by argument quality interaction demonstrated that only incremental theorists were affected by argument quality manipulation, whereas entity theorists were not. The percentages of correct answers for entity theorists were not different between strong and weak argument conditions (i.e. low level of elaboration), while those of incremental theorists are different (i.e. high level of elaboration) under question #7 (F (1, 61) = 3.97, p < .05) and #8 (#5: F (1, 61) = 4.09, p < .05).

Study 2

We examine whether we can still find the threshold difference effect when multiple arguments are presented all together, rather than each argument is presented one by one (Study 1). Participants were first primed with either entity or incremental theory. They were, then, given a print ad displaying 10 persuasive arguments about a novel brand and asked to form attitudes towards the brand. Meanwhile, their eye fixations were recorded using an eye-tracker. To derive dependent measure, we defined 10 rectangular areas of interest (AOI), each of which encompassed each argument.

The results supported our prediction that entity theorists would spend less time than incremental theorists to view the print ad (M_entity =20.79, M_incremental =28.99 seconds, F (1, 26) = 5.61, p < .05). More importantly, entity theorists fixated on 7.71 AOIs on average, whereas incremental theorist fixated (i.e. processed) 9.43 AOIs. These differences were statistically significant (F (1, 26) = 8.32, p < .01). These results illustrate that the threshold difference exists even when arguments are presented all together.

Discussion

A consistent finding in the attitude literature is that strong attitudes are products of effortful cognitive elaboration. Recently, however, researchers suggest that this link could be more complicated. Specifically, it is found that entity theorists can form strong attitudes with low level of elaboration. The purpose of this study is to unveil the way entity theorists can form strong attitudes easily and quickly. We suggest that, in contrast to incremental, entity theorists have lower thresholds to form strong attitudes. Our findings contribute to both the implicit self-theory and attitude strength literature.
Figure 1. The percentage of correct answers for true/false questions for each distracting statement

Entity-primed

Incremental-primed

- The X-axis represents the distracting statement number.

- The X-axis represents the statement number.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

We present a framework that explains how consumers evaluate experiences before consumption, and how this evaluation differs from that of products. We suggest that experiences are evaluated closer to the self, more vividly, and more in the form of narratives, compared to products. We understand experiences as a type of good different from products or material possessions. An experience is an event or series of events that a consumer lives through, while a product is a tangible object, kept in one’s possession (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003). Trips, movies, and restaurants are experiences; laptops, shoes, and jewelry are products. We propose that experiences are processed differently from products in that they are processed as closer to the self, as something more vivid, and more in the form of a narrative.

**Self.** Consumers perceive experiences rather than possessions to be more closely associated with the self (Carter and Gilovich 2012). We propose that this closeness to self is already present during consumers’ evaluations of experiences before consumption. We observe different consequences of this closeness to the self. For instance, this may explain why, while positive experiences are better than positive products, negative experiences are worse than negative products (Nicolao et al. 2009).

We test our proposition by analyzing the impact of congruency between the self and advertising messages. Past research has found important effects of matching a message or a product to consumers’ self-schemata (Wheeler, Petty, and Bizer 2005). Because experiences are a more important part of the self compared to products, we predict that message/self congruency will be more influential for messages regarding experiences than for those regarding products.

**Vividness.** We propose that when consumers evaluate an experience, the experience is perceived as more vivid, compared to a product. This is because experiential aspects of consumption are multisensory and can engage the consumer at multiple senses and levels (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; LaSalle and Britton 2003). This can explain for instance why when an advertisement for an experiential purchase (vacation destination) lacked vividness, it backfired (Petrova and Cialdini 2005).

We test our proposition by looking at the impact that imagining the satisfaction that comes with the consumption of the good has on attitudes towards the good. Anticipating satisfaction has been used to explain for instance why when an advertisement for an experiential event or series of events that a consumer lives through, while a product is a tangible object, kept in one’s possession (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003). Trips, movies, and restaurants are experiences; laptops, shoes, and jewelry are products. We propose that experiences are processed differently from products in that they are processed as closer to the self, as something more vivid, and more in the form of a narrative.

**Narrative.** Finally, we propose that consumers process experiences in the form of narratives. Experiences have the two elements necessary for constructing a narrative: sequence of events in time (temporality), and the inclusion of decisions that trigger specific consequences (causality) (Escalas 2004).

To test this proposition we study consistency between the narrative elements in an ad. Narrative consistency is a necessary condition for a story to create meaning and be persuasive (Cho, Shen, and Wilson 2012; McKee 1997). If it is true that consumers process experiences as narratives, then the elements of an ad (image, copy) for an experience need to be consistent for the ad to be persuasive.
General Discussion

We have presented a framework to understand how experiences are processed differently from products, prior to consumption. Given the recent interest in experiential purchases (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003), and given that most consumer and marketing research so far has disproportionately focused on material purchases (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Sun et al. 2012), this framework is relevant and timely.

Table 1. Summary of results across studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: average of attitudes towards the good advertised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(from 1 to 7)</td>
<td>Congruent messages</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incongruent messages</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: average of intentions towards the good advertised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(from 1 to 7)</td>
<td>Congruent messages</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incongruent messages</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: how attractive the good is (from 1 to 7)</td>
<td>Choice only</td>
<td>5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anticipation of satisfaction</td>
<td>5.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 3</th>
<th>Consistent</th>
<th>Non consistent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: average of attitude towards the good and purchase intention (from 0 to 100)</td>
<td>Ads for experiences</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ads for products</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Prior research has focused on firm level outcomes associated with corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts, or a company’s activities and status related to its perceived societal or stakeholder obligations (Brown and Dacin 1997), such as financial performance (Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003). However, there is little research, with the exception of cause-related marketing, that focuses on consumer level outcomes associated with CSR practices such as its effects on prosocial (e.g., donations) and antisocial consumer behavior (e.g., cheating). This research will seek to answer when does a firm’s prosocial behavior, defined as actions taken for the benefit of others, and antisocial behavior, defined as actions that are self-serving and do not benefit others, motivate vicarious prosocial and antisocial behaviors in consumers?

Kouchaki (2011) finds that individuals can expand their moral self-concept to include psychologically close others, resulting in vicarious moral licensing effects. Accordingly, we propose that for consumers who use brands to expand the self (Aron and Aron 1996), prosocial firm behavior can signal sufficient progress toward the consumer’s goal of being a moral person and motivate antisocial consumer behavior while antisocial firm behavior can signal a lack of goal progress and motivate prosocial consumer behavior. We present three experiments to demonstrate that a firm’s CSR behavior vicariously impacts consumer’s moral behavior, but only for those who include the CSR brand in the self.

In experiment 1, 53 student participants completed a modified version of the Inclusion of Other in the Self scale (Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992) to measure the level of overlap between the self and Nike (referred henceforth as IOS), read a fictional Associated Press article about Nike to manipulate prosocial or antisocial CSR behavior, and completed a dependent variable task in which participants solved 10 GRE questions in 10 minutes with the opportunity to cheat for higher payoffs. This was followed by manipulation checks, which confirmed the morality/ethicality of the Nike stories, and control measures.

The dependent variable was actual time (i.e., survey timer) minus participant’s stated time (i.e., self-timed stopwatch) spent on the math task. A greater discrepancy indicates more cheating. A general linear model (GLM) indicated a significant interaction between firm behavior and the mean-centered IOS measure. A spotlight analysis indicated that higher IOS participants exposed to prosocial firm behavior were more prosocial in comparison to higher IOS participants exposed to antisocial firm behavior or the control condition and in comparison to lower IOS participants exposed to prosocial firm behavior. However, higher IOS participants exposed to antisocial firm behavior were more prosocial than higher IOS participants exposed to the control condition and were more prosocial than lower IOS participants exposed to antisocial firm behavior. There was no significant difference in the number of entries given by lower IOS participants exposed to any of the three CSR behavior conditions.

Experiment 2 shows that higher IOS consumers exposed to prosocial (antisocial) firm behavior conduct less (more) prosocial behavior in comparison to the control condition, which reflects a true drop (boost) in generosity. We conducted a follow-up study to replicate prior findings using a new brand and CSR scenario and to alleviate the negative spillover effects from prosocial firm behavior by measuring hypocrisy in participants.

In experiment 3, 83 student participants completed the IOS measure, read a fictional Associated Press article about Apple’s program to donate Apple devices to low-income schools districts, and completed a hypocrisy measure in which participants were asked, “In general, customers do not often donate to low-income school districts. Is this true for your household?”. This was followed by the same dictator game dependent variable task as in experiment 2.

A GLM with number of entries sent in the dictator game as the dependent variable indicated a significant interaction between the hypocrisy conditions and the mean-centered IOS measure. A spotlight analysis indicated that higher IOS participants with hypocrisy present were more prosocial (i.e., gave more entries) in comparison to higher and lower IOS participants with hypocrisy absent while higher IOS participants with hypocrisy absent were less prosocial in comparison to lower IOS participants with hypocrisy absent. Lastly, there was no significant difference in the number of entries given by lower IOS participants with hypocrisy present or absent.

Table 1: Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment</th>
<th>Firm Behavior</th>
<th>IOS</th>
<th>Consumer Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 1+2</td>
<td>Prosocial or Antisocial</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 1+2</td>
<td>Prosocial</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>More Cheating/ Less Giving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 1+2</td>
<td>Antisocial</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Less Cheating/ More Giving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 3</td>
<td>Prosocial with Hypocrisy Present or Absent</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 3</td>
<td>Prosocial with Hypocrisy Present</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>More Giving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 3</td>
<td>Prosocial with Hypocrisy Absent</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Less Giving</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three experiments demonstrate that higher IOS participants exposed to prosocial (antisocial) firm behavior cheated more (less) and were less (more) generous in comparison to lower IOS participants unless hypocrisy was present, which reversed the effects from prosocial firm behavior.

These findings raise doubts and boundary conditions as to the assumption that CSR efforts may lead to consumer well-being (Bhattacharya and Sen 2004). We suggest further research to formally test the process explanation of these findings and to demonstrate additional methods to alleviate the negatives spillover effects from prosocial firm behavior.

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Within-Category versus Cross-Category Substitution in Food Consumption
Young Eun Huh, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Carey K. Morewedge, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Joachim Vosgerau, Tilburg University, The Netherlands

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Substitutes are goods that can replace one another by satisfying, at least partly, the same consumers’ needs (Nicholson 1998). When a desired product is not available or its price is deemed too high, consumers may look for and switch to a substitute. Substitutes can be classified as within-category and cross-category substitutes based on whether they belong to the same or a different product category as the target product. Within-category substitutes are often less desired than the target as they are not the consumer’s preferred choice (i.e., the target), but—by definition—share many features with the target and satisfy the same consumer needs. Store brand potato chips, for example, would be a within-category substitute for Lay’s potato chips. However, substitution can occur across product categories, too, where the cross-category substitute satisfies a higher level consumer need as the target. For example, Rold Gold pretzels are not potato chips but they satisfy a consumer’s craving for snacks, so pretzels are a cross-category substitute for Lay’s potato chips.

Although cross-category substitution is common (Park and Gupta 2011), surprisingly little research has examined how cross-category substitutes influence consumption experiences. In the current research, we examine how the consumption of cross-category versus within-category substitutes influences craving for and consumption of the desired target food. Specifically, we show that although consumers prefer within-category substitutes over cross-category substitutes when the target is not available, consuming a cross-category substitute actually satisfies consumers’ needs better than within-category substitutes.

Study 1 tested consumers’ preference for a within-category substitute and a cross-category substitute to satisfy their craving for the target. Participants first sampled one piece of the target chocolate. They then consumed one of three foods: the same target (Ritter’s chocolate), a within-category substitute (store-brand chocolate), or a cross-category substitute (granola bar) before consuming the target ad libitum. We found that participants who had eaten the within-category substitute subsequently ate more of the target than those who had eaten the cross-category substitute and those who had eaten the target again (the latter two conditions did not differ in terms of amount consumed). The results of Study 2 suggest that although consumers believe a within-rather than a cross-category substitute would better satisfy their craving for the target, a cross-category substitute actually satisfies consumers’ craving for the target better than the within-cross category substitute.

Study 3 examines the role of comparison between the target and the substitute in the substitution effects. Participants consumed either a within- or cross-category substitute which is as good as the target or inferior to the target before consuming the target ad libitum. Among those who had consumed the within-category substitute, participants who had consumed the inferior substitute subsequently consumed more target than those who had consumed the substitute which was as good as the target. However, the amount of target consumed was not different between those who had consumed the cross-category substitute. The results suggest that substitution effect occurs because the within-category substitute is compared to the target food resulting in a contrast effect, but no such contrast arises when the cross-category substitute is compared to the target food.

In summary, we demonstrate that although consumers prefer within-category substitutes, the consumption of cross-category substitutes can be more effective in reducing craving for the target food. Such substitution effects are driven by contrast between the target and the substitute, which occurs only within the same category, but not across different categories.

REFERENCES
The Effect of Perceived Elevation on Consumer Risk-Taking
Ata Jami, University of Central Florida, USA
Himanshu Mishra, University of Utah, USA
William Moore, University of Utah, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
We frequently use directional words such as “up” or “down” to talk about the concepts related to power. Sentences such as “he is at the height of his power” or “he fell from power” show the association between up and being powerful or down and being powerless. Likewise, throughout history and in our everyday life, we often observe that powerful people are in higher vertical positions. Kings’ or leaders’ thrones are located in higher positions, CEOs’ offices are in top floors of buildings, winners stand on the top of a podium, and more affluent people live in top floors of residential buildings or in houses on hills. Research has also shown that individuals high in dominance favor vertical locations in visual space (Moeller, Robinson, and Zabelina 2008). Moreover, standing on a higher elevation is a major signifier of social dominance and control (Schwartz, Tesser, and Powell 1982) and leads others to infer that an individual has power (Schubert 2005). All these examples show the strong association between physical elevation, psychological concept of power, and perceptions of control and suggest that the concept of power might be grounded in an experience of being in a high vertical position. However, no study has yet directly tested this notion. In this research, we investigate how being in a high vertical position would affect consumer judgments and decision making.

Past research has provided empirical evidence of the association between vertical schema and the perception of power, in which powerful individuals are perceived in higher vertical positions than powerless ones (Giessner and Schubert 2007; Moeller et al. 2008; Schubert 2005). For example, Giessner and Schubert (2007) found that participants presented with an organizational chart used the length of the line between the first and second levels in the organizational chart to judge a leader’s power. Although prior research has firmly established the link between vertical position and power, we think the reverse relationship is plausible and being in a high vertical elevation would make powerful people feel in control compared to a person located in a low vertical position. The sense of control makes individuals to be optimistic in risky situations and enhances risk-taking tendencies (Anderson and Galinsky 2006; Fast et al. 2009). Thus, we expect that being in a high vertical position increases risk-taking tendencies because the scene observed by a person located in a high elevation stimulates power and gives the person an illusory sense of control. We ran three studies to test the proposed effects of elevation on power, control, and risk-taking.

The first study investigated the effect of elevation on activation of power-related thoughts. In this study, we used panoramic pictures taken from high or low vertical positions to manipulate the perception of being in a high or low elevation. Next, we used a word recognition task as an implicit method to measure activation of power-related thoughts. Results show that people in the high elevation condition recognized more power-related words correctly than those in the low elevation condition.

In the second study, we examined the influence of elevation on risk-taking across different dependent variables. In Study 2a, we used a behavioral measure of risk-taking (i.e., Balloon Analogue Risk Task). Results show that a sense of high elevation leads to elevated risk-taking tendencies as participants in the high elevation condition pumped the balloon more than those in the low elevation condition. Study 2b investigated the effect of elevation on a consumption decision involving risk. Results show that participants in the high elevation condition evaluated the risky options (i.e., perishable grocery items that are close to their expiration date) more favorably than those in the low elevation condition.

Study 3 was designed to test our proposed underlying mechanism for the effect of elevation on risk-taking. We posit that an illusory sense of control is the underlying mechanism for the effect of elevation on risk-taking because being in a high elevation gives individuals a sense of control. In Study 3, we showed that participants who observed the high elevation picture had a higher sense of control over uncontrollable outcomes and showed higher risk-taking tendencies compared to those observing the low elevation picture. The results also confirm that the effect of elevation on risk-taking is mediated by an illusory sense of control.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Service recovery plays a strategic role in today’s competitive marketplace. To assure the effectiveness of service recovery, scholars have been debating whether companies should provide recovery efforts that are customized for the individual or standardized for the group (Austin, McGinn, and Susmilch 1980; Hoffman and Kelley 2000; Messé and Watts 1983; Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999). The present research builds upon this stream of work by examining the distinction between individualized and group service recovery.

Prior research thus far has examined the impact of service recovery on firm-customer relationships—but the impact of firm-customer relationships on service recovery has received surprisingly little attention. Given the pervasiveness of status difference in human social systems and the popularity of stratified customer loyalty programs in the service industry (the number of loyalty memberships in the U.S. is 2.09 billion and the average U.S. household has enrolled in more than 18 customer loyalty programs, Colloquy 2011), customers may be expected to hold higher status than others, either inside the buyer-seller relationship (e.g., elite loyalty members vs. ‘ordinary’ members) or outside of it (e.g., socio-economic status). Nonetheless, the effects of status on service recovery and firm-customer relationship has remained virtually unexplored. The present research examines how status—an important and under-investigated factor that may play an important role in firm-customer relationships—affects customers’ response to a firm’s recovery efforts.

Status refers to the prestige, respect, and admiration an actor enjoys in the eyes of others (Anderson et al. 2006; Magee and Galinsky 2008). Status affects people’s perceptions, judgments, and behaviors (Berger et al. 1977; Pettit and Sivanathan 2012; Ridgeway and Berger 1986). On the one hand, research on competitive altruism suggests that activating status motives will lead people to choose self-sacrifice to signal altruism and their ability to bear costs (Griskevicius, Tybur, and Van den Bergh 2010; Roberts 1998; Van Vuurt, Roberts, and Hardy 2007). Accordingly, high-status (vs. low-status) consumers may respond more favorably to group (vs. individualized) recovery following a service failure. On the other hand, power is a close correlate of status and reflects an individual’s control over resources relative to others (French and Raven 1959; Magee and Galinsky 2008). Previous research shows that states of relatively high power foster an agentic orientation, whereas states of relatively low power foster a communal orientation (Rucker et al. 2012). Accordingly, this theorizing leads to a competing hypothesis -- high (low) status consumers may (due to power) respond more favorably to individualized (group) recovery that reflects this self (other) perspective.

The present research investigates the following question: how does status affect consumer response to service recovery efforts by firms? A series of empirical studies investigate how consumers with varying levels of status respond to individualized and standardized recovery efforts following a service failure. To illustrate: Study 1 was a 2 (Recovery: individualized, group) X 2 (Status: elite, regular loyalty status) between-subjects design. Participants were asked to imagine themselves as a high (low) status member of an airline company’s loyalty program who had a negative service encounter and received individualized (group) recovery as a response to the failure. Results indicate that high-status participants were more satisfied with the airline company’s group recovery response than with individualized recovery response (Mgroup=5.75, SD=1.08; Mindividualized=4.61, SD=1.32; F(1,77)=5.28, p<.05, ηp2=.05). Satisfaction did not differ by type of recovery for low status participants (F<1). Likewise, for recovery perceptions, high status participants perceived the group recovery more favorably than individualized recovery response (Mgroup=3.88, Mindividualized=3.41, F(1,77)=3.63, p=.06, ηp2=.04). Recovery perceptions did not differ for low-status participants (F<1). Analyses support mediation of status and recovery effects via recovery perceptions.

Subsequent studies follow up on this preliminary result by examining: i) how status affects consumer choice of individualized and group recovery options; and ii) how status affects fairness and satisfaction when consumers receive better, equivalent, or worse recovery than another customer who differs in status. Evidence thus far suggests that consumer status moderates the impact of service recovery on customer satisfaction following a service failure via differential fairness concerns. Together, these findings reveal how status plays an important role in firm-customer relationships and provide guidance for companies’ service recovery practices.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Each year companies spend billions of dollars on corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs (Luo and Bhattacharya 2009) and highlight these activities in their advertisements to establish a positive perception in their customers’ minds. Past research has mainly investigated how socially responsible initiatives and/or corporate social marketing (CSM) affect consumers’ attitudes, behaviors, and decisions connected to the company (Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and Braig 2004; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). However, little is known about how these messages and their framing affect consumer behavior in general.

Companies can use different framings for their CSM messages. Most companies describe their support of social and environmental causes and ask consumers for their help. One the other hand, some companies such as Starbucks choose another direction and give credit to their customers and praise them for their help in support of the company’s environmental causes: “You are a pioneer in using recycled cups. Everything we do, you do. Your business lets Starbucks do business in a way that’s better for the planet. Like leading the way in cup technology with the first U.S. hot cups made with 10% post-consumer recycled fiber, and cup sleeves that use 60%. Starbucks is working on a cup that’s 100% recyclable too, it’s what we can do, because of what you do. Good for you.” We call the framing of this message a customer-praise framing; and the framing of a message, in which a company acknowledges its support of social and environmental causes without praising its customers directly, a company-praise framing.

Here we argue that CSM messages alluding to customers’ good deeds (i.e., customer-praise; expressions such as the Starbucks message mentioned earlier) that signal goal progress and enhance consumers’ self-concept (Fishbach and Dhar, 2005; Khan and Dhar 2006), increase the likelihood of involvement in subsequent self-interested and self-indulgent behaviors.

People love to be praised and admired. Past research has shown that people respond positively to praising messages and these messages can influence motivation (e.g., Harackiewicz 1979) and alter the way people receive praise see themselves (e.g., Delin and Baumeister 1994; Jussim et al. 1992; Kim, Diekmann, and Tenbrunsel 2003). Besides, it has been shown that prior actions can liberate an individual to behave in a way that is not in line with the actions (Khan and Dhar 2006; Mazar and Zhong 2010; Monin and Miller 2001). Using these two bodies of literature, we argued that exposure to praising messages (i.e., messages alluding to individuals’ good deeds) can provide individuals with credentials that can license their subsequent self-interested and self-indulgent behaviors.

Studying the way people respond to praise messages, we argue that exposure to praising messages (i.e., messages alluding to individuals’ good deeds) can provide individuals with credentials that can license their subsequent self-interested and self-indulgent behaviors. Also, we believe that the perceived self-relevance and sincerity of the message, and the receiver’s values toward what he/she is praised for, moderate the effect of customer-praise message on subsequent self-interested behaviors. We ran a series of studies to test our propositions and the results consistently demonstrate that messages praising customers increase subsequent less altruistic behaviors.

Lastly, in Study 4 we investigated the moderating role of an individual difference, specifically environmental values, on the relationship between a pro-environmental praising message and self-interested behaviors. We measured participants’ pro-environmental values and showed that those with lower score on environmental values showed the licensing effect of praising messages. But, for those with stronger pro-environmental values, the praising message did not lead to the licensing effect.

REFERENCES


Focusing on Desirability versus Feasibility: The Influence of Fit between Goal Progress and Construal Level on Subsequent Self-Regulation

Jooyoung Park, University of Iowa, USA
William M. Hedgcock, University of Iowa, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

According to control theory (Carver and Scheier 1990), high goal progress induces a sense of goal attainment and signals that less effort is needed. Thus, people tend to decrease their effort when perceiving sufficient goal progress. However, other work indicates that people tend to disengage from a focal goal when facing adversity in the course of goal pursuit because lack of progress indicates that continued investments in effort are unlikely to pay off in the end (Schmidt et al. 2009). Furthermore, expectancy value theories of motivation postulate a curvilinear relationship between goal expectancy and motivation, with motivation being lowest at low and high levels of goal expectancy respectively (Atkinson 1957; Louro et al. 2007). Combined, these studies led to seemingly inconsistent predictions about how goal progress will affect motivation, raising questions about how high (low) goal progress can lead to both increased and decreased motivation as well as how to best motivate people.

Theories of mental construal posit that any action can be organized in a cognitive hierarchy, from low-level identities pertaining to how one acts to high-level identities pertaining to why one acts (Trope et al. 2007; Vallacher and Wegner 1987). Furthermore, action identification theory advocates the existence of an optimal level of identification, whereby identification level shifts in order to perform or maintain actions effectively (Houser-Marko and Sheldon 2008). More specifically, it proposes that when an action is difficult, complex, or unfamiliar, conscious concern shifts to the details of the action (i.e., low-level identifications) (Vallacher and Wegner 1989). Similarly, we predict that people perceiving low progress may pay more attention to specific means or sub-acts required to effectively achieve their goals (a lower level of construal), whereas people perceiving high progress may consider the general meaning or value of their goal (a higher level of construal). Formally, we hypothesize that greater perceived goal progress leads to higher levels of construal than lesser perceived goal progress.

Research based on regulatory engagement theory (Higgins 2006; Higgins et al. 2008) suggests that valuations of goals are affected by actors’ consideration of whether the process of goal pursuit is the proper or right way to pursue the goal. Valuations are particularly affected by intensifying the force of attraction toward the goal. Earlier, we predicted that people would consider their goal pursuit at different levels depending on goal progress. If goal progress drives people’s attention to different aspects of goal pursuit (why vs. how), then there will be a more and less appropriate manner in which people consider pursuing their goals. More precisely, we anticipate that people perceiving greater progress may think of their goal pursuit at an abstract, superordinate level, whereas people perceiving lesser progress may think of their goal pursuit in a concrete, subordinate manner. Following the notion that fit effects (appropriateness) increase goal engagement and the valuation of goals, we expect that thinking of goal pursuit in an appropriate manner will influence motivation and subsequent self-regulation.

Studies 1 and 2 tested the relationship between goal progress and construal level. Study 1 employed a social comparison to induce different levels of goal progress and examined its influence on construal level using a classification task (Liberman et al. 2002), where participants were asked to classify objects into categories. As we predicted, participants in the high progress condition classified objects in more inclusive ways using fewer categories (M = 5.16) than participants in the low progress condition (M = 6.13; F(1,75) = 5.32, p < .05). In study 2, we manipulated perceived goal progress using low versus high standards (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). To examine whether different levels of perceived goal progress draw people’s attention to different aspects of goal pursuit, we asked participants to list thoughts that came to their mind as they considered the pursuit of their fitness goals. Supporting our hypothesis, participants in the high progress condition listed a larger proportion of “why” thoughts (M = .626) than “how” thoughts (M = .374). Conversely, participants in the low progress condition generated a greater proportion of “how” thoughts (M = .630) compared to “why” thoughts (M = .370; F(77) = 6.78, p < .05).

Studies 3 and 4 examined how the fit between goal progress and construal level influences motivation. Study 3 induced different levels of goal progress using high versus low standards with which participants could compare their progress toward academic goals. We then asked participants to consider how or why they pursue their academic goals. Results showed that participants in the high progress condition planned to spend more time studying after abstract (vs. concrete) thinking (Mabstract = 4.30, Mconcrete = 3.41). Conversely, participants in the low progress condition planned to spend more time after concrete (vs. abstract) thinking (Mconcrete = 4.56, Mabstract = 3.68; F(1, 95) = 5.30, p < .05). Study 4 replicated the motivational influence of fit in another goal domain and demonstrated the underlying process of the fit effects. We used social comparisons to manipulate goal progress and asked participants to think about how or why they should achieve their money management goals. We found that participants in the high progress condition intended to spend less money eating out with friends when they thought about their pursuit of money management goals (Mhigh = 3.62, Mlow = 4.70), whereas participants in the low progress condition planned to spend less money eating out when they construed their goal pursuit in a concrete manner rather than in an abstract manner (Mhigh = 3.27, Mlow = 4.64; F(1, 88) = 6.56, p < .05). Furthermore, we found engagement (e.g., “feeling motivated”) partially mediates the influence of fit on self-regulation.

From a theoretical perspective, this research extends our knowledge of how perceived goal progress influences individuals’ mental construal. Our findings also provide an answer to the question of how to motivate or persuade people based on the relationship between goal progress and construal level. Our findings suggest that if an advertising campaign primarily focuses on those who have made sufficient progress toward their goals, it would be better to employ concrete (vs. abstract) construals. However, if the campaign targets people who have made sufficient progress, abstract (vs. concrete) construals would be more effective.

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Materialism, defined as a focus on the acquisition and possession of material objects, is described as an essential component of the social value system of societies (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002). Previous research appears to paint a uniformed portrait of materialism, suggesting that it has universally negative consequences for one’s pursuit of happiness. In the current research, we argue that culture has a significant moderating role in how materialism affects individuals’ subjective well-being. Specifically, we discuss and explore how American and Chinese cultures differ in the cultural interpretation of materialistic values and how this might lead to a culturally bound relationship between materialism and subjective well-being.

Cultured Materialism

This salience of the negative aspects of materialism in America may have originated from several distinct aspects of American culture. For example, having a democratic political culture with a great deal of civil liberties such as free press (The Economist, 2011), allows for many outlets of self-expression beyond the acquisition of material possessions. The American culture also endorses an independent self-construal (Lee, Aaker, and Gardner 2000), which places less emphasis on acquiring possessions as a means to social comparison (Aaker and Schmitt 2001; White and Lehman 2005). In contrast to American culture, China’s authoritarian rule and limited free press (The Economist, 2011) may cause materialism to function as an important instrument for self-expression because of a paucity of other outlets. Also, an interdependent self-construal within the Chinese culture (Lee et al. 2000) and a strong motivation to “save face” (Ahuvia and Wong 1995) might enhance the need to acquire materialistic possessions for social comparison (Aaker & Schmitt, 2001; White & Lehman, 2005).

As initial evidence supporting our hypothesis, qualitative work by Ger and Belk (1996) suggests that Americans are more likely to view materialism as excessive or as a weakness, whereas other countries, such as Romania, are more likely to view materialism as empowering and allowing for an expression of personal control and freedom. Eastman et al. (1997) found that Chinese are more likely than Americans to view possessions as important markers of success and obtaining possessions as a means to happiness.

Based on our theorizing and these past findings, we hypothesize that materialism has negative associations in American culture and, as a consequence, the priming of materialism has a negative influence on subjective well-being in American culture. In contrast, we hypothesize that materialism has positive associations in Chinese culture and, as a consequence, the priming of materialism may have a novel and positive influence on subjective well-being in Chinese culture.

Experiment 1

Experiment 1 examined whether cross-cultural differences exist in how people interpret the concept of materialism. Specifically, we tested whether people in the US and China differ on whether they view materialistic individuals positively or negatively.

Method

The design of the study is a 3 (Materialism: pro-materialism vs. neutral vs. anti-materialism) × 2 (Culture: American vs. Chinese) between-subject design (N = 290). Participants were asked to evaluate an anonymous survey taker. In the pro-materialism condition, the survey taker showed a strong endorsement towards materialism. In the anti-materialism condition, the survey taker showed a negative attitude towards materialism. In the neutral condition, the survey taker showed a neutral attitude towards materialism.

Results and Discussion

A 2-way ANOVA revealed a significant materialism prime × culture interaction on evaluation, F (2, 284) = 31.20, p < .001, η² = .18. US participants evaluated the survey taker in the anti-materialism condition more favorably compared with the neutral condition, p = .008, which in turn was evaluated more favorably compared with the pro-materialism condition, p < .001. For Chinese participants, a contrasting pattern of results was observed such that the survey taker in the anti-materialism condition was evaluated less favorably compared with the neutral condition and the pro-materialism condition, p = .005.

Experiment 2

In the current experiment we explored the effect of materialism on subjective well-being in a Chinese population with measures closely replicating Bauer et al. (2012) for the purpose of comparison.

Method

The design of the study is a 2 cell (Materialism prime: materialism vs. control) between-subject design (N = 46). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the materialism prime condition, participants viewed 20 pictures of luxury products. In the control condition, participants viewed 20 pictures of nature and daily objects such as flowers. Participants were then asked to indicate how they felt at the moment on a series of emotions. The measures exactly replicated Experiment 1 in Bauer et al. (2012), which included anxiety, depression, and self-dissatisfaction.

Results and Discussion

Central to our hypothesis, and in contrast from Bauer et al. (2012), participants in the materialism prime reported lower anxiety, lower depression, and lower self-dissatisfaction compared to the control condition (ps < .087).

Experiment 3

The current experiment tested for cross-cultural differences in how materialism affects subjective well-being by utilizing the same stimuli and procedures in American and Chinese cultures.

Method

The design of the study is a 2 (Prime: materialism vs. control) × 2 (Culture: American vs. Chinese) between-subject design. One hundred and four US participants and 90 Chinese participants were recruited. The procedures of the current experiment are similar to those of Experiment 2.

Results and Discussion

Central to our hypothesis, a significant prime × culture interaction on anxiety was found, p = .001. American participants rated themselves as more anxious in the materialism condition compared with the control condition, p = .01, replicating Bauer et al. (2012).
In contrast, Chinese participants rated themselves less anxious in the materialism condition compared with control, \( p = .04 \). Similar patterns were found on depression and self-dissatisfaction measures.

**General Discussion**

The current research provides evidence that the conceptualization of materialism, and therefore its effects on subjective well-being, are culturally bound. Contrary to the existing literature that might lead one to uniformly conclude that materialism is a negative contributor to subjective well-being, the current findings show that materialism can be beneficial to subjective well-being if the culture prescribed associations to materialism is positive, as with Chinese culture.

**Table 1: Summary of results from 3 reported experiments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>American participants evaluated anti-materialistic others more favorably compared to pro-materialistic others. In contrast, Chinese participants evaluated anti-materialistic others less favorably compared to anti-materialistic others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>After being primed with materialism, Chinese participants felt less anxious, less depressed, and less self-dissatisfied, a contrasting pattern from past research that utilized an American population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>After being primed with materialism, American participants’ level of anxiety, depression, and self-dissatisfaction increased compared to control. In contrast, replicating Experiment 2, Chinese participants’ level of anxiety, depression, and self-dissatisfaction decreased after being primed with materialism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REFERENCES**


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Nowadays, people are confronted with an overload of choice alternatives. However, having a lot of options does not necessarily increase consumer satisfaction (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Especially people who are motivated to make the best possible choice (i.e., maximizers), can experience feelings of stress when they have a lot of alternatives, and are more likely to regret their choice afterwards (Schwartz et al. 2002). We suggest that difficulties to choose a product might arise from difficulties to form one’s opinion about products. When people have a hard time to know how much they like something, they might consequently encounter difficulties to choose the product they would like best. Current research suggests that people can have a hard time to form their opinion in general. Whether they have to evaluate a new product, a new neighbor or a new taste, some people find it hard to make up their mind. In current paper, we develop a scale to measure individual differences in the extent to which people have difficulties to evaluate. Moreover, we demonstrate that current evaluation difficulty scale is able to predict several personality measures and behavioral outcomes, including actual taste evaluations.

In a first study, 349 American citizens participated. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted for reducing the initial item pool of 32 items. Items that violated standard criteria, such as a corrected item-to-total correlations above .30, were deleted from the factor solution. Results from EFA and the scree plot indicated a one-factor solution for the evaluation difficulty construct. Moreover, we found that evaluation difficulty relates to several dispositions as expected from the literature. For instance, we found a negative relationship with Jarvis and Petty’s (1996) need to evaluate scale (r = -.28) and a positive relationship with Schwartz’s (2002) maximization scale (r = .33). Thus, the more difficulties one encounters to evaluate, the less likely one is to engage in evaluative behavior, and the more one will experience difficulties to choose a product.

To confirm current findings and to finalize the evaluation difficulty scale measure, we ran a second study in which 476 Americans participated. The final EFA resulted in a one-factor solution with 6 items including one reversed item. The evaluation difficulty construct explained 68.59% of the variance and internal consistency was .84 in current sample. Moreover, results showed high predictive validity of the scale. First, we found that the scale predicted 15 behavioral items (r = .17 to .68) such as “I always choose the same flavor of ice cream”. Second, results showed the scale is related to several consumer behavior scales. People who have difficulties to evaluate are loyal customers (r = .20), are no variety seekers (r = -.37) and have no inclination to express their uniqueness through consuming products that are not used by the general public (r = .32).

Third, people who scored high on the evaluation difficulty scale explicitly stated they had a hard time to evaluate the quality of two books for which we provided a short description (r = .30).

To test whether evaluation difficulty could predict actual behavior, we conducted another study in which 90 Belgian students participated. First, participants completed the evaluation difficulty scale (α=.80) as part of a larger questionnaire. Second, participants were told that they were randomly assigned to evaluate one of two concealed brands of chocolates. The chocolates were actually identical, but were presented in either a beautiful or an ugly box. Afterwards, participants had to indicate how delicious the chocolate was on a 10-point scale (0=very bad, 10=very delicious). The results showed that evaluation difficulty and the type of box had no main effect on the evaluation of the chocolates. More importantly, we did found a marginally significant interaction effect between evaluation difficulty and the type of box on the taste evaluation of the chocolates (F(1, 88)=3.98, p = .070). People who have a hard time to make an evaluation in general, evaluated the same chocolates to be better when the box of chocolates was beautiful (M = 3.53) compared to when the box was ugly (M = 3.05). In contrast, people who do not experience difficulties to evaluate did not make a different taste evaluation for a beautiful (M = 3.22) versus an ugly (M = 3.36) box of chocolates. As such, these results suggest that people who experience evaluation difficulty, might transfer the quality of an irrelevant attribute such as package design to the quality of the product in itself. Taken together, these results indicate that current scale is highly predictive for various types of behavior.

The current research constructed a valid and reliable evaluation difficulty scale with one factor and 6 items that relates to various personality and behavioral measures. Moreover, we found that the constructed scale is able to predict actual taste evaluations. Future research will be conducted to further investigate how difficulties to evaluate affect (consumer) behavior.

REFERENCES


Impacts of the Motivations and Antecedents of Legacy Writing on the Consumption of Biographic Services by the Elderly
Samuel Guilleemot, Western University of Brittany, France
Bertrand Urien, Western University of Brittany, France

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The study highlights an emerging market – the life history business – which enables people to preserve individual and family memory. These services are developing as their target clientele – the elderly and the baby boomers – are becoming aware of their own death and that of their close friends and family. It must be noted that there are two different types of biographic services: guidance services relating to learning methods and know-how, and co-production services involving the services of a personal historian who constructs the biography based on discussions with the consumer. The aim of this research is to test the influence that legacy motivations and their antecedents have on writing behavior and consumer intention to participate in these biographical services.

Our reflection and past research led us to specify the motivations and antecedents to the writing of an autobiography. Six motivations are specified and measured: Flattering the ego (the willingness of the individual to make known certain aspects of his/her person and life course); Mending the ego (the individual feels the need to go over a period of his/her past in order to unburden him/herself); Sharing (willingness to exchange and the search for interaction); Being remembered (the issue of being remembered by family and friends after death); Transmitting (transmission, often to the youngest members of the family, of elements or facts the individual deems important), and Bearing witness (desire to preserve some elements from generation to generation, the life story heritage). The two antecedents for legacy writing refer to the concepts of reminiscence that contribute to identity construction (reminder of the autobiographical memory, the pleasure of looking back over ones past) and of generativity that contributes to identity preservation (the desire to symbolically extend existence beyond death, and worries about future generations).

The models to be tested take into account all of the hypotheses that cover antecedents, legacy writing motivations and behavioral intentions (table 1). We used measuring instruments that had been tested previously and validated in the literature: the Life-Story Writing Motivations Scale (Guilleemot and Urien 2010), the Reminiscence Functions Scale (RFS – Webster 1997) and the Loyola Generative Scale (LGS – McAdams and de S’Aubin 1992, adapted by Urien and Kilbourne 2011). We measure intent to consume biographic services by using concrete and unique mono-item measurements representing guidance and co-production services. Data were collected in France on a sample of 392 people aged between 60 and 92 years and processed with Structural Equation Modeling.

Our study empirically confirms:

(a) Firstly that these motivations are based on the capacity for structured reminiscence (the individual uses his/her past to crystallize important dimensions of the person and to confront existential questions about the end of life) and a direction towards the next generation (which is based on the memory that the individual is going to leave and on aspects that the individual wishes to transmit). The explained variables of motivations range from 40 to 45% for flattering the ego, mending the ego, being remembered, sharing and only 17% and 24% respectively for transmitting and bearing witness.

Table 1: Path Coefficient and Hypothesis Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Path</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Z-Value</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1a: Flattering the ego → guidance biographic services</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.89</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1b: Mending the ego → guidance biographic services</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1c: Being remembered → guidance biographic services</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-1.71</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1d: Sharing → guidance biographic services</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>3.47*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1e: Transmitting → guidance biographic services</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>2.10*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1f: Bearing witness → guidance biographic services</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2a: Flattering the ego → co-production biographic services</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2b: Mending the ego → co-production biographic services</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>3.14*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2c: Being remembered → co-production biographic services</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2d: Sharing → co-production biographic services</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>2.04*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2e: Transmitting → co-production biographic services</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>2.23*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2f: Bearing witness → co-production biographic services</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3a: Reminiscence Identity → Flattering the ego</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>4.07*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3b: Reminiscence Identity → Mending the ego</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>6.47*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3c: Reminiscence Identity → Sharing</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>7.37*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4a: Reminiscence Death preparation → Being remembered</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>5.57*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4b: Reminiscence Death preparation → Transmitting</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>4.12*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4c: Reminiscence Death preparation → Bearing witness</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>4.57*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5a: Generativity Passing on → Sharing</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>3.20*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5b: Generativity Passing on → Transmitting</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>4.16*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5c: Generativity Passing on → Bearing witness</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>4.92*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6a: Generativity Posteriority → Flattering the ego</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>5.41*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6b: Generativity Posteriority → Mending the ego</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>5.22*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6c: Generativity Posteriority → Being remembered</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>6.11*</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics significant at the 5% level are marked with *
(b) Secondly, if the life story can be said to be a multidimensional concept, then only some motivations appear to be decisive on biographic services consumption. An individual that wishes to write an autobiography who is guided by a will to flatter the ego and to bear witness does not seem to be very attracted by biographic services because everything points to the fact that writing alone – with one’s own words – reflects a personal skill. It must also be noted that the influence of the transmitting motivation evokes inter-generational exchange whereas that of sharing relates to intra-generational exchange. The influence of the motivation mending the ego on the intent to consume co-production services may seem more surprising. Nevertheless, according to Rimé’s theory of the Social Sharing of Emotion (2005) when a person tries to communicate traumatic events that he/she has lived through, it is not so much to offload this grief, but more to find a social support for his/her emotions. Hence the motivations sharing and mending the ego would have the same functions: the former enables the strengthening of relationships by mobilizing positive emotions and the latter by negative emotions.

The results of this study will enable service providers to improve their offers and will lead to a more in-depth understanding of consumption behavior linked to the transmission and preservation of the self in end of life. This study contributes indeed to studies on the preservation of the self and intergenerational transmission (Belk 1988; Curasi, 2006; Price et al. 2000; Wallendorf and Arnould 1988). To date, research has studied the symbolic preservation and transmission of the self through “special” objects in which individuals invest a part of their identity. It is striking to consider that the symbolic functions these special objects possess at the end of life have certain elements in common with legacy writing motivations that have been identified in this study. The special, valuable object of recognition (for example, a trophy would be the sign of a reasonably successful sporting “career”), enables the recollection of life moments, the witnessing of particular events (for example a ring or a piece of jewellery that symbolizes a particular interpersonal relationship). When this object is offered as a present or as a legacy to someone who will know how to preserve its meaning, for the giving individual, it is a means of being remembered. It also has a therapeutic value and serves, in particular, as a point of anchorage and stability. Finally, it enables the transmission of individual and family values and it is a vehicle for intergenerational sharing and transmitting. The main difference between the special object and the life story is that for the former, these significant differences are symbolic, whilst for the latter, they explicitly express the very heart of the life story, whether it be filmed, recorded or written. Hence the importance of biographic services which provide the necessary tools for storing the “meaningful”.

REFERENCES
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These Clothes Become You: Effects of Consumption on Social-Identification
Rob Nelissen, Tilburg University, the Netherlands
Maartje Elshout, Tilburg University, the Netherlands
Ilja van Beest, Tilburg University, the Netherlands

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

It is well-recognized that people consume in ways that establish and express their self-identities (Belk 1988; Fournier 1998; McCracken 1989). We investigated if wearing, choosing, and receiving consumer goods also affects people’s identity. Recent studies suggest that consumption influences the way in which people perceive themselves (Chao and Chiou 2011, Gino, Norton, and Ariely 2010). For instance, women felt more glamorous after using a Victoria’s Secret shopping bag than after using a bag from a less appealing brand (Park and John 2010). We build on and extend these findings by revealing that consumption may not only influence people’s self-perception but may also affect their social identities.

The crucial discrepancies are that self-perception effects involve dimensional changes on particular traits (attractiveness, intelligence) that all people possess to some extent, whereas social identity effects of consumption would imply categorical changes in people’s self-views as members of particular social groups to which they either belong to or not. Furthermore, consumption effects on social identity would not only involve a change in self-perception but also imply changes in the perception others who are members of a particular social group. As such, the present studies suggest that the effects of consumption on the self are more profound that currently recognized.

The hypothesis that consumption affects social-identity is consistent with social psychological research on social identity formation (Tajfel and Turner 1979), which demonstrated that people infer group-memberships from cues that establish similarities between individuals. Even very subtle and apparently trivial similarity cues can be sufficient to make people feel more affiliated with-, hold more positive attitudes towards-, and favor apparent in-group members (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 2002). However, research on social-identity formation has not previously considered if self-categorization processes will also affect people’s tendencies to affiliate with members of a negatively valenced out-group. As such, the present research also extends basic insights into social psychological processes of social identity formation.

In three studies, we tested the hypothesis that consumption would affect people’s social identities. In each study, participants received a consumer product that was associated with a negatively valenced group to which they did not belong. Study 1 revealed that customers felt more connected with smokers after receiving an ashtray as a gift in a grocery store than after receiving no gift, regardless of the number of smokers in their social environment. Receiving an ashtray did not result in greater connectedness with other social groups (vegetarians, street kids, and Catholics).

Study 2 replicated and extended findings from Study 1 by showing that wearing a bag that was associated with another negative out-group (Moroccans) during a lab experiment resulted in greater connectedness with the target group compared to a control condition that wore a bag that was not specifically associated with a particular social group. Moreover, wearing a bag associated with the out-group also resulted in less negative implicit attitudes towards the out-group. These effects were particularly pronounced after participants were exposed to a social exclusion manipulation. This is consistent with findings showing that people are especially sensitive to the symbolic meaning of consumer goods after relevant aspects of their self-identity are threatened (Escalas and Bettman 2005; Gao et al. 2008; Morrison and Johnson 2011; Rindfleish et al. 2008). Again, the experimental manipulations did not affect identification with other social groups.

Study 3 revealed that wearing a bracelet that was associated with the negative out-group of gothic people resulted in behavioral effects suggesting social-identification with the out-group. Specifically, participants sat closer to a confederate whose appearance matched the bracelet they were wearing (gothic vs. normal), indicating greater social-identification with the out-group. Specifically, participants sat closer to a confederate whose appearance matched the bracelet they were wearing (gothic vs. normal), indicating greater affiliation, and were more likely to help the matching confederate, indicating in-group favoritism.

Table 1: Summary of Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ashtrays</td>
<td>Bags</td>
<td>Bracelets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(16.64)</td>
<td>Confederate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.58</td>
<td>31.42</td>
<td>40.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(19.80)</td>
<td>(26.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- .43</td>
<td>- .49</td>
<td>22.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(21.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favoritism</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29.4%)</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Participants in the Experimental conditions received a consumer product that was associated with the target out group. Participants in the Control conditions did not receive a product (study 1) or received a similar product that was not associated with a particular social group (studies 2 and 3). Affiliation was assessed through participant ratings in studies 1 (scale: 1-5), and 2 (scale 0-100), and through proximity in seat distance (scale: 1-4) in study 3. Attitude was assessed by IAT scores (D). Favoritism was assessed as percentage of helping behavior.
In sum, the present findings support the hypothesis that consumption may influence the social-identities of consumers. We do not believe that this is the result of priming effects, by which certain consumer goods increase the accessibility and therefore the judgments about the associated social groups. In Study 1, a priming effect would have resulted in an interaction between the manipulation and the number of smokers in the participants' social environments, such that the effects of receiving an ashtray would have been stronger for people who know many smokers. We did not find such an interaction. Moreover, a priming effect cannot account for the interaction with the exclusion manipulation in Study 2 and would have produced a main effect of receiving the Moroccan bag. Finally, the effects on in-group favoritism as reported in Study 3 cannot be explained from mere accessibility effects but rather imply a motivational process.

We believe our results are more readily understood as the consequence of social identity threats. However, receiving products that are associated with a negatively valenced out-group and social exclusion are both threats to people’s social identities that would normally result in a greater tendency to be accepted by the in-group, thus would hinder affiliation with the out-group. On the one hand, it could be that each manipulation presented a situational constraint on the effects of the other, such that social exclusion by the in-group constrained the tendency to affiliate with that group that resulted from the identity threat of receiving a product associated with an out-group. Similarly, the product may have directed the affiliation tendencies resulting from social exclusion towards the associated social group. On the other hand, it might also be the case that receiving a product and being socially excluded constituted threats to different self-identity motives (Lee & Shrum, 2012).

The key limitation to the present findings is the low effect sizes observed across the studies, which we believe can be partly accounted for by the subtle nature of the manipulations and the fact that the present studies constituted a very conservative test of our hypothesis as we investigated the effects of consumption on social-identification with negatively valenced out-groups. In spite of these impairments to a strong effect size, our results were highly consistent and established the power of consumer goods to influence self- and social-identity formation, which may bear important social implications for intergroup relations and prejudice.

REFERENCES


Depletion-as-Information: The Role of Feelings in Resource Depletion
Charlene Chen, Columbia University, USA
Keith Wilcox, Columbia University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The ego depletion model posits that the ability to exert self-control relies on a limited resource of the self (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice 1998). Consistent with this model, numerous studies have found that exerting self-control in an initial task reduces ability to control oneself in subsequent tasks (c.f. Hagger, Wood, Stiff, and Chatzisarantis 2010). Nonetheless, recent findings (e.g., Agrawal and Wan 2009; Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, and Alexander 2010) suggest that initial acts of self-control do not always impair subsequent self-control. In fact, self-regulatory failure due to depletion may depend on how people interpret their experience of depletion. Our research builds on these recent findings by proposing that the experience of depletion may act as a source of information that lowers self-control. Hence, effects of depletion on self-control can be enhanced or reduced by altering the extent to which people rely on its experience as a source of information.

We propose that when resources are depleted, the feeling of depletion (e.g., tired, exhaustion) serves as a source of information that resources are low. The self-control system then reduces subsequent self-control to conserve its limited resources. Thus, the feeling of depletion can affect self-control independently from the amount of depleted resources. If so, the influence of prior self-control on subsequent self-control should depend on how credible feelings of depletion are perceived to be for judgment and how intensely people experience feelings. Hence, we hypothesized that discrediting the informational value of the feeling of depletion would diminish the standard depletion effect. We also hypothesized that the more (or less) intense the feelings of depletion the greater (or lower) the depletion effect. We tested these hypotheses in three experiments using a standard depletion paradigm in which participants engage in an initial task that either requires them to inhibit a behavior or not, and perform a subsequent task that requires self-control resources.

We investigated our first hypothesis in experiment 1. Participants (N=221) were asked to retype a passage as quickly as they can within five minutes. Those in the depletion condition were given additional instructions to refrain from using the letter “e” and space bar. Next, half of the participants were exposed to a discrediting manipulation in which they were asked to rate the extent to which their current feelings were affected by the typing task. Other participants did not see this question. All participants were then given 10 unsolvable anagrams to solve. Persistence on this task was measured using the time they spent trying to solve these anagrams. A significant two-way interaction between depletion and discrediting emerged (F(1,206)=5.90, p<.05). The standard ego depletion effect was replicated in the no-discredit condition: depleted participants spent less time on the anagrams (M=154.07sec) than non-depleted participants (M=214.82sec; F(1,206)=7.74, p<.01). Consistent with our prediction, there was no difference in time spent between depleted (M=200.40sec) and non-depleted participants (M=188.41sec) in the discredit condition (F(1,206)=34, p=.56).

Experiment 2 tested the same hypothesis using a different dependent measure. After completing the same depletion and discrediting manipulations from experiment 1, participants (N=149) were given a limited amount of time to solve IQ problems. Performance on this task was operationalized as the number of correct responses each participant provided. Similar to Experiment 1, the interaction between depletion and discrediting was significant (F(1,141)=4.33, p<.05). In the no-discredit condition, depleted participants did poorer (M=4.91) than non-depleted participants (M=5.80; F(1,141)=3.90, p=.05). However, in the discredit condition, there was no difference in performance between depleted (M=5.47) and non-depleted participants (M=5.03; F(1,141)=.95, p=.33).

Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the standard ego depletion effect and showed that it weakens when perceived credibility of the feeling of depletion is reduced. In experiment 3, we tested whether depleted individuals who are more prone to experience intense feelings would exhibit the standard ego depletion effect more strongly. This experiment also tested our proposed mechanism in a marketing context. Prior research has shown that preference for compromise options decreases under depletion because the process of deliberating trade-offs that favor different options is more demanding on self-regulatory resources than choosing extreme options which typically involves a simple decision rule based on one criterion (e.g., highest quality, etc.; Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, and Baumeister 2009). We predicted that the reduction in compromise effect would be stronger (weaker) among depleted individuals who are more (less) prone to experience intense feelings.

Participants (N=87) completed the same depletion manipulation from the previous experiments followed by a choice task among portable grills. They were asked to choose between three models: one option was superior on cooking area but inferior on weight; another option was superior on weight but inferior on cooking area; the middle option was medium on these two attributes. Then they filled out the Affect Intensity measure which reflects chronic differences in the strength with which people experience feelings (Larsen and Diener 1987). Consistent with our prediction, there was a significant interaction between depletion and affect intensity on choice of the middle option (β=−2.74,Wald=6.16, p<.05). Among participants with high chronic affect intensity, those who were depleted compromised less than those who were not depleted (β=−2.36,Wald=9.05, p<.005). However, among participants with low chronic affect intensity, this difference was not significant (β=.32,Wald=22, p=.64).

We provided evidence for the proposed depletion-as-information hypothesis by manipulating and measuring people’s reliance on the feeling of depletion as a source of information in three experiments. These results indicate that the experience of depletion plays an essential role of giving feedback to the self-control system that

<table>
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<th>Table 1: Results across Experiments</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Experiment 1:</strong> Mean Time Spent on Unsolvable Anagrams (sec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Discredit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discredit</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Experiment 2:</strong> Mean Number of Correct Responses on IQ Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Discredit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discredit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experiment 3:</strong> Percentage of Participants Who Chose Middle Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Affect Intensity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Affect Intensity</td>
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resources are low and that one should minimize self-regulatory effort. Future research should investigate whether the current effects would hold up in cases of severe ego depletion where subjective factors may not be sufficient to overcome actual depletion (Vohs, Baumeister and Schmeichel 2012). Considering how ego depletion can be implicated in a wide variety of maladaptive behaviors (e.g., impulsive purchases, excessive eating, etc.), insights from the current research could help to identify strategies to mitigate the effects of depletion on self-control in a systematic way.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

How Brands Shape Newness Perceptions
Frank Goedertier, Vlerick Business School, Belgium
Kristof Geskens, Vlerick Business School, Belgium
Gregory S. Carpenter, Northwestern University, USA

To be successful, innovations should be perceived as novel and different from existing alternatives (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997, Herrard and Szymanski 2001). The handful of studies that explored the antecedents of novelty focused on either firm characteristics and new product development strategies (Sethi et al. 2012; Sethi et al. 2001) or consumer categorization processes (Selinger et al. 2006). With respect to launching new products, research shows the merits and increasing popularity of introducing products as brand extensions (e.g., Aaker and Keller 1990; Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Stahl et al. 2012). For innovations introduced as extensions, an element that may heavily determine extension newness perceptions, is the brand used to introduce it. In this research, we explore the impact of parent brand typicality on extension newness perceptions. The strong category anchoring of long-established, typical brands like Jeep has been shown to create a unique advantage relative to other brands (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989). However, it has also been argued to present a possible innovation disadvantage (Aaker and Keller 1990; Farquhar et al. 1992), as it intuitively may make people think inside the box. Yet, we counter-intuitively predict that brand typicality may help rather than hinder novelty perceptions.

In particular, we examine whether the type of dominant associations a brand evokes might affect the perceived novelty of its new products. We distinguish between types of brand association based on their level of abstraction: concrete attribute-based associations (i.e., physical product features) versus abstract associations (i.e., not directly related to physical product features). We argue that typical brands (i.e., brands strongly associated with a specific category and core category attributes) evoke more concrete attribute-based associations, whereas less typical brands (i.e., brands not strongly associated with a specific category) tend to evoke relatively more abstract associations. We argue that both types of brand associations affect perceived novelty differently.

Since novelty perceptions are relative judgments, they require a context against which novelty is assessed. Therefore, novelty of a new product is most likely assessed against the context of existing alternative products. Brands – by activating certain associations in consumers’ minds – might influence this comparison context. We posit that attribute-based associations evoked by typical brands provide consumers with a concrete context of existing product features. This context allows a direct comparison between the new product’s features and existing ones. This might draw attention to which features of the new product are new and different from existing ones, which might increase newness perceptions. For less typical brands we do not expect such effect as they are less likely to carry concrete attribute-based associations. Four empirical studies offer converging support for our predictions.

A first experiment (N=42) was designed to test the assumption that typical brands evoke more attribute-based associations compared to less typical brands. In this experiment, participants were confronted with either a typical or a less typical brand from two product categories. We asked participants to list which associations were triggered by these brands. Subsequent analyses confirmed that typical brands trigger a larger number of attribute-based associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Overview of the Experiments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiment 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact of typicality on novelty (regression coeff.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close extensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand typicality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo Camera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chocolate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beer</td>
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<td>Ketchup</td>
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Note.—Experiment 1 reveals that brands scoring high (low) on typicality tend to carry more concrete attribute-related (abstract non-attribute related) brand associations. These results were omitted from this table for reasons of clarity. Experiment 2 uses a regression model to test the impact of brand typicality on perceived novelty of new products. For all product categories tested, perceived novelty is significantly, positively influenced by brand typicality. Experiment 3 uses ANOVA to test the impact of brand typicality on perceived novelty of new products. The mean scores on perceived novelty for each condition are presented in the table. The data shows that brand typicality significantly increases perceived novelty for extensions into similar, but not to dissimilar, product categories. Experiment 4 uses an additional manipulation that affects perceived novelty: construal level. The table presents the mean perceived novelty score under each experimental condition. ANOVA was used to test their significance. Results show that when both the type of brand (typicality low or high) and construal level (concrete or abstract) affect perceived novelty in a consistent direction, the effect of typicality persists. If not, both effects level each other out.

* significant at p<.001 significance level
** significant at p<.01 significance level
*** significant at p<.05 significance level

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compared to less typical brands. The total number of non-attribute-based associations shows the expected opposite pattern. The differences were even stronger when we focused on the top-of-mind associations: attribute-based associations (M Typical = 1.30, SD = .57 versus M Less Typical = 0.65, SD = .47; z = -3.556, p < .001); abstract associations (M Typical = 0.67, SD = .57, M Less Typical) = 1.24, SD = .45, z = -3.256, p < .001).

The goal of the second experiment was to establish the link between brand typicality and perceived newness of new products introduced by that brand. To test this, we ran an online experiment among 1047 participants in which each participant rated the novelty of a new product introduced by either a brand low, medium, or high in typicality. We tested our predictions across three different product categories for generalizability. A regression analysis showed that typical brands increase novelty perceptions of new products (β = .214 (t = 7.080, p < .001)). We observed this effect of brand typicality on perceived novelty of new products in each product category tested.

A third study (N=1030) tests a boundary condition of the effect found in study 2. In particular, we find that the effect of typical brands on perceived novelty is limited to new products introduced in the brand’s core category (i.e., close extensions) as opposed to dissimilar product categories (i.e., distant extensions). This finding offers additional support for the notion that brand associations drive novelty perceptions. Attribute-based associations (physical product features) are only useful in assessing the novelty of a new product if they can be used as a comparison point. This is true for new products introduced into the brand’s own category (e.g., Jeep introduces a new type of 4x4), but not for dissimilar new products (e.g., Jeep introduces a new type of city scooter). We documented this boundary condition across three product categories.

A final study (N=231) aims for convergence by influencing novelty perception through an additional manipulation: construal level. Previous research found that individuals with a concrete (abstract) mindset tend to focus on dissimilarities (similarities) between objects, which might also affect perceived novelty of new products. Experiment 4 combines a construal level and brand typicality manipulation to test their joint effects. Across two product categories, we find that both factors affect perceived novelty, as expected. In particular, we show that when both manipulations drive novelty perceptions in consistent directions, the effect of typicality on perceived novelty remains significant, whereas inconsistent manipulations level each other out.

This research demonstrates, for the first time, that brands can influence extension newness perceptions. Specifically, we show that a new product launched using a brand that is typical for the category is perceived as more novel than it would be if launched by a less typical brand. We also provide evidence for the underlying mechanism. We argue that attribute-based brand associations make people focus on dissimilarities, and as such facilitate novelty perceptions. This insight has considerable business value, as it shows that managers can influence the perceived novelty of an innovation by carefully considering the brand to launch it.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The rising conflict between the growing sensitivity towards environmental concerns while living in a material world has interested consumer researchers and policy makers for some time. To date, the literature on materialism and sustainability is not encouraging regarding the possibility to reconcile sustainable and materialistic consumption. The few existing studies on this topic suggest that materialism and environmentally responsible behavior are mutually incompatible (Banerjee and McKeage 1994; Kilbourne and Pickett 2008). However, Burroughs’ (2010) notion that green products might have taken over from prestige goods (extravagant, expensive, large) as the new status products as well as research that showed that green products are status-relevant when consumed in public (Griskevicius, Tybur, and van den Bergh 2010) point to a new understanding of sustainable consumption. Besides typically considered altruistic motives, green products may in addition serve to pursue egoistic goals such as enhancing status. This lends support on the assumption that green products can serve as enviable material possessions. It is less clear, however, why this might be the case.

To date, researchers tend to agree that material possessions have to be more expensive than other products and have to be socially visible (Richins 1994). However, considering the importance of possessions for identity purposes as well as their influence on the respective social environment (Solomon, 1983), the reduction of material possessions to costly goods only is subject to debate. Regardless of the relative price, ideal material products need to be desired and valued by the targeted social environment. As such, greater value is often related to greater scarcity of objects (Fromkin 1970), which signals that the number of potential co-owners is limited. We extend this reasoning and contend that scarcity can also apply to experiences or personality traits that are associated with certain products or consumption activities.

Specifically, we argue that materialists may appreciate the associations of rare personality traits that can be attributed to buyers of green products. As materialists are particularly apt to scarce product features, this increases attractiveness of green products. Although sustainability has become an important issue in today’s societies, not many individuals are willing to incur the costs of self-sacrifice – in terms of money, quality, or time – for the sake of others (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2011). Public campaigns that try to promote a sustainable lifestyle underline this need for a change in consumer behavior. In doing so, these campaigns subconsciously help to signal materialists that sustainable behavior is still rather rare. Therefore, associated personality traits of sustainable consumption, such as being caring, helpful, or ethical may become desirable personality traits that materialists want to communicate to others. In other words, choosing a green product option over a non-green product option may serve in terms of differentiating oneself from other members of the same social class or to demonstrate belongingness to some intellectual elite.

The aim of our study was to show that under certain conditions – when green personality traits are perceived to be rare – materialism and sustainability are not at odds. One hundred and forty-four students (54.2 % male, mean age = 20.5) at a large Texan public university took part in this study for partial course credit. We employed a 2 (scarcity, control) x 2 (green personality traits, control) between-subject design. We measured materialism using Richins’ (2004) 9-item Material Value Short Scale (α=.81). We used the scrambled sentence test to prime scarcity and a memory task to prime green personality traits. Prior to this study, we pretested those personality traits (e.g., caring, helpful, ethical) with a separate group of 49 students to ensure that these traits are most often associated with green consumption. After the two manipulations and a filler task, participants were asked to imagine a situation in which they are out shopping to buy a) coffee and b) a new TV set. For each product category they were presented with two different options (green, non-green), each described by three product features. Notably, both options were identical in terms of price and two product features. The third attribute was either a green or non-green attribute.

Considering that on a bipolar 9-point rating scale a mean of 5 indicates an equal attractiveness of both the green and non-green product option, our results indicate two different scenarios for ‘green scarcity,’ depending on the product category. With regard to the TV set, priming of green personality traits alone revealed a strong preference for the non-green option among materialists. However, a combined priming (green personality traits and scarcity) increased the desirability of the green option. For coffee, the perceived scarcity of green personality traits increased the desirability of the green option among materialists, while low-materialists and materialists in the neutral condition were rather indifferent. Notably, the preference towards the green product option was even higher than that of low-materialists.

Taken together, results of our study lend support on our contention that materialists prefer green products when consumption of these products entails scarce personality features of the consumer. Specifically, the perceived scarcity of personality attributes lead materialist to evaluate the green option more positively, while there was no such effect for low materialists.

Our research has important implications for policy makers and companies alike. While much effort has been made to change consumer behavior towards a more sustainable lifestyle (e.g., recycling, buying green, reuse things), the notion that some consumers are rather motivated by perceived scarce personality traits (e.g., communicating that one is caring or altruistic) may help to foster a more sustainable lifestyle in a quite unconventional way. That is, even consumers that care less about the environment can be targeted and inspired to increase green consumption by means of communicating the rarity of certain personality traits. This insight helps to present green products in a more attractive way (for this highly materialistic segment) by addressing other than solely altruistic needs or normative expectations. Regardless of the consumers’ motives for sustainable consumption (altruism or striving for materialistic goals), the positive consequences for nature and environment cannot be neglected.

REFERENCES


Choice Utility
Ioannis Evangelidis, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Jonathan Levav, Stanford University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A basic tenet of rational choice theory is that people choose the outcome that produces the highest subjective expected utility (Savage, 1954; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). Decades of research in psychology shows that judgments of utility are in fact malleable, and that choice is affected by the decision context (Slovic, 1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In the present work we argue that the malleability of people’s preferences extends to the context in which an outcome is reached. Thus, people’s choices can be influenced simply by how they are going to attain an outcome, independent of what the actual outcome is. We call the utility that people gain (or lose) from the process of how an outcome is obtained, “choice utility,” which is distinct from outcome utility and which can either enhance or detract from the overall attractiveness of an option.

We focus on two normatively equivalent processes for obtaining the same outcome: action and inaction. Drawing on research in philosophy, morality, the law, and psychology, we argue that these two processes are not equivalent in people’s minds even if they lead to an identical outcome. In particular, moral and legal philosophers have debated the distinction between outcomes obtained through action and inaction extensively. The question most commonly addressed in this research is whether action is equivalent to inaction in cases where both yield an identical outcome. For instance, moral philosophers argue that people cannot be held morally responsible for inactions (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985). Legal scholars argue that because there is no behavior involved, it can be assumed that inactions do not cause any change in the physical environment relative to actions (Duttwiller, 2006). Further, to hold someone as liable for the commission of a crime can only be based on an omission if the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense, or a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law (LaFave and Scott, 1986). Similarly, substantial research in psychology indicates a distinction between action and inaction in various types of judgments, both in the moral domain (e.g. Sugarman, 1986) and in non-moral decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987).

Building on these insights we develop our theory of choice utility. Our theory predicts that when people detect a difference in the utility between two options so that preference uncertainty is low, they prefer to obtain the additional utility given by the high utility option through action rather than inaction. Thus, the choice share of a high utility option will be lower when it is framed as an inaction than as an action. In contrast, when people have difficulty detecting a difference in the utility between two options so that preference uncertainty is high, the inaction frame functions as a tie-breaking mechanism that makes either option framed as an inaction appear more attractive. Thus, the choice share of either option framed as an inaction will be greater than when it is framed as an action.

We provide empirical support for the existence of choice utility in six studies. In our first two studies studies we demonstrate the effect of choice utility on decisions made in the context of classic problems from judgment and decision-making literature. The context of Study 1 is the Asian Disease problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The context of Study 2 is money illusion (Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 1997). We chose these problems because their results have been replicated in previous research and, therefore, we can easily predict what participants’ predominant choices will be. In these studies we randomly assign participants to either the classic versions of the problems, or to a condition where one of the two options is framed as the result of inaction. We find that preference for the predominant response (e.g., certain option for gain frame and risky option for loss frame in Study 1) significantly decreases when that option is framed as inaction. We find no significant effect when the infrequent response (e.g. risky option for gain frame and certain option for loss frame in Study 1) is framed as inaction.

Studies 3a and 3b further replicate the effect of choice utility (Part A) in a different decision problem (the disjunction effect: Tversky and Shafir, 1992), but also demonstrate the predicted fluctuations in the relative utility of the two outcomes as the result of framing the option with the highest utility as the result of inaction (Part B). Participants in Study 3b perceive the difference in the relative attractiveness of the two outcomes to be higher when both result from action compared to when the predominant option results from inaction, while the infrequent option results from action. Moreover, framing the infrequent option as inaction yields no effect. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrate the effect of choice utility in decisions with high difficulty. We show that people prefer inaction when there is difficulty in choosing, similar to a default effect. Participants in Study 4 choose between seven risky gains. We find that inaction increased preference for all options except one. In Study 5 we examine choice utility in the context of the asymmetric dominance effect (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982; Simonson 1989). We replicate the attraction effect when there is no inaction frame. We further find that preference for the asymmetrically dominating option decreases when it is framed in terms of inaction (i.e., when preference uncertainty was low). Moreover, preference for that very same option marginally increases when it is framed as inaction, but it is not dominating (i.e., when preference uncertainty was high). Changes in attribute weights mediated these effects. Our findings have important implications for default effects and choice architecture, particularly in contexts where preference uncertainty is low. In such cases, preference for a given option seen as superior in terms of utility may be harmed as a result of making it attainable through inaction.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Multiple-study articles are the norm in behavioral research and the number of studies per article is increasing [Schimmack, 2012]. Since review practices dictate that all studies demonstrate statistical significance [Simmons et al., 2011], authors may feel obligated to run studies until they get a sufficient number of statistically significant results and then report only the statistically significant ones; this leads to a form of publication bias known as the file drawer problem [Rosenthal, 1979]. Indeed, given the modest power typical of studies in behavioral research [Cohen, 1962, 1992], papers where all studies ran pass this “statistical significance filter” [Gelman and Weakliem, 2009] are generally unrealistic. Furthermore, application of this filter guarantees upwardly biased effect size estimates—a bias that is exacerbated when the true effect size is small as well as when the size of the test (i.e., the threshold p-value) is low. In effect, then, the standards of the field are self-defeating. While these observations are not new or even unique to our field [Sterling, 1959], recent work suggests that publication bias is indeed a problem in psychology journals [Simmons et al., 2011, John et al., 2012].

Many of these problems are directly due to the focus placed on sharp null hypothesis testing (and the concomitant p-values). Indeed, there are many well-known criticisms of statistical significance [Krantz, 1999] including the arbitrariness of the standard α = 0.05 level (“Surely, God loves the 0.06 nearly as much as the 0.05.”; Rosnow and Rosenthal [1989]) and the fact that statistical significance is not the same as practical importance. In addition to these common criticisms, the dichotomization of results into “significant” and “non-significant” frequently leads to the dismissal of whatever differences are observed in practice, thereby cutting off potentially fruitful lines of future research.

Following Cohen’s maxim that “the primary product of a research inquiry is one or more measures of effect size, not p-values” [Cohen, 1990, p. 1310], we suggest an increased focus on effect size estimation and a de-emphasis of the [Cohen, 1990, p. 1310], we suggest an increased focus on effect size-values“p that is p-values frequently leads to the dismissal of whatever differences are observed in practice, thereby cutting off potentially fruitful lines of future research.

Since review practices dictate that all studies demonstrate statistical significance, researchers focus on quantifying the effects of constructs rather than solely on demonstrating systematic deviations from null hypotheses of zero effect. Although establishing non-null effects is an important first step in testing theories, the significance of a finding should not depend solely on inferential statistics [Campbell, 1982].

Despite these strong arguments in favor of effect size estimation, a focus on effect size estimates has not been broadly practiced. Indeed, papers rarely report effect sizes even when authors are asked to do so [La Greca, 2005]. In view of the trend towards multiple-study publications, we propose that authors provide a meta-analytic summary of their experiments (as meta-analysis can be helpful with as few as two studies [Valentine et al., 2009]) and report these results as part of the discussion of their findings. This would directly provide a summary effect size estimate thereby conveying the benefits discussed in the prior paragraph.

To facilitate the meta-analysis of a research paper, we have developed an easy-to-use website that allows authors to input the details of their study design and summary statistics and to receive estimates and uncertainty intervals for the individual studies as well as an overall summary. To power this website, we build on prior work [Cooper and Hedges, 1994, Cooper et al., 2009] to introduce novel meta-analytic methodology that is uniquely tailored to the effect-size analysis of mixed factorial studies and which allows for both repeated measures studies and for studies with different dependent variables (i.e., different operationalizations of the same underlying construct). By analyzing three recent consumer psychology papers (each of which reports multiple experiments), we show that this approach offers five major informational benefits:

i. A concise quantitative paper summary with effect size estimates of both main and interaction effects as well as confidence intervals (see Table 1).
ii. Improved single-study effect size estimates with smaller confidence intervals.
iii. A visual effect summary of each study separately and all studies combined.
iv. A measure about the variability of the effects across studies and conditions that is useful for assessing the need for methodological and other moderating factors as potential sources of this variation.
v. A prospective power analysis for main and interaction effects based on all conducted studies.

Table 1: Meta-analysis Summary Output for Recent Papers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>2.5%</th>
<th>25.0%</th>
<th>50.0%</th>
<th>75.0%</th>
<th>97.5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bos et al. [2011]</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lammers et al. [2008]</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleeth-Keppler and Wheeler [2011]</td>
<td>Context -1.45</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target -0.86</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction 0.64</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The median is the estimate and a 95% confidence interval is formed from the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles. Our methodology also returns quantile estimates for the individual studies as well as a unique graphical display.

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Because these informational gains are obtained by providing merely summary information about experimental conditions (i.e., means, standard deviations, and sample sizes), we are optimistic that our proposal will be viewed as beneficial by many researchers.

REFERENCES


Vicarious Control: Exposure to Mastery and Perceived Self-Efficacy
Irene Scopelliti, City University London, UK
Simona Botti, London Business School, UK
Carmen Donato, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Sometimes we are exposed to other people performing difficult activities with high levels of mastery. In such situations, the performer has perfect control over the activity, and every element of the execution flows naturally and apparently effortlessly. We hypothesize and test in a series of experiments that observing masterful performances of others at difficult activities will increase one’s perceptions of self-efficacy at those same activities.

In general, people are not accurate at predicting their own ability and are susceptible to systematic errors at this type of task (Billette et al., 2011). Projection biases (Loewenstein et al., 2003), self-enhancement motives (DeNisi & Shaw, 1977), or excessive focus on one’s own vs. others’ abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) may keep people from forming accurate predictions. The lack of accuracy at evaluating personal skills and at predicting individual performance suggests that contextual information, such as the performance of a third person, may affect people’s predictions. Indeed, observing the performances of others is a source of information used to judge self-efficacy, that is, one’s perceived ability to perform an activity (Bandura, 1977; Gist & Mitchell, 1993).

Research on contrast effect would predict that exposure to an expert mastering an activity negatively affects one’s perceived ability to successfully perform the same activity, because the expert’s superior ability becomes a new standard of comparison against which personal ability is compared (Herr et al., 1983; Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Therefore, one’s ability will be judged as lower than if it were assessed without being exposed to the high mastery of the expert. In addition, research on social comparisons would expect that exposure to high mastery makes other people’s ability more salient, thus reducing the focus on one’s own ability that is typical for many self-assessments (Kruger, 1999). Such increased salience of others’ ability could mitigate the better-than-average effect (i.e., the tendency to judge ourselves as better than others at relatively easy activities) or exacerbate the worse-than-average effect (i.e., the tendency to judge ourselves as worse than others at relatively difficult activities), thus resulting in diminished self-assessments.

However, we posit that exposure to an expert mastering an activity may have a positive effect on one’s perceived ability to perform that activity. By definition, mastery involves high control over the activity performed (White, 1959; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Kubovy, 1999). The high level of control exhibited by the performer confers an apparent ease to the activity, which may be interpreted as actual ease (Song & Schwarz, 2008). More in general, seeing others perform challenging activities without adverse consequences can generate expectations in observers that they too will improve if they intensify and persist in their efforts (Bandura & Barah, 1973). These findings have been attributed to the powerful motivational effects of individuals’ need for control (deCharms, 1968; Rotter, 1966). Research has shown that a sense of competence and mastery over one’s own environment leads to perception of personal control (Bandura, 1989; White, 1959), and that individuals tend to seek control (Brehm, 1966), even in trivial or illusory forms (Langer, 1975).

We hypothesize that observing a performance conducted with high mastery allows to vicariously satisfy one’s need for control. The exertion of control apparent in the high mastery performance may transfer to the observers, and trigger the belief that they would also be able to exert that same level of control on the activity. As a consequence, such vicarious control would raise observers’ expectations on their own ability to perform the activity, resulting in inflated assessments. We also hypothesize that this effect will be stronger for individuals that are more similar to the expert performer being observed, because such similarity would increase the personal relevance of vicariously derived information (Kazdin, 1974; Schunk, 1989).

Study 1 shows that exposure to the masterful performance of a fairly complex yoga pose positively affects participants’ assessment of their own ability to perform the same pose. Participants exposed to the masterful performance reported higher ability to perform the pose than participants just exposed to the instructions and a picture of the pose.

Study 2 manipulates the level of mastery of the performance of the same yoga pose (high vs. low) and measures its effects on participants’ predicted ability to perform the same pose. We also measured to what extent participants felt in control while watching the performance, and, as a potentially alternative mediator, the perceived difficulty of the pose. Participants exposed to the high-mastery performance evaluated themselves as more likely to be able to perform the yoga pose than participants exposed to the low-mastery performance. In addition, perceived control mediated the effect of exposure to mastery on predicted ability, but the perceived difficulty of the pose did not.

Study 3 tests whether the dissimilarity between the observed expert and the self prevents the occurrence of the effect of exposure to mastery. Participants were first asked whether they watched the London 2012 100m men Olympic final (i.e., a highly masterful sport performance). Then, they indicated in how many seconds they thought they could run 100m, our measure of predicted ability. Finally, as a measure of their similarity to the Olympian athletes, participants reported their level of fitness. A significant interaction between exposure to mastery and level of fitness revealed that the effect of exposure to mastery was significant for high-fitness participants but not for low-fitness participants, signaling that the similarity between the performer and the observer moderates the effect of exposure to mastery on perceived self-efficacy.

Our results demonstrate that exposure to mastery results in enhanced self-efficacy, as individuals exposed to a highly masterful performance overestimate their own ability to perform the same activity. This effect appears to be due to the experience of a form of vicarious control while observing the masterful performance. Supporting the proposed explanation, this effect is moderated by the similarity between the individual and the actor. These results provide initial evidence on the conditions under which exposure to expert performance may enhance intentions to perform activities or purchase products that require skills and practice in order to be appropriately used (Thompson et al., 2005; Murray & Haubl, 2007; Burson, 2007).

REFERENCES


How Can I Choose Not Knowing What You Choose? The Biasing Effect of Context When Consuming With Others
Brennan Davis, Baylor University, USA
Beth Vallen, Fordham University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Individuals frequently utilize the behavior of others as a guide for their own (Baumeister, Hutton, and Tice 1989). As a result, consumers often model their own opinions and behavior – including brand preference and choice – on the observed behavior of others (Bearden and Etzel 1982; Bearden and Rose 1990). Extensive evidence of such modeling behavior is found in the eating domain; research shows that individuals vary the quantity of food they consume based on the behavior of their eating companions, eating more when others eat more and less when others eat less (Herman, Roth, and Polivy 2003).

We build on the modeling literature by exploring the manner in which individuals make social consumption choices when the behavior of others is unknown. In such cases, individuals lack an observable standard upon which to model their own behavior and are thus likely to search for cues from the consumption context that suggest how others are likely to behave. We posit that one such cue is the contextual positioning of the brand or venue in which the consumption episode takes place. We predict that in the absence of information about others’ behavior, individuals rely on contextual cues like a brand’s positioning to establish expectations for others’ consumption. For example, when others’ food choices are unknown, consumers may look to the venue’s health positioning to infer the behavior of others, such that at a less healthy venue they will expect less healthful food choices and behaviors and at a healthier venue they will expect more healthful food choices and behaviors. We posit that these expectations will, in turn, serve as standards for behavior in social settings. Importantly, we do not expect to observe this effect in the absence of others, as individuals are free from the evaluative concerns that drive them to behave in line with social expectations.

To test these predictions, our first study manipulated contextual positioning by asking participants to imagine eating at either a deli (healthy) or a diner (unhealthy). We manipulated the presence of others by asking participants to consider a scenario where they were either eating with or without others. Participants were given no information regarding the choices of others, such that the explicit consumption behaviors of others were absent. They were asked to choose between a more versus less healthful menu option: apple slices versus french fries. In line with our predictions, when participants patronized the unhealthy diner, eating with versus without others increased the likelihood of selecting the less healthful option. When participants patronized the healthy diner, eating with versus without others increased the likelihood of making the healthful choice.

In our second study, we test a key assumption underlying our theorizing; specifically, that contextual positioning serves as a cue regarding the behavior of others when consumption episodes are social yet the behavior of others is unknown (vs. known). If this is correct, then when the behavior of others is known, we would not expect to observe the effect observed in our previous study. To test this, we manipulated contextual positioning using fictitious venues with descriptive venue names that varied in terms of their level of implied healthfulness: Greasyspoon Café (unhealthy) and Garden Café (healthy). In addition, we manipulated knowledge about the consumption of others (i.e., eating with others whose choices are unknown, known to be healthful, or known to be unhealthy). As predicted, when eating at the unhealthy restaurant, participants predicted that they would consume more calories when eating with others whose choices were unknown compared to known to be healthy, versus unhealthy, or inconsistent with the venue; similarly, individuals estimated that they would consume more calories when eating with others whose choices were known to be unhealthy, or consistent with the venue, versus healthy, or inconsistent. When eating at the healthy restaurant, individuals predicted that they would consume fewer calories when eating with others whose choices were unknown compared to eating with others whose choices were known to be less healthy, or inconsistent with the venue; similarly, participants estimated that they would consume fewer calories when eating with others whose choices were known to be healthy, or consistent with the venue, versus unhealthy, or inconsistent.

In our final study we measure the salience of contextual positioning to assess the extent to which thoughts related to positioning mediate the relationship between positioning, the presence of others, and choice. In this study, we utilized restaurant pair that includes venues that specialize in a similar cuisine, but vary in terms of their perceived healthfulness as demonstrated in a pretest: KFC (unhealthy positioning) and Chick-Fil-A (healthy positioning). Participants were asked to write down their thoughts about the food venues, which were independently coded as relating to taste and/or health, and then made a choice between a healthy (steamed vegetables) and unhealthy (fried vegetables) option. We show that when participants patronized the unhealthy restaurant, eating with (vs. without) others increased thoughts about taste. When the consumption venue was positioned as healthy, eating with (vs. without) others increased thoughts about health. Our choice outcomes replicated those of study 1 and, moreover, while thoughts about taste mediated the relationship between the presence of others and choice at the unhealthy venue, thoughts about health mediated this relationship at the healthy venue.

This research demonstrates that individuals look to cues from the consumption context to serve as standards for their behavior when they consume with others whose behavior is unknown. The results of three studies provide support for our predictions that the social context created by the presence versus absence of others and contextual cues based on the positioning of the venue in which consumption takes place jointly impact consumption behavior.

REFERENCES

The Effects of Impulsivity on Perceptions of Prior Consumption
Frank May, University of South Carolina, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Extant research suggests that individuals will give in to indulgence when they perceive sufficient progress toward a regulatory goal (Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, and Ram Nathan 2008). For example, if a dieter feels as though she has abstained from eating unhealthy food for a long enough time, she may feel that it is permissible to eat an unhealthy food item. That is, given that sufficient progress toward the dieting goal has been made, the dieter may then switch to pursuing an indulgence goal, licensing herself to eat something tasty but unhealthy (Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Laran 2010).

This body of research assumes that consumers accurately remember past progress toward a goal. However, a large body of research on motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) demonstrates that people are prone to distort their memories in a motivated manner in order to make themselves feel better about decisions made (Croyle et al. 2006; Matther et al. 2000). In line with such findings, we contend that, when faced with an opportunity to indulge, consumers may be motivated to distort their memories to fabricate progress toward a pertinent self-regulatory goal, allowing themselves to indulge in the present. Further, because such a situation is more likely to arise in the case of competing goals, we predict that those who are high in impulsivity, who chronically have indulgence goals (Ramanathan and Mennon 2006) and thus, often experience conflicts between short-term pleasure versus long-term self-regulatory goals (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2008), are more likely to employ such memory distortions than those who are low in impulsivity.

Our first study employed a 2 (impulsivity: low vs. high, measured) X 2 (indulgence opportunity: present vs. absent) between-subjects design. Participants were first asked to imagine themselves in a shopping scenario in which they spent money despite a savings goal. After filler activity, participants in the indulgence opportunity present condition were told that soon they will be asked to indicate their willingness to purchase a desirable pair of shoes, but first they would need to answer questions about the earlier shopping scenario. In the indulgence opportunity absent condition, participants were merely asked about the previous shopping scenario. Next, participants indicated their perceptions of how much they spent earlier and their willingness to pay for a desirable pair of shoes. The results showed that they ate the first snack (“The time between now and the time at which you consumed the snack seems: 1-Like an instant, 7-Like an eternity”). These temporal perceptions served as the dependent variable. Finally, participants completed Puri’s (1996) impulsivity scale and the cognitive behavioral dieting scale (Martz, Sturgis, and Gustafson 1996). The results showed that the slope of impulsivity was not significant when the yogurt covered raisins were framed as non-indulgent, while the slope of impulsivity was significant and positive when the yogurt covered raisins were framed as indulgent. Additionally, impulsive participants perceived the first candy consumption as more temporally distant when the yogurt was framed as indulgent versus non-indulgent, non-impulsive participants’ time perceptions were not significantly influenced by framing. Finally, in line with our goal-conflict account, the interactive effect of health framing and impulsivity in the case of dieters behaved much like the interactive effect of opportunity to indulge and impulsivity in prior studies in which participants were primed with self-regulatory goals, providing support for the significant role of goal conflict in the effects we observe.

Across three studies we demonstrated that impulsive individuals tend to distort memories of past indulgences when faced with an opportunity to indulge in the present. Our findings suggest that they do so in order to license indulgent behavior.

REFERENCES

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The Change You Don’t See Coming: Nonconscious Consequences of Dynamic Transference in Consumer Contexts
James A. Mourey, DePaul University, USA
Ryan S. Elder, Brigham Young University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Change blindness, the term referring to the phenomenon in which individuals fail to notice even substantial disruptions between an original stimulus and a subsequent altered version of that stimulus, is a well-researched and documented effect (for a review see Simons and Rensink, 2005). Although the majority of change blindness studies have focused on substantial visual differences, such as adding or removing features to an image or the infamous “invisible gorilla” task in which someone in a gorilla suit walks across a room while others toss a ball in the foreground (Simons and Chabris, 1999), recent research has shown that even gradual changes (e.g., slowly fading an item out of a picture) go unnoticed by participants (Simons, Fanconeri, and Reimer, 2000). Humans, it seems, are often consciously oblivious to change regardless of whether or not the disruption is instant or gradual.

However, despite this rich an interesting literature on change blindness, very little research has explored the consequences of change blindness and, to date, only one article has considered consequences of change blindness on consumer behavior (Shapiro and Je- spire, 2013). In that study, the researchers found that moving a logo to a different location on an advertisement led to increased preference for the advertisement compared to a control condition in which the logo remained in the same location. Given the ever-increasing demands on consumer attention and the common lay belief of consumers that they can selectively attend to only the marketing messages they want, the purpose of the current research is to explore further consequences of change blindness in consumer contexts, specifically with respect to subjective ratings.

To motivate the current research, we draw upon a recent finding within the change blindness literature regarding “visual sensing,” which is described as the feeling of change in the absence of a consciously perceived visual experience of change (Rensink, 2004).

Integrating this finding with the vast literature on constructed preference—the idea that consumers often create their preferences on the spot based on often irrelevant, misattributed contextual factors (Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman, 2004; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz and Clore, 1996)—we propose the “Dynamic Transference” effect in which exposing participants to a subtle experience of change will result in participants misattributing that feeling of change to subsequent, unrelated tasks, such as subjective rating tasks. Furthermore, following dynamic constructivist theory, we propose that this misattributed influence holds only for subjective ratings (architectural, for which no set answers yet exist), and not for objective ratings (archaeological, for which there are definitive answers; Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic, 1993).

In study 1, participants completed a 10-question, free-response survey about their Starbucks habits (e.g., “What do you typically order when you go to Starbucks?”). Each question appeared on a separate screen, and above each question was a picture of a cup of Starbucks hot chocolate that either decreased in size by 10%, increased in size by 10%, or stayed the same size (control) in each frame (note: across all five studies no participant reported conscious acknowledgment of the change manipulation in funneled debriefing). Per our theoretical explanation, we collapsed the increasing/decreasing conditions into one Dynamic Transference (DT) condition. Results showed that participants in the DT condition were more likely to buy hot chocolate and rate the quality and intensity of Starbucks hot chocolate higher than the control group.

Study 2 was identical to study 1 except a North Face jacket replaced the Starbucks cup. After the North Face survey, participants rated five winter-related products (North Face jacket relevant) and five non-winter-related products (North Face jacket irrelevant), to see if relevance of the objects evaluated mattered. We also asked participants about a relevant, timely topic—Christmas. Results showed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Summary of Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study 1: Starbucks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of Purchasing Hot Chocolate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_{DT} = 5.24$, $SD_{DT} = 2.72$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_{Control} = 3.67$, $SD_{Control} = 2.48$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 1: Starbucks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Intensity of Hot Chocolate Flavor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_{DT} = 6.37$, $SD_{DT} = 1.36$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$M_{Control} = 5.50$, $SD_{Control} = 1.57$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 1: Starbucks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perceived Quality of Hot Chocolate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_{DT} = 6.65$, $SD_{DT} = 1.60$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$M_{Control} = 5.20$, $SD_{Control} = 1.79$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2: North Face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liking of Relevant North Face Products</td>
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<td>$M_{DT} = 4.48$, $SD_{DT} = 1.38$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$M_{Control} = 4.10$, $SD_{Control} = 1.51$</td>
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<td>Study 2: North Face</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated Spending on Christmas Gifts</td>
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<td>$M_{DT} = 4.35$, $SD_{DT} = 1.89$</td>
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<td>$M_{Control} = 3.79$, $SD_{Control} = 1.71$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 3: Nike Print Ad</td>
</tr>
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<td>Average Liking of Products</td>
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<td>$M_{DT} = 5.39$, $SD_{DT} = .53$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_{Control} = 5.13$, $SD_{Control} = .51$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 4: Sea World Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Much You Care About Sea Life</td>
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<td>$M_{DT} = 4.84$, $SD_{DT} = 1.01$</td>
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<td>$M_{Control} = 4.35$, $SD_{Control} = 1.35$</td>
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<td>Study 4: Sea World Commercial</td>
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<tr>
<td>What Do You Think of Anheuser-Busch</td>
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<td>$M_{DT} = 4.84$, $SD_{DT} = .94$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_{Control} = 4.46$, $SD_{Control} = 1.12$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As predicted, participants in the Dynamic Transference (DT) condition provided higher ratings than participants in the control (no experience of change) condition.

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that DT participants rated products higher overall, with ratings being highest for winter-related product ratings (suggesting relevance mattered). DT participants also reported they would spend more money and expected to receive more presents at Christmas.

In study 3, participants completed a 10-question survey regarding footwear, but instead of varying product size, the color saturation of a print ad on the screen decreased/increased by 10% or stayed the same on each consecutive screen. Participants then rated 21 randomly-presented items, none relevant to footwear. DT again influenced results: participants in the DT condition liked the products more compared to control. Studies 2 and 3 suggest DT affects subjective ratings, in general, but is implicitly applied more towards relevant items when such items are included.

In study 4, participants watched a 60-second commercial for SeaWorld from the early 1990s. The commercial demonstrated SeaWorld’s role in saving sea life and mentioned Anheuser-Busch (SeaWorld’s former parent company). The commercial’s color saturation either increased from 0% or decreased from 200% in 20% intervals every six seconds or remained constant. Participants then responded to a series of seven questions, five objective (e.g., “How much more expensive are Anheuser-Busch products on average compared to 20 years ago?”) and two subjective (e.g., “How much do you care about sea life?” and “What do you think of Anheuser-Busch as a company?”). Results showed that DT affected subjective, but not objective, responses: DT participants said they cared more about sea life and thought more highly of Anheuser-Busch as a company.

Four studies demonstrate how subtle experiences of change are misattributed to subjective preferences, in both relevant and irrelevant contexts, bolstering the extent to which individuals like products, perceive quality, and intend to spend. The findings contribute to both the constructed preference and metacognitive experience literatures by illustrating 1) how experiences beyond those of fluency subtly influence preferences, 2) how the objective/subjective nature of a task lends itself to less/more influence from situational experiences.

REFERENCES
We Are Not All the Same: A Typology of Donor Identities
Jing Lei, University of Melbourne, Australia
Liliana Bove, University of Melbourne, Australia
Anish Nagpal, University of Melbourne, Australia
Ben Neville, University of Melbourne, Australia
Danielle Chmielewski-Raimondo, University of Melbourne, Australia

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Research has long acknowledged the importance of identity in shaping and predicting individuals’ motivations, attitudes, and behaviors (e.g., Aaker and Akutsu 2009; Belk 1988; Oyserman 2009a, 2009b; Reed 2004). Despite its importance, few studies have examined the concept of identity in the context of prosocial behaviors. Further, these studies have mainly conceptualized it as a generic donor/volunteer and moral identity (Aquino and Reed 2002; Reed and Aquino 2003; Reed, Aquino and Levy 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). In this research, using blood donation as a pro-social context, we question the uni-dimensional representation of donor identity, and subsequently uncover its multi-dimensionality. Doing so not only offers a new and unique way to understand donor identity, but also helps us to understand why donors have different motives, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions towards donation. This has implications generally for the understanding of prosocial identity, as well as specific strategic implications for donor recruitment and retention.

Identities are used to gain self-understanding and to be understood by others in a social context (Markus 1977; Reeds et al. 2012; Vignoles, Schwartz, and Luyckx 2011). A more focused conceptualization of the role of identity in shaping and predicting motivations, attitudes, and behaviors has been provided by Oyserman (2009a, 2009b) in the identity-based motivation (IBM) model. In the context of prosocial behaviors, identity has been studied from a role-identity perspective, where continuous participation in prosocial activities leads to an internalization of the role, which then becomes a part of the self (Callero, Howard, and Piliavin 1987; Grube and Piliavin 2000; Lee, Piliavin and Callero 1999; Piliavin, Grube, and Callero 2002). Within consumer research, it has been found that people with a moral identity are more likely to have favorable attitudes towards charitable requests (Reed and Aquino 2003; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). Specific to blood donation, Armitage and Conner (2006) found that identifying oneself as a donor is associated with blood donation intentions.

Although this body of research has established the applicability of using an identity lens to explore prosocial behavior (e.g., blood donation), its conceptualization of identity as a uni-dimensional concept fails to fully capture the differences between donors in terms of their attitude and behavior. Further, the donation literature has mainly characterized donation as giving and often uses the terms interchangeably (Aaker and Akutsu 2009), implying that a donor identity is akin to a giver identity. By definition, however, identity is expected to differ among people as it reflects how people subjectively perceive who they are as a result of their individual traits, characteristics, and social roles (Belk 1988; Callero 1985; Reed et al. 2012). Therefore, we argue that the presumption that donation is uni-dimensional, or solely akin to giving, is worthy of further exploration.

Thirty-eight in-depth interviews were conducted with donors at a large central blood collection center, two mobile collection units, or the donors’ home or workplace in a large city in Australia. The audio-taped interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using the constant comparison method (Glaser and Strauss 1976). Seven key themes were identified which were labeled: motive for donating; public versus private identity; perceptions of personal costs of donating; expectations of reciprocity; emotional consequences of donating/not donating; role model influence; and payback. These themes were then used to look for distinct patterns of sentiment polarity and amplification that may define a unique donor identity.

Four donor identities with distinct profiles emerged from the analysis. We label these identities the Life Saver, the Community Carer, the Practical Helper and the Extraordinaires (see Table 1 for descriptions). Specifically, Life Savers donate to help and save the lives of individuals; they like others to know about their donor identity, appreciate small token incentives, and feel pride and happiness after a donation. Community Carers donate to give back and contribute to the community; they prefer to keep their donor identity private, do not care for recognition or token incentives, feel happy and a sense of well-being after a donation, but can be deterred by the personal costs of making a donation. Practical Helpers donate because they recognize there is a need for blood and that they can do it; they do not care for token incentives, feel little emotion after a donation, and downplay any personal costs of making a donation. Extraordinaires donate to show they are special; they love others to know that they are a donor and appreciate recognition and token incentives. Although they are similar to Life Savers in feeling pride and happiness after a donation, they are very resistant to donation deferrals.

We also conducted seven interviews with non-donors and compared them to donors. Based on the result of this negative-case analysis, we discovered a distinct, fifth identity perceived by non-donors, which we label the Sacrificer (see Table 1). Specifically, Sacrificers are seen to sacrifice blood, strength, time, and effort, and endure significant discomfort for the benefits of others; they do not care for recognition or any form of incentives, feel a quiet sense of satisfaction after a donation, and accept the personal costs that may be incurred in donating.

In conclusion, we believe that our research fundamentally refines the concept of donor identity by putting forward a multi-dimensional view which represents blood donors’ self-identity and non-donors’ perceptions of donors. Specifically, we find that above and beyond the generic donor or moral identity, donor identity can be subdivided into four types – Life Savers, Community Carers, Practical Helpers, and Extraordinaires – and one perceived identity by non-donors, Sacrificers. Theoretically, this typology not only offers a new and unique way to understand donors, but also helps us understand why donors differ in their motives, desire for privacy, attitude towards personal costs, and attraction to incentives. It also gives us insights in how non-donors view blood donors, especially in terms of the high perceived sacrifices that they are assumed to make. Practically, our findings will help organizations such as blood collection agencies better target their recruitment and retention strategies to the different identities. This also opens up a potentially promising and untapped avenue for the more effective management of donation behaviors.

REFERENCES

Table 1: Donor Identity Descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Life Saver</strong></td>
<td>These types of donors donate blood to help and save the lives of individuals. They are focused upon the one-to-one relationship between the donor and the recipient. These donors feel pride, happiness and a sense of well-being following a donation as they have given something special. They like others to know that they are a blood donor and they appreciate the small tokens (badges, stickers, key-rings, diary) the Blood Service gives them to display this. They are disappointed, but accepting when they are unable to donate for some reason. They typically began donating through someone’s influence, and they encourage others to donate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Community Carer</strong></td>
<td>These types of donors donate blood because they want to give back and contribute to the community. They are focused upon the effective working of the blood supply system, both for the benefit of community members who are in need, and in case they themselves are in need sometime in the future. They view blood donation as a private act and do not actively tell or try to recruit others. These donors are very aware of the personal costs (e.g., time, effort, and physical discomfort involved) of making a donation and will stop donating if it exceed their threshold. They do not care for recognition or token incentives given by the Blood Service for their donation. Their initial donation was typically influenced by a role model and they feel happiness and well-being following a donation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Practical Helper</strong></td>
<td>These types of donors have a very practical view about blood donation. They donate blood simply because they know there is a need for it and that they can do it. These donors downplay any personal costs (e.g., time, effort, and physical discomfort involved) that may be incurred in donating. They feel little emotion following a donation or if they are unable to donate for some reason. They also do not care for the small tokens that the Blood Service may offer them and do not actively recruit donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Extraordinaire</strong></td>
<td>These types of donors donate blood because they feel they are stronger, healthier or possess a blood type that is unique compared to most people; in other words, they feel special. Alternatively, they believe blood donors are rare and thus special compared to the general population. They love others to know that they are a blood donor and appreciate any recognition or tokens they receive from the Blood Service, especially if it allows them to advertise blood donation to others. These donors feel pride, happiness and a sense of well-being following a donation and get very upset when they are unable to donate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Sacrificers</strong></td>
<td>These types of donors are seen to sacrifice blood, strength, time, effort, and endure significant discomfort for the benefits of others. They do not desire any form of (tangible or intangible) rewards or acknowledgement as this would likely diminish their offering. They are also not sensitive to the high costs they endure in making the donation as they perceive these as necessary for their choice of this type of donation. Whilst not elated they do gain a quiet sense satisfaction from donating.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Beat Competitors or Beat Yourself: Differential Effects of Goal Focuses on Players’ Motivation in Different Stages of Competitive Goal Pursuit

Eunjoo Han, The University of Texas at Austin, USA
Ying Zhang, The University of Texas at Austin, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Many goal strivings take place in competitive settings, and paying attention to rivalry and competitors’ performance is generally expected to elicit increased motivation from players (Deci, Betley, Jahle, Abrams, & Porac, 1981). The present research questions if this belief always holds. We propose that in competitive goal pursuit focusing on a competition aspect of the goal would elicit higher motivation before the competition begins (i.e., the “pre-initiation stage”). Once the actual competition is initiated (i.e., the “post-initiation stage”), however, individuals are assumed to be better motivated by focusing on the fixed performance standard to achieve, rather than competitors’ progress on the goal.

The goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990; 2002) and the literature on implementation intentions (Gollwitzer 1993; 1999) give support to our hypothesis in the post-initiation stage. Individuals perform better when pursuing a specific, concrete goal as it facilitates an accurate assessment on goal attainability; people do not benefit from an abstract goal during pursuit as it does not offer an external referent that serves as a source of feedback on their progress (Locke & Latham, 1990). A specific goal, by contrast, provides unequivocal feedback on one’s performance, allowing people to easily monitor their progress. Studies also suggest that implementation intentions should be formulated for successful goal accomplishment during pursuit, which increases consistency between intentions and behaviors by activating “if-then” goals (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997).

We make an opposite prediction in the pre-initiation stage. Before starting the actual competition, the level of goal commitment may not be high enough to ensure individuals’ high motivation. Thus, in the pre-initiation stage it is critical to process whether the goal is worth pursuing and establish goal commitment for motivation. The caveat to having a fixed performance standard in this stage is that it lowers an individuals’ focus to an implementation level. Moreover, goal desirability would be reduced because focusing on the fixed performance standard with no reference to the competition misses out on the outcome of pursuit, and therefore, diminishes the value of the goal.

In the first study, participants were invited to a competitive puzzle game and were encouraged to outperform other participants. It was designed as 2 (goal focuses: competition vs. fixed performance standard) X 2 (goal stage: pre- vs. post-initiation), and we assessed participants’ motivation by the time they persisted with each of these partially unsolvable puzzles. We found the hypothesized interaction on motivation: In the pre-initiation stage conditions, participants who aimed to achieve higher scores than competitors (vs. the fixed performance standard) persisted longer in puzzles. In the post-initiation stage, conversely, participants who sought to meet the fixed performance standard (vs. achieve higher scores than others) spent more time in the competitive puzzle game.

Study 2 tested whether the proposed mechanism holds in the level of performance. We invited participants to a competitive anagram quiz and encouraged them to win this anagram competition by getting more correct answers than their competitors. We again manipulated the goal focus and goal stage as done in Study 1 and assessed participants’ performance by the number of correct answers submitted. We found the hypothesized interaction on performance: In the pre-initiation stage, participants who focused on achieving higher scores than others (vs. the fixed performance standard) showed higher performances. In the post-initiation stage, conversely, those who aimed at the fixed performance standard (vs. rivalry – earning higher scores than others) showed better performance.

Study 3 aimed to investigate the role of goal desirability and attainability on individuals’ motivation and performance in the two different goal stages. While replicating findings of previous studies, we also explored the dynamic levels of motivation and performance across three different sessions in each of these two goal stages. Participants were invited to the online game competition and were encouraged to play the same game as many times as they wanted across three sessions in order to get the higher average score than others. The experimental procedure was identical to the prior studies. This study replicated the hypothesized effects of goal focuses on people’s overall level of motivation and performance in each goal stage. Follow-up studies revealed that people felt the higher level of goal attainability and desirability when participants focused on the competition aspect of the goal (vs. performance standard) in the pre-initiation stage and the fixed performance standard (vs. rivalry and competition) in the post-initiation stage. As participants move onto the following sessions (i.e., from 1 to 2, and 2 to 3) in each goal stage, we found that those who focused on rivalry and competition (vs. the fixed performance standard) in the pre-initiation stage showed higher levels of goal attainability and desirability during pursuit, and the results revealed the identical pattern among those who focused on the performance standard (vs. competition) in the post-initiation stage. The level of goal desirability and attainability positively explained the level of motivation during pursuit. Follow-up analysis revealed that those who paid attention to the competition aspect of the goal in the pre-initiation stage and the fixed performance in the post-initiation stage were better concentrated on the given competitive task. We also found that those who aimed at the fixed performance standard (vs. rivalry and competition) in the post-initiation stage felt less exhausted at the end of the game in the post-initiation stage. We, however, did not find the identical pattern of results in the pre-initiation stage: The different goal focuses did not differentially affect individuals’ exhaustion before the actual competition started.

In sum, this research is expected to make theoretical contributions by uniting contrasting views on the roles of a competitive mindset in motivation and goal-oriented behaviors. The study findings also convey implications to marketing practitioners, especially when consumers’ competitive goal-relevant behaviors are involved in their purchase decision making – e.g., consumers’ reactions to marketing tactics that encourage consumers to win the limited number of deals or gifts for purchase.

REFERENCES


Table 1: Summary of Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Stats</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on motivation</td>
<td>$F(1, 163) = 9.44$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – pre-initiation</td>
<td>$t(82) = -1.99$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – post-initiation</td>
<td>$t(81) = 2.42$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on performance</td>
<td>$F(1, 168) = 8.45$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – pre-initiation</td>
<td>$t(77) = -2.08$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – post-initiation</td>
<td>$t(90) = 2.10$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on motivation</td>
<td>$F(1, 133) = 13.09$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – pre-initiation</td>
<td>$t(66) = 2.26$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – post-initiation</td>
<td>$t(67) = 2.37$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of motivation – pre-initiation</td>
<td>Stage1: $t(66) = -5.59$</td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage2: $t(66) = -3.10$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage3: $t(66) = -2.32$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of motivation – post-initiation</td>
<td>Stage1: $t(67) = 2.32$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage2: $t(67) = 2.42$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage3: $t(67) = 1.94$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on the overall level of goal desirability</td>
<td>$F(1, 133) = 28.91$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>$t(66) = -2.26$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – post-initiation</td>
<td>$t(67) = 2.04$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of performance – pre-initiation</td>
<td>Stage1: $t(66) = -0.5$</td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage2: $t(66) = -2.14$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage3: $t(66) = -2.13$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of performance – post-initiation</td>
<td>Stage1: $t(67) = 1.33$</td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage2: $t(67) = 1.67$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage3: $t(67) = 2.26$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on the overall level of goal attainability</td>
<td>$F(1, 133) = 16.31$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – pre-initiation</td>
<td>$t(66) = -2.83$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – post-initiation</td>
<td>$t(67) = 3.23$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of goal focus on motivation</td>
<td>$B = .05, t(133) = 3.89$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of goal desirability – pre-initiation</td>
<td>Stage 0 (before starting): $t(66) = 2.51$</td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage1: $t(66) = 3.79$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage2: $t(66) = 3.13$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage3: $t(66) = 3.62$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of goal desirability – post-initiation</td>
<td>Stage 0 (before starting): $t(67) = 1.66$</td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage1: $t(67) = 3.76$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage2: $t(67) = 4.26$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage3: $t(67) = 4.47$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on the concentration level</td>
<td>$F(1, 133) = 18.04$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – pre-initiation</td>
<td>$t(66) = -2.83$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – post-initiation</td>
<td>$t(67) = 3.23$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of goal focus on motivation</td>
<td>$B = .43, t(133) = 3.57$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .00$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: goal focus x goal stage on the exhaustion level</td>
<td>$F(1, 133) = 6.11$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – pre-initiation</td>
<td>$t(66) = 1.46$</td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned contrast – post-initiation</td>
<td>$t(67) = 2.03$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of exhaustion on motivation</td>
<td>$B = -.04, t(133) = -2.34$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What to Get and What to Give Up: Effectiveness of Promotion vs. Prevention Messages in Acquisition vs. Forfeiture Decision Tasks

Tilottama G. Chowdhury, Quinnipiac University, USA
Camelia Micu, Fairfield University, USA
S. Ratneshwar, University of Missouri, USA
Eunjin Kim, University of Missouri, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In the current research, our main goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of promotion- versus prevention-focused messages for different decision tasks and in the context of different type of products. For this purpose, we bridge multiple theoretical perspectives, including the literatures on regulatory focus and regulatory fit (e.g., Aaker and Lee 2001; Higgins 1998), behavioral decision theory (e.g., Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990), hedonic versus utilitarian products (e.g., Hirschman and Holbrook 1982), and message processing mode (e.g., MacInnis and Price 1987; Thompson and Hamilton 2006).

In developing our conceptual framework, we first link decision tasks such as acquisition and forfeiture to different goal orientations such as seeking gains versus avoiding losses (e.g., Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). Next, we consider the implications of the various types of products that can be involved in acquisition and forfeiture decisions. We distinguish between hedonic products, whose consumption produces sensory enjoyment and pleasure, and utilitarian products that offer functional benefits and are meant to solve consumers’ problems (Babin, Darden, and Griffin 1994). We then examine how advertising messages can be framed in terms of regulatory focus so as to be either promotion- or prevention-focused (e.g., Aaker and Lee 2001). We subsequently discuss the concept of regulatory fit, which suggests persuasive messages are more effective when the message frame is compatible with the goal of the individual (e.g., Lee and Aaker 2004). We then bring these issues together to develop our hypotheses regarding the relative effectiveness of promotion- versus prevention-focused messages. An additional consideration we bring into the discussion is whether the individual processes the message mainly in an imagery-based mode or an analytical mode (e.g., Thompson and Hamilton 2006).

Key hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Provided the ad message structure is conducive to imagery-based processing,

Hypothesis 1a: For hedonic products/attributes, promotion-focused messages will be relatively more effective than prevention-focused messages in acquisition tasks than in forfeiture tasks.

Hypothesis 1b: For utilitarian products/attributes, promotion-focused and prevention-focused messages will be equally effective in acquisition and forfeiture tasks.

Hypothesis 2: Provided the ad message structure is conducive to analytical processing.

Hypothesis 2a: For utilitarian products/attributes, promotion-focused messages will be relatively more effective than promotion-focused messages in forfeiture tasks than in acquisition tasks.

We report three studies designed to test our hypotheses. The first two studies focus on messages designed to be conducive to imagery-based processing (Thompson and Hamilton 2006) so as to test H1. In study 1, we manipulate the hedonic vs. utilitarian variable at the level of product categories, while in study 2 we extend the findings by holding product category constant and operationalizing the variable in terms of the type of product attributes featured in the different messages. Finally, in study 3 we test H2 by focusing on messages designed to be conducive to analytical processing.

Study 1 (N=121) was a between-subjects, 2 (decision task: acquisition vs. forfeiture) X 2 (product type: hedonic vs. utilitarian). Participants read one of two decision task scenarios and then they were exposed to two advertising messages (aimed to evoke imagery-based processing) for two different “brands” in the same product category. Analyses results showed a significant decision task by product type interaction (F (1, 117) = 3.8, p < .05). Follow-up comparisons of means confirmed that in the case of hedonic products, the acquisition (vs. forfeiture) condition led to a significantly higher relative preference for the brand that was advertised with the promotion-focused message (M = 2.57 vs. 3.88, t (60) = 2.52, p = .01; H1a). However, in the case of utilitarian products, there was no difference in relative brand preferences between the acquisition and forfeiture conditions (M = 3.12 and 3.2, respectively; p > .8; H1b).

Study 2 (N = 89) method was identical to study 1, except that the hedonic versus utilitarian variable was operationalized not at the product category level, but by manipulating the type of product attributes featured in the message arguments. Once again, results yielded a reliable decision task by attribute type interaction (F (1, 85) = 8.27, p < .01). Follow-up comparisons of means confirmed: In the case of hedonic attributes, the acquisition (vs. forfeiture) condition led to a significantly higher relative preference for the promotion-focused message (M = 2.62 vs. 3.72, t (44) = 2.6, p = .01; H1a); but in the case of utilitarian attributes, there was no significant difference in message preferences between the acquisition and forfeiture conditions (M = 4.76 and 5.36, respectively; p > .1; H1b).

In study 3 (N=194), we examine H2 in the context of messages conducive to analytical processing. As in study 1, the hedonic versus utilitarian variable was operationalized at the product category level. The study method was identical to study 1, except the messages in this study were specifically designed to be conducive to data driven, analytical processing (see Thompson and Hamilton 2006). Results confirmed a statistically significant interaction between the two independent variables (F (1, 190) = 4.1, p < .05). Follow-up analyses fully supported our predictions in H2. Forfeiture (vs. acquisition) condition led to a significantly higher relative preference for the brand that was advertised with the prevention-focused message (p < .05; H2a).

The focus of this paper has been to examine the relative effectiveness of advertising messages that vary in regulatory foci in the context of different decision tasks, dissimilar types of products, and diverse modes of message processing. The results of the three studies fully supported our predictions and show, in brief, that promotion-focused messages are relatively more effective than prevention-focused messages.
focused messages in acquisition decisions, provided the ad is for a hedonic product and the message structure cues imagery-based processing. The opposite is true in terms of message effectiveness in forfeiture decisions, but only in the case of utilitarian products featured in messages conducive to analytical processing.

REFERENCES
Illusion of Variety: Poor Readability Enhances Perceived Variety
Zhongqiang (Tak) Huang, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Jessica Y. Y. Kwong, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Experiencing variety is central to our well-being (Morales et al. 2005; Rolls et al. 1981; Schwartz 2004). Given its central role, how accurate can we tell whether there is greater or smaller variety in different assortments? Would superficial and obviously irrelevant factors such as the font readability of the printed assortment information influence our perceptions of variety? If yes, in which direction does it influence our variety perceptions?

On the perceptual level, a list of items printed in different font styles are essentially presenting the same number of options and thus should not alter our variety perceptions. Yet, at a metacognitive level, font styles that differ in readability will affect the ease in processing the information. It has been documented that people often rely on feeling as information when making judgments (Schwarz 2004). Likewise, it is possible for the feeling of ease in reading to affect our variety judgments. While there are reasons to believe that readability will affect our variety perceptions, it may alter perceived variety in opposite ways depending on how people use the feeling as information.

Readability may decrease perceived variety. In other words, people see an assortment as more various when the information is less readable. For years, research has repeatedly demonstrated a correlation between great variety in an assortment and subjective difficulty in making choices from the assortment (Chernev 2006; Chernev and Hamilton 2009; Iyengar and Leppers 2000). With repeated experiences of subjective choice difficulty in face of an assortment with great variety, people may form a lay belief linking variety to choice difficulty such that ‘the more variety there is in an assortment, the more difficult it is for me to make choices from the assortment’ (i.e., a difficulty-variety naive belief). As an association gets strengthened over time, it is possible that thoughts about either component will automatically activate the other component (Wyer 2004, 2007), such that feeling of choice difficulty will trigger the feeling of ‘high variety’.

While choice difficulty may stem from the actual variety of an assortment, it may also come from factors that are irrelevant to the actual assortment size. For example, Novemsky and his colleagues’ (2007) research shows that difficulty engendered by reading product specifications in difficult-to-read fonts could already result in heightened choice difficulty. In the current context of investigation, it can be predicted that when people make choices from an assortment that is difficult-to-read, the increased subjective choice difficulty will trigger the feeling of ‘high variety’ via the difficulty-variety naive belief. That is, the poorer the readability of the font styles is, the more difficult it is to process the assortment information and make choices from it, which in turn will trigger an illusion of higher variety.

On the contrary, one may also expect high readability to increase perceived variety. First, ease in processing is hedonically positive (Winkielman et al. 2003). Since variety is regarded as a positive attribute (Morales et al. 2005; Rolls et al. 1981), assortment presented in easy-to-read fonts should appear more varied. Second, a decision may appear more important when its information is harder to process (Sela and Berger 2012). The heightened importance may motivate people to expand their consideration set so as to find the best option, and this need for a larger set will then contrast with the current assortment size and make the assortment appear smaller. Thus, readability may enhance perceived variety.

We conducted three experiments to test whether readability of assortment information will alter variety perception, and if so, whether it will increase or decrease perceived variety. We also examined the mechanism underlying this potential effect.

In experiment 1, participants were presented with an assortment of candy printed in an easy-to-read or a difficult-to-read font. The participants judged there to be a greater variety of flavors when the candy assortment was presented in a difficult-to-read font ($M = 5.89$) than in an easy-to-read font ($M = 5.41$; $t(76) = 2.23, p < .05$). This finding provided initial evidence for the prediction that difficult-to-read fonts could increase variety perception.

Experiment 2 was aimed to examine the difficulty-variety naive belief drove the readability effect. Participants were shown an assortment of sushi. Naive belief strength was measured and font readability was manipulated by varying the font colors. It was demonstrated that the illusion of variety only emerged for those who strongly believed in the difficulty-variety naive belief ($\beta = .56, t(98) = 3.32, p < .005$), and it was absent when the difficulty-variety naive belief was not strongly subscribed to ($p > .9$).

Experiment 3 was conducted to demonstrate that the illusion of variety would only transpire when the choice difficulty-variety naive belief was applicable. In situations where one does not have to make a choice, the belief that “choice difficulty indicates high variety” would become inapplicable. This should eliminate the effect of readability on variety perceptions. Experiment 3 employed a 2 (task: impression vs. choice) by 2 (font readability: easy vs. difficult) between-subjects design. Participants were presented with the same sushi assortment as in experiment 2, but only half of them were asked to make choices from it. The other half was required to form an impression of the assortment. It was revealed that there was a significant interaction effect of task and readability on perceived variety ($F(1, 109) = 7.87, p < .01$). The simple main effect of readability was only evident in the choice condition ($M_{easy} = 5.05, M_{difficult} = 6.28; t(111) = 3.38, p < .005$) but not in the impression condition ($M_{easy} = 6.02, M_{difficult} = 5.79; t(111) = 0.63, p > .50$).

Through three experiments, the illusion of variety was supported. It was also shown that the difficulty-variety naive belief drove this effect. Our enquiry into the role of readability in variety judgment adds to the growing body of research that uncovers the positive side of perceptual difficulty. We believe that marketers may also control consumers’ subjective experience by altering the aesthetic features of an assortment and consequently influence consumers’ perceived variety.

REFERENCES


Tens, Hundreds or Thousands? How Nutritional Information Numerosity Nonconsciously Affects Unhealthy Food Choices
Keith Wilcox, Columbia University, USA
Sonja Prokopec, ESSEC Business School, France

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Obesity is a growing problem in many areas around the globe. It is particularly an issue in the United States where nearly two-thirds of the population is overweight or obese (Flegal et al., 2012). In response to this epidemic, both government and industry organizations have initiated programs to make nutritional information more available to consumers. The underlying assumption behind these efforts is that by giving consumers more information they will make healthier food choices. However, the results of these initial efforts appear to be inconclusive (Elbel et al., 2009). Thus, a greater understanding of how nutritional information influences food consumption is necessary.

When consumers read the nutritional content of a food item, they are often confronted with numbers in a variety of different unit sizes. For instance, a food’s fat content is often a single digit or a double digit number, whereas caloric content can be as large as a four digit number. In Europe, energy content (i.e., joules) can be as large as a five digit number. With both types of information, consumers often try to limit the quantity consumed to stay within a desired daily limit. However, it is possible that the unit size of nutritional content can influence how healthy consumers perceive a food item to be.

In this research, we examine how the unit size (i.e., numerosity) of unhealthy foods’ nutritional content nonconsciously influences food perception and choice. We propose that because people implicitly associate smaller numbers with smaller magnitudes (Bagchi and Davis 2012), consumers perceive nutritional content that they are trying to limit (e.g., calories, fat) as less threatening when it is presented as a smaller number. This makes them pay less attention to limiting their consumption, which leads them to judge unhealthy foods to be healthier. As a result, they are more likely to eat unhealthy foods when the nutritional content they are trying to limit is presented in smaller digits compared to larger digits. Additionally, we argue that this effect primarily emerges in consumers with a high body mass index (BMI) because they are most concerned about limiting their quantity consumed to stay within their daily limits.

These predictions are examined in five studies. In study 1, we presented consumers with the nutritional content for four different unhealthy food items (cookie, pizza, hamburger, pound cake). The nutritional information was presented in three different unit sizes (two digits [fat]; three digits [calories]; four digits [joules]). Across the three different sizes, for each type of food, the value of the nutritional content was set so that it comprised an equal proportion of the average consumers’ recommended daily limit. As expected, when the unit size decreased from four digits to two digits, people with relatively high BMIs judged the food items to be healthier. No difference was observed for consumers with relatively low BMIs.

In study 2, to rule out the possibility that our results were due to beliefs people have about the different types of nutritional information, we presented participants with unfamiliar nutritional content. Specifically, we told participants that the purpose of the study was to develop a new nutritional scoring system called the FSCORE, which was similar to calories and fat. They were then shown two relatively unhealthy foods (cookie and hamburger) with their corresponding FSCORE. The unit size of the FSCORE was manipulated so that they were presented in two digit, three digit or four digit numbers. Consistent with the findings of study 1, participants with higher BMIs judged the food to be healthier when the scoring system was in smaller digits compared to when it was in larger digits. No difference was observed for consumers with relatively low BMIs.

In study 3a, we examined whether differences in unit size would influence food consumption. We presented consumers with a cookie using the same scoring system as study 2. The units were either small (two digits) or large (four digits). After evaluating the cookie, participants were told to imagine that they were considering a snack and to indicate their likelihood of selecting the cookie or an apple. As expected, participants with higher BMIs were more likely to choose the cookie when the units were smaller compared to when they were larger. No difference was observed for consumers with relatively low BMIs. Study 3b was identical to study 3a, except participants were asked to indicate their likelihood of eating a soft pretzel as a snack. The results replicated those of study 3a.

The purpose of study 4 was to demonstrate the process. We had people evaluate an unhealthy food item (i.e. a cookie) using the same procedure as study 2 while we tracked what information they were paying attention to using an eye tracking system. The results showed that participants with higher BMIs paid less attention to their daily limit when the units were smaller. Additionally, those with higher BMIs judged the food item to be healthier when the units were smaller. No difference was observed for consumers with relatively low BMIs. Importantly, the decrease in attention paid to the daily limit mediated the effect of unit size on participants’ judgments of how healthy they perceived the cookie to be.

A variety of factors, both physical and motivational, have been shown to influence whether overweight people make good food choices. This current research suggests that perceptual factors may also influence overweight people’s ability to eat healthier. People with high BMIs perceive an unhealthy food item to be healthier when its nutritional content is presented in smaller numbers, which make them more likely to eat the unhealthy food. The implication from this research is that policy makers must not only focus on the amount of information that is made available to consumers, but also the characteristics of the information.

REFERENCES

The Dark Side of Product Visualization: Negative Effects of Imagery
Arun Lakshmanan, SUNY Buffalo, USA
Lura Forcum, Indiana University, USA
H. Shanker Krishnan, Indiana University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Many websites allow consumers to upload their own pictures to the site, providing an appealing means for consumers to visualize product benefits. This is helpful in online shopping contexts and for sellers of experience goods.

The visualization literature suggests that such product visualization tools should have positive effects. Using imagination while processing product information or advertisements, results in more positive product evaluations and purchase intentions (Babin and Burns 1997; Bone and Ellen 1992; and Escalas 2004; Gregory et al. 1982; Keller and Block 1997; Keller and McGill 1994; Krishnamurthy and Sujan 1999; McGill and Anand 1989). A subjective sense of ease in imagining product benefits also leads to more positive consumer attitudes (Dahl and Hoeffer 2004; Petrova and Cialdini 2005; Zhao, Hoeffer and Dahl 2007). Additionally, the product customization literature shows that customizing enables closer fit with consumer needs (Arora et al. 2008; Franke et al. 2009) and an “I designed it myself” effect (Franke et al. 2010; Moreau and Herd 2010). Product visualization tools that allow product images to be customized to individual consumers might have similar effects.

However, we argue that product visualization may have negative effects. Although visually pairing the product with the self can create associative self anchoring (Gawronski et al. 2007), which has been shown to have positive results, evoking the self also invites greater scrutiny. Stimuli that elicit self-consciousness can intensify affective responses (Scheier and Carver 1977; Scheier and Carver 1985). Thus negative responses to an image of the self with the product could transfer to the product, negatively affecting consumer outcomes.

In three experiments, we advance the visualization literature by demonstrating that vivid and easily generated product imagery may not lead to positive outcomes. Linking products to the self can elicit self-scrutiny, leading to negative outcomes. We uncover a boundary condition to these effects by demonstrating that when one’s own image is less salient, negative effects of self-scrutiny may be dampened.

Experiment 1 employed a commercial online service for making collages from digital pictures. One hundred and nine undergraduate students participated for course credit. We employed a single factor (visualization: personal versus standard) between-subjects design. Each participant completed a travel planning scenario for an impending spring break vacation. Half of participants (standard group) saw a screen with 36 images of a beach vacation. The other half (personal group) uploaded six images of themselves from online sources, which were displayed in addition to 30 beach vacation images (note that any self-image was acceptable, as the object was to juxtapose self-images with vacation images). An online survey containing dependent measures and covariates followed.

Primary dependent measures for this study were attitude toward the vacation and purchase likelihood. We conducted a one-way ANOVA with attitude as dependent measure, visualization (personal vs. standard) as predictor and measured covariates (M\text{personal} = 16.06, M\text{standard} = 17.5; F(1, 108) = 4.74, p<.05). This supports our hypothesis. Website relevance was used as a covariate and showed a significant positive effect (F(1, 108) = 115.4, p<.001). A similar ANOVA showed lower vacation purchase intention in the personal condition (M\text{personal} = 4.31, M\text{standard} = 5.11; F(1, 108) = 5.19, p<.03).

In Experiment 2, we assessed the role of self-scrutiny in personalized visualization. This experiment employed the same design as Experiment 1, with the addition of a five-item scale measuring self-scrutiny adapted from Scheier and Carver (1985). Forty-two students participated for course credit.

We conducted a one-way ANOVA with attitude as dependent measure, visualization type as predictor and measured covariates. Analyses revealed a significant effect for the predictor (F(1, 39) = 4.12, p<.05). Replicating Experiment 1, participants in the personal condition reported lower attitudes (M\text{personal} = 5.71, M\text{standard} = 5.96; p=.05). A similar ANOVA with self-scrutiny as dependent measure also revealed a significant effect for the predictor (F(1, 39) = 5.62, p<.03). Consistent with our expectations, the personal group reported higher levels of self-scrutiny (M\text{personal} = 4.44, M\text{standard} = 3.96; p<.03). A model with self-scrutiny mediating the relationship between visualization type and attitude was not supported.

In Experiment 3, we attempt to mitigate self-scrutiny’s effects by reducing the salience of participants’ images. The high-salience condition is identical to that in our previous experiments, and we thus expect negative effects to replicate. In the low-salience condition, participants have 54 images with which to form a collage. In this condition, self-scrutiny should be reduced among consumers who upload their own pictures because they are less prominent among the larger number of photos.

Experiment 3 utilized a 2 (visualization: personal vs. standard) x 2 (image salience: low vs. high) between-subjects full-factorial design. Sixty-nine students participated for course credit. We conducted a two-factor ANOVA with visualization and image salience as factors, attitude toward the vacation as dependent measure, and involvement and motivation as covariates. Our analyses revealed no main effect of visualization (Fs < 1) but a significant main effect for image salience (F(1, 63) = 5.13, p<.03). A two-way interaction qualified these main effects (F(1, 63) = 4.47, p<.04). Involvement and motivation were positive and significant as covariates (p<.01). Consistent with experiments 1 and 2, planned contrasts revealed that when image salience was high, participants in the personal group had less positive attitudes (M\text{high_personal} = 4.58, M\text{high_standard} = 4.75; t = 1.46, p<.07). However, when image salience was low (more images), this pattern reversed (M\text{low_personal} = 5.01, M\text{low_standard} = 4.86; t = 1.54, p<.07).

Our findings have important implications for both marketing theory and practice. We demonstrate that visualization of product benefits does not universally lead to positive consumer outcomes. While using one’s own image provides a vivid and easy means of visualization, the integration of the self into the product image also elicits self-scrutiny, and its attendant negative affect may transfer to product attitudes and purchase intentions. Thus, our research not only provides an important substantive finding for the visualization literature, it also offers an important warning for firms. One limitation of this work is that we examine a single product context; thus, future research should consider additional product types (i.e. glasses, hats).
REFERENCES


Feel Sorry for the Cake in Trash? The Effect of Food Types on Consumers’ Food Waste Perceptions

Joon Yong Seo, SUNY, Brockport, USA
Sukki Yoon, Bryant University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Over 30% of all the food produced in the US is wasted (US EPA 2010). The average US household generates food waste that costs up to $2,275 annually (Bloom 2011). Food waste presents a significant environmental concern, but a dearth of studies has investigated the psychology of food waste. To our knowledge, no prior study has examined how food types affect the perception of food waste. We propose that consumers deal with food waste with a varying degree of cognitive and affective reactions, depending on the types of food wasted (virtue and vice, Wertenbroch 1998) and food consumption goals (taste and health). Having a better understanding of how consumers perceive food waste and related feelings will help reduce food waste and help consumers improve their food consumption decisions both before the purchase and after the consumption.

According to Sen and Block (2009), valuation goals are activated in the pre-purchase stage, while consumption goals are more salient in the post-purchase stage. Valuation goals reside in the avoidance regulatory system (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999) characterized by more reason and long-term-orientation, while consumption goals are in the approach regulatory system characterized by desire for sensory pleasure and immediate gratification. When consumers make food purchases, valuation goals and avoidance motivations are more active; hence, they tend to put more weight on long-term health benefits than immediate sensory pleasure, often preferring virtues to vices. When the food consumption is imminent in the post-decision stage, on the other hand, consumers tend to prefer vices to virtues to fulfill their consumption goals and approach motivations that are guided by sensory pleasure and immediate gratification. Time discounting theory and the immediacy effect suggest that people prefer delayed virtues but immediate vices, because the vices offer a larger reward in the present (Reed et al., 1999). Thus, the preference of vices over virtues in the post-decision stage is fortified by the tendency to prefer immediate vices and delayed virtues since only imminent food consumption remains in this stage. The liking of vices in the post-decision stage should translate into stronger waste perceptions of vices than virtues. In summary, we hypothesize that consumers will feel more wasteful when discarding unconsumed vices than virtues. We demonstrate that consumers perceive a higher level of food waste in vices than virtues (Study 1) and anticipate that they are less likely to waste vices than virtues (Study 2). In Study 3 we explore a condition that moderates the effect of food types on waste perceptions and show that having a sense of taste goal progress eliminates the differential waste perceptions between vices and virtues.

In Study 1 we offer an initial test of whether waste perceptions vary between two food types. Participants received a scenario in which they purchased either a vice or a virtue. In both scenarios, sometime after the purchase they found they had to discard the food item as it was past its expiration date. Participants then rated how wasteful they felt about the discarded food. We found that participants felt more wasteful about the unconsumed vice than the unconsumed virtue.

In Study 2 we examine whether the differential waste perceptions identified in Study 1 will transfer into differential anticipation of food waste. We hypothesize that people will predict higher likelihood of waste of virtues than vices. The logic is that waste aversion should be stronger for food items that induce stronger waste perceptions when discarded. Since unconsumed vices (vs. virtues) induce stronger waste perceptions, people should be more reluctant to waste vices than virtues, which should be reflected in their prediction of food waste. Participants were asked to imagine they purchased three vice items or three virtue items. Then, they evaluated how likely they were to waste at least some portion of each food item. Results showed that participants in the vice (vs. virtue) condition predicted lower likelihood of waste. This finding suggests that people are less willing to waste vices than virtues, presumably because waste aversion is stronger for vices than virtues.

In Study 3 we explore the psychological mechanism underlying the vice-virtue perceptual difference. Fishbach and Dhar (2005) argue that consumer choices are driven by multiple goals, and having a sense of progress in one goal liberates consumers to pursue another goal. Building on this finding, we hypothesize that increasing one’s sense of consumption (i.e., taste) goal progress will decrease the person’s waste perceptions of vices, thereby reducing the differential waste perceptions between vices and virtues. We used a 2 (goal: taste goal vs. no goal) X 2 (food: vice and virtue) design with food waste perceptions as dependent variable. Participants in the taste goal condition received consumption goal manipulation while participants in the no goal condition did not. Results showed that in the no goal condition, waste perceptions of unused vices (vs. virtues) were stronger, but in the taste goal condition, there was no such difference. This perception is stronger for vices than virtues.

Table 1: Summary of Study Results

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Table 1: Summary of Study Results

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finding suggests that the differential food waste perceptions between vices and virtues are driven by consumption goal that is more salient in the post-purchase stage and resulting preference of vices to virtues.

The present research extends prior research on the psychology of waste by advancing our understanding of the relationship between food categories and waste perceptions of unconsumed food. It also explores the impact of this relationship on food waste aversion. We showed that consumers feel more wasteful when discarding unconsumed vices than virtues, and they are more reluctant to waste vices than virtues. Yet, the differential food waste perceptions fade away when consumers have a sense of consumption goal progress.

Our findings suggest the possibility that consumers buy more virtues than needed as they do not strongly feel wasteful when they discard unconsumed virtues. On the other hand, waste aversion may be one reason why people consume vices beyond satiation. Salience of waste during consumption of vices and resulting waste aversion in the form of consumption beyond satiation may have detrimental effects on consumer satisfaction and welfare as they may suffer from overconsumption of vice foods.

REFERENCES


Transmedia Consumption Experiences (TCE): Patching as a Narrative Consumption Practice

Behice Ece Ilhan, Purdue University, North Central, USA
Robert V. Kozinets, York University, Canada
Cele C. Otnes, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consuming media narratives has been an interest of socio-cultural branding, consumer culture theory, and literary theory scholars (e.g., Brown 2005; Brown, Kozinets, and Sherry 2003, Scott 1994). Over the years, both within marketing and consumer behavior, studies have explored individual or communal entertainment-consumption experiences and consumers’ media-related meaning-making practices. This study contributes to the extant literature by exploring the consumption of transmedia narratives.

Developing Jenkins’ (2006) notion of “transmedia storytelling” (20) and translating it to the realm of consumer behavior, transmedia consumption is herein defined as the consumption of diverse, dispersed narrative elements across multiple media for the purpose of co-creating unified and meaningful story consumption experiences. We consider transmedia storytelling and its consumption to be direct consequences of the combined and intensifying socio-cultural, technological, and economic changes that affect the ways marketers produce and consumers experience media and entertainment (Dena 2004).

Within the highly fragmented contemporary marketscape, transmedia storytelling creates value for consumers by facilitating participation and proliferating potential touchpoints where brand engagement can occur. Also, it generates economic prospects for producers by fostering synergy, reducing costs, and expanding the audience base. Adapting and extending the idea of transmedia storytelling by grounding it in consumer culture theory, we initiate the study of transmedia consumption experiences (hereafter, “TCE”), exploring two related research questions: “What constitutes TCE? and How do consumers co-create a unified and meaningful consumption experience with transmedia franchises?”

Differing from many popular Hollywood marketing strategies (e.g., sequels, story adaptations from one platform to the other, product placements), transmedia is characterized by and relies upon these interconnected elements that in turn help produce the effects that drive its consumption: (1) media coordination, (2) world-building, and (3) negative capability. On the production side, transmedia is not simply about redistributing the same content across different media, but it represents a systematic and coordinated dispersal of narratives across platforms that support each other. Media coordination in transmedia franchises seeks to create a universe composed of interconnected characters and stories as in Star Wars (Brown et al. 2003) or American Girl (Diamond et al. 2009). Jenkins (2006) calls this “act of creating compelling environments that cannot be fully explored or exhausted in a single platform” as “world-building” (116). Consumers are encouraged to explore across these expanded story worlds via some strategically and intentionally placed gaps and mysteries in the narrative that are called negative capability (Long 2007). This exploration and exhaustion, we hold to be acts of consumption; as they transcend single “media” platforms, they become transmedia consumption.

Exploring this consumption side, these unique characteristics of transmedia demand not only consumers’ involvement, but also their motivation, affection, and engagement. TCE are practices through which intertextual, connected, and multiple media vehicle-dispersed commercial narratives are consumed. We explore how consumers engage with these interrelated marketing narratives across a set of media platforms, but because of space restrictions, focus on one emergent key practice — “patching.” This practice describes a unique and customized consumer perspective, as people co-create their own versions of a particular transmedia world.

To understand the lived, complex, and rich phenomena of TCE, we adopt a qualitative research approach. We collected data in three transmedia contexts, Obama For America, the Coca-Cola Happiness Factory, and the Lost franchise (an ABC show)—all understood as transmedia narratives by transmedia experts. This study draws upon data collected from in-depth interviews, netnography (Kozinets 2002), and participant observation in these three contexts. Our data set helps us identify issues and meanings that are shared and that resonate among consumers.

Our findings reveal how consumers weave together disparate media elements into a single narrative stream. Although consumers interact with interconnected transmedia narratives and the worlds they depict, they do not necessarily engage with every media platform that producers disperse the story. Patching describes this idiosyncratic and unique world-consuming process. Unlike Jenkins’ world-building concept, our findings reveal consumers engage in these narrative worlds by fixing them together. The process of “patching” describes a unique and customized consumer perspective that entails uniting, joining, and affixing story elements together to produce narratives whose elements are drawn from different media platforms.

Our analysis reveals that patching involves four permeating types of practices: mapping, dipping, digging, and stitching. Consumers identify the elements of the transmediated Lost, Obama, or Coca-Cola worlds, interpret them, and then re-construct their own individually-tailored versions of each world by stitching multiple stories together. Mapping details consumers’ explorations of the terrain to establish and learn the elements, features, and details of that particular transmedia universe. Dipping is a limited consumption of the secondary texts or media via reading recaps, synopsis from blogs, forums, or Wikipedia, or through other personal resources. Digging, on the other hand, refers to consumers’ first-hand experiences with the secondary texts and intertextual popular titles to find clues, interpret mysteries, and make sense of the transmediated world. Stitching describes how consumers put clues together and make their own versions of transmedia worlds from them. To create a cohesive and meaningful experience in a transmedia universe where stories are dispersed across multiple platforms, consumers rely on these narrative consumption practices.

Our paper offers four important implications to help spur consumer research in this area. First, by formulating the idea of TCE as an “experience,” we suggest transmedia consumption is broader than the consumption of entertainment-related narratives like reading, playing, or watching. Secondly, we place the consumer front and center within transmedia research, by focusing on naturalistically-embedded practices of “world-consuming” to complement the producer-focused “world-building” of prior research (Long 2007). Third, we discover and discuss individualized practices of “world-consuming” in which a complex narrative universe encourages consumers to develop idiosyncratic narrative experiences and customized brand practices (Schau, Muñiz, and Arnould 2009). Fourth, we detail four important interrelated practices that guide the individual
Table 1: Summary of the Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mapping</th>
<th>Awareness of the existence of the secondary texts</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I think <em>Lost</em> is definitely... probably on purpose connected with all the other forms of media. It cannot be just a TV [show]. It would be too difficult to keep up. Or they would have made much simpler. The books didn’t mean as much or the Easter eggs and the representation wouldn’t have been there. There is no way they could do that. Maybe they could but probably... most people knew what that meant weren’t watching TV. [laughs] (Larry)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dipping</th>
<th>Reading the recaps, synopsis of the secondary texts from other resources like forums, blogs, or hyperlinks (e.g., consuming without playing)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I read the first one (ARG) that was about what was going with Dharma and the Vanzetti equation and all that stuff. And then I played ... I didn’t complete but I played pieces of <em>Where is 815</em>. The second one... I was so busy at the time that I appreciated being able to read a recap. ... For <em>Lost</em> at that point everybody was very thirsty for answers. And there seems to be some information in ARG about the Vanzetti equation and those numbers. And so I appreciated being able to get those answers. Same way I appreciate to be able to get to the next episode when I was going through season 1. It is the same kind of connection to the next one. So I liked being able to read the recap on the first one. I liked playing the second one but now I didn’t have the time to do both. So, other people were figuring out stuff out before I was even catching up. Then because I was so religiously reading <em>Lostpedia</em> every source I can get to anyway. Enough solutions were being provided as the game went along that I played some and then I ran across some solutions anyway. I was like” ok, screw it, I am gonna read it over”. ARGs are the... when I have time for, I think, it’s the best marketing tool ever. What I did, I appreciated reading it afterwards. (John)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patching</th>
<th>Consume the secondary texts, play ARGs, read books, etc. and try to solve mysteries and find extra information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If this IS differential calculus, which I understand to be the math of momentum under the laws of motion (in relation to physics), then that might help draw a connection somewhere... Though, the hint could be VERY broad in regards to what it’s “referring” to (meaning, which field of study) I think it gives us a revealing insight... Quote: “In physics, the derivative of the displacement of a moving body with respect to time is the velocity of the body, and the derivative of velocity with respect to time is acceleration.” Keep an ear out for any names popping up like Liebniz, Lagrange, Newton, or Euler as they were major contributors to the study of calculus. There’s also a “Jacobian Matrix” in calculus which makes me wonder (though, it’s a bit of a different TYPE of calculus) (Paperknives, ARG: <em>Find 815</em>, 2008) “This is what my science professors would call misleading. 1) It’s not possible that no jobs were created during the period from 2008 and 2009; 2) The chart excludes the unemployment rate which grew from 3 to 9% in the same period of time; 3) given what is said in my comment 2 -- what exactly is a negative job creation if it IS NOT an unemployment rate?” (OFA, Facebook, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Digging</th>
<th>Combine all the info from the consumption of secondary texts, make an overarching analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The rule of thumb for ancillary stuff like this is thus: The characters themselves are not important or canon to the show, the information they uncover however is. Here’s an example: In <em>Find815</em>, there’s a long character arc about someone who finds the fake 815 crash with underwater probes. In the show, this event/information is canon. We see the probes even. But the person behind them is not the same. The character wasn’t there or important, the information revealed through him was, and was included. See what I mean? Some stuff from the ARGs actually has been referenced to in the show. In “The Constant” we see Widmore buying a book, and the auctioneer says it was from a man “Magnus Hanso” and contained information on the Black Rock. Previously, this information was only referred to in TLE. But the person behind them is not the same. The character wasn’t there or important, the information revealed through him was, and was included. See what I mean? Some stuff from the ARGs actually has been referenced to in the show. In “The Constant” we see Widmore buying a book, and the auctioneer says it was from a man “Magnus Hanso” and contained information on the Black Rock. Previously, this information was only referred to in TLE. But mostly, the information won’t make it in episodes, but it is however canon to the mythology. They do these ARGs for the reason of getting out info or plot details that can’t be fit into the show itself well. (Garmonbozey, ARG The <em>Lost</em> Experience, 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stitching</th>
<th>-----------------</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>construction of a new narrative universe and foster deeper engagement with media narratives: mapping, dipping, digging, and stitching. As the text is woven into a variety of different forms, these metaphors help guide our understanding and further research into this increasingly important area of media and brand consumption.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**REFERENCES**


Consumer Responses to Simultaneous Changes in Price and Quantity: Do Direction and Magnitude Matter?

Jun Yao, Monash University, Australia
Harmen Oppewal, Monash University, Australia
Yongfu He, Monash University, Australia

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers are generally sensitive and averse to price increases but in order to maintain profitability, it may be unavoidable for a firm to increase prices of its products, for example due to inflation or increasing costs. When required to increase prices, marketers of packaged groceries generally rely on either of two tactics: (1) they raise the retail price without altering the package size; or (2) they reduce the package size without changing the retail price (Gourville and Koehler 2004, Kachersky 2011). Both tactics essentially result in a higher effective price, or unit price, of a product.

Now imagine a situation where the price and size of a product vary simultaneously and in the same direction, that is, the price increases but the volume also increases, or the price decreases but the volume also decreases. In such a situation, would volume changes mitigate against price changes in their effects on consumer price attitudes? Even more, consider if the magnitude of the price movement differs from the magnitude of the size movement. In such a situation the change in unit price may be in an opposite direction to the change in retail price. For example, retail price decreases of 10% combined with a volume increase of 15% results in a unit price decrease of 1% and a unit price reduction of 15% with a volume increase of 15% results in a unit price decrease of 1%. Would consumers be able to cognitively detect and interpret the differences in changes in price and volume, and consequently, would they respond negatively (positively) to such a situation where the ‘effective price change’ of a product is in contrast to its prima facie price change?

By answering these questions, we identify a condition in retail pricing, which we term “Simultaneous changes in Price and Quantity” (SPQ), that has not been addressed in the literature yet. Drawing on anchoring and adjustment theory, we predict that consumers respond to simultaneous decreases in price and quantity (D-SPQ) more positively than to simultaneous increases in price and quantity (I-SPQ), regardless of the magnitude of changes that reflect corresponding change in effective price (i.e., unit cost). SPQ situations create a relatively complex judgment and decision environment, where consumers are most likely to encounter difficulties in calculating the effective change in unit cost. In such an instance consumers are inclined to use heuristics, such as anchoring, to simplify their decision making. Since price (as economic loss) is more salient than quantity when consumers evaluate a purchase, price is more susceptible to the anchoring effect. Such a bias is consistent with another research stream into denominator neglect, which suggests that numerators may outweigh corresponding denominators in judgment and decision making by individuals (Raghurib and Srivastava 2002). For packaged groceries, consumers can derive the value-for-money (VFM) of a purchase by calculating the ratio of retail price over quantity of units product obtained (Lichtenstein, Ridgway, and Netemeyer 1993), and it is normal for consumers to compare the VFM or unit prices (if explicitly presented) of alternatives, rather than counting on the ratio of quantity over price.

In addition, compared to retail prices, unit prices provide a more accurate measure of the “real cost” of packages and should be preferred as a cue in price cognition. However, consumers have been found unable to accurately calculate unit prices in retail contexts (Friedman 1972), consequently their behaviours are influenced by the presence of unit price. The explicit presence of unit price information therefore is expected to eliminate the bias caused by insensitivity to quantity than price and unveils the effective change in VFM.

Two experimental studies (Study 1 and Study 2) concerning a shopping comparison task over two time periods provide convergent evidence that regardless of the magnitude of change, there is an effect of the direction of change on consumer price attitudes. Consumers generally prefer situations where product packages become smaller in size and correspondingly lower in price, over those where product packages become larger in size, with corresponding increases in price. Therefore there is a bias towards the retail price, regardless of the directional consistency between retail price change and unit price change. In Study 1 we also observe a mediation effect of simultaneous changes through perceptions of value-for-money and expensive-ness on attitudes.

In Study 2 we find these effects are moderated by the presence of unit price information. Specifically, the effect of simultaneous changes on attitudes does not persist when unit price is made available, because consumers tend to rely on unit price changes to make their judgements. Such empirical evidence rules out the alternative explanation that consumers are more concerned with total payment amounts, and thus look at retail prices only, or prefer smaller sizes to avoid waste. In study 3, we demonstrate another manifestation of the proposed effect by showing that unit prices framed as “$ per 100 ml” lead to a less competitive store price image than unit prices framed as “$ per liter” do. It provides evidence that insensitivity to quantity change relative to price change can be initiated not only by numeric anchoring but also by semantic anchoring.

REFERENCES

Can Sensory Stimulation Decrease Rumination? An Exploration of the Influence of Senses on Repeated Mental Simulation
Gaël Bonnin, Reims Management School, France
Alain Goudey, Reims Management School & Paris-Dauphine University, France

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Struggling to assemble an Ikea product, failing to make a purchase on a website, seeing a recently bought product break down, sitting in the waiting room at the doctor’s office, waiting at the supermarket are only a few of the multiple occasions for rumination. Although seemingly harmless, rumination is a key concept for the understanding of cognitive functioning (Denson, 2012; Gomez and Debenedetti, 2010) especially because it partially or fully mediates the effect of negative emotions on consumer behavior (Porath, McClain, and Folkes, 2010; Strizhakova, Tsarenko, and Ruth, 2012). But little research has investigated the means of reducing it (Strizhakova, Tsarenko, and Ruth, 2012). Two empirical studies show that an arousing visual ambiance (study 1) and a combination of scent and music (study 2) reduce the intensity of rumination.

Rumination and sensory stimulation
Rumination is a maladaptive form of cognitive processing of emotions that follow stress and manifests itself in repetitive, aversive and intrusive thought patterns, whose content focuses on the stressor (Denson, 2012; Joormann, Levens, and Gotlib, 2011; Pronk et al., 2010). It is a form of repeated mental simulation (Brigard et al, 2013). This implies that the person relives the stressing event long after it was experienced and with physiological, cognitive and emotional responses of the same intensity than if it were really experienced (Bushman et al., 2005; Joormann, Levens, and Gotlib, 2011). Moreover, rumination is a circular, self-perpetuating process (Denson, 2012; Gomez and Debenedetti, 2010; Ottaviani, Shapiro, and Fitzgerald, 2011)DBP: the physiological arousal that follows the reappearance of negative thoughts results in negative emotions that maintain physiological arousal (Gerin et al, 2006; Ottaviani, Shapiro, and Fitzgerald, 2011)DBP; difficulties in manipulating information in working memory and a deficit in executive control maintains the cognitive focus on the source of rumination (Joormann et al., 2011; Whitmer and Banich, 2007). In sum, when in a ruminative state, people tend to ruminate further. But how do you stop or decrease the intensity of rumination?

Results of research on the role of distraction are not conclusive and don’t document the process by which distraction would decrease rumination (especially regarding attention switching). Recent research suggest that a way to reduce rumination is to reinforce executive functioning (Denson, 2012; Pronk et al., 2010). Executive functioning is a set of cognitive control processes that regulate behavior, thoughts and feelings (Pronk et al., 2010). Stimulation of the areas involved in executive functioning reinforces the capacity to regulate thoughts and diminish rumination. As areas involved in executive functioning are located in the frontal lobe and overlap those involved in emotion (Pronk et al., 2010), and as stimulation of visual, olfactory and auditory senses has physiological, cognitive and emotional consequences (e.g. Krishna, 2012)and past research has examined the main effects of many pleasant ambient stimuli such as music and scent. To further our theoretical understanding, we extend the notion of Gestalt to consumers'u2019 perceptions of retail environments and demonstrated that consumers perceive services- capes holistically. Specifically, we suggest that the arousing quality of ambient stimuli is one dimension along which holistic evaluations occur, and that pleasant ambient stimuli are perceived more positively when their arousing qualities match rather than mismatch. We manipulated scent and music in a 3 (no music, pleasant low arousal and high arousal music, our central hypothesis is that an increase in pleasant sensory stimulation decreases the intensity of rumination.

Two empirical studies took place in the context of hospital visits. Stimulation was manipulated by adding sensory stimuli in the environment.

Study 1: Visual ambiance and rumination
One hundred and forty one students were randomly assigned to one of two visual conditions as part of an assignment in a market research course. Visual conditions were pictures of the waiting rooms of two hospitals (vivid colors versus neutral and uniform shades of green-white).

Results of two ANOVAs and an ANCOVA show that as visual stimulation increases the emotional quality of the environment improves and the intensity of rumination decreases. Moreover, the fact that the influence of the visual conditions loses its significance when the emotional quality of the environment is introduced as a covariate suggests that the influence of visual ambiance on rumination is the result of an emotional activation.

Study 2: Music, scents and rumination
A field experiment was conducted in a hospital specialized in articulatory pathologies and rheumatisms. A 2 (pleasant fast tempo music versus no music) by 2 (pleasant relaxing scent versus no scent) full factorial design was used. One hundred and twenty six people participated.

Music and the interaction between music and scent influence the emotional quality of the environment and rumination. The emotional quality of the environment has a negative impact on rumination, and music and the interaction of music and scent decreases rumination. Unexpectedly, the condition with the lowest environmental emotional quality (scent and music) is associated with the lowest level of rumination while the emotional quality of the environment is negatively associated with rumination (low emotional quality leads to higher intensity of rumination). This result is discussed below.

Discussion
The results of our first study suggest that an arousing visual ambiance with bright colors decreases rumination, and that this happens because of a change in emotional perception. The results of our second study are less clear-cut. The impact of adding music or scent only is low and it is the co-presence of scent and music that leads to a decrease in rumination. Moreover, when music and scent are present the emotional quality is lower than in other cases. There seem to be two opposite processes working at the same time. While the emotional quality of the environment has a negative impact on rumination (high emotional quality entails a low level of rumination), the low emotional environment (scent and music) shows a lower level of rumination. Contrary to previous findings (Mattila and Wirtz, 2001; Morin et al., 2007) these results suggest that the impact of individual sensory stimuli of the environment is not mediated by the emotional quality of the global environment and on the contrary the effects of the global environment and of individual stimuli seem to act in opposite directions. This research proposes that two processes
are involved in the influence of sensory stimulation on rumination: firstly emotional activation improves executive functioning which decreases rumination and accounts for the impact of the emotional quality of environment; secondly direct physiological processing of sensory information shifts resources away from internal self-focus to the external world and ‘forces’ or ‘helps’ cognitive and emotional switching.

REFERENCES
What a Feeling! Touching Sexually Laden Stimuli Makes Women Seek Rewards
Anouk Festjens, KU Leuven, Belgium
Sabrina Bruyneel, KU Leuven, Belgium
Siegfried Dewitte, KU Leuven, Belgium

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Previous literature seems to have established that women’s economic decision making, contrary to men’s, is virtually insensitive to the presence of sexual cues. For instance, while men are more impatient for monetary rewards (Wilson & Daly, 2003), take more financial risk (Baker & Maner, 2008) and spend more on conspicuous consumer goods (Griskevicius et al., 2007) when visually exposed to a sexually attractive member of the opposite sex, the same studies show that women’s economic decisions remain unaffected after having been primed with potential mates.

In the present paper, we argue that the specificity of the sexual primes used so far (i.e., mostly visual ones) may have caused women’s unresponsiveness to sexual cues when engaging in economic decision-making. We will use other types of sex cues than the ones that have been used previously to study the effect of sexual cues on women’s economic decisions. Specifically, we show in three experiments that touching sexually laden stimuli changes women’s financial decisions.

Actively touching objects or stimuli seems to have an especially strong influence on preferences and decisions (Peck & Shu, 2009). For instance, Peck and Wiggins (2006) found that adding a touch element such as a sample of fabric on a pamphlet requesting donations to a local charity organization increased the impact of the message as measured by the time and money people wanted to spend on the organization. Peck and Shu (2009) showed that the endowment effect also occurs by merely touching -rather than actually possessing- a product. These findings are explained by the suggestion that touch facilitates a person’s affective reaction towards a stimulus. That is, the affective qualities of stimuli seem to be transmitted efficiently when the product is touched. Derived from previously observed effects of sex cues on economic decision making in men (Van den Bergh, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2008), we predict that touching sexually laden stimuli will lead to a craving for monetary rewards (Study 1) and a decline in monetary loss aversion (Study 2) in female consumers. We further expect that these effects will not occur if women are prevented from touching the sexually laden stimulus (Study 3).

In the first experiment, we asked female participants to evaluate either boxer shorts or a T-shirt. Next, participants were asked to indicate the amount of money [truffles] they would be willing to risk losing in a dice gamble (i.e., “If the eyes indicate one, two or three, you win €5 [200gr], if the eyes indicate four, five or six you lose €___ [___ gr]”) (Harinck et al., 2007). Based on this data, loss aversion could be determined for both rewards. Consistent with the findings of the first study, results show that touching boxer shorts rather than a T-shirt erodes women’s loss aversion for both money and food.

In the second study, we investigated the breadth of this sexual priming effect. Similar to the manipulation in experiment 1, we asked participants to evaluate either boxer shorts or a T-shirt. Next, loss aversion (i.e., the pain of losing a specific amount / the pleasure of acquiring an equal sized amount) for both money and food was measured (Li et al., 2012). The denominator of the loss aversion ratio captures one’s craving for monetary rewards (see DV Study 1). Participants were asked to indicate the amount of money [truffles] they would be willing to risk losing in a dice gamble (i.e., “If the eyes indicate one, two or three, you win €5 [200gr], if the eyes indicate four, five or six you lose €___ [___ gr]”). Based on this data, loss aversion could be determined for both rewards. Consistent with the findings of the first study, results show that touching boxer shorts rather than a T-shirt erodes women’s loss aversion for both money and food.

In the third study, we explicitly manipulated whether women could touch the sexually laden stimulus. That is, participants were either asked to rate a pair of boxer shorts put in front of them to touch or put in a fully transparent cubicle of Plexiglas. Subsequently, women’s impatience for monetary rewards was measured using the same DV as in study 1. Our analysis revealed that women’s monetary craving increased when the sexually laden stimulus was touched.

In sum, in line with previous findings obtained in men, we showed that touching boxer shorts led to a monetary craving and an erosion of loss aversion for both money and food in women. We are the first to show that priming women with sexually-laden cues affects women’s financial decisions (in a similar way as men’s). These findings may seem surprising from an evolutionary psychological perspective (Buss, 1989). Specifically, whereas sexual motives should instigate men to show off their (financial) resources, women should

Table 1: Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>STUDY 1</th>
<th>STUDY 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area Under the discounting Curve</td>
<td>LN (Loss Aversion Money)</td>
<td>LN (Loss Aversion Food)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Condition</td>
<td>0.87 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Cue Condition</td>
<td>0.78 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
<td>F(1, 40) = 5.00, p &lt; .05</td>
<td>F(1, 48) = 6.22, p = .02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDY 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Under the discounting Curve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual Sex Cue Condition</td>
<td>0.84 (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactile Sex Cue Condition</td>
<td>0.72 (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
<td>F(1, 39) = 5.97, p &lt; .05</td>
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</table>
What a Feeling! Touching Sexually Laden Stimuli Makes Women Seek Rewards

...primarily invest in physical attractiveness (e.g., by dieting). One potential explanation for our findings is that women primed with sex cues want to acquire money to spend it on beauty products (Wilson and Daly, 2003). Another possibility however is that money, besides being a means to gain access to various resources, is regarded a primary reward or reinforcer in itself, and that being effectively primed with sex makes consumers (both men and women) more susceptible to any type of reward. Our findings with respect to food-related decisions are consistent with this second interpretation. The second interpretation is also consistent with the existence of a “general reward circuitry” in the brain (Van den Bergh et al., 2008). Specifically, drive states that are activated by one type of cue (e.g., sex) can be satiated by rewards from seemingly unrelated domains (e.g., money and food) because various rewards are processed similarly. Hence, if touching sexually laden cues activates the reward circuitry of women, financial and food-related decisions are affected. We call upon future research shedding more light on these issues.

REFERENCES

Variety Promotes Flexibility: The Effect of Exposure to High Variety on New Product Evaluations

Zixi Jiang, University of New South Wales, Australia
Jing Xu, Peking University, China
Ravi Dhar, Yale University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Imagine that a consumer goes on an online supermarket website: in one occasion he is presented with a large variety of clothes or books, while on another occasion, and he is presented with very few varieties. Then, he clicks into digital product category and sees a newly launched product, wireless speaker. Would the number of varieties in unrelated clothing or book domain displayed on the main page influence this consumer’s purchase decision about the new speaker? Could incidental exposure to high variety prior to making an unrelated choice make the consumer more likely to accept new products? Although it may seem that such exposure to high variety in unrelated categories should have no significant impact on subsequent new product evaluation, this dissertation proposes otherwise.

Previous research has demonstrated that consumers’ decisions are affected by how they perceive or interpret the variety of an assortment (Berger, Draganska and Simons 2007; Hoch, Bradlow, and Wansink 1999; Kahn and Wansink 2004). Most of variety research focuses on the conscious information processing associated with variety in assortment choice. However, some recent research has demonstrated more subtle influences of the different categories or assortment structure on consumer behaviors (Mogilner and Iyengar 2008; Ülkümen, Chakravarti, and Morwitz 2010). For example, Ülkümen and her colleagues find that consumers exposed to narrow (versus broad) categories adopt different information processing styles and consider both salient and non-salient pieces of information in unrelated decisions. Building on this stream of research, we focus on the exposure to high variety impacts how consumers process information and their subsequent evaluations for new products.

In the manifestation of the experiments, we define variety as the number of distinct objects. Across five studies, we find that the exposure to high variety increases consumers’ cognitive flexibility, and consequently enhances their evaluations of new products. Study 1a showed that exposure to high variety induced cognitive flexibility represented by increased category inclusiveness. Study 1b showed that exposure to high variety enhanced cognitive flexibility through another manifestation of cognitive flexibility, namely, associative links.

Study 2 provided evidence that exposure to high variety promotes favorableness toward new products. Furthermore, increased cognitive flexibility lead to an emphasis on improvements of the new feature, and more thoughts about new feature benefits of the new product.

Study 3 provided further mediation data that exposure to high variety promotes favorableness toward new products through increased cognitive flexibility. Study 3 also extended the generalizability of the results by testing the effect of exposure to high variety in another new product area—brand extensions. For the low-fit brand extensions, consumers exposed to high variety, due to boosts in cognitive flexibility, will be able to find more and ambiguous ways to link the parent brand and the extension. Thus fit perception will be higher and consequently extension evaluations will be more favorable for consumers exposed to high variety than for those exposed to low variety. We would expect no differences to emerge for high-fit brand extensions, where the connection between parent brand and the extension product is highly accessible, and cognitive flexibility is of little help. The results of Study 3 conformed to our predictions.

In Study 4, we explored another boundary condition, namely, ad message persuasiveness of new products. The new products can be advertised in a direct, easy-to-comprehend way, where specific attributes are presented, or in an indirect, hard-to-comprehend way, where the relationship between the focal product and other images are remotely related and require substantial relational processing. Consumers exposed to high variety, who are more cognitively flexible, should be up to the heightened challenge of understanding indirect ad messages and form favorable ad attitudes. On the other hand, consumers exposed to low variety, who are less cognitively flexible, should have difficulty seeing the relationship between the seemingly irrelevant images. For direct ad messages, in contrast, images are directly related to each other and the product, and minimal relational processing is necessary. Thus, for direct ad messages, consumers exposed to both high and low variety will find the ad message easy to comprehend and form similar ad attitudes. The results of Study 4 were consistent with these predictions.

Table 1: Mean Typicality Ratings as a Function of Exposure to Variety (Study 1a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Varieties Exposure to High Variety</th>
<th>Exposure to High Variety</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Higher numbers indicate greater category inclusiveness.

REFERENCES


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Simms, Jane (2005), “Where Are All the New Ideas?” *Marketing (UK)*, (December 18), 34-36.


APPENDIX A

Picture used in Exposure to High Variety (example, Study 1-4)

Picture used in Exposure to Low Variety (example, Study 1-4)

Picture used in Exposure to High Quantity (example, Study 1b)
The same ethnicity on distinctive consumers’ attitudes towards the brand and ad (e.g. Aaker, Brumbaugh, and Grier, 2000; Antioco et al., 2012). We argue that this strategy is significantly more effective when targeting first generation minority consumers than when targeting second-generation minority consumers. We predict that this effect of generational status on the effectiveness of the strategy is mediated by the strength of identification with the heritage culture.

Participants in study 2 were 270 individuals of Turkish heritage living in the Netherlands (143 were first-generation Turkish immigrants while 127 were born in the Netherlands to Turkish parents). Respondents rated an ad for a charity, the charity itself, their willingness to support it, and the spokesperson. In the otherwise identical ad, the spokesperson’s name was manipulated to sound either Turkish (“Ali Oztürk”) or Dutch (“Frank de Jong”). Participants also completed the Vancouver Acculturation Index (Ryder et al., 2001) to measure identification with ethnic and host culture.

The analysis revealed a significant interaction between generational status and spokesperson heritage on attitude towards the ad (F(1, 266) = 8.24, p = .004). The effect of spokesperson ethnicity was significant for first-generation participants (F(1, 266) = 5.27, p = .022; Turkish spokesperson: M = 4.26, SD = 1.17; Dutch spokesperson: M = 3.84, SD = 1.04) but only marginally significant for second-generation participants (F(1, 266) = 3.17, p = .076; Turkish spokesperson: M = 3.46, SD = 1.06; Dutch spokesperson: M = 3.80, SD = 1.08). The analysis revealed similar effects for attitude towards the organization, attitude towards the spokesperson and willingness to support. A mediation analysis with strength of ethnic identification as a mediator revealed a significant main effect of generational status on identification (mediator variable model: b = -0.30, SE = 0.04, t(265) = -7.11, p < .001), along with a significant identification*spokesperson heritage interaction effect (dependent variable model: b = 1.37, SE = 0.34, t(265) = 4.00, p = .0001). After adding the mediator, the effect of generational status on attitude in the latter model was no longer significant (b = -0.24, SE = 0.14, t(265) = -1.70, p = .09). A bootstrap analysis of indirect effect confirmed a significant mediation effect (95% confidence interval: -0.17 < C.I. < -0.15). The findings confirm that there is an effect of generational status on response to same-ethnicity spokesperson - an effect mediated by the strength of identification with the heritage culture.

In today’s multicultural societies, ethnic targeting is an increasingly important tool for marketers. Few standard approaches to the targeting of ethnic minorities have emerged in recent years but our studies show that the effects of such practices on minority consumers are not homogeneous. Specifically, the findings show that generational status (first vs. second generation) constitutes an important boundary condition for the two most popular ethnic targeting strategies.

REFERENCES


You are Forgiven: Cause Uncontrollability and Negative Emotional Contagion
Stefan Hattula, University of Stuttgart, Germany
Carmen-Maria Albrecht, University of Mannheim, Germany
Torsten Bornemann, University of Stuttgart, Germany
Julian Würth, University of Mannheim, Germany

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The role of emotions displayed by customer contact employees for customer emotions has received increasing attention in recent consumer behavior literature. Several studies find that customers tend to catch positive (Howard and Gengler 2001; Luong 2005; Pugh 2001) and negative emotions (Barsade 2002; Dallimore, Sparks, and Butcher 2007; Du, Fan, and Feng 2011) experienced by frontline employees—a phenomenon referred to as emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994). While the majority of research in this area has focused on which emotions are caught by customers (e.g., happy service display; Howard and Gengler 2001), fairly little is known about boundary conditions of emotional contagion.

Against this background, we explore how customers catch negative emotions of employees and how customers’ attributions for these negative emotions impact the extent of emotional contagion. Specifically, we propose that the extent of emotional contagion depends on whether customers can attribute causes for the negative emotional display as uncontrollable by the customer contact employee.

The present research integrates two literature streams: emotional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1994) and attribution theory (Weiner 1985). The emotional contagion literature focuses on a specific type of social influence and proposes that “a person or group influences the emotions or behavior of another person or group through the conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral attitudes” (Schoenewolf 1990, p. 50). This interpersonal influence results from individuals’ tendency to catch facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements of another individual automatically (Hatfield et al. 1994). However, research on negative emotional contagion is still in its infancy and provides mixed results. While some studies find evidence for successful interpersonal catch of emotions, others fail to provide evidence for the occurrence of emotional contagion effects (e.g., Caughlin, Huston, and Houts 2000; Hemmig-Thurai et al. 2006).

On the basis of attribution theory, we argue that customers’ attribution of uncontrollability for the emotions’ cause may moderate the contagion of frontline employees’ negative emotional display on customers (Weiner 1985). Attribution theory (Weiner 1985) states that people seek for causal explanations for actions and behaviors of others and adjust their own response accordingly (Harvey and Martinko 2009). The theory rests on the assumption that cognitions determine how far particular stimuli result in emotional or behavioral responses (Weiner 2000). In the context of employee-customer interactions, attribution theory suggests that if customers can attribute the negative emotions displayed by an employee to uncontrollable causes, negative emotional contagion to the customer should be less likely since these may experience sympathy, offer help, and forgive (Weiner 1985). Thus, we propose:

Hypothesis 1: Attribution of uncontrollability moderates the relationship between a customer contact employee’s negative emotional display and customers’ negative emotion in a way that when customers can attribute uncontrollability of causes, negative emotional contagion is less pronounced than when customers cannot attribute uncontrollability.

Results of a 2 x 2 ANCOVA reveal a significant main effect for the customer contact employee’s stress display. Participants who experienced stress display of the frontline employee tended to report higher levels of customer stress as compared to participants who were not in the stress display condition. We found no main effect for the external stressor manipulation. Thus, customer stress did not simply occur as a result of the external circumstances where a stressor was provided. Importantly, the main effect of stress display was qualified by a significant interaction with external stressor provision. As expected, when participants were exposed to the stress display condition, those participants who were provided with an external stressor reported a significantly lower stress level than participants who were not exposed to such information. In the no stress display condition, the external stressor provision did not cause different levels of customer stress. These results thus provide support for our hypothesis.

These results make an important theoretical contribution to the emotional contagion literature. This study is the first to provide a theoretically and empirically sound explanation for the existing mixed findings on emotional contagion. Relying on attribution theory, which suggests that cognitions determine the degree to which particular stimuli result in emotional or behavioral responses (Weiner 1985), we show that the strength of emotional contagion depends on whether the customer has access to information about the uncontrollability of the cause of the employee’s negative emotional display.

Further, we provide a deeper understanding of the effect of cause uncontrollability. We show that the effect of customer contact employees’ negative emotional display is significantly lower in situations where customers can attribute uncontrollability of affect to external causes than in situations where customers have no access to...
information on affect cause. This finding provides further evidence for the applicability of the fundamental attribution error in customer-employee relationships (Harvey and Weary 1984), which suggests that customers attribute greater control to the customer contact employee when no explanation is provided for the display of negative emotion.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Social and economic development has been accompanied by an increase in the variety of leisure activities available, ranging from sports and arts to countryside recreation and gaming. Making these options accessible to the public is a central concern of policy makers (Crawford, Jackson and Godbey 1991; Wade 1985) who assume that making more leisure choices available to the public contributes positively to their happiness and well-being. In fact, however, this assumption may not be valid.

We focus our research on three questions. First, do large city residents actually engage in a wider range of leisure activities than someone living in a small town? Second, are big city residents happier about their leisure activities? Third, do people’s lay theories about their leisure activities correspond to reality?

Theoretically, these three questions can help us understand how option variety affects consumption and happiness outside of laboratories. Intuitively, the variety of options available could affect satisfaction for at least two reasons. First, a large choice set is likely to increase choice freedom and flexibility. Second, it could increase the actual consumption of a wide range of options.

Research on the effects of variety on affect (Diehl and Poynor 2010; Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar 2008) has focused on the satisfaction that people experience at the time they make a decision and has not examined the effect of variety on long-term satisfaction and happiness. This limitation has two consequences. First, only one consumption experience is typically provided. Therefore, the research does not indicate the effect of variety experiences on judgments over a period of time. Even if multiple consumption experiences were provided in a single experimental session (see Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman 1999), satiation could greatly undermine people’s consumption experience. When consumption experiences are separated in time, this factor does not come into play. Second, participants in an experimental setting are often implicitly or explicitly expected to consider all available options. Outside the laboratory, however, some available options are likely to be ignored and thus do not generate happiness. In other words, laboratory studies may confound the effect of available options with the effect of considered options.

An understanding of the effect of variety on long-term happiness requires a paradigm that measures multiple consumption experiences over a period of time without implicit demands to consider every option available. To accomplish this, we examined whether and how variety affects happiness in a real-world setting. In doing so, we considered variation in three factors: the set of leisure activities a consumer has access to (the available set), the set that a consumer considers in deciding what activities to choose (the consideration set), and the set of activities in which a consumer actually engages (the consumption set).

First, habits have powerful influences on decisions (Neal, Wood, and Quinn 2006). Because habits are highly accessible in memory, people may repeatedly choose the same activities without giving other options much consideration. As a result, having a large or small variety of options available may have limited impact on the size of consumption set. City residents develop a routine that they perform repeatedly unless an unexpected situation stimulates them to try something new. Consequently, having more leisure options available does not necessarily mean consuming more leisure options.

Second, trying out new leisure activities is often associated with high cost. Such costs of time and money become especially prominent when the actual leisure time is approaching, leading people to opt eventually for the usual and familiar activities.

In contrast, consideration set size is predicted to have a positive impact on consumption set size. The size of a consideration set positively affects purchase likelihood and consumption (Nedungadi 1990; Rortveit and Olson 2007; Shocker et al 1991). Furthermore, adding a new option to a consideration set increases its chances of being chosen (Nedungadi 1990; Rortveit and Olson 2007; Shocker et al 1991).

We conducted three experiments with American residents in order to answer the above questions. In study 1, participants reported their happiness about leisure and then reported their city size. Study 2 replicated the procedure of study 1, and also made participants to report their available set size or the consideration set size (between-participants). Study 3 manipulated consideration set size to establish the causal role of consideration set in affecting consumption set and happiness. Across the three studies, we found that contrary to the common belief that having a wider range of leisure activities available leads people to engage in a wider range of activities and to feel more satisfied, we find that the size of a city (and consequently the diversity of leisure activities available) does not affect the variety of activities in which residents engage or the happiness they derive from these activities. Instead, happiness is largely determined by the diversity of activities that people perform, independently of the number they have available. The variety of activities that people consider when they decide on an activity influences the diversity of activities in which they actually engage and this, in turn, affect their happiness.

REFERENCES


Regulatory Congruence Effects in Two-sided Advertising

Erlinde Cornelis, Ghent University, Belgium
Veroline Cauberghe, Ghent University, Belgium
Patrick De Pelsmacker, University of Antwerp, Belgium

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Although consumer attitudes generally support the fair trade concept, consumers also perceive certain disadvantages to fair trade products (e.g., higher price) (De Pelsmacker et al. 2006). Hence, consumers trade-off between the perceived advantages and disadvantages of fair trade products. This study investigates the effectiveness of message framing in two-sided fair trade advertising. Two-sided advertisements offer both sides of an issue or product, but actually still favor one side (Hovland 1951). By incorporating pro and contra arguments into a two-sided message, the advertisement becomes more complex than a conventional one-sided message. Due to its complexity, a two-sided message requires more attention of consumers to process the message content (Crowley and Hoyer 1994; Eisend 2007).

Up to now, the processing of two-sided advertising has mainly been considered to be central (instead of peripheral) (cf. the elaboration likelihood model, Cacioppo and Petty 1984). However, both routes of persuasion can occur for two-sided messages, depending on certain moderating variables (Eisend 2007). Florack et al. (2009) suggest that the processing depth of a two-sided message depends on receivers’ self-regulatory focus. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins 1997) proposes two basic motivational systems: a promotion focus (i.e., hopes, wishes, and the maximization of positive results) and a prevention focus (i.e., responsibilities, duties, and the minimization of negative results). Similarly, an advertisement can be framed as either being more promotion focused (i.e., by emphasizing the achievement of positive results) or more prevention focused (i.e., by emphasizing the avoidance of negative results). When the message frame matches (versus mismatches) the individual’s self-regulatory focus, regulatory congruence (versus incongruence) occurs.

Florack et al. (2009) showed that consumers differing in their predominant self-regulatory focus process two-sided messages in different ways. Prevention focused consumers tend to process the content of a two-sided message more thoroughly than promotion focused consumers do (Florack et al. 2009). However, Florack et al. (2009) did not take into account the message frame, so they could not test for regulatory (in)congruence effects in two-sided messages. Previous literature has shown that processing depth impacts regulatory congruence effects: congruence effects only occur when processing depth is rather low (Wang and Lee 2002; Briley and Aaker 2006), or when involvement and motivation to process are low (Aaker and Lee 2006). In the case of more central processing, no regulatory congruence effects have been reported (Wang and Lee 2002; Briley and Aaker 2006).

So, if consumers’ self-regulatory focus impacts how a two-sided message is processed (Florack et al. 2009), then will these individual differences in processing depth of two-sided messages also lead to different preferences for regulatory congruence (versus incongruence) in two-sided advertising? We address this research question in two experiments. We investigate whether consumers’ self-regulatory focus impacts regulatory congruence effects in two-sided advertising messages. Furthermore, we address the mechanisms underlying these regulatory congruence effects by means of two explanations: processing fluency (study 1) and processing depth (study 2).

Study 1 investigates regulatory congruence effects in two-sided messages. In a 2-level between-subjects factorial experimental design, we manipulated the message’s frame (prevention versus promotion) and measured respondents’ chronic self-regulatory focus (prevention versus promotion). The results of the first experiment show that in two-sided messages, the effect of regulatory congruence depends on consumers’ self-regulatory focus. A congruence effect was only found for promotion focused consumers, not for prevention focused consumers. This congruence effect for promotion focused consumers was mediated by processing fluency.

Study 2 elaborates on the results of the first study by clarifying the absence of a congruence effect in two-sided messages found for prevention focused consumers. More precisely, our second experiment tests whether this non-effect can be explained by the deeper processing of the message content by prevention focused consumers. It is likely that prevention focused consumers’ tendency to process a two-sided message centrally eliminates the need for processing fluency, and hence, eliminates congruence effects in two-sided messages. If limited processing depth is indeed a necessary condition for regulatory congruence effects to occur, then it should be possible to demonstrate a regulatory congruence effect among prevention focused consumers when processing depth is low (i.e., peripheral processing), and conversely, no regulatory congruence effect should occur when processing depth is high (i.e., central processing). We set up a second experiment to test the role of processing depth on the effectiveness of regulatory congruent two-sided messages in prevention focused consumers.

The results of the second study show that processing depth influences regulatory congruence effects in two-sided messages for prevention focused consumers. Under peripheral processing, prevention focused consumers prefer two-sided messages that are congruent with their self-regulatory focus. Under central processing, on the other hand, a regulatory incongruence effect occurs.

The theoretical added value of this research is twofold. (1) We combine the research stream on two-sided messages with literature on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), in order to fill an important research gap. To date, it remains unclear whether, in two-sided messages, regulatory congruence will be more effective than regulatory incongruence. If two-sided messages are more centrally processed, no regulatory congruence effect is expected. But on the other hand, if a two-sided message is more peripherally processed, a regulatory congruence effect is likely to occur. If, indeed, consumers’ self-regulatory focus plays a role in determining how a two-sided message is processed (prevention focused consumers: centrally; promotion focused consumers: peripherally), then it is theoretically relevant to test the influence of consumers’ self-regulatory focus on the effectiveness of regulatory congruence (versus incongruence) in two-sided messages. (2) Additionally, our study goes beyond prior research in that it clarifies the underlying processes of the regulatory congruence effect by addressing two crucial mediating variables (e.g., processing fluency and processing depth).

Practically, the present study provides useful insights for advertisers to develop fair trade campaigns, but also for public policy makers or nongovernmental or non-profit organizations.
REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

We propose that incidental direction of comparison is an important predictor of prosocial behavior. Direction of comparison can be downward or upward (being better or worse off than a comparison target, respectively). We argue that even when the comparison is incidental to the charitable appeal, downward (vs. upward) comparisons will cause individuals to be persuaded more by appeals that highlight benefits to others (vs. the self) by influencing their acceptance of personal responsibility. Specifically, by being in a relatively better position, those making downward comparisons may feel that they do not need to devote their resources entirely to themselves. In contrast, if those making upward (vs. downward) comparisons are more motivated to improve their relative position, then they should be less receptive to acting altruistically. Thus, we predict that individuals making downward (vs. upward) comparisons will be more willing to help others (H1). Furthermore, we argue that H1 will be supported regardless of whether (1) the comparison target is others or oneself at a different point in time, or (2) the compared resource (money) differs from the requested resource (time).

Although most charitable appeals highlight benefits to others (White and Peloza 2009), we predict that H1 will be moderated by whether the charitable appeal emphasizes benefits to others or the self (H2). If downward (vs. upward) comparisons cause individuals to be more willing to accept responsibility for others, then they should be more receptive to other- than self-benefit appeals.

Finally, we propose that because downward comparisons should reduce self-improvement motives, individuals making downward comparisons should be more willing to accept personal responsibility for others, as requested in an other-benefit appeal. In contrast, when comparing upward, individuals should be more motivated to improve themselves, thereby causing them to be less likely to accept personal responsibility for others. As a result, they will help only when a benefit to the self is highlighted in the appeal. Thus, we predict that personal responsibility for others will mediate the effects of direction of comparison on receptiveness to other-benefit appeals (H3).

In study 1, we analyzed secondary data gathered from the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment and Giving USA (2012)’s Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year of 2011. As predicted in H1, regressing comparison on change in donations yielded a significant model ($R^2 = .35$, $F(1, 31) = 16.45$, $p < .001$), and adding other variables (e.g., disposable income, expected interest rate changes) did not significantly improve the model ($\Delta R^2 = .07$, $F(4, 25) < 1$). Thus, we found the change in amount donated increased as more people made downward (vs. upward) comparisons. Because the results are correlational, we further tested our hypotheses in two lab experiments.

In study 2, 81 participants from a large university in the United Kingdom were randomly assigned to a condition in a 2 (comparison: downward vs. upward) x 2 (appeal: self- vs. other-benefit) experimental design. For the comparison manipulation, similar to prior research (Becker 2012), those in the upward (downward) condition read an article stating that those in the top (bottom) 10% income bracket are getting richer (poorer). Alongside the article was a banner ad that highlighted benefits to others or the self of volunteering (White and Peloza 2009). Participants then reported how much they would donate from their payment for participation and possible winnings from a raffle. They were also asked if they wanted to opt into an email distribution list to learn about local volunteering opportunities. Supporting H2, a comparison x appeal interaction was significant ($F(1, 73) = 6.36$, $p < .05$). When the other-help appeal was used, those in the downward (vs. upward) condition donated more money ($M_s = £14.68$ vs. £9.37, $F(1, 73) = 4.20$, $p < .05$), whereas when the self-benefit appeal was used, there was no significant difference in the amount donated ($M_s = £13.85$ vs. £14.45, $F(1, 73) < 1$). Results for opt-in to an email list were significant as well.

In Study 3, 233 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk were randomly assigned to a condition in a 2 (comparison: downward vs. upward) x 2 (target: intrapersonal vs. interpersonal) x 2 (appeal: self-benefit vs. other-benefit) experimental design. Participants described a person who is (interpersonal) or time when they were (intrapersonal) better or worse off than they currently are. They then read a cancer research ad that highlighted benefits to the self or others (Nelson and Brunel 2000). Supporting H2, comparison x appeal significantly affected the total amount donated ($F(1, 221) = 10.87$, $p = .001$) and the number of times participants planned to volunteer in the next six months ($F(1, 224) = 5.61$, $p < .05$). When the other-help appeal was used, those in the downward (vs. upward) condition donated more money ($M_s = £7.31$ vs. £5.02, $F(1, 221) = 3.71$, $p = .05$). When the self-benefit appeal was used, those in the upward (vs. downward) condition donated more money ($M_s = £7.78$ vs. £5.02, $F(1, 221) = 8.02$, $p = .005$). When the other-help appeal was used, those in the downward (vs. upward) condition intended to spend more time volunteering ($M_s = £3.16$ vs. £2.52, $F(1, 224) = 4.98$, $p < .05$). Finally, consistent with H3, when participants viewed the other-benefit appeal, felt responsibility to care for others mediated the effect of comparison on monetary donations (effect = .42, 95% confidence interval, or CI: .03 to 1.15), and volunteering intentions (effect = .27, 95% CI: .08 to .54). However, with the self-benefit appeal, felt responsibility did not explain monetary donations (effect = .06, 95% CI: -.23 to .53) or volunteering intentions (effect = .02, 95% CI: -.18 to .22). None of the effects were significantly moderated by target or whether the comparison involved money.

To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence directly demonstrating that downward comparisons can positively influence people’s willingness to help, and this is due to concerns with the welfare of a collective rather than the self. We also contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of other- versus self-benefit appeals by introducing direction of comparison as an important moderator.

REFERENCES


The Generative Consumer Can Make a Difference
Caroline Lacroix, University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The concept of generativity, that is the adults’ preoccupation for the well-being of the next generations, has recently generated interest in the field of marketing (e.g., Urie and Kilbourne 2011), with research having mainly focused on philanthropy and pro-social behaviors related to ethics and the environment.

In the “real world,” however, generativity is nowadays used more and more as a positioning strategy for brands, products, and labels (e.g., Swiss luxury watchmaker Patek Philippe). In this regard, Lacroix and Ouellet (2008) found a positive relationship between an individual’s level of generativity and his/her Aad, Ap, and IB for products positioned as generative. Though, a main limitation of their exploratory work was the use of the Loyola Generativity Scale (McAdams and de St. Aubin 1992), which yielded poor reliability and applicability to a general consumer research context. Moreover, Van Hiel et al. (2006) considered that stagnation, an integral part of the Loyola Generativity Scale of McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992), should instead be treated as a distinct concept altogether.

In order to better measure and assess generativity in a wider consumption context, we propose to develop a scale specifically dedicated to consumer generativity. We believe this measurement scale would help academics, marketers, governments, and scores of additional stakeholders understand further the potential power of generativity whenever targeting messages toward generative consumers.

To develop the consumer generativity scale, we first generated some 81 original items, which we submitted to five expert judges. Out of this original list, 45 were eliminated for redundancy or low applicability, leaving 36 items. A first data collection was then organized in order to run an exploratory factor analysis. We asked respondents to evaluate themselves on all 36 items using a seven-point scale (totally agree/disagree). The survey was administered to American citizens through a web-based panel, and a total of 152 questionnaires were completed. After purification, results of the generalized chi-square factorial analysis with varimax rotation suggested a two-factor, 11-item scale (αdimension = .912; αdimension = .867).

The decision to retain two factors seemed coherent in light of the literature on generativity. Indeed, an examination of each dimension revealed a similar structure to that originally proposed by Kotre (1984) and McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992) — that is, a first dimension consisting of agentic generativity, or a desire for symbolic immortality (e.g., “I buy useful products to help make sure I am remembered by those who survive me”), and a second dimension consisting of communal generativity, or the need to be needed (e.g., “I buy things next generations will eventually benefit from”).

To establish discriminant validity and reliability of the scale, we used various measures of neighbouring concepts (e.g., socially responsible consumption). All scales were assessed using a seven-point scale (totally agree/disagree). We then conducted a new data collection through the same web platform using a different sample (American citizens). A total of 443 complete and valid questionnaires were obtained. We then performed a confirmatory factor analysis on our data, and after rejecting different model scenarios, we ended up with a reviewed model yielding good fit indices: χ²(8) = 23.633 (p < .005), RMRR =.055, SRMR=.025, RMSEA=.066, CFI =.992, TLI=.985, GFI=.984, AGFI =.958. A second-order, 6-item model of consumer generativity thus provided the best possible fit to the data, with 1 factor expressing communal generativity (3 items), and 1 factor expressing agentic generativity (3 items). Reliability of the scale was also satisfactory: α = .92 for the communal dimension of generativity, and α = .88 for the agentic dimension. Following Fornell and Larker’s (1981) method, convergent validity presented adequate indicators (.79 for communal generativity, and .72 for agentic generativity), and discriminant and nomological validity were also confirmed using the various concepts we had included in our questionnaire (e.g., long-term orientation).

In order to assess the predictive validity of the scale, we performed a third data collection using a new sample. The design of the survey included the selection of pretested products perceived as intrinsically generative from a communal or agentic point of view: a research foundation for infantile diseases (the most communal-generative), a registered education savings plan (the most agentic-generative), and an espresso coffee machine (neutral on both dimensions). We then developed three fictitious brands and advertisements for each product category. These ads were all identical in their structure, and a generative slogan was included in order to assign a generative positioning to the product. For each ad, we measured the following dependent variables: attitude toward the ad (Aad), attitude toward the product (Ap), and buying intention. The survey was administered to American citizens via the same web platform, which generated a final sample of 187 questionnaires. Using data from the new consumer generativity scale, we then split respondents as either high- or low-generativity consumers following a median split for each of the two consumer generativity dimensions. In the case of products positioned as generative, our results showed that highly generative consumers on a communal or agentic level developed more favourable Aad, Ap and BI than did those whose level of generativity was below the median (except for Aad of the agentic generative consumer concerning the foundation). Also, by running analyses of variance (ANOVAs), we found that consumers with children were more generative on a communal level than those without. In addition, married or in-couple consumers, as well as consumers with higher family incomes were more generative in both communal and agentic ways than those who were single or had lower incomes. Moreover, in line with McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992), we found that fathers were more generative than mothers.

This research contributed to our understanding of the concept of generativity by developing a more appropriate scale for its measurement within a consumption context as opposed to a more generally social one. It also confirmed the ability of the scale to predict attitudes and behaviors. It thus demonstrated to be relevant the use of a generative positioning strategy when targeting generative consumers.

REFERENCES


The following appeared in the ambiguously uncertain (unambiguously uncertain) conditions: “30 - 70% (50%) of all undergraduates will get the flu this season”. The main dependent variable measured was a dichotomous “yes / no” question on whether participants would like to receive additional flu prevention information.

There were no between-group differences in ability to identify the value or range shown in the poster ($\chi^2 (1) = 2.284; p = NS$). There was a significant between-group difference in requests to receive flu-prevention information. An independent samples t-test revealed that participants presented with specific risk statistics were significantly more likely to request additional information (57%) than were those presented with risk ranges (29%; $t(55) = 2.27, p=.03$), demonstrating that framing risk as an absolute was more effective than framing as a range.

Study 2 (N=33, 57% male) participants were recruited in the same manner as in study 1 with participation just prior to spring break. Study design mirrored study 1. Participants completed the Revised Life Orientation Test (r-LOT; Scheier et al. 1994), a six-item scale assessing optimism. After a filler task, participants evaluated one of two versions of a fictitious health poster; this study context was Hepatitis A and B and the traveller’s vaccine. The ambiguously uncertain (unambiguously uncertain) wording read “without immunization, you have a 30—70% (50%) risk of infection”. The main dependent variable was likelihood of talking to a doctor about the vaccine, measured on a 1-7 likelihood scale.

There were no between-group differences in ability to identify the risk statistic seen ($\chi^2 (1) = 1.231; p = NS$). The six items associated with the r-LOT test were evaluated; one item was dropped due to poor item-total correlation, and the remaining five averaged to form an optimism score index ($\alpha=.80$). A regression analysis was run with a dummy variable for condition (ambiguous uncertainty = 1; unambiguous uncertainty = -1), the continuous optimism score mean-centred, and the interaction of the two as the predictor variables. Participants’ likelihood of talking to a doctor served as the dependent variable. Results showed a marginally significant main effect of ambiguity framing ($\beta = -.48, t(29) = -1.76, p = .088$), with unambiguous risk framing increasing likelihood of talking to a doctor ($M_{\text{ambig}}=4.0$ vs. $M_{\text{ambig}} = 3.0$). There was no effect of optimism level on likelihood scores ($\beta = -.64, t(29) = -1.41, p = NS$). There was a significant interaction of condition and optimism strength ($\beta = 1.25, t(29) = 2.6, p = .014$), and further analysis was conducted at one standard deviation above and below the mean of optimism. Participants low on the optimism scale shown absolute risks were significantly more likely to talk to their doctor than were individuals low in optimism, an already vulnerable population cohort (Andersson 1996). We hypothesize that message elaboration...
and reduced confidence in risk ranges drives study results, additional research should confirm this hypothesis.

This research builds on previous work in consumer behaviour determining how best to develop health campaigns, and suggests that policy makers should avoid presenting risks as ranges, given they are not as effective in triggering the desired behaviours as are risks presented in absolutes.

**Table 1: Empirical Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment 1</th>
<th>Descriptives</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.5 (17-23)</td>
<td>44% male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manipulation Check</strong></td>
<td>Chi-Square Value</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.284</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main DV:</strong> Receive Info, 1 = yes, 2 = no</td>
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<td>Mean</td>
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**REFERENCES**


Staying the Course: The Impact of No-choice Options on Post-Choice Persistence
Rom Y. Schrift, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Jeffrey R. Parker, Georgia State University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Whether complying with a diet, training, and drug regimens, completing reward programs (Kivetz, Urminsky, and Zheng 2006), or waiting for service (Janakiraman, Meyer, and Hoch 2011), persistence is important in both long- and short-term goal pursuits. Most previous research on persistence has examined factors arising after the choice is made and during the goal pursuit process (e.g., goal proximity and progress, goal accessibility, resource depletion, etc.). In contrast, this paper focuses on a specific factor that occurs at the time of choice yet still influences consumers’ persistence along their chosen path. In particular, we hypothesize that choices from rejectable choice sets (which contain a salient and viable no-choice option) versus forced choice sets (which do not) will increase persistence along the chosen path.

When consumers encounter adversity along a chosen path, they are likely to have a variety of thoughts and feelings such as regret and disappointment (Zeelenberg 1999). Counterfactual thoughts such as “was this option the right one for me?” may cause consumers to question whether they should persist or abandon their chosen path. We propose that when consumers reflect back on their original choice, the mere availability of a no-choice option in the original choice set will attenuate their counterfactual thinking and, consequently, increase persistence. In particular, since consumers choosing from rejectable choice sets must determine whether any alternative is acceptable or “good enough” to be chosen (i.e., is preferable to the no-choice option), choices made from rejectable choice sets have essentially “passed” the adequacy or acceptability test at the time of choice. Therefore, consumers will be less likely to have counterfactual thoughts regarding the adequacy of their chosen path when they have chosen from a rejectable (vs. forced) choice set, and will be more likely to persist on that path. This main hypothesis and suggested mechanism is tested across six studies.

Study 1 asks participants to choose a task of their liking (from two options) from either a rejectable or forced choice. A “loading” screen then appears and participants wait for their chosen task to begin. Unbeknownst to the participants, there is no actual task and the main dependent variable is how long they are willing to wait (persist) for their chosen task to begin. As expected, participants in the rejectable choice set (RC) condition waited (persist) significantly longer than those in the forced choice set (FC) condition ($M_{rc} = 21.27$ vs. $M_{fc} = 16.38$; Tarone-Ware $\chi^2 = 6.77, p < .01$).

Study 2 extends these results to “active” persistence (persistence in completing an actual task) in an incentive-compatible design. Further, we demonstrate that the inclusion of a no-choice option in particular, and not just any undesirable third alternative in general, increases persistence. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: forced choice set containing 2 task-options (FC2), forced choice set containing 3 task-options (FC3), and rejectable choice set containing 2 task-options plus a no-choice option (RC). The task participants completed was a word-find puzzle on the topic of their choice. As expected, RC condition participants were found to persist longer ($M_{rc} = 418$ seconds) than participants in both the FC2 condition (290 seconds; $F(1, 103) = 6.08, p < .02$; $p_{one-tail} = .025$) and the FC3 condition (283 seconds; $F(1, 103) = 7.30, p < .01$; $p_{one-tail} < .012$). Thus, this study highlights the unique aspects of the no-choice option and its effect on persistence, while examining an active (vs. passive) form of persistence in an incentive-compatible design.

Study 3 demonstrates, again in an incentive-compatible design, that the no-choice option must be embedded in the choice set to affect persistence by replicating the previous results despite giving all participants the choice of opting-in (or out) prior to choosing a task. These results (i) reduce concerns that the reported effect is triggered by negative affect (or reactance) among FC participants resulting from perceptions of being forced to participate in the task, and (ii) demonstrate that simply choosing to do something over nothing cannot explain differences in persistence found between the RC and FC conditions (because all participants actively chose to do something by opting in).

Study 4 shows that choosing from a rejectable (vs. forced) choice set impacts persistence only on the chosen task, not other, unrelated tasks that also occur after the choice. Thus, the effect is task specific and choices made from rejectable choice sets do not increase motivation in general. This further supports our contention that persistence increases only when the selected option is directly vetted against the no-choice option.

In studies 5 and 6 we directly test the underlying mechanism. Specifically, we show that increased persistence due to the inclusion of a no-choice option is fully mediated by counterfactual thoughts (Study 6). Further, we show that the effect of including (or excluding) the no-choice option is dormant, and becomes “active” only when adversity is encountered (Study 5). In the absence of such adversity, counterfactual thoughts are moot.

In summary, this paper examines how merely including a no-choice option at the time of choice influences consumers’ persistence along their chosen paths. The results of six studies demonstrate that the presence of a no-choice option, even if it is undesirable and should logically be ignored, increases consumers’ persistence when facing adversity along their chosen path. Thus, while previous research explored how factors encountered during goal pursuit impact consumers’ persistence, this paper demonstrates that factors encountered earlier, at the time of choice may have a dormant, yet substantial effect on post-choice persistence.

REFERENCES


Do You Have to Look Like a Human to Be Smart? An Exploratory Study of the Influence of Anatomy and Expressivity of Domestic Robots
Alain Goudey, Reims Management School & Paris-Dauphine University, France
Gaël Bonnin, Reims Management School, France

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The 500,000 accident-free kilometers travelled by the Google Car is a dramatic example of the future place of domestic robots in everyday life (Rijsdijk and Hultink, 2003). Because of their ability to behave autonomously, to interact like human and to communicate with their environment, domestic robots occupy an undefined space between objects and human beings. This raises unprecedented questions for researchers and managers alike (Rijsdijk, Hultink, and Diamantopoulos 2007). One specific concern is the impact of the anthropomorphic appearance of domestic robots on consumer adoption. In one study, this research shows that anthropomorphism does not favor the adoption of domestic robots.

Anthropomorphism and Consumer Behavior
Anthropomorphism, usually defined as the attribution of human characteristics and features to nonhuman objects (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007), is an area of growing interest in consumer research (Kim and McGill 2011; Landwehr, McGill, and Herrmann 2011). Theoretically, three processes account for the influence of product anthropomorphism: schema congruence, analogical reasoning and the attribution of human mental capacity (Aggarwal and McGill 2007). Empirical research has shown that the presence of human facial features and expression (eyes and mouth, smiling and frowning) in products leads to more favorable consumer attitudes and behaviors (Kim and McGill 2011) especially in interaction with contextual (framing) or individual (social power) variables.

As to other anatomical features like the presence of limbs (head, neck, legs, arms, and trunk), results are less clear. Social robotics posits that humanoid robots (robots with limbs but without flesh-like skin) would be preferred to machine-like robots. At the same time, people declare that they do not want robots to look like human or to perform tasks performed by human beings (reading books, cooking, interacting with children) (Ray, Mondada, and Siegwart 2008). And experiments show contradictory results (Ho and MacDorman 2010; Mori, MacDorman, and Kageki 2012; Yee, Bailenson, and Rickertsen 2007). However, it is hard to draw conclusions from these experiments because of the presence of confounding effects, the limited size of samples, the focus on tech-oriented people in the experiments, and the unclear descriptions of context of use. Moreover, research has focused on the appreciation of the robot at the expense of adoption behavior.

The goal of this research is to study the impact of anatomical features as sources of anthropomorphism on adoption behavior. In line with dominant theory, the central hypothesis is that the presence of anatomical features has a positive influence on adoption behavior.

Method and Findings
263 working mothers, aged 25-55, were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In each condition there was a photo of a domestic robot with a brief text that presented it as a product that could entertain, teach and look after children. The only difference between conditions was the anatomical appearance of the robot that varied in the level of anthropomorphism (the two anchors being machine-like and human-like with two other robots in between). 233 participants completed questionnaires.

The results of the study do not confirm the hypothesis. Despite significant differences in humanlike appearance of the robots (F(1, 229)=3.432, p=.018), in their perceived personality (F(1, 229)=3.695, p=.013) and in the anxiety they generated (F(1, 229)=3.382, p=.019), anatomical anthropomorphism did not influence context compatibility (F(1, 229)=.146, p=.932), utilitarian attitude (F(1, 229)=.492, p=.688), hedonic attitude (F(1, 229)=1.016, p=.387), ease of use (F(1, 229)=2.274, p=.081) or purchase intention (F(1, 229)=.697, p=.555). Results were similar when computer and mobile phone equipment, familiarity with technology and technology phobia were controlled for.

Only when the binary variable that measures whether interviewee use the Internet on their smartphone was introduced as a factor, did results change. Significant interaction effects between anatomical anthropomorphism and the use of Internet on the smartphone appeared for utilitarian attitude (F(1, 225)=2.699, p=.011), context compatibility (F(1, 225)=2.923, p=.006) and purchase intention (F(1, 225)=3.581, p=.001). The mean scores for the two anchor robots (machinelike and humanlike) did not differ significantly but the means for the two other robots were higher when respondents said they used Internet on their smartphones than when they did not. Our interpretation is that, as domestic robots are moving extensions of smartphones, people that use Internet on their smartphones are able to use these as a reference schema for their evaluation of the robots whilst people that do not have to resort to other stereotypes (machine and human).

Conclusion
From this study, it seems that previous results on the impact of anthropomorphism cannot be extended to domestic robots and to anatomical features. Should this be confirmed, it raises questions as to the processes explaining the impact of anthropomorphism on consumer perceptions. It also raises questions about the strategies of robotic companies that invest thousand millions of dollars in developing humanoid robots, when these do not seem to be preferred by consumers.

REFERENCES

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554/Do You Have to Look Like a Human to Be Smart? An Exploratory Study of the Influence of Anatomy and Expressivity of Domestic Robots
Effects of Different Types of Schematic Support on Item and Associative Memory for Brands in Older Consumers

Praggyan (Pam) Mohanty, Governors State University, USA
S. Ratneshwar, University of Missouri, USA
Moshe Naveh-Benjamin, University of Missouri, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Brand memory is central to brand equity (Keller 1993) (Keller 1993) as well as consumer decision making (Hoyer and Brown 1990; Warlop, Ratneshwar, and van Osselaer 2005; Yoon et al. 2005). It is well established that memory declines with age (Kausler 1994; Salthouse 1991). But episodic memory, that retains contextual information about personally experienced events in one’s life, such as the contents, time, and place of the occurrences (Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield 1979, 215), seems to be especially vulnerable to aging (Light 1991). Given that brand-based experiences with products—whether with the products themselves or marketing communications thereof—get stored in the episodic memory system of the consumer (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch Jr 1991; Kahn and Wansink 2004), the issue of memory deficits in older consumers is particularly problematic for marketers targeting the elderly, a very important consumer segment today.

In this context, an important distinction needs to be made between two types of episodic memory related to brand information, i.e., item memory and associative memory (Clark 1992; Hockley 1991). Note that consumer researchers have overlooked this distinction in the past. Item memory pertains to memory for single units of information, e.g., memory for a brand name or a brand logo graphic individually, whereas associative memory is memory for the co-occurrence of units in a prior event, e.g., memory for a specific brand name and a brand logo graphic together (Old and Naveh-Benjamin 2008). The basic units can be two items; an item and its context; two contextual elements; or more generally, the representation of two mental codes (Naveh-Benjamin 2000). Additionally, and very germane to the present research, it has been shown that aging affects the two types of memory differentially such that memory deficit in older (vs. younger) adults are usually larger in the case of associative recognition memory than item recognition memory (Old and Naveh-Benjamin 2008).

The overarching objective of this paper is to study ways to reduce episodic memory deficits in brand memory in older consumers. Other researchers have investigated the role of schematic support in learning environments to reduce episodic memory deficits in older adults (Arbuckle et al. 1994; Castel 2007). Schematic support refers to the finding that schemas or prior knowledge within a domain can serve to enhance memory by supporting encoding and retrieval processes within that domain (Craik and Bosman 1992). We study the effects of two types of schematic support, meaningfulness of brand elements and relatedness between brand elements, on item and associative recognition memory differences between older and younger consumers. Meaningfulness of a brand element is the extent to which a specific concept is known and represented in a person’s semantic network (Anderson 1983; Collins and Loftus 1975). Relatedness between brand elements, on the other hand, represents an aggregate of the interconnections between two elements in a person’s semantic network (Collins and Loftus 1975). The more properties the two brand elements have in common, and the more links there are between the two elements via these properties, the more closely related are the two elements.

Our research seeks to make several important contributions. First, we introduce the key distinction between item and associative memory to consumer researchers and empirically demonstrate its significance in a branding context. Second, although it has been show in prior studies that schematic support can boost memory performance in older adults, our work helps resolve some major conundrums in the existing literature. The most common type of schematic support that has been studied is related (schema consistent) versus unrelated (schema inconsistent) information (Castel 2007; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2003). But schematic support in the form of meaningfulness of stimuli has not been examined before. In study 1, we hypothesize and show that meaningfulness of brand logo graphics helps attenuate item (but not associative) memory deficits in older consumers. Third, whether schematic support leads to larger improvement in memory performance in older adults (Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2003), or whether they and their younger counterparts benefit equally from schematic support (Verhaeghen, Marcoen, and Goossens 1993), has been a controversial issue (Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, and Ben-Shaul 2002). In study 2, we try and find an explanation for these discrepant findings. Finally, only two studies (Badham and Maylor 2011; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2003) so far have assessed the relative effects of schematic support on item and associative memory. This is the first investigation to make a comprehensive assessment of the effects of two important types of schematic support in attenuating item (vs. associative) memory deficits in elderly consumers, and that too in a branding context.

Study 1 (N = 50) used 2 (older vs. younger consumers, between-subjects) x 2 (associative memory for brand information vs. item memory for brand logo graphics, within-subject) x 2 (more vs. less meaningful brand logo graphics; within-subject) mixed factorial design. The dependent variable was recognition accuracy as measured by the proportion of hits minus false alarms (Law, Hawkins, and Melchior (1994), “Memory for Spatial Layouts in Relation to Age and Schema Typicality,” Psychology and Aging, 9 (3), 467-80.

Study 2, on the other hand, in study 2 (N=69), using a similar procedure as study 1, we find support for a statistically significant three-way interaction between meaningfulness of brand logo graphics, type of memory, and age group (F (1, 68) = 5.42, η² = 0.10, p < .01). We show that meaningfulness of brand elements attenuates deficits in item memory for brand elements but not deficits in associative memory in older (vs. younger) consumers. On the other hand, in study 2 (N=69), using a similar procedure as study 1, we find support for a statistically significant three-way interaction between type of memory (item memory vs. associative memory), age group (elderly consumers vs. younger consumers), and relatedness between brand elements (unrelated vs. related) (F (1, 67) = 7.30, η² = 0.1, p < .01). However, relatedness between brand logo graphics and brand names reduces differences in associative (but not item) memory in older versus younger consumers.

REFERENCES


Charities, Connections, and Costs: Why and When Moral Identity Triggers Preferences to Donate Time versus Money
Eric Levy, University of Cambridge, UK
Stephanie Finnel, University of Maryland, USA
Americus Reed II, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Karl Aquino, University of British Columbia, CA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In this article, we propose that motivation to connect with others is a key driver of the effect of moral identity on preference for giving time rather than money. This identity-based motivation (Oyserman 2007) is expected to have its strongest effect when time is costly or psychologically unpleasant to give. When time is relatively costless to give (e.g., when time is abundant), or when giving is relatively pleasant, virtually anyone should be willing to give it. However, when giving time is relatively scarce or unpleasant, consumers are likely to need an additional impetus such as moral identity to motivate them to give time rather than money. Moreover, the effect of activated moral identity on preference for giving time should be strongest for those who are high in trait-based moral identity, since their moral self possesses a higher activation potential (Reed et al. 2009).

Hypothesis 1: Giving time makes consumers feel more connected to aid recipients than giving money does, particularly when moral identity is activated.

We argue that it is when giving time is costly or unpleasant that activating moral identity will most strongly trigger a preference to give time vs. money. After all, when time is easy to give, most consumers will likely give it. It is when time is costly or unpleasant to give that consumers will need additional motivation to give it – and moral identity can provide that motivation (see Oyserman 2007).

Hypothesis 2: Activating moral identity will lead to a preference for giving time vs. money primarily when giving time is scarce.

Hypothesis 3: Activating moral identity will lead to a preference for giving time vs. money primarily when giving time is psychologically unpleasant.

Prior research has shown that consumers are more responsive to a situational cue that activates an identity if they hold the identity (LeBoeuf, Shafir, and Bayuk 2010; Reed 2004). To further confirm that our effects are driven by identity-based motivation (Oyserman 2007), we test whether a situational cue activating moral identity interacts with individual differences in moral identity centrality to drive preferences to give time vs. money.

Hypothesis 4: Activating moral identity will lead to a preference for giving time vs. money when trait-based moral identity is high, relative to when it is low.

Study 1 tests H1 and H2. 268 participants (104 males, 162 females, 2 preferred not to answer) were randomly assigned to a cell in a 2 (Moral Identity Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 (Time Scarcity and Money Abundant vs. Time Abundant and Money Scarce) between-subjects design. They first completed a moral identity activation task and then an ostensibly unrelated donation task.

Results

Donation Preferences. We found a moral identity activation x scarcity interaction, F(1, 238) = 9.21, p<.01, Partial η² = .04. When time was scarce and money was abundant, participants in the moral identity activated condition preferred giving time rather than money more so than participants in the moral identity not activated condition, F(1, 238) = 8.29, p<.01, Partial η² = .03. However, preferences for giving time vs. money were similar across the moral identity activation conditions when time was abundant and money was scarce, F(1, 238) = 0.88, n.s. This result confirms H2.

Connection to Aid Recipients. We ran a hierarchical regression predicting felt connection to aid recipients, and found a main effect of gender, such that women felt more connected to aid recipients than men did, b = 0.50, t(233) = 2.65, p<.01, Partial η² in corresponding ANOVA = .03. A main effect of donation preference also emerged, such that participants felt more connected to aid recipients as they expressed a stronger preference to give time rather than money, b = 0.31, t(233) = 4.15, p<.001, Partial η² in corresponding ANOVA = .13. This effect was qualified by a donation preference x moral identity activation interaction, b = 0.30, t(233) = 2.73, p<.01, Partial η² in corresponding ANOVA = .03. This result confirms H1.

Study 2 tests H3. Participants were led to believe that giving time involved relatively neutral tasks (e.g., filing papers at a hospital) or relatively unpleasant ones (e.g., emptying bedpans at a hospital). Drawn from a university behavioral lab panel, 238 participants (88 males, 144 females) were randomly assigned to a cell in a 2 (Moral Identity Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 (Volunteering Time High vs. Low on Unpleasantness) between-subjects design. The study consisted of two ostensibly unrelated tasks: the moral identity activation task from Study 2 and a donation task. After these and other unrelated studies, participants were debriefed and paid $10.

Results

Main Analysis. We ran an ANOVA predicting preferences for giving time vs. money. The predictors included all relevant control variables from study 1, the moral identity activation condition, the unpleasantness condition, and the moral identity activation x unpleasantness interaction. The predicted moral identity activation x unpleasantness interaction emerged, F(1, 201) = 7.73, p<.01, Partial η² = .04. When volunteering time was high on unpleasantness, activating moral identity increased preferences for giving time vs. money, F(1, 201) = 6.74, p<.05, Partial η² = .03. However, when volunteering time was low on unpleasantness, activating moral identity had no effect on preferences for giving time vs. money, F(1, 201) = 0.45, n.s. This result confirms H3.

Study 3 tested H4, that activating moral identity will lead to greater preferences for giving time vs. money for people higher in trait-based moral identity, relative to those lower in trait-based moral identity. Ninety-two participants (41 males, 51 females) from a university behavioral lab took part in a study with a 2 (Moral Identity Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 (Moral Identity Centrality High vs. Low) between-subjects design.

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Results and Discussion
To predict preferences to give time vs. money, we ran a hierarchical regression. The predictors were the control variables, the main effects of moral identity activation and moral identity centrality, and the moral identity activation x moral identity centrality interaction. As predicted, a moral identity activation x moral identity centrality interaction emerged, $b = 2.03$, $t(61) = 2.60$, $p<.05$, Partial $\eta^2$ in corresponding ANOVA = .10.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Sunlight is known to enhance positive affect. Increased sunlight in the spring and summer or on sunny days can boost optimism and positive affective responses, resulting in increased helping behavior (Cunningham 1979), greater life satisfaction (Schwarz and Clore 1983), and stock-market upswings (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi 2003). What is less widely known is that this positive relationship between sunshine and positive mood is not always supported, and sometimes is even reversed. Watson (2000) analyzed diary reports from students in Texas during either the fall or the spring and found no consistent effect of amount of sunshine on any of the daily mood variables. Furthermore, the assumed positive relationship between sunlight and positive affect is sometimes even reversed. For example, findings show that the peak incidence of suicides occurs in late spring and summer and fewest suicides occur in winter months (for a review, see Kevan 1980).

In sum, cross four experiments, we found light increases people’s perception of ambient warmth, which in turn activates their hot emotional system, leading to intensified affective reactions in all kinds of situations. Across different domains, ranging from evaluation of words to perceptions of aggressiveness and sexiness, and to choice of food spiciness levels, we found light intensified both experienced and anticipated affective response, and consequently, influenced judgment and choice in a variety of contexts. The findings are important for several reasons. First, they provide a theoretical framework that can reconcile the inconsistent findings in literature regarding the influence of sunshine on people’s affect, some showed that sunshine (ambient brightness) intensified positive affect and others showed that it amplified negative affect. Second, more importantly, they show that one format of sensory input (light) influenced a wide range of judgments that are not obviously or directly related to it. The results thus imply that different sensory inputs combine to influence each other. Sensation of light increases feeling of warmth, and influences judgments just as warmth does. A third substantial contribution is that these data show that visual input of ambient brightness can impact judgments and decision making by activating the hot emotional system. The implications of this finding are important, because they are the first to imply that the visual-perception system and the emotional systems are integrated.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The issue of protecting consumer privacy has continued to grow in prominence over the past several years. Companies have grown increasingly sensitive to privacy concerns as the Federal Trade Commission has actively pursued companies that have flagrantly violated the privacy rights of citizens, such as the case with Google's $22.5 million fine for tracking unaware Safari browser users online. Yet at the same time, most individual consumers freely share information online that can get them into trouble, from General Petraeus' reliance on Gmail to conduct his scandalous correspondence to employees fired for Facebook posts or tweets complaining about their employer or showcasing them in compromising circumstances. Although every change in privacy settings from Facebook generates considerable press, the majority of Facebook users who keep their profiles public reveal important, personal information that can be used for identity fraud—such as their birthday, e-mail addresses, and prior school names (Carsm 2012).

Thus we are faced with an interesting paradox when it comes to how people treat their private information. Although most people agree that protecting their personal information is important and that it should be protected, they readily share information in public forums or for relatively small discounts or to simply get through a transactional process—the “privacy paradox” (Norberg et al. 2007). This research examines why people treat this resource in such an inconsistent fashion.

Previous research has examined this paradox from several perspectives. There are individual differences in propensity to disclose information (Jourard and Lawakow 1958, Westin 1991). There are also risks to sharing personal information, particularly in any digital forum, and people do not always appropriately weigh the potential risks associated with sharing personal information if they feel some immediate benefit to doing so (Acquisti 2004). Alter and Oppenheimer (2009) found that simply by making fonts easier to read, people were more likely to disclose the personal flaws and opinions. Disfluency led to heightened perceptions of risk, which decreased rates of disclosure.

Other more recent work has illustrated that context effects have a very powerful influence on information disclosure. John, Acquisti, and Loewenstein (2009) found that the method of inquiry (direct versus indirect), visual appearance of a website (professional versus unprofessional), and priming privacy concerns can all influence the disclosure rates for quite personal, intrusive questions. Other work by the same researchers demonstrated that disclosure rates are influenced by perceptions of disclosure by others and the order in which the questions are presented in terms of level of intrusiveness (Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein 2012). One of the reasons that disclosure rates fall prey to such context effects is that the valuation of personal information is ambiguous (Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein 2009). This research specifically examines the sources of ambiguity in valuing personal information that contributes to such effects.

From a transactional perspective, people have several commonly used sources of currency—time, money, and more recently, their personal information, which can be exchanged for discounts, personalized services, and other benefits. Previous research has illustrated that both money (Amir, Ariely, and Carmon 2008) and time (Leclerc, Schmitt, and Dubé 1995) are often ambiguously valued when translated into utility. However, time tends to be the more ambiguously valued of the two, which results in effects such as a lack of a sunk time effect, due individual challenges in accounting for time (Soman 2001), or more positive evaluations of negative experiences when paying in time instead of money, due to more easy rationalization of time-related expenses (Okada and Hoch 2004). The difference in how people value these two resources also depends quite critically on perceived surplus, or “resource slack,” as described by Zauberman and Lynch (2005). Discount rates for investments of time tend to be higher than those of money because people believe that time will be more plentiful in the future, relative to money. However, generally speaking, people are conditioned to think of both time and money as scarce resources of some value due to constraints imposed by budget (for money) or available hours in a day (for time.)

In contrast, I contend that because personal information does not operate with such obvious constraints, as the same piece of information can be disclosed multiple times to various parties, people are not naturally inclined to think of their information as a constrained resource relative to other resources like time or money. Furthermore, simply thinking of personal information as a resource or as valuable does not decrease rates of disclosure for such information. However, when consumers are primed to think of their personal information as a valuable, constrained resource, disclosure rates decrease.

Experiments 1 and 2 examine personal information as a resource relative to time and money. Experiment 1 illustrates that while people are reluctant to share their personal information with strangers or exchange it for goods and services, they do not see it as a valuable or constrained resource relative to time or money. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the discount rate for investments made with personal information is even higher than that of time, which is higher than that of money, further underscoring that personal information is typically not thought of as a constrained resource. Experiments 3a and 3b show that relative to a control condition or a condition where participants are primed to think of their personal information as a valuable resource, those that are primed to think of their personal information as a valuable, constrained resource are significantly less likely to indicate they would disclose information about undesirable behaviors (experiment 3a) and less likely to actually admit to having ever engaged in these same undesirable behaviors (experiment 3b). This research has important implications for the ways in which consumers can be educated to think about their personal information in a way that reduces disclosure of personal information that could have negative personal implications.

REFERENCES


Effect of Price Estimate Precision on Pre- and Post-Outcome Satisfaction
Melissa Cinelli, University of Mississippi, USA
Lifeng Yang, University of Mississippi, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Recent research on the precision of provided anchors suggests that consumers adjust less when a provided anchor is represented on a fine-grained scale than on a coarse scale (Janiszewski & Uy 2008; Zhang & Schwarz 2012). As a result, consumers are more confident that a product will deliver on its promises, and are therefore more likely to select a product, when the promise is conveyed in fine-grained units (Zhang & Schwarz 2012). Zhang and Schwarz (2012) find that consumers prefer products whose attributes are expressed precisely (vs. imprecisely), and conclude that consumers have more confidence in outcomes when companies provide fine grained estimates, and that precision may therefore be beneficial to the firm. While Zhang and Schwarz focus on quantities of time, one estimate that consumers routinely receive from firms is a price estimate. We examine how the precision of a price estimate affects satisfaction with the estimate and beliefs about future outcomes. Further, we examine what happens when the actual price differs from the price estimate.

Conceptually replicating the findings of Zhang and Schwarz (2012) and Uy and Janiszewski (2008), we find that consumers who receive a precise price estimate adjust less from this estimate when predicting a final price than do consumers who receive an imprecise estimate. Additionally, we demonstrate that precise price estimates result in narrower ranges of believed possible outcomes. More specifically, while the precision of the anchor does not affect the lower boundary of the range of possible outcomes, consumers believe that the highest price they may possibly pay is significantly higher when they receive an imprecise (rounded) price estimate. We also demonstrate that consumers prefer precise price estimates and that satisfaction with the estimate appears to spill over onto general attitudes toward the retailer, as consumer report more positive attitudes toward the retailer after receiving a precise price estimate. Finally, despite consumer preferences for precise estimates, we provide evidence that providing a precise estimate can backfire. Specifically, we find that when the final price exceeds the estimated price, consumers are more dissatisfied when they originally received a precise estimate, perhaps stemming from their beliefs that this outcome is less fair.

At the price estimate stage, we replicate the findings of Zhang and Schwarz (forthcoming). Specifically, precise price estimates appear to lead consumers to adjust less when settling on an anticipated price. While the precision of the estimate did not affect participants’ estimates of the lowest conceivable price for their car repairs, participants who received imprecise estimates believed the highest conceivable price to be significantly higher than participants who received a precise estimate. Additionally, it appears that consumers prefer more specific information when navigating an uncertain service interaction—participants who received a precise estimate were more satisfied with the estimate, and the service interaction as a whole, than were participants who received an imprecise estimate. Combined, these findings suggest that service providers and retailers of variably priced goods would benefit from providing the most precise price estimate possible.

However, when the final price does not match a provided price estimate, our results suggest that the opposite may be true: service providers may be better served by providing imprecise price estimates. When the final price is lower than estimated, the precision of the original estimate does not matter—consumers are always happy and the final price seems fair. However, when the final price comes in above the original estimate, consumers who received a precise price estimate believe the final price to be less fair, are less satisfied with the final price, and have lower overall attitudes towards the service provider.

Zhang and Schwarz (2012) invoke Gricean maxims to explain consumers’ pattern of adjustments from precise anchors—an assumption of the maxim of quantity leads to the inference that a precisely provided price estimate has more thought behind it (and should therefore be closer to the actual outcome than an imprecise price estimate). In our study, the precise price estimate was lower than the precise price estimate ($381 vs. $400) and the two estimates were provided between subjects—participants were unaware that others were receiving different estimates. In practice, however, there are circumstances where individuals receive separate estimates of the same quantity, and this information may be shared. For example, two coworkers may compare company-provided estimates of upcoming performance bonuses or a married couple may compare two unique quotes they received for the same service. Given consumers’ preferences for precise price estimates, the question arises as to whether a consumer would prefer a higher (but more precise) estimate over a lower (but less precise estimate). We are currently working to examine this question.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to reduce social-desirability-driven distortion in consumer surveys that takes advantage of the increasing availability of social networks. The approach is based on prior research suggesting that consumers express their identity through the choices they make (Belk 1988; Berger & Heath 2007) and that this choice behavior is typically easily observable to their friends (Kenny & Acitelli 2001; Kurtz et al. 2008; Mikulincer & Nachshon 1991). We propose that friends’ knowledge about each other’s preferences and past behavior can be used to incentivize individuals to provide more accurate survey responses. Instead of merely evoking the social context, as in prior work such as that by Tice et al. (1995), the proposed method incorporates the social context in a pure coordination game (Schelling 1969). We examine this approach via a novel Facebook application, where respondents are rewarded if their characterization of their own behavior matches what others believe that characterization will be.

In our proposed coordination game, a respondent and a number of his/her friends independently answer the same survey questions, but from different viewpoints. The respondent answers a question about him/herself (e.g., “Do you exercise regularly?”) while a friend answers the question from the perspective of the respondent (e.g., “Does ___ exercise regularly?”). The greater the correspondence between these independent responses, the greater the probability of receiving a monetary reward. An increase in truth-telling is predicted if individuals’ behavior is observable to others and particularly pronounced for individuals with higher closeness to a game partner. Due to consumers’ self-expression tendency (Belk 1988) and by communicating subtle information about themselves to others (Berger & Heath 2007), observability of a certain behavior is predicted to enhance detection of the truth in the coordination game. Thus, we predict higher levels of truth-telling for higher levels of observability and higher closeness among participants.

In a first study, we examined the influence of observability and closeness among friends on the effectiveness of the game. We recruited 196 participants from a major university for this purpose. Participants were asked to respond to a random set of 20 out of 40 health-related questions on 7-point Likert scales. These questions reflected socially desirable behaviors but varied by the level of observability as assessed in a pretest of 207 subjects from the same population. After answering 20 health-related items and completing a filler task, respondents learned the mechanics of the coordination game. They were asked to invite a subset of their Facebook friends by using our Facebook application, knowing that one of them will be asked to serve as the observer. In the game, a respondent answered the same questions again, but in the context of the coordination game. This within-subjects design allowed us to measure the answers of the respondents to the same questions twice, first in the hypothetical context, and second in the context of the coordination game. We calculated the difference between the answers to the second and first part as a measure of this reduction in bias. We calculated this measure at the question and individual level. This resulted in a dataset containing 3,920 cross-clustered observations. In line with our predictions, answers in the game-condition were significantly lower compared to the standard survey situation. Importantly, we find that both the observability of the question and closeness among friends have a positive influence on the performance of the game. As predicted, we found that the bias-reducing effect of the game is more pronounced in situations of high closeness among friends and high observability at the question level.

In a next study, we explicitly tested the impact of wrong beliefs on respondent’s answers. As the game setting provides incentives to match any answers of friends, it can also defer the respondent from telling the truth if he or she thinks the answers of the friends are either too optimistic or pessimistic. We recruited 121 participants from an online consumer panel for this study. Four fifths of the participants were routed into a hypothetical survey situation in which they were randomly assigned to either the control condition, where they simply responded to the survey questions in regular fashion, or to one of three conditions where they were introduced to the social approach. In these three conditions we manipulated the direction of beliefs to either be higher (friends think I behave healthier than I really do), lower (friends think I behave less healthy than I really do), or equal to the respondent’s self-perception (friends know my true health-related behavior). A fifth condition served as a benchmark where we observed participants’ actual behavior in the task of interest. As the task, we asked participants to make a choice between a health- and a fun-related video, expecting socially biased responding to result in an inflated choice of the health-related video. In the benchmark condition, respondents were told that they would actually have to watch the chosen video online. As expected and in line with our hypotheses, we found inflated survey responses in the hypothetical survey (the control condition) as well as in the situation where friends hold inflated beliefs of a respondent. Importantly, participants playing with friends holding aligned beliefs matched the actual truth as assessed by comparison with the benchmark condition.

Overall, we found converging evidence from a series of both field and lab studies that suggest less biased self-reports if health-related behavior is surveyed in the context of a social coordination game which makes the tacit knowledge of social networks regarding one’s true health-related behavior salient. Accurate information about survey respondents’ self-reports on their socially desirable behavior is of major interest for physicians, health organizations, or governments, and gained considerable attention in recent consumer research (Campbell & Mohr 2011). It is well known, however, that consumers do not always answer such surveys truthfully because health related questions can induce socially desirable responding (Crowne & Marlowe 1960; Kristiansen & Harding 1984). Evidence shows that individuals tend to over report their physical activity and under report the amount of food intake (Adams et al. 2005), a practice that is believed to have considerably increased during the last two decades (McFerran et al. 2010). Thus, investigating ways to debias survey or stated preference data has a long tradition in marketing research (e.g., Miller et al. 2011). In this paper, we propose a novel approach to reduce distortion in health-related surveys that takes advantage of the increasing availability of social networks. Our approach is based on the theory of the extended self (Belk 1988), which postulates that a respondent’s behavior is articulated through
previous knowledge of a respondent’s friends to incentivize truth-telling in a coordination game setting. Specifically, we ask respondents to imagine participating in a pure coordination game (Schelling 1969) where they are rewarded if their assessment of their own behavior matches what observers believe they will respond.

In our proposed game, a respondent and the friends simultaneously answer the same Likert scale survey question from different viewpoints. The respondent answers a survey question about himself (e.g. “Do you exercise regularly?”) while observers answer the same question from the perspective of the respondent (e.g. “Does the respondent XY exercise regularly?”). If both provide a similar answer, they increase the likelihood of receiving a payoff. Our game mirrors what is known as pure coordination game in the behavioral game theory literature (Schelling 1969). In these games, players simultaneously decide on their strategy/answer, whereas no interaction between them is allowed or possible. An equal payoff is provided to both players if their answers match. Players receive no payoff if their answers diverge. Hence, if the respondent believes that there is a probability higher than chance that the observer will pick the true answer then it can be theoretically shown, that the game will lead to a greater motive to tell the truth. It follows from the previous description that the game can only provide incentives for truth-telling if the observer knows the truth to a certain degree. Knowledge about the truth will be greater to the extent that the behavior recorded of the respondent is visible to others. According to the notion of the extended self and the self-expression tendency of consumers (Belk 1988), behavior is relatively visible at least in certain domains. Individuals’ possessions, the products they buy, and their personal preferences communicate subtle information about their desired self to others (Belk 1988; Berger & Heath 2007). These subtle signals are oftentimes correctly decoded from publicly consumed products and inferences are drawn regarding the possessors’ individual traits and characteristics (Berger & Heath 2007; Ferraro, Escalas, & Bettman 2011).

This will be particularly the case if the behavior in question is generally observable to others. Hence, we put forward the following first hypothesis: H1: The more observable a surveyed behavior is, the higher the external validity of answers provided in a coordination game setting. However, the effectiveness of the proposed coordination game is not only dependent on the degree of observability of a respective behavior but also on the closeness among friends, as close friends are more likely to observe a focal respondent’s behavior as sensitive information is shared primarily among close friends (Kenny & Acitelli 2001). Publicly observable behavior is a necessary precondition within our proposed truth-telling game to draw inferences about a consumers’ behavior. Based on previous research, physical activity and health-related behavior was shown to be generally publicly observable for others (Troast et al. 2002). With regard to the degree of closeness among friends, it is noteworthy that it has been shown recently that friends derive accurate estimates of a focal persons’ attitude and behavior (Kurtz et al. 2008) due to the fact that friendship ties are inherently constituted by self-disclosure among friends (Derlega et al. 1976; Mikulincer & Nachshon 1991). Hence, we propose: H2: The higher the degree of closeness between the respondent and the observer, the higher the external validity of answers provided in a coordination game setting.

Based on a series of these four studies, we provide novel evidence that this approach makes people more likely to admit to socially undesirable truths about their health behavior. In addition, we define three conditions under which the proposed social approach can improve truth-telling: (1) if the respondent’s behavior is observable, (2) if the observer is represented by a close friend, and (3), if the focal respondent’s and observer’s beliefs about the focal respondents’ behavior are aligned. Finally, we find that our proposed approach can also be applied to choice questions in addition to Likert scale questions, stressing the generalizability of the approach to different survey formats. A limitation of our studies is that data collection in the field studies was performed over Facebook. We also acknowledge that the performance of the game might differ in other social environments and with survey questions from other subject areas than health-related behavior. However, due to the consistency and magnitude of our revealed effects, we expect results from other contexts to be in line with our findings. Our research particularly addresses a recent call for more elaborate research methods on measuring consumer’s behavior in ubiquitous online environments such as Facebook.

REFERENCES


Extensive Abstract

Consumer cues are everywhere. Given that situational cues can momentarily activate associated identities and that once salient, these identities can subsequently influence behavior (e.g., Oyserman 2009), it becomes imperative to understand how a salient consumer identity may influence behavior and how the salience of this identity is managed. For this investigation, we draw on identity theory and on boundary theory, a recent extension of identity theory (Ashforth et al. 2001, Clark 2000). Specifically, we propose that individuals erect and maintain consumer boundaries to manage when and where a consumer identity is situationally cued. When individuals have strong consumer boundaries, they should be less responsive to situational cues. In contrast, when boundaries are weak, even a subtle consumer cue may heighten the salience of a consumer identity. To test these predictions, we (a) develop a scale of consumer boundary strength, (b) propose that exchange orientation is at least one important indicator of consumer identity salience, and (c) demonstrate that the strength of an individual’s consumer boundaries moderates the effect of a consumer cue on consumer identity salience, as indicated by an increase in exchange orientation.

Study 1

To develop a scale of consumer boundary strength, we began by conducting depth interviews. Specifically, we asked 9 participants to find images that express “what being a consumer means to you.” Based on these interviews, we developed a list of 77 potential items. Eventually, the list was reduced to 44 items measuring three types of consumer boundaries: psychological boundaries (16 items), physical boundaries (16 items), and monetary boundaries (12 items).

Study 2

To reduce the items identified in study 1, 292 undergraduate students completed our measure of consumer boundaries in exchange for course credit (46% female). All items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), with higher values indicating stronger boundaries. The 44 consumer boundary items were subject to a number of exploratory factor analyses using an oblique rotation. The final set of items revealed a three-factor solution (eigenvalues > 1), with each factor mapping onto one type of consumer boundary. Specifically, factor I was labeled psychological boundaries and includes the items, “Emails from my favorite stores are a welcome distraction from other tasks” (r), “Most of my bookmarked websites are online stores” (r), “I keep pictures of things I want to buy in places where I will frequently see them” (r), and “I subscribe to a lot of catalogues and/or store emails” (r). Factor II was labeled physical boundaries and includes the items, “I keep my shopping trips as short as possible,” “I only shop when there is something I need,” “I often go to the mall just because I like to shop” (r), and “I go to the mall just to window shop—even though there’s nothing I need” (r). A third factor, labeled monetary boundaries, includes the items, “I only go shopping when I have money to spend,” “I only let myself think about shopping when I know I can afford it,” and “My budget plays a big part in determining when I go shopping.” All the reliabilities are above the acceptable cutoff of .70, ranging from .78 to .80.

Study 3

Study 3 evaluates the underlying structure of our measurement model (N = 160 undergraduate students). To assess which model best fit our data, we compared three models of consumer boundaries. Model 1 assumes all items are reflective of a single latent construct. Model 2 assumes three separate, uncorrelated factors. Model 3 assumes three separate but correlated factors. A number of model fit statistics suggest model 3 is the only model that demonstrates acceptable fit. The fit of model 3 is further supported by a direct comparison of the models’ chi-square statistics (model 3’s $X^2(41) = 55.80$ vs. model 1’s $X^2(44) = 203.80$ and model 2’s $X^2(44) = 104.77$, p-values < .01). Thus, it appears consumer boundaries are best thought of as three distinct, but correlated, types of boundaries.

Study 4

Study 4 was designed to assess the nomological validity of the scale. To do this, we investigated correlations between consumer boundary strength and theoretically relevant precursors and outcomes (e.g., materialism and compulsive buying). Our sample consisted of 157 undergraduate students who participated in exchange for partial course credit. All correlations were in the hypothesized direction, thus indicating adequate nomological validity.

Study 5

Study 5 used an experimental design to test the reliability and predictive validity of our consumer boundary strength measure. Specifically, we find that framing the experiment as a consumer vs. citizen task increased participants’ exchange orientation, as measured by Murstein et al’s (1987) 16-item scale, but only for participants with weak consumer boundaries (1.5 SD below the mean; $M_{\text{consumer}} = 5.15$, $M_{\text{citizen}} = 4.56$; $t(179) = 31.23$, $p < .01$). When participants had strong consumer boundaries (1.5 SD above the mean), the framing manipulation did not influence their exchange orientation ($M_{\text{consumer}} = 4.07$, $M_{\text{citizen}} = 4.18$; $t(179) = -1.06$, $p > .20$).

Conclusion

This research explores the boundaries individuals erect around being a consumer (study 1), develops a scale to measure individual variance in consumer boundary strength (study 2-4), and demonstrates that this measure moderates the relationship between a consumer cue and consumer identity salience, as indicated by a heightened exchange orientation (study 5). For consumer behavior, this research presents a framework for studying the influence of consumer identity salience in both consumer and non-consumer domains. As a field, we have long acknowledged that we are a society of consumers—it is time we move beyond consumer boundaries and begin to explore how being a consumer affects everything else.

References

Table 1: Study 3 Model Fit Statistics and Study 4 Descriptives, Reliabilities, and Correlations Between Types of Consumer Boundaries and Related Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychological boundaries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical boundaries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary boundaries</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>-2.3**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impulse buying</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-.66**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsive buying</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45.34</td>
<td>13.12</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>-.57**</td>
<td>-.42**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spendthrift-tightwad</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.96</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.54**</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>-.41**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.66**</td>
<td>.64**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer mindfulness</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>-.46**</td>
<td>-.53**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**indicates significance at p < .01; *indicates significance at p < .05

All items were measured on a 7-point scale, with the exception of compulsive buying which used a 5-point scale and spendthrift-tightwad which used different scales depending on the item.

**Scale value is mean of items, with the exception of compulsive buying and spendthrift-tightwad which are the sum of all items.


Fighting For a Cause or Against It: A Longitudinal Perspective
Keith Botner, University of Utah, USA
Arul Mishra, University of Utah, USA
Himanshu Mishra, University of Utah, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
How do companies persuade consumers to buy their products? They have many ways such as advertising, sales promotion, free product trials, etc. However, non-profit organizations face a unique challenge. While their mission is also in persuading consumers to contribute, many times they cannot use the usual means such as advertisements and sales promotion tools available for for-profit organizations (Dixon, 1997). Given that approximately two of every three households donate an annual average of over $2,000 to charities of their choice (Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2007), the competition for charity dollars is quite stiff for a bulk of charitable organizations with unfortunately few or no conventional marketing tools from which to avail.

Hence, the unique challenge faced by non-profits is that they need to persuade people to donate without many of the tried and tested methods of persuasion at their disposal. Many times, the only method that non-profits can use to communicate their aims and persuade consumers to contribute is in their name. Unlike for-profit entities that try to come up with memorable or catchy names, we see non-profits coming up with longer but more descriptive names that try to communicate the aims of the cause in the best possible manner. For instance, “Mothers Against Drunk Driving” captures all the emotions of the cause and hence, the name itself acts as a critical (and at times the only) persuasion tool. We see mainly three types of names for charities—positive, negative or neutral frames.

Given that a charity’s name frame plays such an important role in garnering contributions, how can charities use this tool to optimize value? Could the nature of these names—that is, their positive or negative frame— Influence the revenue generated by charitable organizations, and hence their survival and growth? Specific research questions are worth exploring. First, would a positively framed charity garner greater contributions versus a negatively framed charity over time, and might this difference vary in the short versus the long run? Second, how does the positive or negative framing of the charity name influence the survivability of the charity? If differences do exist, then what theoretical mechanisms can help explain? The aim of this research is to answer these questions.

Existing literature at times gives conflicting answers to the questions raised, especially in the long run. There is greater agreement in short run with extant research suggesting a negative frame will be stronger than a positive frame. Research has demonstrated that negative messages have greater sway than positive messages, all else equal (Petty, 1986; Smith and Petty, 1996). In the long run, however, one of two outcomes could occur. While it is possible that the negative continues to outweigh the positive frame over time, the converse is possible. Briefly, research on loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty, 1986), positive-negative asymmetry and negativity bias (Rozin and Royzman, 2001) would suggest negative retaining its persuasive strength in the long run too. However, from a different stream of research, popularly known as the Mobilization-Minimization hypothesis (MMH) (Taylor, 1991), one could infer the converse with the negative frame appearing stronger in the short run, but soon minimized in favor of a long run preference for the positive (also see Matlin and Stang, 1978).

Applying predictions from previous theories to our research, we are specifically interested in examining whether a negative frame (in terms of the charity’s name) will perform well in the short term as well as the long term. That is, one prediction would suggest that the same pattern would hold in the short term and long term, while the second prediction would suggest that the pattern is likely to reverse in the long-term. In order to test these opposing predictions we considered two variables in survival and revenue. We utilized Hierarchical Linear Modeling to examine the pattern of revenues over time and survival analysis to study which types of charities were likely to survive in the long run. In order to find answers to these questions and to find out which theoretical mechanism might be at work (negativity bias versus MMH) we used as data the key financial performance measures and firm attributes as submitted by all tax-exempt nonprofit organizations to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) spanning a ten year period, gathered and compiled by The Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS).

In this research, we find that the likelihood of survival is statistically greater for positive versus negative charities after controlling for key covariates. Additionally, after accounting for the possibility of a self-selection bias attributed to a charity’s naming, we show statistically greater revenue growth over time for positive (versus negative) charities, providing further evidence in support of a positive framed charity’s greater ability to sustain long-term performance. Thus, both examinations show a greater influence from positive versus negative frames over time.

This research presents theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, our research first informs extant persuasion research on the influence of positive and negative framing on persuasion and its longevity. Second, we inform the theoretically opposing predictions regarding the lasting nature of negative versus positive messages made by ELM and MMH. Third, findings inform how a charity’s framing can influence an individual’s altruistic behavior differently in the short and long run. From a practical perspective, these findings give cue to charities—or any organization for that matter—in selecting a frame based on their strategic aims; that is, whether they strive for more immediate or long-term returns. Additionally, our research illustrates the importance of using longitudinal studies to understand the various factors that have a temporal influence.

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Collective Moral Identity Projects: Authentic Brand Users Anti-Counterfeit Framework
Anna Jansson Vredeveld, University of Connecticut, USA
William T. Ross, Jr., University of Connecticut, USA
Robin A. Coulter, University of Connecticut, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The concept of moral identity has received considerable interest by consumer behavior scholars in the past decade (Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). This is not surprising considering the intuitively appealing notion that consumers may construct their identities and act in accordance with what they believe are typical characteristics of being a good and honest person (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007). Although the identity relevance of morality is difficult to contest, scholars have argued that consumer movements dedicated to ethical consumption are considered too extreme to have any real effect on everyday consumption behavior (Devinney, Auger, and Eckhardt 2010). However, brand community research suggests that morality is central even when the main purpose of the community revolves around a consumption object such as a brand (Luedicke, Thompson, and Giesler 2010). We extend research on moral identity and ethical consumption by exploring the role of collective moral identity in an online consumption community.

Specifically, in this research we draw upon social movement theory (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Snow et al. 1986), moral identity theory (Reed et al. 2007), and theories on social norm construction (Goffman 1974; Fine 2001) to explore how authentic brand users construct collective moral identity around the specific cause of “anti-counterfeits”. The context of counterfeits is interesting because counterfeits represent a threat to the authentic brand user’s self-identity through perceived brand signal poaching (Berger and Ward 2010; Commuri 2009), but also a broader moral identity threat as counterfeits can be seen as unethical or damaging to society. In order to explore the implications of multiple identity threats, we specifically investigate the scripted social norm negotiation that occurs within the online community to shed light on the processes by which members construct and maintain individual moral identity while bridging multiple normative frameworks. For example, we investigate what happens when social norms constructed within the community are challenged by social norms that govern behavior in other social interactions, such as when an authentic brand user is faced with an opportunity to inform a friend that the gift received from a family member is a “fake”. Consequently, this research furthers our understanding of both individual and collective moral identity and the negotiation that concurrently creates and facilitates legitimation of authentic (i.e., non-counterfeit) brand use.

We employed netnographic analysis (Kozinets 2002) to explore the collective and embedded nature of authentic brand users’ moral identity projects. The specific online community selected as a netnographic site is an online blog and forum website dedicated to luxury branded fashion accessories, including Chanel and Louis Vuitton. This particular research context is interesting because branded accessories are highly visible and symbolic, thereby allowing us to study a context in which social norms for legitimate brand use and the appropriateness of brand signals are likely to be very important to the consumer. Specific threads related to counterfeits were downloaded, organized and analyzed and then compared to more general posts in related topic areas to ascertain themes related to both legitimate brand use and the community members differentiation strategies from those who don’t use/like their favorite brand or those who use counterfeits. The threads and posts were coded and analyzed using NVivo 10 software.

The process by which norms are institutionalized has been labeled ‘framing’ (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 291) and the frames constructed within the community can become “guiding doings” that exert corrective control within that social context (Goffman 1974, 22). We find that although the ethical in the consumption is easily distinguished and underscored in community scripts (i.e., buying counterfeits is bad for society), the social normative framework used by the community is highly nuanced in terms of different nested identity threats, thereby blurring the oppositional boundaries between “us” and “them” and what is considered legitimate usage of the authentic brand. Different frames related to ethical consumption, brand authenticity, and identity protection are constructed by the community members and serve as an overall framework for social norm construction and negotiation. Hence, this framework is important because it provides the foundation for both collective and individual moral identity projects within the community.

Importantly, different social normative frames serve different purposes in terms of mobilizing resources to the anti-counterfeit cause and to regulate behavior both within and outside the community. For example, by positioning authentic brand users as “ethical consumers”, the community can create scripted social norms that regulate interactions with outside marketing agents, such as shop owners and websites (e.g., eBay). Interestingly, however, the “ethical” is not enough to truly legitimize authentic brand use. Thus, to achieve such brand use legitimation, we find that community members need to draw upon more brand related meanings, such as the genuine handcraft of the authentic brand, to more effectively mobilize community resources and to neutralize identity threat through community boundary maintenance. This is important because the community needs to continuously redefine and negotiate the social norms that regulate how the community members interact with outsiders, including family and friends, who purchase or gift a counterfeit accessory, such as a handbag or a wallet.

In conclusion, this research furthers our understanding of the ethical consumer and collective moral identity projects by specifically exploring how consumers use oppositional meanings derived from an anti-counterfeit framework to legitimize their authentic brand use. The blurry community boundaries found in this community are likely to be found in many other consumption communities, especially when we explicitly recognize that members are likely embedded in a broader socio-cultural network, governed by several normative frameworks. Importantly, our findings support that the overall anti-counterfeit cause needs be qualified with more specific brand related identity threats for the “ethical” to resonate with the authentic brand consumer.

REFERENCES


Better Not Smile at the Price: The Contradictory Role of Brand Anthropomorphization on Price Fairness
Marina Puzakova, Oregon State University, USA
Hyokjin Kwak, Drexel University, USA
Joseph F. Rocereto, Monmouth University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As corn prices were nearing record highs in the summer of 2012, followed by the rising cost of gas, electricity, airfares, bread, coffee, and fresh fruits, consumers saw significant increases in their shopping bills (Hough 2012). To exemplify, during several subsequent years, Michelin, the world’s second largest tire maker, was forced to raise its prices to offset the increase of the cost of raw-materials. In turn, prices of the truck tires of its major competitors, Bridgestone and Firestone, continued to grow, as well. In these examples, the marketing positioning strategy of the Michelin brand has been to endow its brand with human features in its marketing communications, whereas the Firestone brand has not been positioned with such humanized features. Will consumer price fairness evaluations regarding a price change differ dependent upon whether a brand is anthropomorphized vs. non-anthropomorphized? This research addresses this question.

With the emerging trends of market price increases, firms are becoming more concerned with consumer hostile reactions to price hikes, as these firms’ profitability is constrained by consumer perceptions of what is considered to be a fair price (Bolton and Alba 2006; Wu et al. 2012). Price fairness encompasses consumers’ perceptions of a price as right, legitimate, and just (Campbell 2007; Homburg, Hoyer, and Koschat 2005). Given the importance of price fairness, researchers have begun to address this topic. However, the majority of prior research on price fairness has primarily focused on factors that are intrinsic to the price per se. That is, researchers have examined consumers’ attributions of a firm’s motive for a price change (Bolton and Alba 2006; Campbell 1999; Haws and Bearden 2006), consumer thoughts regarding previous or competitor prices (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003), and consumer knowledge regarding appropriate pricing strategies (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). Yet, research has been especially sparse in terms of investigating the factors that are extrinsic to a price change. The current research fills this gap in the literature and demonstrate that consumer price fairness perceptions when there is a price change will differ dependent upon the brand positioning strategy (i.e., anthropomorphized vs. non-anthropomorphized brand). The research examines both price increases and price decreases.

With this research, we attempt to provide several theoretical contributions. First, we demonstrate that brand anthropomorphization has a more detrimental effect on consumer judgments of price fairness when a brand raises its price (Table 1). Evidence in support of this proposition comes from the theoretical argument that, as consumers perceive brands as mindful and capable of performing intentional actions (Kim and McGill 2011; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2013), they are more likely to attribute a negative motive for a price increase by an anthropomorphized (vs. non-anthropomorphized) brand. In this regard, we establish that no differences in price fairness exist between anthropomorphized and non-anthropomorphized brands for price decreases. Second, we demonstrate that the negative effect of brand humanization in instances of price increases is not universally negative and, instead, depends upon the type of cognitive processes that consumers employ to arrive at a causal judgment of a behavior. Recent research on self-construal (Ahluwalia 2008; Zhang and Mittal 2007) has opened up the possibility that a consumers’ self-construal influences consumers’ reasoning of intentional actions. Specifically, this research has established that the interdependent vs. independent self-construal determines the extent to which a person considers an action as driven by the person as opposed to the context (Ng and Houston 2006; Zhang and Mittal 2007). Third, research has investigated the extent to which an action is viewed as being directed to benefit others. That is, interdependents are motivated to keep interpersonal harmony and hold beliefs that any behavior should benefit others (Heine et al. 1999). These beliefs lead to the interpretation of the goal of any action as an attempt to maintain interpersonal harmony. Relying on two facts: 1) greater attendance to the context as opposed to the object and 2) interpretation of any action’s motivation as to maintain interpersonal harmony, we propose that interdependents will hold more positive view of price increase and will see more positive motive in price increase when a brand is anthropomorphized (vs. non-anthropomorphized). Thus, on the basis of this research, we find that, as opposed to consumers with independent self-construal, interdependent consumers are likely to view price increases by an anthropomorphized brand as more fair compared to that of a non-anthropomorphized brand. Finally, we investigate the mechanism underlying consumer processes of price changes by humanized vs. non-humanized brands. In particular, we demonstrate that consumer price fairness judgments are driven by the inferred motives of a brand.

Table 1: Cell Means and Standard Deviations in Study 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Price Increase</th>
<th>Price Decrease</th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB NAB Mdiff</td>
<td>AB N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Fairness</td>
<td>1.90 (1.07)</td>
<td>2.59 (1.07)</td>
<td>-69*</td>
<td>5.62 (1.06)</td>
<td>5.50 (1.22)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferred Motive</td>
<td>2.48 (1.22)</td>
<td>3.14 (1.22)</td>
<td>-66*</td>
<td>5.60 (1.15)</td>
<td>5.41 (1.16)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: AB = anthropomorphized brand; NAB = non-anthropomorphized brand. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

* p < .05

Overall, we conduct two studies to provide important theoretical and managerial contributions to the price fairness and brand anthropomorphism literature. First, this research contributes to the work on price fairness by shedding light on consumer perceptions of price fairness in situations of price changes by anthropomorphized vs. non-anthropomorphized brands (Studies 1-2). Second, this research enhances the theory of anthropomorphism by investigating the role of self-construal on consumer judgments of anthropomorphized brands and its underlying processes (Study 2). Third, understanding responses to price changes by consumers with interdependent vs. independent self-construals is not only theoretically important but might also open up new possibilities for marketers to use self-construal as a customer segmentation and prioritization variable.
REFERENCES


____________ (2007), “‘Says who?!’ How the source of price information affect influence perceived price (un)fairness,” Journal of Marketing Research, 44 (May), 261-71.


Concealing Your Consumer Stupidity: How the Fear of Appearing as an Incompetent Consumer Reduces Negative Word-of-Mouth

Matthew Philp, Queen’s University, Canada
Laurence Ashworth, Queen’s University, Canada

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

This research proposes that the decision to share negative word-of-mouth (WOM) will involve a dilemma between the various benefits of sharing negative WOM and the potential psychosocial cost of appearing as an incompetent consumer. Specifically, we suggest that dissatisfying purchase experiences – of the kind that are generally assumed to inspire negative WOM – can sometimes reflect poorly on consumers. For example, when a consumer purchased, in retrospect, an inferior product, or paid too high a price because they were not sufficiently careful. Consumers may be concerned that revealing such information could cause them to appear as an incompetent consumer in the eyes of the intended recipient. To avoid this possibility, we predict that individuals will sometimes withhold or distort negative WOM.

Theoretical Development

Consumers are motivated to share negative WOM after a dissatisfying consumption experience to reduce the negative feelings from dissatisfactions (Anderson 1998). Consumers experience a variety of benefits from sharing negative WOM, such as altruism, vengeance, anxiety reduction, and self-enhancement (De Angelis et al. 2012; Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004; Richins 1983). However, little research has examined motivations that may work against these existing motivations, and therefore reducing negative WOM.

It is known that sharing WOM can send signals and information to other people about who that individual is as a person and a consumer, including the prices paid, the decisions made, and the information obtained (De Angelis et al. 2012; Dichter 1966). In the case of sharing negative WOM, this may portray the self as an individual who is unable to get price deals, commonly makes foolish purchase decisions, does not possess superior product knowledge, and is an overall incompetent consumer.

We suggest that incompetence is an undesirable self-image that consumers will be motivated to avoid. Existing work has shown that perceived responsibility for a price deal makes a consumer feel like a “smart shopper” (Schindler 1998). Extending this principle, we suggest that perceived responsibility (or, more accurately, beliefs that the intended target might hold the consumer responsible) for a dissatisfying purchase experience will make consumers concerned about appearing as an incompetent consumer. Under these conditions, we expect that consumers will be less willing to share negative WOM out of fear of appearing incompetent.

Overview of Studies

Three studies were conducted to examine this prediction by manipulating various aspects of consumer dissatisfaction and perceived responsibility and examining the impact on WOM content (Study 1 and 2) and WOM intentions (Study 3). Consistent with prior work, Studies 1 and 2 found that participants were significantly more dissatisfied and used more negative words when sharing WOM after learning that the product they purchased was available at another store for a lower price (relative to the same or a higher price). However, we also found that participants who felt more responsible for their purchase (e.g., by paying with cash instead of gift-card or when they had more time to make a necessary purchase versus no time) used significantly less negative words when sharing WOM despite the high levels of dissatisfaction. We suggest this occurred because of an increased motivation to avoid an undesirable self-image as an incompetent consumer.

Study 3 sought to measure the concern of appearing as an incompetent consumer as a mediator of this effect while extending the findings to a new dissatisfying context. Consistent with prior research, results of a process mediation analysis (Preacher and Hayes 2008) found evidence that learning a firm will charge for repairs for a manufacturer defect leads to a significant increase in dissatisfaction which also leads to a significant increase in the intention to share negative WOM. However, this negative consumption experience also leads to a significant increase in the concern of appearing as an incompetent consumer, which then significantly decreases the intention to share negative WOM. Although, this effect is moderated by warranty choice, where the concern of appearing as an incompetent consumer increases when the participant feels more responsible for opting out of the default warranty (see figure 1 and table 1).

Conclusion

Overall, previous WOM research has examined various motivations underlying consumers’ desire to spread negative WOM. However, the motivations identified work in unison, such that they are all expected to increase the willingness to share negative WOM. This research identifies the psychosocial cost of appearing as an incompetent consumer as a conflicting motive after a dissatisfying consumption experience that decreases negative WOM. The results of three studies further indicated that the more responsible consumers feel for their choices leading up to a dissatisfying consumption experience, the more they are concerned about portraying an undesirable self-image as an incompetent consumer. To avoid portraying this self-image, participants shared less negative WOM.

REFERENCES

Table 1: Overview of Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Purchase Responsibility</th>
<th>Dissatisfying Consumption Experience</th>
<th>WOM Measure</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gift-Card (Low)</td>
<td>Other Available Price: Lower (Dissatisfied)</td>
<td>WOM Valence (Positive – Negative Words)</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>F(1,145) = 4.04, p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash (High)</td>
<td>Other Available Price: Same (Control)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Available Price: Higher (Satisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Immediate Necessity (Low)</td>
<td>Other Available Price: Lower (Dissatisfied)</td>
<td>WOM Valence (Positive – Negative Words)</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>F(1,133) = 3.70, p &lt; .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Immediate Necessity (High)</td>
<td>Other Available Price: Same (Control)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Available Price: Higher (Satisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>Default Warranty (Low)</td>
<td>Does Not Honor Warranty (Dissatisfied)</td>
<td>Willingness to Share Negative WOM (Harrison-Walker 2001)</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>F(1,103) = 13.00, p &lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt-Out of Default Warranty (High)</td>
<td>Honors Warranty (Satisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does Not Honor Warranty (Dissatisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honors Warranty (Satisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Nutrition labeling aims to help consumers make healthful food decisions. However, consumers often make habitual decisions that are driven by taste when shopping groceries and disregard nutrition information (Grunert et al. 2010). This research investigates whether front-of-pack nutrition labeling, and heuristic cues investigated on the labeling, increases attention and the healthfulness of food decisions. We consider actual point of purchase decisions and assess the impact of labeling penetration in the food categories.

Conceptual Framework

We propose that nutrition information, implemented consistently on the front of packages, receives more attention if the labels are present on all packages, compared with the market penetration. Visual search theory substantiates this claim (Duncan and Humphreys 1989): consumers are faster in recognizing objects as present with increasing frequency of appearance and higher similarity in shape and coloring. Consumers are also faster in classifying whether an object is present (vs. classifying it according to its absence; Bialkova and van Trijp 2010; Yamani and McCarley 2010). The full penetration should thus increase the salience of nutrition labeling that is consistently (vs. inconsistently) placed on packages (H1).

The visual scene in the full penetration condition should also allow consumers compare products more easily, without missing information or confusion. Consumers learn about a label’s position on the packages and know where to expect it (Hollingworth 2007; Oliver 2009; Yamani and McCarley 2010). This consistency should facilitate the identification of foods as (un)healthful and thus improve decision quality (H2).

Study 1

Study 1 was conducted in a supermarket and manipulated the front-of-pack nutrition labeling (consistent format at a consistent position vs. real life labeling) and the labeling penetration (implementing the consistent format on all products vs. according to market penetrations). Three hundred and eight products from three categories (sweets, 43% vs. 100% penetration; cereals, 59% vs. 100%; ready meals, 81% vs. 100%) were manipulated. The labels showed calorie, sugar, fat, saturated fat, and salt content. The healthfulness of the product choices was assessed via nutrient-based SSAg/1 scoring (the higher, the less healthful).

Participants (n = 260) were asked to choose three products, one of each category (cover story: orientation in supermarkets). We used mobile eye-tracking to capture visual attention, assessed via share of attention (gaze durations on nutrition labeling / total packaging).

ANOVA revealed that the consistent nutrition label increased share of attention from 1.00% in the inconsistent condition to 4.63% in the market penetration condition, and to 4.12% in the full penetration condition (F(2, 257) = 33.90, p < .001; η² = .17). Hypothesis 1 is only partly supported; the full (vs. market) penetration had no effect on attention change. SSAg/1 scoring did not differ between participants (M = 19.17 vs. M = 19.12 vs. M = 19.07; F(2, 256) = 0.04, p = .96). Hypothesis 2 is rejected.

The nutrition labeling formats may have been ineffective in increasing the healthfulness of choices, because the stimuli did not allow consumers to process the labels within fractions of a second (as quantified by gaze durations). Study 2 assessed how two heuristic cues – health marks and traffic light color-coding – may interact in helping consumers make healthful in-store choices.

Implementing Heuristic Cues

Health marks (binary overall healthfulness classifications) reduce the duration that consumers attend to the packaging (Bialkova and van Trijp 2010). However, we predict that this attention shift is contingent on the presence (vs. absence) of traffic light colors. Adding colors attracts attention to nutrient-specific evaluations (Jones and Richardson 2007). This is expected to inhibit the propensity to use cognitive short cuts offered by health marks (H3). The combination of the two heuristic cues should also make consumers select more healthful products (H4), because health marks guide consumers to a healthful evoked set and the colors automatically activate the meanings ‘go’ (green) and ‘stop’ (red) when assigned to more or less healthful nutrient levels, thereby implying automatic approach-avoidance reactions (Koenigstorfer et al. 2013).

Study 2

A 2 (health marks present vs. absent) × 2 (traffic light colors present vs. absent) between-participant design was applied. Packages of 15 snack foods were manipulated (e.g., rice cakes, SSAg/1 = 0; fried banana chips, SSAg/1 = 18). The procedure was similar to study 1; however, participants (n = 160) additionally selected one snack to take home. Gaze duration and frequency (Rosbergen, Pieters, and Wedel 1997) on the snacks were assessed.

Two-factorial ANOVAs were conducted to test hypothesis 3. The presence (vs. absence) of health marks, the presence (vs. absence) of colors, and their interaction were modeled as independent variables; gaze duration as the dependent variable. The results revealed longer gaze durations when colors were shown (F(1, 148) = 3.97, p < .05; η² = .026); health marks had no effects. However, there was a significant interaction (F(1, 148) = 5.72, p = .02; η² = .037). As postulated in hypothesis 3, health marks decreased gaze duration in the absence of colors (η(73) = 3.48, p < .001) while it was unaffected when colors were present (η(75) = .056, p = .58). The interaction was replicated for gaze frequency (same directions, F(1, 148) = 6.26, p = .01; η² = .041).

Both health marks and traffic light colors did not influence the healthfulness of choices. However, as predicted in hypothesis 4, health marks led to more healthful choices when colors were present (F(1, 156) = 4.44, p = .04; η² = .028; from M = 14.54 to M = 12.16; t(76) = 2.11, p = .04). This effect was not observed in the absence of colors (M = 12.67 vs. M = 13.82; t(80) = –0.93, p = .35).

Contributions

Our research shows that consistency in nutrition information increases visual attention (but not healthfulness of choices), and that combining two heuristic cues, traffic light colors and health marks, on the front of food packages helps consumers make healthful food decisions.
decisions at the point of purchase. As opposed to back-of-pack labeling (Balasubramanian and Cole 2002), front-of-pack nutrition labels that meet consumer heuristics influence food purchase behavior and may have positive health effects, given that consumption volumes will not increase.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Virtuous behaviors are behaviors that people believe they ought to do, but might find them difficult (Ein-Gar, Goldenberg, & Sagiv, 2013; Read, Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman, 1999). Understanding the effectiveness of requests to commit to virtuous behaviors is important theoretically and practically.

Past research suggests that activation of distant future mindset should encourage individuals to be more self-controlled, goal-driven in their behavior (e.g. Dhar & Kim, 2007; Fujita et al., 2006). Furthermore research on choice between “should” and “want” shows that when the execution of the choice is in the distant future, people make more “should” (i.e., virtuous) choices than when execution of the choice is in the near future (Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2010; Rogers & Bazerman, 2008).

This research suggests that contrary to past findings, consumers may be less likely to commit to a distant- (as opposed to a near-) virtuous behavior.

Temporal-construal-theory has laid the notion that distant future is construed more abstract while the near future is construed more concrete (Liberman, Sagristano & Trope 2002; Trope & Liberman, 2003). In line with this notion, in the distant future, one’s schedule is construed abstractly, while in the near future, one’s schedule is construed more concrete.

Research on information processing suggests that abstract information makes people more optimistic regarding the outcome of their actions (Chan, Sengupta & Mukhopadhyay 2013). Thus, when individuals’ schedule is abstract, they might optimistically believe they will find spare time for a given action, and hence be more likely to commit to it. Conversely, research has shown that concrete information provides more confidence of prediction (Camerer & Weber, 1992). Thus, when individuals’ schedules are concrete, they may be more certain of finding the necessary time to carry out the action, and hence might be more likely to commit.

This paper offers to reconcile these seemingly contradicting hypotheses by suggesting that commitment preference is dependent on one’s level of self-control.

It is argued that low self-control consumers prefer committing to the distant future, not only because they are more likely to procrastinate, but also because in the future time is vague and this vagueness makes them feel more confident they will find the time to complete their commitment. High self-control consumers prefer committing to the near future hand, not only because they want to “check things off their list” but also because the near future is concrete and this gives them a sense of certainty that they will be able to identify the necessary spare time.

Study 1: Demonstrated the effect for commitment to pro-environmental behavior. Student participants (n=60, Mage=24) completed a self-control scale (DSC; α=.85; Ein-Gar et al., 2013; Ein-Gar & Steinhart, 2011), a filler task and then read about consumption of green products. Next, participants reported their willingness to hand out flyers encouraging consumption of green products, either the next semester (near-condition) or the next summer vacation (distant-condition). As expected low self-control participants were more willing to hand out flyers in the distant-future while high self-control participants showed greater preference in the near future (F(1,57) =10.11, p<.02).

Study 2: Tested the effect for pro-social behavior, when self-control is manipulated rather than measured. Adult participants (n=122, Mage=28) were asked to recall an event in which they had overcome temptations, (high self-control condition) or had yielded to their temptations (low self-control condition). Next, participants read about a pro-bono project in which volunteers spend time with underprivileged children. The project was expected to take place either next month (near-condition) or in 6 months (distant-condition). Participants were asked to indicate the number of hours they would be willing to volunteer. Low self-control participants volunteered more hours in the distant-future. High self-control participants volunteered more hours in the near-future (F(1,119) =14.08, p<.01).

Study 3: Unravels the underlying effect of time availability certainty while testing commitment to a behavior with a personal benefit. Adult participants (n=386, Mage=32) completed the DSC scale (α =.90) and were then offered to join a 10-session coaching program for attaining a financially goal either in two weeks (near-condition) or four months (distant condition). Participants were asked to indicate their intention to commit to a 10-meeting program and to indicate how certain there are they would find the necessary time to uphold their commitment. Low-self-control participants were more willing to commit in the near-condition while high-self-control participants reported greater commitment intentions in the distant-condition (F(1,382) = 9.95, p < .01). Moderated mediation analyses showed that commitment was positively mediated by time availability certainty for low self-control participants (95% CI: 0.014 to 0.419) and was negatively mediated for high self-control participants (95% CI: -0.488 to -0.02).

REFERENCES


Staging the Museumspace: Overlapping Personal, Social, and Hedonic Experiences
Ada Leung, Pennsylvania State University at Berks, USA
Huimin Xu, The Sage Colleges, USA
Jessica Schocker, Pennsylvania State University at Berks, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A visit to museum is beyond receiving services from the staff or knowledge from browsing and reflecting on the experiences of interacting with the exhibits. Instead, service encounters at the museum should be conceptualized as a theatrical experience, in which museum visitors pay to spend time enjoying a series of memorable events that the museum stages and to be engaged in an inherently personal way (Pine and Gilmore 2011). So the question becomes, “What kinds of experiences do visitors look for and what do they find memorable?” As with any cultural outing, visiting a museum involves the juxtaposing of personal experience with the exhibits (Goulding 2000; Joy and Sherry, 2003), and social experience that often shared with friends or family members (Debenedetti 2003). Therefore, it becomes imperative to investigate how such seemingly ambivalent experiences are enjoyed simultaneously and reflected upon after the visit. In this paper, we propose to examine personal, social and hedonic experiences of museum consumption, in particular, the experiences should also be studied in the social context of the companions. The goal of the present study is to emphasize the overlapping nature of museum experiential consumption as well as the theoretical implications.

Although museum visits can be considered as a typical service encounter, but the focus of this investigation, the social aspect of museum experience which includes the interactions between adults and children, has been different from what has been previously studied, and therefore lends itself to multi-method data collection, including six-month observation and visual image capturing of a community museum in the United States, 18 group exit interviews, seven ZMET interviews, and 32 narratives about personal and pupil field trips to the museum.

We present a model that depicts the overlapping nature of personal, social, and hedonic experiences that occur in the museumspace, and, by extension, museumspace institutions. Although personal experience is often conceptualized as the intrapersonal experiences between the cultural objects and the visitors, its effects and implications are often interpersonal and social in nature. The very act of acquiring “new knowledge” from exposing oneself to the stimuli offered by museum exhibits can be considered as structuring practices of the society. Prior research has tended to frame such experiences as “embodied.” However, such framing can mask important collective and hedonic aspects of museum going. Social experiences include pursuing for quality time, socializing to proper etiquette, and stocking up on cultural capital, have consequences in the strength of social relationships and one’s ranking in social standing. Visitors may navigate energetically or leisurely in the museumspace to engage themselves and their companions to pursue different types of experiences. In today’s experience economy, the museumspace encompasses all four experience-realms, educational, entertainment, escapist, and aesthetic (Pine and Gilmore 2011), which we suggest that they are largely emerge from the intersecting of both personal and social experiences. Capturing aesthetic details of exhibits describes the intersection of the aesthetic based hedonic, personal, and social experience, in which visitors attempt to capture memorable events with images. Meeting artists/curators describes the intersection of emotional based hedonic and social experience, in which visitors overlap visual- and text-based experience with often emotionally charged social interactions with the artists/curators. Playing at staged edutainment describes the interaction of imaginative based hedonic and social experience, in which young visitors play to explore, learn, and be entertained with the interactive exhibits.

This research places consumer experiences at the center of consumption phenomena and provides a typology of various types of experiences that are generated in the museumspace. Our research is consonant with Joy’s (2003) contention that museum consumption is an embodied personal experience that includes both aesthetic and imaginative experience. However, our work departs from Joy’s both in focus and contribution by showing how museum-based hedonic experiences overlap with both personal and social experiences, and in fact social experiences are not only the results but may be the driver for the enjoyment of museum-going (Debenedetti 2003).

Although our primary goal was the development of an emic understanding of visitors’ experiences of a community museum, through a systematic unpacking of informants’ accounts, we also discovered evidence of intersecting experiential consumption. In particular, our informants’ tendencies towards engaging in different types of personal and social experiences were shaped by their level of cultural capital and types and the strength of social relations they are embedded in. Those experiences that relate to personal reflections and stockings up of cultural capital were evident among those with higher level of embodied cultural capital. In contrast, social interaction-based hedonic experiences are evident among those with school-age children in tow. In order to understand more fully the notion of experiential consumption and its relationships with customer satisfaction and involvement, it is necessary to identify factors that increase the likelihood of generating memorable events for the visitors.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Despite the existence of several successful cute-looking products in the marketplace, such as the Volkswagen Beetle or the numerous Hello Kitty accessories, it seems that marketers still prefer striving to create elegant-looking product designs built on aesthetic principles (e.g., symmetry and harmony, Kumar and Garg 2010), and are reluctant to incorporate cuteness into the designs of their products. Such reluctance may reflect an implicit assumption that cute-looking product designs do not have any particular advantage over elegant-looking designs in driving product purchases.

In this research, we argue that the advantage of cute-looking designs emerges when the focus of investigation is shifted from product acquisition to retention. We posit that just as infants' cuteness is conducive to sustaining their parents' caretaking behaviors for a long time (Glocker et al. 2009; Morreall 1991), the advantage of cuteness in product design should be manifested in sustaining a close relationship between a cute-looking product and its user for a long period. We propose that, even when a cute-looking and an elegant-looking product design are perceived as equally attractive, the cute-looking one will induce a higher intent to retain the product.

Study 1 adopted a 2 (Product image: cute-looking versus elegant-looking) X 2 (Mindset: high versus low ownership) between-subjects design to test this hypothesis. As a stimulus, we used a T-shirt featuring a cute-looking (versus an elegant-looking) dog image, and employed a customization (versus a choice) task to induce a high (versus a low) ownership mindset (Shu and Peck 2011). After customizing (versus choosing) a T-shirt, participants (111 undergraduate students, 54 females) indicated their willingness to keep the T-shirt. A product image X mindset interaction emerged (F (1, 107) = 3.28, p = .07). In the high ownership condition, participants were more willing to keep the cute-looking than the elegant-looking T-shirt (M's = 6.22 versus 5.12; F (1, 107) = 7.60, p < .01), whereas this effect disappeared in the low ownership condition (p > .9). Study 1 hence provided initial evidence that when consumers experience a strong sense of psychological product ownership, a cute-looking product design elicits a higher intent to retain the product than does an elegant-looking design.

Study 2 adopted a 2 (Product image: cute-looking versus elegant-looking) X 2 (Mindset: ownership versus acquisition) between-subjects design. This study used a different product category and a different ownership mindset manipulation to further extend the findings of Study 1 by showing that, compared to an elegant-looking product design, a cute-looking design induces only a higher intent to retain, but not to purchase, the product. Study 2 also aimed to provide evidence for consumers' caretaking motivation as explaining the retention advantage of cuteness. Participants (199 adults recruited online, 89 females) evaluated either a cute-looking, panda-themed teapot or an elegant-looking, peacock-themed teapot. In the acquisition mindset condition, participants indicated their willingness to buy the teapot. In the ownership mindset condition, participants completed a mental imagery task that simulated psychological ownership (Peck and Shu 2009) and then indicated their willingness to retain the teapot. To test the underlying mechanism, we measured caretaking motivation with two items, “a desire to take care of/protect” the product (α = .93). There was a product image X mindset interaction (F (1, 193) = 4.14, p < .05), with perceived attractiveness and anthropomorphism, which differed across the cuteness and elegance conditions, as covariates. Extending the findings of Study 1, the results showed that participants were more willing to retain the cute-looking than the elegant-looking teapot (M’s = 4.70 versus 4.28; F (1, 193) = 10.72, p < .001), whereas their purchase intentions for the two teapots did not differ (p > .6). A bootstrap-based mediation analysis further confirmed that the advantage of cuteness over elegance on product retention was mediated by caretaking motivation (LL 95% CI = .01, UL 95% CI = .22).

In Study 3, we tested product category as a boundary condition for the retention advantage of cuteness. Due to the associations between elegant-looking designs and higher performance expectations (Orth, Campana, and Malkewitz 2010) and between baby-schema and weakness and vulnerability (Gorn, Jiang, and Gita 2008), people might infer low performance from cute-looking designs, which should be particularly detrimental in product categories for which functional performance is the primary attribute used in product evaluations (hereafter referred to as “functional” products). Therefore, we expect that for functional products, the advantage of cuteness over elegance on product retention will be reduced. Study 3 adopted a 2 (Product image: cute-looking versus elegant-looking) X 2 (Product category: functional versus non-functional) between-subjects design, with a focus on intent to retain the product. Participants saw the images of either a cute-looking or an elegant-looking computer speaker. In the functional product condition, the speaker image was shown as is, whereas in the non-functional product condition the same speaker image was printed on a fridge magnet, with participants being told that they received the magnet as a gift from a company manufacturing computer speakers. The procedure was similar to the one used in the ownership mindset condition of Study 2. Eighty undergraduates

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<td>Study 1</td>
<td>T-shirt</td>
<td>A customization task</td>
<td>--Participants were more willing to keep the cute-looking T-shirt than the elegant-looking one only when they experienced a strong psychological product ownership.</td>
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<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Teapots</td>
<td>A mental imagery task</td>
<td>--Participants were more willing to retain, but not more willing to purchase, the cute-looking teapot than the elegant-looking one. --Caretaking motivation mediated the effect of product image on product retention.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>Computer speakers, fridge magnets</td>
<td>A mental imagery task</td>
<td>--For functional products, the retention advantage of cuteness over elegance disappeared.</td>
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(44 females) participated in the study. We found a product image X mindset interaction ($F(1, 75) = 4.15, p < .05$), with affective reaction, which differed across the cuteness and elegance conditions, as a covariate. When the product was non-functional (i.e., fridge magnets), we obtained the same pattern of results observed in the previous studies—specifically, participants were more willing to retain the cute-looking rather than the elegant-looking product ($M's = 4.50$ versus $3.21$; $F (1, 75) = 4.25$, $p < .05$). In contrast, there was no difference in willingness to retain the product ($p > .4$) when the product was functional (i.e., speakers). The results support our hypothesis that the effect of cuteness on retention is reduced for functional products.

In summary, we show that although cute-looking product designs enjoy no advantage over elegant-looking designs in stimulating purchase intentions, consumers are more willing to keep cute products when they own them. The cuteness advantage on product retention results from caretaking motivation and is absent in functional products.

REFERENCES


Value is Shaped by Unsatisfied Desire: Activating Frustrated Values From Past Tradeoffs
Dynamically Shifts Unrelated Decisions
Stephanie M. Carpenter, University of Michigan, USA
Brian D. Vickers, University of Michigan, USA
J. Frank Yates, University of Michigan, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Traditional (e.g., microeconomic) views have presumed that the values or utilities people attach to various entities are fixed. From this perspective, making a good decision requires a valid process for eliciting what those values are, which may be thought of as equivalent to “looking up” fixed subjective utility measures in a registry. More recent behavioral decision research has largely displaced that presumption with one maintaining that valuation is a labile process. In particular, studies have indicated that decision makers’ value assessments depend on a host of conditions that happen to be present at the time of elicitation (e.g., framing and the nature of the required decision; Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1980; Hsee 1996; Slovic 1995). The resulting consensus has been that values are constructed on the spot, per existing conditions and demands.

The present research proposes that the valuation process is a dynamic one that extends beyond the incidental circumstances surrounding a given decision situation. The proposition we examine is that among the significant contributors to the values that drive people’s decisions are also particulars of their recollections of prior decisions. Many real-life decision problems require the decision maker to make tradeoffs. Thus, choosing Laptop A and therefore enjoying its superior RAM would necessitate the pain of paying more than Laptop B’s lower price. The specific hypothesis we examined is that recalling a prior tradeoff situation can reliably remind decision makers to make tradeoffs. Following this manipulation, each participant made a hypothetical purchase decision between two cameras. One camera was superior on attribute dimensions commonly recognized as reflective of picture quality (megapixels and lens), and the other was superior on an attribute conceptually associated with speed (shutter speed). Perceived camera knowledge was also measured, as having a better understanding of the choice options would presumably make the tradeoff sacrifice more salient.

Consistent with our hypothesis, results indicated that high-perceived camera knowledge subjects in Condition 1 (fast/low-quality restaurant experience) were more likely than those in Condition 2 (slow/high-quality restaurant experience) to choose the camera superior on the frustrated tradeoff value dimension they recalled—quality. Also consistent with our prediction, high-perceived camera knowledge subjects in Condition 2 were more likely than those in Condition 1 to choose the camera superior on the value frustrated in the recalled tradeoff situation—speed (Table 1).

One plausible explanation for why this value carryover occurred is that having a better understanding of the choice tradeoffs made the decision more difficult for high-perceived camera knowledge subjects in Study 1. This choice difficulty, in turn, increased choice and attribute tradeoff processing (see Bettman, Luce and Payne 1998, for

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<th>Study</th>
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<td>Study 1</td>
<td>Recall Group only model was non-significant. Adding Camera Knowledge as a covariate led to a trend (p = .092) effect of Camera Knowledge that was moderated by a significant interaction between Recall Group and Camera Knowledge</td>
<td>Recall Group only:  ( c^2(2) = 0.32, \ p = .852 ); Recall Group x Camera Knowledge:  ( c^2(2) = 6.31, p = .043 )</td>
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<td>Slow-High quality, as compared to Fast-Low quality, recall group was significantly more likely to choose the Fast Camera</td>
<td>( b = 1.66, \text{odds ratio (OR)} = 5.25, z = 2.02, p = .044 )</td>
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<td>Slow-High quality, as compared to Control, recall group was not significantly more likely to choose the Fast Camera</td>
<td>( b = 1.17, \text{OR} = 3.22, z = 1.41, p = .160 )</td>
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<td>Frustrated Value Carryover occurred for High Subjective, but not for Low Subjective, Camera Knowledge subjects</td>
<td>High:  ( c^2(2) = 9.16, p = .010 ); Low:  ( c^2(2) = 0.76, p = .683 )</td>
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<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Train Choices affected by Recall Group when the Decision Task was Difficult (i.e., in the deep choice processing condition)</td>
<td>( c^2(2) = 6.76, p = .034 )</td>
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<td>Frustrated Value Carryover from the recall occurred in the Difficult, but not in the Easy, choice processing condition</td>
<td>Difficult:  ( c^2(2) = 7.07, p = .029 ); Easy:  ( c^2(2) = 1.91, p = .384 )</td>
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<td>When the choice was more Difficult, the Slow-High quality, as compared to the Fast-Low quality, recall group was significantly more likely to choose the Fast Train</td>
<td>( b = 1.19, \text{OR} = 3.19, z = 2.55, p = .011 )</td>
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<td>When the choice was more Difficult, the Slow-High quality, as compared to the Control, recall group was marginally more likely to choose the Fast Train</td>
<td>( b = 0.81, \text{OR} = 2.25, z = 1.79, p = .074 )</td>
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a review). To test this explanation, in a second study we predicted that inducing greater choice tradeoff processing through manipulating the difficulty of the decision would increase the attractiveness of the option with the frustrated value. We also wanted to show that our effect generalizes to other contexts. Two hundred and sixty six participants were assigned randomly to one of three conditions in which the subject recalled and wrote about a time when s/he had: (1) a fast, but low-quality, doctor’s office experience; (2) a slow, but high-quality, doctor’s office experience; or (3) any restaurant experience (i.e., control condition). Following this manipulation, each participant made a hypothetical purchase decision between two trains traveling between cities. One train was superior on attribute dimensions commonly recognized as reflective of train quality (cleanliness, food service), and the other was superior on an attribute conceptually associated with speed (travel time). To determine if greater tradeoff processing is a factor underlying value carryover, we manipulated perceived difficulty of the train choice using a standard fluency paradigm (Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz and Simonson 2007; Song and Schwarz 2008). Participants were randomly assigned to view the train options in either an (1) easy to read font (i.e., Arial) or a (2) difficult to read font (i.e., Mistral).

Consistent with our hypothesis, participants in the difficult-to-read font condition, as compared to those in the easy-to-read font condition, were more likely to choose the option consistent with their frustrated value. Specifically, those in the difficult decision condition who recalled the slow/high-quality doctor’s office experience were more likely than those in the easy and control conditions to choose the train that was superior on the frustrated tradeoff value dimension they recalled—speed. Similarly, those in the fast/low-quality doctor’s office experience condition were more likely to choose the train superior on the value frustrated in the recalled tradeoff situation—quality (Table 1). Thus, our findings suggest that greater tradeoff processing increased choices in favor of the frustrated value. Ongoing studies are investigating the mechanisms underlying this value shifting process, including the possible role that deprivation and satiation play in driving the observed carryover.

The present findings lend credence to the fundamental idea introduced in this new line of research, whereby the construction of value is subject to the systematic influences of prior value experiences in contexts that are remote from the current decision situation, in both time and domain. Specifically, in a decision situation involving difficult tradeoffs, frustrated values do not simply go away, but instead remain active and seek to be satisfied. Subsequent, superficially distinct, decision situations represent opportunities to satisfy those frustrated values. Current research is being directed toward the elaboration of further forces that affect value carryover in consumer contexts.

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The Roles of Appropriateness and Relevance in Determining Reactions to Humor in Frontline Service Encounters

J. Mark Mayer, Indiana University, USA
Michelle Roehm, Wake Forest University, USA
Michael Brady, Florida State University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In The Experience Economy, Pine and Gilmore (1999) suggest that service firms can use humor to create a competitive edge. A humorous approach to provision has been discussed in services as disparate as restaurants and accounting (Williams 2009; Michaud 2000), and airline personnel have been explicitly encouraged to set up inflight gags (Woodyard 2004). Humor’s effects have been examined in advertising including that of services (Bauerly 1990; Fugate 1998; Fugate et al. 2000; McCullough and Taylor 1993), with little investigation in other consumer contexts. We explore how two humor aspects—relevance (the degree to which a joke by a service provider is germane to the consumption purpose) and appropriateness (the acceptability or desirability of humor in a particular context), and their interplay—map onto service delivery.

Relevant advertising humor generally outperforms irrelevant (Weinberger and Gulas 1992), but we believe in service contexts relevance might be assessed at two levels with different degrees of cognitive processing (Lovelock 1983). With few resources devoted to joke processing, heuristics should provide evaluation shortcuts (Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly 1989; Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann 1983) and a joke may be considered relevant to a consumer’s purpose if it simply shares surface feature overlap with the service (e.g., a joke set in a restaurant setting delivered by a waiter). However, when consumers devote significant effort to joke processing, evaluation may occur at a deeper level (Chaiken et al. 1989; Petty et al. 1983). Here, relevance may be judged more sophisticatedly, according to diagnosticity of the joke’s deeper substance for current goals.

Humor occurring in settings perceived as appropriate generally gives rise to more favorable reactions (Bauerly 1990; Fugate 1998; Fugate et al. 2000). This begs a follow-up: how service consumers determine humor to be (in)appropriate. Broad clues offered by service advertising research suggest that humor may be more appropriate in less serious industries (bars, car washes, bowling alleys) than highly serious ones (tax or legal services) (Bauerly 1990; Fugate 1998; Fugate et al. 2000; McCullough and Taylor 1993). Situational norms—highly accessible beliefs about how to behave in particular social situations or environments (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and Custers 2003; Cialdini and Trost 1998)—aid in explaining this divergence. Norms may dictate that frivolous behavior is (in)appropriate in the (latter) former setting.

Relevance and appropriateness have often been conceptually bundled in research on humor (Fugate 1998) under a general presumption that (ir)relevant humor will be deemed (in)appropriate, but the unique contributions of each have not been well-documented. We propose that relevance and appropriateness are conceptually separable, with service settings offering a prime disentangling opportunity. One special consideration here is that humor is often a shared social experience, but exposure to advertising generally occurs in private (Gulas and Weinberger 2006)—an assumption pervasive in humorous advertising research methodologies. However, if a joke is experienced in a highly public service environment (e.g., with other patrons), the strong social setting may heighten the salience of appropriateness norms. Evidence that increasing focus on norms increases likelihood that they will affect thought and behavior (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990; Jonas et al. 2008; Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000) leads us to believe that highly public humor would naturally lend itself to assessment of appropriateness in evaluation. At the same time, the strong social dimension of the setting may render a judgment of appropriateness to be somewhat complicated, given the presence of both self and others, yielding multiple vantage points from which to assess the appropriateness of humor. Consideration may be given not only to whether the scenario is too serious for humor, but also to how others may respond (i.e., perspective taking: Abele and Wojciszke 2007; Davis et al. 1996; Trotshel et al. 2011). Integrating one’s own humor perspective with others’ may be more challenging and require more effort than is required to consider one’s own assessment (Davis et al. 1996). While the natural inclination in highly public humor settings may be to examine appropriateness, respondents may not always have the cognitive resource availability to be capable of rendering these judgments. When mental resources are more constrained, a respondent may seek a less demanding means of evaluating the humor attempt (Chaiken et al. 1989; Petty et al. 1983). When a joke is told in a highly public service context and a consumer has low cognitive resources available, we expect a joke with high relevance will produce more positive reactions than a joke with low relevance.

Consistent with our theorizing, our study shows that, with high resources available, responses to a public joke varied with perceived appropriateness. In this situation, the complexity of assessing appropriateness from multiple perspectives could be managed. However, responses among those who had limited resources available (because of a TV distraction in the restaurant environment) depended on relevance. These individuals reacted more favorably after hearing a joke that pertained to a restaurant than one that pertained to a fabric store or hearing no joke at all. Given the low levels of cognitive resources that were apparently devoted by these respondents, as evidenced in our multiple manipulation check measures, the restaurant setting presumably provided a simple and useful cue for evaluation. Our supplemental analyses of process support this interpretation.

One important take away from our studies is that public humor consumption has key implications for the ways relevance and appropriateness are deployed in determining reactions to humor. Thus, a theoretical contribution to consumer research exploring the efficacy of humor is in exploring more public displays of humor than have been typical of marketing research on humor. In doing so, we add nuance to extant marketing-based humor theory. Our results suggest a more sophisticated view of relevance and appropriateness and thereby contribute meaningfully to our understanding of humor in marketing settings. With respect to humorous advertisements, our results suggest a need to reconsider the roles of relevance and appropriateness when an ad is viewed in a public setting, such as during a World Cup or Super Bowl gathering.

REFERENCES


The Moderating Role of Regulatory Focus on the Social Modeling of Food Intake
Johanna Palcu, University of Vienna, Austria
Arnd Florack, University of Vienna Austria
Malte Friese, University of Saarland, Germany

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Introduction
Previous research on the social modeling of food intake has shown that individuals’ food consumption is strongly influenced by the food consumption of their eating companions, that is, individuals usually eat more when others eat more, and they eat less when others eat less (e.g., Herman, Roth, & Polivy, 2003; Herman & Polivy, 2005). In illustrating the basis for social modeling effects on food intake, Herman et al. (2003, p. 874) argue that “a significant concern for most people is to avoid eating excessively” and that “the intake of one’s eating companions, then, serves to establish a guideline indicating how much one may eat without eating excessively”.

A hypothesis that directly follows from this reasoning is that individuals should be more likely to follow social models in food intake when they are motivated to show socially appropriate behavior, follow social rules, and avoid inappropriate behavior than when they are less motivated to do so. Although this conclusion is reasonable, to our knowledge, research on this particular question has so far been missing.

In the present research, we address this gap and examine the moderating role of motivational orientations on the social modeling of food intake. Based on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2012), we assumed that individuals in a prevention focus, who regulate their behavior according to their responsibilities and duties and are driven by a fundamental desire to avoid inappropriate behavior, are more likely to show social modeling effects in food intake, compared to individuals in a promotion focus, who tend to regulate their behavior according to their ideals, aspirations, and accomplishments and are thus more likely to rely on their internal responses when determining their level of food consumption (Florack, Friese, & Scarabis, 2010; Pham & Avnet, 2004; 2009).

In two studies, we tested the strength of social modeling effects under different regulatory foci. In Study 1, a social model that was present consumed a high amount of food or did not consume food at all. In Study 2, the social model was not present; however, incidental cues signaled that the model had consumed either a high or a low amount of food. In both studies, we expected the social model’s behavior to more strongly influence consumption of participants in a prevention focus, compared to consumption of participants in a promotion focus.

Study 1
The experimental study was conducted at a German and Austrian University.

We varied participants’ regulatory focus experimentally by increasing the salience of ideals or hopes (promotion focus) or duties and responsibilities (prevention focus). Participants were then provided with palatable food (cookies) they were free to consume during the experiment. Moreover, each participant was paired with another participant, who served as a social consumption model. The assigned partner either received the instruction to eat freely, or not to eat at all. To test our hypothesis, we measured the absolute amount of cookies participants consumed as well as the degree of intake matching between target participants and the assigned partners.

Results show that, in line with our assumptions, participants in a prevention focus (but not participants in a promotion focus) aligned their own level of consumption with the level of consumption of their eating companion, regardless of whether the companion consumed a lot of food or no food at all. Thus, the results of Study 1 support our assumption that prevention-focused individuals, who are driven by a fundamental concern to make secure decisions and avoid inappropriate behavior, rely on the behavior of social model to determine the appropriate amount of food to consume. By contrast, promotion-focused individuals seemed to have followed their internal responses to determine their own level of consumption.

Study 2
In Study 2 we took our assumption one step further by investigating whether prevention-focused individuals rely on the consumption behavior of a social model, even when the social model is no longer present, and its behavior is therefore less salient. We expected that, even in situations when the role model is not actually present, prevention-focused individuals maintain their motivation to disambiguze the ambiguous situation with respect to the appropriate food intake by relying on external cues such as visible leftovers of other participants’ consumption behavior.

Study 2 was conducted at a German University. We asked participants to test and evaluate three different flavors of ice cream.

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<th>Table 1. Summary of Main Results (simple slope tests) for Study 1 and Study 2.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Study 1 (N = 71)***DV: Cookie Consumption (50g)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Consumption Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.39 g</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 2 (N = 40)***DV: Ice Cream Consumption (600g)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Consumption Cues</td>
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<td>116.67 g</td>
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*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .001
*** interaction: regulatory focus x consumption model significant at p ≤ .05

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Unlike in Study 1, participants did not observe the behavior of a physically present eating companion. Instead, when entering the lab, they saw the leftovers of an ostensible previous participant. Participants either saw three empty cups of ice cream (high-consumption model) or three cups of ice cream that were close to being full (low-consumption model). We expected these subtle consumption cues to have a similar effect on the consumption behavior of prevention-focused individuals as the food intake of an actually present eating companion. The results of Study 2 are in line with our assumptions and with the results of Study 1. Again, individuals in a prevention focus (but not individuals in a promotion focus) ate significantly more ice cream when provided with cues about a high-consumption model than when provided with cues about a low-consumption model.

Conclusions

The present research offers support for previous assumptions of Herman and colleagues (2003) that social modeling effects mainly occur because individuals have a fundamental concern to avoid eating excessively. In two studies, we demonstrate that individuals who show a strategic inclination to avoid inappropriate behavior (individuals in a prevention focus), but not individuals who show a strategic inclination to approach advancement (individuals in a promotion focus) match their food consumption to that of a social model, regardless of whether the social model is actually present or not. Our results provide promising results that can help to increase the effectiveness of interventions that use social models to positively influence individuals’ eating behavior.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Despite the widespread use of acronyms in branding (e.g., IKEA, WWF), little is known in terms of how consumers perceive them. According to research on processing fluency, easy-to-pronounce acronyms should render more positive evaluations of a brand than difficult-to-pronounce acronyms. This is because the ease of processing fluent information creates positive affect which is often misattributed to the target (Reber, Winkielman, and Schwarz 1998). In the present research, we argue that difficult-to-pronounce acronyms can be evaluated favorably with respect to attributes that are associated with social distance.

Our prediction is based on research that shows that disfluent stimuli are associated with physical distance and abstract construal (Alter and Oppenheimer 2008; Förster 2009). In a brand name context, we argue that the difficulty of processing a brand name elicits the impression that a brand is “distant” from the consumer. In turn, the brand is positively evaluated with respect to attributes that are representative of distant relations. This explanation is in keeping with research that suggests when people encounter information that is consistent with an existing mental representation, they are likely to “feel right” about the information, which subsequently heightens the evaluations of target information (e.g., Kim, Rao, and Lee 2009; Higgins et al. 2003; Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004). Attributes that are associated with social closeness, on the other hand, are experienced as “unfit” with the distant representation of the brand, and therefore, are expected to be less positively evaluated compared to fluent brands.

In study 1, we employed a 2 (fluency: fluent vs. disfluent) x 2 (attribute type: close vs. far) within-subjects design. Participants were presented with a list of five-letter acronyms disguised as organization names. Intermixed in the list of acronyms were four acronyms that were pretested as being difficult to pronounce (e.g., CCDC and four acronyms that were pretested as being easy to pronounce (e.g., CATSA). Participants in the pretest indicated no prior knowledge of the acronyms. They were instructed to give their impressions of each organization on five attributes, two of which, were pretested as being representative of socially close relations (i.e., approachable, warm, friendly). The “distant” and “close” attributes were pretested as being equally attractive qualities to a brand. Each attribute was presented as a seven-point scale in a fixed order for every acronym. A repeated measures ANOVA on participants’ attribute evaluations revealed close attributes were more positively evaluated when the acronym was fluent than disfluent, replicating classical findings in fluency research. However, attributes that were associated with distant relations were rated more positively when the acronym was disfluent than fluent.

In study 2, we adopted a 2 (fluency: fluent vs. disfluent) x 2 (attribute type: close vs. far) mixed design with the latter factor as within-subjects variable. All participants were presented with a five-letter acronym that represented a home security company (i.e., A.C.A.A.F.). Participants in the disfluent condition saw the brand name alone, while those in the fluent condition were presented with a cue below the acronym that facilitated its pronunciation (i.e., [a-ca-f]). All participants were asked to give their impressions about the brand name on four attributes, two of which were pretested as being representative of socially distant relations (i.e., proficient, skilled) while the other two were pretested as being representative of socially close relations (i.e., loyal, caring). They were asked to evaluate the likelihood that the brand would be to reflect each description on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very likely). After providing their attribute evaluations, participants were asked to indicate how attached they would become to the company if they were to become its customer (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). This measure was included to test whether disfluency (vs. fluency) created a sense of psychological distance which subsequently affected attribute evaluations of the brand. Finally, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they used their feelings to evaluate each of the attributes (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).

A repeated measures ANOVA on participants’ attribute evaluations with fluency as a between-subjects factor revealed a significant interaction between attribute type and fluency. Once again, close attributes were more positively evaluated when the acronym was fluent than disfluent. Attributes that were associated with distant relations were rated as equally positive when the acronym was fluent or disfluent. A mediational analysis was conducted on the close attributes to confirm whether the difference in evaluations between the fluent and disfluent conditions was due to a difference in psychological distance. Disfluency negatively predicted the evaluations of close attributes as well as feelings of attachment or closeness to the home security company. When both feelings of psychological closeness and disfluency were included as predictors, the effect of disfluency on the evaluations of close attributes was significantly reduced, indicating that a difference in psychological closeness fully mediated the effect. For both the close and distant attributes, participants indicated that they used their feelings to a similar extent to evaluate the brand. This result suggests that a difference in processing styles (affective vs. cognitive) could not have explained the difference found in attribute evaluations.

Across two studies, we find that when a brand name is disfluent, individuals perceive the brand to be distant, which enhances the evaluations of matching attributes while lowering evaluations of mismatching attributes. Our findings have practical implications for brand positioning as well as theoretical implications for brand personality research (Aaker 1997). Whereas brand personalities such as competence can be promoted through disfluent communication, personalities such as sincerity are likely to become more salient through fluent communication.

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The pursuit of happiness is one of the most fundamental of all human motives. This motive is often translated in the acquisition of hedonic products. Hedonic products offer fun, pleasure, cheerfulness and enjoyment (Chitturi, Raghunathan and Mahajan 2008). However, hedonic products fail to elevate happiness in the long run (Brickman and Campbell 1971; Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). The hedonic treadmill theory (Brickman and Campbell, 1971) argues that hedonic products do not offer a sustainable elevation of happiness, despite consumers’ intentions. After purchase, consumers’ happiness falls back to the baseline level. The hedonic treadmill theory sketches a fatalistic image: consumers pursue happiness through hedonic consumption, but fail to do so in the long run. Our research shows that hedonic products are bought for purposes of immediate gratification. Consumers do not want to elevate their long term happiness and they anticipate the hedonic fallback.

Additionally, we want to demonstrate how utility affects length of ownership of hedonic versus functional products. If hedonic products are bought to meet short term goals, the utility derived from it should be in the near future. The deceleration rate of benefits should be steeper and this should determine the duration of ownership.

Overall, we argue that consumers buy hedonic products for purposes of immediate gratification which results in a shorter period of ownership. However, time-perspectives may shift. Hedonic products demand more resources, which bolsters guiltiness (Khan, Dhar, and Wertenbroch 2005). Guilt is correlated with risk aversion (Mancini and Gangemi 2004) and risk aversion supports the acquisition of insurances, or extended service contracts (ESC). ESC’s extend a product’s lifetime. So, paradoxically despite a shorter period of ownership guiltiness fosters the acquisition of an ESC which extends the lifetime of a product.

Study 1 was conducted online using MTurk (N = 119, mean age 35.27 years, 42% were male, US-residents). Participants had to indicate how long they anticipated keeping either 10 hedonic or 10 functional products. Pretests indicated that the hedonic products were more hedonic (F(1,58) = 59.33, p < 0.001), and the functional products more functional (F(1,58) = 37.79, p < 0.001). All participants answered on a scale how fast they think people will replace the product (1 very late; 7 very soon) and how long people will keep the product before disposing it (1 very short; 7 very long). We reverse coded the second question and averaged with the first question (r = 0.72, p < 0.001). The results show that utilitarian products are kept longer than hedonic products (F(1,12) = 18.98, p < 0.001).

In the second study we held the product constant, but manipulated the motivation to buy a bike. Seventy-seven undergraduate students (mean age 20.56 years, 63% were male) from a European university completed the study. Participants were asked to imagine that they bought a bike to practice their beloved hobby (= hedonic) or as a transportation device to go to work (= functional). They rated the former condition as more hedonic (F(1,75) = 140.14, p < 0.001). Also, they expected having more fun with the bike to practice their hobby (F(1,75) = 13.89, p < 0.001). In both conditions they equally liked riding a bike (F(1,75) = 2.41, p = 0.13). Again, the participants anticipated keeping the functional bike longer than the hedonic bike (F(1,75) = 10.31, p < 0.001).

To test if the deceleration rate of utility accounts for anticipated duration of ownership, we asked how they perceived the evolution of the benefits (1 very little; 7 very much) associated with the product over a time horizon (at the time of purchase, half year, a year, a year and half and two year after the purchase (fig 1).

Repeated measures ANOVA revealed that participants assigned more utility to the functional bike (F(1,75) = 27.75, p < 0.001). Additionally, an interaction effect shows a steeper deceleration rate for hedonic products (F(1,75) = 47.46, p < 0.001). Furthermore we calculated the area under the curve (AUC) for each participant. Mediation analysis reveals a significant total effect of the hedonic versus functional condition on length of ownership (t(76)=3.21, p < 0.001). Further, when controlling for AUC the direct effect disappears (t(76)=1.56, p = 0.120), and AUC turns up as a better predictor (t(76) = 2.51, p < 0.05). Lastly, AUC is smaller in the hedonic condition (t(76) = 5.19, p < 0.001). Therefore, we conclude that a different deceleration rate of utility accounts for the length of ownership for hedonic versus functional products.

For the third study we used the same scenario as in the second study. However, instead of asking about duration of ownership the respondents were offered an ESC which costs 15% of the purchase price. The ESC comprised multiple maintenance services which extend the product-lifetime. Eighty-seven undergraduate students (mean age 20.87, 47% were male) from a European university completed the study and received partial course credit.

The hedonic bike was rated as more hedonic (F(1,76)=83.34, p<0.001), and participants expected have more fun with this bike (F(1,76)=5.48, p=0.020). Across both conditions the respondents equally liked riding their bike (F(1,76)=2.01, p=0.159). Finally, the participants reported that it would be more likely that they would buy an ESC for the hedonic bike (F(1,76)=3.86, p=0.050).

Our results support the idea that hedonic products are bought to meet short time goals. Additionally, hedonic products are kept for a shorter period of time because the benefits evaporate faster. These results challenge the idea that consumers buy hedonic products to elevate their long term happiness. Instead, we show that hedonic products are bought for purposes of immediate gratification. However, hedonic products bolster feelings of guilt which may alter time-perspectives. Feelings of guilt activate risk aversion, which results in the acquisition of ESC’s. Paradoxically, an ESC extends the lifetime of a product.
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The Feeling of Learning and the Joy of Liking

Daniel He, Columbia University, USA
Shiri Melumad, Columbia University, USA
Michel Pham, Columbia University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Immeasurable in richness and overwhelming in immensity, the scale of New Media is of the grandest kind. To manage the deluge of incoming information and the trove of existing content, New Media firms rely on user generated ratings to optimize browsing and enhance search (Huberman, Romero, and Wu 2009). Users’ “Likes” and “Dislikes” for stylish clothing and entertaining videos enable firms such as Threadless, Amazon, and Netflix to manage their content as well as recommend products based on similarities between users’ history of preference ratings (Balabanovic and Shoham 1997). Understanding what motivates people to express their preferences by liking and disliking products and content online has important implications for New Media.

Although users have social motives of sharing their preferences (Back et al. 2010; Gosling, Gaddis, and Vazire 2007; Toubia and Stephen 2013) and instrumental incentives of customizing their browsing experience when they express their preferences online (Herlocker et al. 1999; Herlocker, Konstan, and Riedl 2000), we propose that people evaluate their preferences for another reason – the feeling of learning about their own preferences. Specifically, we posit that people undergo a process of self-discovery when they express their preferences, and they derive an inherent sense of pleasure from this self-discovery process. As such, the more people feel they are learning about their preferences, the greater the pleasure they experience from liking and disliking. Moreover, relative to other judgment tasks not involving evaluating one’s preferences, liking and disliking evokes the highest enjoyment.

Using T-Shirts from an online retailer as stimuli, Study 1 measures people’s expectation of the enjoyment in evaluating their preferences (liking vs. disliking) against four sets of non-preference related judgments about clothing, such as gender appropriateness (for males vs. for females), age appropriateness (for adults vs. for children), or price estimation (cheap vs. expensive). Against any combination of the non-preference related alternative tasks within the four sets, the task of liking and disliking is always perceived to be the most fun, suggesting that people are motivated to express their “Like” and “Dislike” online because of an inherent pleasure in assessing their preferences (F(3, 75) = 8.17; F(3, 75) = 14.99; F(3, 75) = 10.22; F(3, 75) = 8.48, all p’s < .01).

Studies 2 and 3 manipulate the feeling of learning to test the proposed mechanism underlying the fun of preference evaluation. In a series of pairwise comparisons between a base shirt, T-Shirt X, and nine alternative shirts, T-Shirts A through I, respondents are induced either to feel they are learning more about their preferences in T-Shirts or learning less through a framing manipulation of asymmetric comparisons. Specifically, asymmetric comparison is visually manipulated through a boxed frame around the target shirt and semantically manipulated through the instructions. In the Focus on Base condition, the base shirt (T-Shirt X) serves as the target and the nine alternative shirts (T-Shirts A through I) act as the reference points, which generates a feeling of learning about T-Shirt X again and again for each comparison (e.g., How much do you like X vs. A? X vs. B? X vs. C?). Conversely, in the Focus on Alternatives condition, the nine alternative shirts serve as the target and the base shirt becomes the reference point, which creates a feeling of learning about many different shirts (e.g., How much do you like A vs. X? B vs. X? C vs. X?). Results reveal greater enjoyment when respondents feel they are learning about nine different shirts (Focus on Alternatives condition) than when they feel like they are learning about the base shirt repeatedly in the Focus on Base condition (F(1, 90) = 4.18, p = .04). Moreover, the manipulation check confirms that respondents feeling they are learning about T-Shirt X repeatedly have a higher recall rate (F(1, 90) = 5.74, p = .02) and are more confident in their final assessment of T-Shirt X at the end of the experiment (F(1, 90) = 4.03, p = .05), suggesting that it is possible to learn more about the T-Shirts in the stimuli beyond one or two exposures.

Using a similar design of asymmetric comparison, Study 3 replicates the findings of Study 2 with a new stimulus and addresses a potential confound of boredom. In particular, the new stimuli replace T-Shirts with letters of the English alphabet, since past work demonstrate that people can form preferences for symbols (Zajonc, 1968). More importantly, a second factor of a non-preference related task about the positioning in the alphabet (e.g. Which letter is further along the alphabet?) is introduced as a baseline measure to account for any boredom potentially caused by the asymmetric comparison manipulation. The 2 (Focus: Focus on Base vs. Focus on Alternatives) x 2 (Task: Preference evaluation vs. Order of letters) between-subjects experiment finds a significant two-way interaction, in which higher feelings of learning (Focus on Alternatives) induce more fun than lower feelings of learning (Focus on Base) within preference evaluation, but the asymmetric comparison yields no difference of Focus within the non-preference related control condition of positioning in the alphabet (F(1, 302) = 6.62, p = .01). Additionally, the process measure of the feeling of learning reveals a similar Focus x Task interaction (F(1, 302) = 3.60, p < .06).

In all, people not only expect liking and disliking to be more enjoyable than other judgment tasks, but their source of fun originates from a feeling of learning about their preferences. By manipulating the feeling of preference learning with two different stimuli, our results reveal that people who feel they learned more about their preferences have more fun than people who feel they learned less. The motivation behind expressing one’s likes and dislikes bears relevance to New Media firms, which rely upon preference ratings as the basis for collaborative filtering, content management, and consumer customization. Although there are social and instrumental motives to submitting Likes and Dislikes online, people may also derive an inherent pleasure in evaluating their preferences due to the feeling of self-discovery associated with learning about their preferences.

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The Moderating Role of Numeracy in the Effectiveness of Cause-Related Marketing
Janet Kleber, University of Vienna, Austria
Arnd Florack, University of Vienna, Austria
Anja Chladek, University of Vienna, Austria

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Cause-related marketing (CRM) is a well-known selling strategy to improve the success of a product by including a donation to a charitable cause into the product price (Varadarajan, & Menon, 1988). The effectiveness of CRM depends on several factors such as the type and the selling price of the product. Particularly, CRM is usually more effective in hedonic products than in utilitarian ones (Strahilevitz, 1999; Strahilevitz & Myers, 1998) and it works better in low-priced products (Chang, 2008). Research has also shown that CRM is often more successful when the amount of the charitable contribution is provided in absolute amounts (i.e., X Euro of the selling price) than in percentages (Chang, 2008). This effect occurs even though the donation amount in these different presentation formats is equal.

A prerequisite to perceive the actual donation amount in each presentation format might be sufficient numerical ability (i.e., numeracy). Individual differences in numeracy influence the comprehension of numerical information, including the transformation of frequencies, percentages and probabilities into each other (Peters et al., 2006; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). Accordingly, the presentation of numerical information either in frequencies or in percentages changes the meaning of these numbers for less numerate individuals, but does not influence evaluations of higher numerate individuals (for an overview see Peters, 2012). For example, individuals with lower numeracy were willing to donate more if the victim is presented in a frequency format (i.e., 1 out of 100 vs. 1% out of 100), whereas higher numerate individuals are not affected by the format (Dickert, Kleber, Peters, & Slovic, 2011). Therefore, we expect that numeracy moderates the effect of presentation formats on CRM effectiveness. Particularly, we hypothesize that people with less numeracy are influenced by the presentation format of the donation amount, whereas the effectiveness of CRM is not affected by different presentation formats for higher numerate individuals.

In two experiments, we manipulated the presentation format between-subjects by showing the donation amount of the sales price either in absolute amounts (absolute condition: “X Euro of the selling price will be donated”) or in percentages (percentage condition: “X% of the selling price will be donated”). Numeracy was assessed with an objective questionnaire, which measures the understanding of frequencies and percentages (Peters et al., 2007). To examine whether the predicted interaction between numeracy and presentation format depends on product type and selling price, the product type (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the selling price (low vs. high) were also manipulated in both experiments.

In Experiment 1 (N = 56), we used a 2 (presentation format: absolute vs. percentage) x 2 (price level: low vs. high) x 2 (product type: hedonic vs. utilitarian) mixed-factorial design with numeracy as an additional continuous predictor. Participants evaluated hedonic and utilitarian products with low and high selling prices regarding their willingness to purchase and their attractiveness. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a repeated measures regression with product type and price level as within-subjects factors and presentation format and numeracy as between-subjects factors. As dependent variable, we combined willingness to purchase and attractiveness ratings into one CRM effectiveness scale. The results support the predicted interaction between numeracy and the presentation format. Particularly, less numerate individuals evaluated CRM as more effective if the donation amount is presented in absolute amounts than in percentages, whereas no difference was found for higher numerate individuals. This interaction was independent of the product type.

Experiment 2 (N = 118) was designed to replicate our findings regarding the interaction between numeracy and the presentation format of the donation. In contrast to Experiment 1, we examined the same hedonic and utilitarian products by describing their purpose differently and therefore manipulate product type between-subjects. In addition, we considered the attitude towards helping others as a covariate (Koschat-Fischer, Stefan, & Hoyer, 2012). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects conditions (presentation format x product type) and evaluated products of low and high prices. In this experiment we replicated the interaction of numeracy and presentation format with better evaluations of the absolute donation amounts for less numerate individuals and no effect for participants with higher numeracy. Neither the products’ type nor the selling price affected this interaction.

Both experiments consistently showed that the effect of presentation formats on CRM effectiveness depends on individual differences in numerical abilities of the consumer. As hypothesized, less numerate individuals evaluated absolute donations as more effective than percentages, whereas evaluations of higher numerate individuals were not influenced. Furthermore, we found that this interaction was independent of the product type. Accordingly, in the conception of CRM campaigns it should be considered that presenting donations in percentages requires sufficient numeracy to easily comprehend the absolute donation amount correctly. Therefore, presenting absolute donation amounts should be preferred over percentages in all types of products. In general, this research demonstrates that individual differences can result in differential evaluations of the same CRM campaign and should be considered in its conception.

REFERENCES


Cognitive Motivation and Its Impact on Price Cognition
Mehdi Tanzeeb Hossain, The University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Ritesh Saini, The University of Texas at Arlington, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
As defined by Cacioppo and Petty (1982), need for cognition (NFC) refers to individuals’ tendency of engaging in effortful thinking. Tenets of dual process theory invoke that low NFC individuals are likely to exert greater use of system 1 processing which is a more affect based and automatic system for information processing (Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). However, effortful thinking can enhance certain biases and individuals with high NFC are likely to show such biases more often than individuals with low NFC. For example, high NFC individuals are found to show greater false memories (Graham 2007) and similar to low NFC individuals, high NFC individuals are also found to show halo effects (Petty et al. 2009) and anchoring effects (Blankenship et al. 2008). In alignment with such research demonstrating the counter intuitive fact that thoughtful individuals may also make errors in judgment and decision making, in this research we demonstrate that high NFC individuals are more likely to make errors in price cognition than low NFC individuals. Marketers often offer products at a price that is just below a round number to make an impression to the consumers that the product is offered at a cheaper price or on sale (Schindler and Kirby 1997). While there is apparently no difference between $4.00 and $3.99, consumers perceive the latter as a lower price. The magnitude of such price perception is substantial enough to generate additional sales (Kalyanam and Shively 1998). Even though research has shown that it is an error emanating from incomplete processing of pricing information (Thomas and Morwitz 2005), scant attention has been paid to explore the impact of consumers’ tendency to think effortfully on their tendency of making such errors in price cognition. This research fills in this gap by demonstrating that individuals who exert greater degree of effortful thinking are more likely to make errors in price cognition relative to individuals who do not enjoy effortful thinking. Moreover, we found that effortful thinking leads to overreaction to free offers. We reasoned that high NFC individuals are more likely to be driven by maximization goals rather than satisficing goals (Nenkov et al. 2008; Cacioppo and Petty 1982) and such maximization tendency will enhance the attractiveness of a price point that provides a discount cue. In our context, we posit that the low price perception induced by JBP enhances the feasibility of goal achievement (i.e., best shopping outcome) for high NFC individuals and therefore, such price points are evaluated as more attractive by such group of individuals. As a consequence, effortful thinkers, often driven by the maximizing goal, are more likely to be deceived by JBP than effortless thinkers. Similarly, greater degree of effortful thinking may enhance the perception that a free offer gives them an opportunity of maximizing their shopping value by eliminating price constraints.

Study 1 was conducted to test our key thesis. Respondents were asked to imagine that a new ice-cream store was to be opened in their locality which wanted to know consumers’ price perception of certain items. They were given the picture of a hot fudge sundae with its price mentioned either as $3.99 (nine ending condition) or as $4.00 (zero ending condition). Respondents indicated their price perception on a seven point semantic differential scale indicating whether the price of the item was high. We implied a regression analysis where the dependent variable was the price perception and independent variables were the price conditions, NFC and their interaction. The results indicated a significant interaction effect ($\beta = .739; p<.05$) of price conditions and NFC showing that high NFC individuals perceived the price to be significantly lower in the nine ending condition ($M=5.27$) than in the zero ending condition ($M=3.77$) whereas the low NFC individuals didn’t show any variation of price perception across conditions ($M=4.00$ vs. $M=3.86$). A spotlight analysis at one standard deviation above the mean of NFC showed a significant difference such that high NFC individuals perceived the price to be significantly lower in the nine ending condition than in the zero ending condition. A similar spotlight analysis at one standard deviation below the mean of NFC did not show a significant difference in price perception across the two conditions. Moreover, a mediation analysis was conducted following the Zhao et al. (2010) procedure where the attractiveness rating of price was the mediating variable. The 95% bootstrap confidence interval ranges from .0313 to .8415 and we found evidence of a complementary mediation.

Study 2 and 3 were conducted to replicate findings from study 1. In these studies we had introduced a reference option along with the target product. The purpose was to see how the price perception of the target category (sundae) varies due to the price ending in presence of a reference category. A regression analysis revealed a significant interaction effect ($\beta = .717; p<.01$) indicating that high NFC individuals showed greater degree of price ending bias ($M_{99} = 2.409$ vs. $M_{99} = .720$) than the low NFC individuals ($M_{399} = 1.0$ vs. $M_{300} = 1.1$). Similar results were obtained in study 3 using a cognitive efficiency measure proposed by Frederick (2005). Results indicated that cognitive efficiency enhances the nine ending bias. Study 4 was conducted to replicate the findings by situationally manipulating thoughtfulness rather than using chronic measures. Respondents were randomly assigned to high thoughtful and low thoughtful conditions. A significant interaction effect revealed that respondents in the high thoughtful condition showed significantly lower price perception ($M=4.52$) in the nine ending condition than in the zero ending condition ($M=3.34$) while respondents in the low thoughtful condition did not show any difference across price conditions ($M=4.41$ vs. $M=4.36$) ($F(1,160) = 4.688; p<.05$). In study 5, we extend our investigation of the impact of effortful thinking on price cognition to the context of free promotions (Shampianer et al. 2007). A logistic regression analysis indicated a significant interaction effect ($\beta = .353; p<.05$) showing that individuals in the high thoughtfulness condition showed greater degree of zero price effect than individuals in the low thoughtfulness conditions.

REFERENCES

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Table 1: Summary

<table>
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<th>Study</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>Regression analysis: DV= price perception, IV1= price conditions ($3.99 vs $4.00), IV2= NFC</td>
<td>a significant interaction effect ($β= .739; p&lt;.05) of price conditions and NFC</td>
<td>high NFC individuals perceived the price to be significantly lower in the nine ending condition (M=5.27) than in the zero ending condition (M=3.77) whereas the low NFC individuals didn’t show any variation of price perception across conditions (M= 4.00 vs M=3.86)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Regression analysis: DV= difference in price perception, IV1= price conditions ($3.99 vs $4.00), IV2= NFC</td>
<td>a significant interaction effect ($β= .717; p&lt;0.01) between price conditions and NFC</td>
<td>the difference in price perception was significantly higher in the nine ending condition (M= 2.409) than in the zero ending condition (M= .720) for high NFC individuals. For low NFC individuals no such difference was evident (M=1.0 vs M=1.01) across conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>Regression analysis: DV= difference in price perception, IV1= price conditions ($3.99 vs $4.00), IV2= CRT</td>
<td>a significant interaction effect between price conditions and CRT ($β= .422; p=.018)</td>
<td>individuals scoring high on CRT showed significantly greater difference in price perceptions in the nine ending condition (M= 1.882) relative to the zero ending condition (M= 1.01) while individuals scoring low on CRT didn’t show any difference in price perceptions across conditions (M= 1.25 vs M= 1.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>ANOVA: DV= difference in price perception, IV1= price conditions ($3.99 vs $4.00), IV2= thoughtfulness conditions</td>
<td>a significant interaction effect between price conditions and thoughtfulness (F 1,160 = 4.688; p&lt;.05).</td>
<td>respondents in the high thoughtfulness condition showed significantly lower price perception (M= 4.52) in the nine ending condition than in the zero ending condition (M = 3.34) while respondents in the low thoughtfulness condition did show any difference across price conditions (M= 4.41 vs M =4.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>Regression analysis</td>
<td>a significant interaction effect ($β= .353; p&lt;0.05) of price conditions and thoughtfulness</td>
<td>the choice share of the low value option went up from 42% in the cost condition to 75% in the free condition for the high thoughtfulness group, showing a significant zero price effect ($β=.311; p&lt;0.01). For the low NFC group the choice share of the low value option barely increased from 61% in the cost condition to 63% in the free condition ($β=.023; p&gt;.8)</td>
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Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). This distinction seems particularly important when judging the norms that foster a personalized view of power should fear the consequences of excessive power that goes unchecked. This is evident in the political system of checks and balances contained in the American Constitution—aimed at assuring fairness in the use of power by the different branches of government. Thus, mainstream European Americans, because they are seen as more strongly embodying North American culture (Devos and Banaji 2005), may be especially likely to apply injunctive norms of fairness when judging the interactions of power-holders with others.

As important as fairness norms are, research suggests that compassion can sometimes override fairness, particularly when notions of compassion are made salient (Batson et al. 1995). We propose that Hispanics who hold a socialized view of power for the benefit of others would be predisposed to apply injunctive norms of compassion to power-holders. A power-holder who focuses on helping those around him or her does not represent a social threat that needs to be deterred. On the contrary, people generally approve of benevolent power-holders (Frieze and Boneva 2001). Thus, we expect that Hispanics will apply to power-holders injunctive norms of compassion when judging their interactions with others.

An important characteristic of social norms is that, although they serve an important role in guiding behavior within a society, they are more likely to do so when they are made salient by environmental stimuli (Cialdini et al. 1990). Accordingly, cultural differences in the application of injunctive norms are more likely to emerge in situations that render these norms salient (Fu et al. 2007). We further suggest that cues that prime power should increase the salience of the culturally associated injunctive norms and thereby increase the focus on these normative considerations for judging a power-holder. Thus, when power is salient (versus not salient) European Americans should rely more on notions of fairness for evaluating power-holders’ actions, whereas Hispanics should focus more on notions of compassion in the same context.

Study 1 tested the basic contention that European Americans and Hispanics differ in the injunctive norms applied to power-holders. European American and Hispanic participants indicated the extent to which they believed that power-holders should embody three personal characteristics that were selected to represent fairness, and three personal characteristics selected to represent compassion. After that, they were presented with three pairs of characteristics designed to pit fairness against compassion (sympathetic vs. fair, ambitious vs. friendly, and thorough vs. good-natured), and asked to choose the one from each pair that they believe “it is a must” for power-holders to have. Results showed that European Americans believe that power-holders should embody more fairness than compassion characteristics, whereas Hispanics believe that power-holders should embody more compassion than fairness characteristics. European Americans (Hispanics) were also much more likely to choose characteristics of fairness (compassion) versus compassion (fairness) as “must haves” for power-holders.

Study 2 extends the findings to a negotiation context and provides evidence that power activated culturally distinct injunctive norms associated with power. Participants were first presented with a task designed either to make notions of power salient (power condition) or not (neutral condition). Participants were then presented with a negotiation task in which a powerful negotiator behaved in either a fair or compassionate way, and then evaluated the negotiator. When power was made salient (vs. not), European Americans (Hispanics) evaluated more favorably the powerful negotiator according to cultural norms of fairness (compassion). When power was made salient (vs. not), European Americans (Hispanics) evaluated more favorably the powerful negotiator according to cultural norms of fairness (compassion).

In Study 3 we tested the hypothesis that power salience would cause European Americans (Hispanics) to evaluate power-holders more favorably the more fair (compassionate) they are perceived to be. We did so by investigating people’s evaluations of power-holders with whom they have a real-life, on-going and consequential interaction (patient-physician interaction). Results showed that, when power is salient (vs. not), Hispanics evaluate more favorably a power-holder with whom they have an on-going, real relationship to the extent that he/she is perceived as being more compassionate. This effect was absent among European Americans, who evaluated the power-holder non-significantly less favorably as a function of compassionate perceptions when power was made salient (vs. the baseline condition). In contrast, European Americans evaluated non-significantly more favorably the power-holder as a function of perceptions of fairness in the power salient (vs. neutral) condition.

In sum, our research demonstrates that European Americans are predisposed to apply to power-holders injunctive norms of fairness, whereas Hispanics are predisposed to apply injunctive norms of
compassion. These cultural variations in the use of injunctive norms were more evident in situations where power was made salient. These findings have important consequences for service interactions in which notions of power are relevant.

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The Better You Do, the Worse You Feel: Selective Information Processing Approaches Based on Social Comparisons Moderates the Effect of Absolute Performance on Satisfaction

Dilney Gonçalves, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Jonathan Luffarelli, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Antonios Stamatogiannakis, IE Business School – IE University, Spain

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumption settings in which consumers are evaluated in comparison to others are ubiquitous. A prime example of such settings is the postsecondary education industry with, in the USA alone, its 21 million annual consumers. Yet, consumer research has largely ignored such settings. Consequently, the antecedents of satisfaction when customers are evaluated relatively are not well understood. This research addresses this gap by examining satisfaction in consumption settings in which consumers are evaluated relatively. We primarily (but not only) use the postsecondary industry as the testing-ground for our theory.

In relative evaluation settings, consumers may have access to three pieces of information: their individual scores (individual absolute evaluation), the scores’ distribution mean (average evaluation), and the actual relative evaluation outcome (ranking). We hypothesize that in these settings, superior (inferior) evaluations can lead to inferior (superior) satisfaction. We theorize that different weights are given to the aforementioned pieces of information as a function of social comparison orientation. We refer to social comparison orientation as SCO.

Specifically, we argue that consumers high in SCO pay relatively more attention to the average evaluation, which is a relevant proxy of others’ absolute evaluation. A lower (higher) average evaluation signals that others are doing poorly (well), setting thus a lower (higher) comparison standard. In turn, a lower (higher) comparison standard makes high SCO consumers feel that they are more (less) competent in comparison to others.

Conversely, consumers who are low in SCO would focus their attention relatively more closely on their own absolute evaluation. Since a high (low) absolute evaluation is better (worse) than a low (high) one, these individuals feel more (less) competent when their own absolute evaluation is high (low).

Jointly, we propose that a simple intervention like moving all the absolute scores up or down without changing rankings (actual outcomes), can significantly affect consumer satisfaction. Since in such interventions the individual and average evaluations would covary, consumers high in SCO would then feel more (less) competent and, therefore, satisfied when their own absolute evaluation is low (high), while the opposite pattern should be observed for consumers low in SCO.

Study 1

A pilot study (not reported) revealed that employees have a tendency to believe that consumers will be more (less) satisfied with higher (lower) evaluations. Study 1 demonstrates that such belief is erroneous and that consumers high in SCO are more satisfied with lower absolute evaluations, although they do not expect to be. Fifty-four graduate students (familiar with relative evaluations) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: high vs. low absolute evaluation. Importantly, relative ranking was kept constant across conditions. In each condition, participants evaluated the satisfaction of a fictitious colleague of theirs with an exam grade. Two weeks later, 70 graduate students drawn from the same population were asked to make a direct choice between the high vs. the low evaluation condition.

Consistent with our hypotheses, participants provided higher satisfaction ratings in the low (vs. high) absolute evaluation condition (t=6.36; p=.05). In contrast, when two weeks later participants made a direct choice, 77% of them preferred receiving high absolute evaluations (X²=20.63; p<.001). Hence, in the second part of the study, participants indicated that a situation in which everyone would obtain a higher absolute evaluation, and thus (as the first part shows) be less satisfied, was preferable.

Study 2

This study (n=111), tested the moderating role of SCO. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (absolute evaluation: high vs. low) x 2 (relative evaluation: above vs. below the mean evaluation) x 3 (context: classroom, sports competition, loyalty program) between-subjects design. We measured satisfaction on 7-point scales and SCO (Gibbons and Buunk 1999).

We found only one significant interaction; between absolute evaluation and SCO ($B=-.60; p=.02$). A spotlight analysis (Irwin and McClelland 2001) revealed that participants with a high SCO were less satisfied when absolute evaluation was high (vs. low) ($B=-1.19; p=.037$). Conversely, participants with a low SCO were more satisfied when absolute evaluation was high (vs. low) ($B=1.23; p=.034$).

Study 3

This study (n=256), replicated our results through procedural priming of SCO (Mussweiler and Epstude 2009) and uncovers a moderated mediation between evaluation and satisfaction. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (absolute evaluation: high vs. low) x 2 (social comparison: primed vs. control group) between-subjects design. We measured satisfaction and perceived competence with 7-point scales.

Results showed that SCO significantly moderated the relationship between absolute evaluation and perceived competence while perceived competence significantly mediated the relationship between absolute evaluation and satisfaction (Preacher et al. 2007). Indirect effects show that participants who were primed to be more socially comparative felt significantly more dissatisfied with a high (vs. low) absolute evaluation (95% CI [-.007, -.001]) while participants in the control condition felt significantly more satisfied with a high (vs. low) absolute evaluation (95% CI [.055, .33]).

Discussion

To summarize, we found that SCO moderates the relationship between consumer evaluation and perceived competence, while perceived competence mediates the relationship between consumer evaluation and satisfaction. We suggest that this process is the result of different information processing approaches triggered by individual differences in SCO.

Theoretically, our work is the first to examine satisfaction in consumption contexts in which consumers are evaluated relatively. It also contributes to the scant literature showing how higher satisfaction may result from lower performances (Medvec et al. 1995; Iyen-
gar et al. 2006). Thirdly, we add to the understanding of the selection of comparison information (Mussweiler 2003) by showing that information about others’ (vs. own) absolute evaluation is selected based on SCO.

Managerially, our results have important implications for all of the firms that — in one way or another — evaluate their consumers or their employees relatively. We demonstrated that “being as nice as they come” when evaluating consumers may be detrimental for consumer satisfaction and we expose the previously unknown, and potentially detrimental, impact of relative evaluation methods on consumer satisfaction. Interestingly, according to our results, when appraising individuals with a greater (lower) tendency to engage in social comparison, appraisers should shift absolute evaluations downward (upward), while keeping relative evaluations constant, in order to increase satisfaction.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Neoclassical economic theory considers man to be a utility maximizer who will choose the same alternative under any circumstance given it provides to him the maximum utility (Luce 1959). However, research has documented many instances when consumers’ preferences are predictably biased by the composition of the set under consideration (e.g., Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982). It is worth noting that much of this existing behavioral research shows that when the set composition is changed in some manner (e.g., attributes, brand information, additional options), choice is influenced. We propose, however, that even when the factors in the alternative set are kept constant, choice can still be influenced. Specifically, when we keep the set of alternatives exactly the same but merely change their spatial order, choice of alternatives can change. Consider an ice cream parlor that offers five ice cream cones displayed on the shop counter in increasing order of size from left to right (smallest to largest). Would consumers’ preferences change if the cones were arranged in the opposite order—increasing in size from the right to the left? Would consumers’ estimates of the amount of calories differ? Why would seeing the same set of alternatives left to right (LTR) versus right to left (RTL) affect choice? We borrow from literature in cognitive psychology that demonstrates the influence of language-scanning habits (based on the direction of script flow of the dominant language) on different outcomes (e.g., Chae and Hoegg forthcoming; Maass and Russo 2003).

The repeated scanning of information in the same direction (LTR in English) is thought to foment a habit of scanning information in the direction of the language script and an expectation of the path that movement should follow, which consumers then employ in domains extraneous to language (Chan and Bergen 2005; Dehaene, Bossini, and Giraux 1993; Maass, Pagani, and Berta 2007; Tversky, Kugelmass, and Winter 1991). Based on this research, we first propose that reading in an LTR direction consistently biases the order in which consumers evaluate unfamiliar product sets: starting by evaluating products on the left and then evaluating products to the right. We posit this biased estimation order influences how consumers estimate unknown set quantities, such as price and calories. Because the product they estimate first is likely to serve as anchor for the estimation of subsequent products, those estimates are likely to be biased toward the first estimate (Epley and Gilovich 2001). Therefore, if a set is organized in increasing order LTR (RTL), where the least (most) expensive product is located in the left, price estimates of the products to the right will be biased low (high), making the whole set appear lower (higher) in value. Second, we propose that spatial sets can vary in their level of visual flow—how well they match the direction of language—and that visual flow can influence the estimation process, where product sets high in visual flow encourage adjustment while products low in visual flow discourage it.

Four lab and one field study support these propositions. Study 1 tested the role of reading directionality on the estimation of process, specifically anchoring. Participants were shown images of three food items increasing LTR in caloric content (salad, chicken, burger). In the RTL condition, they were shown the same items but in the reverse order. As predicted, an LTR (vs. RTL) order, where the food with the lowest (highest) number of calories was located on the left, caused participants to anchor on a low (high) calorie estimate which biased subsequent estimations toward the low (high) anchor. Study 2 tested the underlying process by temporarily reversing the direction in which individuals read. As predicted, temporarily changing the direction in which participants read moderated the bias to anchor on the leftmost products. Study 3 moderated the effect by facilitating or hindering visual flow. As it was expected, the set high (vs. low) in visual flow increased of adjustment away from the anchor. Study 4 moderated the effect of reading directionality on estimation by using real movement (rather than implied as in study 3). As with the previous study, the set that matched (mismatched) visual flow encouraged (discouraged) adjustment. Study 5, a field study, tested the effect in a smoothie shop. As predicted, consumption was influenced by spatial order of the alternatives.

Through lab and field studies, this work provides evidence of how simply changing the spatial arrangement or visual flow of the alternatives changes not only the estimation processes but also consumer preferences. This work adds to the literature on spatial decision making, demonstrating that consumers employ an anchoring and adjustment process that is highly influenced by the direction in which they read.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

As one of the negative emotions most tightly related to decision-making, regret has proved an important topic for consumer behavior research (e.g., Simonson 1992, Inman and Zeelenberg 2002). People are strongly motivated to avoid or decrease it and the regulation strategies they implement may have strong influence on their judgments, decisions and behaviors. This research illustrates how optimism may represent a defense mechanism against regret when the outcome of the regretful decision is still pending and uncertain.

Although most research on regret examine situations where the negative emotion results from a disappointing outcome, a decision process, independently from its outcome, can also trigger regret, when it is not judged as sensible and wise, i.e. justifiable (Connolly and Zeelenberg 2002, Pieters and Zeelenberg 2005). Pre-outcome regret can emerge after neglecting some topics while preparing for an exam or investing in highly risky financial products, even before knowing the academic exam questions, or the performance of the chosen financial products. Research has already documented strategies that people may implement to mitigate their post-outcome regret (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007) but much less is known about regulation strategies of pre-outcome regret. We propose that, when there is a delay between the decision and its outcome, regretful people are optimistic about the outcome of the wrongful decision compared to non-regretful people, as a strategy to cope with self-blame. Furthermore, this regret-induced defensive optimism correlates with potentially harmful behavioral intentions such as decreased willingness to alter and improve future similar decisions. However we show that severity of decision consequences is a boundary condition for defensive optimism. When the consequences at stakes loom larger, pre-outcome regret does not optimistically distort expectation any longer.

Study 1 (N=133) relies on real decisions where pre-outcome regret is manipulated with the responsibility for not practicing before taking a standardized reasoning test (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead 2000, Ordoñez and Connolly 2000). In the high regret condition, participants were given the choice between practicing before the actual test or earning one additional dollar by answering another unrelated questionnaire. Consistent with our pretest, the vast majority of participants chose the 1S unrelated questionnaire. In the no-regret condition, the experimenter gave them the unrelated questionnaire without any other choice. Severity of the consequences was manipulated by assigning the respondents to a test version that either matched (high severity) or mismatched (low severity) their self-stated preferred type of reasoning (verbal or numerical). The rational for choosing this manipulation was that a bad performance at a test that matches an individual’s preferred type of reasoning will represent a more severe threat for the self than a bad performance in another domain less relevant for the individual’s identity. Performance forecasts were elicited just after the actual test, such that participants had no longer any control on the test outcome when giving their expectations. In the low severity condition, individuals who regretted not practicing estimated they answered more questions correctly (M=61.52) than individuals in the no-regret condition (M=50.85) (t(1,112)=5.11, p=.03). However when the consequences were more severe, the estimates given by regret (M=68.47) and no regret (M=68.92) groups did not differ (F(1,112)=.99, NS, interaction F(1,112)=2.74, p=.10). Furthermore, in the low severity condition only, regretful participants expressed less willingness to practice in the future compared to non-regretful ones. In line with the expectation pattern, regretful people actually performed better than non-regretful people when the test version mismatched their preferred type of reasoning (low severity), whereas the performances of the regret and no-regret groups did not differ when the test matched the preferred style of reasoning (high severity). It is possible that the regret manipulation may have led participants to put more efforts in the test so as to perform better and make up for choosing to skip practice. The optimistic forecasts compared to those on the non-regretful participants may thus both reflect the better performance and a defense mechanism. The design of Study 2 allows to better control for alternative explanations when testing regret-induced defensive optimism in a different domain with different manipulations of pre-outcome regret and severity.

In Study 2 (N=183), regret is manipulated by priming participants (Scrambled Sentence Task, Reb & Connolly 2009), in order to provide more direct evidence that optimism is a regulation strategy specifically triggered by regret. Priming also allows distinguishing between the outcome and self-blame components of regret. Previous research has shown that self-blame regret leads to more learning than outcome regret (Reb & Connolly 2009). We thus explore the possibility that the type of pre-outcome regret may also affect expectations for the decision outcome. Participants had to compose a financial portfolio out of a set of stocks. Severity was manipulated with the percentage of their savings they supposedly had invested in that portfolio (5% vs. 100%). In the low severity condition, both groups primed with self-blame regret (M=6.90) and outcome regret (M=6.65) were optimistic compared to the no-regret condition (M=5.96, respectively t(167)=2.44, p<.05 and t(167)=1.79, p=.075). Individuals in both regret conditions were also more willing to endorse the same decision they made before compared to the control condition (both p’s<.05). In the high severity condition, people primed with self-blame regret were pessimistic (M=5.57) compared to the no-regret (M=6.42) and the ‘outcome regret’ conditions (M=6.36, respectively t(167)=2.01, p<.05 and t(167)=2.28, p<.05). They were also less likely to recommend their portfolio choice compared to the other conditions.

This research illustrates how optimism can emerge as a defense mechanism against pre-outcome regret for decisions with relatively benign consequences. People experiencing pre-outcome regret are also less prone to question and less willing to improve their decision if a similar situation occurs in the future. Both the self-blame and the outcome components of pre-outcome regret induce optimism and it does not arise for more consequential decisions.

REFERENCES


Aging Well Differently: Desired Aging Well and its Influence on the Consumption of People from Ages 50 to 65

Eloïse Sengès, Université Paris-Dauphine, France
Denis Guiot, Université Paris-Dauphine, France
Ziad Malas, Université Toulouse III Paul Sabatier, France

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The increase in life expectancy and the challenge of aging well that ensues from it have given rise to the new concept of successful aging (SA). SA has been the subject of many research studies over the last fifty years (Havighurst and Albrecht 1953; Rowe and Kahn 1987). Aging well has also become a key issue for marketing to seniors, yet this concept remains under-investigated in consumer research.

Given the demographic, financial, and strategic importance of the seniors target (Moschis 1992, 2003) and the lack of marketing research on the subject, it is necessary to examine the perception of SA and its influence on consumption by individuals over 50 years old.

This study provides a reliable and valid measurement instrument for Desired Aging Well (DAW) in three dimensions: physical, psychological, and social. Its influence on consumer behavior is tested in three markets: health, leisure, and financial services. The DAW scale and the overall antecedents-manifestations-consequences model are validated on a sample of 1,019 individuals who are representative of French people aged 50 to 65 years old.

The SA model, its definition, and measurement have been subject to controversy in scientific research (Depp and Jeste 2006). Our research, through the DAW construct, is situated within the theoretical framework of Baltes and Baltes (1990). Through the Selection, Optimization, and Compensation (SOC) model, the authors have defined SA as an adaptive process of selective optimization and compensation.

There is a lack of consensus in the literature for the evaluation of SA. Some researchers (Rowe and Kahn 1987) consider that SA should be characterized by normative criteria defined by the researchers. Others (Baltes and Baltes 1990; Baltes and Carstensen 1996) argue that it is a matter of the individual’s subjective judgment. In order to clarify the divergent approaches of the SA construct, we propose making a conceptual distinction between SA and Aging Well, and argue that SA is a normative view of the quality of aging (objective approach) while Aging Well is centered on the perceived quality of aging by the people concerned (subjective approach).

Baltes and Carstensen (1996) believe that a normative approach is detrimental to a better understanding of aging because it ignores the individual and cultural variation among people’s objectives. On the contrary, according to the subjective approach, when one is interested in SA an important preliminary question would be to establish people’s goals.

Following Baltes and Carstensen’s (1996) position, we view SA as the achievement of the objectives of the person concerned. The subjective approach seems all the more relevant in a marketing research context as it can more accurately explain consumption behavior. It is also more adapted to marketing methodologies.

In sum, the literature review on SA and the marketing context of our study led us to understand DAW as a perception for which we offer the following definition:

“DAW is the individual perception of the relative importance of the objectives to be pursued in the quest for ideal aging in accordance with one's physiological, cognitive, social, and financial resources” (Sengès, Guiot, and Malas 2013).

A literature review on DAW antecedents led us to consider the following variables: subjective age tendency which is the discrepancy between chronological age and subjective age (Barak and Gould 1985; Moschis and Mathur 2006), age, the search for positive emotions, life satisfaction, and gender. The SOC model (Baltes and Baltes 1990) and the future time perspective theory in motivation (Nuttin 1980, 1984) prompted us to test the influence of DAW on consumer behavior. The three sectors highlighted by the literature were studied through the following indicators: the number of financial portfolio reallocations, the frequency of leisure activities, and the attitude towards health innovation.

To define the DAW concept and to create a reliable and valid measurement scale, we drew on Churchill’s (1979) paradigm. Data collection was carried out through a quantitative online survey on a sample of 1,019 French people aged 50 to 65 years old.

The model was tested by the structural equations method, which gave a satisfactory fit to the data: Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) were close to the norms if one refers to the commonly used measurement indices (χ2: 433.00, significance: .000, χ2/degree of freedom: 2.547, GFI .961, AGFI: .947, CFI: .958, RMSEA: .039). Causal relationships were evaluated using standardized parameters.

This study reveals three important findings. The first is that the DAW may be captured by a multidimensional construct made up of three components: Physical, Psychological, and Social. It is possible to work either with the full DAW scale or with only one dimension. The physical factor constitutes two-thirds of DAW explained variance.

The second important result concerns DAW antecedents. Life satisfaction, the search for positive emotions, internal subjective age tendency, and gender (being a woman) have a significant positive influence on the importance given to the DAW dimensions. On the other hand, actual age and the external subjective age tendency have no impact. These findings confirm that the internal subjective age tendency should be distinguished from the external subjective age tendency.

The third contribution of the study is that DAW appears to have a significant effect on consumption behavior. Indeed, the greater the importance attributed to physical, social, and psychological DAW, the greater the number of actions related to financial investments and the greater the interest in health innovations. Finally, the importance attached to psychological DAW exerts a positive influence on the frequency of leisure activities.

Thus, DAW has the capacity to characterize consumer expectations in terms of aging and to predict their consumption behavior. Therefore, the DAW may be used as a segmentation criterion for the seniors market.

Future research should consider other dimensions for grasping the DAW construct more fully, such as cognitive functioning (Rowe and Kahn 1997) and physical appearance (Bowling 2010). Further research on a wider sample (from 35 to 80 years old) would also enable an analysis of the potential variations of DAW according to age and their impact on consumption.
In conclusion, the introduction of the DAW concept to marketing could contribute to the development of Aging Well Marketing and could enable practitioners to better meet the needs of senior consumers who want to assume control of their aging.

**REFERENCES**


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers who are motivated to present themselves in a socially desirable manner often choose to display images of higher status, wealth, and prestige through conspicuous consumption. However, will conspicuous consumption have its desired social benefits even when conspicuous products are purchased with money or wealth acquired unfairly? Will consumers themselves engage in conspicuous consumption when they earned money without adequate effort? The results of four studies suggest that the social benefits of conspicuous consumption can be diminished when others spend money acquired without fair effort. However, consumers who themselves acquire money without adequate effort still prefer to engage in conspicuous consumption. These effects are moderated by individual differences in the value placed on social justice.

Though conspicuous consumption has many known social benefits (Griskevicius et al. 2007; Nelissen and Meijers 2011; Scott, Mende, and Bolton 2012), these social benefits may not accrue when money spent on conspicuous consumption is acquired without adequate effort. Justice is an important, universal social value, and people have a desire to believe that people get what they deserve (Lerner 2003; Haidt and Graham 2007). Thus, when consumers are aware that others spend conspicuously using money acquired without their own effort, conspicuous consumption may highlight social inequality and the other person may be perceived negatively. Furthermore, this effect will be more pronounced if evaluators place greater importance on social justice.

Study 1 tested this prediction by examining participants’ perceptions of a classmate who engages in conspicuous consumption. Participants in the low (high) monetary fairness condition read that their classmate won a competition with a cash prize through inadequate effort (hard work). Then, the classmate was considering the purchase of a Louis Vuitton (vs. no brand) wallet using the award money. Participants indicated their overall impressions of the classmate and the value placed on social justice, using two items from the moral foundation scale (Graham et al. 2011). As expected, a significant three-way interaction between monetary fairness, brand, and value of social justice revealed that when the brand was conspicuous, money acquired without fair effort led to more negative evaluations of the classmate, particularly when participants highly valued social justice. When the brand was not conspicuous, money acquired without fair effort led to negative evaluations of the classmate in general, independently of the value placed on social justice.

In study 2, we sought to test the process underlying the effect demonstrated in study 1. We theorized that conspicuous consumption with money earned unfairly may diminish the perceived validity of the prestige signal communicated via conspicuous consumption. Given that positive images from conspicuous consumption are based on perceptions of personal qualities that generate wealth or status, people may not evaluate others engaging in conspicuous consumption positively when they do not perceive others as having higher prestige and status. Thus, the perceived prestige attributed to others should mediate the effect of monetary fairness on evaluations of others’ conspicuous consumption.

Study 2 examined participants’ evaluations of a classmate who was wearing an Emporio Armani jacket. In the low (high) monetary fairness condition, the jacket was bought with money received from the parents (vs. a paycheck). Participants indicated their impressions of the classmate, prestige perceptions, and the value placed on social justice. As in Study 1, money acquired without fair effort led to negative evaluations of the classmate, particularly when people valued social justice. Moreover, the indirect effect via prestige perceptions was significant. Thus, people who value social justice perceived other consumers negatively because they thought that conspicuous consumption did not signal prestige when others earned money without their own fair effort.

In studies 3 and 4, we examined the impact of monetary fairness on consumers’ own choice of conspicuous consumption. We predicted that when consumers have acquired money without adequate effort, they are likely to feel a lack of personal ability and competence, and therefore become more motivated to engage in conspicuous consumption to fulfill efficacy needs (e.g., power, control) through compensatory consumption (Lee and Shrum 2012; Rucker and Galinsky 2009), particularly if they do not highly value social justice.

Study 3 manipulated monetary fairness as in study 1. Participants considered purchasing a t-shirt using their award money, and they indicated their preference for one of two t-shirts from Emporio Armani that differed in conspicuousness and their beliefs about the value of social justice. As expected, the interaction between monetary fairness and value of social justice revealed that money acquired without fair effort increased preference for a more conspicuous product when consumers placed less value on social justice, although this was not the case when consumers valued social justice.

Study 4 examined the reason for the different patterns of effects of monetary fairness on one’s own choice of conspicuous consumption versus perceptions of others. Monetary fairness was manipulated by money from the parents (vs. a paycheck) as in study 2. Participants then provided their beliefs about the prestige signaling effect of their own (or their classmate’s) conspicuous consumption using the money (i.e., how much status conspicuous purchases communicate). Consistent with the mediation found in study 2, when people evaluated their classmate’s conspicuous consumption, money acquired without fair effort led to lower perceptions of prestige, particularly when people valued social justice. In contrast, when participants considered their own conspicuous consumption, money acquired without fair effort led to higher perceptions of prestige, particularly when people placed less value on justice, supporting the rationale provided for the study 3 findings.

These results demonstrate that the value placed on social justice by consumers negatively affects consumers’ perceptions of others when others engage in conspicuous consumption through money acquired without fair effort. This occurs because conspicuous consumption is no longer seen as signaling prestige. However, consumers who acquire money unfairly themselves prefer to engage in conspicuous consumption to signal their prestige, mostly when they do not place much value on social justice, believing that their conspicuous consumption still has a prestige signaling effect on others. This research contributes to the literatures on conspicuous consumption and justice motives in consumer behavior.
Table 1. Summary of Study Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>DV</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Conditional effects of monetary fairness on DV at different levels of value of social justice</th>
<th>Brand type</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Positive impression of the classmate</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Low value of justice (-1SD)</td>
<td>.97*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High value of justice (+1SD)</td>
<td>2.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low value of justice (-1SD)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>High value of justice (+1SD)</td>
<td>1.70***</td>
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<td>Positive impression of the classmate</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Low value of justice (-1SD)</td>
<td>.50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prestige perceptions</td>
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<td>Low value of justice (-1SD)</td>
<td>.03 NS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>High value of justice (+1SD)</td>
<td>.71***</td>
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<td>(N=158)</td>
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<td>Prestige perceptions mediated the interaction effect on the DV (95% CI = .06 to .33)</td>
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<td>Choice of a conspicuous product</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Low value of justice (-1SD)</td>
<td>-.65**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High value of justice (+1SD)</td>
<td>.10 NS</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Prestige signaling role of conspicuous consumption</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Low value of justice (-1SD)</td>
<td>.20 NS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Low value of justice (-1SD)</td>
<td>-.71**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>High value of justice (+1SD)</td>
<td>.06 NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: NS = Not significant, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.

REFERENCES


Consequences of Cultural Fluency
James A. Mourey, DePaul University, USA
Ben C.P. Lam, Iowa State University, USA
Daphna Oyserman, University of Michigan, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

On the 4th of July, do Americans put more food on a patriotic plate? Can subtle exposure to traditional wedding photos make you more willing to buy an unrelated consumer product? In short, can cultural meanings deeply rooted in memory influence consumption when cued?

Culture is a meaning-making framework; the characteristic way humans perceive their environment (Triandis, 1972). In this sense, culture provides a blueprint or outline for how one is to behave and what one can expect of others across a variety of situations. What is culturally appropriate seems right, while what is culturally inappropriate seems off or wrong (Triandis, 2007). Because all of human life occurs within culture, and cultural knowledge is deeply rooted in memory, what feels right or wrong ‘goes without saying’. While social scientists have long studied culture, the implications of this feeling of fluency, the telltale marker that culture is at work, has not yet been studied directly. Instead, researchers have either focused on describing a particular culture or on comparing and distinguishing between cultures, particularly contrasting East and West and describing the content and consequences of cultural ‘syndromes’ such as individualism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002).

Rather than focusing on a specific culture or on specific differences between cultures, we introduced the concept of “cultural fluency” and focus on the consequences of the feeling of fluency that being immersed in a culture provides. Within situations that are culturally appropriate, people from that culture can feel at ease, they know what to expect and how the situation will unfold. These feelings of ease can spill over into unrelated judgments, including, as we show here, consumer judgments. We build from two major tenants of behavioral decision research and social cognition research: first, that preferences are constructed in the process of making a choice (Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007) and second, that metacognitive judgment, the feelings that emerge while thinking, are a major source of constructed preferences (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). These prior studies have focused on feelings of ease or difficulty that come to mind in the process of choosing or judging. For example, they show that difficult to read print font (Song & Schwarz, 2008b) or being required to give many examples both cue feelings of difficulty that spill over into the judgment task. Building on this prior work, in five studies we provide evidence that subtle cultural cues influence consumption such that cues congruent with deeply-rooted cultural memory “feel right,” create a sense of fluency, and encourage more consumption while culturally-incongruent cues “feel wrong,” create a sense of disfluency, and discourage consumption. However, we also show that this experience of cultural fluency can influence cognitive processing style, encouraging more analytic, systematic processing when experiencing cultural disfluency and more gut, intuitive processing when experiencing cultural fluency.

In studies 1a-1b we conducted field experiments in which picnickers are provided with culturally fluent plates (i.e., patriotic plates on the 4th of July), culturally disfluent plates (Halloween plates on Labor Day), or control white plates. We measured the amount of food these picnickers put on their plate in ounces and found that people unknowingly put more food on their plates when randomly given a culturally fluent plate and less food on their plates when provided a culturally disfluent plate relative to one another and to the control white plate condition.

To replicate this effect across cultures to demonstrate the robustness of the concept of “cultural fluency,” we replicated the study during Chinese New Year with Hong Kong Chinese participants and Americans. Chinese participants provide a red-bordered plate took larger serving sizes at a buffet during Chinese New Year compared to Hong Kong Chinese provided a black-bordered control plate and Americans provided either a red- or black-bordered plate, as the cultural script was not accessible for the American participants. As predicted, the effect did not hold for the Hong Kong Chinese participants given a red-bordered plate when it was not Chinese New Year, as the cultural fluency meaning of the red-border was no longer culturally significant.

Moving beyond the domain of holidays, the third study involved participants looking at wedding photos and ratting them for their quality. Unbeknownst to participants they were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, one depicting traditional wedding imagery (culturally fluent) and one depicting nontraditional images (e.g., green dress, purple tuxedo; the culturally disfluent condition). Participants were then provided with a random consumer product (a blanket in study 3a; a shovel in study 3b) and asked about the likelihood of purchasing the product. Participants in the culturally fluent condition were significantly more likely to purchase the random product than participants in the culturally disfluent conditions.

To explore the effects of cultural fluency beyond choice, we designed a fourth study using the same wedding manipulations as in the prior studies but with a different dependent variable: the cognitive reflection task (CRT). We predicted that participants in the culturally fluent condition would be more likely to make errors on the CRT, and that’s precisely what we found in two studies, the latter demonstrating mediation through the ease with which one could imagine his/her own wedding (validating our proposal that cultural fluency affects style of processing).

The final study combined the aforementioned manipulations and reasoning in a study involving Valentine’s Day that was conducted in Hong Kong and the U.S. Valentine’s Day was selected because it is a holiday celebrated the same day and in the same way in both cultures. Participants completed the CRT on February 14 or February 21, or February 21 in a computer screen with a pink border (culturally fluent) or a black or white border (culturally disfluent). As predicted, participants completing the CRT on February 14 with a pink border performed the worst of any group, whereas no differences emerged on February 21, a day on which the colors carry no cultural meaning.

In sum, across five studies we show that culture congruence influences consumption in a variety of contexts via subtle feelings of fluency/disfluency. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.

REFERENCES


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Table 1: Summary of Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Fluent</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>t(39)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study 1a:</td>
<td>4th of July</td>
<td>Amount of food put on plate (in ounces)</td>
<td>M_Fluent=8.93, SD_Fluent=2.63</td>
<td>M_Control=7.14, SD_Control=2.34</td>
<td>t(24) = 1.83, p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 1b:</td>
<td>Labor Day</td>
<td>Amount of food put on plate (in ounces)</td>
<td>M_Fluent=12.15, SD_Fluent=4.15</td>
<td>M_Control=14.75, SD_Control=1.69</td>
<td>t(17) = 1.69, p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2:</td>
<td>Chinese New Year (Chinese during CNY)</td>
<td>Amount of food taken (in serving sizes)</td>
<td>M_Fluent=3.48, SD_Fluent=1.11</td>
<td>M_Control=2.94, SD_Control=.87</td>
<td>t(44) = 1.81, p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2:</td>
<td>Chinese New Year (Americans during CNY)</td>
<td>Amount of food taken (in serving sizes)</td>
<td>M_Fluent=2.39, SD_Fluent=.79</td>
<td>M_Control=2.47, SD_Control=.77</td>
<td>(no difference expected)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2:</td>
<td>Chinese New Year (Chinese 1 month after CNY)</td>
<td>Amount of food taken (in serving sizes)</td>
<td>M_Fluent=2.69, SD_Fluent=.84</td>
<td>M_Control=2.80, SD_Control=.76</td>
<td>(no difference expected)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3a:</td>
<td>Wedding - Blanket</td>
<td>Purchase intentions (blanket)</td>
<td>M_Fluent=3.15, SD_Fluent=1.73</td>
<td>M_Control=2.71, SD_Control=1.51</td>
<td>t(158) = 2.17, p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3b:</td>
<td>Wedding - Shovel</td>
<td>Purchase intentions (shovel)</td>
<td>M_Fluent=3.62, SD_Fluent=2.09</td>
<td>M_Control=2.58, SD_Control=1.78</td>
<td>t(130) = 3.07, p &lt; .01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 4a:</td>
<td>Wedding - CRT</td>
<td>Percent of average correct responses</td>
<td>M_Fluent=11%, SD_Fluent=.25</td>
<td>M_Control=25%, SD_Control=.33</td>
<td>t(67) = -1.92, p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 4b:</td>
<td>Wedding - CRT w/ mediation</td>
<td>Percent of average correct responses</td>
<td>M_Fluent=15%, SD_Fluent=.24</td>
<td>M_Control=25%, SD_Control=.34</td>
<td>t(99) = -1.73, p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 5:</td>
<td>Valentine’s Day - CRT</td>
<td>Percent of average correct responses</td>
<td>M_Fluent=27%, SD_Fluent=.27</td>
<td>M_Control=44%, SD_Control=.37</td>
<td>t(77) = -2.11, p &lt; .05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Primary results for all studies are summarized in the table provided; manipulation checks and detailed analyses are omitted due to the space limitation of the proposal but are available upon request.
Consumer Creativity in Product Design: The Effects of Providing a Default Product on Idea Generation

Bo Chen, ESSEC Business School, France
Niek Althuizen, ESSEC Business School, France

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

From the widespread practice of product customization to the recent practice of “crowdsourcing” ideas, companies are actively involving consumers in the new product development process. To benefit from the input of consumers as well as professionals, companies could provide consumers with a professionally designed default product that may serve as a starting point in the idea-generation process for new products or product improvements. Providing a default product has been shown to impact the consumers’ utility (Dellaert and Stremersch, 2005) and evaluation of self-designed products (Moreau and Herd, 2010), but no research has investigated the effects of providing a default product on consumer creativity. In this paper, we investigate the moderating effect of the product design goal on the relationship between the level of advancement of the provided default product and the creativity of the generated product ideas.

Based on contemporary creative cognition research, we can envision two contrasting effects of the provision of a default product in the consumer’s idea generation process: 1) it may enhance creativity when the existing features of the default product activate relevant domain knowledge and stimulate a more thorough exploration of the idea space (Rietzschel, Nijstad, and Stroebe, 2007) or 2) it may inhibit creativity when the default product fixates attention too much on the existing product features and limits the exploration of the idea space (Smith, Ward, and Schumacher, 1993). We hypothesize that the combination of the level of advancement of the default, i.e., the number of already incorporated features, and the product design goal determines whether the default product will stimulate or inhibit the generation of creative product ideas.

The design goal can either be to modify or enhance the functional performance of the product or its aesthetic appearance. When the product design goal is aesthetic, we expect that fixation effects will play a more dominant role. The rational here is that people generally show a preference for aesthetic congruity in product design (Patrick and Hagtveld 2011). Thus, consumers are expected to generate ideas that are congruent with the aesthetic features of the default product. A more advanced default product incorporates more features, which increases the likelihood of fixation effects. This may limit the exploration of the idea space, resulting in less creative ideas.

When the design goal is functional, aesthetic considerations presumably play a less important role than improving the performance of the product. In this case, the positive effects of activating relevant domain knowledge (and the spreading of activation in the consumer’s memory) by means of the provision of a default product will outweigh any negative fixation effects. The more features the default product already incorporates, the more relevant knowledge structures will be activated in the consumer’s mind. This may lead to a more thorough exploration of the idea space, resulting in more creative ideas.

We conducted two experiments to investigate the interaction effect between the level of advancement of the default product and the design goal on the creativity of the generated ideas. Sixty-one business school students participated in return for course credit. The study design was a 2 (default product: basic vs. advanced) x 2 (design goal: functional vs. aesthetic) mixed design.

Participants were randomly assigned to a pretested picture of either a basic or an advanced alarm clock. In addition to an improved appearance, the advanced default product also incorporated three common wake-up functions (i.e., the most frequently mentioned ones in a pilot study). Each participant was then asked to complete two tasks: 1) to improve the alarm clock’s wake-up function and 2) to improve its aesthetic appearance. Three target consumers were asked to rate the creativity of the generated ideas on a single-item, seven-point scale (cf. Sellier and Dahl, 2011).

A mixed ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect between the level of advancement of the default product and the design goal (F (1, 59) = 12.195, p<.01). Follow-up analysis revealed that with a functional design goal participants generated more creative ideas when given an advanced default product rather than a basic default product. With an aesthetic design goal, we found exactly the opposite (see Table 1).

The purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the results of Study 1 using a different product (a tablet computer holder) and a different task (an idea-generation rather than a problem-solving task). The study design was similar to Experiment 1 except for the experimental stimuli. We also added a baseline condition in which no default product was given. One hundred-eleven business school students participated in return for course credit. As in Experiment 1, a mixed ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect on creativity of the generated ideas (F(1, 108) = 7.700, p = .001). The nature of this interaction effect was similar to Study 1. The means and standard deviations for the experimental conditions can be found in Table 1.

Table 1a: Summary of Study 1 Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Creativity of results</th>
<th>Functional design goal</th>
<th>Aesthetic Design Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>5.32 (1.25) a</td>
<td>5.60 (1.38) a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>6.24 (1.13)</td>
<td>4.83 (1.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=111

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Creativity of results</th>
<th>Depth of Exploration</th>
<th>Breadth of Exploration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5.80 (0.62) c</td>
<td>1.86 (0.72) b</td>
<td>2.89 (1.09) bc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>5.76 (0.58) c</td>
<td>1.54 (0.51) ac</td>
<td>2.54 (0.77) ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>6.07 (0.55) ab</td>
<td>1.95 (0.77) b</td>
<td>2.03 (0.59) ab</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aesthetic Design Goal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Creativity of results</th>
<th>Depth of Exploration</th>
<th>Breadth of Exploration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>4.72 (0.59) c</td>
<td>1.58 (0.55) b</td>
<td>2.33 (0.76) bc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>4.61 (0.59) c</td>
<td>1.19 (0.46) ac</td>
<td>2.00 (0.71) a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>4.28 (0.77) ab</td>
<td>1.42 (0.60) b</td>
<td>1.92 (0.63) a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=61

a Significant difference with the “no default product” condition (α = .05)
b Significant difference with the “basic default product” condition (α = .05)
c Significant difference with the “advanced default product” condition (α = .05)
We also investigated the effects of providing a default product on the exploration of the idea space by asking two trained coders to categorizing all generated ideas. The highest number of ideas generated in a particular category was used as a measure of the depth of exploration, while the number of different categories in which the participant generated ideas was used as a measure of the breadth of exploration of the idea space. The results revealed that, independent of the design goal, the level of advancement positively impacted the depth, but negatively impacted the breadth of exploration. These variables mediated the effects of the level of advancement of the default product on creativity when the design goal is functional, but not when the design goal is aesthetic.

The two experiments show that the level of advancement of a provided default product influences the exploration of the idea space and, hence, the creativity of the ideas generated by consumers, but the nature of this effect depends on the design goal. Our findings have straightforward managerial implications for companies that want to achieve higher levels of creative performance by offering default products when soliciting ideas from consumers in the new product development process.

REFERENCES
An Attributional Explanation of Consumers’ Unexpected Attitudes and Behavior Toward Poor-Nutritional Products, with Implications for Childhood Obesity

Claudia Dumitrescu, Whitworth University, USA
Renée Shaw Hughner, Arizona State University, USA
Clifford J. Shultz, II, Loyola University Chicago, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Rising obesity rates among children have led many to blame the fast food industry because frequenting quick-service restaurants has been linked to higher intakes of sodium, fat, calories, and soft drinks, and lower intakes of healthful nutrients like fruits and vegetables (Bowman et al. 2004; Paeratakul et al. 2003). As such, some regulatory agencies are seeking legislation to restrict certain marketing practices by fast food outlets. One such regulation took effect recently in the state of California and requires meals targeted to children to meet certain nutritional standards for fat, calories, sugar, and sodium if toy premiums or any other incentives are included with the food purchase (Baertlein 2010). This regulation aims to help parents change their attitudes, and subsequent behavior, toward unhealthy food products.

In conjunction with government regulations, amidst growing public concerns about childhood obesity, food marketers have responded with self-regulatory actions. For example, Kraft pledged to eliminate advertising to children, of foods that do not meet certain nutritional standards and Jack in the Box has eliminated toys from its children’s meals as of June 2011 (Morrison 2011).

While these governmental and corporate initiatives addressing childhood obesity may be well intended, it is unclear how and why consumers respond to such efforts. Childhood obesity is indeed epidemic in the US (CDC 2012), which raises questions about how best to develop theory and change behaviors, and ultimately redress this societal problem. The Theory of Psychological Reactance was extensively used to explain consumers’ unintended reactions to government regulations (Ringold 2002); however, in some cases, this and other frameworks may not explain this deviance phenomenon in the way that attributional processes can (Conway and Schaller 2005).

First, Reactance Theory posits that individuals most likely deviate from expectations such that they can reassert their lost freedom of choice (Conway and Schaller 2005). Although children’s meals toys are banned, parents may still purchase the same food item, without a free toy, or paying for the toy. That is, parents still have the freedom to select their food products, regardless of the nutritional content. Second, Reactance and Attribution Theories predict indeed the same outcomes (deviance); nonetheless, these two psychological approaches provide “different accounts of the origins of deviance” (Conway and Schaller 2005, 313). For instance, reactance is more emotionally-driven (Knowles and Linn 2004), which may imply that parents persist in buying potential harmful products for their children just to rebel against this policy, a hardly acceptable perspective. Conversely, attribution provides a cognitive reason for deviance; this suggests that parents may deviate due to factors (e.g., government regulation) that influence their attributional judgments; hence, the unique explanatory value of the attribution model. Consequently, this study builds on Attribution Theory to provide a better understanding of how and why consumers respond to government regulations (GR) relative to corporate self-regulations (CSR). We argue that the presence of GR versus CSR triggers more unexpected attitudes, and subsequent behavior, toward poor-nutritional products, because parents have an unexpected lower tendency to blame the food marketers for these products. The mediating role of attributions of responsibility is particularly important here, especially when examining consumers’ post-consumption reactions, because these cognitive processes are likely to have a lasting impact on consumer behavior (Weiner 2000).

This research essentially suggests that government regulations, despite their good intentions, may be detrimental in changing parents’ attitudes and behavior toward unhealthy food products due to unexpected attributions of blame for the nutritional value of their children’s meals. A unique view on the power of attributions of responsibility is thus provided. Our findings further highlight that corporate self-regulations could truly make a difference when it comes to childhood obesity. Specifically, consumers reported more negative attitudes and behavior toward poor-nutritional products when corporate self-restrictions on toy premiums were announced.

The theoretical rationale for this research is Attribution Theory (Kelley 1973). Research has demonstrated that, in co-production contexts, consumers are subject to self-serving bias or have the tendency to blame the company when a negative product outcome occurs, which in turn negatively affects their satisfaction with the firm and its products (Bendapudi and Leone 2003). In the current context, parents would normally blame the food marketers for children’s unhealthy meals, which leads to negative attitudes regarding these products. Nevertheless, we find that the presence of GR mitigates this self-serving bias. Specifically, a toy premium ban causes fewer attributions of blame to the firm, for poor-nutritional meals. As a result, consumers’ attitudes and subsequent behavior, toward these products, are enhanced. Thus, we test the impact of GR on product satisfaction through attributions of responsibility, stressing the mediating role of attributional judgments.

Data for testing the hypotheses were collected experimentally, using a sample of US parents who purchase children’s meals from McDonald’s. Two studies were conducted: a pilot study, in which some of the scales were tested and the main experiment, used to test the hypotheses. We used between-subjects and randomized experimental design; parents were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions: control group, GR, and CSR, which reduced the possibility of confounding effects. One hundred and eighty respondents were used, with 60 participants per each condition.

Attributions of responsibility (α = 0.73) measured the degree to which parents blame the company for their poor-nutritional meal choices. Product satisfaction (α = 0.90) scale, adapted from Huffman and Kahn (1998) and Fitzsimons (2000), captured parents’ overall satisfaction with these meal selections. Lastly, the behavioral intentions scale (α = 0.93), modified from Cronin, Brady, and Hult (2000), measured parents’ tendency to make similar food choices in the future.

The multivariate analysis of variance was employed to examine whether GR had the hypothesized impact on attributions of responsibility and product satisfaction. As predicted, attributions of responsibility to the firm, in the GR condition, were lower (M = 2.98) relative to the control group (M = 3.68) and CSR treatment (M = 3.99); (F (2,179) = 6.61, p < .05). Our results further showed that participants in the GR condition reported a higher product satisfaction (M = 6.09) as opposed to those parents in the control group (M = 5.30) and CSR treatment (M = 5.43); (F (2, 179) = 3.26, p < .05). Participants’ gender, education, age, and income were controlled for. Gender (coded 1 for male and 0 for female) had a significant impact on consum-
would be relevant to examine the extent to which Reactance Theory
meals, which triggers higher satisfaction with, and subsequent en-
lation, parents take more personal responsibility, for poor-nutritional
self-serving bias). The regulation construct (i.e., moderator of attributions of responsibility/behavior; (2) proposes a mediating role of attribu-
Psychological mechanism, which explains unexpected consumers'
such as childhood obesity. The study (1) advances an alternative
to government regulations with regard to a major societal challenge
matters, and ultimately to transform/enhance consumer well-being.
2010) and the MSI (2010-2012) to conduct research on substantive

cient was in the expected direction.
behavioral intentions (\[\beta = 0.68, p < .05\]) and the sign of the coeffi-
cient was in the expected direction.
This study responds to calls from ACR/TCR champions (Mick 2010) and the MSI (2010-2012) to conduct research on substantive matters, and ultimately to transform/enhance consumer well-being. We propose and test a conceptual framework of consumer responses to government regulations with regard to a major societal challenge such as childhood obesity. The study (1) advances an alternative psychological mechanism, which explains unexpected consumers' attitudes and behavior; (2) proposes a mediating role of attributions of responsibility between government regulation and product satisfaction; (3) offers a new conceptualization of the government regulation construct (i.e., moderator of attributions of responsibility/self-serving bias).
This research shows that, in the presence of a government regu-
ulation, parents take more personal responsibility, for poor-nutritional meals, which triggers higher satisfaction with, and subsequent enhanced behavioral intentions toward, these products. Nonetheless, it would be relevant to examine the extent to which Reactance Theory versus Attribution Theory explains consumer responses to different consumer protection regulations. Lastly, while both studies -- the pilot and main study -- supported the unexpected impacts of a government regulation, the results may not be generalizable to different other contexts and operationalizations of government versus corporate regulations. Future research should thereby broaden the scope of product category and examine whether consumers' responses to various regulations can be explained by their attributional judgments.

**REFERENCES**


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**Note.** a The model that does not include attributions of responsibility; b The model that includes attributions of responsibility. NFI = normed fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root-mean squared error of approximation.

\* *p < .05; ** *p < .01

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**Table 1. MANOVA and Structural Equation Modeling Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Attributions of responsibility</th>
<th>Product satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control group</td>
<td>3.68**</td>
<td>5.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government regulation</td>
<td>2.98**</td>
<td>6.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate self-regulation</td>
<td>3.99**</td>
<td>5.43*</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>R²</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product satisfaction</td>
<td>Government regulation</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>2.92*</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product satisfaction</td>
<td>Government regulation</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>2.23*</td>
<td>0.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attributions of responsibility</td>
<td>Government regulation</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-2.52*</td>
<td>0.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Behavioral intentions</td>
<td>Product satisfaction</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>13.75**</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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<th>χ²</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>NNFI</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1*</td>
<td>13.51</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<td>Model 2b</td>
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<td>.17</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.98</td>
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

France is worldwide known all over the world for its passion for cooking to such an extent that the French gastronomic meal has been recently declared as a world intangible heritage (UNESCO 2010). However, despite its world renowned reputation, the French food model suffers from relative isolation. The hedonistic approach to food is far to be shared by all cultures. For example, in the United States, food choices are mainly driven by utilitarian concerns in which health holds a central place (Rozin, Remick, and Fischler 2011). Based on this utilitarianistic view of eating, many Western countries have established public health plans in order to increase health-conscious food choices. France does not escape this process of food utilitarianization. By introducing the National Nutrition and Health Program in 2001, the French ministry of health hoped to improve the health of the French population. Thus, French consumers are encouraged to place a greater emphasis on the relationship between their food choices and overall health. There is reason to believe that this focus on the utilitarian aspects of eating may decrease the French cultural enthusiasm for food. For instance, the French start to consider food more as a basic necessity than a pleasure (Hébel 2008).

Borrowing from recent research on the social psychology of globalization and on the effects of cultural mixing (Morris, Mok, and Mor 2011; Torelli et al. 2011), we argue that these attempts to enforce healthy eating can be perceived by French consumers as something that is both foreign to their culture and symbolic of utilitarian values that are inconsistent with the Frenchness of food enjoyment. In this research, we focused on the case of nutrition information because this is one of the most visible and noticeable aspects of public health plans designed to fight obesity. Indeed, in France, most food items display nutrition information (Storcksdieck genannt Bonsmann et al. 2010).

Thus, because food enjoyment is a central aspect of French culture, providing nutrition information in food could induce feelings of cultural contamination and its concomitant negative reactions (Chiu et al. 2011; Torelli and Ahluwalia 2012; Torelli et al. 2011). As a result, we believe that the exposure to nutrition information when French identity is made salient will enhance the perception that it is associated with values impervious to the in-group (i.e., utilitarian values). The current research is based on the assumption that nutrition information in foods is perceived as a cultural contaminant, or as an attempt to add something foreign to a cultural symbol. We report three studies that investigate the evaluative and cognitive consequences among French consumers of presenting nutrition information in foods upon making French cultural identity salient (vs. not). Study 1 examined the influence of making French identity salience (vs. not) on processing fluency. This prediction is consistent with past research, which suggests that exposure to bicultural products (i.e., those that are culturally incongruent or that juxtapose symbols of contrastive cultural traditions) increases processing difficulty (Torelli and Ahluwalia 2012). Identity salience was manipulated by asking 218 French undergraduates to list three reasons someone might prefer to live in France or to study at their college. Following the cultural identity salience manipulation, participants were asked to assess the nutrition labeling of either a healthy version or an unhealthy version of a ready-made meal. As predicted, in the French identity condition, participants rated nutrition information as more difficult to process than those in the college identity condition. A moderator mediation analysis indicated that feelings of processing difficulty mediated the relationship between cultural identity salience and perceived healthiness when the food item was framed as unhealthy but not when the food item was framed as healthy.

Study 2 proposed that French consumers will assess food items containing French primes as less healthy than food items containing neutral primes when nutrition information is provided. We expect that simultaneous exposure to nutrition information and iconic symbols makes accessible the stereotype that French food is unhealthy (Lee, Kim, and Vohs 2011) and, consequently, increases risk perceptions. 138 French adults participated in an online experiment. We primed cultural identity by exposing the participants to a food item that contained either French identity primes or neutral primes. Additionally, nutrition information or general information about how to preserve the product properly was shown to participants. Participants exposed to French primes reported higher risk perceptions in the presence of nutrition information than those exposed to neutral primes. Thus, cultural contamination induced by nutrition information exposure triggered defensive mechanisms that drive participants to devaluate the healthiness of culturally iconic food items.

Study 3 aimed to further demonstrate the negative reactions induced by cultural contamination by extending it to product evaluations. A sample of French adults (N=165) recruited from an online consumer panel completed the questions designed to make the French identity salient. In order to check that product actual healthiness does not moderate cultural contamination effects, two food items were tested (a virtue and a vice). Feelings of cultural contamination were induced by providing or not nutrition information to participants. Findings showed that belonging to the vice or virtue category did not influence participants’ responses to cultural contamination. However, a direct effect of nutrition information on product evaluations emerged. Further analysis revealed that the decrease in evaluations of products was due to a reduction of anticipated pleasure and perceived Frenchness.

This article examines how culturally incompatible marketplace cues influence cognitive and evaluative processes. More specifically, we have found that nutrition information, which is usually treated as a neutral stimulus in the marketing literature, is perceived as a cultural contaminant by French consumers. The reason is that nutrition information symbolizes a food model (utilitarianistic) antagonistic to the French one (hedonistic). Our results support the findings that apparently innocuous global standards in nutrition information is perceived as cultural contaminants and that these feelings of cultural contamination lead to meta-cognitive experience of disfluency and exclusionary responses (i.e., product derogation).

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When Do Consumers Experience Humor?
A. Peter McGraw, University of Colorado, Boulder, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Humor is a psychological response characterized by the positive emotion of amusement, the appraisal that something is funny, and the tendency to laugh (Martin 2007; McGraw et al. 2012; Veatch 1998). Consumers seek humor in products, activities, and relationships, because humor is enjoyable and contributes to psychological and physical well-being (Martin 2007). Despite its benefits in consumption contexts, marketing research has focused largely on humor in advertising (e.g., Eisend 2009; Gulas and Weinberger 2006; Woltman et al. 2004). Focusing only on humor in an advertising context, however, may be inhibiting the development of broader theoretical and practical insights. Thus, we turn our attention to the important topic of what drives perceptions of humor in consumption contexts.

The most popular humor theories suggest that humor occurs when one perceives an incongruity (Morreall 2009; Nerhardt 1970; Woltman Elpers et al. 2004). The literature, however, has not defined or operationalized incongruity consistently. Some define incongruity as something unexpected (i.e., surprise), whereas others define it as something that is different than what typically occurs (i.e., atypicality) or as a contrast of concepts or ideas that do not normally go together (i.e., juxtaposition). Moreover, some versions of incongruity theory suggest that humor occurs only when an incongruity is resolved, or made sense of, in some way (Suls 1972; Woltman Elpers et al. 2004). Although the variants of incongruity theory have led to useful insights in the perception of humor in jokes (e.g., Suls 1972; Shultz 1972) and advertisements (e.g., Alden, Hoyer, and Lee 1993; Woltman Elpers et al. 2004), we contend that they have difficulty explaining the perception of what is funny (and what is not funny) in many consumption experiences.

We empirically compare the different variants of incongruity theory (surprise, atypicality, juxtaposition, and incongruity-resolution) to an emerging theory that suggests that humor occurs when one simultaneously appraises something as both a violation and as benign (McGraw and Warren 2010, McGraw et al. 2012; Veatch 1998). A violation is anything that threatens one’s sense of how things should be, including physical threats (e.g., tickling), identity threats (e.g., teasing), and behaviors that break cultural (e.g., inappropriate attire), social (e.g., flatulence), moral (e.g., bestiality), conversational (e.g., sarcasm), linguistic (e.g., a strange accent), or logic norms (e.g., absurdities). A violation is benign if it also seems sensible, acceptable, or okay in some way.

There are a number of similarities between the variants of incongruity theory and a benign violation account. In many cases, benign violations are surprising and portray a resolved incongruity. Furthermore, benign violations are necessarily atypical and involve juxtaposition. There are, however, also situations in which the benign violation theory and incongruity theories make diverging predictions. Our studies examine whether the benign violation theory better explains perceptions of humor across different types of consumption experiences than four variants of incongruity theory: surprise (study 1), atypicality (study 2), juxtaposition (study 3), and incongruity-resolution (study 4).

Study 1 (N=47) examines perceptions of humor in a Youtube video in which an amateur athlete attempts a pole vault. We crossed participants’ expectations with the actual outcome of the pole vault attempt. Consistent with the benign violation theory but not with incongruity theories rooted in surprise, participants who observed a violation (a failed attempt) found the video more humorous than participants who did not observe a violation (a successful attempt) irrespective of whether they expected the attempt to succeed or fail (M
\text{ExpectedViolation}=3.95, \ M
\text{UnexpectedViolation}=3.06, \ M
\text{ExpectedSuccess}=2.33, \ M
\text{UnexpectedSuccess}=2.26).

Study 2 examines whether the presence of a benign violation or an incongruity (operationalized as atypicality) better explains differences between humorous and non-humorous sports plays. Participants (N=101) either described a humorous sports play or one of three types of non-humorous plays: a routine play, a tragic play, or an amazing play. After describing the play, they rated whether the play seemed atypical (i.e., incongruous), worse than normal (i.e., a violation), and to have either a positive effect or no effect (i.e., benign). Incongruity was incapable of distinguishing humorous plays from non-humorous tragic or amazing plays. Although most humorous plays were atypical (87%), amazing plays (93%) and tragic plays (68%) were equally likely to seem atypical. In contrast, humorous plays were far more likely to contain benign violations (43%) than the routine (4%), amazing (0%), or tragic plays (9%).

Study 3 examines whether juxtaposition in general or the specific juxtaposition of a benign violation better explains perceptions of humor in consumer products. Marketing students (N=86) identified a product that juxtaposed features in a useful way (juxtaposition without violation), juxtaposed features in a useless way (benign violation), or did not juxtapose features (no juxtaposition). Juxtaposition alone did not produce humor, as products that juxtaposed features in a useful way were not perceived to be any more humorous than products that did not juxtaposed features (M=2.43 vs. 2.50). In contrast, products in which the juxtaposition featured a benign violation were more likely to seem humorous (M=3.71). Incongruity, when defined as juxtaposition, may be an important ingredient in humor, but it is not a sufficient explanation because many products involving juxtaposition seem innovative rather than humorous.

Study 4 examines whether the presence of a benign violation or a resolved incongruity better explains differences between humorous and non-humorous everyday consumption experiences. One group of participants (N=29) objectively described a funny experience, a tragic experience, and a normal experience. Another group (N=19) coded either whether the experiences contained a resolved-incongruity or whether they contained a benign violation. Both incongruity resolution theory and the benign violation theory discriminated humorous experiences from normal experiences. However, incongruity resolution was unable to explain differences between funny and tragic experiences (17% vs. 20% contained a resolved incongruity, respectively), whereas the benign violation theory was able to (25% vs. 10% contained a benign violation, respectively).

Although the benign violation theory did not perfectly explain humor across different consumption domains, it provided a better explanation than leading humor theories based on incongruity. We hope our research encourages the field to continue to explore the question of what makes consumption experiences humorous.

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When Do Consumers Experience Humor?


When Color Meets Health: The Impact of Package Colors on the Perception of Food Healthiness and Purchase Intention
Lei Huang, State University of New York at Fredonia, USA
Ji Lu, Dalhousie University, Canada

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
The rising obesity epidemic (Flegal, Carroll, Kit, and Ogden 2012) arouses consumers’ healthy eating concerns and motivates food manufacturers to improve the nutritional content of their products towards a healthier direction. In a real-life grocery shopping situation, however, consumers often lack time or motivation to search and process detailed nutrition information to support their judgment and purchase decision (Wansink and Sobal 2007). Thus, visual cues, such as color, become critically influential because processing this type of information requires little cognitive resource.

Although substantial research has been given to food color (e.g., Stillman 1993, Christensen 1985), the package color, as influential visual information on food decision making, is overlooked. This research aims to explore the effect of package color on consumer’s perception and behavioral intention on contained food. We expect that food in blue package is perceived healthier and hence associated with a higher purchase intention than in red package.

Furthermore, in the present research foods are categorized as utilitarian or hedonic products based on the major motives behind their consumption. The consumption of utilitarian foods is driven by their functions (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000), such as quest hunger or reduce diseases risks, whereas the desire to eat hedonic foods is mainly driven by the anticipated hedonic experience of eating, such as the palatability of foods (Benforado, Hanson, and Yosifon 2004). Empirical findings revealed that hedonic foods may not be intuitively perceived as healthy as utilitarian foods because sensory pleasure often are associated with sweet, salty, and fatty hedonic foods (Assanand, Pinel, and Lehman 1998, Wertenbroch 1998). Therefore, we expect that compared to utilitarian foods, the potential influence of package color on consumer’s perception of food healthiness should be less salience for hedonic foods since they have already been intuitively perceived as unhealthy.

To highlight the nutritional content on packages, food producers often present labels on the package to make general nutrition claims. As concise as these labels are, they are sometimes ambiguous. For example, “light” is used to imply the healthiness in comparison with “regular” foods. When exposed to ambiguous information, consumers tend to search for additional information to confirm their expectation and reduce ambiguity (Hoch and Ha 1986), and the package color can serve as “additional information”. According to the Selective Accessibility Model (SAM) (Mussweiler 2003), contextual information (e.g., package color) often provides an easily accessible standard and interpretation frame when there is ambiguity. We expect that if the verbal cue is ambiguous, the package color will have an assimilation effect on consumers’ perception of food healthiness and purchase intention. Specifically, we postulate that label effect is stronger in the condition that package color is congruent with label than that of incongruent conditions. The term “congruence” in this research refers to whether the effects of label and package color on the healthiness expectation or purchase intention are consistent with each other.

Without the presence of ambiguous labels, Study1 (N=34) aimed to explore the effect of package color on healthiness perception and purchase intention. While looking at pictures of six food/beverage packages (hedonic: potato chips, ice-cream, and ice-tea; utilitarian: cereal, yogurt, and milk), participants were asked to rate their perception of food healthiness (1-item) and purchase intention (3-item; α=0.91) to the presented products. For each product, two packages were designed with solid red (Hue: 0º, Saturation: 100%, Brightness: 100%) or blue (Hue: 240º, Saturation: 100%, Brightness: 100%) covering 90% of package surface.

Study2 (N=80) applied a similar protocol to test the color effect in a condition that ambiguous labels were presented hinting the nutrition value of products (color-label assimilation effect). For each of the products (utilitarian: yogurt and milk; hedonic: potato chips and ice-cream), there were four designs using red or blue (as Study1) as the package color and “regular” or “light” as the nutrition label.

The participant’s perception of product healthiness and purchase intention was analyzed in mixed models for repeated measurement with within-subject factors of package color (red vs. blue), product category (hedonic vs. utilitarian), nutrition label (light vs. regular in Study2), and their interactions.

Results from the analyses on healthiness perception in both studies suggested that products in red packages were perceived to be less healthy than in blue (ps<0.001). The interaction of color by product category (ps<0.03) further showed that, such an effect was particularly significant for utilitarian (ps<0.001) but not for hedonic products. The color-label assimilation effect in Study2 suggested that the difference between regular- and light-labeled products was observed in congruent condition (blue-light vs. red-regular: p<0.001), but not in incongruent condition (blue-regular vs. red-light; p>0.9).

In terms of purchase intention, participants in both studies reported higher intention to purchase blue- than red-packaged products (ps<0.04). Such an effect was particularly salient for utilitarian products (study2: p<0.02), but not for hedonic products. Study2 further revealed that label effect was significant (p=0.01) only if the color and label information were congruent (assimilation effect).

Further analyses revealed the color effect on purchase intention was mediated by healthiness perception. That is, the color effect on purchase intention was not significant after controlling the healthiness perception, while healthiness perception directly predicted purchase intention (p<0.001).

This is the first experiment of its kind designed to investigate the influence of package color on consumers’ perception of food healthiness and purchase intention. In line with a general color research in marketing (Labrecque and Milne 2012), the significant effect of color reported in both studies points out the potential that using package color as marketing cues in agri-food sector, accompanied with consistent verbal cues, can not only differentiate food products but also influence consumer’s perception and attitude toward such products. Future research may further investigate additional determinants, such as dieting habits and other individual differences, in order to better identify the enhancers of or detractors from the current paradigm.

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

English speakers often refer to themselves via first-person narrative forms, such as “I think” or “in my opinion”. One variation on this type of self-reference is known as illeism, where individuals refer to themselves using a third-person narrative form. While illeism is often associated with narcissism as famous individuals often use it to appear impartial (e.g., Bob Dole: “Let me tell you what Bob Dole thinks” Garner 2009), it is also used by average individuals in everyday conversations (e.g., Land and Kitzinger 2007) and even with what could be considered the opposite of narcissism—submission (e.g., DesRivieres 2010). Illeism is part of consumers’ everyday lives, most notably in contracts (e.g., “John promises to do X in exchange for Y”) and direct marketing communications (e.g., “We have all that John will need this fishing season”). As a result, illeism can be present at key moments in the life of a consumer, such as when signing a contract for a new house or deciding to become an organ donor. It is with difficult decisions such as these, that consumers often face a strong internal conflict between what they would like to do based on affect and impulsive behavior, and what they know is the best choice based on deliberate thought and their long-term goals. As a result, this work examines how illeism can influence decision making under such conflicts. For example, if Jane were to decide between buying a new coat (impulsive choice) or making a donation (deliberate choice), how would her decision be influenced if the charitable request, instead of being framed in a first-person narrative on the self (e.g., “I will donate $___”) were instead framed in an illeistic manner (e.g., “Jane will donate $____”)?

Because research exploring the role of self-reference forms in decision making is scant, we use research on self-distancing (e.g., Arriaga and Rusbult 1998) along with the Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) hot-cool systems framework. This framework proposes that highly affective stimuli increase the probability of processing via a hot system (which is emotional and reflexive) leading to impulsive behavior. The cool system (which is cognitive and strategic), the seat of self-control, can intercede and regulate these impulses in favor of long-term goals (Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss 1972). Per the self-distancing literature, recalling negative events from a self-immersed perspective (first-person perspective) leads individuals to over-focus on the concrete details of their experience, thus generating “hot negative affect” (Kross, Ayduk, and Mischel 2005). In contrast, recalling an event from a self-distanced perspective (e.g., the perspective of a fly on the wall) allows for the “cool” processing of the event, leading to experiences that are less emotional and have a lower level of physical reactivity (Ayduk and Kross 2010; Ayduk and Kross 2008; Kross and Ayduk 2008; Kross et al. 2005). Based on this research, we propose that while a first-person self-reference form creates a self-immersed perspective that is subject to the influence of affective cues, a third-person narrative on the self (i.e., illeism), similar to the “fly on the wall” manipulation, creates a self-distant perspective that reduces the influence of affective cues on decision making. As a result, during decision conflicts, illeism reduces the activation of the hot system allowing the cool system to supersede it.

Five studies tested the role of illeism on decision conflicts. Study 1A and 1B demonstrated that requesting help from consum-
The Effects of Framing Products as Experiences on the Creation and Use of Consumer Reviews

Iñigo Gallo, IESE Business School, Spain
Claudia Townsend, University of Miami, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

There are two recent developments in marketing and consumer behavior that may initially seem separate but are related and can influence one another. First, companies and brands are increasingly selling products as experiences, focusing not on specific functionalities of the good but on how it feels physically and emotionally to use (LaSalle and Britton 2003; Newman 2012; Schmitt 2011). Second, thanks to social media and internet-enabled personal devices, consumers are increasingly generating and relying on consumer-created product information (Bughin, Doogan, and Vetvik 2010; Cisco 2012). This research analyzes the interaction of these two developments in the marketplace. When a product is positioned as an experience, how does this influence the way consumers respond? We specifically study the use of product information from various sources including reviews and recommendations from other consumers and also the likelihood of providing product information in the form of a review.

Framing Products as Experiences

Experiential aspects of consumption draw consumer affect (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982), are more seductive (Hoch 2002), and are better at advancing happiness (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003). The implication is that experiences, or products framed as such, are more desirable than products. Increasingly, marketers are trying to capture some of this seduction and affect by positioning products as experiences. We confirmed the existence of this trend by comparing the use of experiential positioning in recent print advertisements (June 2012) versus twenty years prior (June 1992). As expected, the ads in the 2012 sample were significantly more likely to employ experiential framing than those in the 1992 sample, even when controlling for the number of experiential products advertised (movies, restaurants, etc.).

Information Search and Closeness to Self

When examining a product, consumers can access information from a variety of sources, including the product description from the marketer (packaging, advertising), expert ratings, and recommendations from others. Nelson (1970) suggested that, because experiences are difficult to evaluate pre-consumption, when consumers consider an experience they will rely more on information coming from other consumers who have undergone the experience and less on information provided by the marketer. We hypothesize that this will also be the case for products framed as experiences. Additionally, we propose that the mechanism behind this effect is based on the increased connection that consumers see between experiences and the self, compared to between products and the self (Carter and Gilovich 2012). Indeed, experiences are perceived by consumers as more self-defining and more central to the self than products (Carter and Gilovich 2012). We suggest that this greater connection between experiences and the self helps explain the differential consumer behavior with respect to recommendations. Because experiences are perceived close to the self, consumers turn to others close to the self for recommendations. Also, because consumers talk about what they identify with (Carroll and Ahuvia 2006; Yeh and Choi 2011), consumers will be more likely to generate recommendations for experiences than for products.

Study 1

As an initial test of our theory we consider the relative use of recommendations from sources that vary on closeness to the self for products and experiences. Participants were presented with two products or two experiences which were either endorsed by a friend or an expert. Consistent with our hypothesis, there was a significant interaction of product type and endorsement source (see figure 1). Participants reported liking the experience (product) better when it was endorsed by a friend (expert) (F(1, 336) = 20.98, p < .001; F(1, 337) = 6.48, p < .05). Additionally, we replicate this pattern when comparing search versus experiential attributes within one product.

Figure 1: Study 1A, Preferences for Products and Experiences with Recommendations from Experts or Friends Across Experiences and Products

*Preference is defined as the average of ratings of appeal and likelihood of purchase both on 7-point scale (α = .85). The interaction between type of product and type of endorsement (F(1, 676) = 23.91, p < .001). Participants liked experiences endorsed by a friend more than those endorsed by an expert (M_{P, expert} = 5.19, M_{P, friend} = 5.72, F(1, 336) = 20.98, p < .001) and liked products more when endorsed by an expert than when endorsed by a friend (M_{P, expert} = 5.18, M_{P, friend} = 4.84, F(1, 337) = 6.48, p < .05).

Interaction is significant: (F(1, 676) = 23.91, p < .001). There is a significant difference in type of source for experiences (M_{E, expert} = 5.19, M_{E, friend} = 5.72; F(1, 338) = 21.26, p < .001), while the opposite was true for products (M_{P, expert} = 5.18, M_{P, friend} = 4.84; F(1, 338) = 6.36, p < .05).

Study 2

Going forward we consider the same search good framed as either a product or an experience. We study how such product framing influences reliance on product information from different sources and we also formally test for mediation. Participants saw one of two advertisements for a pair of running shoes where the information content of the two ads was held constant but the positioning varied between regular product framing or experiential framing (imagery language, added sound, and emphasis on how it feels to use). Participants who saw the experience-framed ad ranked recommendations from friends as more useful than did participants who saw the product-framed ad (F(1, 23) = 7.08, p < .05). Participants who saw the product-framed ad ranked the marketer-provided product description as (marginally) more useful than did participants who saw the experience-framed ad (F(1, 23) = 3.54, p < .10) (see figure 2). In support of our proposed mechanism, bootstrapping tests revealed that perceived closeness to self of the product mediated this interaction.
Interaction is significant interaction ($F(1, 50) = 10.62, p < 0.01$). Recommendations from friends was ranked higher for the experience-framed shoes than for the product-framed shoes ($M_{\text{Experience-Shoes}} = 2.00$ vs. $M_{\text{Product-Shoes}} = 1.00$, $F(1, 23) = 7.08, p < 0.05$). On the other hand, description of the product was ranked higher for the product-framed shoes than for the experience-framed shoes, although this effect was only marginally significant ($M_{\text{Product-Description}} = 0.28$ vs. $M_{\text{Experience-Description}} = 0.79$, $F(1, 23) = 3.54, p < 0.10$). Those who were exposed to the experience-framed ad ranked recommendations from friends significantly higher than product description ($M_{\text{Description}} = 0.79$ vs. $M_{\text{Recommendation}} = 1.00$, $F(1, 26) = 0.37, N.S$). While those who saw the product-framed ad were indifferent between the sources ($M_{\text{Description}} = 0.27$ vs. $M_{\text{Recommendation}} = 2.00$, $F(1, 22) = 40.11, p < 0.001$). None of the other sources of information presented any significant differences.

Study 3

Study 3 considered how experiential product framing influences consumer creation of product information. Using the same stimuli as in study 2, participants who saw the experience-framed shoe ad reported a higher likelihood of writing a review than those who saw the product-framed shoes ($F(1, 121) = 4.43, p < 0.05$) (see figure 3). This result was mediated by perceived closeness to the self of the shoes.

Figure 3: Study 3, Likelihood of Writing a Review for Search and Experience Frame

Consumers who saw the experience-framed shoes reported a higher likelihood of writing a review than those who saw the product-framed shoes condition ($M_{\text{Experience-Shoes}} = 5.31$ vs. $M_{\text{Product-Shoes}} = 4.82$, $F(1, 121) = 4.43, p < 0.05$). There was no effect of experience valence on likelihood of reviewing ($M_{\text{Satisfied}} = 4.92$ vs. $M_{\text{Dissatisfied}} = 5.27$, $F(1, 122) = 2.43, N.S$), nor did these two factors interact.

Study 4

Finally, to confirm the existence of an effect of experiential framing on likelihood to review with actual consumer behavior, we examined the relationship between product framing and the number of consumer reviews on Amazon.com. A coder rated the experiential nature of the product descriptions of the top ten products in each of 30 product categories on Amazon.com. Controlling for product category, average price, and average review rating, we find an effect of framing on number of consumer reviews. Products with more experiential product descriptions garnered more consumer reviews ($F(3, 279) = 13.59, p < .001$).

Our understanding of the differences between experiential and non-experiential consumption has focused on the consequences, rather than on the decision-making process. This research offers insight on an important influence on choice. In this experiential economy, these findings offer strong implications and cautions to those aiming to position their brand as an experience.

REFERENCES


FIGURES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

We explore the dynamics of consumption experience in traditional bazaars constructed as the new ‘other’ retail spaces. The bazaar, once known to be the consumption space that was a signifier of the lower class identity (Urry 1991) and is characterized by economic poverty (Varman and Costa 2009), is redesigned to include upper classes, now in the form of High Society Bazaars (HSBs) in Turkey, and enhance shopping experience for diverse social classes. We study consumption of space with a distinct difference from earlier studies, where the spaces consumed are often organized by authorities, whether municipal governments or private owners of spaces (Benjamin 2002; Miller 1998; Urry 1995). In the HSB, space is mostly designed by its inhabitants; the sellers, who are small vendors independent of the authorities, and the shoppers, who influence how the stalls will be stocked and displayed by their motion as they visit the HSB.

We aim to contribute to the literature on consumption of space through reflecting the transition from consumption of space (Belk et al. 1988; Sherry 1990a, 1990b, 1998; Urry 1995) to construction of space that is an active, contested and transitive process involving negotiation (Goodman et al. 2010). Most importantly, we discover the means used by consumers to construct and negotiate their space in the HSB. This focus led us discover the dynamics of identity politics of/within consumption spaces. Findings of the qualitative data obtained as a result of focus group and in-depth interviews with bazaar consumers and sellers, and participant observations reveal the means of constructing space in the HSB, which include hybridization, licensing, and negotiation.

HSB is constructed as a hybrid space, not the ‘original’ for either the westernized or the traditional, thus a different order for both, but one that allows meeting and experiencing the other. Observed in the upper class experiences of HSB, the strange (people’s and sellers’ attitudes and attires) mixed in with the familiar (wares being sold, selling and buying going on), thus the hybrid, attracts the ‘westernized’; for them the HSB is a familiarly novel, engaging, and entertaining environment. The HSB is primitive, untamed, and not fully ‘cultured’ or rationally ordered, but it is seductive for the same reasons. For the lower class, the presence of upper classes in the HSB has turned these bazaars into something bazaars were not before, a hybrid, where the other can be encountered.

For the ‘traditional’, the encounter with the ‘other’ is both alluring and a confirmation of a new status, an equality with the ‘other’ that used to be superior. The inclusion of the upper classes in HSBs is presented as a renegotiation of the image of the bazaar as an ‘ordinary’ space for all, not exceptionally an experience for poor people. The hybrid HSB now constitutes a new order for the traditional, who still have the old bazaars to frequent, but especially for the modernized, who still have the modern stores to shop at. The HSB becomes a ‘leveling’ (Karababa and Ger 2010) space for consumers from different social strata initially representing different and conflicting identities (traditional, modernized), where they can negotiate their space on an equal footing. Lower classes find license they did not have before in their relations with the upper classes in the HSB, whereas the upper classes accede the license of the lower class, which they did not before. For both elements, the sought consequence of this negotiation is the ability to experience the ‘other’ and ‘becoming the other’ in order to be included in the HSB.

The possibility of negotiation in the ‘new’ environment as opposed to the regimented order of that which is set, contributes to the allure of experiencing the other. Constrained by the disciplinary and relatively non-negotiable structure of the contemporary markets, upper classes lose their ability to have pleasurable consumption experiences, a condition that could be transformed through actually experiencing those they have otherized; yet it must emerge through mutual choice and negotiation (Hooks 2006). HSBs allow for this transformation to occur, and negotiation takes place at many levels. Seeming lack of a script of shopping at bazaars gives way to continual bargaining between the sellers and buyers; stimulates competition among shoppers to reach, explore, and acquire the sought products, and provides a space to experience the ‘other’ and her/his tastes (Belk et al. 2003).

We also draw attention to the tensions occurring at the macro level. We highlight the tension between bazaar sellers and the news media, as sellers oppose the labeling of the bazaar as a High Society retail venue and argue that HSB is a public bazaar inhabited by people from all social classes. In addition, we highlight the tension between HSB inhabitants (sellers and consumers) and the municipal and other modern retail stores aiming to exert control over the uncontrollable economy and the unfair trade competition the HSBs create.

Consequently, HSBs have altered the discourse on social class and consumption and production of/within space. We observe transformations in upper and lower class desires to experience each other and the HSB as the other consumption venue. Negotiation of the order(s) and navigation of one’s space in the HSB draw our attention to the concept of liminality (Sherry 1990a; Turner 1967), a state of in-betweenness, which gives way to cultural hybridity (Bhabha 1994) that promotes difference without an imposed hierarchy among social strata. HSB serves as a physical space that is socially constructed to experience and construct otherness (Lefebvre 1991). Construction of space is characterized by a constantly transforming interplay (Meethan et al. 2006) between the lower classes as the local residents of the bazaar, the sellers, and the elite sectors of the population visiting the bazaar.

REFERENCES

References available upon request
Usage Frequency Neglect
Mauricio Mittelman, UTDT, Argentina
Dilney Gonçalves, IE University - IE Business School, Spain

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Most people will agree that, except for products like a sunroof whose mere ownership can be a source of enjoyment, consumers must consider how often they expect to use whatever they intend to buy. Yet we show that consumers may fail to do so.

It is well established that consumers often construct their preferences on the spot (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Now, usually there is nothing in the product itself or in the shopping environment to prompt consumers to consider usage frequency. Moreover, it is unlikely that consumers will spontaneously consider usage frequency, because research in psychology has shown that decisions are driven mostly by information that is explicitly presented (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Legrenzi, Girotto, and Johnson-Laird 1993). Therefore, we suggest that consumers may neglect usage frequency when making a purchase decision. There is evidence that consumers can indeed neglect critical information when considering a purchase. For example, Frederick et al. (2009) reported several studies in which consumers neglected opportunity costs when making a purchase decision.

If, while making a purchase decision, consumers indeed neglect (or underweight) how often they expect to use the product they consider buying as we hypothesize, then interventions that bring to mind usage frequency shall influence their choices. Three studies support our hypothesis.

Study 1
In study 1 we tested whether a simple reminder that a product is used often influences consumers’ preferences. Participants (n=105) were asked to imagine that they went to a store to buy a new mattress and decided to read a brochure with “three points to consider when choosing a mattress.” We randomly assigned them to one of two conditions: usage-frequency or control. The brochure had three points. The first two points were identical to both conditions and did not relate to usage frequency. The third point reminded them of the usage frequency (“Recall that you will be sleeping on it virtually every day.”) in the usage-frequency condition, and was inconsequential (“Before making up your mind, first narrow down your choice to three or four options.”) in the control condition. Then they were asked to choose an option from among three models available that varied in price and overall quality. As expected, those who were subtly reminded that one uses a mattress every day chose the premium model more often than those who were not (25% vs. 8% respectively; chi-square(1) = 5.48, p = .02). This result provides initial evidence that people do not spontaneously account for usage frequency in making product choices.

Study 2
In study 2 we replicated the results of study 1 and addressed an alternative explanation. MBA students (n=122) were asked to imagine that they went to a store to buy a digital camera and decided to read a small brochure called “How to choose a digital camera.” We randomly assigned them to one of three conditions: frequency, liking, or control. The brochure had two questions that were identical to all participants and a third question that was our manipulation. This third question read either “How often do you plan to take pictures using artistic features?” (frequency condition), or “How much do you like to take pictures using artistic features?” (liking condition), or “Are you going to take pictures mostly indoors or outdoors?” (control condition). We then asked participants to choose between two camera models that only differed in price and in the presence of an artistic feature allowing consumers to take pictures in black and white plus one other color. In a separate pretest consumers thought this feature would be used infrequently.

The proportions choosing the model with the artistic feature that was expected to be used infrequently were 31% in the frequency, 61% in the liking, and 61% in the control conditions. The difference between the frequency and control conditions was statistically significant (chi-square(1) = 7.29, p <.01), but that between the liking and control conditions was not (chi-square(1) = .0001). Priming usage frequency had an effect as compared to the control group, but priming liking did not. This suggests that our intervention works only if people do not have the primed concept previously accessible in their minds. It is unlikely then that our manipulation simply caused people to exaggerate the importance of an attribute (note that the priming of liking had no effect).

Study 3
In study 3 we not only primed but also manipulated usage frequency to implicate it unambiguously in the pattern of choices observed. Participants (n=242) were assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (frequency priming vs. control) x 2 (usage frequency: high vs. low) between-subjects design to take two purportedly unrelated studies. In the first study they did a scrambled sentence task. The scrambled sentences were either related to frequency (priming frequency condition) or neutral (control condition). In the second study we asked participants to choose between two USB flash drives and manipulated usage frequency by suggesting they would work on files directly from the device or store a backup of their files. The models differed only in data-transfer speed, design, and price such that the more expensive model looked better and was faster. Consistent with our hypothesis, when we primed participants with usage frequency, those in high-frequency condition chose the model more appropriate for frequent users (faster, better looking) more often than those in the low-frequency condition (60% vs. 38%; chi-square(1) = 5.67, p = .02), but not in the control condition (57% vs. 48%, chi-square(1) = .84). Without a reminder frequency seems to have no influence in consumers’ preferences.

Our studies show that in the absence of a reminder people tend to neglect – or significantly underweight – usage frequency, which in turn might lead them to make suboptimal choices. Usage frequency neglect can make consumers buy less (studies 1 and 3) or more than they need (study 2). This research has important implications for consumer decision-making as well as consumer well-being by showing that consumers are neglecting an important aspect in their purchase decisions.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

People often compare themselves with superior others when striving for a goal. Research has shown that upward social comparison motivates people to improve oneself in order to close the gap between themselves and the superior others (Van de Ven et al. 2011). Similarly, goal literature has demonstrated that comparison to superior others signals a lack of goal progress and hence increases motivation to engage in goal-congruent action (Fishbach et al. 2006). In this stream of research, upward comparison is usually described as any situation in which one is outperformed by others. This research, however, posits that holding the relative distance between the self and others constant, people are less motivated when they perceive that the superior others have already achieved the goal. Objectively though, the others’ goal attainment should have no negative consequences for their own goal attainment.

We propose that a decrease in motivation when observing others’ goal attainment (compared to when superior others are simply performing better), is caused by feelings of being beaten. Consistent with this explanation, we predict that people are less likely to become demotivated if they focus more on their own progress. In addition, this feeling of being beaten and hence the subsequent demotivation should also decrease if the other person achieving the goal is someone close (i.e., close friends). We also examine how observing others’ goal attainment influences performance in a subsequent task. We predict that it may ironically motivate people to perform better, as the subsequent task provides a new opportunity to outperform the superior others. However, such effect should only happen when the subsequent task is related to the focal task, because performing better than the others in an unrelated task does not help to reduce the gap between themselves and the superior others on the considered dimension.

Three experiments tested these hypotheses. Experiment 1 used a 2 (priming: self vs. other) x 3 (other’s goal attainment: goal attained-low self progress vs. goal attained-high self progress vs. goal unattained-low self progress) between-subjects design. Participants first conducted a story-writing task about themselves versus another subject to induce self-other focus (Goukens et al. 2009). Next, participants imagined joining a loyalty program offered by a café. In the program, they could receive one stamp for each coffee purchased. After accumulating 10 stamps, they could enjoy a free coffee. Participants imagined meeting another student who joined the same program. In the goal unattained-low self progress condition, the other student supposedly had accumulated 8 stamps (no free coffee yet), while they only had 6 stamps. In the two goal attained conditions, the other student already had 10 stamps (free coffee), while they only had 8 stamps in the high self progress condition and 6 stamps in the low self progress condition respectively (hence the 3 goal attainment conditions are 8-6 vs. 10-8 vs. 10-6). After the scenario, participants indicated how likely they would go to that café (compared to a café closer on their way to campus). As expected, in the other-focus condition, the likelihood to visit the café was lower when the other student already attained the goal versus not, regardless of high or low self progress. In contrast and in line with the goal gradient research (Kivetz et al. 2006), those in the self-focus condition reported higher likelihood to visit the café when they themselves had high progress (8 stamps) compared to low progress (6 stamps), regardless of the other student’s goal attainment.

Experiment 2 used a 3 (priming: self vs. friend vs. co-worker) x 2 (other’s goal attainment: attained vs. unattained) design to identify another boundary condition for the demotivating effect of the other person’s goal attainment. Similar to Experiment 1, participants were asked to first write a story either about themselves, a friend or a co-worker. Participants then took part in a task that purportedly tested their mathematical skills in two parts (Huang and Zhang 2011). If they reached 100 points in total, they could enter a lottery to win €50 coupon. After Part I, participants received feedback about their own and another (anonymous) participant’s performance, in which we manipulated the other’s goal attainment. In the goal attained (unattained) condition, participants were told that they earned 80 (60) points, while the other earned 100 (80) points. After the feedback, participants started Part II, which included math questions that were unsolvable. Time spent on the task was used as an indicator of motivation. Results showed that in the co-worker condition, participants spent less time on the task when the other achieved the goal vs. not, thus replicating the previous findings. More importantly, when friend was primed, the time spent did not differ regardless of the other’s goal attainment. Finally, when self was primed, participants spent more time in the goal attained (vs. unattained) condition similar to Experiment 1.

Finally, Experiment 3 examined whether the negative effect on motivation transferred to a subsequent task. This study used a 2 (other’s goal attainment: attained vs. unattained) x 2 (task relatedness: unrelated vs. related) between-subjects design. Similar to Experiment 2, participants were first asked to write a story about a co-worker. Next, they worked on a separate task that tested their verbal skills in two parts. After Part I, they again received feedback about their own and another (anonymous) participant’s performance. This study held the performance feedback constant across conditions, but manipulated whether the other’s performance was equal to the end goal or not. In both goal attainment conditions, participants were told that they obtained 60 points, whereas the other participant obtained 80 points. Only in the goal attained condition, it was added that 80 points is also the amount of points required to be labeled “a qualified expert in verbal skills”. In the goal unattained condition, no further information about the end goal was provided. After the feedback, participants filled in Part II of the verbal test. We used the number of solutions attempted as a measure of motivation. Next, participants were asked to take part in another study, a proofreading task. We manipulated the task relatedness by highlighting whether the previous verbal task and the proofreading task involved related or unrelated psychological processes. We examined the number of correct answers as an indicator of performance. Replicating the previous findings, the number of attempted solutions in Part II of the focal task was lower in the goal attained condition than in the goal unattained condition. In the goal attained condition, performance was better in the subsequent task when it was related (vs. unrelated) to the focal task. Conversely, participants in the goal unattained condition did not differ in performance regardless of the task relatedness.

Taken together, results from our studies show that not all upward social comparisons have the same effect on motivation. Holding relative distance the same, the perception of someone else who already achieved the goal can be demotivating, although it might also have positive influences on other related tasks.
REFERENCES
The Moderating Role of Self in the Persuasiveness of Visual Perspective
Jing Zhang, San José State University, USA
Xiaojing Yang, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The effectiveness of visual communication depends on its stylistic properties (e.g., camera angle, orientation of an object, and visual perspective) (Yang et al. 2010). In this project, we will focus on the actor-like vs. observer-like visual perspective. An actor-like perspective assumes an active participant’s perspective while an observer-like perspective assumes a detached onlooker’s perspective to audiences (Libby et al. 2009). A growing body of research has been conducted in social psychology and social cognition to examine the effect of visual perspective on memory and attribution in the context of social event (Libby et al. 2009). With different visual perspectives so frequently adopted in marketing practice through camera angle (Meyers-Levy & Peracchio 1996), it would be interesting to study the impact of visual perspective on consumers’ product evaluations and behavioral intentions. Specifically, to what extent are the visual perspectives effective in persuading audiences? And what role does the audience’s self-concept (ideal vs. ought) play in the process? This project is designed to answer these questions. Drawing upon research from social cognition, self-concept, and visual processing, we predict that when an actor (observer) perspective is used to promote a product or service, participants with an ideal (ought) self will have more favorable evaluations than those with an ought (ideal) self. These predictions are tested in two experiments. Findings of the project will contribute to consumer research on visual communication and self concept and offer implications for creating marketing messages.

Research has shown that different visual perspectives make people access different aspects of the information, which in turn affect their emotions (Hung & Mukhopadhyay 2012), interpretation of actions (Libby & Eibach 2002), and judgment and decision making (Jones & Nisbett 1972). For example, Hung & Mukhopadhyay (2012) found that an actor (observer) perspective makes consumers focus more on the situation (the self in the situation), which in turn elicits different emotions. This suggests that an observer’s perspective facilitates greater attention to the self whereas an actor’s perspective promotes greater attention to the situation. We predict further that such difference in actor-observer perspective may vary depending on different self-concepts, ideal vs. ought (Pham & Avnet 2004).

Specifically, consumers with an ideal self are more likely to adopt a first-person or actor perspective, through which they are looking out at their surroundings through their own eyes. An actor-like visual perspective will enable consumers with an ideal-self to project themselves into a situation or scenario, and understand the demands and constraints of an event. In advertising, the congruency between the actor perspective in the ad and consumers’ ideal-self will result in greater persuasiveness of the ad message. Similar reasoning can apply to the observer perspective and consumers’ ought self. We predict that, when an actor (observer) perspective is used in ad, participants with an ideal (ought) self indicate more favorable attitudes toward the ad and the advertised product, and higher purchase intentions than do participants with an ought (ideal) self.

Two experiments were designed to test the hypotheses using different products, recycling program and online classes. Both studies used a 2 (Self: ideal vs. ought) x 2 (Visual perspective: actor vs. observer) between-subjects design. The visual perspective is manipulated through camera angle that is used to shot the ad image. For example, one print ad shows an observer perspective, in which the ad image portrayed someone watching an online lecture on a tablet PC; the other print ad shows an actor perspective, in which the ad image was shot from the viewer’s perspective such that the viewer is watching the online lecture him/herself. Self-concept is manipulated by asking participants to list their current and past hopes and aspirations for the ideal-self priming condition, and duties and obligations for the ought-self priming condition (Pham & Avnet 2004). Three dependent variables, ad attitudes, product attitudes, and behavioral intentions were measured by multiple bipolar scales. For Study 2, participants’ thoughts were also collected and analyzed to reveal the mechanism underlying the effects.

Hypotheses were tested by submitting the three dependent variables to a 2x2 ANOVA, respectively. A significant 2-way interaction effect emerged for all the tests. Contrast analysis revealed further that when an actor (observer) perspective was used in either recycling or online class ad, participants with an ideal (ought) self had more favorable attitudes toward the ad and the advertised product, and higher purchase intentions than did participants with an ought (ideal) self. Study 2 results replicated Study 1 results. In addition, analysis of self-focused vs. situation-focused thoughts offered evidence for the mechanism that underlies the effects. As expected, when an actor (observer) visual perspective was used, participants with an ideal (ought) self had a greater proportion of situation-focused (self-focused) thoughts than those with an ought (ideal) self.

Our findings contribute to the literature on visual processing and in particular, stylistic prosperities of visual images. We have shown that actor or observer visual perspectives used in an ad can be diagnostic and affect how viewers evaluate the product. Yang et al (2010) also revealed how camera angles, another stylistic property, affect consumers’ product evaluations. Taken together, this line of research has suggested that the persuasive power of ads often resides in pictorial depictions, which convey semantically meaningful concepts to consumers via their stylistic properties (Messaris, 1997; Scott & Batra, 2003). Our research findings also have implications for marketing practitioners. In light of the visual perspective x self-concept interaction effect, advertisers need to be careful when it comes to decide on the visual perspective. The best approach is to consider which self is salient at the moment when visual perspective is presented. If an actor (observer) perspective is used in the ad, an ideal (ought) self should be activated in order to maximize the persuasive effects.

REFERENCES


Hypothesis 1: The “free price” will disproportionately strengthen the preference of the hedonic (vs. utilitarian) products.

Hypothesis 2: The positive affective reaction due to the free offer will be more for hedonic (vs. utilitarian) products.

We tested the free price bounce for hedonic consumption in a series of five studies. In study 1 the respondents chose among a hedonic option (Lindt chocolate), a utilitarian option (Libby’s fruit salad) and choosing nothing. The price condition was manipulated as between subjects. In the cost condition a certain price was mentioned for both the products while in the free condition both the products were offered for free. The main effect of the cost condition on choice of the hedonic option was significant ($β=.752$; $Wald=4.548$, $Exp(β)=471$, $p<.033$) supporting our hypothesis that a free-price disproportionately augments the hedonic option.

The setting for study 2 was similar to study 1. But instead of comparing the hedonic preference in a hedonic-vs.-utilitarian choice set, we now compare conditions. We followed the Shampanier et al. (2007) procedure where a zero-priced hedonic product is pitted against a positive-priced hedonic product, and a zero-priced utilitarian option against a positive-priced utilitarian one. A logistic regression analysis reveals a significant interaction effect of product types (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and price conditions (free vs. cost) ($β=-1.154$; $Wald=6.797$, $Exp(β)=.315$, $p<.01$) showing that the choice share of the hedonic option increases significantly in the free condition while that of the utilitarian option remains similar across the cost conditions.

Study 3A explores the mechanism behind our findings. The study design was exactly similar to that of study 1 except that an affect measure was introduced before the DV. The Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation analysis indicated that affective arousal indeed fully mediates the zero price bounce for hedonic consumption across price conditions.

Study 3B was conducted to rule out the alternative mechanism that anticipated guilt rather than affective arousal is driving our results. The study design was similar to study 3 except that attractiveness and guilt measures were included for both the hedonic and utilitarian products across price conditions. The Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation analysis indicated that perceived guilt doesn’t mediate our main effects whereas affect was again found to fully mediate the impact of price conditions on the choice share of the hedonic option.

In study 4, we kept the product same across hedonic and utilitarian conditions but primed individuals with either hedonic (in the hedonic condition) or utilitarian (in the utilitarian condition) goals for consumption (Botti and McGill 2011, study 2) to rule out the possibility of potential product related confounds. We used a 2 (hedonic vs. utilitarian) × 2(50% discount vs. free) condition between-subjects design. An ANOVA model revealed significant interaction effect between product-type and cost ($F (1, 268) = 4.253$, $p<.05$) supporting our prediction of a free price bounce for hedonic options.

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Perhaps more than ever before, consumers are increasingly spending more and more of their time in consumptions that are completely free - think Facebook, Google, Wikipedia, etc. An important managerial prerogative is to optimize the product mix for what will be offered for free, and what not. In this paper, using various kinds of promotional and market formats, we examine the relative advantage of offering hedonic (vs. utilitarian) products for free. We conclude that it makes more sense to offer hedonic (vs. utilitarian) products for free. This gives a discontinuous and significant preference boost to the product relative to when (i) non-hedonic options are offered for free, or (ii) hedonic options are offered at discounted but above-zero prices. Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely (2007) demonstrate that, while deciding about free products, people don’t simply subtract costs from benefits but instead perceive the benefits associated with the free products as higher since the zero-price is used as a qualitatively different price point than other non-zero prices. This theoretical rationale for differential comparative frames is similar to the one offered by past research which has compared zero-price to other non-zero price offers (Diamond and Sanyal 1990; Chandran and Morwitz 2006). These researchers find that since the monetary value of free promotions is often not explicit, “free” promotions evoke a non-market transactional mindset instead of a monetary, cost-benefit based mindset evoked by non-zero prices. This affective deconstruction of the zero-price effect is analogous to the affect heuristic (Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2002) and also to the “how do I feel about it” heuristic (hereafter HDIF heuristic) (Schwarz and Clore 1988). Both the Affect heuristic and the HDIF heuristic theories argue that integral affect (experienced feelings about the stimulus) is commonly and forcefully used as a source of information in evaluative judgments. Instead of rationally calculating evaluations from a target’s attributes, consumers often base their choices on feelings as they hold the target’s representation in their mind.

Consumption of goods and services is often classified as hedonic (product for fun and feelings) or utilitarian (products for functional benefits) (Khan, Dhar, and Werttenbroch 2005). When consumers evaluate (affect-poor) utilitarian products, they are likely to be driven by the normative cost-benefit utility maximizing calculus. But when evaluating an (affect-rich) hedonic product, such deliberative rationality often breaks down and gives precedence to a more feelings-driven attitude-formation process (Pham 1998; Adaval 2001). Therefore, attitudes and preferences for hedonic consumption are more emotionally driven, whereas those for utilitarian goods and services are more cognitively guided (Havlena and Holbrook 1986; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Mano and Oliver 1993; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). Since the use of affective appraisals has been shown to be the underlying basis of the zero price effect (Shampanier et al. 2007), it follows that this effect will influence preferences more for hedonic (vs. utilitarian) consumption items and situations. This theorizing enables us to develop a straightforward argument for a cross-category difference in the influence of “free price” in boosting product preference. We expect this effect to be greater in the case of hedonic (vs. utilitarian) products. More specifically, we propose the following hypotheses:
The Hedonic-Shift for Freebies: How Preference for Hedonic Options is Disproportionately Enhanced when Their Price Falls to Zero

Table 1: Brief Description of Design, Stimuli and Mean-Results of Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Stimuli</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Attractiveness/ Preference (7-point scales)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 Conditions Heterogeneous Choice sets</td>
<td>H(Lindt)$0 vs. U(Fruit Salad)$0, U(Lindt)$2 vs. U(Fruit Salad)$2</td>
<td>H(Lindt)$0 = 0.652, H(Lindt)$2 = 0.422</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2×2 Conditions Homogeneous Choice sets</td>
<td>H(GV Cupcake)$0 vs. H(LD Cupcake)$0, H(GV Cupcake)$1 vs. H(LD Cupcake)$1, U(GV Sugar)$0 vs. U(Imperial Sugar)$0, U(GV Sugar)$1 vs. U(Imperial Sugar)$1</td>
<td>Condition 1: H(GV Cupcake)$0 = 0.702, H(GV Cupcake)$1 = 0.368, Condition 2: U(GV Sugar)$0 = 0.769, U(GV Sugar)$1 = 0.723</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (replication)</td>
<td>2×2 Conditions Homogeneous Choice sets</td>
<td>H(GV Cupcake)$0 vs. H(LD Cupcake)$0, H(GV Cupcake)$1 vs. H(LD Cupcake)$1, U(GV Fruit Salad)$0 vs. U(Libby’s Fruit Salad)$0, U(GV Fruit Salad)$1 vs. U(Libby’s Fruit Salad)$1</td>
<td>Condition 1: H(GV Cupcake)$0 = 0.574, H(GV Cupcake)$1 = 0.317, Condition 2: U(GV Fruit Salad)$0 = 0.585, U(GV Fruit Salad)$1 = 0.557</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2×2 Conditions Separate Evaluation</td>
<td>H(Spa)$0 vs. H(Spa)$50% off, U(Spa)$0 vs. U(Spa)$50% off</td>
<td>H(Spa)$0 = 6.27, H(Spa)$50% off = 5.42, U(Spa)$0 = 5.87, U(Spa)$50% off = 5.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GV: Great Value, LD: Little Debbie’s
H(***) denotes Hedonic option
U(***) denotes Utilitarian option
Subscript denotes associated cost

Table 2: Mediation Analysis Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>DV ← IV</th>
<th>Mediator ← IV</th>
<th>DV ← Mediator + IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A (attractiveness)</td>
<td>(β = .173; p = .05)</td>
<td>(β = 1.04; p &lt; .01)</td>
<td>(β price condition = .019, p &gt; .5; β affect = .148, p &lt; .01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B (Attractiveness)</td>
<td>(β = .172; p = .084)</td>
<td>(β = 937; p &lt; .05)</td>
<td>(β price condition = .219, p &lt; .05; β affect = .073, p &gt; .1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B (Guilt)</td>
<td>(β = .172; p = .084)</td>
<td>(β = .039; p &gt; .10)</td>
<td>(β price condition = .071, p &gt; .4; β affect = .122, p &lt; .01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The betas are unstandardized coefficients

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Many human judgments are comparative in nature (Mussweiler 2003). Consumers have been shown to judge themselves more positively (or less negatively) than others: a bias called self-positivity (Hoorens 1995; Pahl and Eiser 2005). These effects can represent true biases that people have about themselves that are self-enhancing or self-presentational tendencies in socially desirable reporting whereby they wish to appear better to others (Paulhus 2002).

Building on the context effects literature in survey responding (Schuman and Presser 1996), we examine the potentially debiasing effect of question order and type of comparison other on self-presentational responding. Differences in self/other-judgments depend on contextual factors such as question-order (Lin, Lin, and Raghubir 2004) and type of other (Pahl, Eiser, and White 2009; Perloff and Fetzer 1986). We predict and show that self-presentational responding extends to the domain of consumption motives (why one undertakes an experience) and emotions (how one feels about an experience), and can be attenuated using contextual manipulations (question order, type of other) that affect the degree of perceived self/other-similarity (Mussweiler 2003).

We study the experience of marathon participation. In 2011, over half a million runners participated in 720 marathons in the US alone. In study 1 (N=957), we asked runners to indicate why they and average other runners run, and the emotions they feel and they believe other average runners feel when thinking of the upcoming race. We manipulated the order of self and other. Motives for running were categorized as self-esteem- or fitness-related. Emotions were categorized as positive or negative. All scales were multi-item. Means are in the table.

A repeated-measures ANOVA with target (self vs. other) and motives (fitness vs. esteem) as within- and the order (self/other- vs. other/self-order) as a between-subjects factor yielded a three-way interaction (F(1, 955) = 49.5, p < .001). Runners believed that others are more likely to run for self-esteem reasons than they are, particularly when they responded about themselves first (M_self = 2.8 vs. M_other = 3.9) versus others first (M_self = 3.0 vs. M_other = 3.6; target x order: F(1, 955) = 47.7, p < .001). This was not true for fitness motives (target x order: F(1, 955) = 3.1, p > .05).

Runners also believed that others feel more negative (M_self = 1.2 vs. M_other = 2.1, p < .001) and less positive (M_self = 4.5 vs. M_other = 4.0, p < .001; target x emotions: F(1, 955) = 766.0, p < .001) about the race than they do irrespective of order of elicitation (three-way F < 1).

Following up on the order effect in motives, study 2 (N=789) measured perceived self/other-similarity and to what extent the runners used themselves as a reference to make judgments about the average marathoner. Replicating study 1 results (three-way: F(1, 787) = 16.8, p < .001), runners thought they ran less for esteem than others, particularly when questioned about themselves first, with no effect for fitness motives. Runners also thought they felt more positive and less negative than other runners (F(1, 787) = 423.1, p < .001). Extending study 1, in the self/other-condition, runners perceived themselves as less similar to the average runner (M_self/other = .10 vs. M_other/other = .21; F(1, 787) = 8.1, p < .01) and used themselves less extensively as a standard to evaluate others (M_self/other = 2.94, vs. M_other/other = 3.40; F(1, 787) = 13.9, p < .001) with perceived similarity mediating the effect of question order on self/other-differences in self-esteem motives (BCa 95% CI [-.09, -.02]).

To tease out whether these effects represent social desirability or self-positivity, in study 3 (N=1095) we manipulated self/other-similarity between subjects (average, similar, inferior, superior others). If the effects are attenuated with similar others, these results would be consistent with a self-positivity interpretation (Perloff and Fetzer 1986, Raghubir and Menon, 1998), and if they are attenuated with a superior other, it is consistent with a social desirability interpretation as people would like to aspire to superior others. Other-similarity moderated the three-way interaction (F(3, 1087) = 2.5, p = .06). Separate analysis for each type of other showed that the 3-way interaction replicated for average others (F(1, 271) = 5.5, p = .02, η^2_p = .02) and was of comparable magnitude for inferior others (F(1, 271) = 5.7, p = .02, η^2_p = .02). Importantly, it was attenuated for similar others (F(1, 279) = 2.0, p > .10), and exacerbated for superior others (F(1, 266) = 16.6, p < .001, η^2_p = .06). This pattern suggests that the bias may be self-positivity rather than social desirability. For esteem motives, the target x order interaction was present for all targets. For fitness motives, the interaction was only significant for superior others (F(1, 266) = 4.3, p = .04, η^2_p = .02). Put differently, respondents indicated that all others run more for self-esteem than they do, and superior runners also run less for fitness.

Type of other also moderated the target x emotions interaction (F(3, 1087) = 50.3, p < .001). Separate analysis for each type of other, showed that this interaction replicated for all targets (F(1, 272) average_others = 4.4; similar_others = 133.1, F(1, 272) inferior_others = 333.5, p < .001 for all, η^2_p = .41, .32, and .55 respectively), but was of smaller magnitude for superior others (F(1, 267) = 6.5, p = .01, η^2_p = .02). The interactions suggest that runners believe that they have less negative and more positive emotions than others. In all three studies we also found that the magnitude of the effect was greater for negative than for positive emotions.

Our findings contribute to the social-comparison and context effects literature by showing how contextual manipulations such as question-order and type of target can moderate self-presentational responses. The study uses the original domain of a new and emerging consumption experience field: marathon running. Future research should validate these effects in different consumption contexts not involving ability, and further tease out the role of self-positivity versus social desirability in explaining why people believe they sign on for an activity for reasons different than others.

REFERENCES


### Table 1: Means, Relevant Interaction Effects, And Alphas Across Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain (w)</th>
<th>Motives (M)</th>
<th>Emotions (E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha self-other-rating (α)</td>
<td>Esteem Motives</td>
<td>Fitness Motives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>S2</td>
<td>S3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motives (M)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target x M/E x Order x Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target x M/E x Order (average)</td>
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<td>Target x M/E x Order (similar)</td>
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<td>Target x M/E x Order (superior)</td>
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<td>Target x M/E (average)</td>
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<td>Target x M/E (similar)</td>
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<td>Target x M/E (superior)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target x M/E (inferior)</td>
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<td>Target x Order (average/esteem)</td>
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<td>Target x Order (average/fitness)</td>
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### ANOVAs (F(η²))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(only relevant higher order effects)</th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target x M/E x Order x Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5 (.01)</td>
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<td>&lt;1 (.&lt;.01)</td>
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<td>Target x M/E x Other</td>
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<td>50.3*** (.12)</td>
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<td>Target x M/E x Order (average)</td>
<td>49.5*** (.05)</td>
<td>16.8*** (.02)</td>
<td>5.5* (.02)</td>
<td>&lt;1 (.&lt;.01)</td>
<td>1.5 (.&lt;.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target x M/E x Order (superior)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target x M/E x Order (inferior)</td>
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<td>Target x M/E (average)</td>
<td>766.0*** (.45)</td>
<td>243.1*** (.35)</td>
<td>189.6*** (.41)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target x M/E (superior)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target x M/E (inferior)</td>
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<td>Target x Order (average/esteem)</td>
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<td>23.6*** (.03)</td>
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<td>&lt;1 (.&lt;.01)</td>
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<td>&lt;1 (.&lt;.01)</td>
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</table>

**NOTE.**—Motives were measured using four items for fitness motives (i.e., control weight, improve health, stay physically attractive, become physically fit) and four items for esteem motives (i.e., getting recognition, improving self-esteem, competing with others, adding life meaning) using 7-point scales (0=completely unimportant, 6=very important) derived from the Motivations of Marathoners Scales (Masters, Ogles, and Jolton 1993). Emotions were measured using five positive items (confident, joyful, optimistic, hopeful, calm) and five negative items (worried, anxious, uncomfortable, hopeless, tense) using a 7-point scale (0=not at all, 6=very strongly) derived from inventories on anticipatory emotions (Baumgartner, Pieters, and Bagozzi 2008; Leone, Perugini, and Bagozzi 2005) and prospective achievement emotions (Pekrun 2006). Items were counterbalanced.

S1, S2, S3 indicate studies 1, 2, 3; S denotes within-subjects factors; B denotes between-subjects factors.

*p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. **** p < .001.

### References


Time for the Sad and Money for the Happy? The Role of Social Approach on Consumer Willingness to Contribute Charitably
Rhiannon MacDonnell, Cass Business School, City University London, UK

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

We propose that while past research has generally suggested that communals (vs. agentics) help more (Utz 2004), this will depend on the resource being sought (i.e., time vs. money; e.g., MacDonnell and White 2012). Due to the social nature of volunteering, we predict and find that communals are more inclined to contribute time, whereas agentics prefer to donate money (pilot study). In addition, we predict and find that this effect is moderated by the affective state of the target, such that when the target is sad, or sadness-provoking, and there is therefore social esteem to be gained from making the individual feel better, communals are more willing than agentics to give time (studies 1 and 2). Further, we predict and find that agentics are more compelled to give money – a more individual approach to helping – when presented with a sad target. Social approach – the desire to help from up close, versus from a distance – to enable feeling good about one’s contribution is proposed and tested as a mechanism (study 3).

Pilot Study

This study assessed the willingness of communal (vs. agentic) individuals to contribute time (vs. money) to a charitable cause. When time was the resource solicited, the model was significant (p=.005). Communal orientation (p=.01; Singelis 1994; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawak and Gelfand 1995) was significantly related to volunteer intentions, whereas agentic orientation was not (p=.11). When money was sought, the overall model predicting volunteer intentions was also significant (p<.001). Notably, while communal orientation was significantly related to donation intentions (p<.001), agentic orientation was also a significant predictor (p=.015). In line with our predictions, while communals were in general more willing to contribute either resource, agentics a.) were not inclined to contribute time, but b.) were more willing to contribute money.

Study 1

Study 1 assesses the notion that affect of the target (i.e., sad vs. happy) will moderate the effect of helping. It was predicted that communal individuals would be most inclined to contribute time to a sad target, whereas agentics would be least inclined to do the same. The data was analyzed using a 2 (orientation: agentic vs. communal) by 2 (target affect: sad vs. happy) by 2 (resource: money vs. time) ANOVA. While agentic (M = -.10) and communal (M = .14) individuals did not differ significantly in their preference for contributing to an identified target (p=.38) the pattern was in the predicted direction. Agentics tended toward contributing money to an identified victim, whereas communals tended toward contributing time. When the target was unidentified, however, agentics (M = .28) intended to contribute significantly more money, whereas communals (M = -.23) intended to contribute significantly more money (p = .03) in the predicted direction. When the target was not identified, communals did not experience a social approach motive, and thus preferred to help from a distance, whereas agentics did not feel inhibited from a social approach and thus intended to contribute money.

Study 3

The results of studies 1 and 2 suggest that the mechanism underlying the observed effects involves approach (vs. avoidance), wherein communals approach individuals who are sad (study 1) or identified (study 2) with their time, but the opposite with their money. Conversely, agentics approach individuals who are happy (study 1) or unidentified (study 2) with their time, and do the opposite with their money. The proposed mechanism is social approach, or the desire to help from up close (vs. from a distance). Data were analyzed using hierarchical multiple regression on volunteer intentions. Main effects were entered in the first step, interactions in the second step, and the three-way interaction in the third step. While neither the main effects nor the first order interactions significantly improved the model, the three-way interaction significantly improved model fit (p=.01). Next, social approach was added to the model, showing significant improvement in fit (p<.001). Importantly, the three-way interaction dropped from significance (p = .18), suggesting that social approach significantly mediated the path between the three-way interaction and volunteer intentions. Thus, whether one prefers to help from up close (vs. from a distance) significantly mediated the effect of self-construal, affect and victim status on volunteer intentions.

Discussion

Taken together, the results of the pilot study and studies 1 to 3 suggest that agentic and communal consumers weight different information in determining what, when, and to whom they contribute charitably. In studies 1 and 2, the differing effect of contribution on money (vs. time) was examined, and in study 3 the mediating role of social approach was established for volunteer intentions. These findings suggest that agentics gravitate more toward assisting those who seem happier or less emotionally taxing; whereas communals gravitate to supporting those who are sad or whose plight is more emotionally engaging (i.e., identified targets).

REFERENCES


The Role of Visual Attention in Decision-Making: An Eye-Tracking Experiment

Milica Mormann, University of Miami, USA
R. Blythe Towal, California Institute of Technology, USA
Christof Koch, California Institute of Technology, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Bettman suggested as early as 1979 that attention may be one of the key factors that influence choice. More recently, Janiszewski et al. (2013) reported that repeated allocation of attention to a product increases the likelihood that consumers will eventually select that product. But which factors determine what products successfully attract consumer attention? More importantly, how do these factors interact and influence one another? And, critically for marketing theory and practice, how exactly does the resulting attentional focus affect consumer choices among various, competing products?

The deployment and focus of consumer attention depend on two types of factors: endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous factors are “person factors” that are driven by consumer goals, such as taste, familiarity, and involvement (Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow and Young 2009; Pieters and Wedel 2004; 2007). Exogenous factors, on the other hand, are “stimulus factors”, such as color or brightness of packaging. These exogenous factors automatically attract consumer attention irrespective of one’s goals and intentions (Milošavljević et al. 2012; Chandon et al. 2009; van der Lans, Pieters and Wedel 2008). The marketing literature has identified the interplay between endogenous and exogenous factors, their respective and joint effects on attention, and the effect of attention on the decision-making process as research topics of prime importance (Payne and Venkatraman 2011; Russo 2011; Chandon et al. 2009; Wedel and Pieters 2008; Bettmann 1979; Russo 1978). Addressing these questions is the focus of the current research.

We presented hungry participants with high-resolution photos of store shelves filled with a total of 28 typical snack food items (randomly chosen from a set of 41 food items, such as Doritos, Oreos, Reese’s, M&Ms, etc.) and asked them to search for and choose the item that they want to eat. Seventeen participants (median age = 25 years, range = 18 – 55 years; 61% male) participated in an eye-tracking experiment but due to incomplete eye-recordings and failures to follow task instructions, the data from four participants had to be dropped from the analysis. Each participant made 150 choices in blocks of 25 based on the allowed decision-making time: 0.255 seconds, 0.455 seconds, 0.655 seconds, 1.155 seconds, 3.155 seconds and 25 trials in the free-response condition in which participants had as much time as they wanted to make a choice.

During the entire decision-making task, we record moment-to-moment measures of attention, at a rate of 1000 times per second. We use the neuro-model of visual saliency to measure the exogenous-factor strength of the images on store shelves (Koch and Itti 2012; WhiteMatter Labs GmbH; Itti, Koch and Niebur 1998), and liking ratings of 41 different snack food items, such as Doritos and Snickers, to measure participants’ preferences for each item.

Our results indicate that the visual saliency of the items that participants chose was significantly higher than the saliency of equally or, sometimes, more liked but non-chosen alternatives (providing support for our H1). More specifically, when participants chose an item that was not rated as a “5=would like to eat very much”, they chose an item rated “4=would like to eat” with the highest saliency ranking (5) as measured by the neuro-model of visual saliency in significantly more trials than they chose items that were less visually salient (saliency ranking of 1-4; \( \chi^2(4), p = 5.64 \times 10^{-6} \))

We next test three properties of visual attention that may give rise to this bias. During initial fixations, the items that participants look at have a higher visual saliency rank than preference rank (all \( p < 0.012 \), Wilcoxon sign-rank test; H2 supported). We next hypothesize that visual saliency will continue to bias eye movements throughout the entire decision-making process (H3), not only during the initial eye movements. To estimate the relative importance of visual saliency on refixations, we here consider two additional variables known to affect consumers’ eye movements: preferences and centrality (i.e., how close to the center of the shelf an item is placed).

We found that the three-parameter model significantly outperformed a model based on centrality alone for all fixations (all \( p < 0.05, \chi^2(2) \) test of difference in deviance) indicating that both preference and visual saliency information are required to predict whether or not an item will be refixated on. Visual saliency contributes to the model not only at the beginning of the decision-making process (H2), but up through fixation 7 (H3 supported). Finally, we hypothesize that visual saliency will influence total gaze duration, i.e., consideration, during decision making (H4). We found that items that have a very high saliency rank are fixated on longer overall than items with lower saliency ranks across all decision-making times (H = 64, 4 d.f., \( p = 3.75 \times 10^{-13} \), Kruskal-Wallis).

The current study improves our theoretical understanding of the effects of exogenous and endogenous factors on attention, as well as the effects of attention on decision making. Our results show that every-day choices are systematically biased by exogenous visual saliency so that consumers are likely to choose the alternatives that are visually salient among several liked alternatives. Using the eye-tracking method and insights from vision science we further show how this effect on choice is generated: participants look (1) earlier, (2) more repeatedly, and (3) overall longer on items with higher visual saliency allowing them more opportunity to consider, and eventually choose, these alternatives.

REFERENCES


Yes, “Touch” Matters: The Impact of Touch on Consumer Creativity
Heeryung Kim, Indiana University, USA
H. Shanker Krishnan, Indiana University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In many product categories, consumers are integrally engaged in design of a product in order to customize it to their own needs. In such cases, the level of creativity displayed by a consumer may lead to superior outcomes. Creativity may be influenced by individual factors (some consumers more creative than others), the environment, and even the product. In our research, we are interested in examining the effect of perceptual cues on creativity. For example, when designing clothes, how does a haptic cue (e.g., feeling the fabric) influence creativity?

There is a long history regarding the importance of the sense of touch. Aristotle believed that touch mediates every type of sense perception, even vision (Siegel 1970). In the marketing literature, research on the role of haptics has risen in prominence, perhaps encouraged by the surge of online shopping. In such contexts an important question is how to compensate for the lack of touch (Peck and Childers 2007). However, research on the impact of touch or haptics on creative consumption is an unexplored question, which we seek to address.

Previous research acknowledges that in creativity, haptics plays an important role. Because it is effective in facilitating learning and memory (Lacey and Campbell 2006) as well as provides sensory experience and fun (Peck 2009). However, despite the importance of haptic cues for creativity, due to surge of online consumption contexts, haptic cues become less accessible. In this paper, we discuss the potential benefits and applications of haptics to foster creative consumption in a marketing setting.

Three laboratory experiments were conducted to shed light on this topic. Experiment 1 explored the effect of haptic cues on creativity. As in previous research participants were asked to design a toy. We predict that presence of haptic cues will result in designs that are higher in appropriateness and novelty. Each participant was provided with either 14 shapes (haptic cues condition) or 14 photos of shapes (no haptic cues condition), with the same shapes across conditions. They were asked to design a toy, anything a child (age 5-11) can use to play with. In the haptic cues condition, participants could touch and manipulate the shapes whereas, without haptic cues participants could only see the shapes. After the design task, participants answered questions pertaining to covariate variables such as mood, knowledge, attention, and involvement. We invited two judges who majored in design to evaluate each toy idea on three seven-point scales measuring novelty and appropriateness. A MANCOVA was conducted. Results show that haptics had a significant influence on creativity. Specifically, when consumers were presented with information with haptic cues, higher novelty was shown than consumers without haptic cues ($M_{no\text{haptic}} = 2.50, M_{haptic} = 3.40; F(1, 73) = 4.96, p < .05$). But the impact of haptics on appropriateness did not reach statistical significance ($M_{no\text{haptic}} = 4.40, M_{\text{haptic}} = 4.80; F(1, 73) = 1.40, p > .1$). This finding shows that haptic cues aids consumer’s creativity, especially in terms of their novelty.

Experiment 2 followed a 2 (haptic cues vs. no haptic cues) by 2 (visual cues vs. no visual cues) between-subjects factorial design to examine the moderating role of visual cues. In particular, can the presence of visual cues compensate for the absence of haptic cues? Participants were instructed to list creative usage of a plastic cup. In condition 1, (with both haptic and visual cues) participants were able to see and touch the cup. In condition 2, (haptic cues only) participants were able to touch the cup but not see it (it was placed inside a box). In condition 3, (visual cues only) participants saw a picture of the cup on a computer screen. In condition 4 (neither haptic nor visual cues) participants read a description of the plastic cup such as color, weight, height, and texture on the computer screen. Subsequently participants wrote down as many creative uses of the cup as they could identify. A two-way ANOVA with haptic cues and visual cues as the independent variables, and the number of creative uses of a plastic cup as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of the haptic cues ($F(1, 106) = 5.299, p < .05$) as well as a significant two-way interaction ($F(1, 106) = 3.975, p < .05$). Planned contrasts revealed that when haptic cues were not provided, the presence of visual cues led to more creative uses ($M_{no\text{visual}} = 4.85, M_{\text{visual}} = 7.50; F(1, 106) = 10.21, p < .01$). When haptic cues were provided, however, the presence of visual cues didn’t influence creative uses ($M_{no\text{visual}} = 7.39, M_{\text{visual}} = 7.69; F(1, 106) = .258, p > .1$). This finding demonstrates the moderating effect of visual cues, such that visual cues can compensate for the absence of haptic cues, and shows that the visual and haptic cues do not produce an additive effect.

Experiment 3 investigated the moderating role of ownership, following a 2 (haptic cues vs. no haptic cues) by 2 (ownership vs. no ownership) between-subjects factorial design. When haptic cues are present, the sense of touch induces imaginary ownership (Peck & Shu 2009), and hence there would be no ownership effects. When haptic cues are not present, ownership provides a higher level of motivation and enhances creativity (Amabile 1996). The creativity task was same as in Study 1. To induce a feeling of ownership, half the participants were instructed to imagine that the toy company would give them the toy that they just designed. A MANCOVA revealed a main effect of ownership on novelty ($F(1, 94) = 4.259, p < .05$) and significant two-way interactions for creativity composed of novelty and appropriateness ($F(1, 94) = 10.740, p < .05$). In specific, the provision of ownership significantly changed novelty ($F(1, 94) = 2.963, p < .10$) and appropriateness ($F(1, 94) = 10.740, p < .05$). When haptic cues were provided, the level of ownership had no effect across two creativity dimensions. However, when haptic cues were not provided, the effect of ownership became stronger. This finding demonstrates the moderating effect of ownership, such that ownership can compensate for the absence of haptic cues.

Figure 1: Study 2 Results:
Modulating Effects of Visual Cues On Creativity

![Figure 1: Study 2 Results](image-url)
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this paper shows interplay between sensory inputs and creativity which has been rarely paid attention despite active researches in other disciplines such as psychology and education. Second, to our knowledge, in consumer creativity literature, it is the first study investigating the importance of haptics. In addition, this paper guides how managers can compensate the absence of haptics in this online consumption dominant era.
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Whether trying to get people to quit smoking, exercise more often, or simply get out to vote, public service announcements (PSAs) genuinely attempt to promote societal well-being. One pervasive strategy is the use of “Top 10” reasons to change a certain behavior. For instance, the National Institute of Health (NIH) website currently includes a “Top 10 Reasons to Quit Smoking” PSA that lists, among others, the following reasons: (1) I will reduce my chances of a heart attack, (2) I will reduce my chances of getting lung cancer, emphysema, and other lung diseases, (3) I will have better smelling clothes, hair, breath, home, and car.” Because these “Top 10” lists are generally exhaustive, they inevitably include both strong and mildly-strong reasons to change behavior. In this report, we question whether such PSAs actually help or hurt the cause.

This question builds on past work on the Presenter’s Paradox (Weaver, Garcia, and Schwarz 2012), showing that when people present information, they tend to use a strategy that resembles “adding” (more is better) while people evaluating that same information tend to use a process that resembles averaging (less is more). For instance, while presenters thought that adding a $15 voucher for books to a $1,750 tuition credit would increase recipients’ perceptions of the generosity of a scholarship, recipients actually evaluated the $1,750 tuition credit + $15 books package as significantly less generous than the $1,750 tuition credit alone.

While there are some surface similarities between people’s evaluations of a “Top 10 Reasons” PSA containing strong and less strong arguments and their evaluations of a consumer product containing highly and mildly favorable product features (Weaver et al. 2012) or their impressions of other people based on highly and mildly favorable trait information (Anderson 1965), there are several reasons why these types of judgments may differ. First, past work on averaging in impression formation has largely been limited to targets that are naturally perceived of as unified entities, like other people and consumer products. Here we investigate whether similar averaging-like processes will arise in the context of persuasion with strong and less strong arguments. Whether adding or averaging will occur in this context is an open empirical question. Second, one of the most developed perspectives on the issue of strong versus weak arguments, the Elaboration Likelihood Model, also does not explicitly address this question. While the ELM has looked at how the quality versus quantity of persuasive arguments affects persuasion, it has focused exclusively on strong and “specious” (false or misleading) arguments rather than strong and mildly strong ones. While designers of PSAs may believe that relevant but less strong arguments (e.g., smoking will reduce my morning cough) may help or at least would not hurt in persuading people that smoking is unhealthy, it is unlikely that they would think that including a specious or false argument would have persuasive appeal. Furthermore, the psychological mechanism through which specious arguments may affect persuasion may not be easily transferable to the context of mildly strong arguments. Reading a specious argument may lead to an inference that a source is unreliable and unintelligent, leading a receiver to question all other arguments from that source. This explanation would not apply to the types of mildly favorable arguments that presenters may include in PSAs.

Second, despite evidence of the Presenter’s Paradox, previous investigations used settings that were created for controlled experiments to examine differences between presenters and evaluators. In contrast, the present analysis examines whether policy makers fall prey to the presenter’s paradox by testing real PSAs. Third, our work is fundamentally different from the “dilution effect” (Nisbett et al. 1981), because we look at the effect of mildly versus strongly favorable information that is always relevant to evaluators’ judgments and presenters’ presentation decisions. Work on the dilution effect, however, studies the effect of additional information that is by definition nondiagnostic and irrelevant to the judgment at hand and of no value in predicting the outcome (Nisbett et al. 1981; Tetlock et al. 1996).

We examined three “Top 10” PSAs to assess what is more persuasive, the combination of strong and mildly strong reasons that policy makers included in the original campaigns or a PSA created by us containing only the strongest reasons.

Study 1 showed that people were less inclined to quit smoking after reading the NIH’s “10 Reasons” campaign than after reading our truncated 2 Reasons campaign (NHLBI 2013a). Study 2 showed that prospective voters ascribed less importance to voting and were less likely to personally express an intention to vote after reading a “Top 10 Reasons to Vote” PSA put forth by the Douglas County, Nevada, Election Center than after reading our “Top 3 Reasons” list that used only the strongest arguments. Study 3 used a “Top 10 Reasons to Exercise” PSA from the Medical News Today website, a widely-read medical news site with a monthly readership of 3-4 million, to examine whether need for cognition (NFC) moderated the effect. Results showed that while High NFC (mean + 1SD) participants expressed stronger intentions to exercise after seeing our 3 versus the original 10 Reasons PSA, Low NFC participants (mean - 1SD) showed a non-significant tendency in the opposite direction.

In sum, our results show that Top 10 lists can reduce rather than enhance people’s likelihood to adopt healthy lifestyles or make desired social decisions. For instance, each year, The National Health, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) receives over $3 billion in tax money from the Federal Government in order to, among other, advance understanding of the development and progression of disease, diagnosis of disease, and disease prevention (NHLBI 2013b). While the designers of their Top 10 Reasons to Quit Smoking? PSA chose to include the less strong, but still relevant reasons, they inadvertently weakened the message rather than strengthened it. Marketers and public policy makers should be very careful designing such Top 10 lists, because weak reasons can dilute the message.

REFERENCES


Top 10 Lists: Public Ads that Hurt the Cause


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumer researchers have identified ways in which an employee’s gender influences consumers’ perceptions (e.g., consumers’ responses to a model or spokesperson in an ad, a salesperson, an organization’s leader) (e.g., Gilly 1988; Matta and Folkes 2005; Mohr and Henson 1996; Richins 1991), but no research has investigated consumers’ judgments when presented with a service organization’s gender composition. Considering that stereotypically male occupations generally have higher prestige and salaries and that women’s salaries within occupations generally lag men’s (Budig 2002), we believe that investigating male-typed occupations is an important starting point for research on how various gender compositions for a workgroup influence consumers’ perceptions of that group. For a male-typed occupation, does a workgroup’s gender composition influence consumers’ evaluations? If so, do negative perceptions increase proportionally with the presence of each additional woman or is it a step function? In this research we address these fundamental and previously unexplored questions.

We conducted two laboratory experiments that systematically varied a workgroup’s gender composition and asked consumers about their impressions of the group. We find that a workgroup’s gender composition does indeed influence consumers’ judgments of the group and its output. In addition to addressing a novel issue with important managerial implications, our research sheds light on fundamental aspects of group impression formation. Our hypotheses propose different results from a linear or averaging model that predicts increasingly negative judgments as the proportion of women increases, even though an averaging combination rule is one that follows from well-established theory (Anderson 1981) and has been demonstrated in other consumer judgments (e.g., aggregation of information about product bundles, Yadav 1994).

Drawing primarily from research on gender stereotypes (Eagly and Karau 2002), group impression formation (Dasgupta et al.1999; Ostrom and Sedikides 1992; Sherman, Castelli and Hamilton 2002) and information processing about individual members of a group (Kunda and Oleson 1997; Richards and Hewstone 2001) we make predictions on the effect of a group’s gender composition on consumers’ judgments when the group’s gender was homogenous, included a solo or was slightly skewed (a slight majority in favor of one gender).

Hypothesis 1: Consumers believe a homogenously male workgroup is superior to and more agentic than a homogenously female workgroup.

Hypothesis 2: Judgments of slightly skewed gender workgroups are similar to each other, regardless of whether they favor women or men. Consumers believe that a group whose majority is slightly skewed is no more superior and are no less agentic than a homogenously male group. However, a group whose majority is slightly skewed toward either women or men is superior to and is more agentic compared to a homogenously female group.

Hypothesis 3: Solo workgroups are judged differently from each other, depending on the solo’s gender.

Consumers believe that a predominantly female group with a solo male is no more superior to and no more agentic than a homogenously female group, but believe that a predominantly female group with a solo male is inferior to and less agentic compared to a predominantly male group with a solo female. Conversely, consumers believe that a predominantly male group with a solo female is not inferior to and is not less agentic than a homogenously male group but is superior to and more agentic compared to a predominantly female group with a solo male.

In addition, we predict a moderator of the effect of a group’s gender composition – the gender composition within ranks of a hierarchical group. The output from a group that is only slightly skewed to favor women but that is organized hierarchically in a counterstereotypical manner (where the higher rank is homogenously female and the lower rank is homogenously male) will be judged inferior to other skewed groups (an anti-gynocracy effect).

Hypothesis 2a: Consumers judge the output of a group slightly skewed toward males differently from a group slightly skewed toward females when the groups contain hierarchical subgroups that are homogenous as to gender. They judge the gynocratic group’s output to be worse than the androcratic group’s output.

We conducted two experiments that manipulated gender diversity in a male dominated occupation to test our hypotheses. In both studies, the particular occupation was marketing business school professors, with the particular workgroup being a group of marketing faculty at a specific university. Study 1 (N=223) manipulated the gender composition of the workgroup and tested hypotheses 1-3 using a 2 x 3 between subjects design. Study 2 (N=227) revealed a limitation on hypothesis 2’s prediction, using a 2 x 2 between subjects design. Study 2 manipulated the within-group status hierarchy of mixed gender groups and found that this information moderated the effect of group composition on judgments of the group.

Our research shows novel findings about how a work unit’s gender composition influences consumers’ judgments of the group and its output. Not only did the information about each individual’s gender influence consumers’ beliefs about whether the unit was superior to competitors, gender composition also influenced inferences about the unit’s personality traits.

Consumers did not aggregate group composition information in a piece meal fashion, as in a linear or averaging model as suggested by information integration theory. Instead, the aggregation process more closely resembled a step function. Despite the employees’ occupation being perceived as male-typed, the point at which judgments differed was not when the majority began to skew in favor of women rather than men, but instead when the largely female group included a solo man. We show that a group’s gender composition must be very counterstereotypical for it to suffer from negative evaluations. Only the groups that were comprised entirely of women or included a solo man were judged inferior to the rest.
Inferences about the relative status of men and women within the group moderated the effects. Just as consumers derogated all female groups, they also derogated groups with an all-female hierarchy (a gynocracy). Gender homogeneity per se did not imply inferiority since all male groups (in study 1) and all male status hierarchies (in study 2) were not derogated.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

“An ‘elephant in the room’ is an obvious truth that’s either being ignored or going unaddressed.”
-Jeff Inman, ACR 2012

Lifestyle brands (LBs) address consumers’ core values through both their tangible and symbolic qualities. In using them, consumers hope to possess and project the values and qualities that these brands represent (Helman and de Chernatony 1999). Lifestyle branding (LBg) led to success in the United States and abroad (Danziger 2009; Lamb 2011; Sauer 2012; Birkner 2011; Menkes 1997). Top consumer brands are identified as LBs, including Nike (Klein 1999), Starbucks (Sauer 2012), and Apple (Cuneo 2003). LBg seems ubiquitous in the practitioner’s world (Geskens 2012), with a dizzying array of brands claiming lifestyle brand (LB) (Kiley 2005).

This research highlights an academic-practitioner divide regarding LBs, namely, an almost absolute lack of discussion of LBs in the most highly respected academic marketing journals. While LBg has been touched on in some academic articles (Helman and de Chernatony 1999; Fernie et al. 1997), we do not believe anyone has formally operationalized the concept of LBg beyond a very brief definition. We contribute to marketing theory and practice by identifying the essential elements of LBg and providing a comprehensive definition of the term.

In a literature review we found a single top-tier marketing journal article with the words “LB” or “LBg” in the title (Chernev, Hamilton, and Gal 2011). Yet the words “LBg” appear only in the “managerial implications” section. The article’s focus is consumer self-expression through brands, and while theoretically and practically useful, LBg is left wholly unexamined. Only one article with the words “LB” or “LBg” was discovered in the Journal of Marketing Research; they do not appear at all in the Journal of Consumer Research.

Top-tier marketing journals regularly decry the academic-practitioner divide including Reibstein, Day and Wind (2009), Lilien (2011), Hunt (2002), and Stanton (2006). Bridging the divide will happen only if marketing academia addresses topics of great interest to practitioners, including LBg.

We take a theory-in-use approach (Zaltman 1982) to understanding LBg, examining its practical definitions, identifying its essential theoretical elements, and providing a comprehensive definition of the concept useful for both theoretical and practical approaches to marketing.

Some business writers have attempted to define what these brands actually mean. Edery (2006) argues that properly defining an LB is not simple, and even identifying which brands are and are not LBs can be controversial. LiBrandi (2012) agrees with Edery’s assessment, positing that there are five core attributes central to LBs:

1) Authenticity
2) Use of “halo effect to extend beyond core
3) Selectivity (not all things to all people)
4) Focus on sense of community, not 4P’s
5) “Work[ing] harder” than non-lifestyle brands

Defining Attributes of Lifestyle Brands: Finding the Theory-in-use

In the academic world, Jung and Merlin (2002-2003) are among the few scholars who attempt to provide a definition for an LB, stating that it “provides consumers with an emotional attachment to an identifiable lifestyle” (40), and arguing that LBs work “building and sustaining a strong, emotional and long-term bond with consumers” (40). Relying on emotion as the crucial factor in defining LBs is overly simplistic; modern branding strategy generally emphasizes emotional connections through the creation of brand personalities (Aaker 1997), and by encouraging consumer-brand relationships (Fournier 1998).

Based on widespread understanding and use of the term “LB” and the extant theoretical branding literature, we propose that the notable presence of all ten attributes below is what sets LBs apart from others:

1. Association: linking to other people, places, organizations, activities, events, other brands or images (cf. Berger and Heath 2007, Keller 2003, Watts and Dodds 2007)
2. Quality/excellence: superior quality or excellence on key attributes (cf. Bhattacharya and Sen 2003)
3. Sensory appeal: attractiveness or artistic value, or qualities related to the way its products look, feel, taste, smell or sound (cf. Simonson and Nowlis 2000)
4. Sign value: how conspicuously the brand is displayed by the user, and is congruent with the user’s self-identity (cf. Escalas and Bettman 2005, Sirgy 1982)
5. Personification: a personality that resembles human characteristics (cf. Aaker 1997)
6. Interactivity: engaging consumers, requiring or inviting them to exert mental or emotional energy on its behalf (cf. Austin et al. 2007, Bruns 2005)
7. Facilitation: the ability to help the user engage in preferred behaviors or attain important personal goals (cf. Fournier 1998, Solomon 1983)
10. Values: ability to communicate a set of core values that are important to its employees, and the consumer (cf. Harris and de Chernatony 2001, Sen and Bhattacharya 2001)

The first 7 of these attributes are either adapted or come directly from Charles Martin (1998). Item 8 comes from Guidry, Zinkhan and Tam (2008). We have added the last two attributes, following Martin’s guidelines and basing them on the extant self-expressive branding literature, as key qualities of LBs.

We offer then the following definition: LBs 1) reflect and facilitate people’s ways of living, and enable key aspects of their consumers’ behavior, ranging from core users, who help define the brands’ meanings, to those for whom the lifestyle is aspirational; 2) utilize multifaceted marketing mixes appealing to more than a single aspect of their customers’ interests, feelings and needs; 3) offering high quality products; 4) authentically and consistently espouse a set of essential values that resonate deeply with their consumer base; and 4) consciously embrace multi-directional relationship marketing (Zinkhan 2002, Lacey and Morgan 2007).
Implications for Theory and Practice

We have two major goals: firstly, to refine academics’ and practitioners’ understanding of LBg by creating a functional framework for the concept; secondarily to support this framework with theoretical foundations, giving this structure explanatory and predictive power.

It is time for the academy to conduct rigorous research to better understand this brand typology, furthering the interests of academics and practitioners alike.

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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

How do consumers react when they have acquired identity-linked products in order to associate with a specific group, only to later be rejected from this group? The present research seeks to answer this question by studying the impact of social rejection on product disposal behavior. The present research builds on research that demonstrates that consumers will engage in strategic (Mead et al. 2011) and even conspicuous (Lee and Shrum 2012) consumption decisions following rejection, by focusing on circumstances under which rejection may cause the opposite reaction—product disposal. As such, the present investigation examines rejection as it pertains to disposing identity-linked possessions, and explores when and why consumers will dispose of and agress against these possessions.

Social rejection is a threat to an individual’s fundamental need to belong (Baumeister and Leary 1995) and a volume of literature has examined responses to being rejected, ranging from aggression (e.g., DeWall et al. 2009) to more strategic coping mechanisms (e.g. Lee and Shrum 2012; Mead et al. 2011). For example, Mead et al. (2011) found that participants who are given the opportunity to reintegrate with other individuals seek to acquire products that facilitate reintegration, thus demonstrating a degree of social strategy. On the other hand, research has also found that rejection can cause a person to behave in aggressive (DeWall et al. 2009), and anti-social (see: Catanese and Tice 2005) ways, against both the original rejecters (Warburton, Williams, and Cairns 2006) and against innocent third parties (Twenge 2005; Catanese and Tice 2005). Interestingly, aggression only occurs against innocent third parties who can be connected to the rejecters in some way (i.e. all of them are “students”; Twenge and Campbell 2003).

Given that possessions are an important part of the self-concept (Kim and Johnson 2012) and the extended self (Belk 1988), they are part of the self-concept that an individual develops with a group. As such, when a group rejects a person, the way the person responds towards group identity-linked possessions should be a proxy for how they feel toward the group, so that the possessions become the “innocent third parties” in the situation. We thus expect that individuals will react toward their group-identity possessions in ways consistent with their reactions to the rejection situation, such as by disposing of these possessions if there is no potential for reintegration and thus no social benefits (of reconnecting) in continuing to signal the group identity. Individuals should react destructively against the possessions if the rejection has incited aggression, such as when social expectations are high (Wesselmann et al. 2010).

To further investigate aggressive reactions, our second study also manipulates social expectations—that is, the anticipation of a positive experience and outcome with a group—and examines whether social expectations impact the way participants treat their possessions. Previous research has shown that having high social expectations about the outcome of an interpersonal interaction, followed by a subsequent rejection, causes individuals to feel unsure about their social judgments; this leads to increased aggression post-rejection (Wessleman et al. 2010). As such, we predict and find that individuals with high expectations are more aggressive than those with low expectations (F(1,123) = 3.16, p = 0.078). Specifically, individuals are more likely to ruin their group-related possession when they have high (vs. low) social expectations about a positive outcome with the group, particularly when rejection was final (M_final = 2.56; M_low = 1.93; F(1,120) = 3.35; p = 0.07). When rejection is ambiguous, participants with both high and low expectations respond similarly in their destructive intentions (F(1,123) = 0.44, p > 0.5). This study demonstrates that consumers balance aggressive intentions and the strategic ability to curtail these aggressive desires when reintegration is possible.

In order to uncover why destructive intentions occur, our third study provides an initial investigation of mitigating factors. Prior literature suggests that post-rejection aggression may be caused by a lack of control over a situation, such that replenishing power may remove aggressive responding (e.g. Warburton et al. 2006). However, other research also suggests that direct rejection (vs. incidental ignoring) depletes relational needs (e.g. self-esteem or the need to belong), but not power needs (Lee and Shrum 2012). Thus, manipulating social expectations may deplete either a sense of control—because we see aggressive responses—or else social and relational needs, because expectations related to feelings about the group. To determine which of these needs (power or belonging) was depleted, our third study first looks at power needs and establishes that, contrary to previous research on aggression, replenishing a sense of control did not impact aggressive responses post-rejection (F(69, 1) = 0.006, p > .90). A follow-up study will contrast replenishing relational needs vs. efficacy needs to see which better mitigates aggressive reactions.

REFERENCES

Table 1 – Summary of Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposal Type</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
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<td>N = 32 N = 28 N = 31 N = 33</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Final</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<td>Expectations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Non-aggressive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggressive</td>
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Note: means for each condition are reported here.

Secrets and Lies: How Consumers Manage the Flow of Ego-Threatening Information
Christine Kang, University of Michigan, USA
Grant Packard, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
David B. Wooten, University of Michigan, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Previous research suggests that consumers react negatively to price disparities (Feinberg, Krishna and Zhang 2002), view policies that produce them as unfair (Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004) and find the prospect of facing them to be threatening to the self (Argo, White and Dahl 2006). In response, they are willing to lie about the prices they have paid to minimize the ego-threat of having been “taken” (Argo et al. 2006; Sengupta, Dahl and Gorn 2002).

Despite finding expected patterns of lying to avoid sharing ego-threatening information, these studies also report levels of lying intentions suggesting a general reluctance to lie. For example, across four studies in Argo et al. (2006), the mean score on the lying index exceeded the scale midpoint in only two of 16 experimental conditions. That is, on average, participants reported being unlikely to lie. If these participants were being honest about their lying intentions, then how else might they respond to requests for information about unfavorable social comparisons when the truth is perceived as an unattractive option?

We examine evasion (i.e. ambiguous, vague or avoidant responding) as an alternative to deception (lies) in the face of potential disclosures of ego-threatening consumer information. Evasive self-presentation has been described as a non-obvious alternative to authentic and deceptive self-presentation (Leary 1995), theorized as a probable response to concerns about presenting oneself unfavorably in group conversations (Wooten and Reed 2000), and found to be an effective response to difficult questions (Rogers and Norton 2011). Accordingly, we conduct four studies to: (1) assess evasion as an alternative to deception as a means of managing the flow of ego-threatening information, (2) examine the psychological mechanism underlying the use of evasion or deception in such social predicaments, and (3) explore factors that differentially affect consumers’ intentions to evade versus deceive.

In Study 1, we expose participants to a hypothetical scenario in which they learn that they paid more (ego-threatening) or the same amount (control) as a friend who purchased an identical product. Participants (n = 227) from an online panel self-reported embarrassment, even when it is not in their best interest to do so (Leary and Kowalski 1995). Participants (n = 227) from an online panel in the U.S. read one of two scenarios similar to those in Study 1, and then reported their intentions to evade or deceive in response to the friend’s price inquiry. Participants’ self-reported embarrassment when confronted with a price disparity was also measured. Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1, demonstrating evasion as an alternative to deception using multi-item scales rather than open-ended responses (Table 1 Panel B). Embarrassment was revealed to be a mediator of the effect for both evasion and deception (Table 1 Panel C). In subsequent studies, we examine moderating variables to support our evasion and deception as distinct behavioral responses.

In Study 3, we examine a condition under which deception (but not evasion) intentions are likely to be affected. Goffman (1963) describes discreditability as the possibility that an undisclosed discrepancy between an individual’s actual and desired social identity may be revealed. When an individual engages in deception, they experience the fear of being caught in a lie (Keltner and Buswell 1996). We thus predict that discreditability may cause consumers to avoid deception. As evasion does not involve a discreditable assertion, discreditability should not affect evasion intentions. Members of a paid research panel (n = 181) participated in a study in which discreditability was manipulated by the presence or absence of a third party who knew the truth. Analysis of scaled intention measures yielded a significant decrease in deception intentions (but not evasion intentions) given high discreditability (Table 1 Panel D).

Study 4 considers a condition under which evasion (but not deception) intentions are likely to be affected. Student participants (n = 146) were assigned to read one of two scenarios in which their interaction partner was either more or less persistent when questioning others. Levering findings from research on persistence in criminal interrogations (Buller, Strzyzewski and Comstock 1991; Burgoon et al. 1994), we predicted evasion (but not deception) to be affected by the presence of a persistent inquirer. This study also used credit scores rather than price as the ego-threatening consumer information for further support of robustness. Analysis confirmed that evasion (but not deception) intentions were attenuated when participants faced a more (vs. less) persistent interaction partner (Table 1 Panel E).

In conclusion, this research empirically supports evasion as an alternative tactic to deception for people motivated to conceal ego-threatening information. Lying is not the only, or even the preferred, method of avoiding the disclosure of inconvenient truths. It is our hope that this work will stimulate further inquiries into the evasive maneuvers made by people on the everyday battleground of consumer self-presentation.

REFERENCES


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<th>Panel</th>
<th>Study 1: Count (and percentage) of open-ended responses</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Self-threat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truthful</td>
<td>58 (76.3%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deceptive</td>
<td>6 (7.9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evasive</td>
<td>12 (15.8%)</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
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<th>Study 2: Condition means for behavioral intentions</th>
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<tr>
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* All path coefficients are p < .05 or better
** Alphabetical superscripts summarize within-panel differences in condition means at p < .05 or better.


Spending Sadly: How Time versus Money Impacts Enhanced Valuations Under Sadness

Sommer Kapitan, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Rajesh Bhargave, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Abhijit Guha, Wayne State University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Under the ‘misery-is-not-miserly’ effect, consumers’ incidental sadness influences their motivation to value goods and services. In particular, feelings of sadness (relative to happiness or neutral emotions) produce more positive valuations, leading to higher purchase intentions (Cryder et al. 2008, Lerner, Small and Loewenstein 2004). We contend that payment currency (time vs. money) may influence the degree to which sadness triggers greater valuations of targets.

Consumers spend time, money, or both on goods and services, and thinking about spending with these currencies produces differences in motivation and involvement. Consumers perceive themselves to be more connected to targets on which they have spent time versus money (Mogilner and Aaker 2009). Money is depersonalized; even subtle reminders of money arouse feelings of detachment (Vohs, Mead and Goode 2006, 2008). Thus, currency of payment may affect how consumers react to incidental emotions when valuing goods and services.

In past work, the misery-is-not-miserly effect has obtained mainly when consumers are self-focused (Cryder et al. 2008). Our investigation focuses on situations in which consumers are self-focused during the induction of an emotional state. Specifically, we employ autobiographical mood induction (i.e., writing about a life event; Schwarz and Clore 1983) to increase self-focus along with activating incidental emotion. We argue that contemplating payment itself could mitigate the misery-is-not-miserly effect if situational self-focus no longer persists. Specifically, we predict that the misery-is-not-miserly effect will be minimized when the payment under consideration forges a weaker connection between the self and the target.

We propose that thinking about spending time (vs. money) on a future or past purchase leads to more persistent self-focus that allows initial feelings of sadness to carry over into valuations. We argue that this moderating role of payment currency occurs because sadness spurs a focus on the self, and thinking about spending time (vs. money) acquiring an offer connects the self to the target of an ensuing judgment, which facilitates (blocks) the persistence of self-focus into valuations of the target. Further, we also predict that the misery-is-not-miserly effect can be mitigated for purchases involving spending time if consumers are primed to disconnect the self from the concept of spending time.

In three studies, we examine the role of induced emotional state on valuations. In each study, half of the participants experience a sadness induction. Across studies, we vary whether the other half of participants respond to a happy or neutral mood induction to generalize the effect. Immediately following the mood induction, participants are asked to think about spending time or money on a target. Study 1 (N = 140) had a 2 (mood: sad or happy) X 2 (currency: time or money) between-subjects design. Following a mood induction, participants responded to a laptop valuation task (Mogilner and Aaker 2009). Participants in the time (money) condition were asked, “How much time (money) have you spent fixing your laptop?” A 2 X 2 ANOVA on attitudes toward the laptop revealed a significant interaction between incidental mood and payment currency (F(1,139) = 5.29, p = .02). In the time condition, participants’ attitudes were elevated after a sad versus happy mood induction, but in the money condition, sadness had no effect on valuations. Study 1 establishes, for the first time in the literature, that the effect of sadness on increasing valuations of participants’ possessions is more pronounced when spending time (vs. money) is evoked.

Next, we consider whether the misery-is-not-miserly effect obtains in acquisition situations involving different currencies of payment. An online panel of mTurk participants (N = 161) participated in a 2 (mood: sad or neutral) X 2 (payment currency: time or money) between-subjects design. Following mood induction, participants judged an offer for restaurant vouchers available for $10 (money) or in return for 40 minutes filling out marketing surveys (time). In the time condition, participants’ purchase likelihood was elevated after a sad versus neutral mood induction (t(160) = 4.77, p = .03). In the money condition, ratings were not influenced by sadness (t(160) = 1.74, p = .19). This demonstrates that incidental sadness (vs. neutral mood) enhances the attractiveness of target offerings involving spending time significantly more than target offerings that involve spending money.

In study 3, we seek to disassociate the self from the idea of “spending time” to attenuate the strength of the misery-is-not-miserly effect. Students (N = 151) participated in a 2 (mood: sad or happy) X 3 (payment currency: time, time-with-disconnect-prime or money) between-subjects design. Following mood induction, participants judged an offer of a 1-day gym pass for $12 (money) or after listening to a sales pitch (time). For the time-prime condition, participants also listed examples of activities unimportant to self that they have wasted time on. A 2 X 2 ANOVA on purchase likelihood revealed a significant interaction between manipulated emotion and payment currency (F(1,142) = 4.57, p = .03). In the time condition, participants’ valuations were heightened after a sad versus happy mood induction (t(142) = 4.12, p = .04). Sadness had no effect on valuations, however, in either the money condition (t(142) = 0.43, p = .67) or the time-prime condition (t(142) = 0.35, p = .72). This shows that priming participants to think about ways in which they spend time on things unimportant to themselves effectively diminishes the effect of sadness upon time as a payment currency.

Across three studies, we showed that sadness enhanced valuations of targets on which spending was framed in terms of time, but this misery-is-not-miserly effect was less pronounced for targets on which spending was framed in terms of money. Moreover, study 3 revealed that this effect was mitigated when participants were primed to imagine how time can be spent on things not connected to the self. These studies provide the first evidence that the context of a decision setting might encourage or stifle self-connection to an offering. Self-focus, primed by an autobiographical sadness manipulation, can persist if the context allows a link to be forged between the self and the offering. We show that offerings framed via time tend to aid that persistence.

REFERENCES


### Table 1: Summary of Findings

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Manipulation</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Results</th>
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</table>
| 1     | Participants’ own laptops: time (money) spent on repairs | 2 (mood: sad or happy) by 2 (time or money) | - In the time condition, attitudes toward owned laptops were elevated after a sad versus happy mood induction ($M_{sad} = 6.16$ vs. $M_{happy} = 5.65$; $t(139) = 4.12$, $p = .04$).  
- In the money condition, sadness had no effect on valuations ($M_{sad} = 5.60$ vs. $M_{happy} = 5.99$), $t(139) = 1.67$, $p = .20$). |
| 2     | Restaurant voucher: Pay $10 or 40 minutes volunteering | 2 (mood: sad or neutral) by 2 (payment currency: time or money) | - In the time condition, participants’ purchase likelihood was elevated after a sad versus neutral mood induction ($M = 5.77$ vs. $M = 4.87$; $t(160) = 4.77$, $p = .03$).  
- In the money condition, ratings were also directionally higher under sad versus neutral mood, but this effect was not significant ($M_{sad} = 5.53$ vs. $M_{neutral} = 4.93$, $t(160) = 1.74$, $p = .19$). |
| 3     | Gym day pass: Pay $12 or listen to 40 minutes sales pitch/demonstration from trainer | 2 (mood: sad or happy) by 3 (payment currency: time, time-with-disconnect-prime or money) | - In the time condition, valuations of the gym pass were heightened after a sad vs. happy mood induction ($M = 6.16$ vs. $M = 5.65$; $t(142) = 4.12$, $p = .04$).  
- In the money condition, sadness had no effect on valuations ($M_{sad} = 3.90$ vs. $M_{happy} = 4.07$, $t(142) = 4.3$, $p = .67$).  
- Likewise, in the time-prime condition, valuations of the gym pass were not influenced by manipulated mood ($M = 4.32$ vs. $M = 4.12$; $t(142) = .35$, $p = .72$). |


When Logos Rise and Fall: Exploring the Metaphorical Meaning of Upward and Downward Imagery

Ann E. Schlosser, University of Washington, USA
Sokiente W. Dagogo-Jack, University of Washington, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Stylistic properties influence product judgments by communicating symbolic meaning beyond what is explicitly stated (Doyle and Bottomley 2006; Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1992; Peracchio & Meyers-Levy 2005). Indeed, psychologists have long been interested in the metaphorical meaning of concepts; however, they have focused largely on verbal rather than visual metaphors (e.g., Fauconnier and Turner 1998; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). One common visual property is the diagonal orientation of product images, wordmarks, and logos. Given multiple uses of diagonals in our society, it is conceivable that diagonal orientation could communicate a variety of concepts that might influence product attitudes. Although there is evidence that diagonals symbolize dynamism (Peracchio and Meyers-Levy 2005), several questions about the metaphorical meaning of diagonals remain.

First, do diagonals with opposite orientations (i.e., upward- vs. downward-sloping) convey different meanings, such as different degrees of activity? Second, how much cognitive elaboration is necessary for the diagonal orientation of an image to convey metaphorical meaning? Here, the existing literature equivocates: earlier research suggests that these effects arise spontaneously (Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1992), while more recent research suggests that they require extensive processing (Nordhielm 2002; Peracchio and Meyers-Levy 2005). Third, what other semantic concepts beyond activity do diagonals convey? Given differences in how upward and downward diagonals are commonly used in society (e.g., depicting success vs. failure, growth vs. decline, effort vs. ease), it is likely that upward and downward diagonals carry multiple opposing associations.

Across three studies, we employ a multimethod framework (cf. Rozin et al. 2012) to investigate consumers’ capacity to extract metaphorical meaning from upward and downward diagonal logos at an automatic (vs. deliberate) level. Using direct measurement profiling, in study 1, 143 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to a condition in a 2 (diagonal: upward vs. downward) x 3 (order: heatmap, activity items, or rest item measured last) between-subjects design. Participants were shown an upward- or downward-sloping line and told to click on the origin of the line (heatmap measure). The x- and y-coordinates of the image served as the dependent variables. Supporting our hypothesis that people anchor on the left side of images, thereby seeing diagonals sloping from the lower-left to upper-right as upward rather than downward, there was no effect of diagonal on the x-coordinate: both clicked on the left side of the image (M = 197.85, F(1, 165) < 1, NS). Importantly, downward (vs. upward) diagonals had higher y-coordinate values (M = 329.77 vs. 65.33, F(1, 165) = 1028.80, p < .001).

Participants also rated how well the attributes dynamism, success (success and power, r = .76), activity (active and effortful, r = .58) and at rest described the line on scales anchored by not at all (1) to very much (7). In line with our theorizing, although diagonal had no significant effect on dynamism (M = 4.39 vs. 3.86; F(1, 137) = 1.36, NS), upward (vs. downward) diagonals had significantly higher ratings for success (M = 5.20 vs. 4.17, F(1, 137) = 6.80, p < .01) and activity (M = 4.84 vs. 4.00, F(1, 137) = 5.20, p < .05), and lower ratings for at-rest (M = 4.13 vs. 3.25, F(1,137) = 4.23, p < .05).

Because we explicitly instructed participants to consider these semantic meanings, to examine whether diagonals would spontaneously generate these concepts, we used a free association task in study 2. 150 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were randomly assigned to see one of eight fictitious logos in a 2 (diagonal) x 4 (image type) between-subjects design. Participants then listed the first three words that came to mind, after which they rated each word and the image itself on six dimensions: bad/good, passive/active, failure/success, weak/strong, beginning/ending, and decreasing/increasing. Focusing on the top of mind association, upward (vs. downward) diagonals evoked concepts judged higher on activity (M = 4.77 vs. 3.98, F(1, 142) = 6.20, p < .05) and strength (M = 5.12 vs. 4.49, F(1, 142) = 5.69, p < .05). No other effects were significant (all ps > .10). Furthermore, based on the direct measurement of the images, ratings of upward (vs. downward) diagonals were only higher for growth (M = 4.92 vs. 4.26, F(7, 142) = 5.90, p < .05), success (M = 4.74 vs. 4.17, F(7, 142) = 4.92, p < .05), and positivity (M = 4.54 vs. 4.12, F(7, 142) = 3.06, p < .10). Activity and strength were only directionally consistent with our expectations (M = 4.88 vs. 4.47, F(7, 142) = 2.55, p = .11 for activity; M = 4.90 vs.4.54, F(7, 142) = 1.79, p = .18 for strength).

Because free association tasks are context-sensitive (Rozin et al. 2012), corroborating evidence is needed. In study 3, 136 undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of five Implicit Association Tests (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). This procedure used response latencies from paired categorization tasks to determine the strength of the implicit association between upward and downward diagonals and positivity vs. negativity, strength vs. weakness, activity vs. inactivity, growth vs. decline, and success vs. failure. As predicted, for the activity IAT, mean reaction time (RT) was 222.01 ms faster for upward-active/downward-passive than for the reverse (t(23) = 4.76, p < .001). For valence, mean RT was 150.35 ms faster for upward-good/downward-bad than for the reverse (t(30) = 3.42, p < .005). For potency, mean RT was 206.52 ms faster for upward-strong/downward-weak than for the reverse (t(28) = 4.11, p < .001). For success, mean RT was 349.69 ms faster for upward-success/downward-failure than for the reverse (t(26) = 7.67, p < .001). Lastly, for growth, mean RT was 406.10 ms faster for upward-increase/downward-decrease than for the reverse (t(24) = 7.12, p < .001). Importantly, analyses using the D measure scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 2003) yielded consistent results. Taken together, our results suggest (1) diagonal direction matters because upward and downward diagonals can convey opposite semantic concepts, (2) diagonals can convey multiple semantic meanings in addition to activity, and (3) these associations can occur automatically.

REFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Summary of Empirical Results</th>
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<tr>
<td>Study 1 (Direct Measurement)</td>
<td>People anchor on the left side of diagonal lines. Using a heatmap measure, diagonal orientation did not influence horizontal anchoring x-coordinate value of what participants identified as the line’s origin (F(1, 165) &lt; p, NS), but it did influence vertical anchoring , with those viewing upward diagonals anchoring on a lower point than those viewing downward diagonals (F(1, 165) = 1028.80, p &lt; .001). Perceptions of activity and success are stronger for upward than downward diagonals (F(1, 137) = 5.20, p &lt; .05 for activity; F(1, 137) = 6.80, p = .01 for success ). ‘At-rest’ perceptions are stronger for downward diagonals than upward diagonals (F(1, 137) = 4.23, p &lt; .05). Upward and downward diagonals do not differ in dynamism (M = 4.39 vs. 3.86; F(1, 137) = 1.36, NS).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 2 (Free Association Task)</td>
<td>Focusing on the first elicited word, upward (vs. downward) diagonals evoke concepts judged higher on activity (F(1, 142) = 6.20, p &lt; .05) and strength (F(1, 142) = 5.69, p &lt; .05). However, there were no significant main effects or interactions for any of the remaining four dimensions (all ps &gt; .10). Averaging ratings of all three elicited words , upward (vs. downward) diagonals evoke concepts judged higher on activity (F(1, 142) = 5.87, p &lt; .05) and strength (F(1, 142) = 4.73, p &lt; .05). Direct measurement of diagonals: Upward (vs. downward) diagonals more strongly communicate growth (F(7, 142) = 5.90, p &lt; .05), success (F(7, 142) = 4.92, p &lt; .05), and positivity (F(7, 142) = 3.06, p &lt; .10). Activity and strength were directionally consistent with our expectations, but not significant when directly measured (F(7, 142) = 2.55, p = .11 for activity; F(7, 142) = 1.79, p = .18 for strength).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3 (Implicit Association Test)</td>
<td>Mean RT was 222.01 ms faster for upward-active/downward-passive than for the reverse (t(23) = 4.76, p &lt; .001). Mean RT was 150.35 ms faster for upward-good/downward-bad than for the reverse (t(30) = 3.42, p &lt; .005). Mean RT was 206.52 ms faster for upward-strong/downward-weak than for the reverse (t(28) = 4.11, p &lt; .001). Mean RT was 349.69 ms faster for upward-success/downward-failure than for the reverse (t(26) = 7.67, p &lt; .001). Lastly, mean RT was 406.10 ms faster for upward-Increase/downward-Decrease than for the reverse (t(24) = 7.12, p &lt; .001). Analyses based on D scores indicated the existence of the same implicit associations: upward-active/ downward-passive (D = 58, t(23) = 4.85, p &lt; .001), upward-good/downward-bad (D = 35, t(30) = 3.70, p &lt; .001), upward-strong/downward-weak (D = 44, t(28) = 4.50, p &lt; .001), upward-success/downward-failure (D = 82, t(26) = 9.37, p &lt; .001), and upward-Increase/downward-Decrease (D = 85, t(24) = 7.55, p &lt; .001).</td>
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers often encounter product harm information in different forms such as product harm crises, warnings about side effects or rumors. Cancer-causing dyes and materials used by fashion companies, such as Levi’s, Zara and Calvin Klein, brake problems in Toyota’s cars are a few but notable examples of mass-publicized product harm information. Product harm information might have detrimental effects such as hurting brand evaluations or sales (Ahlwalia, Burnkrant and Uvnava 2000). Although it is clear that spreading of such information is important, there has been limited work on understanding transmission of negative information about products. In this research, we explore when and why consumers share product harm information with others.

Word-of-mouth (WOM) literature suggests that consumers are more likely to share information about products if they have a high level of interest in a product category (Sundaram, Mitra and Webster 1998). On the contrary, recent evidence suggests that negative WOM is often about other brands rather than one’s main brand or often other people’s experiences (East, Hammond and Wright 2007; De Angelis et al. 2012). Further, when individuals encounter threatening information that has high self-relevance, they engage in biased defensive processing strategies (Carvalho et al. 2008; Puntoni, Sweldens and Tavasoli 2011). These findings together suggest that higher self-relevance of the product harm information might lead consumers to share product harm information less.

Sharing is interpersonal process and is not only influenced by content characteristics (i.e. relevance of the information for the sender) but also social factors such as the relation between sender and receiver (Berger 2013). Most of the existing work in WOM so far has explored the relation between the sender and recipient (e.g., tie strength or similarity to the recipient). Yet, the way individuals see themselves in relation to others (self-construal) is not always due to their chronic disposition or context, but can be also shaped through environmental cues (Aaker and Lee 2001). Self-construal can influence how individuals process information and behave in their social interactions (Markus and Kitayama 1991). We suggest that self-construal should influence sharing behavior differently depending on self-relevance of the product harm information, through three distinct processes: defensive processes, desire to reduce one’s own worries, and helping others.

The following five studies show how content characteristics (self-relevance) and social factors (self-construal) explain product harm information sharing.

Study 1 tested the effect of self-relevance on sharing information under chronic-independent self-construal. In order to manipulate self-relevance, participants received a newspaper article about the potential side effects of plastic bottles. This article focused on either on male or female health-issues. In the high self-relevance conditions, participants received information about risk for their own gender, while low self-relevance was created by providing information about risk for the other gender. After reading the article, a confederate engaged in a conversation with the participant. Our key dependent measure was whether participants were willing to talk about the information with confederate. Participants were less likely to share health risk information, when the information was more self-relevant (i.e., pertained to their own gender).

In Study 2, we tested the boundary condition of self-relevance on sharing. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (severity: low vs. high). Participants’ hair styling products usage was used as a proxy for self-relevance. Participants read a newspaper article discussing about the health risks of hair styling products, where severity was manipulated. Participants indicated their likelihood of sharing the information on a 7-point scale. Product harm information with high severity (e.g., heart problems) was less likely to be shared when self-relevance was higher, and this effect was reversed for those with low severity (e.g. sleepiness).

Study 3a and 3b examined how self-construal of individuals influences sharing product information with different levels of self-relevance. In Study 3a, we manipulated self-relevance using the same procedure in Study 1. Participants were provided with the option to share the article with people outside the lab, by clicking on the share buttons via social network sites. Supporting our predictions, self-construal moderated the effect of self-relevance on sharing. While under independent self-construal, heightened self-relevance decreased sharing; this effect was attenuated under interdependent self-construal. In Study 3b, by using a continuous self-relevance measure, another self-construal priming technique and scenario, we replicated our results.

In Study 4, we tested underlying processes. Participants were asked for their permission to provide their saliva sample in the behavioral lab and received their (purposely prepared) saliva sample reports that reported duclin (fictitious) levels, which was either high or low. Self-construal was primed using a pronoun-circling task. Further, participants read a newspaper article discussing health risks of Stevia (food additive). In order to manipulate self-relevance, Stevia either poses risk for people who have high or low levels of duclin. After reading the article, participants completed process measures (defensive responses, desire to reduce one’s own worries and helping others) and indicated likelihood of sharing the information.

Mediation analyses supported our theorizing. First, higher self-relevance of the product harm information under independent self-construal increases defensive processes, which decreases sharing. Second, higher self-relevance of the product harm information under interdependent self-construal increases desire for reducing one’s own concerns and helping others, which both then increases sharing. Study 4 showed the generalizability of our findings and provides deeper insights into the processes behind these effects.

This research makes several important theoretical contributions. First, we integrate work in word-of-mouth and information processing literature by showing that self-relevance of the information can also play an important role in sharing product harm information. Second, we contribute to word-of-mouth literature as less is known about role of context on transmission. Finally, we address the gap in defensive biases work by studying the role of social factors. This work has important implications for marketers but also for public policy makers protecting consumers’ welfare.

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Standing Out or Fitting in? Memory Effects of Ad Typicality Depend on Exposure Duration
Millie Elsen, CentERdata, The Netherlands
Rik Pieters, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Michel Wedel, University of Maryland, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Advertisers want to create memorable ads and brands. Developing ads that stand out from the crowd of other ads – that are “atypical” – is commonly believed to be an effective strategy to accomplish memorability (Goodstein 1993; Smith et al. 2007). Atypical ads are dissimilar from other ad exemplars in the advertised category, which makes them stand out more. Typical ads are similar to the prototype of the advertised category and hence to other ads for the same type of product, which should make them less memorable, is the general idea.

The present research contests this idea. It aims to reconcile competing theories on the memory effects of atypicality by introducing exposure duration as a crucial moderator. In practice, attention to ads is usually short, ranging from a brief glance up to a few seconds at most (Pieters and Wedel 2004). Yet, memory effects are often tested after surprisingly long ad exposures of up to 30 seconds (Heckler and Childers 1992; Lee and Ang 2003). Therefore, the question remains largely unanswered whether atypical ads are more effective than typical ads across the short exposure durations common in real-life. In fact, there is reason to believe that the effects of atypicality are qualitatively different at different points in time during exposure, even during such short durations.

Furthermore, although it is acknowledged that recall and recognition represent different memory processes (Krishnan and Chakravarti 1999), they seem to be used more or less interchangeably in ad research as indicators of memory strength. This research shows that recall and recognition are determined by ad typicality, contingent on exposure duration, but in very diverse ways.

We distinguish between typical ads and two types of atypical ads, namely “mystery ads” and “false front ads”. Typical ads are similar to the prototype of the advertised category and dissimilar from the prototype of other categories (a car ad that shows a car on a mountain road). Mystery ads are dissimilar from the prototype of the advertised category and dissimilar from the prototype of other categories (a car ad that displays a selection of crystal sculptures in the shape of wild animals, with the headline “Luxury off-road”). Finally, false front ads are dissimilar from the prototype of the advertised category and similar to the prototype of another category (a car ad that pictures a couple of space suits hanging to dry on a clothesline, with the headline “Future proof”).

The results of two experimental studies show that typical and false front ads are better recalled than mystery ads after brief exposures, but not after long exposures. Due to their similarity to a prototype and other ad exemplars, the product category in typical and false front ads is immediately identified upon exposure to them, and this ad-category association facilitates retrieval (producing inaccurate recall for false front ads, however).

In contrast, recognition memory is higher for mystery and false front ads after long exposures, but not after brief exposures. Due to their dissimilarity from the category prototype, atypical ads are recognized with higher specificity than typical ads, but only after exposures sufficiently long to process their distinctive features.

In sum, the findings reveal the advantage of being similar to other ads (“fitting in”) in recall and the advantage of being dissimilar from other ads (“standing out”) in recognition, and the crucial role that exposure duration plays in these. Our theory and findings have important implications for ad development and ad testing.

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Ambiguity Seeking in Payoffs as a Source of Consumer Patience  
Yuanyuan Liu, ESSEC Business School, France  
Timothy B. Heath, HEC Paris, France  
Ayşe Öncüler, ESSEC Business School, France

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers frequently face intertemporal choices where they must trade-off outcomes occurring at different points in time. These choices challenge consumers because they involve trading off smaller-sooner payoffs with larger-later payoffs, where future payoffs tend to be discounted. Researchers have investigated factors that mitigate impatience, such as connecting people to their future selves (Hershfield et al. 2011), framing the decision as expediting rather than deferring (Malkoc and Zauberman 2006), etc.

The current study extends research on intertemporal choice by showing that adding ambiguity to larger-later payoffs increases the appeal of future options, thereby increasing patience. People generally prefer precise rather than ambiguous alternatives (Ellsberg 1961). Since people discount both the future and ambiguity, we might expect them to discount future ambiguous payoffs especially severely. However, prior research reports instances in which congruity between an option’s various features improves appeal (e.g., Zhao and Xie 2011). Budescu and Wallsten (1995) propose a three-way taxonomy of the sources of imprecision that affect how individuals process and communicate uncertainty: the definition of the target event, the nature of uncertainty about that event, and the representation of this uncertainty. People are motivated to achieve congruity between the three factors, where congruity often increases an option’s appeal. Given that the future and ambiguity are both sources of uncertainty about the payoff, we predict: When ambiguity is added to larger-later payoffs, it will match the uncertainty of the future and thus improve evaluation of the target option. However, when ambiguity is added to smaller-sooner payoffs, it will have no such effect as it is incongruous with the present’s certainty.

Study 1a randomly assigned eighty graduate students to one of the two conditions (precise payoff vs. ambiguous payoff) where they chose between a smaller-sooner payoff and a larger-later one. People chose between 1,000€ now and 1,800€ in one year in the precise condition, and between 1,000€ now and 1,700€ to 1,900€ in one year in the ambiguous condition. Adding ambiguity to the larger-later payoff increased its choice share significantly. Study 1b enlisted a choice-itation procedure and found the same effect in certainty equivalents.

Study 2 replicates and extends Study 1 by testing an alternative hypothesis: that ambiguity has positive features which then increase the appeal of future-ambiguous payoffs, such as excitement and hopefulness. Study 2 was designed to rule out this possibility by examining whether adding ambiguity to a smaller-sooner payoff would increase its appeal as well. One-hundred-twenty-eight US-based participants (mTurk) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: precise payoffs, future-ambiguous payoff, and present-ambiguous payoff. Participants across these three conditions, respectively, chose between $600 now and $800 in 1 year, $600 now and $700-$800 in 1 year, and $500-$600 now and $800 in 1 year. In contrast to the upper-range hypothesis, the larger-later payoff continued to be chosen more when it was ambiguous ($700-$800) than when it was certain ($800). And again ruling out the possibility that payoff ambiguity is positive, adding ambiguity to the smaller-sooner payoff ($500-$600 now) reduced this option’s choice share relative to the precise-payoff condition ($600) significantly.

Four experiments thus examined the influence of ambiguous payoffs on consumer preference. We find that ambiguity added to a larger-later payoff increased its choice share, and thus resulted in greater patience (Study 1a & 1b), though no such effect was found when ambiguity was added to a smaller-sooner payoff (Study 2). We attribute this effect to the perceived congruity between ambiguity and the future (Study 3). We also rule out alternative possibilities such as (1) the positive effect of ambiguity, and (2) more optimism in the future and a focus on the payoff range’s highest value (Study 4).

This research has significant implications for managers. For example, shipment options with a longer delay may use a range of prices instead of one exact price. These payoffs could be used to increase patience and thus weight the upper range’s value more. If so, then an inferior ambiguous option would fail to improve the appeal of future payoffs. One-hundred-twenty-three US-based participants (mTurk) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: precise payoffs, future-inferior-ambiguous payoff, and present-inferior-ambiguous payoff. Across the three conditions, respectively, participants chose between $600 now and $800 in 1 year, $600 now and $700-$800 in 1 year, and $500-$600 now and $800 in 1 year. In contrast to the upper-range hypothesis, the larger-later payoff continued to be chosen more when it was ambiguous ($700-$800) than when it was certain ($800). And again ruling out the possibility that payoff ambiguity is positive, adding ambiguity to the smaller-sooner payoff ($500-$600 now) reduced this option’s choice share relative to the precise-payoff condition ($600) significantly.

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Consumers’ Privacy Concerns are Relative and Malleable: Implications for Online Behavioral Advertising
Idris Adjerid, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Eyal Peer, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Alessandro Acquisti, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
George Loewenstein, Carnegie Mellon University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Behavioral and targeted advertising promises significant gains for firms and reduce search costs and better meet consumer needs (Chen & Stallaert 2010; George & Hogendorn 2012; Yan et al. 2009). The adoption and effectiveness of such approaches, however, has been hampered by consumer privacy concerns (Acquisti & Varian 2006; Goldfarb & Tucker 2011; Tucker 2011). To address these concerns while allowing for marketing innovations, policy makers, with general consensus from industry, have advocated increased transparency of firm data practices and more consumer control over how their personal information is used and shared (FTC 2012; Santalesa 2012; White House 2012). However, the landscape for behavioral advertising is constantly shifting including changes in protection afforded to consumers and an increasingly complex set of choices for consumers to navigate. In this paper we argue, and provide supporting evidence, that this shifting landscape has the potential to limit the effectiveness of these policy approaches intended to address consumers’ privacy concerns. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of reference dependence (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) on the consistency of consumer privacy decision making: both in terms of disclosure and choice of privacy settings.

In our first experiment we evaluated the impact of changing protections’ levels on self-disclosure behavior. We asked participants (N=386, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk) to take two separate surveys on (un)ethical behavior in which they were presented short, simple, privacy notices communicating the protection level each survey offers. Between subjects, we manipulated whether protection increased, decreased, or stayed the same from the first to the second survey. We found that participants presented with decreasing protections were 14% less likely (χ² (1) = 8.56, p < .01) to admit to unethical behavior relative to participants that were presented no change in privacy notices. Moreover, participants that were presented increasing privacy protections were 11% more likely (χ² (1) = 4.70, p < .05) to admit to unethical behavior relative to participants that were presented no change in privacy notices.

In a second experiment (N=177), we recruited students at a large university to take part in a new online social network that was (allegedly) being formed in their university (no such network was actually formed but students were not aware of this). Students were asked to first choose who would be able to see their personal profile (privacy setting) and then answered several personal questions about themselves that would be used to create one’s personal profiles (self-disclosure). Between subjects, we manipulated the position of the most and least restrictive privacy settings with respect to a default option in order to frame identical privacy choices as either relatively less or more protective. In the high default condition, the least restrictive choice was indeed perceived as less protective than it was in the low default condition and vice versa for the most restrictive choice. We found that the percent of participants who chose a privacy setting that was higher (more restrictive) than the default was higher in the low vs. high default condition (51.1% vs. 34.8%), while the percent of participants who chose a privacy setting that was lower (less restrictive) than the default was higher in the high vs. the low default condition (30.3% vs. 14.8%, χ² (2) = 7.49, p < .05). We also found that holding the chosen privacy setting constant, participants in the low default condition disclosed personal information slightly more often (66.9%), compared to participants in the high default condition (60.45%, F (2,171) = 3.97, p < .05). These differences suggests that regardless of the actual choice of privacy setting, if the same choices were framed (and perceived) as relatively high, participants disclosed more personal information, compared to when the (objectively same) privacy settings were framed as relatively low.

In further studies we found that this effect was robust in regards to different combinations of privacy settings and also occurred when no default choice was present.

Both these studies demonstrate that privacy preferences are malleable and susceptible to reference dependence effects. The (objectively) same privacy levels (protections in the first study and settings in the second study) were perceived differently if they were presented as either relatively low or relatively high. These relative perceptions of privacy levels also impacted people’s self-disclosure behavior. The implications of these results is that both notice and choice policies intended to address privacy concerns in the context of behavioral advertising may be limited in that consumers may continue to disclose at levels inconsistent with their stated concerns or expected level of privacy protection. Firms that benefit from increased disclosure by consumers for purposes of behavioral advertising may find some value in presenting notices and choices as “more protective” to elicit higher levels of disclosure. However, if underlying consumer concerns remain unaddressed, troublesome and costly privacy incidents may persist, leading to decreased disclosure and trust by consumers in the long term.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Product customization, whereby consumers self-design their products using a seller’s mass customization (MC) interface, has the potential to provide consumers with offers that closely match their idiosyncratic preferences and, hence, to increase their product satisfaction, loyalty, and willingness-to-pay (Ansari & Mela 2003; Franke et al. 2010). Recent research suggests that each of the two most common formats of product customization – (1) the “by alternative” format of having consumers choose from a pre-specified set of alternatives and (2) the “by attribute” format of asking consumers to customize every attribute and attribute level of the product – has distinct limitations from the consumer’s perspective (Huffman & Kahn 1998; Valenzuela et al. 2009), such as increased complexity due to trade-offs among attributes (Valenzuela et al. 2009; Dhar 1997) and the need to process a large number of attribute information in parallel (Dellaert & Stremersch 2005; Huffman & Kahn 1998).

Inspired by prior research on multi-stage decision processes suggesting that consumers typically first narrow down the set of considered alternatives, and subsequently examine the remaining alternatives in greater depth (Beach 1993; Ge, Häubl, & Elrod 2012; Häubl & Trifts 2000, Bettman & Park 1980), we propose a novel procedure that partitions the product customization process into two stages, whereby consumers first select one of a few pre-specified products as a starting solution, and then create their final customized product by further refining this starting solution. Our key hypotheses were that, compared to standard attribute-by-attribute MC systems, the proposed two-stage approach would reduce the cognitive effort associated with product customization, promote mental simulation of product use, motivate the purchase of more feature-rich – and thus higher-priced – products, and lead to greater satisfaction with self-designed products.

Converging evidence from a series of field and lab studies shows that, compared to standard (attribute-by-attribute) customization systems, the two-stage “Customization via Starting Solutions” procedure reduces decision complexity, promotes the mental simulation of product use, leads to the purchase of more feature-rich, higher-priced products, and results in greater customer satisfaction.

A field study with 842 customers of a large manufacturer of men’s dress shirts revealed that, as predicted, consumers who used the two-stage MC format designed more feature-rich shirts than did those who used a standard attribute-by-attribute MC system, ultimately resulting in the choice of higher-priced products ($M_{Two-Stage} = 73.21, M_{Standard} = 57.77; t(840) = 3.245, p < .01$). Moreover, the two-stage format significantly reduced the amount of time it took consumers to self-design their shirt relative to the manufacturer’s standard MC system ($\text{Beta}_{Two-Stage} = -4.95, t(837) = 3.25, p < .01$).

In a field experiment conducted with 159 car buyers at a major German automobile manufacturer’s web site, we found that customers who had been randomly assigned to a two-stage rather than a standard (i.e., attribute-by-attribute) MC interface not only configured significantly more feature-rich cars as reflected by higher-priced configurations ($M_{Two-Stage} = 620.765, M_{Standard} = 183.449; t(158) = 2.071, p < .05$), but were ultimately also substantially more satisfied with their self-designed vehicle ($t(158) = 2.14, p < .05$) as revealed by a follow-up survey.

A field experiment at a ski resort in Switzerland in which 210 travelers were randomly assigned to either a standard customization system or the proposed two-stage format provided additional support for our hypotheses. As predicted, the proposed two-stage procedure caused travelers to select resort packages that included a greater number of services ($M_{Two-Stage} = 25.35, M_{Standard} = 16.80; t(209) = 9.930, p < .001$) and were higher priced ($M_{Two-Stage} = CHF 1,611.96, M_{Standard} = CHF 1,061.46; t(209) = 9.948, p < .001$), ultimately resulting in greater satisfaction with their ski vacation ($M_{Two-Stage} = 6.11, M_{Standard} = 5.74; t(209) = 2.122, p < .05$).

Three lab experiments, all involving a web-based jewelry customization interface, examined the psychological processes that underlie these effects. In the first of these experiments, 69 participants were randomly assigned to either a standard MC system or the proposed two-stage format. A multiple mediation model revealed that the positive effect of the two-stage format on consumers’ satisfaction with their self-design products is mediated by an increase in their mental simulation of product use, as well as a decrease in the perceived complexity of the decision process ($z = 2.628, p < .01$). A second lab experiment with 133 participants revealed that, compared to a standard MC system, using a two-stage procedure caused a significantly lower error rate in a Stroop task ($M_{Two-Stage} = 1.23, M_{Standard} = 2.30, t(132) = 2.458, p < .05$), indicating greater availability of cognitive resources after self-designing a product using the two-stage format.

The third lab experiment was designed to examine the effect of merely allowing consumers to refine their initial product choice, without at the same time identifying a subset of the possible product configuration as candidate starting solutions. A total of 100 participants were randomly assigned to either a standard MC system or a two-stage format. In the latter condition, the set of starting solutions was, in fact, the entire assortment of all possible combinations of attribute levels that consumers could configure in the standard MC condition. In line with our prediction, participants in the two-stage condition were significantly more satisfied with their ultimate self-designed product ($M_{Two-Stage} = 6.33, M_{Standard} = 5.92; t(100) = 2.577, p < .01$), and this effect was mediated by an increase in mental simulation of product use and a reduction in the perceived complexity of the self-design process ($z = 2.537, p < .05$).

This paper’s contribution to the literature is threefold: First, it shows that the two-stage format outperforms current customization formats, resulting in increased consumer satisfaction with self-designed products. Second, this research reveals that the proposed self-design format stimulates consumers’ mental simulation of product use, which in turn results in the choice of more feature-rich products. Finally, it highlights the external validity and generalizability of the key conceptual insights by presenting converging evidence from lab experiments and field studies involving actual purchases in a various domains.

REFERENCES


Set-Fit Effects in Choice
Ellen R. K. Evers, Tilburg University, Netherlands
Yoel Inbar, Tilburg University, Netherlands
Marcel Zeelenberg, Tilburg University, Netherlands

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In five experiments, we show how the “fit” of an item with a set of similar items affects choice. We find that people have a notion of a set that fits together—one where all items are the same, or all items differ, on salient attributes. One consequence of this notion is that in addition to preferences over the set’s individual items, choices take set-fit into account. This leads to predictable shifts in preferences when choosing between different sets as opposed to individual items, sometimes even resulting in people choosing normatively inferior options over superior ones.

Even though many products are manufactured and sold as grouped sets, virtually no research has investigated how the composition of such sets influences choice. Other literature, however, suggests that the composition of a set could have strong effects on preference and choice. Early research by the gestalt psychologists (Wertheimer, 1923) shows that people categorize and group stimuli rapidly and automatically, and that some sets of stimuli are grouped together more easily than others. Furthermore, we know from research on fluency, that things that are processed more easily are liked better (e.g., Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Therefore, it could be expected that sets that are easier to group, will be liked better. Similar arguments can be found in work by philosophers on aesthetics. For example Kintsch (2012) argues that the lower the complexity of a stimulus, the more it will be liked. Even though these claims have not been tested empirically, cognitive psychologists (e.g., Garner, 1970) have investigated the liking of patterns and found a strong negative relation between the complexity and liking. Taken together, this suggests that sets of products that are low in complexity will be liked better than sets that are more complex. More specifically, we expected that sets in which all products are either all-similar or all-different on every salient attribute, would be liked better than sets which are not. A pre-test in which participants rated sets of geometric shapes confirmed our expectations. Participants consistently rated sets which were all-similar or all-different on shape and color as much more liked than sets which were not.

Knowing that sets are indeed liked better when they are either all-similar or all-different on every attribute, we proceeded to investigate how this affects choice. We first looked at this by having participants make choices between either two individual items, or two logically equivalent sets. For example, we had young children in one condition choose between a striped translucent marble, and a red opaque one. Consistent with a pre-test, we found that an overwhelming majority of the children chose the striped translucent marble. However, in the other condition, we added an opaque green, blue and yellow marble to both sets. Even though in this situation the only difference between the two sets is the striped translucent vs. the red opaque marble, we expected the children to be more likely to choose the set including the red opaque marble because this group formed a better set; all four marbles being opaque. This is what we found, where only 10.4% of the children chose the red marble in the individual-choice condition, this increased to 72.7% when choosing between the two sets. We did not only look at differences in choice proportion between individual and set-choices, but also varied the contents of the set in other experiments. For example, in one study participants always chose between sets of mugs. In each condition the choices were logically equivalent, the only difference between the two sets was always a green vs. an orange mug. Sometimes these mugs were embedded in all-similar sets, created by adding three orange mugs to both options, or three green ones. Consistent with our expectations, participants were more likely to choose four green mugs over three green ones and an orange mug. When adding three orange mugs, participants were more likely to choose the set consisting of four orange mugs. This shows the all-similar effect. In two other conditions we added a pink, blue and either an orange or a green mug to both options. There we found the all-different effect. Adding a pink, blue and green mug to both options increases choice for the set including the orange one, but adding pink, blue and orange increases choice for the set including the green mug.

The experiments reveal a strong effect of the set-fit on consumer-choice. Effects that cannot be explained by well-known accounts of non-normative influences on choice, such as attraction and compromise effects (Simonson, 1989), contrast or assimilation (Wänke, Bless, & Schwarz, 1999), or variety-seeking (Ratner, Kahn, & Kahneman, 1999).

These findings hold direct practical implications. When selling products that are consumed in sets, making sure that the set fits well will make consumers more likely to choose your products. Several interesting questions also arise for consumer research. First of all, even though variety-seeking and set-fit are the result of two different underlying processes, it can be expected that set-fit effects increase variety seeking, because consumers diversifying their first choices for satiation reasons, may be more likely to continue choosing diversified options to keep the set-fit good. Furthermore, the effect being a very intuitive affective response, suggests that people who choose according to set-fit may experience regret about their outcomes later.

REFERENCES
The Diversification Paradox: How Lay Investors Perceive Risk and Covariance Information
Yann Cornil, INSEAD, France
Yakov Bart, INSEAD, Singapore

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
With the development of employee savings plans and privatized retirement savings schemes, people with scant knowledge of finance routinely make risky decisions with dramatic implications for their future wealth. Although people can drastically reduce portfolio risk by investing in negatively correlated assets (Markowitz 1952), empirical evidence demonstrates that they fail to do so, instead investing overwhelmingly in positively correlated assets (e.g. French and Poterba 1991; Huberman 2001). Behavioral research suggests that novice investors diversify poorly because they fail to take into account the way assets covary with each other (Hedesstrom, Svedsater, and Garling 2006). For instance, they evaluate the riskiness of assets one at a time (Dorn and Huberman 2010), or they invest in all available assets in the menu evenly (Benartzi and Thaler 2001).

Building upon this literature, we examine the interplay between covariance information, risk perception, and financial literacy. We suggest that investing in positively correlated assets can actually be a deliberate choice made by novice investors, in a failed attempt to reduce risk. Indeed, negatively correlated assets may appear incongruent to novice investors. In non-financial decisions, incongruence is usually associated with a notion of risk (Campbell and Goodstein 2001; Meertens and Lion 2008). While retrieving this misleading incongruence-risk association, novice investors may end up making riskier financial decisions (investing in correlated assets and avoiding negatively correlated assets) when trying to minimize risk, compared to when they are encouraged to take risks. In other words, they accomplish exactly the opposite of what they intend to do. In four studies, we show that this erroneous strategy can be applied in sequential (study 1) and in simultaneous (study 2) financial allocation tasks, and that it is the result of a deliberate and reasoned decision-making process (study 3). We also suggest menu design (study 2) and investor education (study 4) solutions to improve novice investors’ investment decisions.

In study 1, participants were fictitiously endowed with a fund and asked to choose a second fund. We manipulated investment motives: participants were either instructed to minimize the risk of their allocation (risk-minimizing condition), or to maximize profits by taking risks if necessary (risk-taking condition). They could choose between two funds, presented as equally risky and equally profitable. Based on expected performances across hypothetical economic situations, one fund was positively correlated with the endowed fund, and the other fund was negatively correlated. We hypothesized that the latter fund would appear incongruent to novice investors and be perceived as riskier. We measured financial literacy with a standard questionnaire. Not surprisingly, expert investors were more likely to invest in the negatively correlated fund when instructed to minimize risk, than when encouraged to take risks (z=3.24, p<.001). More interestingly, novice investors adopted the opposite strategy; they were marginally more likely to invest in the positively correlated fund when instructed to minimize risk (z=1.86, p=.06). Novice investors’ decisions were mediated by the belief that investing in the negatively correlated fund would add risk to their investment.

In study 2, participants were asked to allocate $800 among eight funds, whose past performances were shown in a table. The funds were equally risky (same variance of returns) and equally profitable (same average return). As in study 1, we manipulated investment motives. We also manipulated the covariance structure of the funds. In one condition (unbalanced structure), a majority of funds exhibited positively correlated returns, and the remaining funds were negatively correlated with the majority funds. We hypothesized that these minority funds would appear incongruent to novice investors and be perceived as riskier. In the other condition (balanced structure), there was no majority subset of positively correlated funds. In the unbalanced structure condition, novice investors allocated less money into the minority subset when instructed to minimize risk, compared to when they were encouraged to take risks, paradoxically resulting in a riskier allocation (z=2.31, p=.02). Mediation analyses confirmed that this strategy was due to erroneous beliefs about covariance. Designing the menu in such a way to decrease the perceived incongruence of negatively correlated assets (balanced structure condition) made the erroneous covariance-risk inferences ineffective, and improved novice investors’ allocation.

In study 3, we hypothesized that impairing cognitive abilities would hinder the accessibility of this covariance-risk inference and thus improve diversification. We replicated study 2’s design (unbalanced structure only), and half of the participants had to memorize fifteen words before performing the financial allocation task. Under cognitive load, novice investors instructed to minimize risk invested less in the positively correlated funds, compared to the no-load condition (t(80)=1.97, p<.05), resulting in a less risky allocation.

Study 4 was based on the idea that laymen already know and routinely use the correct covariance-risk inference in their everyday life, although they are unable to retrieve it in financial decision tasks. To test this idea, we used the same operationalization as in study 1 but framed the investment decision task in such a way to help participants retrieve by themselves the correct inference. They were initially endowed with the stock of a company that produces Umbrellas, and they had to decide whether to invest in a company that produces Raincoats or in a company that produces Sunglasses. Most participants retrieved the correct inference, and made the correct choice. This study may inspire financial education programs, as previous research shows that explaining Markowitz’s portfolio theory to novice investors is largely ineffective (Hedesstrom et al. 2006).

This research documents an erroneous diversification strategy, which leads novice investors to take on more risk when in fact they intend to reduce it. Whereas previously documented diversification heuristics increase with cognitive load (e.g. Morriss et al. 2012), the strategy that we present requires investors’ full cognitive capacity, thus relying on deliberate and reasoned inference-making. We believe that managers and policy-makers largely ignore this diversification paradox, and our research proposes applicable solutions (menu design, financial education) to mitigate its negative consequences on people’s long-term financial wealth.

REFERENCES


The Effect of Color vs. Black-and-White on Information Processing
Hyojin Lee, Ohio State University, USA
Xiaoyan Deng, Ohio State University, USA
H. Rao Unnava, Ohio State University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The effects of using color in various forms of marketing communications (e.g., television and magazine advertising, package design) have received much attention from marketing researchers. One area of color effects that has not received much attention is the type of information processing that is elicited from a viewer by color vs. black-and-white (bw) stimuli. We focus on this topic in this research. In particular, we argue that people process the central elements of both color and bw pictures spontaneously. However, color pictures draw a viewer’s attention to the peripheral elements of a picture as well, more so than bw pictures. We further show that the differential attention drawn by color to peripheral elements of a picture can affect some important consumer decisions such as product categorization, feature evaluation, and subsequent choice. Our findings also provide practical guidance for strategic use of color in marketing communications.

A picture generally contains the main elements of the object being depicted (e.g., a chair) along with contextual elements (e.g., the color of the chair, the floor, and any other peripheral elements). When exposed to a picture of an object, a viewer’s focus is first drawn to the global shape of the object (Arneheim 1954, 1957; Nojima 2003). However, our vision system is designed to continuously change its focus as it tries to locate the next piece of important information (Janiszewski 1998). In a bw picture, the salience and value of each element are relatively even, thus inhibiting specific parts of the picture from being distinctive. As a result, our visual attention tends to stay focused on the global form of the bw picture, rather than exploring other elements.

In contrast, color diffuses people’s attention to the various elements of a picture because it causes each element to be salient and distinctive (Itti and Koch 2001; Janiszewski 1998). Consequently, a viewer’s attention is drawn to various components of the picture rather than stay relatively focused on the overall form and shape of the object. In a study directly examining attention shifts while reading a newspaper, Bohle and Garcia (1987) found that viewers’ attention is first directed to the main part in a newspaper page, regardless of the presence of color. Afterwards, however, viewers’ attention in a color present condition moved toward the colored, less essential block at the bottom of the page, while it stayed on the main part in the color absent condition.

To summarize, people exposed to a bw picture are expected to focus on the central elements of the picture while those exposed to a color picture are likely to focus not only on the central elements, but on other peripheral elements as well. These differences in attentional focus lead to several interesting consequences that we explore in five studies.

Study 1 shows that people exposed to color pictures attend to the peripheral aspects of the object depicted in the picture more so than they do when the pictures are presented in bw. Both types of pictures do not differ in the attention drawn by the central aspects of the pictures. Studies 2 through 5 show the effects of such differential attention to peripheral aspects on common consumer decisions. In study 2, we show that people exposed to objects presented in color are more likely to use their perceptual features as a basis for categorization than people exposed to the same objects in presented in bw. In Studies 3 and 4, we investigate whether color vs. bw presentation of products can affect consumers’ evaluations of product features as well as choices. If color makes people focus on unimportant features of a product, those features should be perceived as more important and carry more weight in the subsequent decisions (Mackenzie 1986). Consistent with this notion, in Study 3 we find that non-critical product features were rated as significantly more important when the product was presented in color than in bw. Study 4 further shows that color increases the choice probability of a suboptimal option, suggesting that color can sometimes lead people to spend unnecessary extra costs. In Study 5, we show that the increased choice probability of a suboptimal option is mediated by the increased perceived importance of the otherwise unimportant product attribute.

We believe that our research generates some important theoretical and managerial implications. The first theoretical contribution of our research is in reconciling prior findings that have argued for color to be more attention-getting vs. being distractive. We show that color does both. It draws greater attention, but only to peripheral details of a picture. Insofar as the peripheral details are not necessary to interpret a picture, it is true that color distracts by drawing attention to those details. However, such increased attention is not at the expense of attention to central aspects of a picture, but due to added attentional resources drawn from the reader. Thus, color is both attention-getting and distractive. Second, our work extends the previous research into consumer decision domain by demonstrating that the increased attention to unimportant product features can lead consumers to respond differently in tasks like product categorization, feature evaluation, and choice. These results thus suggest that marketers can strategically use color to achieve different marketing goals. Third, our finding that color (bw) pictures are conducive to the processing of peripheral (central) information suggests a link to the construal level theory. Indeed, the way people process color (bw) information is akin to low- (high-) level construal as the focus is on the low- (high-) level features (Trope and Liberman 2010). Future research is in need to investigate this link.

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**Table 1: Summary of Results**

| STUDY 1 (DV=change detection score) | | | |
| Change in Central Component | Change in Peripheral Component |
| BW | Color | Contrast | BW | Color | Contrast |
| 2.69 | 2.84 | *p* = .20 | 2.07 | 2.36 | *p* < .01 |

| STUDY 2 (DV=% of participants who categorized the products based on perceptual similarity) |
| BW | Color | Contrast |
| 10.0% | 23.1% | *p* < .05 |

| STUDY 3 (DV=Importance rating) |
| Central features | Peripheral features |
| BW | Color | Contrast | BW | Color | Contrast |
| 6.38 | 6.57 | *p* = .44 | 5.16 | 5.99 | *p* < .01 |

| STUDY 4 (DV=% of participants who chose the product with more peripheral features and higher price) |
| BW | Color | Contrast |
| 26.1% | 50.0% | *p* < .05 |

| STUDY 5 |
| Mediator= Importance rating of peripheral features | DV=Purchase likelihood of product with more peripheral features and higher price |
| BW | Color | Contrast | BW | Color | Contrast |
| 4.44 | 5.25 | *p* = .05 | 3.57 | 4.22 | *p* = .08 |

Mediation analysis result: b = .45, SE = .07; 95% confidence interval [CI] = .01 to .81.


When a Sequence of Decisions Leads to Unfavorable Outcome: The Conflicting Roles of Perceived Control
Maggie Y. Chu, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Lisa C. Wan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers make numerous decisions every day. These decisions may form a causal sequence in which earlier decisions influence subsequent ones. For example, a decision of which restaurant to go to is a precondition of what to order from the restaurant’s menu. The decision outcome might be either delightful or a disaster. In either case, consumers’ overall evaluation of the experience is influenced not only by the outcome but also the actions that lead up to it. These considerations are particularly important when the outcome of the decision sequence is unfavorable. Extant literature suggests that the negative impact of an unfavorable experience can be attenuated when people have control over their decision to engage in them (Hui and Bateson 1991, Mills and Krantz 1979, Averill 1973). Thus, perceived control over the decision might enhance the evaluation of the entire consumption experience (despite a negative outcome). At the same time, attribution research suggests that the more control people have over their behavior, the more likely they are to regret when the outcome is negative (Roese and Olson 1995, Simonson 1992; Wortman 1976). The regret that one experiences over the bad outcome may undermine the entire experience. In this research, we attempt to resolve this ambiguity. More specifically, we consider situations in which a negative outcome is preceded by a series of decisions and consumers’ control over each of these decisions varies. We postulate that the effect of control at each point in the sequence depends on the control the individual has over other decisions in the sequence.

Previous research suggests that when a causal sequence of actions leads to an unfavorable outcome, people tend to imagine how the earliest behavior in the sequence could have been altered so that the outcome would not have occurred (Giriotto, Legrenzi, and Rizzo 1991, Wells, Taylor, and Turtle 1987). Because earlier events have fewer preconditions, people can imagine how these events could be modified more easily than they can imagine the modification of later ones. Therefore, if the initial choice was made voluntarily and leads to a negative outcome, people are more likely to regret having made this choice, and this negative affect can lower their evaluation of the experience as a whole. On the other hand, their overall evaluation of the experience depends on the amount of control over not only this decision but also subsequent ones. Their freedom of choice over these latter decisions may elicit positive affect and have a positive effect on their overall evaluation of the experience that overrides the effect of their regret over their initial decision. We hypothesized that choice freedom that occurs at a later stage can enhance consumers’ evaluation of the entire experience even when the outcome is unfavorable.

Three empirical studies validated our conceptualization. Participants in Study 1 (N=67) imagined themselves performing a sequence of actions that involved two decisions: which marketing study to participate in and which food sample to taste. They were told to imagine having freedom of choice over each decision or not. In all cases, the decision outcome (i.e., the food sample) was unpleasant. Participants then answered a questionnaire using eleven-point scales (0 = not at all; 10 = very much) for assessing their regret over participating in the study and their evaluation of the entire experience. The results show that freedom of choice at an earlier stage indeed led to more regrets (M<sub>study/choice</sub> = 5.85; M<sub>study/no-choice</sub> = 4.74; F(1, 63) = 6.37, p<.05). However, freedom of choice at a later stage offset these negative reactions and enhanced overall evaluations (M<sub>sample/choice</sub> = 4.20; M<sub>sample/no-choice</sub> = 3.23; F(1, 63) = 4.99, p<.05).

Study 2 (N=53) was a real-life replication of the scenario experiment in which participants made real choices and received an actual decision outcome. The results were consistent with Study 1 that initial choice provoked more regret (M<sub>initial/choice</sub> = 4.11; M<sub>initial/no-choice</sub> = 3.10; F(1, 49) = 4.11, p<.05). Nevertheless, choice occurred at a later stage attenuated regret (M<sub>sample/choice</sub> = 2.87; M<sub>sample/no-choice</sub> = 4.42; F(1, 49) = 9.64, p<.05) and enhanced overall evaluation (M<sub>sample/choice</sub> = 6.69; M<sub>sample/no-choice</sub> = 5.32; F(1, 49) = 5.65, p<.05).

Conditions in which participants are not given a choice at a given stage of the decision sequence might seem to be equivalent to a single-decision situation of the sort considered in previous research. The major difference between the sequential and single decision situation is that in the latter case, an alternative possibility is not mentioned. Study 3 (N=66) was similar to Study 2 except that the existence of an alternative was manipulated. That is, at the first (second) stage, participants were either instructed to participate in a study (taste a food sample) without mentioning the existence of an alternative or were told that an alternative existed but arbitrarily assigned to one of them. Across the four conditions, participants evaluated the entire experience less favorably particularly when neither alternative study nor sample was mentioned (M<sub>no-alternative</sub> = 2.08; t(63) = 3.45, p<.01). Thus, mentioning the existence of an alternative had a positive influence on judgments even when participants were not given any opportunity to choose this alternative. In other words, not having a choice at a given stage in a sequential decision situation is not equal to entering into a single decision.

To conclude, this research provides evidence of the differential impact of perceived control in a sequential decision situation. It shows that the control at an early point in the sequence can elicit regrets over an undesirable outcome but the control over choices at later stages can offset the effects of these negative feelings. Our findings also indicate that consumers’ evaluation of the entire experience would be more favorable when there is an alternative despite of its unavailability. Such a difference underlines the importance of the notion of sequential decision making.

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A Fluency Account of How Price Operates as a Cue to Psychological Distance
Thomas Allard, University of British Columbia, Canada
Dale Griffin, University of British Columbia, Canada

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Building on construal level theory (CLT; Trope and Liberman, 2003), we propose that the price of a product, like time (e.g., Liberman and Trope, 1998), spatial distance (e.g., Fujita, et al. 2006), social distance (e.g., Chandran and Menon 2004), and probability (e.g., Todorov et al. 2006), creates a psychological distance between consumers and consumption. In particular, because access to more expensive products is more limited than to more affordable ones, higher prices create a higher psychological distance between customers and their objects of desire. We propose this price-induced psychological distance to be an overgeneralization of the principle that relatively more expensive products require to work or save for a longer period of time before being able to purchase them.

Based on recent findings on the interaction between price and construal level (Bornemann and Homburg 2011; Hansen and Wänke 2011; Hansen, Kutzner, Wänke 2013; Yan and Sengupta 2011), we propose that generating a feeling of fit between the price of an object and the construal-level of the advertising slogans promoting it—a low/low or high/high match—will improves both advertisement and product evaluations compared to situations of non-fit. This prediction relies on a mechanism where situations of fit will lead consumers to experience greater cognitive fluency when evaluating the product (e.g., Lee, Keller, and Stermthal 2010, Tsai and McGill 2011). We further support this rationale by demonstrating that consumers with a low (vs. high) tendency to enjoy thinking, low need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao 1984), rely more on this fit or non-fit between prices and construal levels of advertising slogans when making judgments. We present four experiments investigating this price-construal fit framework.

The pilot study used a 2(price: low vs. high) between X 2(construal level: low vs. high) within mixed-model design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two versions of the questionnaire, each providing a list of the same 17 products (e.g., a haircut, a chocolate bar, a gym membership, etc.). Half of the products on the list were priced at a relatively low price for their category, the other half were priced at a relatively high price. Prices were counterbalanced between questionnaires. For each product, participants were asked to identify the more appropriate of two descriptions, either a low or high construal level description (chi-squares between 4.7 and 86.9, all p’s < .03).

Study 1 used a one factor (price condition: low vs. high vs. control) between-subjects design. It demonstrates that making salient the concepts of high (low) prices activates a high (low) construal level mindset. Participants were first shown a list of 12 different items ranging from inexpensive ones (i.e., a pack of gum) to expensive ones (i.e., 60 inch HDTV), shown without a price tag. Participants were asked to rank order the products from 1 = “the least expensive and most affordable item” to 12 = “the most expensive and unaffordable item”. Next participants in the low (high) price condition provided a price estimate in dollars for the product they ranked 1st (12th) and described what it would be like to pay this price. Participants in the control condition went through a similar procedure, but instead ranked ordered twelve animals (e.g., a panda, a mouse, etc.) in term of size.

To measure construal level induced by the cheap or expensive prices, participants selected the word that best fit their frame of mind “right now” in a list of fourteen pairs of words representing either a low-construal or high-construal level (e.g., Near-Far, Sure-Unsure, Self-Others). We used those answers to create an index measuring their construal level. Participants’ had a higher construal-level mindset in the high price than in the control condition. Moreover, participants had a higher construal-level mindset in the control than in the low price condition.

Study 2 used a 2(price: low vs. high) X 2(construal: low vs. high) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four versions of the same advertisement for some green tea, each using the same photographic illustration. The tea was either priced at $2.99 per 100g (low price) or $32.99 per 100g (high price), and the advertising slogan was either “Provides caffeine boost” (low-construal) or “Makes you more productive” (high-construal). Participants evaluated the advertisement, we also measured their NFC. The low-construal advertisement was marginally preferred in the low price (vs. high) price condition, and the high-construal one, was preferred in the high (vs. low) price condition. Results were qualified by a three-way interaction with NFC. For Low-NFC consumers, results support our predicted interaction between price and construal levels of advertising slogans. For high-NFC consumers, no difference were observed for low or high construal level slogan between the price conditions.

Study 3 used a 2(price: low vs. high) X 2(construal: low vs. high) between-subjects factorial design. Participants evaluated an advertisement for a watch either priced at $24.99 (low price) or $1024.99 (high price). The advertisement contained either the low-construal captions “100% stainless steel”, “easy to read display”, “100 meters water-resistant”, “automatic quartz movement”, “Manufacturing defect warranty”, or their high-construal equivalent “built to last a lifetime”, “never let you lose track of time” “an active lifestyle companion”, “precision workmanship”, “worry free timekeeping”. We measured perceived fit between the advertisement and the product, advertisement evaluation, and product evaluation. We also calculated how long participants took to answer the focal measures of this survey. Results supported our predicted interaction for fit, advertisement evaluation, product evaluation, and completion time (faster = more fluent).

Taken together, those results support a fluency mechanism underlying the positive effect of the fit between product prices and construal levels of advertising slogans on advertisement and product evaluation.

REFERENCES


Fear Not, For You Can Help! The Effect of Fear of Failure And Self-Construal on Charitable Giving
Lale Okyay-Ata, Koç University, Turkey
Zeynep Gürhan-Canli, Koç University, Turkey

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Extant literature offers mixed findings as to how people respond to having an aspect of the self threatened, reporting both social contact seeking (Maner et al. 2007), and avoiding behavior (Murray et al. 2006). We propose that whether people might want to draw closer to others when threatened by a specific type of threat, fear of failure (FF; Rhodewalt 1990), depends on self-construal (Markus and Kitayama 1991).

FF is a dispositional tendency to avoid situations with possible negative outcomes due to the risk of feeling ashamed of failure (Elliott & Thrash 2004). FF has been considered as a form of self-threat (Sherman et al. 1984), and an aversive state (Fiske and Taylor 1991) that reduces control over one’s life (Hogg and Mullin 1999). FF presents a potential link to self-construal (Singelis 1994), the extent to which individuals define themselves as individuals or as parts of groups (Agrawal, Maheswaran 2005). As separate construals of the self may be differentially sensitive to personal control (Hamilton and Biehal 2005), they might also differentially react to a loss of personal control caused by FF. An independent self-construal will likely rely on own thoughts and feelings for resolving the negative feelings caused by FF, whereas an interdependent self-construal will likely rely on input from other group members. Thus, we propose that compared to independent self-construals, interdependent self-construals are more likely to respond to a threat via embracing others.

As the present research pertains to the social implications of FF, a help-giving context using monetary donations (Batson et al. 1997) was selected for testing behaviors indicating embracing others. We predicted that compared to an independent self-construal, an interdependent self-construal would lead to more interest in and willingness to donate to a charitable cause under a high FF, because interdependent self-construals are more likely to resolve their negative feelings in relation to others and in a more social manner. This differential evaluation is likely to be further pronounced when a loss of personal control is salient, because independent self-construals are likely to be more sensitive to a loss of personal control (Hamilton & Biehal 2005), and might thus less positively evaluate their social support system, leading to a lowered likelihood to embrace others via charitable donations. We define social support as perceived or actual support from community, social networks or close others (Lin 1986). Studies 1 and 2 test our main predictions and rule out some alternative accounts, and study 3 introduces loss of personal control as the mediating and perceived social support as the mediating mechanism.

Online panel participants (N=179) completed study 1. Following the self-construal manipulation (Swaminnathan et al. 2007), participants elaborated on a time when they were very (somewhat) afraid of failing at something important (of not much consequence) in the high FF (low FF) conditions. The control group wrote about their breakfast. Participants’ likelihood to donate to a fictitious charitable cancer foundation was tested next (Liu & Aaker 2008). Manipulation checks confirmed that self-construal and FF level were successfully primed. In line with expectations, we observed a significant overall interaction of self-construal with fear of failure level (F (1,175)= 4.341, p=0.015 and (F (1,175)=4.407, p=0.014)), for the main dependent variables of interest in donating and willingness to donate, respectively. Planned contrasts further showed that among those in the high FF condition, interdependent self construals were more interested in donating and more willing to donate than independent self construals.

Study 2 (N=99) used a prospective FF scenario, a more behavioral donation measure, an existing cancer charity, and measured the functional motives underlying the decision to donate (VFI; Clary et al. 1998). The results of study 2 replicated study 1 in showing the moderating effect of self-construal on the relationship between FF and donation likelihood and the actual amount to donate, after accounting for personal involvement, perceptions of manipulative intent and the motivations to donate. Manipulation checks confirmed that self-construal and FF level were successfully primed. A 2 (self-construal) x 2 (FF level) ANOVA revealed a significant overall interaction of self-construal with FF for the main dependent variables of willingness to donate, (F (1,94)= 9.45, p=0.0033) and the ($ amount to donate (F (1,95)= 8.38, p=0.005), respectively. There were no main effects apart from a partial main effect of FF on the willingness to donate (F (1,94)= 3.15, p=0.079). Planned contrasts showed that among those in the high FF condition, interdependent self-construals were more willing to donate and donated a higher amount of the $10 bonus than independent self-construals.

Study 3 tested the moderating role of perceived control on the relationship between self-construal and donation likelihood under a high FF. Online panel participants (N= 81) were randomly assigned to a 2 (self-construal) x 2 (perceived control) x (fear of failure: high) mixed design. For the perceived control manipulation, participants elaborated on an event that made them feel in control (high-control condition) versus not in control of their life (low-control condition), respectively. All respondents completed the high FF task, followed by interest and willingness to donate measures for a children’s charity. Manipulation checks indicated that both self-construal and perceived control were successfully primed. We observed a significant overall interaction of self-construal with personal control on interest in donating (F(1,77)=3.75, p=0.056), and the willingness to donate (F(1,77)=7.86, p=0.006), respectively. Finally, a bootstrap analysis (Preacher and Hayes, 2008) supported the mediating effect of perceived social support. When perceived social support was added to the analysis, it emerged as a significant predictor of willingness to donate (C.I. = 0.043, 0.671; p =0.0041), whereas the effect of self-construal became non-significant.

We contribute to previous literature by reporting that FF will have spillover effects in an unrelated domain, introducing loss of personal control as a new moderator for self-construal and perceived social support as a new mediator of consumer willingness to donate, and suggesting that advertising messages for charitable giving, which evoke a high FF and thinking about the self in relation to others, are more likely to elicit favorable consumer responses.

REFERENCES


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Manipulation Checks</th>
<th>Fear of Failure Manipulation Check</th>
<th>Use of Personal Goal Manipulation Check</th>
<th>Design</th>
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<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>M = 2.4, M Intent = 3.99 (F, 179) p = 0.00</td>
<td>MFFreetings vs. MFFcontrol (F, 1, 179)</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
<td>2 (self-construal: independent, interdependent) x 3 (fear of failure: high, low, control) between subjects</td>
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<td>Willingness to donate (+ SC interaction: F, 1, 179)</td>
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<td>Study 2</td>
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<td>MFFreetings vs. MFFcontrol (F, 1, 179)</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
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<td>Willingness to donate: overall + SC interaction</td>
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<td>Willingness to donate (+ SC interaction: F, 1, 179)</td>
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<td>Study 3</td>
<td>M = 2.0, M Intent = 3.99 (F, 1, 179) p = 0.00</td>
<td>MFFreetings vs. MFFcontrol (F, 1, 179)</td>
<td>p = 0.00</td>
<td>2 (self-construal: independent, interdependent) x 3 (fear of failure: high, low, control) between subjects</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Interest in donating: overall + SC interaction</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Willingness to donate: overall + SC interaction</td>
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Happiness from Giving: When Consumers Misforecast Their Affective Responses to Prosocial Behavior
Stefanie Robinson, North Carolina State University, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
William O. Bearden, University of South Carolina, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumer giving has steadily declined over the last few years (Giving USA 2010). When consumers do give, approximately 50% are motivated to only give once and not give again (Nonprofit Times 2003). In order to continue to serve those in need, charities must effectively request help from donors. Consumers are more likely to engage in helping behavior when they will receive a positive emotional response (Batson 1998; Piliavin et al. 1981). However, research has not addressed whether consumers are accurate in their forecasts. Affective misforecasting is the difference between forecasted and experienced affect (Patrick, MacInnis, and Park 2007). There are several different biases that have been associated with misforecasting; however, they do not tap into the key drivers of prosocial behavior: the costs endured by the giver and benefit received by the person(s) in need (Piliavin et al. 1981).

When consumers think about helping others, consumers are more likely to focus on the benefit to others. The focus of benefitting others is likely to induce predictions of positive affect as research has shown that thinking about the benefit to others produces strong feelings of positive affect (Salovey et al. 1991). When consumers experience the helping behavior, consumers are more likely to focus on the process to self. With prosocial behavior, consumers do not see the outcome produced to those in need. Therefore, they use their endured costs to inform the provided benefit. The cost-benefit inference is not taken under consideration during time of prediction.

In the context of everyday helping behavior, the process generally involves low sacrifice on the part of the giver. Consumers value the outcome of their input more when they engage in greater effort (Zhang and Epley 2009). If the costs endured are low, then this will inform consumers that the benefit provided was low which in turn decreases experienced positive affect. We suggest with low cost helping, experienced affect will be lower than predicted affect.

In study 1, participants were exposed to one of two helping conditions: prediction or behavior. In the prediction (behavior) condition, participants were asked to review a website that sponsors a donation campaign (to go on-line to the website and click on the link to help the charity). Results showed that consumers who thought about helping the cause had more positive affect than those who actually helped (p < .01) and perceived benefit to others mediated this effect (p < .01).

Since consumers overestimate their positive affect when they forecast helping in low cost contexts, they are likely to be disappointed when their experienced affect does not match their anticipated affect (Oliver 1980). When consumers do not forecast their affect, they do not have a comparison point to use and therefore do not have an opportunity to be let down. Thus, consumers’ experienced affect is expected to be higher when consumers do not forecast their emotions (vs. forecast their emotions). If consumers have a positive experience helping others, they may be inclined to help again in the future (Jenner 1982). Therefore, not forecasting (vs. forecasting) one’s positive affect will increase consumers’ willingness to engage in future helping behavior.

The purpose of this study is to test whether making predictions of emotional responses influences consumers’ willingness to help a cause again in the future. In the prediction condition, participants were asked to review a website that sponsors a donation campaign. In the no-prediction condition, participants did an unrelated task at time period 1. At time period 2, all participants were asked to go to the website and click on the link to help. These results show that making a prediction (versus not making a prediction) of emotional responses can decrease consumers’ likelihood to help again when the charity makes a request immediately following the helping task (p < .01).

All helping requires some costs on the part of the giver (Bartlett et al. 2002), for example, one’s time, money, and/or effort (Dovidio et al. 1991). With costly helping behavior, the help itself is more intense (Piliavin et al. 1981) and therefore the process of helping others, i.e., the cost involved to the self, is apparent both when thinking about and engaging in prosocial behavior. Therefore, consumers are less likely to misforecast their emotions as compared to the misforecasting with low cost helping. We suggest that high cost helping provides a boundary condition to the misforecasting effect associated with prosocial behavior. The purpose of the next study is to test this prediction.

The final study is a 2 (cost: high vs. low) X 2 (help: prediction vs. behavior) between-subjects design. Participants are randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Participants exposed to a low (high) cost helping task, were presented with one (five) present(s) for children in need. Participants in the prediction condition were asked to think about wrapping the presents, while those in the behavior condition wrapped the presents. The variables of interest were similar to those used in previous studies (e.g., positive affect). The results showed a significant interactive effect of cost and help (p < .05). In the low cost condition, participants had more positive affect when they thought about helping versus engaged in the behavior (p < .01). In the high cost condition, participants had similar positive affect in both conditions (p > .75).

Across the studies, results provide evidence that consumers overestimate their positive affective responses, which is due to consumers’ perception of greater benefit to others when they think about versus engage in the behavior. Furthermore, this overestimation decreases consumers’ likelihood to help the charity again in the future. A boundary condition for this effect shows that, with costly helping, misforecasting diminishes.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

One of the most general approaches to studying consumer choice under risk is based on the assumption that consumer are rational value maximizers (i.e., people prefer larger over smaller expected returns) and prefer smaller risks over larger risks (Pratt 1964). A standard assumption in this literature is that risk is negatively associated with the attractiveness of an option (March and Shapira 1987). One way via which individuals can reduce uncertainty associated with the expected outcome is by acquiring information that can help them to make more precise estimates of the product value (Aqueveque 2006; Conchar et al. 2004; Erdem and Swait 2004; Peterson and Merino 2003; Taylor 1974). Based on this line of reasoning, consumers’ choice formulation under risk should be based on information that provides a clear ranking-based standard for product evaluation (e.g., a camera’s resolution; a vertical product attribute) rather than on information that does not affect the actual performance of the product (i.e., a camera’s design, a horizontal product attribute).

We offer an alternative account of choice under risk which predicts that consumers facing trade-offs between horizontal and vertical attributes shift their focus from vertical to horizontal product attribute information when the purchase involves higher levels of risk. Drawing upon research on the ambiguity effect (Ellsberg 1961; Heath and Tversky 1991; Klein et al. 2010), we show that consumers facing higher levels of risk to more positively value an attribute that reflects their own preference (one that they are knowledgeable and feel competent about) but that does not necessarily improve product performance than an attribute that unambiguously indicates product performance. We test these competing accounts of choice under risk in 5 experiments.

In Experiment 1, participants chose between a digital camera with higher brand equity (i.e., horizontal attribute) and lower resolution (i.e., vertical attribute) and a digital camera with lower brand equity and higher resolution. We observed greater preference for the choice with higher resolution and better brand in the high-risk condition (32.0%) than in the low-risk condition (10.7%; $\chi^2(1) = 3.64, p < .05$). To rule out the possibility that “brand name” lowers one’s risk because it may be a proxy for a bundle of vertical attributes, we ran a second experiment (Experiment 2) where participants chose between a refrigerator featuring a less desirable color (i.e., horizontal attribute) and larger capacity (i.e., vertical attribute), and a refrigerator featuring a more desirable color but smaller capacity. Participants were more likely to choose the refrigerator with the more desirable color and lower capacity in the high-risk condition (54.1%) than in the low-risk condition (33.3%; $\chi^2(1) = 3.18, p < .05$). Given that our results depend on the assumption that consumers are facing true trade-offs, we ran a second version of Experiment 2 where subjects’ preference for the horizontal attribute was obtained prior to the risk manipulation. The results show that the magnitude of the effect was amplified as a larger proportion of participants faced a true trade-off. To rule out an alternative explanation based on the salience of information available to process (i.e., consumers may attend to perceptual cues featuring greater salience in face of greater risk), we ran a version of experiment 2 with the color and the overall capacity of the refrigerator presented in text form only (instead of pictures). Results replicated those of experiment 2, ruling out the perceptual salience alternative explanation. Surprisingly, these results are observed despite participants’ own intuition that information about vertical (vs. horizontal) attributes should be more diagnostic when making a choice under risk (as measured in a pretest). In experiment 3, we focus on providing additional process evidence for the predicted mechanism by showing that consumers rate themselves to be more knowledgeable on horizontal product attributes than on vertical product attributes under greater levels of risk (no-learning condition). However, if consumers become more knowledgeable about the vertical attribute (learning condition), then such increase in competence should produce a reversal of the direction of the effect observed in the previous experiments. For participants in the no-learning condition, we observed greater preference for the refrigerator with the more desirable color and lower capacity in the high-risk condition (45.0%) than in the low-risk condition (20.0%; $\chi^2(1) = 2.85, p < .05$). In contrast, participants in the learning condition were less likely to choose the refrigerator with the more desirable color and smaller capacity in the high-risk condition (18.2%) than in the low-risk condition (45.0%; $\chi^2(1) = 3.53, p < .05$). To test the effect of felt competence on choice, we ran an ordinal logistic regression on the ranking of perceived competence about the vertical attribute, the attribute which was the focus of the learning manipulation. This analysis revealed a significant interaction between the risk and learning factors ($Wald \chi^2(1) = 5.66, p < .01$). An examination of the predicted probability of an upward increase in ranking showed that, in the learning condition, overall capacity had a greater probability of being ranked higher in the high-risk condition (49.6%) than in the low-risk condition (25.9%; $\chi^2(1) = 3.35, p < .05$). In contrast, in the no-learning condition, overall capacity had a greater probability of being ranked higher in the low-risk condition (37.5%) than in the high-risk condition (19.7%; $\chi^2(1) = 2.63, p = .05$). This pattern of perceived competence with the vertical product attribute along with the reversal in choice proportions across learning conditions is consistent with the competence hypothesis.

Counter to marketers’ intuition and prior literature, this research demonstrates that product information that does not objectively affect the actual performance of the product may actually become more important in a choice decision associated with higher levels of risk. This effect stems from the belief that people tend to have favorable perceptions of one’s competence, which is argued to become more preferable under risky purchase situations. It stems from our results that, all else equal (e.g., production costs) horizontal differentiation, i.e., differentiation based on consumers preferences, may be more effective than vertical differentiation, i.e., differentiation based on rank-ordered attributes, in purchases involving higher levels of risk. Our results are of particular importance for products and services for which the value proposition is based on vertical attributes that cannot be unambiguously discerned by consumers (e.g., internet speed, processor capacity, etc.).

REFERENCES


Table 1: Choice Proportions

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experiment 1</th>
<th>Experiment 2A</th>
<th>Experiment 2B</th>
<th>Experiment 2C</th>
<th>Experiment 3</th>
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<tr>
<td>No-Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Risk</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Risk</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Risk</td>
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</table>

*Note: Choice A (more preferable horizontal attribute), Choice B (more preferable vertical attribute)


Brands Status and Reverse Placebo Effects: High Status Products Inhibit Performance Despite Being Preferred

Renée Gosline, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Sachin Banker, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Jeffrey Lee, Harvard Business School, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Placebo treatments have been shown to influence medication efficacy, but recently, researchers have investigated placebo effects of marketing actions. For instance, pens and wines whose labels bear a prestigious name may be experienced as superior (Park et al. 2010; Wansink et al. 2007), and higher-priced items have been shown to increase performance (Shiv, Carmon, Ariely 2005a, 2005b). We extend this literature by investigating the impact of brand status on performance. Despite consumers’ preferences for “better” brands, we demonstrate that the use of high status products may result in lower performance, even though people judge them as higher in quality and are willing to pay more for them.

Why might a higher status product result in lower performance? People tend to form expectancies about their own abilities after comparing themselves to other users, and this may have implications for their subsequent performance when using high status products (Escalas and Bettman 2005; Festinger 1954). We posit that, in the case of a high status brand, this leads to a higher perceived performance standard but greater accessibility of the differences in the performance expectancies of one’s self versus this reference group (Mussweiler 2001). When these malleable performance expectancies lead to an unfavorable comparison to that standard, we expect to observe contrast effects that lead to lower performance when using higher status products. This perspective is consistent with past research on placebo effects that show that expectancies and conditioning affect performance (Kellogg and Barron 1975; Storms and Nisbett 1970; Beecher 1946). We present a process that incorporates the influence of status, and show how it increases perceived standards and feelings of intimidation.

We report four studies comparing 2 types of products (language training or cognitive training), differing only in brand name status. We test two hypotheses: that that despite higher reported product quality and willingness to pay, higher status products can lead to lower performance, and, that participants compare themselves to high-performance reference others when using high-status brand products. These studies identify when participants will underperform with higher status products.

For study 1, 138 participants were asked to use a language training product for a fictional language. We varied the branding as either produced by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or University of Phoenix (Phoenix). A separate pre-test revealed that the MIT brand ranks higher for prestige, even when controlling for brand familiarity (M = 6.36, p< 0.00). After using the language training product, participants believed they were better prepared (M=2.93, SD=0.18; simple contrast, P < 0.02) and were more willing to pay for the product from the higher status MIT producer (M = $26.71, SD=4.12) than the Phoenix producer (M = $15.73, SD=3.91; simple contrast p < 0.06). Nevertheless, Study 1 participants tested worse with the MIT brand (M = 9.96, SD=0.29) than Phoenix (M = 10.90, SD=0.27; F(1, 134) = 5.545, p = 0.02). A three-path mediation analysis (Taylor, MacKinnon and Tein 2008) demonstrated that perceived high standards associated with the school mediated the relationship between the brand and self-reported level of intimidation, which then mediated the relationship between perceived high standards and performance on the test. To exclude alternative interpretations, we measured differences in participants’ moods and exerted effort; these proved not to be significant.

Study 2 tested whether status and price interact to affect performance, because previous research has established that higher prices lead to placebo effects (Shiv et al 2005). We find that price does not activate social comparison in the way that brand status does. New participants scored lower when the product was labeled from a higher status producer, MIT (M = 10.67; SD = 0.49) than a lower status producer, Phoenix (M = 12.21, SD = 0.50; F(1, 113) = 4.839, p = 0.03). However, there was no difference in performance when the product was labeled cheaper (M = 11.13, SD = 0.55) versus more expensive (M = 11.75, SD = 0.44; F(1, 113) = 0.76, p > 0.35). Perceived high standards associated with the school mediated the relationship between the school and self-reported level of intimidation, which then mediated the relationship between perceived high standards and performance on the test.

A third study using a different product (cognitive training) explored the role of self-monitoring. High self-monitors are more likely to process brand information and attend to social image (MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991), suggesting that the social comparison processes elicited by brand status will be more strongly observed in these individuals. We find “reverse” placebo effects of high status brands, as participants perform worse in the MIT condition than the Phoenix condition and relative to an unbranded control (mean score = 50% vs. 56%, t(160) = -2.44, p < 0.02). Moreover, we find an interaction between brand and self-monitoring, particularly when answering the most difficult questions (F(1,206) = 4.68, p < 0.04).

A fourth study explored boundary conditions for the reverse placebo effect. This fourth study addresses 2 boundary issues: 1) clarify the role of reference groups in comparisons while holding branding constant, and, 2) identify when these comparisons lead to forward placebo effects. To that end, 135 MIT students were assigned to one of 3 conditions: (1) a high-performance reference group, (2) a low-performance reference group, or (3) a control condition. As in study 3, the training task again involved using a cognitive training product. Our results show that performance increased in the presence of high-performance others and decreased in the presence of low-performance others, relative to the control (one-way ANOVA F(2,131) = 3.21, p = .04).

Together, these studies demonstrate the reverse placebo phenomenon: participants in the lower-status brand condition performed better on cognitive tasks. Participants in the higher status condition used an identical product yet performed worse (despite reporting higher willingness to pay and perceived product efficacy). Our findings suggest that, when individuals use high-status brands of this ilk, reference group comparisons are made against high-performance others that can lower expectancies about one’s own performance.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Owning a product and choosing a product often go hand in hand. In some cases, ownership precedes choice; consumers first acquire redundant products, like when they receive two toasters as wedding gifts, and then they choose which of these products to retain. In other cases, the reverse happens, where consumers first choose which toaster to acquire and only then obtain the product. Can the timing of choice, before or after ownership, affect decision making? The vast research on the ownership-choice interplay has examined the endowment effect, studying how owning versus not owning a product increases preference for that same product (Thaler 1980). However, relatively little is known on how owning rather than not owning multiple products affects preference among these different products, namely how choice among owned products, or retention, differs from choice among unowned products, or acquisition.

The present research suggests that, compared to consumers who face acquisition, those who face retention care more about product features that are primarily applicable to describe people (and less so to describe products). We refer to this class of attributes, which includes hedonic and pragmatic features (e.g., beautiful, resilient) as well as variety of brand personalities (e.g., outdoorsy), as person-related features. By contrast, consumers facing retention may care less about features that are primarily applicable to describe products (and less so to describe people), namely product-related features. This range of attributes includes other hedonic and practical features (e.g., aesthetic, portable) as well as a distinct set of brand personalities (e.g., fragile).

Why would consumers who face retention rather than acquisition care more or give more decision weight to person-related features? Research on cognitive implications of ownership suggests that people associate owned (but not unowned) objects with their self-concept and even classify owned products as being part of in the category “self” (Weiss and Johar 2013). The present research suggests that consumers who own a product, and thus include it in the category “self,” may experience greater ease of processing information about the product’s person-related features. This is because a category guides how people disambiguate items, for example, by increasing people’s ease of processing information about features that are more strongly associated to that category (Barsalou 1982). Accordingly, when people choose among products they classify in the category “self,” they should process more easily person-related features, which are highly associated with the category “self.” Consequently, because easy-to-process features carry more weight in choice (Herr, Kardes, and Kim 1991), consumers who choose among products they own (and thus classify in the category “self”), namely in retention rather than in acquisition, may give person-related features more weight.

Four studies demonstrated that product owners (vs. non-owners) more easily retrieve, afford greater weight to, and prefer products that are better on person-related features. In Study 1, participants had to find words in a word-puzzle, comprised of person-related and product-related features (as verified by a pretest) under time pressure. Consistent with the idea that people process more easily person-related features for owned (vs. unowned) products, when the puzzle theme was “words that can describe products you own” (vs. do not own), participants found more person-related features.

In Study 2, participants saw a series of five product categories, and were asked to allocate 30 points, representing decision weights, among four attributes: two person-related and two product-related features. Half of the participants did so for a choice which of two owned products to retain, and the other half, for a choice which of two unowned products to acquire. Next, to examine whether the perception of an attribute as a person-related or a product-related feature drive the results, participants rated to what extent the features apply to people and to products. The results confirmed that participants gave greater weight to person-related (vs. product-related) for product retention (vs. acquisition) decisions, especially when they perceived the person-related features as more applicable to people than to products.

In Study 3, participants received a series of three choices, each in a different product category, and each poses a tradeoff between a person-related and a product-related feature. The decisions were either in a product retention or acquisition choices. Consistent with predictions, participants were more likely to retain the product that was higher on a person-related (e.g., intuitiveness) feature, but more likely to acquire the product higher on product-related feature (e.g., durability).

Study 4 replicated one of Study 4’s results, showing that when a choice between watches required the tradeoff between beauty (person-related) and precision (product-related), consumers preferred to acquire the more precise watch, but to retain the more beautiful one. However, when a choice between watches required the tradeoff between aesthetic appeal (product-related) and dependability (person-related)—conceptually equivalent features with differing applicability to people—the pattern reversed: Participants preferred to retain the dependable watch and acquire the aesthetically pleasing one. Moreover, this pattern was only observed for people who tend to see owned products as part of their self-concept, as measured by an independent scale.

This research shows that the product-related and person-related features can have different effects on consumer choices, offering new insight into how consumers respond to products and brands. For example, the results suggest that marketers’ decision whether to encourage feelings of ownership of their products prior to purchase needs to be considered alongside with the decision whether or not to highlight person-related features in positioning the product. In particular, when practices that encourage feelings of ownership, such as mass customization, test-drives or advertising that encourage consumers to imagine product use (Peck and Shu 2009), are at play, marketers may benefit from positioning a product along person-related features; the same may apply when marketers focus on retaining existing consumers (who already owns the product). By contrast, when marketers do not employ conventional marketing plans that are aimed at evoking a feeling of ownership, and when markets focus on acquiring new consumers, marketers are likely to benefit from positioning their product along product-related features.

REFERENCES


A Cross-Cultural Study of Price Search Decisions
Suppakorn Pattaratanakun, University of Cambridge, UK
Vincent Mak, University of Cambridge, UK

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Search is an important domain in consumer behavior, and yet cross-cultural differences in search decisions remain a largely unexplored topic. The present study focuses on the following research question: how might cultural background interact with search cost to affect people’s price search behavior, and why? Existing literature provides some relevant clue. A predominant observation in consumer search experiments is that people often do not search sufficiently relative to optimal strategies that maximize expected payoffs, and, in some instances, search approximately optimally. However, Zwick et al. (2003) found a contravening exception of over-searching behavior (only) in their high search cost condition. It has never been completely clarified how such difference from previous results could have occurred. But notably, Zwick et al.’s experiments were conducted with Asian (Hong Kong) subjects, while previous search experiments were largely conducted with subjects from Western cultural backgrounds. Meanwhile, Ackerman and Tellis (2001) found in their field study that Chinese took more time to shop than Americans, a result that corroborates the possibility that Easterners search more than Westerners in some cases. Hence cross-cultural differences may be a key to resolving the differences between Zwick et al. and previous findings – although any theorizing must explain why that happened only when search costs were sufficiently high.

This paper builds on the above observation by theorizing that Eastern subjects, with their higher sensitivity to sunk costs and higher susceptibility to escalation of commitment, would search more than optimally when search costs are high and sunk costs effects have high impact by implication; however, when search costs are low, we theorize that Easterners’ and Westerners’ search behaviors would not differ significantly. Previous studies have noted that Easterners tend to be more susceptible to sunk costs than Westerners. This is because (see Keil et al. 2000; also cf. Hofstede 1980) the lower individualism (ID) and higher power distance (PD) in Eastern societies cause Easterners to be more reluctant than Westerners to appear weak or lose face by admitting errors in public, a tendency that can carry over as a reluctance to lose face to the decision maker’s self-image. The implication is that, as sunk costs accumulate, Eastern decision makers would become less compromising with the level of task performance than Westerners. Data from two experiments support all hypotheses derived from our theorizing, and also provide process evidence.

Our study involved two controlled laboratory experiments. In a typical task, subjects sequentially obtained price quotes in tokens (experimental currency). If a subject decided to stop after obtaining the $i$-th price quote, she earned a payoff of 700 tokens minus the lowest among the $i$ price quotes obtained. After obtaining the first price quote, a subject incurred a search cost every time she sought an additional quote. Subjects were informed that price quotes were normally distributed with a mean of 430 tokens and standard deviation of 50 tokens. In both experiments, the same search task was given to subjects from different cultural groups respectively from an Eastern (Thailand) and a Western (United Kingdom) society. The two societies differ in the key dimensions that, as we theorize, drive differences in sensitivity to sunk costs (ID and PD indices of Thailand = 20 and 64 while those of the UK = 89 and 35, according to Hofstede Center 2005). Experiment 1 has a 2 (Eastern vs Western) X 2 (search cost = 5 vs 15 tokens per search) between subject design. Experiment 2 has a 2 (Eastern vs Western) X 2 (salient vs non-salient sunk cost) between subject design where search cost increased with the number of searches. Upon obtaining the $i$-th price quote, an additional price quote could be obtained at a cost of 5i tokens. The salience (non-salience) of sunk cost was manipulated by including (excluding) the notion of sunk cost on the decision and summary screens and in the experiment instructions.

The experiments included 264 student subjects from two major universities in Thailand and the United Kingdom; both were top-ranked universities in their countries with comparable academic aptitude levels among students with respect to country averages. Demographic data suggest similarity in economic status between groups. Every subject was required to perform 40 identical search tasks out of which three were selected at random for payment. The conversion rates for payment were adjusted with relevant GDP per capita to control for perceived incentives across groups.

The experimental data exhibit significant influence of culture groups on search decisions. In the low search cost condition of Experiment 1, subject decisions did not differ significantly across culture groups: both culture groups under-searched relative to the expected payoff-maximizing optimal strategy. By contrast, in the high search cost condition in the same experiment, Eastern subjects over-searched while Western subjects searched optimally. In Experiment 2, Eastern subjects over-searched as they did not seem to be more willing to accept higher prices as the number of searches (and thus search costs) increased; meanwhile, Western subjects’ decisions were close to optimal.

Further analysis suggests that our results were driven by Easterners being more sensitive to sunk costs and thus more susceptible to escalation of commitment than Westerners, a notion that corroborates with previous literature. This difference did not create significant effects when search costs were low, as in the low search cost condition in Experiment 1. However, it caused significant over-searching among Eastern subjects in the same experiment’s high search cost condition, and also when search costs increased steadily in Experiment 2.

The findings that Eastern subjects could over-search in our experimental conditions present a rare, but significant, exception to previous experimental findings. More generally, our results exemplify the perils of generalizing conclusions from behavioral research in marketing as well as judgment and decision-making — which have been conducted largely in the West — across cultures. Although comparing the behavior of subjects from different culture groups with similar demographic profiles is appropriate for our research objectives, our argument could receive stronger support by priming culture-related inclinations through experimental manipulations (e.g., Hong et al. 2000), a direction which we are currently pursuing.

REFERENCES


Gratitude is generally made known through conduct; it is an emotion with a social aspect that is incomplete without inclusion of an act of acknowledgement (Ceaser 2011). This acknowledgement is referred to as an expression of gratitude (EoG). Researchers have investigated the effects of EoGs in interpersonal contexts and have identified a variety of pro-social behaviors affected by EoGs (e.g. McGovern, Dittrand, and Taylor 1975). We extend this research to determine whether EoGs impact consumers’ pro-organizational responses, including satisfaction with the employee, the organization, and loyalty intentions.

**Hypothesis 1:** An EoG from an organizational representative will increase consumer satisfaction with the representative and the organization, as well as loyalty.

According to attribution theory (Folkes 1984), consumers’ attitudes and behaviors are influenced by rationally-derived causal inferences. We believe that consumers respond more positively to EoGs upon completing such an attribution. Consumers similarly generate attributions regarding the causes of low-quality service (e.g. Bitner 1990). We anticipate that low-quality attributions will overshadow those associated with an expression of gratitude.

**Hypothesis 2:** Service quality will moderate the pro-organizational effects of an EoG such that these effects will be stronger following high-quality service than low-quality service.

Finally, we propose that the extent to which expectations are disconfirmed (e.g. Cardozo 1965, Churchill and Surprenant 1982, Oliver 1980, Oliver and DeSarbo 1988, Swan 1983, Tse and Wilton 1988), will underlie this effect.

**Hypothesis 3:** Disconfirmed expectations mediate the effects of an EoG on pro-organizational consumer responses.

We test these hypotheses across four studies.

**Study 1: Do Expressions of Gratitude Affect Pro-Organizational Consumer Attitudes?**

Study 1 examines whether an expression of gratitude positively impacts consumer attitudes. A two-condition (EoG present vs. absent) experiment was conducted using a scenario paradigm outlining a pleasant restaurant experience. Participants were 72 undergraduate students. Dependent measures for all studies were satisfaction with the employee (SatEmp), satisfaction with the organization (SatOrg), and behavioral intentions (Loyalty).

ANOVA analyses showed that participants in the EoG condition reported significantly more positive SatEmp (measured on a 7-point scale) than participants in the no EoG condition ($M_{Eog}=6.00$, $M_{NoEog}=5.29$, $F(1,70)=5.71$, $p<.05$). Follow-up mediation analysis using bootstrapping (Preacher and Hayes 2004) revealed a significant indirect effect of EoG on SatEmp ($\beta=.53$, 95% CI = (0.08, 0.96)) and a significant indirect effect of EoG on Loyalty, mediated by SatEmp ($\beta=.37$, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.73]).

**Study 2: Do Expressions of Gratitude Differ from Expressions of Politeness?**

To demonstrate that an EoG is distinct from general positive affect or politeness, we ran a three-condition (Message: EoG, “have a nice day” (HAND), control) experiment. The EoG was manipulated verbally and contrasted with the phrase “Have a nice day”. Participants were 230 undergraduate students.

ANOVA analysis showed a significant main effect of message on SatEmp. Planned contrast analyses showed that SatEmp was significantly greater for the EoG condition as opposed to the HAND condition ($M_{Eog}=5.22$, $M_{HAND}=4.56$, $F(1,228)=11.11$, $p<.01$). Notably, the HAND condition was not significantly different from the control ($F(1,228)=2.36$, $p>.10$). A similar pattern of results was observed for each of the other dependent variables.

**Study 3: Do Expressions of Gratitude Affect Attitudes Across Levels of Service Quality?**

Study 3 was a 3 (EoG vs. Explicit No EoG vs. Not Mentioned) x 2 (Service Quality: High vs. Low) between-subjects design. To increase generalizability, a hair salon context was employed. In a slight change from the first two studies, we included a condition that explicitly stated that no EoG had been received. This change was made because participants in the absent (study 1) and control (study 2) conditions had been scoring closer to ‘definitely yes’ than ‘definitely no’ on the “were you thanked” manipulation check. Participants were 335 undergraduate student participants. Dependent measures were consistent with previous studies, though measured on a 9-point scale.

ANOVA analyses demonstrated similar effects across all three dependent variables. Importantly, we observed the expected interaction between EoG and service quality ($F(2, 329)=9.62$, $p<.01$). Planned contrast analyses revealed that this interaction was significant between the EoG and Explicit No conditions ($M_{EogHigh} = 8.02$, $M_{EogLow} = 6.31$, $M_{ExpNoHigh} = 6.31$, $M_{ExpNoLow} = 2.07$, $F(1,329)=18.86$, $p<.01$). A marginally significant interaction was observed between the EoG and Not Mentioned conditions ($F(1,329)=2.87$, $p>.10$). A similar pattern of results was seen for SatOrg as well as Loyalty.

**Study 4: Through what Mechanism does an Expression of Gratitude Operate?**

Study 4 took a 3 (EoG: Written vs Verbal vs Explicit No) x 2 (Service Quality: High vs. Low) between-subjects design and measured disconfirmed expectations. Participants were 313 adults.

Again, we observed the hypothesized interaction effect between service quality and EoG ($F(2, 307)=8.74$, $p<.01$). As in study 3, the two EoG conditions demonstrated a significant increase in SatEmp when service quality rose from low ($M_{Written}=2.51$, $M_{Verbal}=2.15$, $M_{NoEog}=1.74$) to high ($M_{Written}=6.32$, $M_{Verbal}=6.70$, $M_{NoEog}=4.82$). This pattern of results was similarly observed for SatOrg and Loyalty.

We compared the effects of an EoG versus an Explicit No EoG. Using bootstrapping methods (Preacher and Hayes 2004), we found that the indirect effect of an EoG on SatEmp through disconfirmed
expectations was significant when service quality was high (β = 0.42, 95% CI = {.23, .65}) but not low (β = 0.09, 95% CI = {.002, .17}). This supports the hypothesized model wherein service quality significantly moderates the extent to which an EoG disconfirms expectations, and disconfirmed expectations predict level of SatEmp.

General Discussion

Across four studies, using multiple contexts and participant demographics, we demonstrate that expressions of gratitude promote pro-organizational attitudes, supporting H1. Further, we identify an important boundary condition to these effects. A low service quality experience overwhelms the presence or absence of an expression of gratitude. Finally, we demonstrate that this effect occurs through an attribution process whereby the extent to which consumers’ prior expectations are disconfirmed drives attitude change.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The mental rigidity of ideological conservatives, known as the rigidity-of-the-right, is well-documented. In their thorough review, Jost et al. (2003, 352) conclude that “by far the most convincing research on left-right differences pertains to epistemic motives associated with mental rigidity and closed-mindedness.” Consequently, conservatives tend not to seek out or even consider the opinions of others when making judgments and decisions, and are especially resistant to the views of liberals.

With this research, we offer a more nuanced understanding of conservative ideological responses, predicting that conservatives may update their decisions toward the perceived norms of a common audience to manage their impressions with the in-group. Though perhaps seemingly in conflict with the “rigidity of the right,” conservatives emphasize the group and are more strongly motivated to adhere to social norms and conventions than are liberals (Jost et al. 2003). Conservatives and liberals have distinct moral foundations, with conservatives placing a greater value on binding or group-focused moral foundations, which include group loyalty and duty (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Also, conservatives may be more agreeable than liberals. Hirsh et al. (2010) distinguish between two subtraits of agreeableness: compassion and politeness. While compassion reflects empathy and interpersonal concern and thus is associated with liberals, politeness is more closely linked to norm compliance and traditionalism and reflective of conservative beliefs (Hirsch et al. 2010). Thus, conservatives are motivated by politeness and complying with social norms, which are likely to be salient in public situations.

Consequently, conservatives in the public eye may be motivated to conform even to in-group members subscribing to a different ideology, to the extent that the decision regards social norms. Whether this occurs, though, may depend on which social identity is salient at the time of a decision. At any point in time, situational constraints can make salient a given social identity used to represent the self (self-categorization theory; Turner et al. 1987). For instance, although students from the same university can define themselves in terms of liberal—conservative social identities, situational constraints can lead the same individuals to ignore these identities and to focus instead on the shared college identity for self-definition. Contextual activation of this common in-group identity heightens the need to maintain in-group cohesiveness and harmonious relations with other group members. Here, we expect that conservatives will be particularly motivated to comply with the norms and stereotypes of the salient in-group, even when this in-group consists of individuals who are believed to hold liberal views.

A charitable giving context is well-suited for this research. People hold stereotypes of liberals (e.g., Democrats) as generous and of conservatives (e.g. Republicans) as somewhat heartless toward the needy. The stereotype of a bleeding heart liberal is particularly salient among conservatives (labeled the “Limbaugh Effect”; Farwell and Weiner 2000) and the lack of generosity by conservatives (vs. liberals) is particularly prevalent in the case of needy people judged to be responsible for their plight (Reyna et al. 2005). In this context, conservatives faced with charitable decisions that would be discussed with fellow college students holding liberal views should be motivated to seek approval from the audience (Torelli 2006), and hence factor into their decisions the more generous expectation of their fellow students, thus boosting their own generosity to fit with a liberal audience’s norms for charitable giving. When a common social identity (e.g., fellow college students) is not salient, though, the effect of a liberal audience on increasing conservatives’ generosity will be attenuated.

In three studies, we show that conservatives (liberals) who anticipate accountability to individuals who hold the opposing political ideology exhibit greater generosity (no change) in their charitable decisions, compared with those who anticipate interacting with individuals holding the same political ideology or those making charitable decisions in private, and that this effect is mediated by the desire to seek approval from the audience.

In a preliminary study, we tested whether conservatives (liberals) who anticipate accountability to individuals who hold the opposing political ideology exhibit greater generosity (no change) in their real donation decisions, compared to those making charitable decisions in private. Students who self-identified as either liberals or conservatives were assigned to make a charitable decision either under accountability to someone from the opposing political ideology (where shared social identity was salient) or in private. ANOVA results show that, as expected, conservatives were more generous when accountable to a liberal than when in private, with no difference in generosity among liberals in the two conditions. Further, within the private decision condition liberals were more generous than conservatives, while in the public accountability condition there was no difference between conservatives and liberals.

In study 1, we tested for whether conservatives (liberals) exhibit greater generosity (no change) when accountable to liberals versus when accountable to other conservatives (liberals) or making decisions in private in an established paradigm (Farwell and Weiner 2000), and also test for the mediating role of desire to seek audience approval (White and Peloza 2009). As expected, regression results revealed that participants self-defined as conservatives were more generous when anticipating accountability to a liberal audience than to a conservative audience or in the private condition. There were no differences in generosity among self-defined liberals in the different conditions. Further, mediation analyses confirmed that conservatives’ decisions were driven by desire to seek approval from the audience. In study 2, we provided further evidence of mediation and, importantly, also showed that the effects dissipate when a common identity is not salient.

A rich literature suggests that conservatives are firmly rooted in their beliefs and are highly unlikely to alter their views in the face of public accountability, particularly to a liberal audience. We show that conservatives can be motivated to align their donation decisions with the generosity of liberals, and hence are likely to increase their generosity when anticipating accountability to an audience of liberals with whom they share a salient common identity. Implications for ideology and charitable giving literatures are discussed.

REFERENCES

## Table 1: Summary of Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Main Objective</th>
<th>Results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary</td>
<td>Test for whether conservatives (liberals) who anticipate accountability to</td>
<td>• Own ideology x accountability interaction ($F(1, 101) = 5.27, p &lt; .05$).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>individuals who hold the opposing political ideology will exhibit greater</td>
<td>• Conservatives more generous when accountable to a liberal than when in private ($M = $18.58 and $13.27$ respectively; $F(1, 101) = 4.08, p &lt; .05$), with no difference in generosity among liberals ($M = $20.11 and $17.01$ respectively; $F(1, 101) = 1.44, p &gt; .2$).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>Test for whether conservatives (liberals) exhibit greater generosity (no change)</td>
<td>• Liberals more generous than conservatives ($F(1, 101) = 6.57, p &lt; .01$) within the private decision condition, with no difference between conservatives and liberals in the public accountability condition ($F(1, 101) = .39, p &gt; .5$).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>Test for whether effects dissipate when common identity is not salient, and</td>
<td>• Political ideology X conservative dummy interaction ($b = -.56, S.E. = .26, t(111) = 2.13, p &lt; .05$) and political ideology X private dummy interaction ($b = -.50, S.E. = .24, t(111) = 2.06, p &lt; .05$).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>further test for mediation.</td>
<td>• Conservatives more generous when anticipating accountability to a liberal vs. conservative audience ($M = 3.77$ and $2.75$ respectively, $t(111) = 1.66, p &lt; .05$, one-sided, or in the private condition ($M = 2.56$, $t(112) = 2.26, p &lt; .05$).</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• No differences in generosity among self-defined liberals across conditions ($M_{liberal,,audience} = 3.01$, $M_{conservative,,audience} = 3.80$ and $M_{private} = 3.37$, all $p &gt; .1$).</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Full mediation of desire to seek approval from the audience.</td>
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Social Comparison to Advertising Depictions: Exploring Advertising Practitioners’ Perspectives
Catherine A. Coleman, Texas Christian University, USA
Linda Tuncay Zayer, Loyola University Chicago, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Social comparison, proposed nearly 60 years ago by Festinger (1954) is defined as an evaluative process in which an individual compares himself or herself on some dimension to a target of comparison (Kruglanski and Mayselless 1990). This theory has demonstrated relevance for consumer research including explaining consumers’ reactions to advertising messages (e.g., Richins 1991). However, little work examines how advertising practitioners, as creators of such images, perceive the social comparison process and its outcomes among consumers. Through a mixed method qualitative approach, this research examines how advertising practitioners conceptualize the social comparison process among consumers.

Past studies show that individuals actively compare themselves and may be motivated not only by self-evaluation, but also by a sense of self-improvement or self-enhancement when making comparisons (Wood 1989). Research also addresses the consequences of social comparison. Much scholarly discussion in psychology centers on assimilation and contrast effects (e.g., Thornton and Moore 1993; Brewer and Weber 1994; Lockwood and Kunda 1997; Muzzweiler 2001) and details a number of moderating variables. Other scholars (e.g., Richins 1991) explain that individuals may shift their standards and/or lower their self-perceptions of performance. Research in this stream mostly examines comparisons to attractive or thin models by women and is mixed with regard to its negative effects, although some scholars argue these comparisons may lead to feelings of dissatisfaction (e.g., Hogg, Bruce and Hough 1999; Martin & Kennedy 1993, 1994; Harper & Tiggemann 2008; Hargreaves & Tiggemann 2002; Lavine, Sweeney and Wagner 1999).

Gulas and McKeage (2000) and Zayer and Otnes (2012) have taken a first step in extending the research on comparison to advertising images to examinations of men and into domains other than physical attractiveness. Gulas and McKeage (2000) find idealized images of financial success have a negative effect on men’s self-evaluations, while Zayer and Otnes (2012) demonstrate that men exhibit a variety of responses to comparisons of masculinity in ads, including feelings of vulnerability and anxiety as well as more motivational and aspirational outcomes.

To investigate how advertising practitioners perceive consumers’ comparisons to advertising representations, the researchers used a qualitative approach across two waves of data collection. In the first round, field observations, a focus group and unstructured and semi-structured interviews with advertising practitioners were conducted in a large U.S. advertising agency. Twenty participants were asked “grand tour” questions (McCracken 1988), and questions focused on their perceptions of how advertising impacts consumers, probing into social comparison processes. In the second round of data collection, the researchers conducted ten semi-structured depth interviews with advertising professionals working at various agencies across the U.S. in cities such as Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Dallas. After transcription, the researchers engaged in data analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1998) to identify salient themes in a similar manner as Drumwright and Murphy’s (2004) analysis of interview data from advertising practitioners.

The findings indicate informants’ concerns about consumers’ feelings is largely client-driven and focused on whether or not the target audience in particular will have a good reaction as defined by how it benefits the client—whether the target audience will “like it and want to buy it” (Erin, female). Many informants did not express a concern about how advertising images may impact consumers’ self-perceptions. Next, findings demonstrate practitioners view the social comparison process and its outcomes differently based on whether the intended audience is male or female. With few exceptions, informants demonstrate a belief that women are more prone to engage in social comparison. Several informants associate the tendency to compare with perceived gendered traits, such as how observant women are. Further, women are seen as more susceptible to possible negative effects of social comparison, particularly with regard to comparisons of beauty.

In contrast, men are seen as largely immune from the negative impact of social comparison to advertising images. One informant suggests that men engage in social comparison internally and do not verbalize it, but clearly indicates women are more prone to engage in the process (Casey, male). Moreover, unlike women’s perceived vulnerability to negative effects of social comparison, the effects of men’s comparisons—among informants who expressed a belief that men do engage in the process—predominantly are seen as positive and aspirational. A few practitioners did express that both men and women engage in social comparison and that these comparisons may hold negative consequences for consumers; however, they were in the minority.

Despite research demonstrating that both men and women actively engage in social comparison to advertising representations, most informants focused on women. When asked separately about whether they believed men and women compare themselves to models in ads, not only were their responses about women’s social comparison longer in duration, they were more detailed in content. However, despite research demonstrating that men also engage in social comparison, few respondents actively addressed these possibilities. Importantly, practitioners revealed that their gendered perceptions do influence the types of advertising messages they develop and market. Future research should examine the specific ways these perceptions impact the creative and strategic development of ads, and thus is a limitation of the current research.

In sum, this research is important for several reasons. By highlighting the contrast between what practitioners believe are different social comparison processes between men and women and what research has demonstrated as a salient process for both men and women (and sometimes with negative outcomes), scholars may be able to bring a greater understanding of the process to the advertising community. Advertisers could incorporate this understanding into their decision processes. Further, advertisers should recognize the potential that some messages may detrimentally affect men and that women are not always vulnerable and detrimentally affected. Finally, understanding how practitioners view the social comparison process holds important consumer welfare implications.

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Effects of Construal Level on Omission Detection and Multiattribute Evaluation
Hélène Deval, Dalhousie University, Canada  
Bruce E. Pfeiffer, University of New Hampshire, USA  
Frank R. Kardes, University of Cincinnati, USA  
Douglas R. Ewing, Bowling Green State University, USA  
Xiaoqi Han, University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA  
Maria L Cronley, Miami University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers often rely on limited information that is readily available while neglecting missing information. Research has demonstrated that insensitivity to missing information results in inappropriately extreme judgments and detecting omissions is surprisingly difficult (Sanbonmatsu et al., 1991; 1992; 1997). As with all judgment biases, it is important to have an understanding about situational differences that may differentially impact decision making. Although people frequently neglect omissions, a growing body of evidence has shown that sensitivity to omissions can be heightened under certain conditions (Kardes et al., 2006; Sanbonmatsu et al., 1991, 1992, 1997, 2003).

A variable that should be keenly important in omission detection is construal level. Research has indicated that people construe situations along a continuum from abstract to concrete and that this impacts the decision process (Trope & Liberman, 2000, 2003, 2010; Liberman & Trope 2008). Construal level theory would suggest that omission detection may depend on the level to which a judgment is construed and possibly even whether the missing attribute information is related to primary or secondary features. Lower-level construals result in more detailed or local processing while higher-level construals result in more holistic or global processing (Förster, 2009; Förster et al., 2009; Liberman & Förster, 2009). Because omission detection requires effortful, analytic processing (Sanbonmatsu et al., 1991), omission detection should be more likely in near-future evaluations than in distant-future evaluations.

Although it has not been empirically tested, construal level theory also implies that people may be sensitive to different types of omissions. People weigh primary or central features more heavily in distant-future evaluations and secondary or peripheral features more heavily in near-future evaluations (Trope & Liberman, 2000). As a result, there may be greater sensitivity to missing information about primary features in distant-future evaluations and secondary features in near-future evaluations. The omission neglect literature makes no such distinction regarding the level of construal or the type of missing features. The goal of this paper is to investigate these important situational differences.

Study 1 tested the effects of construal level on omission detection using multiple measures of sensitivity to omissions. Construal level was manipulated using temporal distance. Participants were asked to imagine that they were purchasing a product (cell phone) either “tomorrow” (near-future condition) or “in about three or four months” (distant-future condition) and were provided with a few pieces of information about the product. Participants in the near-future condition reported greater attention to detail than participants in the distant-future condition, supporting a construal level to process style relationship. Further, participants in the near-future condition reported a greater need for additional information, a greater likelihood that information was missing from the product description, and generated significantly more additional attributes than participants in the distant-future condition. Collectively, these results indicate that the level of construal has an impact on the sensitivity to missing information and the likelihood of omission detection.

Study 2 investigated the impact of construal level on evaluative extremity. Participants were asked to imagine that they would be purchasing a HDTV either “tomorrow” or “in about six months” and were provided with a few pieces of information about the product. People in the near-future condition reported more moderate evaluations of the product than people in the distant-future condition, indicating that they detected omissions and adjusted their evaluation accordingly.

Study 3 assessed the impact of construal level on evaluative extremity while investigating any differential effects of missing primary and secondary features. Participants were asked to imagine that they were in the market for a basic cell phone and were provided with a few pieces of information about the phone. In the description, either a primary feature (network information) or a secondary feature (camera quality) was used as the omitted attribute. A pretest confirmed that these were perceived as either primary or secondary features. A how vs. why goal priming (Liberman et al., 2007) manipulation was used in this study to generalize our results beyond the temporal manipulation. The how vs. why goal manipulation achieved the same effect on omission detection as the temporal distance manipulation used in the previous studies. Focusing on how (vs. why) a behavior is performed results in lower-level construals, greater sensitivity to omissions, and more moderate evaluations (F(1,63)=6.29, p<.05). We found no differential impact between primary and secondary omitted attributes.

Study 4 investigated a potential moderator to the effect of construal level on omission detection. The Behavioral Identification Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) measures individual differences in personal agency related to differing levels of behavioral abstractness. Since low-level agents interpret situations in more concrete terms, they should be more inherently sensitive to omissions. In contrast, high-level agents should have greater difficulty detecting omissions because they tend to focus on more abstract, high-level interpretations of behavior. Participants were asked to imagine that they would be purchasing a laptop computer either “next weekend” or “in about six months” and were provided with a few pieces of information about the computer. The results support the expected moderating effect of personal agency. Near-future evaluations were more moderate than distant-future evaluations, but only for high-level agents. Low-level agents provide more moderate evaluations regardless of temporal distance, indicating that they were more inherently sensitive to omissions.

This research contributes to the growing body of literature on omission neglect. People are more likely to spontaneously detect omissions when they are making temporally near versus distant evaluations, when they are in a concrete versus an abstract mind-set, and when they are inherently more likely to interpret actions in concrete versus abstract terms. Further, although prior findings suggest that people may have differential sensitivity to primary and secondary missing features at different levels of construal, we found no such difference. Our findings parsimoniously indicate that people are more sensitive to all types of missing information when construal levels are low, and that this sensitivity leads to more moderate and appropriate judgments.

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### Table 1: Studies 2 to 4
Overall Evaluation as a Function of Construal Level and Omission Cuing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Construal Agents</th>
<th>Low Construal Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Omission</td>
<td>Omission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Cued</td>
<td>Cued</td>
<td>Not Cued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>5.91*</td>
<td>4.50</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>4.77</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Study 4</td>
<td>High-level Agents</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mean different from all the other means included on the same line.

### REFERENCES


Why Do You Think They Do That? Consumer Elaboration in the Detection of Manipulative Intent and Its Consequences on Product Judgments
Robert Madrigal, University of Oregon, USA
Catherine Armstrong-Soule, University of Oregon, USA
Leslie Koppenhafer, University of Oregon, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumer awareness of deception is important in order to effectively cope with marketers’ strategic attempts to unfairly influence them. Yet, in spite of the widespread prevalence of marketplace deception, consumers are typically insensitive to situations where they are being manipulated. The current research attempts to answer the call for research in best practices for consumer education in detecting manipulative intent (Boush, Friestad, & Wright, 2009). Across three studies, each featuring a different deception tactic, we show that consumer elaboration of marketer motives enhances inferred manipulative intent (IMI), leading to less favorable product judgments. We argue that by elaborating on marketer motives using a specialized form of System 2 thinking, consumers will become more sensitive to marketplace deception.

IMI is a measure of consumer recognition that an attempt to persuade is inappropriate, unfair, or manipulative (Campbell, 1995). The assumption here is that the marketer intends to deliberately mislead. Other researchers have conducted studies exploring consumer education regarding marketplace deception (Bolton, Bloom, & Cohen, 2011; Sagarin, Ciadlini, Rice, & Serna, 2002). Unfortunately, in operationalizing a tactic, these studies have explicitly identified the behavior as unethical. In contrast, we refrain from telling respondents whether or not the use of a tactic is unethical. In our studies, respondents are merely educated about the tactic, but not about the ethics of its use. Respondents in the treatment conditions are asked to elaborate on the marketer’s motives for using the tactic, thus allowing them to draw their own conclusions about marketers’ manipulative intent.

In Study 1, we consider the use of conditional probabilities in marketing claims to convey differences (i.e., improvements, reductions). Framing a difference in relative (vs. absolute) terms exploits consumer innumeracy. It fails to provide meaningful insight into a claim unless baseline information is also presented. However, simply being educated on how relative risk frames are calculated may not be enough. We posit that it is only when consumers elaborate on marketer motives that such framing is inferred to be manipulative.

Respondents in study 1 (N = 141 undergraduate students) were educated and quizzed on how to calculate a relative risk reduction. Next they viewed a product claim that featured a relative risk reduction. Prior to seeing the claim, they were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which they were given: (1) no additional information; (2) baseline information used to calculate the relative reduction that was not included in the product claim; or (3) the same information as in (2), as well as additional instruction about the tactic. The latter group also elaborated on marketer motives for using the tactic. All respondents then completed an index summarizing product judgments (α = .87) and an IMI scale (Campbell, 1995; Cotte, Coulter, & Moore, 2005; α = .89). As hypothesized, IMI increased for those in who received additional instruction and elaborated on marketer motives (p < .01). In addition, IMI mediated the effect of additional instruction and elaboration on the product judgment index, with IMI being negatively related to the index. An alternative hypothesis considering consumer anger toward the tactic.

Figure 1: Study Models

STUDY 1

Contrast 1: (background information, additional instruction, and tactic elaboration) vs. (background information but no additional instruction or elaboration). Contrast 2: (background information but no additional instruction) vs. (Control).

STUDY 2

Tactic Manipulation
0 = control
1 = treatment

STUDY 3

Additional Information Manipulation
0 = control
1 = treatment

Disclosure Adequacy Manipulation
0 = adequate disclosure
1 = inadequate disclosure

Interaction
0 = all other conditions
1 = additional info + inadeq disclosure

Note: A language contrast (0 = native English speaker, 1 = non-native English speaker) construct (not shown) was related to each measured construct as a covariate and was allowed to covary with exogenous predictors.
was not supported. A graphical representation of the model is shown in Figure 1 and results are reported in Table 1.

Study 2 considers malevolent distraction, a tactic designed to obscure or camouflage important information featured during a commercial. The technique is especially prevalent in direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising where background imagery is typically varied at the same time information about the drug’s side effects is being presented. Approximately half the respondents in study 2 were informed about this camouflage tactic in pharmaceutical advertising and then asked to elaborate on why marketers employ it (treatment). The other half of the sample was not given this information (control). All participants (N = 123 MTurk workers) were initially shown a commercial for a drug intended to lessen the effects of depression. Those in the treatment condition were then taught about the tactic, shown how it applied in the ad, and asked to elaborate on why it is used. Those in the control condition were not given this information. The same measures used earlier were included (IMI, α = .90; index, α = .92). Consistent with the hypotheses, those in the treatment condition inferred greater manipulative intent. IMI also mediated the effect of the tactic manipulation, with higher levels of IMI negatively correlated with index scores. The hypothesized model is shown in Figure 1 and results are given in Table 1.

In Study 3, the tactic of omission neglect was considered. Specifically, a marketer’s failure to provide affirmative disclosure consistent with the “clear and conspicuous” (CCS) standard required by the FTC was the context used in the study. All participants (N = 102 MTurk workers) received information about the CCS requirement, shown examples and quizzed about what they learned. Those assigned to the treatment condition then received additional information about the necessity of disclosure statements in order for consumers to make an informed decision. They were also asked to elaborate on why marketers often fail to include adequate disclosures. Those in the control condition where told that the CCS also applies to other types of media and were asked to elaborate on why

Table 1: Summary of Results by Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Effect Type</th>
<th>Model Path</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Direct Eff</td>
<td>Contrast 1 → IMI</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.17,.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contrast 2 → IMI</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.43,.23</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contrast 1 → Anger</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.15,.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.44,.42</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMI → Index</td>
<td>-.49***</td>
<td>-.65,-.32</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMI → Anger</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.16,.10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediated Direct Eff</td>
<td>Contrast 1 → Index</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.11,.25</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contrast 2 → Index</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.16,.27</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Covariance</td>
<td>IMI ↔ Anger</td>
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<td>.85,1.50</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mediating Eff</td>
<td>Contrast 1 → IMI → Index</td>
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<td>-.36,-.08</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Contrast 2 → IMI → Index</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.11,.23</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contrast 1 → IMI → Anger</td>
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<td>-.07,.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contrast 2 → IMI → Anger</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.04,.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Direct Eff</td>
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<td>.59*</td>
<td>.18,1.06</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMI → Index</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>-.40,-.14</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMI → Risky Side Effects</td>
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<td>-.58,-.28</td>
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<td>-.74,.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Covariance</td>
<td>IMI ↔ Risky Side Effects</td>
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<td>.18,.68</td>
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<td>-.39,-.04</td>
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<td>-.61</td>
<td>-.20,.17</td>
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<td>Disclosure Adequacy (Adeq) Manip → IMI</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.21,.83</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction → IMI</td>
<td>1.00*</td>
<td>.13,1.80</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Language Contrast → IMI</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.51,.43</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>IMI → Index</td>
<td>-.52***</td>
<td>-.70,-.35</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Additional Instr Manip → Index</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.19,.55</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Disclosure Adeq Manip → Index</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.15,.69</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interaction → Index</td>
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<td>-.20,.15</td>
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<td>Language Contrast ↔ Interaction</td>
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<td>-.06,.02</td>
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<td>Mediating Eff</td>
<td>Interaction → IMI → Index</td>
<td>-.52*</td>
<td>-.105,-1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Hypothesized effects in bold. IMI = inferred manipulative intent; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
research on the topic is valuable. This factor was crossed with the adequacy of disclosure in a stimulus ad (adequate vs. inadequate). The results provided evidence of moderated mediation such that those in the treatment condition and who saw an inadequate disclosure had higher IMI and this was negatively related to the product judgment index. As before, the model is presented in Figure 1 and results are reported in Table 1.

In sum, we find that simply educating consumers about deceptive tactics may not be enough to elicit IMI, a necessary precursor to self-protection actions. Elaborating on marketer motives for using a given tactic is required for consumers to discern manipulative intent. It is unlikely that a consumer will engage System 2 every time they consider a marketing claim. However, thinking about the marketer’s motives is particularly important in those situations where consumer risk is highest. In such cases, engaging System 2 thinking is likely to be well worth the effort.

REFERENCES
This Is Important (But Don’t Tell Me That): The Backfire Effect of Emphasizing Goal Importance

Scott W. Davis, Texas A&M University, USA
Kelly Haws, Vanderbilt University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom and prior research suggest that when goals are more important, people will strive harder to reach them and increase self-control efforts (Trope and Fishbach 2000). However, might there be conditions under which emphasizing the importance of a goal may instead backfire, making people more likely to fail to reach the goal? We examine this possibility in the present research by examining the way in which individuals of varying levels of self-control respond differently based on the perceived importance of a goal.

Prior studies indicate that consumers allocate more self-regulatory resources to achieving subjectively important goals (Carver, 2004; Köpetz et al. 2011). Even when self-control resources are depleted, individuals have been shown to exert more self-control toward important goals than unimportant ones (Agrawal and Wan 2009). Our findings support these assertions for individuals with high self-control who tend to experience less desire toward temptations that conflict with important goals and better regulate behaviors as a result. Conversely, emphasizing goal importance may backfire for individuals with chronically low self-control. We examine the key interaction between goal importance and self-control across three studies and provide initial evidence of the underlying process.

In study 1, participants completed a scenario that presented the opportunity to allocate money to a 401(k) retirement plan after starting a new job. Participants chose to contribute up to $16,500. After several unrelated tasks, we measured general self-control using a short-form Tangney et al. (SC; 2004) scale. Then, we assessed the importance of one’s control over their spending on a 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important) scale.

To test our hypothesis, we ran a regression using the SC index, importance ratings, and their interaction as predictors of 401(k) contribution. The interaction between SC and goal importance was significant (b = 1116.55, t = 2.69, p = .008). To better understand the interaction, we conducted a spotlight analysis (Aiken and West 1991) at 1 standard deviation above (i.e., high self-control) and below (i.e., low self-control) the SC mean. Those with high self-control contribute significantly more to the 401(k) plan (b = 1579.68, t = 2.63, p = .009) when they rate the importance of control over spending highly versus when importance is lower. Those low in self-control contribute less to 401(k) when controlled spending is important, but not significantly.

Study 2 followed a 2 (financial goal importance: high vs. low) × continuous self-control design. We manipulated importance of goals in the personal finance domain by asking participants to rank a set of goals from most (1) to least (5) important. “Managing one’s finances carefully” was included in both the low and high importance conditions. The low importance condition diminished the importance of the finance domain by presenting it alongside items that pretrained as highly important goals. The high importance condition grouped the financial goal with less important goals. Participants read a projective purchase scenario involving a self-control purchase decision (adapted from Dholakia et al. 2006 and Haws et al. 2012). Specifically, participants were asked to indicate the probability that they would purchase a jacket that would involve spending beyond one’s current means. Self-control was assessed using the Tangney et al. SC scale (2004).

We ran an ANCOVA analysis on the likelihood to purchase the jacket, using the SC index, the importance condition, and the interaction of these two variables as predictors. The predicted interaction between SC and the importance condition was significant (b = -10.57, t = -2.16, p = .032). A significant relationship between the SC × importance interaction and likelihood to purchase was found for those low in self-control (b = 14.12, t = 2.16, p = .033). These low self-control individuals were more likely to purchase the jacket when the finance goal was important. A spotlight on high self-control at 1 SD above the SC mean was not significant (b = -6.2115, t = -0.948, NS). These findings provide further support for our hypothesis.

In study 3, we adapted the design of study 2 and tested experienced desire as a potential mediator. Desire was measured by asking participants how much they would want to purchase the jacket if they were Ms. A following the purchasing scenario. We again used the likelihood to purchase the attractive jacket as our dependent variable and measured SC (Tangney et al. 2004). As in our results from study 2, we found a significant interaction between the SC and the domain importance condition (b = -16.79, t = -2.87, p = .005) for the likelihood of purchasing the jacket. The likelihood for people with high self-control to purchase the jacket drops consistently as self-control increases. At 1 SD above the mean for SC, high self-controllers are significantly less likely to purchase the jacket (b = -26.88, t = -2.93, p = .004).

The indirect effect of the interaction between importance × SC on likelihood to purchase through desire is entirely below zero for a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap interval (-16.19, -1.59). This indirect effect is driven by reduced desire among those high in self-control when the goal is important (-24.83, -2.62). Increasing goal importance is mediated by desire experienced by people with high self-control, but the emphasis on importance of sound financial management fails to reduce desire toward temptation for those lower in self-control, as predicted.

Our findings advance the understanding of consumer goal-striving behavior. Trait self-control influences whether assigning high importance to a self-regulatory domain motivates or deters goal-congruent choices. When a person struggles with a self-control goal, although it may seem intuitive to emphasize the importance of the goal, our research suggests that this can instead backfire for those low in self-control. Rather, people with low self-control may benefit from downplaying the importance of the goal domain. In marketing contexts, messages are often designed to increase the relative importance of long-term goals over short-term temptations. Since messages are often targeted to those who struggle to exert self-control when faced with conflicts, it is critical to consider the potential backfire effect when highlighting goal importance.

REFERENCES


### Table 1: Summary of Empirical Results

**Panel A: Model Results (F-Values)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Importance (I)</th>
<th>Self-control (SC)</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>I X SC</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Study 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>401(k) Contribution Amount ($)</td>
<td>5.87*</td>
<td>7.29**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Income Saved (%)</td>
<td>3.26*</td>
<td>2.83*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacket Purchase Likelihood (%)</td>
<td>5.23*</td>
<td>10.48**</td>
<td>5.60*</td>
<td>4.66**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacket Purchase Likelihood (%)</td>
<td>6.34*</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>8.30**</td>
<td>8.23**</td>
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</table>

**Panel B: Unstandardized Betas For The Effect of Importance on Dependent Variables at Alternate Levels of Self-Control**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Very Low (10th)</th>
<th>Low (25th)</th>
<th>Moderate (50th)</th>
<th>High (75th)</th>
<th>Very High (90th)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Study 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401(k) Contribution Amount ($)</td>
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<td>349.32</td>
<td>1294.09*</td>
<td>1809.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Income Saved (%)</td>
<td>-3.90</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>6.62*</td>
<td>8.95*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacket Purchase Likelihood (%)</td>
<td>17.40*</td>
<td>11.70*</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>-2.93</td>
<td>-9.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacket Purchase Likelihood (%)</td>
<td>15.34*</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>-9.21</td>
<td>-23.42**</td>
<td>-33.75**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel C: Mediation Analysis in Study 3 — Indirect Effect of Importance (I) on Jacket Purchase Likelihood (Y) Through Desire (M) at Alternate Levels of Self-Control**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Very Low (10th)</th>
<th>Low (25th)</th>
<th>Moderate (50th)</th>
<th>High (75th)</th>
<th>Very High (90th)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95% Bias-Corrected Bootstrap Confidence Interval</td>
<td>(-3.50, 20.57)</td>
<td>(-5.57, 13.22)</td>
<td>(-11.41, 3.01)</td>
<td>(-21.73, -1.89)</td>
<td>(-31.02, -3.94)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Indirect Effect: 95% Bias-Corrected Bootstrap Confidence Interval (-16.21, -1.65)**

$'p < .10$,  *$p < .05$,  **$p < .01$.  


Too Tired to Choose It: Shifting Preference of To Do or To Have While Seeking Happiness

Aekyoung Kim, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Ryan T. Howell, San Francisco State University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Some people endeavor to attain happiness whatever they are doing. They might pursue happiness even while choosing a simple stuff. Can seeking happiness change individuals’ buying habits? Which products are people likely to pick while seeking happiness? And why?

A recent study demonstrated that the pursuit of happiness is an act of self control that requires limited resources (Kim 2013). This generates an inquiry as to how people make choices while seeking happiness because making choices also requires the same resources (Vols et al. 2008). The current study tested whether seeking happiness would alter product preference (toward fluency preference). While there are numerous options, limited resources will make people choose easier option requiring less energy. Acts demanding high (vs. low) level construal drain greater regulatory resources (Fujita et al. 2006), and construal levels indeed shift fluency effects (Alter and Oppenheimer 2008; Tsai and McGill 2011). Given that material (vs. experiential) items show more feasible and concrete (vs. abstract) attributes, life experiences will be perceived as more difficult than material possessions. Hence, we proposed that the pursuit of happiness would lead people to prefer materialistic (vs. experiential) items.

Study 1 (N=546) examined the association between two traits (seeking happiness and materialism). Participants completed Tendency to Seek Happiness (TSH) as a trait (Mauss et al. 2011), Brief Self Control (Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone 2004), and Materialistic Values Scale (MVS; Richins 2004). TSH positively correlated with MVS (r = .41, p < .001). To directly examine the process, a mediation analysis was conducted. When MVS was regressed on both the TSH and resource depletion, the effect of TSH was reduced (β = .38, p < .001), whereas the effect of resource depletion remained significant (β = .22, p < .001; Sobel z = 3.02, p = .002). These results suggested that individuals who tend to seek happiness may prefer material possession due to resource depletion during the pursuit of happiness.

Study 2 (N=56) tested whether people who tend to seek happiness actually choose material (vs. experiential) items. After making hypothetical choices (e.g., bags vs. theater ticket and jean vs. iTunes card), participants reported actual desire to be happy, tiredness during the choice task, and TSH. Participants who showed higher TSH reported that they actually tried to seek happiness (r = .50, p < .001), felt they were running out of more resources while making choices (r = .41, p = .002), and chose more material products (r = .29, p < .05).

Given that inducing the pursuit of happiness while making choices leads to resource depletion (Kim 2013), we predicted that an intention to be happy while making choices would also alter the momentary choice preferences. In Study 3, participants were assigned to either the experimental (instruction to choose items that will improve happiness) or the control condition (no instruction) and were asked to choose one (Target gift card vs. game pass, shoes vs. restaurant, and new electronics vs. resort). Participants in the experimental condition chose more material products (t(66) = -2.09, p < .05) than those in the control condition.

More intriguingly, people generally try to feel happy while doing something (e.g., watching movie), and this impairs their subsequent self-control (Kim 2013). Hence, we predicted that ego depletion derived from the previous acts of seeking happiness would alter one’s subsequent choices (i.e., carryover effect). Participants were assigned to either experimental (seeking happiness while watching movie) or control condition (being natural). More important, people often try to feel happier even if they are already happy or are enjoying pleasant experiences, and this also leads to ego depletion (Kim 2013). Hence, we examined impacts of seeking happiness while watching pleasant movie (Mr. Bean) in Study 4b instead of the neutral movie (Bridge construction) which was used in study 4a.

After conducting the film tasks, participants rated desire to be happy and tiredness during the film task. In study 4a, we asked participants to choose the most two items among given items (e.g., cosmetics, jewelry, reading books, and going to restaurant). To strengthen our prediction, in Study 4b we additionally asked participants to choose at most two web-sites among given options (Amazon, Target.com, Movieticket.com, and Expedia).

Participants in the experimental condition reported more desires to be happy (Study 4a: t(151) = -3.01, p = .003; Study 4b: t(283) = -5.40, p < .001), greater ego depletion during the film task (Study 4a: t(149) = -2.82, p = .005; Study 4b: t(278) = -3.27, p = .001), and chose more materialistic preference (Study 4a: t(156) = -2.40, p < .05; Study 4b: t(283) = -2.47, p < .05) than those in the control condition. To directly examine the process, two sets of mediation analyses were conducted with ego depletion as the mediator. When materialistic preference was regressed on both seeking happiness and ego depletion, the effect of seeking happiness was significantly reduced (Study 4a: β = .13, t = 1.66, p > .05; Study 4b: β = .12, t = 1.95, p > .05), whereas the effect of ego depletion remained significant (Study 4a: β = .27, t = 3.36, p < .001; Sobel z = 2.25, p = .002; Study 4b: β = .16, t = 2.62, p = .009; Sobel z = 2.21, p = .03). These results show that individuals who seek happiness subsequently prefer material possessions (vs. experiences) due to resource depletion during the pursuit of happiness.

Ironically, the pursuit of happiness decreases happiness (Mauss et al. 2011). We attempted to explain why seeking happiness causes such negative consequences, by showing that ego depletion while seeking happiness led individuals to prefer materialistic possessions. When seeking happiness impairs one’s limited resources (Kim 2013), the pursuit of happiness may continuously cause materialistic preferences. The current study sheds light on a potential vicious cycle involving seeking happiness, materialism, and less well-being. Although life experiences improve one’s happiness than do material possessions (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003), individuals are likely to pick easier one (material item) while pursuing happiness, but this will ultimately ruin their happiness.

REFERENCES


Too Tired to Choose It: Shifting Preference of To Do or To Have While Seeking Happiness


The Role of Power Distance in Influencing Non-Loyalty Status Customers’ Satisfaction
Jessie J. Wang, Indiana University, USA
Ashok K. Lalwani, Indiana University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Loyalty programs are increasingly being preferred by businesses as a tool to increase customer retention (Dreze and Nunes 2009). We explore how power distance belief – the extent to which hierarchy and inequality is prevalent in society – influences non-loyalty-status consumers’ satisfaction with businesses that offer loyalty programs (Hofstede 1980, 2001).

Current conceptualizations of power distance suggest that, because they expect and observe inequalities, non-loyalty status consumers in high (vs. low) power distance contexts would be more tolerant of preferential treatment given to loyalty status consumers. Hence, they should be less dissatisfied when loyalty-status consumers receive priority. Contrary to this hypothesis, we suggest that in high (vs. low) power distance contexts, people low in the social hierarchy dislike being at the low end of the rung, and desire equality. Hence, they are more dissatisfied with businesses giving preferential treatment to loyalty-status consumers (H1).

Although research has not directly explored the link between power distance and desire for equality, some limited research points to the relationship. Based on a study of 116,000 respondents from over 50 countries, Hofstede (2001) suggested that inequality is rarely considered desirable and especially so in high power distance contexts. Similarly, Carl et al. (2004) found a negative correlation between the level of inequality in a country (which they referred to as power distance-in-practice) and its citizens’ desire for hierarchy (which they referred to as power distance-values). Accordingly, we propose and find that because consumers in high (vs. low) power distance contexts have a stronger desire for equality, the inequality of loyalty programs affects consumers in high (vs. low) power distance contexts more negatively. In brief: non-loyalty-status consumers’ desire for equality mediates power distance’s effects on their satisfaction with businesses that offer loyalty programs (H2).

Furthermore, we identify boundary conditions that strengthen our conceptualization and moderate the effects of power distance on non-loyalty-status consumers’ satisfaction. First, when non-loyalty-status consumers in high (vs. low) power distance contexts are informed that loyalty-status consumers are older, they become more satisfied with businesses that give preferential treatment to such elderly consumers. People in high (vs. low) power distance contexts believe that the elderly – who are considered to be less powerful – need to be uplifted from their current state to attain the objective of equality (i.e., non-loyalty status consumers in high power distance contexts desire equality for the elderly, as opposed to themselves). Hence, we propose: when the old age of loyalty-status consumers is highlighted, non-loyalty-status consumers in high (vs. low) power distance contexts are more satisfied with businesses (H3).

Second, when non-loyalty-status consumers perceive loyalty-status consumers to be wealthier, power distance does not influence their satisfaction with businesses offering loyalty programs. We propose that when loyalty-status consumers’ wealth is highlighted, non-loyalty-status consumers in high power distance contexts believe that they cannot match status consumers. Hence, their desire for equality is mitigated, and their dissatisfaction is reduced. In brief, we propose: highlighting loyalty-status consumers’ wealth attenuates high (vs. low) power distance non-loyalty-status consumers’ satisfaction with businesses that offer loyalty programs (H4).

A multi-method approach was used to establish reliability and generalizability across four studies. In study 1, a regression analysis revealed a significant effect of non-loyalty-status participants’ power distance (β = -.36, t(55) = -2.82, p < .008) on their satisfaction with businesses that give preferential treatment to loyalty-status consumers, supporting H1. In study 2, we again found a significant negative effect of power distance on non-loyalty-status consumers’ satisfaction (β = -.18, t(136) = -4.3, p < .04). We also found that non-loyalty-status consumers’ power distance has a significant positive effect on their desire for equality (β = .37, t(136) = 4.63, p < .001). Non-loyalty-status consumers’ desire for equality has a significant negative effect on their satisfaction (β = .23, t(136) = -3.1, p < .007). When both power distance and desire for equality are included as the independent variables, non-loyalty-status consumers’ desire for equality has a significant negative effect on satisfaction and power distance has a non-significant effect on satisfaction. The four regression analyses together suggest that desire for equality fully mediates the effect of power distance on consumers’ satisfaction with the business (Baron and Kenny 1986).

In study 3, we highlighted (vs. not) the old age of loyalty-status consumers and found evidence for a reversal effect. A regression revealed a significant interaction between power distance and old age highlighted (vs. not highlighted) (β = .36, t(72) = 3.13, p < .004). In the old age not highlighted condition, non-loyalty-status consumers in high (vs. low) power distance contexts were less satisfied with the business (M_high = 3.73, M_low = 5.28; F(1,31) = 2.32; p < .03); however, in the old-age-highlighted condition, they were more satisfied (M_high = 4.94, M_low = 3.77; F(1,41) = 2.08; p < .05), supporting H3.

Study 4 examined the moderating role of highlighting loyalty-status consumers’ wealth. A regression revealed a significant interaction between power distance and loyalty-status consumers’ wealth highlighted (vs. control) (β = .44, t(41) = 2.73, p < .01). In the control condition, power distance was negatively associated with participants’ satisfaction with the office supply company (r = -.46, p < .03); this association was non-significant in the wealth-highlighted condition (r = .32, p > .15). These results support H4.

These findings support our framework and suggest that loyalty programs have a stronger negative effect on high (vs. low) power distance non-loyalty-status consumers’ satisfaction. Further, high (vs. low) power distance consumers’ desire for equality mediates the effect. Finally, we have provided support for two moderators for the relationship.

REFERENCES


Framing the Game: How Positioning Brands in Competition Can Be Strategically Used to Increase Brand Value

Neeru Paharia, Georgetown University, USA
Jill Avery, Harvard Business School, USA
Anat Keinan, Harvard Business School, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

A prominent narrative in contemporary consumer culture is one in which “category killer” brands like Amazon, Starbucks, Home Depot, and Wal-Mart are forcing mom and pop independent bookstores, coffee shops, hardware stores, and retailers out of business. The narrative tells us that consumers are switching their loyalties from independently owned and operated businesses to big box retailers (Hosein and Hughes 2006; Spector 2005). However, recent anecdotal evidence suggests this narrative misses part of the story. For example, when Coldstone Creamery, a national chain, moved in across the street from independently-owned J.P. Licks ice cream in Newton, Massachusetts, consumers rallied around J.P. Licks and drove Coldstone out of town. When Starbucks moved in next door to Los Angeles’s Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf, sales at the local café ironically went up. This activity suggests that consumers may be willing express their political will in the marketplace and protect small, independent brands from aggressive competition. In this article, we explore the effect of competitive framing, positioning brands in competition with one another, and show that small brands can paradoxically benefit from having a large competitor. Unlike prior research that focuses on the dyadic relationship between a consumer and a brand, we provide a networked understanding of how consumers assess brands not in isolation, but as part of a competitive system. We explore the effects of competition and show how changing the competitive framing of the marketplace positively and negatively affects consumers’ support for the brands within it. Our results show that consumers’ brand evaluations are not dependent only on dyadic interactions between a consumer and a firm, but rather are also influenced by the web of competitive relationships within which the brand is entangled. Work on separate versus joint evaluations (Hsee et al. 1999) provides support for our theory that consumers’ preferences for brands may shift depending on their perception of the competitive context. People justify their decision when products are assessed together versus when they are assessed alone, inserting social approval into the decision calculus (Curley, Yates, and Abrams 1986; Tetlock 1985), making consumers more likely to choose in a manner consistent with societal or peer expectations, than a more self-interested one.

Our theory and empirical findings demonstrate the importance of considering consumers’ perceptions of the brand’s competitive context and competitive behavior. Brands, both big and small, can use the framing the game effect to motivate or mute political consumption. We offer positioning advice for both small and large firms for either highlighting or downplaying competitive aspects of their industry and strategy. We illuminate how small brands can benefit from the real or perceived presence of a large competitor and how big brands can suffer when they are perceived as being too aggressive in competitive arenas. Our theory shows that small, independent brands should highlight their competitive context and encourage consumers to reframe consumption as a political, rather than an economic act. Large, corporate brands should avoid invoking competition narratives, especially when they are competing against small, independent brands.

REFERENCES


Brand Consensus and Multivocality: Disentangling the Effects of the Brand, the Consumer, and the Consumer-Brand Relationship on Brand Meaning
Claudio Alvarez, Boston University, USA
Remi Trudel, Boston University, USA
Susan Fournier, Boston University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Branding research and practice offer two contrasting perspectives on how much control managers have over brand meaning (Allen, Fournier, & Miller, 2008). The most established tradition positions the brand manager as the main responsible for selecting, implementing, and controlling meaning (Park, Jaworski, & MacNish, 1986). The direction of causality is defined as being from the brand manager who crafts and communicates the brand to consumers who, as larger or smaller collectives (segments), receive and evaluate the brand. A fundamental assumption of this approach is that the meaning of a brand is shared by consumers: consumers may vary in terms of how favorable a particular brand association is, but they generally agree on the associations they link to a brand name. BMW is “styling and driving performance,” Volvo is “safety,” and Coke is “Americana and refreshment” (Keller, 2003, p. 87). The ideal case is indeed the brand with a single meaning across segments and markets (Aaker, 1996, p. 104).

This understanding of brand perception as generally consensual can be contrasted with a point of view that positions consumers as co-creators of meaning (Allen et al., 2008; Thompson, 1997). From this perspective, brands do not belong to managers; they are contextualized in the broader fabric of consumer culture in which consumers, brand managers and other agents negotiate and reinterpret brand meanings (Arnould & Thompson, 2005). Rather than mere receivers, consumers actively make sense of branded communications by selecting legitimate interpretations that facilitate their life pursuits (Mick & Buhl, 1992). A core assumption of this co-creative approach is that brands are essentially multivocal: consumers diverge significantly in the meanings they ascribe to brands as their personal and social contexts vary.

The core question that arises from contrasting these two perspectives is whether consumers predominantly agree or disagree on what a brand means to them. The present study addresses this issue by (1) proposing the construct of brand consensus and conceptualizing brand multivocality in terms of consumer and relationship effects, in line with the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 1994); (2) measuring the relative strength of these effects; and (3) showing that these effects vary in meaningful ways according to characteristics of brands, consumers, and consumer-brand relationships.

The Social Relations Model defines interpersonal perception as a dyadic process in which meaning is derived from three independent sources: the perceiver, the target, and the interaction between perceiver and target. For instance, if Mary is asked about how sincere her friend Jane is, her answer will be a function of Mary as perceiver (i.e., the extent to which she thinks that people in general are sincere), Jane as target of perception (i.e., the extent to which people in general tend to see Jane as sincere), and the specific relationship Mary has with Jane (e.g., because they are friends, Jane tends to be more sincere with Mary than with other people). Following this conceptualization, we define brand consensus as the variance in brand effect, which is the degree to which a brand tends to be perceived similarly by all consumers, and decompose brand multivocality into consumer and relationship effects. Consumer effect relates to the extent to which a consumer perceives all brands similarly, and relationship effect is the unique perception of a consumer about a given brand (i.e., the brand x consumer interaction).

We report two studies with the same general procedure: participants are asked to fill out a survey about how they perceive themselves, and then, after an unrelated task, they rate a series of 10 brands on brand personality (Aaker, 1997) and Self-Brand Connection (Escalas & Bettman, 2005) items. The difference between studies is the specific brands being rated: study 1 (n = 99) includes 5 familiar and 5 non-familiar sports brands, and study 2 (n = 133) includes 5 publicly consumed and 5 privately consumed brands. The analytical approach was based on three-way random effects ANOVA (brand x consumer x measure), which allows us to separate the effect of the brand x consumer interaction (i.e., relationship effects) from measurement error. Tests of equality of variances were conducted to provide statistical significance tests for the hypotheses proposed.

Our findings across 20 brands in different product categories indicate that, contrary to prevailing wisdom, consumers disagree more than agree on how they perceive brands. Both relationship variance and consumer variance were higher than brand variance in both studies. Specific hypotheses about the sources of brand, relationship, and consumer effects are also tested and show the theoretical significance of these effects. We conclude with implications for the brand manager on how to embrace brand multivocuality.

REFERENCES


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The Freedom Bias: Empirical Evidence for a Neglected Tariff-Choice Anomaly
Sören Köcher, TU Dortmund University, Germany
Till Dannewald, University of Goettingen, Germany

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Due to an increasing convergence in quality, providers of electronic services (e.g., telecommunication and internet services) are relatively limited in their possibilities to differentiate from each other. Therefore, competition in these branches is mainly influenced by the providers’ pricing policy in terms of tariff structures. Traditionally, the offered tariffs differ with regard to the specifications of monthly fixed fee, variable usage price per unit, and included monthly volume. However, during the last years, providers have increasingly offered menus of tariff options with varying contract durations. As these tariffs usually provide discounts depending on the length of commitment, individuals – when tempted to maximize consumer surplus – have not only to account for their monthly usage but also for the expected usage period to minimize their total costs and make a rational tariff choice. Nevertheless, research on tariff-choice anomalies indicates that people often fail to correctly estimate their usage patterns with the result of a less than optimal choice (e.g., Kling and Van der Ploeg 1990; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva 1987). Despite the wide range of findings regarding existence, causes, and consequences of biased choices in favor of flat-rate or pay-per-use tariffs, research on possible additional tariff-choice biases lacks. Thus, the purpose of this research is to introduce a novel bias in the tariff choice context, namely the freedom bias, which is observable if people prefer a short-term contract although they would be better off choosing a long-term agreement.

Several theoretical explanations exist for why individuals might choose short-term contracts over long-term commitments. First, the prospect theory’s value function (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) implies that segregation of multiple gains results in a higher perceived value than integration, whereas multiple losses loom larger in case of segregation than in case of integration (Thaler 1985). Transferring these principles to the tariff structure context, we assume that the losses of a short-term contract in terms of monthly costs are characterized by a higher amount per month over a shorter period, and consequently follow the idea of integration, whereas the costs of a long-term contract that are characterized by a lower amount per month over a longer period approach the segregation concept. As segregation of multiple losses result in higher perceived costs than integration, the choice of a short-term tariff over a long-term tariff should become more likely. Second, regret theory (Bell 1982; Loomoes and Sugden 1982) assumes not only that decision makers regret a bad choice in hindsight, but also that the possibility of regret can be anticipated in the decision making process (e.g., Zeelenberg 1999). As regret is determined by reversibility of decisions (Zeelenberg et al. 1996), it should be less likely to occur with a short-term agreement as compared to long-term contracts, as customers can alter or end contracts sooner. Third, contract length represents switching costs in terms of legal barriers (Burnham, Frels, and Mahajan 2003). Previous research highlights that it is often difficult to anticipate future consequences (e.g., satisfaction) of present decisions (Kahneman and Snell 1992; March 1978). The choice of a short-term contract curtails these switching costs, as individuals can switch sooner with a short-term contract than with a long-term contract. This might be an additional reason for a preferable short commitment.

Two experimental studies systematically verify the existence of the proposed freedom bias. Specifically, experiment 1 (N = 163) examines the necessary condition for the proposed bias that different contract durations provide different levels of utility by means of a choice-based conjoint analysis analyzing respondents’ preferences for mobile phone tariffs. Participants were asked to imagine that their current contract with their service provider had expired and, thus, they had to choose a new mobile phone tariff. Participants then were confronted with ten random choice sets. We varied the three typical attributes of monthly fixed fee (five levels), variable usage price per minute/text message (four levels), and contract duration (five levels) for stimuli construction. We used the multinomial logit model for the estimation of respondents’ tariff preferences (McFadden 1974) and estimated part-worth utilities of tariff characteristics at the individual level using a Hierarchical Bayes procedure (Moore 2004; Lenk et al. 1996). The results of the coefficient estimation appear in table 1. This study’s findings indicate that the part-worth utilities of all contract durations significantly differ providing a first evidence of the possible existence of the freedom bias.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes and attribute levels</th>
<th>Mean part-worth utilities</th>
<th>Differences in part-worth utilities</th>
<th>Significance of differences</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly fixed fee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. ¥5.00</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ¥7.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>18.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ¥10.00</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>14.78***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ¥12.50</td>
<td>-2.59</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>25.98***</td>
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<td>5. ¥15.00</td>
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<td>1.79</td>
<td>22.37***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variable usage price per unit</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 5 cents</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 10 cents</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>13.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 15 cents</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>16.95***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 20 cents</td>
<td>-2.63</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>15.79***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract duration</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Monthly callable</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. After 6 months callable</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>9.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. After 12 months callable</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>18.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. After 18 months callable</td>
<td>-1.30</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>11.93***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. After 24 months callable</td>
<td>-2.40</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>16.81***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***p < .01

Building on this result, experiment 2 (N = 106) provides additional support for the existence of the proposed bias. This survey was designed as a 2 (total costs of the short-term tariff) × 4 (contract duration of the short-term tariff) study. The study scenarios asked participants to imagine that they planned to spend a semester abroad in 18 months. Participants then were told that their current mobile phone contract had expired and they had to choose a new tariff: Here-
upon, they were confronted with the choice between a short-term tariff (with varying contract durations ranging from monthly callable to after 18 months callable) and a long-term tariff (with a constant duration of 24 months). To keep the choice tasks as simple as possible, we used flat-rate tariffs including calling and text messaging which only differed regarding contract duration and monthly fixed fee. This study’s findings confirm that when contract durations of offered tariff options diverge greatly, people significantly preferred short-term tariffs over long-term tariffs although total costs were equal or even higher. However, this biased tariff choice disappears and even reverts if contract durations of tariff options converge.

These findings supply important implications for a more efficient tariff pricing in business practices. Due to the customers’ preference for short provider commitments offering higher priced tariff options with short contract durations entails the promising benefit that profits can be realized earlier. Moreover, although these tariffs might reduce switching costs, the risk of customer churn is still limited. Customers often prefer reversibility of choices without exercising this option in the future (Gilbert and Ebert 2002). Hence, this enables providers to skim the customers’ higher willingness-to-pay for short-term contracts.

REFERENCES
Loneliness and Moral Judgment Does Loneliness Make Moral Judgment More Permissible?
Jinfeng (Jenny) Jiao, University of Iowa, USA
Jing (Alice) Wang, University of Iowa, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Despite the fact that social connections are central facets of daily social life, and loneliness influences most people’s quality of life, relatively little empirical attention has been devoted to the understanding of how feeling lonely impacts people’s moral judgment. Some people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several others. Some people think whether or not someone suffers emotionally has nothing to do with their judgments of right and wrong. What explains the differences in moral judgment? Will lonely people make moral judgment more permissible? In consumer research, it has been shown that socially excluded people are more likely to sacrifice their financial well-being for the sake of social inclusion, and more willing to try an illegal drug (Baumeister et al. 2008). From an evolutionary perspective, lonely people feel unsafe and tend to be more defensive and sensitive to threats and rejection (Cacioppo et al. 2006; Cacioppo and Patrick 2008; Ernst and Cacioppo 2000; Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010).

However, it is still unclear how loneliness influences moral judgment. The purpose of this study is to advance our understanding on loneliness and moral judgment, where we refer loneliness as the subjective feeling of social isolation (Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010) Louise C. and John T. Cacioppo, Loneliness matters: a theoretical and empirical review of consequences and mechanisms, Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 218-227, 40 (2), 2010, 0883-6612. Because lonely people are more sensitive to threats and attacks, see the world as a more threatening place, expect more negative consequences from social interaction, have less trust in social interaction, and remember more negative events and feeling than non-lonely people. It becomes more interesting to test whether or not lonely people have the similar moral judgments as non-lonely people. Do lonely people see moral judgment differently than normal people? Do they have different dimensions of moral judgment? We addressed those questions in four studies, and the result showed that feeling lonely makes moral judgment more permissible.

We define loneliness as a complex set of feelings that occurs when intimate and social needs are not adequately met and that “drives” individuals to seek the fulfillment of these needs (Russell, Peplau, and Cutrona 1980). Lonely people have a lower evaluation of self, a lower self-esteem, a lower trust in others and self, and they usually feel less control over success and failure; lonely people generally feel less happy than non-lonely people (Cacioppo et al. 2006; Cacioppo and Patrick 2008; Ernst and Cacioppo 2000; Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010; Wang, Zhu, and Shiv ; Wang, Zhu, and Shiv 2012). Haidt’s social intuitionist approach suggests that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions)(Haidt 2001). We propose, in line with research on Cacioppo (2006)’s evolutionary model and Haidt (2001)’s social intuitionist approach, that because of increased negative emotions and defensive behaviors, feeling lonely decreases the severity of moral judgment. Specifically, feeling lonely increases the likelihood to choose a utilitarian choice in moral scenarios.

Hypothesis 1: Feeling lonely decreases the severity of moral judgment.

Empathy is critically important for subjective well-being because it promotes the maintenance of quality relationships and prosocial behaviors (Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Batson 1991; Eisenberg and Miller 1990). Previous studies have suggested that empathy in general, and most often emotional empathy, is associated with prosocial behavior (Batson 1991; Batson et al. 2002; Warden and Mackinnon 2003). Poor empathy could also lead to decreases in personal well-being as a consequence of isolation and feelings of loneliness. We expect to see that the positive side of emotional empathy, empathetic concern, mediates the relationship between loneliness and moral judgment. Therefore, it is hypothesized that feelings of loneliness will increase the utilitarian choices than non-lonely people. Furthermore, feeling lonely will also decrease moral standards by reducing empathic concern for others.

Hypothesis 2: Empathetic concern mediates the effects of loneliness on moral judgment. Specifically, feeling lonely will increase the utilitarian choices than feeling non-lonely. Furthermore, feeling lonely will also decrease moral standards by reducing empathic concern for others.

This paper also highlights the importance of the positive emotion, empathy, in influencing moral judgment. Social psychology and neuropsychological studies have shown the importance of emotions in moral behaviors. Social psychology studies have shown that psy-
Chopaths usually violate moral behaviors even when they know it is not right. Because of lack of emotions, psychopaths can steal from their friends, dismember live animals, cheat on their partners, and even murder their significant others to collect insurance benefits, without showing any trace of remorse or shame (Cleckley 1982; Haidt 2001).

**Figure 1: (Submarine Scenario): Percentage of people chose utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian choice by loneliness**

![Percentage of choice graph](image)

**Figure 2: Loneliness and Moral Foundations (N=206)**

![Graph showing loneliness and moral foundations](image)

**Table 1: Means of Five Dimensions of Moral Foundations on Loneliness score**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Harm</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
<th>Ingroup</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Purity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lonely</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Lonely</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P-value: <.0057 <.057 <.003 <.026 =.121

Note. Lonely people versus non-lonely people on five dimensions of moral foundations. It is measured by using 30 items Moral Foundation Questions. Each dimension has four questions, with lower number means not at all relevant to my moral judgment; and higher number means extremely relevant to my moral judgment. Loneliness is measured by using 20 items UCLA loneliness score, with lower number means non-lonely, higher number means lonely. Media Split of loneliness score. The lonelier the participant, the less relevant they rated those moral foundations, especially for the first four dimensions.

**REFERENCES**


Altruistic Behavior, Egoistic Choice
Adelle Xue Yang, University of Chicago, USA
Christopher K. Hsee, University of Chicago, USA
Oleg Urminsky, University of Chicago, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Altruism can be loosely defined as “a willingness to act in the consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior motives” (Nagel 1970, p79). The opposite of altruism is egoism, that is, when the ultimate goal of people’s behaviors is to improve one’s own welfare. The egoistic motive and the altruistic motive have usually been pitched against each other as two competing motives, especially in the debate about whether many seemingly altruistic behaviors are actually driven by ulterior motives to serve egoistic purposes (see Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Versterlund 2008 for review).

Some recent novel empirical findings suggest the relationship between egoistic and altruistic motives can be more complex than presumed, especially when the two motives are juxtaposed. Feiler, Tost and Grant (2012), for example, found that people donate less when the potential to benefit others and oneself were both emphasized in a donation request, than when only one potential benefit was emphasized. Andreoni, Rao & Trachtman (2011) found that when Salvation Army solicitors standing at different entrances of a shopping mall explicitly asked each customer for donation, total donation increased by a large margin, but more people avoided the asking solicitors by entering and exiting from alternative entrances. These line of findings seem to suggest that altruistic and egoistic seeming behaviors may arise in the same setting, in different forms.

Another recent line of research suggests an overlooked motivational role of helping others. For example, simply focusing on the pro-social consequences of one’s creative work could increase worker’s creativity (Grant & Berry 2011), and the potential to help others buffers one from emotional exhaustion caused by negative tasks (Grant & Sonnentag 2010). Moreover, under some circumstances, people become happier spending money on others than spending money on themselves (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton 2010). These findings suggest that the comparison between motivation to help others and motivation to benefit oneself could be potentially more complex than current research demonstrates.

In this paper, we propose an asymmetry between choices and motivation, such that even when people are more motivated to perform on a task when the incentive benefits others rather than themselves, they may nevertheless prefer benefits to go to themselves rather than to benefit others. Specifically, if research participants are given the opportunity to work on a laborious task in return for a low payment, we predict that participants will work harder on the task if the payment directly goes to a charity, than if they could keep the payment, or than if they can choose whether to keep the payment or donate it to the charity. Moreover, we predict that when given a choice between keeping the payment and donating it to a charity, most participants would keep the money for themselves.

The effects hypothesized above reflect “altruism” in behavior, and “egoism” in choice. We argue that these seemingly contradictory effects will occur because the motivation to increase one’s own welfare and the motivation to improve others’ welfare are leveraged differently under different situations. However, a direct choice may highlight the difference between the two options and eliminate altruistic motivation.

In Study 1 (N=168), we described a local charity to all participants who came to the lab, and informed them that they could donate any amount of their earning from the lab to the charity, at any time, by letting the experimenter know. Then participants worked on a simple task: sorting out the pennies from a big bowl of about 1000 mixed foreign coins. We randomly assigned participants into one of three conditions. In the self condition, we told them they could keep the pennies they found; in the charity condition, we told them all of the sorted pennies would be donated to the charity introduced earlier; and in the control condition, we did not give them incentives to sort the pennies. In all conditions, participants were told that 50 pennies were buried in the bowl, left over from a previous study, and that if no one sorted out the pennies, they would all be wasted. The results revealed a stark contrast between participants’ performance and their choices. Participants in both the self and charity conditions outperformed those in the control condition (F(2, 165) = 15.2, p<.001).

Moreover, participants in the charity condition found more pennies than those in the self condition (M_charity= 27.5, SD= 11.4, M_self= 21.8, SD =10.1; contrast analysis t = 3.037, p<.01). In contrast, only one participant in the self condition opted to donate the pennies to the charity. We replicated these results in Study 2 (N=111) with different stimuli (a hole-punching task).

In study 3 (N=163), we assigned participants into four conditions: charity only, self only, choice first and choice last. Participants could earn money based on the number of steps taken on a stepping machine in 5 minutes. In the charity condition, participants’ earnings from the stepping task would be donated to the charity. In the self condition, participants could keep all their earnings and were not aware of the charity. In the choice conditions, participants learned about both options and were asked to make a choice either before or after the task. As in the first two studies, when they were not given a choice, participants worked harder for the charity project than for themselves (M_charity=298, SD=72.8, M_self=251, SD= 104.4, t=2.32, p<.05). Participants in the charity condition also outperformed those in the choice conditions, regardless of their choices (M_choice-first=261, SD= 85.4, M_choice-last=268, SD= 72.7, t=-2.26, p<.05), indicating altruistic behavior. However, when a choice was given between self-interest and other’s welfare, only 20% chose to donate in the choice first condition, and 24.4% chose to donate in the choice last condition, indicating egoistic choices. Implications and excluded alternative explanations will be discussed.

REFERENCES


What Makes a Luxury Brand: The Effect of Competence and Warmth Cues on Luxury Perception

Miao Hu, Northwestern University, USA
Derek D. Rucker, Northwestern University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Luxury, a concept once used to delineate class-oriented exclusivity, appears to becoming increasingly popular and prevalent among today’s mass market consumers. Not only has the size of the global luxury market grown exponentially to approximately 1 trillion dollars, but consumers are joining the world of luxury consumption from mature and emerging markets alike (BCG report 2010).

Given the large footprint of luxury products and services, an important challenge for marketers is to better understand the antecedents of a brand being perceived to be a luxury. The current research explores whether and how luxury perception can be influenced by cues of competence and warmth. While warmth is an assessment of others’ intentions towards the self, competence captures others’ ability to carry out intentions towards the self (e.g. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Applying this framework to branding, Aaker, Garbinsky, and Vohs (2012) found that while being judged high on either competence or warmth contributes to purchase intention for a brand, being judged high on both warmth and competence gives brands an extra boost in purchase intention, which they termed the “golden quadrant”. However, in many situations, a brand might have the bandwidth to only advertise or represent itself as either competent or warm. The present research asks how each of these factors independently contributes to the luxury perception for brands.

Based on prior literature, we propose that just as competence cues signal ability to act on one’s actions in an interpersonal context (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu 2002), the same cues could signal a brand’s ability to produce superior products and services when judging a brand or a product. We further suggest that competence is more likely to be inherently linked to the product, as a consequence we suggest warmth cues may contribute more strongly to additional luxury perception. Four studies tested the above novel hypotheses.

Experiments 1a and 1b: The first two studies tested the effect that competence cues contribute to luxury perception through subtle variations of color or taglines on advertisements. Experiment 1a manipulated warmth and competence by either adding a warmth-related word (e.g. passion, sincerity) or a competence-related word (e.g. talented, intelligence) on the same mock advertisements. Experiment 1b manipulated warmth and competence by slightly altering the color tone on real print advertisements from well-known brands (e.g. Forever 21, Swatch) to be either a warm tone or a cool tone.

In both experiments, participants saw two advertisements with either warmth cues or competence cues. After viewing each advertisement, participants answered two items on the luxury perception of the advertisement on 7-point scales (“How much luxury do you associate with this ad?”, “How much status/prestige do you associate with this ad?” 1= Not at all, 7= Very much). Results show that in both experiments, participants rated the advertisements with competence cues as more luxurious compared to advertisements with warmth cues (ps = .01, .005 respectively). An additional control condition in experiment 1b demonstrates that it is competence cues that elevate luxury perception (p = .001) instead of warmth cues lowering luxury perception compared to the control condition (n.s.).

Experiment 2: The next experiment tested the proposed interaction effect that once a brand reaches luxury status, warmth cues enhance luxury perception more than additional competence cues. A 2 (cue: competence vs. warmth) × 2 (brand status: non-luxury vs. established luxury) between-subject design was adopted for the current study. Brand status was manipulated by using real print advertisements from well-known non-luxury brands (Forever21 and Swatch) or established luxury brands (Hugo Boss and Omega watch). Similar to Experiment 1b, warmth and competence were manipulated by altering the color tone on either advertisement to be warm or cool toned. Participants saw two advertisements in a random order and answered questions on luxury perception of the advertisements after seeing each advertisement, similar to Experiments 1a and 1b. Results show a significant two-way interaction (p < .001) between warmth/competence cues and brand status. For non-luxury brands, advertisements with a cool color tone are judged as more luxurious (p = .02) compared to the same advertisements with a warm color tone. However, for brands with an established luxury image, it is advertisements with a warm color tone that are judged as more luxurious compared to the same advertisements with a cool color tone (p = .08).

Experiment 3: As Experiment 2 manipulated brand status by adopting real-life brands, the current study sought to replicate Experiment 2 in a more controlled setting with brand status manipulated through description of the brand. The current study adopted a 2 (cue: competence vs. warmth) × 2 (brand status: non-luxury vs. established luxury) between-subject design. To manipulate brand status, we informed participants at the start of the experiment that they would either see advertisements from “various new brands that hope to establish a reputation as luxury brands” or “various brands that have established a reputation as luxury brands.” Competence and warmth cues were manipulated similar to Experiment 1a, in which either warmth or competence related words were displayed on the same mock advertisements as taglines. Results show a significant two way interaction (p = .003) in which advertisements with competence cues were rated higher on luxury perception for non-luxury brands (p = .04) while advertisements with warmth cues were rated higher on luxury perception for established luxury brands (p = .03).

Conclusion and Contributions. The findings contribute to the literature on warmth and competence by identifying distinct stages of brand development in which either competence or warmth contributes to luxury perception. The current research has important implications for brands by suggesting that a brand should build a luxury image by sequentially displaying first competence cues and then warmth cues.

REFERENCES


The Effects of Color on Food Temperature Perceptions
Courtney Szocs, University of South Florida, USA
Dipayan Biswas, University of South Florida, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Red and blue denote warm and cold temperatures on water faucets, air-conditioning systems, weather maps, and thermometers, among other items. The co-occurrence of red/blue hues and warm/cold temperatures in everyday experiences leads to the formation of learned color-temperature associations which consumers can use to make inferences about products (Wright 1962). However, would incidental exposure to red or blue color cues influence a consumer’s perceptions of the temperature of a focal food/beverage? Specifically, would a consumer rate a food/beverage as having a higher (lower) temperature after seeing a red (blue) color cue? Moreover, what are the downstream behavioral outcomes that result from the integration of visual (i.e., color) cues into haptic (i.e., temperature) perceptions?

Prior research shows that individuals are extremely responsive to subtle variations in temperature (Cheema and Patrick 2012) with some areas of the body, such as the fingertips and oral cavity, being able to detect a one degree change in temperature (Jones and Berris 2009). Given that the hands and mouth are the primary inputs involved in food/beverage consumption, it is not surprising that temperature perceptions play an influential role in food/beverage evaluations (Moskowitz, Beckley and Resurreccion 2012). In fact, for many foods/beverages, there is a narrow range of acceptable temperatures and deviation from this range can lead consumers to reject food as unsafe (USDA 2011) or unacceptable in taste (Cardello 1994).

When evaluating product temperature, individuals rely on haptic and visual cues. Haptic cues to temperature are obtained when heat transfers to or from a product to thermoreceptors in the skin, and thus haptic cues require physical product interaction, or at least proximity to the product (Klatzky, Lederman, and Reed 1987). Visual cues to temperature such as steam emitting from a bowl or frost on a glass can be obtained without product interaction and with less proximity to the product.

In this research we focus on how incidental exposure to non-diagnostic red or blue color cues—such as the color of the cup a beverage is sampled from—influence product temperature perceptions. We draw on theories of intersensory integration and propose that the integration of visual and haptic cues in temperature perceptions is a function of ease of obtaining visual (vs. haptic) information. We propose that because visual can be obtained with a lesser degree of product proximity, visual color cues will be integrated into product temperature perceptions so that individuals exposed to a red (blue) visual cue will rate a product as having a higher (lower) temperature. We test these propositions in five studies.

In study 1 we demonstrate the basic effect of visual cues on temperature perceptions (i.e., the color-temperature effect) using an experiment with two between subjects conditions (visual cue: red vs. blue). We find that when asked to sample a clear, room-temperature beverage from a red or blue cup participants who sample from a red (blue) cup perceive the beverage as having a higher (lower) temperature.

In study 2 we provide evidence that the color-temperature effect is a function of the lower cost of obtaining visual (vs. haptic) cues to temperature which leads to visual cues being integrated into temperature perceptions. Specifically, we manipulate the order sequence in which visual (vs. haptic) information is available using a 2(visual cue: red vs. blue) x 2(sensory cue sequence: visual-haptic vs. haptic-visual) between subjects experiment. In this study we manipulate the color of the beverage and have participants view the color of the beverage before sampling the beverage (i.e., visual-haptics) or after sampling the beverage (i.e., haptics-visual). In support of our theorization, we find that when visual information is available before haptic information (i.e., visual-haptics), and hence visual cues are less costly to obtain than haptic cues, the color-temperature effect persists. However, when haptic information is available before visual information (i.e., haptics-visual) the effect is diminished.

In study 3 we examine the robustness of the color-temperature effect to unambiguously warm or cold product temperatures. Employing a 2(visual cue: red vs. blue) x 3(beverage temperature: room vs. cold vs. warm) between subjects design experiment, we had participants sample a cold, room or warm temperature beverage from a red or blue cup and evaluate the temperature. We find that the color-temperature effect persists for room temperature beverages, gets diminished for warm beverages and gets reversed for cold beverages.

In studies 4 and 5 we investigate the behavioral outcomes of the color-temperature effect. In study 4, we induce thirst and have participants sample a clear beverage from one of three cups (visual cue: red vs. blue vs. white) representing the between subjects experimental conditions. We find that participants consume a larger volume of the beverage from red (vs. blue or white) cups.

In study 5 we examine whether the color-temperature effect would influence food preparation behaviors. The results of a single factor between subjects experiment (visual cue: red vs. blue) show that participants exposed to blue (vs. red) color cues reported longer heating times for foods.

Collectively, the results of five studies suggest that visual cues are integrated into temperature perceptions leading to a color-temperature effect. This color-temperature effect subsequently influences downstream behavioral outcomes such as consumption volume and food preparation behaviors. Process evidence seems to suggest that the integration of visual cues into temperature perceptions is driven by the fact that visual cues to temperature can be obtained with less product proximity than haptic cues to temperature making visual cues less costly.

REFERENCES

### Table 1: Summary of Empirical Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Cell Means</th>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>One factor between subjects (visual cue: red vs. blue) Dependent variable: Perceived temperature (in °F)</td>
<td>$M_{\text{red}} = 72.83$ vs. $M_{\text{blue}} = 69.30$; $F(1, 47) = 5.47, p &lt; .05$</td>
<td>The color-temperature effect- exposure to red color cues leads to higher temperature perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2(color cue: red vs. blue) X 2(sensory input sequence: visual-haptic vs. haptic-visual) between subjects Dependent variable: Perceived temperature (in °F)</td>
<td>$M_{\text{blue V-H}} = 64.64$ vs. $M_{\text{red V-H}} = 73.52$; $F(1, 49) = 14.85, p &lt; .01$ $M_{\text{blue H-V}} = 70.32$ vs. $M_{\text{red H-V}} = 72.34$; $F(1, 42) = .84, p = .362$</td>
<td>The color-temperature effect holds when visual cues are available prior to haptic cues but gets diminished when haptic cues are available prior to visual cues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2(cup color: red vs. blue) X 3(beverage temperature: neutral/room vs. cold vs. warm) between subjects Dependent variable: Perceived temperature (in °F)</td>
<td>$M_{\text{red room}} = 74.10$ vs. $M_{\text{blue room}} = 72.43$; $F(1, 43) = 3.63, p &lt; .07$ $M_{\text{red cold}} = 63.71$ vs. $M_{\text{blue cold}} = 69.82$; $F(1, 39) = 5.18, p &lt; .05$ $M_{\text{red warm}} = 79.19$ vs. $M_{\text{blue warm}} = 82.74$; $F(1, 38) = 1.24, p = .273$</td>
<td>The color-temperature effect holds for room temperature beverages and gets reversed for cold beverages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>One factor between subjects (visual cue: red vs. blue vs. white) Dependent variable: consumption volume (in grams)</td>
<td>$M_{\text{red}} = 91.04$ vs. $M_{\text{blue}} = 74.04$; $F(1, 51) = 6.92, p &lt; .05$ $M_{\text{red}} = 91.04$ vs. $M_{\text{white}} = 76.56$; $F(1, 58) = 4.60, p &lt; .05$</td>
<td>When thirsty, individuals exposed to red (vs. blue or white) color cues consume a larger volume of a beverage Perceived temperature mediates the effect of color cues on consumption volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>One factor between subjects (visual cue: red vs. blue) Dependent variable: heating time (in seconds)</td>
<td>$M_{\text{blue}} = 123.65$ vs. $M_{\text{red}} = 98.08$; $F(1, 49) = 3.22, p &lt; .08$</td>
<td>Consumers exposed to blue color cues heat food for a greater number of seconds than consumers exposed to red or white color cues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Consumers’ Global Versus Local Brand Choice In Foreign Contexts
Katharina Zeugner-Roth, IESEG School of Management, France
Claudiu V. Dimofte, San Diego State University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Although there is a consensus in the literature that industries are globalizing and that consumer attitude and behaviors worldwide are homogenizing (Cleveland, Laroche, and Papadopoulos 2009, Steenkamp and Jong 2010), only limited research so far has followed the global consumer across national borders to examine brand preferences abroad. This research addressed the case of consumer brand choice in the context of travelers to a foreign destination, in particular the case of a host nation not known for any tradition in the respective product category and whose local brands therefore engender higher levels of perceived risk. We focus on a variety of origin specific (product ethnicity), consumer specific (cosmopolitanism vs. ethnocentrism), as well as situational variables (word of mouth) to determine if and when conditions consumers prefer local or global brands abroad. Importantly, this is the first research addressing these variables jointly.

The first study supports prior research on consumer ethnocentrism (Steenkamp, Batra, and Alden 2003) and cosmopolitanism (Cleveland et al. 2009, Riefler, Diamantopoulos, and Siguaw 2012) in finding that both types of consumers largely replicate their domestic choices when abroad. Ethnocentric consumers exhibit foreign product derogation even when traveling to foreign destinations, whereas cosmopolitan consumers in the same context display more interest in the products local to the host nation.

We extend these findings via the concept of product ethnicity (Roth and Romeo 1992, Usunier and Cestre 2007). In line with Dimofte, Johansson, and Ronkainen (2008), who show that consumers’ preferences for global versus local brands are partly determined by their ethnicity, we find that travelers whose home country is comparatively superior in that product category (i.e., has a high product country ethnicity) behave differently depending on whether their nation’s category expertise or tradition resides in its local or its global brands. In the former case, they act in line with ethnocentric consumers and prefer global brands to some other nation’s local brands. In the latter, they act in line with cosmopolitan consumers and give local brands a try. In a sense, it could be said that the former (latter) exhibit the behavior of individuals with more (less) of a global consumer culture (Alden, Dana L., Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp, and Rajeev Batra 2006), “Consumer Attitudes Toward Marketplace Globalization: Structure, Antecedents and Consequences,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 23 (3), 227-239.). Overall, the findings of study 1 suggest that global travelers’ choices can be predictably determined by specific variables such as product ethnicity, consumer ethnocentrism, and cosmopolitanism.

The results of the second study demonstrate that the initial inclinations are malleable and that brand managers possess tactical levers that can influence travelers’ choices in predictable ways. Importantly, we add to the mix situational variables such as word of mouth. We show that, among nations with a high product ethnicity, consumers who come from a nation with a local beer tradition (i.e., Belgium) will be more reluctant to try another nation’s products when traveling abroad compared to consumers from a nation with a global beer tradition (i.e., the U.S.).

Methodologically, the experimental scenarios employed for evaluating the hypothesized theoretical relationships ensured a conservative test of consumer preferences: unlike previous research, our studies allowed participants to assume idiosyncratic levels of brand globalness and local iconicness, ensuring that choice was reduced to its most basic local-global dimension. Furthermore, given that most research on consumer cosmopolitanism has been qualitative in nature (e.g., Thompson and Tambyah 1999), we offer novel studies that contribute to the empirical validation of the construct (Cleveland et al. 2009, Riefler et al. 2012) in a setting that has not received much attention so far. In doing so, we also extend the application of the recently established product ethnicity construct (Usunier and Cestre 2007), which has been put forward as a promising construct for future research on country-of-origin effects (Usunier 2011).

In practical terms, the present research has clear and actionable implications for segmentation as well as marketing purposes of global and local companies. If the host nation does not have a tradition in a particular product category, foreign travelers will not be predisposed to choosing its local brands. This is particularly the case for travelers coming from nations that do have this tradition through strong local brands and for whom inferior foreign brands do not even enter the consideration set (i.e., they engage in overt avoidance behavior). However, for consumers hailing from nations with tradition through strong global brands or from countries of no particular tradition, the novelty of the host nation’s local brands is attractive enough as to create approach behavior and choice preference. Furthermore, local brand managers can take comfort in the knowledge that even consumers from nations of high product ethnicity in the category can be attractive targets for their brands when traveling. In general, these consumers are more open to local products, as long as there are no salient prompts that highlight the associated risks.

Brand managers should note that some of the often posed arguments for global brands—namely their importance for the global traveler (Nijsen and Douglas 2008)—have to be revised. Our research shows that consumers originating from a country with strong global brands (such as the U.S.) will be attracted by the novelty and variety local brands can provide. At the same time, global brand managers can count on two segments in particular—ethnocentrist and people originating from a country with a strong local beer tradition. Global brands stand for quality and ensure the same taste experience across all markets (Dimofte et al. 2008). Minimizing risk is particularly important for these two segments.

Finally, our research demonstrates how brand managers can shift these default choices through information cues that alter the risk perceptions associated with the local or global brands involved in choice. Although global brands feature higher equity and their attractiveness is more difficult to change, local brands can be reliably rendered more or less attractive via manipulated risk perceptions.

REFERENCES


Magnitude Representations Underlie Valuations of Prospects

Dan R. Schley, The Ohio State University, USA
Ellen Peters, The Ohio State University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

In his original conception of expected utility, Daniel Bernoulli (1738; 1954) proposed that individuals generally have diminishing marginal utility (DMU). Much in the same way that an additional spoonful of sugar provides a smaller additional taste sensation than the previous spoonful of sugar (i.e., satiation), an additional dollar of wealth provides a proportionally smaller additional utility than the previous dollar. Current conceptualizations of DMU suppose that consumers simply value additional dollars of wealth less. Rather, we suggest that consumers are simply less sensitive to greater numeric magnitudes. In the current article, we demonstrate that an individual’s ability to “value” money, goods, and services depends critically upon their ability to perceive differences in the numeric magnitudes of the money, goods, and services.

Previous research in numerical cognition has demonstrated that individuals have curvilinear representations of magnitude (Dehaene et al., 2008; Furlong and Opfer, 2009; Siegler and Opfer, 2003; Opfer and Siegler, 2007; Siegler, Thompson, and Opfer, 2009; Birnbaum, 1974; Anobile, Cicchini, and Burr, 2012; Peters et al. 2008). Although an individual may know that 1,000 is 10 times as large as 100, their subjective representation of 1,000 is often much less than 10 times as large as their subjective representation of 100. In the current article, we propose that the extent of DMU may be related to how individuals represent numeric magnitudes. In particular, we suggest that a gain of $1,000 may not be perceived as ten times as beneficial as a gain of $100 because the magnitude of “1,000” is not perceived as ten times as large as the magnitude of “100”. Across three studies, we tested this hypothesized relation in a riskless paradigm, a risky-choice paradigm, and in a consumer judgment paradigm.

In all studies, we assessed participants’ magnitude representations by using a task taken from Siegler and Opfer (2003). On each of 11 screens, participants were randomly presented a number (e.g., 268) and asked to indicate its position on a line anchored at 0 and 1,000. This task allows us to investigate participants’ sensitivities to numeric magnitudes and compare these to their sensitivities to contextualized quantities (e.g., an amount of money).

Study-1 participants (N=76) indicated their Willingness to Drive (WTD) for 12 dollar values ($5, $10, $15, $20, $30, $40, $50, $60, $70, $80, $90, $100) presented in random order. The WTD measure asked participants to indicate the furthest distance they would be willing to drive (roundtrip) to receive a specified amount of money; as this is a common consideration for individuals (e.g., driving to take advantage of a sale).

We built a log-log multilevel (MLM) model predicting WTD with the dollar amounts; the coefficient between these two variables represents the exponent parameter in the value function. The exported coefficient, $b = 0.87$, $t(68) = 8.64$, $p < .0001$, was less than 1, indicating DMU (i.e., concave value functions).

In support of our hypothesis, the results also indicated an interaction between objective dollar amounts and participants’ magnitude representations in WTD predictions, $b = 0.09$, $t(68) = 2.34$, $p = .02$, controlling for numeracy, gender, age, education, and income. Participants with more linear magnitude representations exhibited more linear value functions (i.e., less DMU) than those with less linear magnitude representations.

In study 2 (N=99), we assessed participants’ value functions with a more conventional risky-choice paradigm. We used the DEEP program for measuring prospect theory parameters (Toubia et al., 2012). On each of 16 trials, participants indicated their preference between two gambles. Results indicated a mean value function exponent parameter of $b = 0.68$, $t(90) = 26.02$, $p < .0001$, indicating DMU. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants with more linear magnitude representations exhibited more linear value functions (i.e., less DMU) than those with less linear representations, $b = 0.07$, $t(90) = 2.34$, $p = .02$.

In the previous two studies, we demonstrated that a participant’s ability to value prospects depends critically upon their ability to perceive the magnitude of the prospect they are valuing. The goal of study 3 was to extend this paradigm in an attempt to account for a well-known phenomenon in consumer pricing perceptions—the differential influence of relative and absolute discounts.

Participants (N=201) in study 3 indicated their WTD for 16 sale prices: four discount levels (10%, 15%, 20%, 25%) at four different price levels ($10, $50, $150, $400). In addition, participants were randomly assigned to see either relative discounts (e.g., was $150, now 20% off) or absolute discounts (e.g., was $150, now $30 off). We hypothesized that relative discounts inhibit consumers’ ability to represent the magnitude of the discount. Given the relationship between magnitude representations and valuation, we also hypothesized that relative discounts would produce greater DMU for discounts (i.e., more curved value functions).

Results confirmed our predictions. First, greater relative discounts were related in one analysis, to less linear magnitude representations, $b = -1.12$, $t(199) = 13.72$, $p < .0001$, and, in a second analysis, to less linear value functions, $b = -0.10$, $t(199) = 3.10$, $p = .002$. When the magnitude-representation scores were introduced into the model predicting DMU, participants with more linear magnitude representations exhibited more linear value functions, $b = 0.14$, $t(198) = 5.23$, $p < .0001$ and the influence of the condition variable became non-significant, $b = 0.05$, $t(198) = 1.28$, $p = .20$. Thus, the influence of discount frame was mediated by magnitude representations, $b_{Indirect} = -0.16$, CI [-0.21, -0.10].

The primary contribution of this article is the demonstration that the ability to represent abstract numeric magnitudes underlies how consumers value different prospects. That is, a consumer’s ability to “value” money, goods, and services depends critically upon their ability to perceive differences in the magnitudes of the money, goods, and services. Prior conceptualizations of DMU assumed that consumers value additional units less than preceding units. Our research suggests that consumers are simply less sensitive to greater numbers of units. This interpretation has rather stark implications for the conceptualization of risk aversion an intertemporal choice, and provides several novel avenues for consumer research.

REFERENCES


Table 1: Summary. Multiple regression models predicting the shape (i.e., exponent parameter) of participants’ value functions for Studies 1-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate (SE)</td>
<td>Estimate (SE)</td>
<td>Estimate (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.874*** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.684*** (0.017)</td>
<td>0.354*** (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude-</td>
<td>0.091* (0.038)</td>
<td>0.068* (0.029)</td>
<td>0.078* (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation Score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numeracy</td>
<td>0.019 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.023* (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.001 (0.054)</td>
<td>-0.045 (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.067 (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Versus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.008 (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Discount</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Condition Variable)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas the MLMs described in the text (studies 1 and 3) are more appropriate analyses, the analyses presented in the table are more easily interpretable. The above reported analysis for study 1 was conducted in the same manner as described in study 3 (i.e., exporting a value function exponent parameter for each participant).

*** p < .0001
**  p < .001
*   p < .05
The Bottom Dollar Effect: How Resource Availability Influences Perceived Value and Satisfaction

Robin L. Soster, University of Arkansas, USA
Andrew D. Gershoff, University of Texas at Austin, USA
William O. Bearden, University of South Carolina, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Mental accounting research suggests that pain of payment attenuates the pleasure of consumption and that consumers with depleted resources think about costs differently. The present research finds that, when consumers spend their last available resources (i.e., spend to zero), the perceived value of purchases decreases and satisfaction is attenuated.

Introduction and Background

Recent research has shown a number of ways in which depleting resources influence consumers’ spending decisions (Brady 2009; Huffman and Barenstein 2005; Kamakura and Du 2012; Mishra, Mishra, and Nayakankuppam 2010; Stilley, Inman, and Wakefield 2010a). For example, consumers tend to choose more prevention-oriented products as more time passes since their last paycheck, and they are more likely to choose products that are scarce when they feel financially deprived compared to others (Mishra et al. 2012; Sharma and Alter 2012). Findings also suggest that consumers spend differently, such as spending less on non-essential products during times of both macroeconomic contraction (Kamakura and Du 2012) and personal economic contraction (Brady 2009; Huffman and Barenstein 2005). Other research suggests that consumers think about both expenditures and opportunity costs differently, depending on the amount of resources at their disposal (Morewedge, Holtzman, and Epley 2007; Spiller 2011). Although it seems likely that these patterns of spending might influence consumer financial and material well-being, researchers have yet to examine whether they have implications for consumers’ satisfaction with the products that they do end up purchasing.

We extend the above findings relating to resource availability by considering how the state of consumers’ resources at the moment of purchase influences not only the consideration of costs, but also post-purchase satisfaction. We hypothesize that consumers are less satisfied with products and services when the purchase itself has “zeroed out” or exhausted a budget compared to when funds remain in a budget after a purchase. Specifically, we propose that, when consumers incur costs that exhaust their budgets (i.e., spend their bottom dollar), the marginal utility of those spent resources is significantly greater than economically equivalent costs that merely reduce budgets (i.e., non-bottom dollar spending). According to both the mental accounting literature (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998) and the value perspective of satisfaction (Johnson, Anderson, and Fornell 1995), these differences in the perceived cost of the resources spent should influence satisfaction.

Experiments

Study 1 used adult consumers (n = 169) recruited from MTurk to test whether reported feelings about spending ten dollars depends on whether the spending comes out of a budget, and whether the spending does or does not deplete available resources to zero. Findings reveal that consumers are more circumspect when spending their bottom dollar (i.e., going from $10 to $0), but only when that money comes from a depleting budget.

Study 2 employed a mixed design to examine the relationship between budget condition and satisfaction (H1) as well as the meditational role of perceived value (H2). The first factor, budget condition (exhausting versus not) was a between-subjects factor, while the second, consumption timing, was within-subjects, consumption timing (T1/T3). The context used for the study was the viewing and evaluation of short movies for an online film festival. Adult participants from MTurk (analysis based upon n = 87) were told that they had been given 30 [50] credits to spend on short films costing 10 credits each. Satisfaction and perceptions of film value were measured after participants viewed the T1 and film (when no participant’s budget was exhausted) and T3 films (when half of the participant’s budgets were exhausted). The resulting 2-way interaction of budget condition and timing supported our hypothesis; bottom dollar spending decreases satisfaction. Additionally, value perceptions fully mediated the relationship between budget condition and satisfaction at T3 (Hayes 2013).

Study 3 used a scenario-based study with students (n = 201) to further examine the relationship between bottom dollar spending and satisfaction. The study was a 2 × 2 design. All participants were to get a ticket to an attraction. A Budget factor varied whether or not buying the ticket would have exhausted a budget or not. An Acquisition factor varied whether or not participants had to use money from their budget to buy the ticket, or they were given the ticket as a gift. We predicted that, for those who had to purchase, satisfaction would be lower if their budget was exhausted compared to not. For those who received the ticket as a gift, there would be no difference by budget condition. Results supported this.

Study 4 employed a mixed design to replicate the findings from study 2 (H1; H2), while also testing whether the ease of obtaining resources had an influence on the bottom dollar effect, impacting both satisfaction with and perceived value of the films (H3). MTurk (n = 217) participants first had to complete actual work in order to earn credits. Participants’ perception of the ease of obtaining credits was measured. Participants then spent their credits at the film festival (see study 2). Half of the participants (exhausting budget condition) ran out of credits after purchasing their second film. Similar to study 2, both satisfaction and perception of value were measured after the second film was viewed.

Budget condition, perceptions of ease of obtaining resources, and the interaction of these factors were regressed on satisfaction with the second film. A significant interaction of resource availability and ease of obtaining resources supported H3. Further analysis (Model 8; Hayes 2013) revealed moderated mediation. For those spending their bottom dollar, value perceptions mediated the relationship between ease of obtaining resources and satisfaction. This mediation did not arise for participants with resources remaining.

Conclusion

While prior models of satisfaction have focused on concepts such as product performance and expectations (Oliver 1980, 1997), this research applies a mental accounting perspective to examine how satisfaction is influenced by whether or not there are remaining resources in a budget used to make a purchase. We show that, when individuals make purchases that exhaust their budgets (versus not), satisfaction is lower (H1). Findings also reveal that perceived value mediates the relationship between budget condition and satisfaction.

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(H2), and that the perceived ease of obtaining resources also influences these relationships (H3).

REFERENCES


Table 1: Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 1 (n = 160)</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Interaction</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relative Wealth;</td>
<td>Relative Wealth;</td>
<td>Absolute Wealth;</td>
<td>Absolute Wealth;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend to $0</td>
<td>Not Spend to $0</td>
<td>Spend to $0</td>
<td>Not Spend to $0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = “disagree”</td>
<td>1.975</td>
<td>3.045</td>
<td>3.093</td>
<td>3.995</td>
<td>F(1,165) = 9.827, p &lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = “agree”</td>
<td>4.205</td>
<td>3.591</td>
<td>3.488</td>
<td>3.187</td>
<td>F(1,165) = 10.946, p &lt; .01</td>
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<tr>
<td>“I will think extra carefully about spending this money”</td>
<td>4.245</td>
<td>3.909</td>
<td>3.688</td>
<td>3.376</td>
<td>F(1,165) = 8.357, p &lt; .01</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 2 (n = 85)</th>
<th></th>
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<th>Interaction</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low resources;</td>
<td>Low resources;</td>
<td>High resources;</td>
<td>High resources;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spend to 0 Credits</td>
<td>Spend to 20 Credits</td>
<td>Spend to 40 Credits</td>
<td>Spend to 20 Credits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = “extremely dissatisfied”</td>
<td>4.623</td>
<td>5.751</td>
<td>5.707</td>
<td>6.632</td>
<td>F(1, 71) = 6.383, p &lt; .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = “extremely satisfied”</td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td>1.898</td>
<td>1.493</td>
<td>1.429</td>
<td>F(1, 197) = 9.057, p &lt; .01</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Study 3 (n = 201)</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Interaction</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low resources;</td>
<td>Low resources;</td>
<td>High resources;</td>
<td>High resources;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self Pays</td>
<td>Other Pays (Windfall)</td>
<td>Self Pays</td>
<td>Other Pays (Windfall)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4 = “extremely dissatisfied”</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>1.3514</td>
<td>0.1758</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = “extremely satisfied”</td>
<td>-0.0046</td>
<td>0.0711</td>
<td>-0.0046</td>
<td>0.9484</td>
<td>-0.1451</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Study 4 (n = 217)</th>
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<th></th>
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<th>Interaction</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low resources;</td>
<td>Low resources;</td>
<td>High resources;</td>
<td>High resources;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difficult to Recoup</td>
<td>Easy to Recoup</td>
<td>Difficult to Recoup</td>
<td>Easy to Recoup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = “extremely dissatisfied”</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.996</td>
<td>0.26, t = -2.74, p &lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = “extremely satisfied”</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.1083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Findings
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Round numbers have been defined as multiples of the powers of the base (e.g., multiples of 10 in the commonly used base 10 number system, see Dehaene and Mehler 1992) or as numbers whose factorial content includes 2, 5, or 10 (Sigurd 1988). Intuitively, most individuals would likely agree that 5, 40, 125, or 3740 are “rounder” numbers than 6, 41, 128, or 3739. Individuals often employ such numbers “to indicate not only the quantity represented by the number itself, but also quantities that could be more precisely described by numbers close in value to the reference number” (Jansen and Pollmann 2001, p. 190). Round numbers are more common than other numbers in communication contexts, conducive to individuals’ greater liking thereof. They are often used as milestones and granted special meaning even when none is rationally warranted (e.g., rational investors prefer round numbers for the prices of the stocks they buy—Bradley et al. 2004, Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl 2001). The fondness for round numbers is not indiscriminate. It seems to largely apply to categories that involve metrics associated with commonplace categories or phenomena. For categories involving unfamiliar natural or random phenomena, a paradoxically opposite effect occurs whereby round numbers are suspiciously fluent and best avoided. This comes from the perception that, in unfamiliar contexts that feature randomness, the occurrence of an event that can be precisely quantified via something as common as a round number is surprising and considered highly unlikely. Anecdotal evidence includes the scientific expedition to measure Mt. Everest that came up with a perfect 29,000 ft. altitude but arbitrarily added another 2 feet before making it public because it was assumed that the perfectly round measurement would be disbelieved. Research on lottery number picks has found that out of the six least commonly played numbers in Canada’s 6/49 Lotto game a full half are round numbers (Stern and Cover 1989).

Round numbers thus are preferred when describing the magnitudes of known objects and situations (i.e., the principle of favorite quantities—see Jansen and Pollman 2001), but also shunned and distrusted when paired with unfamiliar phenomena and quantities. In the latter instance, we face the unusual case of enhanced levels of fluency and familiarity which, instead of increasing liking and creating approach, raise suspicion and produce avoidance via an illusion of lie effect.

Study 1

In one set of items, 146 participants were asked which one of three provided numbers was the correct answer to a series of trivia-type questions. One of the three options was always a round number. Out of the remaining two non-round numbers, one was relatively easier to process due to featuring repeated digits. Across the board, the round number was the most frequently picked if the question referred to common decisions or events, but a non-round choice prevailed for unfamiliar random situations or natural events. The fluent non-round number was always the second most frequent choice. Early in the experimental session, participants were also asked to provide a 4-digit number that was personally relevant to them. About 50 minutes and several studies later, they were asked to assess the probability that a certain number of Panda bears were left in the wild worldwide (on an 8-point likelihood scale anchored at extremely unlikely and extremely likely). This number was extracted by the experimental software from the initial 4-digit number question and inconspicuously inserted in the Panda bears query. Out of the 4-digit numbers participants provided, 39 were round and 107 were not. Data showed that participants thought it less likely for the number of Panda bears to be round than non-round. Since the fluency of the self-generated, personally relevant number was uniformly high, this reinforces that the processing of round numbers is peculiar. Finally, participants were offered more or less difficult to process stimuli as the two possible numeric answers to questions that dealt with random events. In the typical case, despite a larger 16-size font used for the round number (vs. 12-point font for non-rounds), the non-round number was the preferred choice. The illusion of lie effect emerged even though the round number was undistorted and thus more perceptually fluent.

Study 2

The second study assessed the extent to which the illusion of lie emerges and has consequences in terms of consumer willingness to believe product claims. We looked for marketing communications that are more likely to allow for some doubt, and infomercials and competitor-generated brand information (i.e., comparative advertising) were relevant contexts. Participants looked at a series of product claims that had purportedly been made in infomercials, half of which had been proven true and half false. Participants had to assess the extent to which the statements were true on 7-point likelihood scales. In the typical case, a statement claimed that a particular piece of gym equipment improves body strength in just 28 or 25 minutes (or that mental exercise bolstered memory performance by 60 vs. 63%). The round-number claim was disbelieved significantly more, in particular by those for whom the category was less familiar. When a competitor could have mentioned it in an advertisement, the seating capacity of a new aircraft was more likely to be 248 rather than 250 passengers.

Conclusions

The illusion of lie effect refers to the unique information processing case wherein the fluency of round numbers produces avoidance if associated with random stimuli or unfamiliar claims. Marketing communications that employ numerical claims demonstrate the effect when consumers are unfamiliar with the product or its category. Two more studies are currently pursued in order to disentangle the processing mechanisms behind the illusion of lie effect. The discussion above suggests that either a disfluency explanation or a set of naive theories that individuals hold about when [non]round numbers are appropriate may be at work.

REFERENCES


Descriptive Norm as a Moderator in Predicting Fundraising Responses from Involvement and Social Influence Susceptibility

Huimin Xu, The Sage Colleges, USA
Ada Leung, Penn State Berks, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

With cuts in government funding, a lot of vital societal functions from medical research to disaster relief increasingly rely on charitable giving from individuals. Research has looked into characteristics of individuals who are more likely to give, and characteristics that may boost a fundraising message’s effectiveness. Our research seeks to understand interactions between certain characteristics of audience and fundraising messages in shaping favorable responses to fundraising messages. As a contribution to the marketing and charitable giving literature, this research represents the first examination of descriptive norms’ moderating effect on the relationships between involvement, social influence susceptibility and fundraising message responses. We demonstrate that taking descriptive norms into consideration can boost the effectiveness of targeting in obtaining donor support. Another contribution of this research is that it extends prior work on descriptive norms by showing that highlighting the prevalence of donations does not always increase fundraising effectiveness. Instead, fundraising campaigns may benefit more from portraying a lack of popularity in donating when targeting potential donors who are highly involved.

In the context of fundraising, high involvement would predispose one to respond positively to the message. However, the strength of this relation would vary depending on one message characteristic, i.e., whether a descriptive norm of donating being prevalent is stressed in a fundraising message. When a message portrays a descriptive norm in donating to the related organization, it leads to a perception of gaining adequate financial resources. Kingma (1989) posits that if charitable giving is purely driven by altruism, the knowledge of an increase in contributions by others with $1 would reduce one’s own contribution with $1. Others’ contributions are to some degree seen as substitutes for one’s own. Subsequently an individual may deem his/her contribution as less necessary, since the soliciting organization’s goal is already met. This is termed a “crowding out” effect (Abrams and Schmitz 1984) which would dampen the more involved individuals’ natural tendency of responding favorably to fundraising. In contrast, when a message depicts an absence of norm in giving, an involved, caring individual would infer the severity of financial shortage and thus would resonate more with the solicitation.

Perceived descriptive norm has a different moderating role for another audience characteristic, i.e., social influence susceptibility. A socially susceptible reader/viewer is on the watch for the presence or absence of “social proof” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) depicted in a message. Doing the popular thing provides benefits that include boosted certainty about the worthiness of a cause/organization, feeling good about being socially approved, and earning a reputation among certain social groups. When a prevalence descriptive norm is portrayed in a fundraising message, the more socially susceptible individuals would feel more eager to jump onto the bandwagon to enjoy these benefits, thus they would respond more favorably to the message. However, when a message reveals that few people donate, donating is unable to provide potential donors such social benefits. The association between social influence susceptibility and favorable responses would fare weaker when an unpopularity descriptive norm is present, relative to when a prevalence descriptive norm is present.

To examine these two interactions, an experiment was conducted among 166 college students. Descriptive norms in fundraising messages were manipulated (“many donate” vs. “few donate”). Pre-existing involvement with the topical non-profit organization and social influence susceptibility (Bearden, Netemeyer and Teel 1989) were measured. The key outcome variable is the immediate cognitive and affective responses to a fundraising message. A regression that includes descriptive norm appeal type, involvement, susceptibility to social influence, and two interaction terms supports the involvement x descriptive norm hypothesis (p < .016). Specifically, in the “few donate” condition, higher involvement predicts more favorable responses (r = .47, p < .001); but in the “many donate” condition, this positive association is statistically weaker (r = .26, p = .02). The susceptibility x descriptive norm interaction emerges marginally significant (p = .06). For the “few donate” condition, social influence susceptibility doesn’t predict favorable responses (r = .1, ns); but in the “many donate” condition, greater susceptibility translates to more favorable responses (r = .42, p < .001). Meanwhile, greater involvement and greater social influence susceptibility both predict more favorable message responses.

These findings bear managerial implications for what is known as “social norm marketing” (Berkowitz 2005). Sometimes people’s normative beliefs, whether rooted in reality or not, are entrenched and not readily changeable in the short run through advertising (Polonec, Major, and Atwood 2006). Further, ethical questions arise when fundraisers mis-present descriptive norms in an attempt to gain certain advantages. In such circumstances fundraisers would be better served if they examine and accept the reality of normative belief to decide who would be the most promising audience to target, e.g., the more involved, or the more socially impressionable?

Although this research conceptually treats descriptive norm as a moderator, the results also shed light on norm’s role as a focal predictor. Its lack of main effect echoes earlier research that tested the causal link between norms and behaviors with mixed results. The current findings suggest that the choice of descriptive norm appeal in advertisements would largely depend on characteristics of the target audience. Although for-profit advertisements’ common practice is to highlight “popularity” descriptive norms, this strategy would not be effective for fundraising when target audience is very involved. Unintuitively, fundraising campaigns may benefit more from employing the opposite normative strategy when target audience are highly involved with and attached to the focal brand.

REFERENCES


In previous studies, the positive influence of MD promotions offset the objectively larger economic values of SD promotions. In study 3b, I tested whether the positive influence of MD promotions could offset both objectively larger economic and face values of SD promotions. Participants were randomly assigned to the SD (30% off) or the MD (15% off plus an additional 10% off) condition. Results indicated that purchase intentions and perceived rarity in the MD condition were significantly greater than in the SD condition, ps < .04, once again confirming mediation, b\_salience = 0.32, CI [0.08, 0.66]. Thus, the influence of MD promotions appears to offset contrasting influences of both economic and face values.

Whereas I measured perceived rarity in previous studies, I manipulated rarity in study 4. Participants were presented 10 previous purchases from a store. In the MD_Rare condition 2 of the purchases had MD promotions whereas 8 purchases had MD promotions in the MD_Frequent condition. Participants were then presented a novel MD promotion. Results indicated that purchase intentions and perceived rarity in the MD_Rare condition were higher than in the MD_Frequent condition, ps < .05. Mediation results confirmed that the manipulating the perceived rarity of MD promotions influenced purchase intentions by way of decreasing perceived rarity of the promotion, b\_salience = 0.60, CI [0.30, 0.99].

The results of five studies confirm the initial hypothesis, that MD promotions are perceived as rarer, and thus, more attractive than SD promotions. Whereas Chen and Rao (2007) supposed that MD promotions were preferred by consumers because of erroneous processing of multiple percent changes (i.e., 40% off = 20% off plus 25% off), the results of all five studies control for this possible effect by requiring the face value of the MD conditions to be the same or less (study 3b) than the face value of the SD conditions. Future research should seek to differentiate the roles of erroneous processing of multiple percentage changes (Chen and Rao 2007), perceived rarity, and mental account (Thaler 1985; 199) in MD promotions.

The current research provides a novel perspective for the influence of MD promotions. These findings may also have similar implications for domains outside of price discounts (e.g., loyalty program points, changes in package size, bundle composition) where perceived rarity of an offer enhances its attractiveness. While the current research concerned participants’ immediate price perceptions, subsequent research should seek to investigate the effect of MD promotions on future price expectations as well (DelVecchio et al. 2007).

REFERENCES
When 15% Off Plus 10% Off is More Than 30% Off: Multiple-Discount Promotions are Preferred to Larger Single-Discount Promotions


Table 1: Summary. Means and standard errors for purchase intent and perceived rarity in all studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Likelihood of purchase</th>
<th>Likelihood that product will go on sale for lower in the near future (i.e., perceived rarity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (SE)</td>
<td>Mean (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 1 (N = 108)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD (40% off)</td>
<td>4.92 (.29)</td>
<td>3.95 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD (20% off + 20% off)</td>
<td>5.78 (.23)</td>
<td>3.00 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD (20% off + 25% off)</td>
<td>5.75 (.26)</td>
<td>3.11 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2 (N = 121)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD ($20 off)</td>
<td>4.89 (.19)</td>
<td>4.33 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD ($10 off + $10 off)</td>
<td>5.53 (.16)</td>
<td>3.95 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3a (N = 117)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD (40% off)</td>
<td>5.46 (.22)</td>
<td>3.74 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD (20% off + 20% off)</td>
<td>5.92 (.16)</td>
<td>3.00 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD (20% off + 10% off + 10% off)</td>
<td>6.05 (.15)</td>
<td>3.07 (.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3b (N = 120)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD (30% off)</td>
<td>4.91 (.23)</td>
<td>4.85 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD (15% off + 10% off)</td>
<td>5.53 (.20)</td>
<td>4.12 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 4 (N = 99)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD_Frequent</td>
<td>4.33 (.20)</td>
<td>4.31 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD_Rare</td>
<td>5.04 (.17)</td>
<td>3.19 (.18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers may approach product choice when hungry, tired, aroused or distracted. Such motivational states have extensive effects on product judgment and choice, including increases in perceived attractiveness (Read et al. 1998), purchase (Mela et al. 1996), variety seeking (Goukens et al. 2007), and impulsive choice (van den Bergh et al. 2008).

In addition to general trends towards underestimation, a variety of factors systematically bias one’s perception of food amount (Gleaves, Williamson, & Barker, 1993). Consumers’ calorie estimates are particularly prone to various distortions. People often have biased estimates of calories (Chernev and Chandon 2010, Chandon and Wansink 2007). Such errors are often in the direction of calorie underestimation (Lansky and Brownell 1982, Lichtman et al. 1992, Livingstone and Black 2003).

In the current work, we wish to examine how a common physiological state, hunger, influences calorie estimation. Counter to prior thinking regarding the influence of need on size estimate (Beasley et al. 2004, Bruner and Goodman 1947, van Koningsbruggen et al. 2011, Veltcamp et al. 2011) we show that hunger may actually lead to a reduction in calorie estimates.

In our first study, 67 participants were recruited outside a large cafeteria in a large Northeastern University. The setting was chosen to maximize distribution of hunger levels, since we assumed some participants would approach us before lunch (hungry), and some after (sated). Participants estimated calories in four baked goods: muffin, bagel, donut, and brownie.

After estimating calories, participants were asked to report on their hunger level on a 9-point scale. They were also asked to report whether they had eaten lunch yet or not (binary). We analyzed the data using a repeated measures mixed model, with item type as the repeated factor and an unstructured covariance matrix.

Participants estimated a lower number of calories when hungry: F(1,65)=7.01, p=.01. Using a median split on hunger, high hunger participants estimated a lower average number of calories (255.52) than did low hunger participants (311.94), a decrease of 18%. We found similar results using the binary measure of having had lunch. Participants who have not yet had lunch (hungry) reported a lower number of calories (263.87) than did those who have already had lunch (305.99): F(1,68)=.04.

In our second and third studies, we manipulated hunger by asking half of our participants (N=120) to fast for five hours. In both studies the manipulation increased self-reported hunger (<.0001). Participants estimated calories in three baked goods: muffin, bagel, and cookie. Given high levels of noise in prior studies, we asked participants about adeptness at calorie estimation and eliminated participants who self-reported lack of adeptness at calorie estimation (below bottom quartile [2] on a 9-point scale rating of “How good are you at estimating calories”). For other participants (N=106), there was a significant effect of fasting on calorie estimation: F(1,100)=6.87, p =.01. Average estimated calories were lower for fasting participants (M=252.79) than for non-fasting participants (M=305.17).

The third study aimed to extend the generalizability of the previous studies by showing similar with grocery items containing more than one serving, and a correspondingly greater amount of calories. This would also extend the relevance of our findings from discrete items for immediate consumption (baked goods) to grocery settings, where purchases are made for potential consumption over time. Half of our participants (N=72) were asked to fast for five hours prior to the study. Participants estimated calories six grocery items (crackers, cookies, chips). As before, we eliminated participants who self-reported lack of adeptness at calorie estimation. We also eliminated very extreme observations - 4SDs above the mean. Among those participants, fasting produced a significant effect on calorie evaluations: F(1,59)=5.4, p=.02. Given the larger heterogeneity of the sample, age was included as a covariate. Fasting participants evaluated the products as containing fewer calories (M=1465.21) than did non-fasting participants (1969.18), a reduction of over 25%.

The findings highlight the fact that at least under some circumstances, visceral motivations can lead people to perceive less of a desired product property rather than more of it. Specifically, a greater need for food (hunger) made people think foods provide less energy (calories). Such findings are not only of interest in themselves, but might also explain prior results showing hunger leads people to purchase more, and higher-calorie, groceries (Nisbett and Kanouse 1969, Mela et. al 1996, Tal and Wansink 2013).

It is possible that motivated perception effects are in fact a rarity, or occur only in some cases, and our opposite effects in other cases. For instance, motivated perception effects may occur when a person needs to act to obtain a product, but not in the judgment of a product that’s available for use. Alternately, it may be that the level of consciousness of a particular goal affects whether motivated perception or other effects occur.

It may also be that motivated perception effects occur for some domains but not for others. For instance, physical size dimensions might be more easily affected by wishful seeing, while other quantity dimensions such as quantity and calories may not be affected. Size, being a more directly perceived dimension, may be biased in a direction consistent with motivated perception, while the more abstract dimension of calories may be affected differently, according to shifting functional needs.

Our initial suspicion is that these effects constitute a case of functional perception. People often perceive their environment in terms of how it allows them to act and fulfill their needs (Gibson 1979/1986, Schall et al. 2010, Witt et al. 2005). Rather than evaluating stimuli objectively, they evaluate them in terms of how they fulfill current needs. Consequently, evaluations of dimension such as weight and calories would be distorted by current hunger. Specifically, when is hungrier and needs more food, any given quantity of food would appear to provide less sustenance. This is because relative to one’s needs it provides less sustenance, and quantities are perceived not in an absolute sense, but relative to one’s needs. Consequently, hunger would lead to judgments of lower calories.

The distorted food perceptions demonstrated in the current study may subsequently affect quantity purchased and consumed. Accordingly, we might wish to help consumers debias their judgment, for instance by providing or stressing objective information. Consumers themselves may wish to be particularly careful about their judgments and choices under conditions that lead to biased judgment.

REFERENCES

When Hungry People See Leaner Meals: Hunger Reduces Calorie Evaluations


Tipping Points in Consumer Choice: The Case of Collections
Leilei Gao, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Yanliu Huang, Drexel University, USA
Itamar Simonson, Stanford University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The classic account of escalation of commitment suggests that decision makers have a tendency to become locked into courses of action by throwing good money after bad in dealing with losing projects (Staw, 1976, 1981). Most of the research in this area has focused on its negative consequences, the psychological, organizational and project-related causes of such behaviors, and the procedures to help people avoid the escalation trap (Staw & Ross, 1987). Very little, if any, research has examined the point at which the tendency to escalate is triggered. The present research examines this question in a unique setting of consumer collections. Collection is important to both consumers and marketers, yet we know very little of how consumer decisions about collections occur and why some collection programs are highly successful (e.g. Barbie dolls, baseball cards) whereas others fail. We propose that making a decision to collect (e.g. antiques, books) often originates from consumers escalating their commitment to something they have already had but was not initially intended to collect.

Prior research has also suggested that an important explanation of the commitment dilemma is the decision makers’ desire to appear rational in their decisions (Staw, 1981). That is, by committing new and additional resources an individual who has suffered a setback could attempt to “turn the situation around” or to demonstrate the ultimate rationality of his or her original course of action. Relevantly, in the domain of collection, the point at which consumers start to escalate their commitment by actively acquiring more products is usually when maintaining the current possession level becomes difficult to justify. But at what point are individuals likely to experience a lack of justification with their current possessions?

First, we propose that there are often good reasons to possess one item in a product series. Owning such an object, say a Starbucks City Mug, can satisfy consumers’ utilitarian needs. The first item in a collectible product series chosen by a consumer is also likely to be his or her favorite, thereby enhancing its value. Therefore, unless a decision to collect has been made, or at least entertained, consumers are unlikely to buy additional items of the same type.

How then do decisions about collections occur? We propose that possessing a small number of collectible items could become the collection tipping point because it represents a disequilibrium that is “neither here nor there,” which is difficult to justify and thus prompt a change. Without an intention to form a collection, possessing a few items in a large collection series fails to provide the psychological benefits of having a collection. Even worse, whereas some collectible items have utilitarian value regardless of their collection status, ownership of a few such items is redundant and wasteful and may also reflect an apparent failure as a collector. One way to resolve the conflict, however, is to escalate one’s commitment to start a collection.

We conducted four studies to test these hypotheses. In study 1, participants were endowed zero, one, or two boxes of collectible mints and were asked to choose between getting another box of collectible mint or a different gift of equivalent value. A logistic regression with condition number as independent variable and choice as dependent variable yielded a significant condition main effect (Wald χ² (2) = 4.12, ß = -.815, p < .05). Consistent with our hypothesis, compared to those in the zero-mint condition, those in possession of one box of collectible mints were no more likely to choose another collectible mint as their additional reward (47% versus 45%, p = NS). In addition, we found that owners of two boxes of collectible mints were significantly more likely to choose mint over the pen as an additional reward than owners of zero or one box of collectible mints (69%; Wald χ² (1) = 4.17, ß = 1.17, p < .05).

In Study 2 participants were endowed with 0, 1, 2, or 3 collectibles in a different collection domain, fridge magnets. We found that participants’ likelihood of starting a magnet collection differed significantly across the four conditions (χ² (3) = 7.939, p < .05). Compared to those assigned no magnet, those assigned just one were no more likely to choose another in the same series (32% versus 40%, p = NS). However, we found that those with two or three magnets were more likely to choose a magnet than those with zero or one (χ² (1) = 4.55, p < .05). The difference in the choice share between owners of two and three magnets, however, was not significant (58% versus 55%, p = NS).

In Study 3 we replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in the collection domain of Starbucks coffee mugs. The results of Study 3 provided strong support for our conceptualization by demonstrating the mediating role of decision justification on the influence of possession level on collection commitment. In addition, it shows that the collection tipping point effect is not affected by the total collection size.

Study 4 showed that the effect was eliminated when owners of two items could easily justify their possessions, that is, when they perceived the two items come in a pair. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications accordingly.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Most spending decisions involve conflict in one form or another. Even ordinary decisions like whether to dine out or eat at home can create conflict. Research on self-control typically studies conflicts resulting from tradeoffs between product quality and price (Haws and Poyner 2008; Okada 2005; Wilcox et al. 2011)—situations where consumers contemplate purchasing attractive products that are considered indulgent, frivolous expenses (Kivetz and Simonson 2002). Oftentimes, however, consumers’ spending conflicts involve quality and quantity. Quantity-quality tradeoffs occur when consumers decide between higher-quality products in smaller numbers versus lower-quality products in greater numbers. For example, buying a single pair of designer brand shoes or spending the same amount of money on multiple pairs of non-designer brand shoes. Quantity-quality tradeoffs also occur when consumers decide between higher-quality products in smaller volume versus lower-quality products in larger volume. For instance, for the same price, consumers can buy a small jar of premium mustard versus a larger bottle of regular mustard, or a standard-sized bottle of a national brand of shampoo versus a jumbo-sized bottle of a generic brand. In such situations, tension results from the desire for better quality versus greater quantity.

Despite their prevalence, quantity-quality conflicts remain largely unexplored. Moreover, although quantity considerations involve self-control (Wertenbroch 1998) little is known about how self-control affects quantity-quality tradeoffs, and it is non-intuitive what this effect would be. That is, because high self-control consumers tradeoff quality for price, they also may prefer quantity over quality because (1) greater quantity typically reduces price on a per-unit basis, and (2) higher quality is typically associated with indulgent expenses. We propose, however, that high self-control consumers have an aversion to quantity, which causes them tradeoff quantity in favor of quality. According to prior research, consumers believe small package sizes are an effective way to control consumption (Wansink and Park 2000). The tendency to avoid larger packages is so robust that consumers pay higher prices per-unit by purchasing smaller packages of products whose consumption they want to control (Wertenbroch 1998). For example, regular smokers buy a single pack when they could save money per-unit by purchasing ten-pack cartons. This willingness to forgo price discounts on larger packages occurs in categories including potato chips, cookies, beer and ice cream. This research implies that consumers focused on moderating consumption experience greater conflict from higher quantity, and therefore limit consumption quantity. In the case of high self-control consumers, because they focus heavily on controlling the amount they consume (Redden and Haws 2013), they should place less importance on quantity when facing conflicts involving quantity. Accordingly, we propose that when consumers face quantity-quality conflicts, higher levels of self-control correspond to a greater focus on controlling consumption. This enhanced focus on control leads high self-control consumers to place less importance on quantity and to select higher-quality products in lower quantity over lower-quality products in greater quantity. Consequently, high self-control consumers gravitate toward indulgent products, like premium quality and designer products, simply to avoid excessive quantity. We refer to this phenomenon as quantity aversion.

Importantly, whereas most prior research has focused on conflicts involving indulgence, we propose that quantity aversion extends to non-indulgent product categories. This occurs because high self-control consumers regulate behavior across widely ranging situations (Tangney et al. 2004) and do so relatively automatically, without much conscious deliberation (Fishbach et al. 2003; Wilcox et al. 2009). Oftentimes, well-ingrained habits are executed not only in situations that require them, but also in contexts that bear strong resemblance to situations in which the habit was formed (Wood and Neal 2009). Thus, high self-control consumers may limit consumption quantity as a generalized response to conflicts involving quantity. Therefore, they exhibit quantity aversion even in categories that do not provoke concerns about over-indulgence (e.g., dishwashing soap).

Five studies present conflicts involving quantity and show that high self-control consumers are quantity averse. Study 1 is a conjoint study that shows that high (vs. low) self-control consumers place less weight on quantity in tradeoffs among quantity, quantity and price. In studies 2 and 3, we reasoned that prompting high self-control consumers to stop regulating their behavior would attenuate their quantity aversion. Using a depletion manipulation, study 2 presents a quantity-quality conflict and shows that high self-control consumers prefer a low quantity/high quality option (i.e., one pair of designer brand shoes) over a high quantity/low quality option (i.e., three pairs of non-designer shoes) in a no depletion condition. However, this effect is eliminated when consumers are depleted and lack willpower to exert self-control (Baumeister et al. 1994). Using a licensing manipulation, study 3 shows that quantity aversion occurs in a no licensing condition but is attenuated when consumers feel licensed to lower self-control (Khan and Dhar 2006). Study 3 also demonstrates that quantity aversion in a non-indulgent category (i.e., dishwashing soap).

Study 4 delineates the underlying process. It shows that quantity aversion does not occur in the absence of a quantity conflict, but facing conflict involving quantity, high self-control consumers focus on constraining consumption. In turn, quantity becomes less important and they prefer a low quantity/high quality option over a high quantity/low quality option (again, dishwashing soap). Finally, study 5 moves away from the lab and tests for quantity aversion in a field study. Controlling for price-per-unit-purchased, we find that high (vs. low) self-control consumers tend to purchase fewer items on a routine trip to the supermarket.

These findings are significant because research typically conceptualizes self-control failure as purchasing indulgent products and associates good self-control with avoiding higher-priced, hedonic luxuries. But we show that high self-control consumers actually prefer higher-priced, higher-quality options over higher-quantity options. This is surprising because greater quantity options (e.g., larger packages, bulk packaging) typically reduce price-per-unit, which should attract consumers with high self-control. Our findings are also novel because they suggest that encountering quantity conflict triggers quantity aversion (study 4), while the actual need to control consumption is less important. That is, quantity aversion occurs even in categories where over-indulgence is unlikely, suggesting that quantity aversion is an automatic response to quantity conflict.
REFERENCES
Giving Time vs. Giving Money: Which is Better for Moral Cleansing?
Jing Wan, University of Toronto, Canada
Pankaj Aggarwal, University of Toronto, Canada

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Time and money are both important but distinct concepts. Spending time allows one to feel personally connected to others (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009), and consider emotional meaning rather than economic utility (Liu and Aaker, 2008). On the other hand, compared to time, money is more functional and less personally connected (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009); simply the thought of money increases feelings of independence and reduces helping behavior (Vohs, Meade, and Goode, 2006).

One stream of research that has employed the concepts of time and money is the work on moral transgression. After committing a moral transgression, the transgressor is motivated to compensate in some way, to right their wrongs. People like to cleanse themselves when their moral identity is threatened, whether the cleansing be metaphorical or physical (Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin, 2009; Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006). Further, donating money and time are seen as substitutable methods to compensate for past bad behaviour (Sachdeva et al, 2009; Tetlock, et al, 2002), and donating time and donating money are often interchangeable (Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz, 1996; Bryant et al, 2003).

Given that the psychological meaning of these two constructs is very distinct, compensating with time versus money should lead to different degrees of “cleanliness”. In other words, if people use donation as a means to absolve oneself of the guilt of a past transgression, then the perceived severity of the transgression should depend on whether they donated time or money. Since time is associated with personal connection (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009) and emotional meaning (Liu and Aaker, 2008), it may well be the case that volunteering time allows the transgressor to feel closer and more self-connected to the charitable cause, such that donating time, relative to donating money, is a more effective “cleanser”. On the other hand, it could be argued that money is perceived to be a tool, a means to enable one to attain goals (Lea and Webley, 2006; Vohs and Baumeister, 2011). Thus, “cleansing” with money rather than time may be more effective because one can use money as an instrument to directly “pay off” the psychological debt of the immoral transgression with the donation. Support for this premise come from a pilot study in which we found that activating the concept of money rather than time cues exchange norms (Aggarwal and Zhang, 2006). Money-primed participants expressed higher levels of exchange orientation (mean_time = 2.88, mean_money = 3.52, F(1, 74) = 4.58, p < .04), suggesting that donating money may more readily cue feelings of quid pro quo, and thus be more effective in paying off the initial moral transgression.

In three studies, we demonstrate that donating money and volunteering time lead to different evaluations of the initial transgression. In Study 1, we show that donating money allows the transgressor to feel better and less immoral about the initial transgression. Moral transgression was manipulated through a scenario describing a student cheating on an exam. Subsequently, the participants read about an upcoming fundraising event held by the Leukemia Society for cancer research. Participants were asked to donate for the cause in time or in money. Results show that participants who donated money felt less bad about the earlier transgression than participants who volunteered time (M_donate_money = 3.95, M_donate_time = 5.48, F(1, 37) = 9.64, p < .01).

Given the greater level of exchange-orientation of money over time, these results suggest that donating money can directly pay off the “moral debt” of the initial transgression. Further, since spending time allows one to feel personally connected (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009), volunteering time to a specific cause (the Leukemia Society) may make one feel close to it resulting in an inability to transfer the “moral credits” and apply them to the initial immoral behaviour (cheating in the exam).

In Study 2, we examine conditions where volunteering time can link the moral act of compensation with the initial transgression. We facilitate the transfer of moral credits by making the domain of transgression and moral behavior the same. Participants were told to imagine that they had rejected a classmate from their group project because they felt uncomfortable with that student’s disability. Subsequently, they were exposed to either Transport Canada’s awareness campaign for environmentally sustainable transportation or accessible transportation for disabled people. Donation in time or money was sought. When the domain of the transgression and compensation did not match, those who donated money felt less bad about their transgression (M_donate_money = 7.54, M_donate_time = 3.97, t(96) = 1.90, p = .06), but when the domains matched, those who volunteered time felt the same as those who donated money (M_donate_money = 7.50, M_donate_time = 7.07, t(96) = 1.05, p = .30).

Study 3 replicates these effects using actual rather than hypothetical transgressions. Participants first filled out a survey about their eating habits including questions about chicken and egg consumption. Subsequently, they read an article about poultry farming practices and the inhumane conditions that chickens lived in. Next, they read about either an upcoming environmental event or a farm animals-related fundraising event, and were encouraged to donate time or money. Results mirrored those of Study 2. When the domains matched, those who volunteered time felt the same about consuming chickens/eggs as those who donated money (M_donate_money = 3.85, M_donate_time = 3.49, t(138) = .62, p = .54). When the domains did not match, those who donated money felt less bad about consuming chickens/eggs (M_donate_money = 3.02, M_donate_time = 4.11, t(138) = 2.29, p < .05). In fact, those who volunteered time in a different domain felt equally bad as participants in a control group who did not compensate at all (M_donate = 4.11, M_control = 4.34, t(138) = .64, p = .52).

These findings demonstrate that time and money are not substitutes for each other for moral compensation and that compensating with time may be less effective in “cleaning” past transgressions. This work may have important implications for instances of repeat transgressions: if people feel cleansed subsequent to donating money, they may be more likely to commit similar transgressions in the future: donating money may be better for alleviating negative feelings relating to the transgressions committed, but volunteering time may be better for restraining individuals from transgressing in the future.

REFERENCES
Table 1: Summary of All Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Volunteering Time</th>
<th>Donating Money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV = Average of guilty, immoral, harmful</td>
<td>5.48³</td>
<td>3.95⁶</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Volunteering Time</th>
<th>Donating Money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV = Average of guilty, immoral, wrong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Domain</td>
<td>7.07³</td>
<td>7.50³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Domain</td>
<td>8.37⁶</td>
<td>7.54⁵</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 3</th>
<th>Volunteering Time</th>
<th>Donating Money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV = Average of guilty, wrong, harmful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Domain</td>
<td>3.49³</td>
<td>3.85³ᵇ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Domain</td>
<td>4.11ᵇ</td>
<td>3.02ᵃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control (no compensation)</td>
<td>4.34ᵇ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers with different superscripts are significantly different at p < .05


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

When do consumers prefer consistency and when will they be more open to change and novel choice options? A large literature has investigated how aspects of the choice context and time horizon can affect openness to change and different options. We propose a novel additional influence, determined by the self-relevance of the choice and how people anticipate future outcomes.

People try to understand what leads to future outcomes, to form anticipations, and to change the future outcomes for the better if possible. In a world of pure certainty, the mechanism behind a causal process is known, and consistency is guaranteed so that predictions can be made based on the causal mechanism and past experiences. In a realistic world full of uncertainty, however, predictions are much harder to make. First, the causal mechanism is more complex - a single outcome is determined by a multitude of various factors, some of which may even work in opposition. Second, even if a major causal mechanism is identified, past experiences are not specifically instrumental, since consistency between the past and future is indefinite.

Earlier research on the causal reasoning behind predictions of uncertain events mostly focused on differences in causal mechanisms (see Ahn & Kalish 2000, and Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland & Hastie, 2009 for a review). We highlight the belief in internal consistency (i.e. that the nature of the system relevant for the causal mechanism is consistent, and endorses transitivity between the past and the future). Following prior research, we argue that this belief is as important as causal beliefs in the process of predicting future outcomes. If “the causal mechanism mediates between causes and effects” (Ahn & Kalish, 2000), then internal consistency is the link that connects past causal processes and future outcomes. Internal consistency directly depends on the active subject in the system (e.g. the person playing a game), upon which the mechanism belief also resides. Further, we propose that when optimistic or pessimistic predictions of anticipated future outcomes are formed, choices between maintaining or disrupting their own perceived internal consistency may also be affected by the anticipated outcomes.

Consumer research has shown that choices constitute a common means of self-representation (Ariely & Levav 2000; Kim & Drolet 2003), with different choices reflecting different aspects of one’s self-concept (Stephens, Markus & Townsend, 2007). Therefore, in this paper we look at game scenarios where people interact with simple objects in a short sequence and are faced with choices of self-relevance. We examine the role of identity continuity on predictions in the pilot study and the pretest of Study 2. Then, in Study 1 and Study 2, we examine how the anticipation of a future outcome conversely affects people’s choices relevant to the continuity of self-conception.

First, in a simple pilot study (N=170), we used a hypothetical ball throwing game in which we manipulated mechanism beliefs (skill vs. chance), prior outcomes (success vs. failure), and the identity continuity of the subject (the same person vs. two different persons). Results showed that when the same person performs, the two opposite mechanism beliefs lead people to opposite anticipations of future outcomes even based on the same prior outcomes (logistic regression β=2.48, Wald=7.30, p<.01). But when internal consistency is interrupted, these predictions are suppressed (β=.693, Wald=.612, n.s).

Then in Study 1 (N=203), we used a hypothetical blackjack game and employed a 2 (mechanism beliefs) X 2 (prior outcomes) X 3 (future outcome present vs. absent) between-subjects design. When a future outcome is present, we found more participants chose a novel drink that they have never had before over a drink they usually get in the pessimism-inducing conditions, but not so in the optimism-inducing conditions (β=1.78, Wald=4.22, p<.05). However, when the future outcome is absent, no such effect was found (β =-1.51, Wald=2.20, n.s.) These findings suggest the differences in participants’ preference between the usual and novel choices were indeed associated with a consciously or unconsciously formed anticipation for the future outcome.

In Study 2, we designed a real ball rolling game with monetary incentives, and employed a 2 (mechanism beliefs) X 2 (prior outcomes) X 3 (self-relevance of the choice) design. We first confirmed in a separate pretest (N= 61) that participants formed predictions of the next future outcome as we predicted. Then in the main study, 232 participants took part in both the game and a seemingly separate survey. First, they were asked to list three different aspects of their personal identity, and write a sentence describing one of the aspects. Then they played the game and were stopped after four rolls and asked to choose between elaborating on the previously chosen aspect of their identity (the continuity option) or writing about a new aspect of their identity (the discontinuity option). More participants in the pessimism-inducing situations chose the continuity option than those in the optimism-inducing situations (β=.575, Wald=.456, p<.05). However, no effects were found when the choice options were irrelevant to one’s own self-concept, suggesting the self-relevance of choices was crucial in the process. Other alternative explanations such as reducing anxiety or mood were ruled out by content analyses.

In sum, we find that options representing a discontinuity of self-conception are differentially chosen, depending on the anticipated future outcome. When a pessimistic future outcome is anticipated, people prefer options reflecting discontinuity of the self-conception, as if to “thwart fate”, but when an optimistic future outcome is anticipated, people prefer options reflecting continuity of the self-conception, as if to welcome and “embrace fate”.

These findings have important implications. For example, anticipated future outcomes may affect self-relevant choices such as their loyalty to identity-relevant brands and services.

REFERENCES


Feeling Guilty About Money: How Consumers Prioritize Cleansing Tainted Money Over Redeeming Themselves From Moral Failures

Hyun Young Park, China Europe International Business School, China
Tom Meyvis, New York University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers can feel guilty about money, for instance, when they receive a product refund by stretching the truth or obtain a pay raise by exaggerating their contribution to a project. Given that consumers feel guilty about money, does this affect how they spend that money? Since feeling guilty about money signals a problem in one’s moral standing, it should thus encourage spending the money in ways that restore this threatened morality (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994; Keltner and Gross 1999; Izard 2010). But exactly how do people counter the threat to their moral standing exemplified by the guilt-tainted money?

One possible response is to engage in moral balancing (Nisan 1991)—people who feel guilty about money can restore their moral standing by participating in various kinds of pro-social activities, such as donating the money or volunteering time. A second possibility relies on a more generalized model of moral compensation. Rather than engaging in pro-social activities, the guilt may simply encourage people to engage in activities that improve their own welfare (e.g., investing in their health or education). This prediction is based on a perspective that views moral system to be interconnected with other domains of self, consequently allowing improvements in one domain to compensate for shortcomings in another domain (Monin and Jordan 2009; Steele 1988).

In contrast to these two perspectives, we propose a more specific compensation process. We argue that compensatory actions can be highly constrained by (1) the moral nature of guilt, and (2) the association between the guilt and money. First, prior research suggests that emotions motivate actions as a response to the emotion-eliciting event (Frijda 1986). Thus, when guilt arises from personal contexts (e.g., failing to adhere to a diet goal), it will trigger actions that improve the self (e.g., spending on healthy food or books; Khan, Dhar, and Wertebroch 2005). However, when guilt results from events undermining the welfare of others (e.g., cheating), it will motivate actions that improve others’ welfare (e.g., charitable giving; Haidt 2003). Second, recent findings suggest that the compensatory actions can be even more specific depending on whether guilt is associated with money or not. De Hooge et al. (2011) demonstrate that guilt motivates pro-social behaviors focused on victims, rather than a general pro-social orientation. Also, Levav and McGaw (2009) show that feelings can be attached to money and these feelings associated with money influence how consumers spend that money. These findings indicate that guilt can be attached to money, and this association between guilt and money may limit the compensatory efforts to pro-social actions that involve the tainted money, just as they were limited to actions that involved the victims. Therefore, while people who feel guilty about money would spend this money pro-socially, they would not engage in pro-social actions that do not involve the money (e.g., donating untainted money and volunteering time).

Our predictions suggest that consumers focus on cleansing money rather than redeeming themselves. If they aim at moral redemption, they would prefer giving time over money (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007).

Study 1 examined whether guilt promotes virtuous spending in general or only those specific to its moral domain. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: moral guilt, non-moral guilt, and control. All participants read a scenario in which they received a refund. While participants in both guilt conditions felt guilty about their refund, only those in the moral guilt condition felt guilty because of a transgression; those in the non-moral guilt condition felt guilty due to a private self-control failure. Next, participants indicated how likely they were to spend some of the refund on various spending categories. The results confirm that unlike non-moral guilt, moral guilt uniquely increases pro-social spending, but not other forms of virtuous spending for self or close others.

Studies 2 and 3 tested whether the guilty spend money pro-socially only when the guilt is associated with the money (consistent with a motivation to cleanse the tainted money) or also when it is elicited by reasons unrelated to the money (consistent with a striving for general moral balance). For instance, in study 3, all participants took part in an Implicit Association Test to measure their prejudice against disabled people. Whereas the control group received money simply for participating in the test, a second group received money because they qualified for a follow-up study due to their strong prejudice against the disabled. Compared to participants in the control, those who received the money because of their alleged prejudice engaged in increased pro-social spending. However, people in a third group, who also received a negative test result but received money as a reward for their participation (not for the test result), did not show any increase in pro-social spending. The studies show that guilt promotes pro-social spending when it is directly associated with the money being spent, more so than when guilt is unrelated to the money.

Study 4 demonstrates that guilt associated with money increases preference for giving money over giving time to charities—even though volunteering time can be more effective at compensating for moral failures (Reed et al. 2007). Study 5 shows that those who lied for a refund use that refund more pro-socially, but not their other money—even though money should be fungible. These findings indicate that the compensatory actions do not reflect a generalized drive for moral remedy, but rather a specific desire to remove the unpleasant guilt attached to money.

Finally, in Study 6, we measured feelings about money either before or after participants’ donation decision and find a reduction in guilt after the donation. The result confirms the effectiveness of people’s attempt to cleanse their tainted money by spending it pro-socially.

Our results show that compensatory efforts that arise from guilt can be strikingly specific when guilt is moral in nature and is associated with the money being spent. This specific compensation process indicates that people’s specific desire to cleanse tainted money is more powerful than their quest for general moral redemption.

REFERENCES


Feeling Guilty About Money: How Consumers Prioritize Cleansing Tainted Money Over Redeeming Themselves From Moral Failures


Temptation’s Itch: Goals, Self-Discourse and Money Management Practices While in a Debt Management Program

Mary Wolfinbarger Celsi, California State University Long Beach, USA
Stephanie Dellande, Menlo College, USA
Russel Nelson, University of California, Irvine, USA
Mary C. Gilly, University of California, Irvine, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

This study examines long-term consumer temptation. We chose the context of consumers enrolled in a debt management program (DMP) as their history of getting into debt, and relatively constrained resources should result in high temptation to spend. In 2011, more than 3 million consumers received financial counseling and education from a consumer credit counseling service (CCCS). The National Foundation for Credit Counseling (NFCC) has 90 member agencies and 700 offices throughout the U.S. and Puerto Rico (National Foundation for Credit Counseling), (2013). The program only works if consumers are able to live within their means and pay off their debts. Consumers in the program work with counselors to design their budgets with little room for discretionary spending.

Research on temptation originates in psychology, where self-regulation theory predicts giving in to or resisting various short-term temptations (cf. Baumeister 2002; Tice, Baumeister et al. 2007; Faber & Vohs 2004; Vohs and Faber 2007). These studies usually measure short-term self-regulation and involve small temptations. Our research focuses on the lived experience of temptation while in a DMP. Consumers in a DMP are especially likely to face difficult tradeoffs between long-term goals and short-term temptations that have real consequences for their financial well-being.

The contributions of this study are four-fold: 1) we examine long-term rather than short-term temptation; 2) we find financial education alone is not sufficient to enable DMP members to counteract temptation; 3) our results suggest the concept of impulse purchasing should be better conceptualized; and 4) we find a link between self-discourses when tempted and success or failure in the DMP.

Detailed description of Studies and Data

In fall 2010, a local CCCS identified participants in their DMP (a five-year program) who have email addresses. The President of CCCS sent an initial email explaining the study; we provided a link to enroll in the study and accepted participants until the sample size reached 100. Participants received an email with a questionnaire link once each week for the next 11 weeks (total of 12 weeks of participation). Participants were compensated for their participation.

Several open-ended questions were included in the survey to provide insight into participants’ thinking and emotions regarding weekly temptations. The authors read all open-ended responses related to temptations and goals vertically (across weeks) and developed thematic categories iteratively (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Then the authors split the cases into 4 groups with each author reviewing cases horizontally such that each case was read across all weeks. Based on our analysis, we identify two general categories of DMP participants: program-focused and temptation-sidetracked.

Discussion of Results/Conclusion

DMP program-focused participants are successful at resisting temptation; they set specific spending goals each week, and track their spending as taught by their CCCS counselors. When faced with temptation, they remind themselves of their goals and values, and most importantly, exercise counteractive control (Fishbach, Friedman and Kruglanski 2003; Trope and Fishbach 2000; Zhang, Huang, and Broniarczyk 2010). Program-focused participants often report positive emotions after resistance in a temptation episode, narrating that they are “free,” “successful,” or even “victorious.” Temptation-sidetracked behavior may or may not have an effect on participants’ ability to succeed in a DMP. Smaller temptations may be considered over weeks and worked into the budget, even if the money has to be pulled from other budget categories. However, expensive temptations (even when resisted) or smaller temptations that are not considered or delayed are associated with failure in the program. Temptation-sidetracked consumers who ultimately fail in the DMP program engage in avoidance (Roth and Cohen 1986) when tempted or alternatively, when they do resist, extreme negative emotions are evident.

Our findings suggest that temptation-sidetracked behavior is a category conceptually different from impulsive or compulsive purchasing as presently conceptualized (c.f. Beatty and Ferrell 1998; O’Guinn and Faber 1988; 1992; Rook and Hoch 1985; Rook 1987; Vohs and Faber 2007). Impulse buying is typically defined as buying that is spontaneous and not deliberative (c.f. Beatty and Ferrell 1998). But impulse purchasing may or may not have consequences for consumers. For example, participants in impulse buying studies have described their primary purchase emotion as “carefree” (Rook and Gardner 1993) and some report putting aside money to spend impulsively (Rook and Hoch 1985; Stilley et al. 2010). The major difference between the temptation-sidetracked behavior in our study and impulse shopping is that temptation-sidetracked behavior may be either spontaneous or elaborately considered over weeks. While they do experience “go” emotions such as “rush” and “excitement,” temptation-sidetracked consumers never used the word “carefree” or any synonym to describe their emotions when tempted. As with impulse shopping, temptation-sidetracked behavior may or may not be problematic, depending upon whether or not DMP consumers work the tempting item realistically into their budget. Moreover, temptation-sidetracked consumers appear to enjoy the products they purchase rather than shopping just to shop, and thus do not fit into traditional conceptualization of compulsive shopping (O’Guinn and Faber 1988; Faber and O’Guinn 1992).

Our research of temptation suggests that impulse purchasing needs to be better conceptualized as some behavior traditionally defined as impulse purchasing is fun, enjoyable, and affordable while other impulsive purchase behavior is problematic because of avoidance or resistance of boundaries. This study contributes to the consumer compliance behavior literature (Dellande, Gilly, and Graham 2004) by showing that failure occurs when temptations are highly unrealistic relative to goals and/or when responses to temptation are automatic, avoidant, or angry. For credit counselors and policymakers, our research suggests that the tools for managing money, debt, and temptation should include more than learning how to budget and track spending. Without the ability to associate the challenge of resisting temptation with financial success and goal achievement, some individuals cannot actuate the budget management tools they learn in the DMP. In addition, our research suggests that participants may benefit from learning to anticipate that stress, hunger, special events,
sales and clothing items are likely to trigger temptations that will require active resistance. Future research should determine if and how resistance to temptation in the moment can be better developed among DMP consumers.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

From Stone Age pottery, to Renaissance paintings and modern luxury watches, there is strong evidence that using objects as status symbols is at the core of human behavior. This phenomenon has been widely studied across various research disciplines.

Given that signaling high status through products (for instance, through luxury products) is a prevalent behavior, we examine the underlying factors that make a product most suitable for status signaling. In other words, we accept that a lot of consumers want to signal high status (socio-economic-status, SES) through the products they consume and we try to understand the characteristics a product needs to have so that it is preferred over another product as a means of status signaling.

In this article, we propose an answer to this question, a construct that we call natural scarcity. Although scarcity has been frequently studied as a factor that enhances the value of products we contend that only in situations where a product of excellence is produced by naturally constrained resources, such as the unique skills of a craftsman, or scarcely available raw materials, will enhance the value of product in the context of status signaling. Other means of scarcity, such as artificial scarcity induced by the marketer, are much less effective in the long run. Typically, luxury goods are supposed to be of superior performance, made by hand, from traditional brands, require craftsmanship, have exclusive designs, or are limited editions, etc. As we will argue, natural scarcity provides the necessary mechanism to explain such instances (and all others). It explains under what circumstances a product’s performance matters and when products would signal high-status even when they are not made by hand or do not require craftsmanship. It is important to mention though that our intention is not to define when a product should be called a luxury product and when not, but to explain the underlying mechanism that makes a product a more suitable signal for high socio-economic status and this mechanism could also apply to products that are not typically considered luxury products, such as collectibles (e.g. stamps) or premium products. As we will show, suitability for status signaling also correlates with the product’s perceived value.

It seems intuitive that having access to scarce resources signals status. However, research has not been very clear about how specific forms of scarcity affect product valuation. On the one hand, just making a bad product appear scarce does not necessarily enhance its status signaling value. But we also hardly ever observe limited editions from excellent cell phones, computers, or TVs. According to the basic microeconomics market model, when supply is low and demand is high, the price (as an indicator of perceived value) goes up. Yet, in line with signaling theory we argue that for a signal to be an efficient (or to function as an honest signal, which means that a true high status individual is able to signal his true underlying qualities (i.e. having high status) with this signal) signal of high status it must be hard to imitate from low status individuals. For example a US$50 watch from a supermarket would not function as a suitable signal for the underlying trait of high SES, because it can easily be bought by a low SES individual who wants to pretend signaling high SES. However, a very expensive Patek Philippe mechanical watch would decrease the performance once it goes to manufacturing, producing a higher number of units would not affect the performance. To produce more iPhones, one just needs to let the assembly line work longer, whereas producing more Patek Philippe mechanical watches would decrease the performance level of excellence of every single watch. In this context, natural scarcity serves as a better signal of high SES, because the person who owns such a product can be sure that only few people would own such a high quality product. We test these hypotheses with three experimental studies where participants rated product scenarios in various contexts of natural scarcity. Study 1 shows (similar to the argumentation above) that handmade products are only perceived as suitable means for status signaling if the production is naturally scarce. In study 2 we demonstrates how even fully machine-made products can be considered as high status signaler under the context of natural scarcity (e.g. when it requires high skills to monitor production of every single unit). Finally study 3 extends the concept to décor elements and examines under what conditions a naturally scarce décor element can add value (and increase it’s high SES signaling capacity) depending on the product’s functional performance.

The implications of our research is that natural scarcity provides an important construct to explain various phenomena in the context of product valuation. It is probably one of the central factors to determine both a product’s suitability for high SES signaling and its perceived value. It can furthermore account for various factors and variables that have been frequently been suggested as driving factors for product valuation.

REFERENCES


Exploring the “I” in Mass Customization Decisions: Narcissists’ Proclivity Towards Configuring Unique Products

Andreas Herrmann, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Emanuel de Bellis, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Hans-Werner Bierhoff, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany
Elke Rohmann, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany
David E. Sprott, Washington State University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Mass customization (MC) systems allow firms’ customers to create unique, self-designed products (Franke and Schreier 2008; Moreau and Herd 2010). Field evidence, however, indicates that only a minority of consumers use the full individualization potential of these systems by configuring products with unique options (e.g., configuring a red pearl car instead of a black one). This consumer segment is of considerable interest to firms given their potential impact on product diffusion and enhanced profit margins. Therefore, the present research aims to better understand the nature of this important segment.

Who are the consumers who select unique product options when mass-customizing a product and what motivates them to do so? Initial conceptual research suggests that answers to these questions may reside within the narcissistic personality trait (Sedikides et al. 2007). In the light of recent research showing that narcissistic consumers have a strong preference for scarce products (Lee and Seidle 2012), our general premise is that some consumers who configure unique products may be doing so in order to be “special,” as an expression of their narcissistic personalities. In particular, we argue that narcissistic consumers are anxious to stand out in order to appear unique, as well as to command attention and admiration of others, with both processes influencing product configuration. For narcissists, the purchase and consumption of unique products is likely to serve as an important interpersonal strategy to project a colorful lifestyle to the public (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007).

In terms of marketing, narcissistic consumers should be more likely to desire unique product options and thus to configure distinctive products via MC systems, in order to act in accordance with their narcissistic personalities. To date, only little research has addressed the narcissistic consumer at the empirical level. In response, we explored the impact of consumers’ narcissistic tendencies on the uniqueness of configured products.

In a pilot study, we established that recent car buyers scoring high on narcissism tended to use online car configurators more often and chose product options that were selected by few other consumers (see table 1). Further, they more frequently purchased a new (vs. used) car and also paid a higher price for it. Building on these real-world findings, our experimental studies began by showing narcissists as more likely to configure unique products. In study 1, participants configured a car using a mock-up online car configurator, allowing us to determine the uniqueness of participants’ product configurations by an objective measure (built around actual percentage shares of the selected product options obtained from the car manufacturer). We found that a consumer’s level of narcissism is a significant positive predictor of how unique a product is configured in an online MC system (while controlling for demographics such as age, income or car expertise), with narcissists’ enhanced need for uniqueness and feelings of superiority mediating this effect (see table 1). In addition, narcissistic consumers configured more expensive products (compared to less narcissistic ones), given that unique product options are more expensive than common ones. These results suggest that unique configured products help express the narcissist’s personality and their tendency to self-enhance (as expressed by their sense of superiority). Therefore, MC systems seem to be ideal tools for narcissistic consumers.

In study 2, we built upon study 1’s findings by demonstrating that consumers react differently to feedback on their product’s degree of uniqueness contingent upon their narcissistic tendencies. After participants configured a car by means of the mock-up car configurator, they were believed that their configuration was compared against the manufacturer’s database. Depending on the experimental condition, they were then provided with “unique feedback” (“average feedback”), stating that no similar car (many similar cars) were configured within the same year. When told that their configured product was unique (vs. average), the narcissist felt more pride of authorship and was thus less willing to modify the original configuration. These effects were less pronounced for the non-narcissist (see table 1). Building on consumers’ ability to save a product configuration for later reference, study 3 then examined the longitudinal configuration process. Therefore, consumers configured their preferred car and were then asked to repeat their choices four times over the course of a one-day workshop. While narcissistic (vs. non-narcissist) consumers were more convinced of their initial product configuration, they changed it more often when having the opportunity to do so (see table 1). It appeared that the configured product had lost its uniqueness appeal over time, which is why narcissists altered their product more often than non-narcissists did.

While MC systems are inherently designed to allow the individualization of products, few consumers using MC systems take advantage of this fact and actually configure unique products. Our experimental studies indicate that narcissists, whose incidence rates are steadily increasing around the globe (Twenge et al. 2008), are likely to account for some of the heterogeneity associated with unique product configuration within MC systems. This consumer segment is of particular interest within the realm of customizing a product, given that these consumers systematically deviate from the mainstream in order to define their unique identity with unique products. In the light of initial evidence showing that narcissistic mind states can be primed (Sakellaropoulo and Baldwin 2007), these findings may have the potential to make a difference for firms offering MC systems as well as for researchers studying these devices.

REFERENCES


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Table 1: Main Results of The Empirical Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study (N)</th>
<th>Main results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (N=107)</td>
<td>The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a car buyer, the greater the number of surcharge options selected on a car (narcissism main effect: $\beta = .23$, $t = 2.22$, $p &lt; .05$).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 1 (N=213)</td>
<td>The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the more unique the product configuration (narcissism main effect: $\beta = .17$, $t = 2.52$, $p &lt; .05$). The positive relationship between narcissistic tendencies and product configuration uniqueness is mediated by need for uniqueness (indirect effect $a_1 \times b_1 = 2.08$, 95% CI: .19, 4.73) and feelings of superiority (indirect effect $a_2 \times b_2 = 4.14$, 95% CI: .57, 8.08).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 2 (N=190)</td>
<td>The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the more (less) pride of authorship of the configured product in the case of “unique feedback” (“average feedback”) (feedback x narcissism interaction: $\beta = .05$, $t = 2.32$, $p &lt; .05$). The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the less (more) willingness to reconfigure the product in the case of “unique feedback” (“average feedback”) (feedback x narcissism interaction: $\beta = .05$, $t = 2.11$, $p &lt; .05$).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3 (N=50)</td>
<td>The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the more likely a product configuration will be altered over several configuration rounds (narcissism main effect: $\beta = .26$, $t = 2.68$, $p &lt; .05$). The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a consumer, the less convinced the consumer is of the product configuration over several configuration rounds (round x narcissism interaction: $\beta = -.04$, $t = -2.54$, $p &lt; .05$).</td>
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A View to a Choice: The Effects of Lateral Visual Field on Choosing between Healthy Versus Unhealthy Food Options
Marisabel Romero, University of South Florida, USA
Dipayan Biswas, University of South Florida, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Suppose you had the option to choose between a healthy (e.g., salad) and an unhealthy (e.g., chocolate cake) food item, with one item placed on your left visual field and the other item placed on your right visual field. Would the lateral (left vs. right) visual field positions of the healthy versus unhealthy items influence your choices?

Prior research has examined different factors that could influence choices between healthy versus unhealthy food items, such as the body type of people in the surroundings (McFerran et al. 2010), package cues of the products (Deng and Kahn 2009), and affective/cognitive states (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999), among others. However, no study, to the best of our knowledge, has examined the effects of presenting healthy versus unhealthy options in different lateral visual fields on consumer choices. In this paper, we examine this research question through the help of four experiments. The results of our studies suggest that a healthier food option is more likely to be selected when it is placed on the left (vs. right) visual field.

Choices between healthy versus unhealthy food items involve tradeoffs between temptation and self-control (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2012). Our theorizing is based on the prior research in spatial representation of magnitude, which has found that individuals tend to map increases in magnitude as moving from left-to-right (Cohen Kadosh, Lammertyn, and Izard 2008), which is applied to any domain that can be described in more/less terms (Holmes and Lourenco 2011). We extend the previous literature by studying how this left-to-right mental representation of magnitude affects consumption decisions between a healthy and an unhealthy product. Specifically, we expect that presenting food items in a structure consistent with the way consumers organize food mentally (i.e., healthy on the left and unhealthy on the right) will increase processing fluency and hence help consumers override any automatic predisposition for the unhealthy food item. In sum, we hypothesize that there will be greater preference for the healthy food options when it is placed on the left (vs. right) of the unhealthy food item. Four experiments test our hypotheses.

Study 1 examined if presentation of two food items (healthy vs. unhealthy) on the left versus right visual fields might influence choices. Consistent with our hypothesis, a greater proportion of participants chose the healthy option when it was on the left (vs. right) visual field.

Study 2 examined the behavioral outcome of consumption volume when participants are able to consume both the healthy and the unhealthy items, placed in the different visual fields. In addition, Study 2 also examined the moderating effects of priming health-concerns on the effects driven by the left-to-right organization of magnitude. The results of this study revealed that when the food products were arranged congruently with the left-to-right direction of magnitude, consumption of the healthy and unhealthy product when the health prime was not made accessible was comparable to the amount consumed when there was a health prime present. On the contrary, when the organization of the products was incongruent with the left-right orientation of magnitude, there was a tendency to drink more from the unhealthy item (vs. the healthy one) unless a health prime was present.

Study 3 examined a boundary condition for the results observed in Study 1. Specifically, Study 3 examined the moderating effects of deprivation state (in form of hunger). The results of this study showed that under low hunger, consistent with the findings of Study 1, a greater proportion of participants chose the healthy option when it was on the left (vs. right) of the unhealthy food item. In contrast, and as hypothesized, these effects got attenuated when the choices were made under high hunger.

Finally, Study 4 examined visual field effects on choices. The results of this study show that when the items are processed in a compatible direction to the left-to-right magnitude orientation, consumers tend to prefer the healthy option to the unhealthy one. However, when the food items are processed from right-to-left, the results are attenuated. These results provide some evidence that it is the left-to-right mental organization of food items and not sequential processing (i.e., seeing the healthy item first) that is driving the proposed effects.

In conclusion, the results of four experiments show that preferences for the healthy options are higher when they are placed to the left of an unhealthy food item. In addition, we show that placing the healthy item on the left leads to less consumption of the unhealthy item. We also identify deprivation state (in the form of hunger) as a boundary condition to this effect. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research to examine how lateral visual field positions (left vs. right) of healthy and unhealthy items might influence choices between them. From a theoretical perspective, the findings of this research provide further insights into how consumers organize healthy and unhealthy food items mentally and how this organization affects consumption choices. This is especially relevant given rising obesity rates worldwide.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Energy efficiency plays an increasingly important role in policy because it addresses rising energy prices and the negative externalities of energy consumption from pollution. Although the development of more advanced “green” technologies is a possible long run solution, the adoption of such solutions is questionable because, even today, many conservation efforts and technologies are routinely neglected. This is particularly perplexing to researchers because the immediate personal benefits alone often outweigh the observable costs of conservation (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Hausman & Joskow, 1982). For example, government estimates suggest tire pressure underinflation is common, at roughly 75% of the domestic personal vehicle fleet (USDOT, 2001), even though drivers stand to benefit by facing the small cost of tire inflation: properly inflated tires can substantially improve fuel efficiency (between 2-3%) and reduce accidents by improving stopping speed and preventing tire blow-outs (NHTSA, 2005). We address this discrepancy by presenting results from a field experiment designed to test possible solutions.

To the best of our knowledge this is the first analysis of tire pressure in the social sciences. We chose this setting because it is an economically significant behavior in its own right, and our unique experimental design allows us to compare competing theories of consumer behavior in a real-world, real-stakes context. We begin by documenting widespread “tire pressure neglect” through conducting spot-checks at gas stations throughout Chicago. In designing treatments, we considered three theories for tire pressure neglect: 1) Lack of information, both about the savings from tire pressure and their own tire pressure level; 2) High upfront costs, exaggerated by present bias; and 3) Inattention to the social consequences of neglect. Our treatments varied the incentives offered, and the framing used, to test between these three accounts. They were also crossed in a way that also might induce an “overjustification effect”, which would predict that incentives are not as effective when they conflict with internal motivations (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; Gneezy, Meier & Reyn-Biel 2011).

Analyzing our results, we found that information alone had almost no effect on tire inflation rates, even though the average driver who had one or more low tires (78% of our sample) would have saved at least $10 over the next four months (in 2010 gas prices), translating to a marginal wage of over $125/hour. When small incentives, such as paying the $0.50 air pump fee or helping with the inflation, our intervention saved roughly $30/hour in short-term gas saving alone, and $48/hour in the single most effective treatment. The two incentives (free air or help) also differed depending on what framing was used - describing tire pressure neglect as a social concern increased the likelihood of tire inflation when offered help (32.9% of Intent To Treat) relative to when air was free (17.3%). However, when pressure neglect was framed as a personal concern, customers were more likely to inflate with free air (23.9%) than with help (11.6%).

From a policy perspective, this study is limited since we can only observe tire pressure decisions made that day - in that sense, we treat inflation as a one-time investment in energy efficiency over the medium-term, rather than as a strategy to curtail energy-intensive behaviour (Stern & Gardner, 1981). We believe our results apply to many other efficiency investments, which tend to be both more effective at reducing energy consumption, and yet under-appreciated as a conservation strategy, compared to curtailment (Attari et al., 2010). However, a comprehensive account of tire pressure neglect would also consider the long-term effects of intervention, where issues like procrastination and habit formation become more important, and tire inflation might more closely resemble a curtailment behavior. In particular, our results support the use of small incentives to motivate behaviour, even on a scale that might seem trivial compared to the obvious benefits of the behaviour.

The results of this study can inform many real-world efforts to encourage pro-social behavior. Existing promotions for energy conservation have mixed monetary incentives (such as cash rebates) with social motives (protecting the environment), where our results suggest that switching either to non-monetary incentives (such as free delivery) or monetary motives (saving on energy costs) may be more effective. This applies not just to energy efficiency but also to other pro-social domains where mixed motives are present. As a general rule, where neglect is the dominant state of affairs, we reject the common dichotomy between psychological approaches that focus on persuasive appeals, and economic approaches that focus on incentive structures. Rather, we argue that getting the most out of either approach requires a careful understanding of both.

Matching Motivations and Incentives to Combat Tire Pressure Neglect
Mike Yeomans, University of Chicago, USA
David Herberich, University of Chicago, USA

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Cultural Authentication: Historical Narratives of African Clothing, Identity, and Heritage
Benet DeBerry-Spence, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Elif Izberk-Bilgin, University of Michigan-Dearborn, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

There is growing consumer interest in things that are “unspoiled, pristine, genuine, untouched, and traditional” (Handler 1986, 2); and this is captured in a wide variety of market offerings and experiences such as retro brands (Brown, Kozinets and Sherry, 2003), reality shows (Rose and Wood 2005), retail environments (Peñaloza 1998), among a host of other examples. Past studies empirically demonstrate how postmodern conditions such as globalization, deterritorialization, and hyperreality (Arnould and Price, 2000) motivate consumer demand for cultural authenticity. The impact of postmodernity is undeniable potent, yet it may easily lead scholars to conceptualize the desire for the “authentic” as solely a reaction to the loss of meaning and disenchantment. This perception leads some to declare authenticity a “hoax” (Potter 2010). More importantly, the obsession with postmodernism leads to overlooking the importance of history, thereby portraying an incomplete understanding of cultural authentication (see Peñaloza 2001 and Oswald 1999 for notable exceptions). Ohnuki-Tierney (2005) argues that scholars’ obsession with postmodernism “has led some to deny histories, even in the plural, of a particular people” (Ohnuki-Tierney 2005, 181-183). Calls have also been made in consumer research to not only explore “cultural history through the commodity form” (Arnould and Thompson 2005, 876), but also note the importance of history as a “source of market value” (Peñaloza 2000, 105) and a “cultural maker of legitimacy and authenticity” (Brown, Kozinets, and Sherry 2003, 19).

In response to these calls, we present an empirical examination of cultural authentication and show how during this on-going process consumers creatively use history, drawing from historical events and cultural artifacts with historical significance. We use Pierre Nora’s (1989) definition of history as “how our hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, organize the past.” (p. 8). We conducted a multi-site ethnography of African Americans in African clothing to understand how consumers reflexively seek and enact elements of their cultural heritage as they investigate and perform an ethnic identity. Over a one-year time frame, we interviewed eight core informants a minimum of nine times each (i.e. at least three times each in three different consumption settings). We also observed informants, often spending 6-8 hours a day for several weeks with a single informant.

Our data show that representing resistance, journeying to the ‘Motherland, and educating one’s own, are authenticating practices African American consumers engage when wearing African clothing. We find the process of cultural authentication involves seeking heritage and enacting heritage, which are informed by consumer authenticating practices. Seeking heritage finds consumers inquiring what is “authentic” when it comes to the cultural-roots of African-Americans and searching to define what is African-American. It is more than a reaction against a postmodern marketplace, which threatens authenticity with simulation of reality and superficial performance of identity (Firat and Venkatesh 1995; Beverland and Farrelly 2010; Leigh, Peters, and Shelton 2006; Rose and Wood 2005). Rather, it is about investigating or exploring one’s heritage in the context of never having known but mostly imagined one’s historical ancestors and ancestral nation. When consumers seek heritage they attempt to create a space in which to explore the (in)authenticity of African and African American-ness and to search for a collective identity. Enacting heritage finds consumers legitimizing their cultural heritage through performance. Unlike authoritative acts which engage cultural displays like festivals and rituals to make explicit what the membership of the community of participants regard as significant life moments (Arnould and Price 2000), our consumers enact performances where the expectancy-disconfirmation model of consumer satisfaction do not apply (Deighton 1992). Taken together, seeking heritage and enacting heritage present cultural authentication as both a reflexive and dialectic process, something to which previous cultural authentication research did not account. This view of cultural authentication supports previous work theorizing ‘integration’ or ‘incorporation’ as important components of cultural authentication (Arthur 1997) and acculturation (Peñaloza 1994), respectively; yet it also extends this work by revealing the process of ‘disintegration’ at work. Further, it captures the inherent dynamism of history and culture, where history allows the consumer to reconstruct what is no longer, to manage the inherent cross-fertilization of the African and American identities and to create a quilted understanding of their ethnic identity.

Our findings support the idea that the authentic and inauthentic co-exist (Grayson and Martinez 2004) and that there is often interplay between the two. They also support the notion of paradox as an important element of authenticity (Rose and Wood 2005). However, a number of important differences exist. First, paradoxes that consumers experience are not always elicited by postmodern forces and reactions to threats of inauthenticity inherent in postmodernism; instead they may arise from gaps in consumer historical knowledge with respect to established meanings and the desire to understand what is authentic and what is inauthentic. Second, the paradoxes that exist are not always between differing ‘known’ texts; that is, the consumer may not be reconciling tensions between what they know (albeit subjectively) to be either real or fantastic. While our consumers do ‘imagine’ and create fantasy that are inconsistent with historical facts, they do not realize the meanings they assign are inaccurate. Therefore, unlike Cohen’s tourists (1979) or reality television viewers, who are able to distinguish between “people like me” and “storybook characters”, our consumers are often less capable of distinguishing the real and unreal parts of their culture. Third, because our consumers are not dealing with known texts, our work shows the paradoxes that confront consumers are not so much ‘negotiated’ as they are ‘investigated’. The findings also contribute to discourses on cultural authenticity by calling attention to the role and importance of history; and that authentication may not only reflect consumer desire for truth and genuineness (Grayson and Schulman 2000; Trilling 1972), but equally important, may reflect consumer desire to explore and investigate—with the consumer an active agent in this very reflexive and dialectic, temporal process.

REFERENCES


EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Imagine that you have just finished some hand grip exercises, or you have just finished putting together a puzzle. You find some grapes and apples on the kitchen table. Which fruit would you choose to eat?

These scenarios depict a common consumption phenomenon where consumers engage in certain hand movements prior to making seemingly unrelated food decisions. Hands are one of the most frequently used body parts in consumers’ daily life so it is not surprising that consumer judgments and decisions can be shaped by hand sensations and movements (e.g., Elder and Krishna 2012; Hung and Labroo 2011; Krishna 2006; Krishna, Elder, and Caldana 2010; Krishna and Morrin 2008; Lee and Schwarz 2010; Peck and Shu 2009; Peck and Wiggins 2006; Xu, Zwick, and Schwarz 2012). This paper contributes to this realm of research by examining the influence of incidental hand movements on consumer food preferences. Specifically, we focus on how hand movement gentleness could shape consumer attitudes toward food with different haptic hardness (Klatzky and Lederman 1992, 1993).

The embodied cognition literature suggests that perceptual-motor patterns are an integral part of the multimodal representation of concepts (Barsalou 2008). Hence, the sensations a person feels at any given time can drive experiences offering similar sensations to become more accessible in the memory. Thus, making gentle hand movements (e.g., using a sensitive computer mouse setting) causes a host of “gentle touch” activities (e.g., eating food with low haptic hardness) to become more “top of mind.” As a consequence, these highly accessible activities could be preferred more than less accessible activities (e.g., eating food with high haptic hardness), because the former is more “top of mind,” and therefore easier to simulate and activate. Hence the embodied cognition literature would posit that making gentle hand movements should lead to increased preferences toward food with low (vs. high) haptic hardness. Moreover, the accessibility of the “gentle touch” experiences could be increased through hand movements primed both temporally and chronically (Higgins 1996), and this embodied gentleness effect could appear when the haptic cues are physically available and when they are only verbally communicated (Krishna and Morrin 2008). Three studies were conducted to test these predictions.

Study 1 examined the impact of hand movement gentleness on the choice between verbally communicated food options with different haptic hardness (sliced apples vs. grapes). Participants were randomly assigned to use a computer mouse with fast pointer speed in the high gentleness condition or slow pointer speed in the low gentleness condition. Both the haptic hardness difference of the food stimuli ($p < .001$) and the hand movement gentleness difference under the mouse manipulations ($p < .01$) were confirmed in pretests. Consistent with our prediction, the choice of grapes was higher in the high gentleness condition (73%) than in the low gentleness condition (55%; $\chi^2 = 4.15, p < .05$).

Study 2 extended and replicated the findings of Study 1 with a different dependent variable (attitude and purchase intention rather than consumption choice) and a different domain of food product (drinks rather than fruits). Participants were randomly assigned to four conditions, based on a 2 (hand movement gentleness: high vs. low) x 2 (cup hardness: soft vs. hard) between participants design. At first participants used high or low gentleness mouse to complete a few computer tasks. Then, they were asked to taste and evaluate spring water filled in soft or hard cups. The results indicated a significant interaction of hand movement gentleness with cup hardness ($F(1, 154) = 4.64, p < .05, \chi^2 = .03$). As expected, when the soft cup was used, contrasts revealed more positive attitudes and purchase intention among participants with high (vs. low) hand movement gentleness ($M$ (high gentleness) = 4.18 vs. $M$ (low gentleness) = 3.56; $p < .05$). When the hard cup was used (i.e., under the control condition), however, hand movement gentleness didn’t affect participants’ attitudes and purchase intention toward the spring water ($M$ (high gentleness) = 4.03 vs. $M$ (low gentleness) = 4.18; $p > .50$).

Study 3 examined the possible boundary condition of the embodied gentleness effect. Existing literature suggests that individuals low (vs. high) in self-monitoring are more sensitive to internal states (DeMarree, Wheeler and Petty 2005). Hence, low (vs. high) self-monitoring consumers would be more likely to make their food choices based on their internal states, including bodily sensations involved in gentle hand movements. Therefore, the embodied gentleness effect should be more prevalent among low (vs. high) self-monitoring consumers. In Study 3 participants used a normal mouse (under medium pointer speed) to complete a few computer tasks, including the Revised Self-Monitoring scale (Lennox and Wolfe 1984). Then, they were asked to make refreshment choice between sliced apples and grapes and indicated how long they had been using smartphones. The results revealed a significant smartphone history \times self-monitoring interaction ($\chi^2 = 4.09, p < .05$). Among low self-monitoring participants, smartphone history length had a positive effect on the choice of grapes ($\chi^2 = 7.53, p < .01$). However, no smartphone history effect emerged among high self-monitors ($\chi^2 = .03, p > .85$). These results suggest that using smartphones leads to a higher likelihood of choosing grapes in the refreshment decisions and this effect is apparent among low rather than high self-monitors. Hence, consumer activities such as using smartphones can provide chronic priming of gentle hand movements and give rise to the embodied gentleness effect.

The current research explores whether the enactment of gentle hand movements affects consumer food preferences. We find that making gentle hand movements can lead to increased preferences toward food with low (vs. high) haptic hardness and that this embodied gentleness effect is robust under both temporary and chronic hand movement priming and salient on both verbally communicated refreshments and spring water served in cups. Furthermore, our evidence also shows that this embodiment effect is moderated by individual differences in self-monitoring.

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Understanding through the Eyes of Others: Inferences Regarding Chosen and Forgone Products

Stephen He, Manhattan College, USA
Samuel Bond, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers often make inferences by observing the behavior of others in the marketplace. These inferences can provide important information for our own judgments (Asch 1956; Yaniv et al. 2011) and purchase decisions (Chan and Berger 2012; Wang et al. 2012). For example, the market share of smartphone brands indicates the proportion of consumers who choose a certain brand. What, if anything, does such information tell us about users’ preferences for competing options in the market? Most likely, the consumer who has chosen an iPhone perceived more value from that model than others, but by how much? Such inferences are likely to affect our perception of different brands, and may even influence our own consumption choices. To address this issue, our research investigates the inferences that a prospective consumer makes about the evaluations of prior consumers, based on their choices. We show that the degree to which previous consumers are perceived to distinguish between competing options depends on overall choice share and various contextual factors.

In a market setting where two options (brands) compete and each is chosen by some consumers, a split in choice share suggests that the two consumer groups favored each option for different reasons. Building on correspondence inference theory (Jones and Davis 1965), we suggest that observers will be differentially impacted when an option is chosen by the majority group vs. the minority group. Because majority judgments tend to be perceived as a better reflection of reality (Nemeth 1986), choice of an option by the majority indicates the likely presence of advantages for which there is widespread agreement. Therefore, we hypothesize that observers will generally assume the majority group to perceive greater differences between competing options than the minority group.

Choice share information also reveals the level of consensus among consumers. Higher-level consensus makes the likely advantages of the majority choice (mentioned above) especially plausible. As a result, greater overall consensus should lead observers to expect that the majority group perceives even larger differences between competing options, while the minority group perceives smaller differences.

Finally, we expect characteristics of the product itself to impact inferences made from choice share information. Affect-rich products tend to be evaluated by use of one’s feelings, while affect-poor products tend to be evaluated by objective criteria and, therefore, more sensitive to differences (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004). If observers believe that larger differences are necessary to distinguish evaluations of two affect-rich products vs. two affect-poor products, then the same choice share information should result in greater perceived differences for affect-rich options.

We examined our hypotheses with two experiments involving hypothetical decision scenarios. The dependent variables were inferences made by participants from choice share information. Study 1 used a mixed factorial design including five factors: choice, majority membership, consensus, product type, and awareness. For each of four decision scenarios (presented within-subjects), undergraduate participants (N = 151) were given choice share information for two competing options. Participants were asked to predict the expected average rating given each option by both the majority group and the minority group.

Not surprisingly, analyses revealed that predicted average ratings were significantly higher for the chosen option than the forgone option. More important, we observed a significant two-way between choice and majority membership, through which the perceived difference in rating between the two options was larger for the majority group than the minority group. In addition, we observed a significant choice × majority membership × consensus three-way interaction effect, indicating that the effect just described was stronger in the high-consensus condition than the low-consensus condition. Finally, the choice × product type two-way interaction was significant, and the pattern of means suggested the difference in perceived ratings between the two options was larger for the affect-rich product than the affect-poor product.

The results of study 1 provided initial evidence that inferences based on choice share information follow a systematic pattern. The goals of study 2 were to explore potential consequences of such a pattern while replicating the findings of study 1. Specifically, we examined whether inferences derived from choice share information would be consistent with actual choices based on the same information.

The design of study 2 was similar to study 1 with three changes. First, participants (N = 182) were asked to make an additional decision after each of the four original decision scenarios. These new decision scenarios had their own cover story and presented a choice between two options with different average ratings. The average ratings were generated individually for each participant, by combining the choice shares for each of the four earlier scenarios with participants’ predicted average ratings for those scenarios. As a result, a form of preference reversal would be observed if a participant’s choice in the original decision scenario differed from that participant’s choice in the new decision scenario. The second change was to drop the awareness manipulation. Finally, we counterbalanced the order of product type.

Analyses of predicted average ratings revealed a pattern congruent with that of study 1. Analyses of the new choice variable were conducted by comparing the frequency of preference reversal across conditions. We observed a significant effect of product type, such that participants were more likely to make inconsistent choices for affect-rich products. In addition, we observed reliable differences in the occurrence of preference reversal across consensus levels: choices were more consistent when consensus was high rather than low.

Our research identifies several factors affecting inferences based on choice share information. Participants inferred that members of the majority group perceived greater difference between competing options than members of the minority group, and this effect was amplified under high levels of consensus. In addition, participants inferred that others’ sensitivity to perceived product differences was greater for products that were affect-rich than those that were affect-poor. These findings have important implications for researchers exploring social influence and interpretation of social statistics, and for practitioners managing products at varying positions in the marketplace.
Table 1: Inferred Expected Ratings of Forgone/Chosen Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Consensus level</th>
<th>Minority chooser</th>
<th>Majority chooser</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forgone option</td>
<td>Chosen option</td>
<td>Forgone option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Low consensus</td>
<td>5.14 (0.13)</td>
<td>7.33 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High consensus</td>
<td>4.56 (0.17)</td>
<td>6.53 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Stereo</td>
<td>Low consensus</td>
<td>5.46 (0.14)</td>
<td>7.27 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High consensus</td>
<td>5.05 (0.17)</td>
<td>6.28 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Low consensus</td>
<td>5.04 (0.11)</td>
<td>7.26 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High consensus</td>
<td>4.68 (0.15)</td>
<td>6.97 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Stereo</td>
<td>Low consensus</td>
<td>5.42 (0.13)</td>
<td>6.66 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High consensus</td>
<td>5.47 (0.15)</td>
<td>5.93 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

REFERENCES
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Consumers never before had the opportunity to customize such a wide variety of products. An increasing number of companies are offering web-based services that allow customers to design their own customized products. Allowing people to express their preferences attribute-by-attribute can benefit consumers and retailers by decreasing the complexity of choice, increasing product satisfaction, and leading to greater purchase likelihood (Huffman and Kahn 1998; Schreier 2006; Valenzuela, Dhar, and Zettelmeyer 2009). However, providing such opportunities for customization may not be uniformly beneficial to all consumers. For example, consumers’ responses to customized offers may be affected by their degree of preference development as well as their insight into their own preferences (Simonson 2005). In this paper, we argue that the type of configuration format predominantly used in mass customization (MC) systems can lead to more local information processing, ultimately leading to decreased purchase intentions and diminished post-choice evaluations of the configured product.

This research builds on prior work demonstrating that information processing styles can easily be triggered by and carried over to other tasks ( Förster and Dannenberg 2010). Most MC systems are designed as a bottom-up process where consumers configure their product in multiple sequential steps by choosing feature or style elements attribute-by-attribute. For instance, to configure a car, a consumer would first select the model type, then the exterior color, followed by the type of rims, and so on. Focusing on a sequence of individual attributes rather than the complete product may trigger more local processing, as consumers engage in less mental simulation of the whole configuration. Such sequential processing can increase consumer’s hopes (Mogilner, Shiv, and Iyengar 2013), inadvertently leading to suboptimal choice outcomes. Moreover, focusing on each attribute likely reduces mental simulation which has been shown to impact post-choice evaluations (Escalas 2004). In contrast, choosing from a set of ‘off the shelf’ alternatives (by-alternative) likely increases global processing, as consumers can see the product in a more holistic manner and make cross-attribute comparisons simultaneously. This focus on the product as a whole better enables consumers to select a product whose attributes fit well together. Thus, contrary to intuition, customizing a product can make consumers worse off in some circumstances than simply choosing from available alternatives.

In two studies, we examined configuration formats (by-attribute vs. by-alternative customization) utilizing a simulated online car configurator of a European automotive manufacturer. In study 1, the by-attribute condition allowed participants to customize their car attribute-by-attribute, selecting a value (e.g., silver) for each of six attributes (e.g., exterior color). In the by-alternative condition, participants chose from a set of six prespecified alternatives (e.g., completely configured cars), consisting of random selections of the same six attributes. Processing style was measured using the Kimchi similarity task (Kimchi and Palmer 1982) where participants were shown a triangle made up of smaller triangles and had to indicate which of two other figures (e.g., a square made of triangles or a triangle made of squares) was more similar to this target. Results confirmed that consumers in the by-attribute (vs. by-alternative) configuration format engaged in increased local processing as measured by the Kimchi similarity task.

The design of study 1 allowed participants to select from numerous values on each attribute, similar to the way MC systems are usually used by retailers and manufactures. Although higher in external validity, this design allowed for a greater number of possible combinations in the by-attribute condition than in the by-alternative condition. To control for the potentially confounding influence of different amounts of possible option combinations between conditions, study 2 used a reduced configuration set where the total number of prespecified alternatives represented all possible combinations of the same three attributes of the by-attribute condition (2 model types x 3 exterior colors x 2 rims). Measures included choice satisfaction, pride of authorship, purchase intention, and degree of mental simulation of the configured product.

Replicating study 1, the by-attribute (vs. by-alternative) configuration format led participants to process in a more local manner. Moreover, participants in the by-attribute condition indicated lower choice satisfaction and pride of authorship relative to participants assigned to the by-alternative condition. Importantly, the by-attribute configuration format substantially decreased consumers’ purchase intentions. Mediation analyses using three serial multiple mediation models with processing style as the first mediator and mental simulation as the second mediator indicates that increased local processing stemming from the by-attribute configuration format led to less mental simulation of the product, negatively affecting ultimate choice satisfaction, pride of authorship, and purchase intention.

Together these studies demonstrate that the typical MC format of by-attribute customization can lead to unintended consequences for consumers. Contrary to prior research demonstrating positive effects for allowing consumers to customize products, the results of this research demonstrate that a by-attribute customization format was generally associated with less favorable outcomes than the by-alternative format and that processing style plays a central role within that process. As society places greater emphasis on consumer self-expression, the demand for and availability of individualized and customized products is ever increasing. Surprisingly, little research has examined the effect of various MC systems on consumer choice outcomes. This research highlights that there is further need for examining the impact of configuration system formats. Future research should also examine whether global processing is generally favorable or whether there are conditions where increased local processing can be beneficial.

In summary, the contribution of our research is twofold: We demonstrated that the format of configuration (by-attribute vs. by-alternative) has an impact on individual styles of information processing. Furthermore, we presented evidence that increased local processing and decreased mental simulation stemming from a by-attribute customization format can make a difference to both consumers (by decreasing their product satisfaction and pride) and firms (by diminishing consumers’ intentions to purchase the product).
Table 1: Main Results of Studies 1 and 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>By-attribute</th>
<th>By-alternative</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processing styles (study 1)</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing styles (study 2)</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.74*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice satisfaction</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>1.72*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride of authorship</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>1.90*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase intention</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2.44**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05; ** p < .01

Note. Whereas study 1 used an extensive configuration set, study 2 used a reduced configuration set. Processing styles ranged between 0 and 3 (higher numbers indicate a global processing style), choice satisfaction and pride of authorship were inquired on a 7-point Likert scale, and purchase intention was measured as a percentage value.

REFERENCES


Facial Expression Intelligence Scale (FEIS): Recognizing and Interpreting Facial Expressions and Implications for Consumer Behavior

Meghan Pierce, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile
David Brinberg, Virginia Tech, USA
Rajesh Bagchi, Virginia Tech, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Faces provide insights into the traits and characters of individuals. For example, attractive individuals are often perceived (or stereotyped) as having more positive personality traits and successful life outcomes (Eagly et al., 1991). Similarly, Ekman and Friesen (1974) demonstrated that individuals can perceive deceptive intent from facial structure and expression. Beyond face shape, symmetry and other structural characteristics, a more interesting component of impression formation is the dynamic nature of the face. The ability to accurately identify emotions in the face has been the subject of considerable research, particularly in the area of emotional intelligence. Abilities to recognize and interpret facial expressions vary based on the individual (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004).

Several scales have been created to measure individual abilities in the recognition of emotions; one popular scale is the Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). Salovey and Mayer (1990) described Emotional Intelligence as “the ability to monitor one’s own and other’s feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.” According to the theories of Emotional Intelligence, the degree to which people are good at monitoring their own emotions and those of others around them is likely to differ.

Existing scales rely solely on static photographs of expression, threatening ecological validity (Carroll & Russell, 1997; Tian, Kanade, & Cohn, 2001) and intense expressions, which may mask the subtle effects of dynamic displays, thereby failing to include the importance and authenticity of motion to facial expression and perception (Ambadar et al, 2005). Furthermore, there is evidence that the use of dynamic views in face perception research assists in understanding individuals’ expressions and the implications of these (in)abilities on individuals. For example, attractive individuals are often perceived (or stereotyped) as having more positive personality traits and success-tad and Wright 1994), and our knowledge and understanding of the intrinsic aspects of the face, such as the following:

Study 1 includes the development of a three component instrument (FEIS): static recognition of facial emotional expressions, accuracy of interpreting emotional expressions in different contexts, and the impact of dynamic facial expressions in emotion recognition. Muscular movements of the face were coded by facial expression recognition software programmed utilizing the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman and Friesen 1978). A series of static photographs, photographs embedded in a context, and dynamic videos were presented to study participants. Results of study one indicate that participants exhibit a range of expression identification abilities.

Quartiles of each component were computed. Belonging to the fiftieth and seventy-fifth percentile, and between the twenty-fifth and fiftieth percentile, the third quartile expression identification scores, the second quartile meant scoring between the twenty-fifth and fiftieth percentile, and the fourth quartile meant scoring amongst the top twenty-five percent of all facial expression identification scores. We would expect individuals who score poorly on component one (i.e., at the 25th percentile or lower) to score poorly on each individual task. A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of each task on the overall component score. There was a significant effect of task on the overall component score (i.e., belonging to a particular quartile) at the p<.01 level for happy (F(3,238)=37.107, p=.000), anger (F(3,238)=49.372, p=.000), disgust (F(3,238)=49.177, p=.000), sad (F(3,238)=43.790, p=.000), surprise (F(3,238)=38.682, p=.000), fear (F(3,238)=27.297, p=.000) and neutral (F(3,238)=41.631, p=.000). Furthermore, the mean scores by quartile demonstrate linear graphical trends. Interpretation and dynamic scores were computed separately and demonstrate similar results, all significant at the p<.01 level.

Study 2 tests the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale by comparing the FEIS with existing scales of emotional intelligence, namely the MSCEIT. Pearson correlations were conducted to test the relationship of the proposed instrument and its components with an existing scale (MSCEIT) and its four branches. Results indicate the first component of the FEIS (Identity) is correlated significantly with the MSCEIT total score (r(96) = .323, p<.01). This low-level correlation is expected given that both the first component of the FEIS and the MSCEIT measure a participant’s evaluation of a facial expression in a photograph. The second and third components (Context and Video), however, are not correlated with the total emotional intelligence score provided by the MSCEIT, suggesting there is minimal overlap between the two instruments. The overall score for the FEIS and the MSCEIT exhibit a low-level correlation (r(96) = .255, p<.05). This pattern of results indicates that the MSCEIT and the FEIS examine distinct constructs.

Structural equation modeling was used to examine the characteristics of the FEIS model. The model, including the three components of the FEIS scale and the MSCEIT (with its four components), fits well (χ² (13) = 14.364, p = .35; CFI = .987, TLI = .980, SRMR = .047, RMSEA = .033 [90% CI = .000, .109]. All regression coefficients for the model components were significant at the .05 level. This evidence provides support for the discriminant validity of the FEIS and its hypothesized structure.

The FEIS demonstrated acceptable test-retest reliability with a significant Pearson correlation of .79 for the overall score (r(85) = .79, p <.01) in Study 3.

Studies 4 and 5 examine the face and predictive validity of the scale. Results indicate that marketing majors perform better than accounting majors on the FEIS scale (Study 4) and that individuals with better emotion recognition ability, i.e., those who score higher on the FEIS scale, perform better in negotiation tasks (Study 5).

The current paper contributes to our understanding of marketplace metacognition (Wright 2002), persuasion knowledge (Fries- ted and Wright 1994), and our knowledge and understanding of the intentions of others in the marketplace. Specifically, facial expression recognition can serve as an interpretive tool when assessing the goals and tactics of marketers. FEIS also contributes to the social and emotional intelligence literatures by focusing on facial emotion recognition and creating an instrument that includes real-time, dynamic views of the face.
REFERENCES
The Effects of Ambient Light on Choices between Virtues and Vices
Dipayan Biswas, University of South Florida, USA
Courtney Szocs, University of South Florida, USA
Donald R. Lehmann, Columbia University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
In most retail contexts, managers usually have flexibility in controlling the ambient light intensity. Hence, not surprisingly, stores and restaurants vary greatly in terms of ambient light intensity with some stores and restaurants being very bright (e.g. Bed, Bath and Beyond, Chipotle) and others being very dim (e.g. Hollister) or even pitch dark (e.g. The Opaque Restaurant Chain). Along these lines, would the ambient light intensity in a store or restaurant influence consumers’ choices between vice and virtue products? We focus mostly on choices between healthy (virtue) and unhealthy (vice) food items, but we also test the robustness of our findings in a non-food budget allocation context.

Building on prior research streams, two alternative hypotheses can be proposed. First, research in the domain of sensory compensation would suggest that deficiency or weakness in one sensory input tends to get compensated with better processing of stimuli from other sensory inputs (Hoover et al. 2012; Kolarik et al. 2013). Based on this literature stream, it can be proposed that diminished ambient light would lead to increased sensitivity and alertness in the non-visual modalities. If this holds, a consumer is more likely to choose the virtue/healthy item when the ambient light is dim (vs. bright). In contrast, research in the domains of sleep behavior and disinhibition will predict an opposite pattern of results. Specifically, consumers might be more mentally alert and less sleepy in bright (vs. dim) light, because among other physiological changes, bright light suppresses melatonin, which is the primary controller of circadian (day/night) sleep bio-rhythms (Lowden et al. 2004). Thus, consumers would be less mentally alert in dimly (vs. brightly) lit environments, and therefore less likely to rely on cognitive effortful processing when choosing between virtue and vice products. Second, consumer decision-making would more disinhibited in dim (vs. bright) ambient light since dark/dim lights give people a sense of illusory anonymity and encourage moral transgressions (Zhong et al. 2010). Thus, theories related to both mental alertness and disinhibition would predict greater preference for vices/unhealthy foods when the ambient light is dim (vs. bright).

Across four studies (two conducted in the laboratory and two in the field), we examine the effect of ambient light on consumers’ choices and in the process test the two competing hypotheses discussed above. In Study 1A, a field experiment at a restaurant, we have restaurant diners choose between healthy (i.e. fruit cup) and unhealthy (i.e. cheesecake) food items in dim or bright ambient lighting and find a greater preference for the unhealthy food item in dim (vs. bright) lighting. In Study 1B we extend these findings to a non-food budget allocation task and have participants allocate a budget of windfall money to fun and necessary activities. The results show that participants allocate a greater proportion of the budget to fun items in dim (vs. bright) ambient lighting. In addition, process evidence suggests that participants are more mentally alert in bright (vs. dim) lighting. Overall, the results of Studies 1A and 1B provide support for the hypothesis based on theories related to ambient light influencing sleep behavior but do not provide support for the sensory compensation or disinhibition models.

In Study 2 we investigate the underlying process driving greater preference for vices in dim (vs. bright) lighting in further detail by manipulating mental alertness through the use of a highly alerting (vs. neutral) ambient scent. We argue that if decreased mental alertness in dim ambient lighting is driving the greater preference for unhealthy foods then this effect should be attenuated when a highly alerting ambient scent is present in dim lighting. In support of our theorization, we find that in the presence of a highly alerting ambient scent the increased preference for unhealthy (vs. healthy) foods in dim lighting is diminished.

While Studies 1-2 employed forced choice tasks Study 3, another field study at a restaurant, involved unobtrusively recording diners’ food choices. We varied the ambient light intensity (dim vs. standard vs. bright) in the restaurant and unobtrusively recorded restaurant diners’ orderings from the regular restaurant menu. Consistent with the findings from the previous laboratory studies, the results show that restaurant diners order the unhealthy menu items to a greater extent in dim (vs. bright or standard) lighting.

Overall, the results of four experiments show that dim (vs. bright) ambient light enhances choice for vices across food and non-food domains. This finding has strong practical relevance since managers can typically control ambient light levels in most stores and restaurants. Thus, they might be able to manipulate ambient light intensity to drive preferences.

Table 1: Summary of Empirical Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Dim Ambient Light</th>
<th>Bright Ambient Light</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion Choosing Healthy</td>
<td>Proportion Choosing Healthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A</td>
<td>n=73 Chocolate Cake vs. Fruit Salad</td>
<td>44%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean amount to Fun</td>
<td>$397.22a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B</td>
<td>n=77 Fun vs. Necessary Activities</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean amount to Necess</td>
<td>$602.78b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Field study, n=95 Chocolate Cake vs. Fruit Salad</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion Choosing Healthy</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>n=118 Regular Restaurant Menu</td>
<td>29%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dim Proportion Choosing Healthy</td>
<td>51%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bright Proportion Choosing Healthy</td>
<td>62%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proportions with different subscripts are significantly different at p < .10
* indicates significantly different at p < .05

REFERENCES


When More Than One Negative Emotion is Elicited: How Suppressing or Expressing One Allows the Other to Raise its Ugly Head
Rashmi Adaval, HKUST, Hong Kong SAR, Hong Kong, China
Maria Galli, UPF, Spain
Suresh Ramanathan, Texas A&M University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
An ad from an award-winning campaign for the World Wildlife Fund shows penguins rummaging through trash with the tagline “The future is man-made.” It suggests how, in the absence of human stewardship, greed and overconsumption are ruining the planet. Advertising like this is commonplace and typically elicits different emotions. For example, thinking about the plight of various species that are disappearing may elicit sadness. However, thinking about the actions that lead to this decline in biodiversity may elicit anger too. How do attempts to regulate these different feelings affect the downstream effects they can have?

Although past research on affect has emphasized the need to examine different emotions (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), much of this work does not address how exposure to stimuli that elicits more than one emotion (Lau-Gesk 2005; Williams & Aaker, 2002) has an impact on judgments of unrelated targets. For instance, in the example above, does sadness have an effect on subsequent unrelated judgments? Or are we more influenced by anger? Or, do both emotions exert an influence? And, under which conditions is the effect of each more dominant?

Several possibilities exist. First, the emotion elicited most intensely might be the only one to have an impact on current and subsequent judgments. Second, other emotions elicited to a lesser degree ad might also have an effect if considered applicable to the judgment situation. Third, the downstream effects of the different feelings experienced might depend both on whether the dominant feelings are expressed or suppressed, and on the passage of time. For instance, imagine that a single stimulus (e.g., a print ad) elicits two different negative emotions. One of these (e.g., sadness) might dominate the other (e.g., anger). Suppressing the dominant emotion might lead to a post-suppression rebound similar to that observed in thought suppression research (Wegner, 1994). This rebound effect might temporarily overpower the weaker emotion, lessening its impact. Expressing the dominant emotion, on the other hand, might have a cathartic effect, thereby allowing other less intense emotions to manifest. Although the effects of catharsis are unclear, with some prior studies showing that the effects of emotions are accentuated with catharsis and others showing that they are attenuated, work by Watkins (2004) suggests that an experiential mode of expressing emotions might be adaptive whereas an evaluative mode of analyzing emotions might be maladaptive. Following this work, we suggest that expressing the dominant emotion might have cathartic effects (i.e., a reduction of that emotion). However, if other less dominant emotions are being experienced (e.g., anger), catharsis of the dominant emotion might allow less dominant ones to be more evident.

How might these effects change if some time passes after suppression or expression of the dominant emotion? If the dominant emotion is expressed during ad processing and catharsis takes place, the less intense emotion would be allowed to surface, leading to catharsis as well. In this case, with the passage of time we would likely see further reductions in both emotions.

If the dominant emotion is suppressed, however, the passage of time might lead to a reversal of the initial effects observed: The rebound effect that initially overwhelmed the less intense emotion would likely subside after a while, allowing the less intense emotion to finally surface (perhaps even with renewed force!), impacting behavior.

We examined this in three experiments. In experiment 1 (N = 72), participants saw an ad that elicited sadness (more dominant) and anger (less dominant). Participants were either instructed to suppress sadness, or not given any specific instruction. A lexical decision task followed, to assess the relative accessibility of sadness and anger emotion concepts. As expected participants were faster in responding to sadness- than to anger-related words (F(1, 58) = 75.77, p < .001). However, there was also a significant interaction (F(2, 58) = 3.15, p = .05): The difference in reaction times to sadness vs. anger-related words was greater when participants were instructed to suppress sadness (492 vs. 576 ms) than when they were not (499 vs. 553 ms; t(58) = 1.99, p = .055). Thus, suppressing the dominant emotion not only increased its salience but also diminished the extent to which the less dominant emotion was accessible.

Experiment 2 (N = 104) varied whether participants expressed or suppressed the dominant emotion, as well as the time at which emotions were measured. In the immediate conditions the dependent measure came right after viewing the ad. Participants in the delay condition were told that questions about the ad would be asked after a while and completed two filler tasks first. Even though all participants felt equally sad (all Fs < 1), levels of anger depended jointly on instruction and time of measurement (F(1, 99) = 5.74, p = .02). When instructed to express sadness, anger did not vary with time (M instantaneous = 4.73; M delay = 4.23; t(99) = .61, p = .5). However, when instructed to suppress sadness, time had a big effect: Participants felt less angry initially than after a while (M expression = 3.88; M delay = 6.16; t(99) = 2.77, p = .01). Interestingly, also, instruction and time jointly influenced the extent to which participants blamed corporations for the environmental problems seen in the campaign (F(1, 100) = 5.45, p = .02). Immediately, expressing sadness led to blaming corporations more than suppressing sadness (7.23 vs. 6.15; t(100) = 1.97, p = .05). After a delay this pattern was reversed (though not significantly so, 6.85 vs. 7.58, t(100) = 1.32, p = .18).

The results of Experiment 3, not discussed in detail here because of space constraints, converged with those of experiment 2. They showed that the less dominant emotion was more likely to manifest when participants expressed the dominant emotion. As a consequence, actions of companies in unrelated situations were seen as more blameworthy when these lower-level (less dominant) feelings were allowed to manifest.

Our experiments showed how the suppression and expression of different emotions that are elicited by the same ad could impact evaluations in both related and unrelated situations. Our results not only contribute to the literature on emotion regulation, but also our paper is one of the first to examine how this emotion regulation works in a context when more than one emotion is elicited.

REFERENCES


Colour Me Morally: White and Black Products Influence Prosocial Behaviours
Jing Wan, University of Toronto, Canada
Eugene Y. Chan, University of Toronto, Canada

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Television and movie characters who wear white clothes are the “good guys” and those who wear black ones are the “bad guys”. In the English language, “black-hearted” means wicked and evil, while the idiom “pure as driven snow” refers to moral cleanliness. People often associate white colours with moral concepts such as purity and goodness, and black colours with immoral concepts such as contamination and evilness. These psychological associations between white, black, and morality are likely engrained into human existence. People more readily identify positive words in a white font than negative words in a black font (Meier, Robinson, and Clore 2004; Sherman and Clore 2009), and they perceive gray colours as lighter when evaluating positive words but as darker when evaluating negative ones (Meier et al. 2007).

Drawing upon findings from priming research, we posit that exposure to white products increases propensity for prosocial behaviours while exposure to black products increases propensity for non-prosocial behaviours. For instance, people exposed to elderly concepts walk slower (Bargh et al., 1996) and people primed with professor stereotypes score higher on academic tests (Hansen and Wänke 2009). These priming effects occur because environmental cues activate related concepts in the self that then guide behaviour (Wheeler et al., 2007).

In addition, we posit that mere colour exposure leads to consistent moral behaviours, but interacting with the colours leads to compensatory moral ones. The moral licensing literature has found that people who behave morally subsequently behave immorally (Miller and Effron 2010), while people who behave immorally subsequently behave morally (Zhong and Liljenquist 2006). We hypothesize that buying white products will lead to moral licensing, whereas buying black products will lead to moral compensation. Although a white sofa is not inherently more moral than a black sofa, but because the colours white and black imbue products with moral meaning, buying the product (in contrast to viewing the products) allows the consumer to engage with the product. Hence, buying the white sofa should make the individual feel as if she has behaved morally, thus leading to licensing; conversely, buying the black sofa should make the individual feel as if she has behaved immorally, thus leading to compensation.

In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that exposure to white products causes people to “do good”, while exposure to black products causes them to “do bad”. Participants saw pictures of four black or white products. All participants indicated how much they liked each product. Then they indicated how likely they would perform four prosocial and non-prosocial behaviours. Participants who rated the products (M = 3.07), t(48) = 2.52, p < .02.

In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that colour can imbue products with symbolic meaning beyond the inherent function or purpose of the product. Participants saw either a hedonic or utilitarian product. They then indicated whether it was a vice or a virtue, and whether it was something that they want to or something that they should buy. As expected, the utilitarian product was more virtuous (M = 7.04) than the hedonic product (M = 5.80), F(1, 148) = 18.50, p < .001. More importantly, white products, both hedonic and utilitarian, were more virtuous (M = 7.09) than black products (M = 6.35), F(1, 148) = 13.76, p < .001.

The colour of the product can affect how virtuous the product is perceived to be. Hence, buying white products should lead to licensing, while buying black products should lead to compensation. Rating these same products, on the other hand, should lead to behaviours that are consistent with the moral meanings of the colours. Experiment 3 used a 2 (store: white vs. black) × 2 (task: rate vs. buy) between-subjects design. Participants entered a simulated online store with either predominantly “white” or “black” products. In each condition, half of the participants rated the products; the others selected five products to purchase. Participants were entered into a draw for $2 and they could donate any amount of it to Greenpeace. In the store with white products, rating participants donated more to Greenpeace (M = $0.89) than buying participants (M = $0.48), t(39) = 2.56, p < .02. But in the store with black products, rating participants donated less (M = $0.47) than buying participants (M = $0.72), t(56) = 1.88, p < .07.

Buying for oneself is a form of action that directly links to the self-concept to facilitate the perception of having done good or bad from buying white and black products. We demonstrate in Experiment 4 that these buying vs. rating effects only hold when one is buying for the self. In a 2 (colour: white vs. black) × 3 (task: buy for self vs. buy for others vs. rate) between-subjects design, participants again entered the simulated online store. They were told to either rate the white (black) products, choose five to purchase for themselves, or choose five to purchase for a friend. They then indicated how likely they would perform four prosocial and non-prosocial behaviours. Among participants in the store with white products, those who bought for themselves scored lower on prosocial intentions (M = 2.35) than those who bought for others (M = 4.18) as well as those who rated the products (M = 4.35), F(2, 88) = 5.65, p < .01. But among participants in the store with black products, those who bought for themselves scored higher on prosocial intentions (M = 4.20) than those who bought for others (M = 2.75) as well as those who rated the products (M = 2.31), F(2, 89) = 4.14, p < .02.

In this research, we show that when people are exposed to white and black colours, related moral concepts become readily accessible and affect their subsequent behaviours. White and black colours also influence how virtuous products are perceived, and since white products are perceived as more moral and black products are perceived as less moral, engaging with (i.e. buying) these products leads to compensatory moral behaviours while mere colour exposure leads to consistent moral behaviours. Any moral deed has individual and societal consequences, and if colour is everywhere, an understanding of colour exposure on morality is needed.

REFERENCES


Table 1: Summary of All Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>White Products</th>
<th>Black Products</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV = Prosocial intentions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.07a</td>
<td>3.07b</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Study 2</th>
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<tr>
<td>DV = Virtuousness of product</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Utilitarian Product</td>
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<td>6.79b</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedonic Products</td>
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<td>4.98b</td>
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<tr>
<th>Study 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV = Donation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buy</td>
<td>$0.48a</td>
<td>$0.72b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>$0.89b</td>
<td>$0.47a</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 4</th>
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<th>Black Products</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Buy-self</td>
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<td>4.20b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buy-other</td>
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<td>2.75a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>4.35b</td>
<td>2.31a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers with different superscripts are significantly different at p < .05


Anticipating Regret When Making Investments in One’s Higher Education  
Jeffrey P. Wallman, Oklahoma State University, USA  
B.J. Allen, University of Oklahoma, USA  
Jeffrey B. Schmidt, University of Oklahoma, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the role that anticipated regret plays in investment decisions, particularly consumer education investment decisions. Regret is an emotion that plays a powerful role in consumer decision-making (Inman and Zeelenberg 2002), and is defined by Sugden (1985) as “the painful sensation of recognizing that ‘what is’ compares unfavorably with ‘what might have been’” (p. 77). It is backward-looking. Consumers sometimes learn after a decision that another alternative would have been optimal, which causes a sense of regret (Bell 1982). Studies have found that information about products after purchase (Cooke, Meyvis, and Schwartz 2001) and information about forgone alternatives (Inman, Dyer, and Jia 1997) play an important role in not only regret but also post-purchase satisfaction. Consumers expect to possibly feel regret about purchase decisions, and thus try to reduce future regret that may come with different choices (Simonson 1992). Therefore, consumers not may not only feel regret for a decision made in the past, but they may also feel anticipatory regret before the decision is actually made (Janis and Mann 1977). Anticipated regret is forward-looking and is the focus of the present study.

We postulate that anticipated regret actually consists of two components, keep and drop regret, and both should be considered when studying consumer regret. Anticipated keep regret is defined as a situation where a consumer anticipates regret for continued investment in a situation and finds out later that they should not have invested. Anticipated drop regret represents a situation where a consumer anticipates regret for not continuing with an investment but later finds out that he should have. Both types of regret play an important role in the way consumers evaluate decisions. While existing research suggests that consumers may feel regret or anticipate regret for multiple reasons, this is the first study that attempts to define and explicitly study the factors that comprise anticipated regret.

A decision-making exercise was developed to empirically test a variety of research hypotheses. A total of 469 subjects participated, and they were asked to evaluate an investment in education under losses that grew larger over repeated decisions. Participants were instructed that they entered a two-year graduate program to earn a professional degree at a well-known university. The program costs over $50,000 per year (including tuition, room, board, books, fees), and they expected to pay over $100,000 in costs to complete the entire program, nearly all of it financed through student loans. Before entering the program they determined that they could afford the program if current trends continue, but that may change. As a result, in order to validate their decision after each semester, the subjects developed a plan that included the following minimum benchmark requirements for the degree. After each semester they would review the projected performance measures and decide whether or not to continue in the program. The majority of these measures fell below the minimum acceptable threshold, and they declined further at the second evaluation point.

We found mixed support for our research hypotheses. As hypothesized, consumers anticipate drop regret and keep regret when making continuing investment decisions, and (b) anticipated drop and keep regret help explain consumers’ decisions beyond what perceptions of eventual program success and commitment to completing the graduation degree explain. We also found that (a) anticipated drop regret causes consumers to continue with a failing investment, and (b) anticipated keep regret causes consumers to not continue with a failing investment (partial support; first decision period). Our third hypothesis was partially supported: anticipated drop regret explains the decisions to continue (or not) with a failing investment more than anticipated keep regret for decision 1 (but not decision 2). Finally, our results shows that anticipated drop regret decreases over the course of a failing investment, and anticipated keep regret increases over the course of the failing investment in graduate education.

This study finds that consumers anticipate regret in the future when making consumption decisions in the present. This suggests that worrying about the future weighs on the minds of consumers. It is argued that anticipated regret could lead to decision-making errors in the present. This suggests that anticipated regret is an important mechanism that might affect persistence in a losing investment (i.e., escalation of commitment, Staw 1976).

The contributions of this study are as follows: first, we attempt to clearly define and measure the two subsets of anticipated regret in order to better understand the dynamics of anticipated regret and its role in escalation. Second, we model these two types of anticipated regret together on the same situation in order to better understand their comparative explanatory power on decisions. Lastly, we measure how these components of anticipated regret change over time.

REFERENCES

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

There are many factors that influence our enjoyment and satiation from a current experience. Among them we have, the initial utility we derive from it (Coombs and Avrunin 1977), the objective quantity that we have (Mook and Votaw 1992), the rate at which we consume it (Galak, Kruger and Loewenstein 2013; Nelson and Meyvis 2008; Nelson, Meyvis and Galak 2009), how much variety it contains (Rolls et al. 1984), or merely how we remember it (Rozin et al, 1998) or categorize it (Redden 2008). Finding ways to delay satiation is instrumental to our happiness (Raghunathan and Irwin 2001) because when this phenomenon takes place, consumers stop enjoying their favorite stimuli as much as they did before and need to consume better ones in order to just maintain a desired level of enjoyment (Brickman and Campbell 1971). Despite its importance for wellbeing, just a few ways in which satiation can be reduced have been documented in the literature (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999).

The current research looks at a new factor that can affect satiation from a current experience, such as anticipating consuming variety in a given domain. Frequently, in our everyday lives, we find ourselves in situations where our future consumption in a given category is likely set due to decisions we have made for ourselves, or simply because the circumstances have attached us to a particular set of conditions. For example, we choose to buy vacation packages, time shares, or season tickets for extended periods of time, lease vehicles to contracts for a set number of months or years, acquire annual country club or gym memberships, or simply buy our favorite flavor of yogurt in bulk at the local Costco. Alternatively, there are situations such as moving to a particular city for work, where we may find ourselves committed to a specific set of entertainment or dining options. What both of these cases have in common is that consumers know what their future consumption in a specific domain will be. Needless to say, we encounter this type of conditions on a regular basis, so it would be useful to learn more about what their effect is on the enjoyment of a related present experience. This research has the objective to help answer this question.

We look at cases where consumers face a current experience in a given domain and are able to anticipate what their prospective future consumption on that category is. We propose that in such cases people will satiate slower in the present if the prospective future episode contains variety. We also provide evidence that this effect is due to consumers’ increased savoring of the current experience - potentially caused by their anticipation of a different episode in the future - and to anticipatory thoughts related to the upcoming event (Loewenstein 1987).

We tested this effect in a series of studies in which subjects rated their enjoyment of different sets of jelly beans as they repeatedly consumed them. Study 1 tested the core prediction as participants satiated less from the consumption of jelly beans when they were made to believe they could have a more varied consumption opportunity in the future. The setup employed for this experiment served as a proxy for situations where consumers are attached to a particular set of consumption options due to external circumstances, such as the options available in the city in which they live. Study 2 replicated the effect in a design where instead externally establishing what the future consumption scenario is we determined it by asking participants about their individual preferences. This setup served as a proxy for situations in which participant’s future consumption is entirely determined by their own choices. Moreover, this experiment demonstrated the moderating role of time distance on this effect. It shows that the effect will be stronger in cases where the future consumption opportunity will take place in a few days as opposed to in several months. Lastly, study 3 provided evidence in favor of savoring of the present and thoughts about the future as the underlying mechanism, while showing that the effect is domain specific and does not extend to future, varied experiences in general.

In conclusion, these findings contribute to our understanding about the phenomenon of satiation in meaningful ways, as no research had looked at the effect that such important factor at the theoretical and practical level, such as anticipating future consumption, may have on satiation from a current experience. This paper is consistent with the conference objective of “making a difference”, as we, consumer behavior researchers, must strive on doing work on topics that are both, theoretically and practically relevant. If we use our skills towards this objective, we will be able to have a bigger impact on consumer welfare.

REFERENCES


Choosing the More Effortful Option for Illusionary Self-Control
Yanjie Li, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Leilei Gao, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Consumers must often choose between giving into temptation and the pursuit of a higher-order, long-range goal (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). These dilemmas are especially common in the domain of eating behavior, where people must often decide whether to indulge their craving for delicious but fattening food (e.g., chocolate cake and ice cream) or to choose an alternative (e.g., fruit salad) that is consistent with their goal of staying healthy. However, people often encounter situations in which only unhealthy options are available. For example, a dinner guest might feel obligated to choose between two luscious desserts that the host has spent considerable effort in preparing; a tourist may patronize a local “greasy spoon” restaurant that does not offer healthy alternatives; and one might contemplate two flavors of popcorn to eat at a movie concession stand.

Most research on the resolution of conflicts between immediate gratification and long-term goal attainment (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Loewenstein 1996; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999) has focused on the first type of choice situation described above. That is, individuals are confronted with a choice between a hedonically appealing but unhealthy option and a healthy but relatively less unappealing one. In these conditions, they typically choose the first option (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991). If the desirability of good health is called to their attention, however, they may choose the healthy option (Ferguson and Bargh 2004; Shah and Kruglanski 2003). Or, they might choose one option of each type thereby striking a balance between their desires to attain the two goals in question (Dhar and Simonson 1999).

The second type of choice situation, which we consider in the present article, is less straightforward. In this situation, a healthy alternative is not available; that is, the choice alternatives are both hedonically appealing and unhealthy. In this case, health-conscious consumers might often decide not to choose either option. If they are unable or unwilling to defer choice, however, how do they make a decision that allows them to forgo the goal of good health?

Our answer to this question was guided by implications of two areas of research concerning (a) the motivation to justify one’s decisions (Shafir, Simonson and Tversky 1993) and (b) the role of self-control (Baumeister and Exline 2000; Geyer and Baumeister 2005). In the latter regard, people consider the exercise of self-control to be moral and inherently desirable, or the “master virtue” as put by Baumeister and Exline (2000). Consequently, they may believe that practicing self-control by sacrificing a degree of pleasure in a choice situation (e.g., forgoing the objective they consider to be most desirable) is virtuous, and that if they are willing to make this sacrifice, they deserve a reward. Therefore, we speculated that if individuals are confronted with two appealing but unhealthy alternatives, and if they can convince themselves that they are being virtuous by sacrificing the alternative they perceive to be more desirable, they may feel entitled to a reward for their virtuousness by choosing the relatively less desirable option. Thus, if consumers believe that obtaining one option requires greater effort than obtaining the other, consumers might convince themselves that by resisting the temptation to select the more easily available option, they are being virtuous and are entitled to choose the more effortful one. Ironically then, consumers choose not to maximize their pleasure even if a health goal is violated.

We tested our prediction in four studies. Study 1 adopted a 2 (goal priming: health goal vs. control) × 2 (counterbalance of attractive options) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to either a health goal priming condition or a control condition by evaluating magazine covers either related or unrelated to health goals. They were then presented descriptions of two chocolate truffles and were asked to indicate their preference and choice. We manipulated the psychological effort of evaluating the choice options by presenting one option in a difficult-to-read font and the other in an easy-to-read font. A logistic regression revealed only a main effect of goal priming such that when a health goal was primed participants were more likely to choose the less fluent chocolate (52%) than those in the control condition (25%) regardless of which option was made less attractive.

Study 2 replicated the finding of Study 1 by manipulating the physical effort involved in obtaining indulgent food items. We showed that making a health goal salient increased the likelihood that the participants would choose the more vice option that is more distant (vs. close) to them.

Study 3 showed that choosing the more effortful indulgent food option was specific to individuals with a high level of self-control. This finding suggests that sacrificing pleasure in the conditions we considered results from not only participants’ motivation to justify their indulgence, but also their ability to do so.

Study 4 adopted a 2 (goal priming: health goal vs. control) × 2 (food category: healthy choices vs. unhealthy choices) × 2 (counterbalance of attractive options) between-subject design. The results suggest that activating a health goal will lead to greater consumer preference for the more effortful option only when both options violate the health goal; when choosing between two healthy options, people will always prefer the less effortful option, regardless of whether a health goal is activated.

REFERENCES


How Incidental Affect Alters Subsequent Judgments: Insights From Behavioral, fMRI, and Psychophysiology Studies

Hilke Plassmann, INSEAD & École Normale Supérieure, France
Beth M. Pavlicek, INSEAD, École Normale Supérieure, France
Baba Shiv, Stanford University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

People do not have stable, coherent and readily accessible preferences that can be reliably measured through self-report. Instead, judgments are constructed on the spot and recent, contextual factors exert a disproportionate influence on judgments (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1992; Slovic, 1995). These contextual influences include feelings that are unrelated to the judgment (such as moods, emotions, and expectation of receiving a reward, Schwarz & Clore 1983, Cohen, Pham & Andrade 2008). Why is the brain susceptible to these types of rewards that engender such changes in revealed preferences? To address this question, we studied the impact of incidental affect on behavioral measures of experienced value (studies 1-3) and the neural representation of experienced value (study 2), an essential computation in the process of value-based decision-making.

In study 1 (N=80, 41m, aged 18-29 years), we tested whether receiving or losing monetary rewards of different sizes altered the subsequent enjoyment of consuming a product (two different wines) in an unrelated task. We found that wines tastes significantly worse after losing 5 EUR as compared to winning 5 EUR (planned contrast: F(1,77)=5.16, p=.026) and to winning 10 EUR (planned contrast: F(1,77)=6.82, p=.010).

In study 2, we scanned human subjects’ brains (N=19, 6f, aged 21-46 years) using fMRI while engaging in a task that again first involved the receipt of a monetary reward ($0, $50, $200) for real using a one-armed bandit task and subsequently the receipt of a food reward (two different liked wines). During the tasting task, subjects were instructed to evaluate how much they liked the taste of each wine.

Behavioral analysis showed that the incidental rewards (i.e. amounts won from the slot machine) significantly biased participants’ judgments of how much they enjoyed the wines (F(1, 18) = 7.46, p=.013). No effect on reaction times was found. We replicated these effects on behavioral measures of valuation in another follow-up study. In study 3 (N=160, all females, aged 18-36), we conceptually replicated this effect for a different type of reward (i.e. exposure to affective vs. neutral print ads) and also investigated whether these effects depend on the motivational state of the consumer (i.e. hungry vs. satiated state). We could replicate our findings also for such primary rewards (main effect: F(1,151)=6.76, p=.010) and showed that the effects depend on the motivational state in the high affect ad but not in the low affect ad condition (planned contrast for motivational state in high affect group F(1,147)=5.29, p=.023).

We ran a set of different univariate fMRI analysis. First, we looked for brain areas correlating with the size of monetary reward and found that the size of incidental rewards triggered activity changes in different brain areas previously found to be involved in reward processing (i.e. vStr, dStr, amygdala, insula, inferior OFC). Second, we investigated brain areas that correlate with the size of reported experienced value (EV) and found that EV was encoded in brain areas that also have been previously found to encode EV (i.e. vmPFC, the inferior lateral OFC, anterior insula). Third, we analyzed the neural correlates of how the judgment of the consumption experience is biased by the size of the incidental reward. Interestingly, we found that incidental rewards affect EV through a negative correlation in two of the EV areas mentioned above, the insula and the inferior lateral OFC.

Our results show that incidental rewards have an effect of reported OV. Interestingly, our fMRI results reveal that incidental affect bias taste processing such that subjects show more activity in brain areas in encoding EV the smaller the reward. This means that during tasting and before rating subjects first compensate for lower rewards as mood management theories would suggest. This is different from how more cognitive cues that are linked to the product such as the price of the wine (Plassmann et al. 2008) or a verbal label signaling quality (De Araujo et al. 2005) affect activity in brain areas encoding EV. Interestingly, these effects are primarily presented during a late tasting stage but not on early tasting stage. We are currently collecting SCR and Facial Affective Encoding measures to better understand the temporal dynamics of these effects.

REFERENCES


Physiological Correlates Of Effects Of Prior Outcomes On Risky Choice

Eduardo Andrade, FGV, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Ming Hsu, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Yuan Shao, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, China

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

The question of how prior outcomes influence risk preferences is central to all sequential decision settings. A wealth of evidence has shown that such influences are poorly described by subjective expected utility (SEU) theory, and that prospect theory, where outcomes are coded as gains and losses relative to some reference point, offers a better framework for analyzing such behavior. However, due to the flexibility in how one can specify the reference point, prospect theory often fail to offer an unambiguous prediction concerning the effects of prior outcomes on behavior. For example, Kahneman & Tversky (1979) states that, “there are … situations in which gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo.”

In the current study, we explored the possibility that psychophysiological responses to gains and losses can be used to supplement the theory. In particular, we examine risk taking, its psychophysical correlates, and how prior outcomes influence risk attitudes. Indeed, there is a long tradition in prospect theory to describe the value function in terms of psychophysics principles such as diminishing sensitivity and reference dependence. Thaler (1999), for example, states that the prospect theory value function is “a representation of some central components of the human perceived pleasure machine”, with the reference point, diminishing sensitivity, and greater salience of losses relative to gains, as the three core properties of the value function. Recent studies in addition, have shown that this latter property—loss aversion—is directly reflected in the psychophysiological responses (Sokol-Hessner, 2009), raising the possibility that such a measure can be a general strategy for understanding how the value function changes in sequential decisions.

Specifically, we measure participants’ skin conductance responses (SCR) to quantify bodily arousal responses, and relate such responses to behavior. We observe both behavioral and psychophysiological consequences of prior outcomes, suggesting that physiological responses are related to the observed behavior. By combining the above variables and individual level behavioral and psychophysiological analyses, we can explore subtle effects within subjects, and can speak directly to the effects of prior outcome on a given individual, rather than being limited to group analysis.

In Experiment 1, we investigated behaviorally using 36 subjects how prior gains and losses affected participants risk attitude. Upon arriving at the lab, subjects were told that they were to make a series of gambles that unfolded in sequential order. Specifically, each subject played a roulette wheel task for 60 rounds. Each round consisted of 2 stages of roulette gambles that were resolved successively. The large number of rounds was chosen so that subsequent psychophysiology experiment would contain enough trials to obtain robust physiological response estimates. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were endowed with $18. Participants were told that, in each stage, they could bet any amount between $0-9, and that they would observe the gamble and its outcome regardless of their choice. To highlight the chance nature of the gamble’s outcome, we displayed a roulette wheel on the computer screen where red slots represented winning outcomes, and black squares represented winning outcomes. The roulette wheel spun for 10 s and a white ball would then be dropped onto the wheel. The color of the slot that the ball stopped at the end of the 10 s determined the outcome. Participants viewed a trial gamble before choosing whether or not to bet in the target gamble. We included a trial gamble to prevent any ambiguity about what would happen during the gambling procedure, so that it would be difficult for participants to later reinterpret the situation in a way that minimized its affective impact. Results from Experiment 1 showed that subjects’ risk attitude differed according prior outcome. Specifically, risk taking was greater following losses than gains, consistent with the break-even effect. Importantly for subsequent physiological measurement, we found no significant time trend with regards to this tendency.

In Experiment 2, we extended the previous experiment by investigating how responsibility of the choices affected subjects’ choices. This tests for the hypothesis that the breakeven effect is moderated by a need to justify or rationalize the initial decision, as has been suggested by previous literature. As in Experiment 1, a total of 36 subjects participated in the study, each completing 60 rounds. In contrast to Experiment 1, however, in half of the trials, the wager amount in Stage 1 was assigned at random by the computer and implemented by the subject. In the other half of the trials, the wager amounts in Stage 1 were freely chosen by the subject as before. Our results showed that the breakeven effect was moderated by whether initial choices were free or assigned. Specifically, the breakeven effect was reduced when initial choice was assigned, consistent with the literature on escalation of commitment.

In Experiment 3 (N=40), we incorporated psychophysiological recordings in our experimental paradigm in Experiment 2. SCR was measured using Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the crease between the distal and middle phalanges of the first and second digits of the left hand. The SCR data were amplified and recorded with a BIOPAC Systems skin conductance module connected to a laptop computer. Data were recorded at a rate of 200 samples per second. SCR analysis was conducted using AcqKnowledge software (BIOPAC Systems Inc.). SCR (in microSiemens, µS) was measured as the trough-to-peak amplitude difference in skin conductance of the largest response in the window 0.5 s after stimulus onset to 4.5 s after stimulus offset. Following standard preprocessing procedures, a minimal response criterion was set at 0.02 µS, and responses not exceeding this threshold were scored as “0”. SCR data were low-pass filtered (25Hz), smoothed (3 sample kernel), and square root transformed to reduce skewness. SCRs at outcome were normalized with the dollar amount of the outcome to produce measurements with units of µS/S. Consistent with previous literature, we found that SCR during outcome reflected magnitude of the gains and losses. More relevant for our hypotheses, we found that SCR following the first outcome was correlated with the subsequent wagers, suggesting that the effects due to prior outcome are partially mediated by psychophysics of gains and losses as reflected by the physiological responses.

REFERENCES

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

This paper considers how a commitment to not publishing p-hacked results will change the lives of individual scientists and products of science. We call this “Life After P-Hacking.” We discuss four lessons.

Lesson #1

We have to really start caring about statistical power. The freedom to engage in p-hacking created an environment in which researchers were able to get many of their studies to yield statistically significant results despite dramatically underpowering those studies (or studying truly null effects). “Life after p-hacking” means that conducting underpowered studies will now come with significant costs to the individual researcher: (1) by definition, many underpowered studies will yield null effects, and (2) researchers will not know why they did not work – whether the null effects represent a false hypothesis (a truly null effect) or a false-negative. This makes it difficult to learn and difficult to publish, a combination of costs that is unlikely to be sustainable for the typical researcher. The only way forward, then, is to really start caring about statistical power – to make sure our studies are properly powered at, say, 80%.

Of course, ideally we would conduct power analyses in order to properly power our studies, but power analyses require researchers to know what effect sizes they are studying. When effect sizes are unknown, researchers are unlikely to have good intuitions about the size of the effect they are studying, for publication bias and p-hacking means that the literature dramatically overestimates the sizes of most effects. In order to give researchers better intuitions about effect size – and power – we conducted a large MTurk survey (N = 696) that tested a number of “obvious” two-condition between-subjects hypotheses (e.g., men are taller than women). Based on the (unbiased) effect sizes obtained, we then computed how many participants a researcher would need to have in each condition in order to have achieve 80% power. Although some very obvious effects require the kinds of small samples we see in our literature – for example, you need “only” 15 per cell (30 total) to detect that women report owning more pairs of shoes than do men – other obvious effects require much larger samples than we are used to. For example, to detect that men report weighing more than women, a researcher needs 46 participants per cell (94 total). Given that most of the effects that we study are likely to be smaller than “men weigh more than women,” we advise researchers investigating unknown effect sizes to have at least 50 participants per cell. Otherwise, their studies are likely to be so underpowered as to prevent them from learning or publishing anything. (We will emphasize that this n=50 heuristic is merely a heuristic, and should not substitute for conducting power calculations when effect sizes are estimable).

Lesson #2

At the exploratory stage, p-hacking is advisable as it helps us learn from the data; but we should replicate any p-hacked result. Some researchers have misinterpreted our crusade against p-hacking as a suggestion that we should never p-hack, no matter what. This is wrong. Conducting lots of unplanned, exploratory analyses on our data is a fruitful way to learn from data. We will describe a real example of this – in which a researcher collects three measures and finds the predicted result for only one of the three (and even then, only after removing outliers). The two measures that did not work were obviously “bad” in retrospect, and the removal of outliers for the third measure is easy to justify. Thus, this is a case in which exploratory p-hacking may have helped identify a result that was not obviously there after the first, planned analysis was conducted. Of course, at this stage one cannot know whether the significant result is due to capitalizing on chance or whether it is real. The only way to tell is to conduct an exact replication, using only the measure that worked and committing in advance to the same outlier rule that worked. Thus, this is what “life after p-hacking” will often involve – p-hack during an exploratory phase but then attempt to directly replicate any result obtained during that phase.

Lesson #3

Fewer papers. A science that requires larger samples (for statistical power) and more direct replications of one’s own work (to test whether a p-hacked result is reliable or not) is a science that takes longer. Thus a natural, inevitable consequence of “life after p-hacking” is that we will write fewer papers. This means that our field needs to lower the threshold for what is considered an adequate quantity of published papers, and that published papers should be judged on their merits rather than as lines on one’s cv.

Lesson #4

Label your research as not p-hacked. Research that is not p-hacked is more likely to be true and is of therefore higher quality. Until journals start requiring disclosure of all sample size rules, measures, and manipulations upon submission of articles, a reader and reviewer cannot know whether a paper is p-hacked or not. Those who are not p-hacking will benefit from making it know that they are not p-hacking. Thus, we advocate that researchers include the following 21 words in their methods sections: “We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study.”
Using Multiple (Imperfect) Methods to Test Alternative Views: The Case for Stable Preferences for Not/Compromising

Itamar Simonson, Stanford University, USA

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

New concepts that go against conventional assumptions are typically hard to “prove” using a single method. In such cases, it is more effective to rely on evidence that employs a number of different methods/data. That is, while changing fundamental assumptions is unlikely to be supported with any single study, a pattern of findings obtained using various approaches and domains can more persuasively advance the alternative view.

This approach is illustrated in the context of a basic assumption underlying consumer decision making whereby attribute values are the carriers of utility whereas relative option positions in any given set are irrelevant. Specifically, an assumption that decision researchers have adopted from economic theory is that consumers should have stable utilities for each attribute value. Violations of this principle, such as that consumers prefer Option A over B but prefer B over A when C is added to set, were thus interpreted as evidence that preferences are “constructed” when decisions are made. More generally, decision researchers have assumed that preferences should be based on the options’ absolute values (e.g., 10X magnification, the felt comfort of headphones), and violations of this assumption represent the influence of context, task, and frame on constructed preferences.

An alternative view being proposed is that consumers have a stable tendency to prefer options in particular relative positions. The focus of this research is on the notion that consumers have a stable tendency to compromise or avoid compromising, which means that non/compromising choices they make are not constructed and represent stable tendencies. In support of this view, I present evidence that involves several different types of evidence and different research methods, all of which are consistent with the alternative view of preferences. One project (Simonson and Sela 2011; Briley, Frederick, Sela, and Simonson, in progress) involves studies of twins and demonstrates that the tendency to not/compromise is largely heritable.

A second project (Knafo, Solomon, Simonson, and Hasenfratz, in progress) uses a videogame that incorporates various choice problems. A comparison of the choices made by young children and older children suggests that the tendency to compromise develops between the ages of seven and nine (and may further develop as the children get older). Additional projects (Drolet et al., In progress; Sela and Simonson, In progress) show that certain individual differences are associated with an enhanced tendency to compromise; these individual differences include age, moderation, and self-monitoring.

These very different research projects support the notion that people have a stable tendency to compromise (or refrain from compromising). Accordingly, a finding that consumers tend to select the middle option from sets presented to them should not be interpreted as evidence of “preference construction,” because stable tendencies are not constructed.
A Study of the Play Element of a Location-based Social Network: Foursquare (20 min)
Alexandra Vignolles, INSEEC Business School, France

The videography presents the social network location-based Foursquare within the perspective of users and experts. We develop the theory of the play element as a social function applied to Foursquare (Huizinga, 1951). Implications as well as limitations and avenues of research are finally introduced.

A Pen (8 min)
Anastasia Seregina, Aalto University School of Business, Finland
Norah Campbell, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Bernardo Figueiredo, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
Hannu Uotila, Rakettijengi Tuotannot Oy, Finland

What might an object-oriented philosophy look like? This video places a mundane object, a pen, at the center of meaning-making by plotting its mode of being as something other than anthropological or instrumental. The pen co-constitutes reality with human actors. Where does agency end and passive materiality begin?

Around the World of Tourist Souvenirs (30 min)
Alain Decrop, University of Namur, Belgium
Julie Masset, University of Namur, Belgium

This videography invites you to travel inside tourist souvenirs around the world. The film shows that souvenirs often are considered as special possessions that help consumers remember and extend their trips in time, space and the social network. It also highlights the hierophanous role of souvenirs as messengers of meanings.

Fading Stories (12 min)
Inga Jonaityte, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy
Olivija Douris, Philadelphia Art Institute, USA

Recent far-reaching transformations in the field of photography have accelerated the creation of inexpensive crowd-generated “photo archives,” reducing the demand for more expensive professional and objective imagery. This film explores the irreversibly shrinking path for traditional photojournalism, altering production, distribution and the consumption patterns of unbiased and representative photographic truth.

Entre-deux-mondes: Shaping of Artistic Projects in a Local Music Scene (31 min)
Joonas Rokka, Rouen Business School, France
Baptiste Cléret, University of Rouen, France
Alice Sohier, University of Picardie, France

This video continues research on music from a scenes perspective. By studying local indie music producers in France, we conceptualize “artistic projects” of indie music producers as a particular cultural universe that is embedded in scenes and shaped by an assemblage of market actors.

Citizen Consumer (29 min)
Sonya Grier, American University, USA

What does it mean to be a consumer in a context which emphasizes social goals as key to citizenship? This film explores the evolving notion of citizen/consumer in Cuba at a time of shifting market dynamics and cultural change.

The Runners’ (R)evolution (24 min)
Caroline Graham Austin, Montana State University, USA
Conor Benson, Bluejack Productions, USA

Running is more popular than ever in the United States, and a vocal minority of runners have decided to eschew traditional footwear (a-shoe, perhaps?) in favor of minimal shoes, or no shoes at all. They find the experience to be transformative for both their bodies and spirits.
The Indian Bazaar: Street Markets and Customer Perceptions (16 min)
Sowmya Raja, IIT Madras, India
Niranjan Kuppan, Allahabad Bank, India

‘Sandhai’, ‘Bazzar’, ‘Mandi’ – called by different names, the informal local marketplaces serve as cultural hubs of India. This movie documents an explorative look at various informal street markets in the Indian city of Chennai. While giving insights into Indian customers’ psychology, this film also captures their perceptions of these bazaars.

Coffee Shops Yesterday, Running Groups Today - Consumption Communities as the New Address for Oldenburg’s Third Places (20 Min)
Giridhar Ramachandran, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, India
Richa Agrawal, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, India

Ramon Oldenburg coined the name ‘third places’ to social gathering places outside of home and work, and felt that the vanishing third places were a reason for the decline of community. Through participant observation and interviews this study explores the possibility of considering consumption communities as present day third places.

Yoga and Fashion (13 min)
Maria Kniazeva, University of San Diego, USA

A former banker from Singapore, a pornographer from Los Angeles, a student from Washington D.C., and a former marketer from Tokyo help the author explore how they marry yoga and fashion.

Consuming the Contradiction (17 min)
Joel Hietanen, Aalto University, Finland
John Schouten, Aalto University, Finland
Iiro Vaniala, Aalto University, Finland

In ‘Consuming the Contradiction’ we produce a mashup of the footage shot at the Flow music festival in Helsinki. The stories reveal further insights into the acts of demythologization and contradiction in what has been coined hipster consumption.

Entertained to Excess: The Contemporary Practices of Boredom (21 min)
Henri Myöhänen, Aalto University School of Economics, Finland
Joel Hietanen, Aalto University School of Economics, Finland

Perhaps it is not surprising that the concept of boredom has not received much interest in consumer research in our media saturated consumer culture. This videography illustrates, from a Heideggerian perspective, how boredom becomes embodied in the lives of consumer seeking extreme thrills. We find that a world which bombards us with distractions in the form of various types of entertainment may have its dark side that perpetuates the very experience of boredom we wish to desperately escape in our pleasure-obsessed age.

It’s a Girl Thing (58 min)
Shannon Silva, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA
Andre Silva, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA
Donna King, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA
Tiffany Albright, University of North Carolina Wilmington, USA

Framed by the structure of a faux interactive website for tween girls, “It’s a Girl Thing” speaks with consumer critics, tween brand marketers, girls, moms, and educators to explore the seemingly benign cultural universe of candy-coated, pastel-colored, hyper-commercialized girl culture (and the tween queen phenomenon) to reveal the complex and contradictory messages directed at today’s young girls.
Roundtable Summaries

ROUND TABLE
Consumption Addiction: A Research Agenda of the Progression from Adaptive to Maladaptive Categories of Consumption Behaviors

Chairs:
Dante M. Pirouz, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Ingrid M. Martin, California State University, Long Beach, USA
Michael A. Kamins, SUNY-Stony Brook, USA
Hieu Nguyen, California State University Long Beach, USA

Participants:
Wendy Attaya Boland, American University, USA
Merrie Brucks, University of Arizona, USA
Paul Connell, City University London, UK
June Cotte, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Samantha Cross, Iowa State University, USA
Stephanie Feiereisen, City University London, UK
David Glen Mick, University of Virginia, USA
Ann Mirabito, Baylor, USA
Vanessa Perry, The George Washington University, USA
Justine Rapp, University of San Diego, USA
Cristel Antonia Russell, American University, USA
Maura Scott, Florida State University, USA
Kathleen D. V ohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Stacey Finkelstein, Baruch College, USA

Our focus of this roundtable is to develop a research agenda that explicates the process of consumption addiction, including categories of consumption behaviors not usually associated with addiction. We will discuss a taxonomy of consumption addictions and the influence of marketing cues on this process.
ROUND TABLE

Best Practices for Behavioral Lab & Subject Pool Management

Chairs:
Christina Brown, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA
Lillian Chen, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA

Participants:
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France
Pierre Chandon, INSEAD, France
Diego Costa Pinto, Reims Management School, France
Kristin Diehl, University of Southern California, USA
John Galvin, Harvard Business School, USA
Miranda R. Goode, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Joseph K. Goodman, Washington University in St Louis, USA
Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland, USA
Chase Harrison, Harvard Business School, USA
Douglas Hausknecht, University of Akron, USA
Marcia Herter, Reims Management School, France
Amber Holden, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, USA
Jeff Lees, Columbia Business School, USA
Gina S. Mohr, College of Business, Colorado State University, USA
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA
Melvin Prince, Southern Connecticut State University, USA
Dan Rice, E.J. Ourso College of Business, Louisiana State University, USA
Patricia Rossi, Reims Management School, France
Aaron M. Sackett, University of St. Thomas, USA
Sridhar Samu, India School of Business, Hyderabad, India
Karen H. Smith, Texas State University, Texas, USA
Rebecca White, University of Chicago, USA
Alan Malter, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Cameron McClure, Columbia Business School, USA

ACR member schools face increasing expectations regarding publishing, with concomitant increases in the need for data collection. This session begins the process of building a community of faculty supervisors and lab managers, to facilitate exchange of best practices in lab and subject pool management, to improve our efficiency and effectiveness.
This roundtable explores intersections between consumption and heritage—a construct that remains underconceptualized within our field. Participants will share their experiences with research endeavors that explore various forms of heritage consumption (e.g., brand, ethnic, intellectual, touristic), address questions related to conducting heritage-related research, and explore a research agenda around heritage.
**ROUNDTABLE**

**Changing the Way We Think About Consumer Financial Decision-Making: Bridging Theory, Practice, & Relevance in Household Financial Decision-Making**

**Chair:**
Avni Shah, Duke University, USA

**Participants:**
Daniel Bartels, University of Chicago, USA
Cynthia Cryder, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Hal E. Hershfield, New York University, USA
Eric J. Johnson, Columbia University, USA
Punam Anand Keller, Dartmouth College, USA
Kyu B. Kim, University of Southern California, USA
John G. Lynch, University of Colorado, USA
Michael I. Norton, Harvard Business School, USA
Scott Rick, University of Michigan, USA
Suzanne Shu, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Stephen Atlas, University of Rhode Island, USA
Stephen Spiller, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Abigail B. Sussman, University of Chicago, USA
Oleg Urminsky, University of Chicago, USA
Keith Wilcox, Columbia University, USA
Gal Zauberman, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Dilip Soman, University of Toronto, Canada

This session examines the emerging topic of consumer financial decision-making. Researchers will discuss 1) successful ways that consumer behavior research has influenced financial decision-making, 2) ways to encourage researchers to study consumer behavior theory through the lens of household financial decision-making, and 3) directions for future research.
Roundtable

Mechanical Turk 2.0: Issues, Limitations, & Solutions for Collecting Data

Chair:
Joseph K. Goodman, Washington University in St. Louis, USA

Participants:
Kathleen D. Vohs, University of Minnesota, USA
Daniel G. Goldstein, Microsoft Research, USA
Gabriele Paolacci, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Pamela Smith, University of California, San Diego, USA
Keith Wilcox, Columbia University, USA
Andrew T. Stephen, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Selin A. Malkoc, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Cynthia Cryder, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Pamela Mueller, Princeton University, USA
Joseph P. Redden, University of Minnesota, USA
Panos Ipeirotis, New York University, USA
Donna Hoffman, The George Washington University School of Business, USA
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA
Ayelet Gneezy, University of California, San Diego, USA
Thomas Novak, The George Washington University School of Business, USA
Brittney Dalton, Washington University in St. Louis, USA
Hilke Plassmann, INSEAD, France

Consumer research has seen a dramatic increase in the use of Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Research has recently discussed the benefits and reliability of MTurk data, yet important questions remain. We will discuss some of these issues and limitations faced by consumer researchers, and propose possible solutions.
**Roundtable**

Making a Difference in Different Ways: Unleashing the Power of Collaborative Research Teams to Enhance Consumer Well-being

**Chairs:**
Meryl P. Gardner, University of Delaware, USA
Minita Sanghvi, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, USA
Julie L. Ozanne, Virginia Tech, USA

**Participants:**
Laurel Anderson, Arizona State University, USA
Alan Andreasen, Georgetown University, USA
Eric Arnould, University of Bath, UK
Stacey Baker, University of Wyoming, USA
Julia Bayuk, University of Delaware, USA
Merrie Brucks, University of Arizona, USA
Paul Connell, City University London, UK
Brennan Davis, Baylor University, USA
Benet DeBerry-Spence, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Alexander (Sasha) Fedorikhin, Indiana University, USA
Gavan J. Fitzsimons, Duke University, USA
Curt Haugtvedt, Ohio State University, USA
Ronald Paul Hill, Villanova University, USA
Deborah Roedder-John, University of Minnesota, USA
Michael A. Kamins, SUNY-Stony Brook, USA
Carol Kaufman-Scarborough, Rutgers University, USA
Punam Anand Keller, Dartmouth College, USA
Junyong Kim, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea
Aradhna Krishna, University of Michigan, USA
Craig Lefebvre, RTI International and University of South Florida, USA
Daniele Mathras, Arizona State University, USA
David Glen Mick, University of Virginia, USA
Stephanie Oneto, University of Wyoming, USA
Connie Pechmann, UC at Irvine, USA
Vanessa Perry, The George Washington University, USA
Mark Peterson, University of Wyoming, USA
Norbert Schwarz, University of Michigan, USA
Linda Scott, University of Oxford, UK
Clifford J. Shultz, H, Loyola University Chicago, USA
Laurel Steinfield, University of Oxford, UK
Harish Sajan, Tulane University, USA
Ekant Veer, University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Madhu Viswanathan, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

This roundtable seeks to foster discussion among researchers who use different paradigms and methods to improve consumer well-being. We seek to inspire synergies and collaboration by offering practical advice for building and maintaining effective cross-paradigm and trans-disciplinary research teams to explore new models for transformative and life-enhancing consumer research.
Workshop Summaries

Mediation, Contrasts, & LISREL
Dawn Iacobucci, Vanderbilt University, USA

How to really do mediation analyses, contrasts in ANOVA, and LISREL. Bring your laptop and questions. Dawn will email pre-conference instructions for downloads and be available for personal consultation.

Selected References:
How to really do mediation analyses, contrasts in ANOVA, and LISREL. Bring your laptop and questions. Dawn will email pre-conference instructions for downloads and be available for personal consultation.

Designing QUALTRICS Studies
Bryce Winkelman, Qualtrics, USA

Learn what is new in the Qualtrics platform and how it can help you conduct more effective research. Also covers future product development roadmap and includes a Q&A session.

Selected References:
Learn what is new in the Qualtrics platform and how it can help you conduct more effective research. Also covers future product development roadmap and includes a Q&A session.

How to Make a Good Consumer Research Video
Russell Belk, York University, Canada
Marylouise Caldwell, University of Sydney, Australia
Paul Henry, University of Sydney, Australia

Anyone who wants to make a consumer research video can do so with relatively little instruction or equipment. After whetting appetites with a few short examples, this workshop will provide practical suggestions for making a good video and conduct a short exercise on pre-production filmmaking. The workshop will conclude with a discussion of how to turn video footage into a film and how to make it an effective film. Both total novices and experienced filmmakers should be able to learn from it.

Journal of Consumer Research New Reviewer Training
Rashmi Adaval, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Jim Burroughs, University of Virginia, USA

Open to all conference attendees who are new, potential, or beginning reviewers who review for or are interested in reviewing for JCR. The Editors and Associate Editors of the Journal of Consumer Research (JCR) are conducting a workshop to train new, potential, or beginning reviewers and discuss the review process in general. They will explain what makes a great review, discuss the trainee program, and answer any questions. Potential Participants: Søren Askegaard, University of Southern Denmark; Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta; Lauren Block, Baruch College/CUNY; Margaret C. Campbell, University of Colorado; Darren W. Dahl, University of British Columbia; Kristen Diehl, USC; Aimee Drolet, University of California, Los Angeles; Jennifer Edson Escalas, Vanderbilt University; Eileen Fischer, York University; Kent Grayson, Northwestern University; Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland; Joel Huber, Duke University; Gita V. Johar, Columbia University; Andrea Morales, Arizona State University; Page Moreau, University of Colorado; Brian Ratchford, University of Texas at Dallas; Rebecca Ratner, University of Maryland; Jaideep Sengupta, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Craig Thompson, University of Wisconsin; Stijn van Osselaer, Cornell University; Patti Williams, University of Pennsylvania; Stacy Wood, North Carolina State University; Ann McGill, Editor, University of Chicago; Laura Peracchio, Editor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Mary Frances Luce, Editor, Duke University
Open to all conference attendees with substantial reviewing experience who would like to refine their skills in reviewing for JCR. The Editors and Associate Editors of the Journal of Consumer Research (JCR) are conducting a workshop to train advanced reviewers (reviewers with substantial reviewing experience) and discuss the review process in general. They will explain what makes a great review, discuss the trainee program, and answer any questions. Potential Participants: Rashmi Adaval, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta; Søren Askegaard, University of Southern Denmark; Lauren Block, Baruch College/CUNY; James Burroughs, University of Virginia; Margaret C. Campbell, University of Colorado; Kristen Diehl, USC; Aimee Drolet, University of California, Los Angeles; Jennifer Edson Escalas, Vanderbilt University; Kent Grayson, Northwestern University; Rebecca Hamilton, University of Maryland; Joel Huber, Duke University; Gita V. Johar, Columbia University; Andrea Morales, Arizona State University; Page Moreau, University of Colorado; Brian Ratchford, University of Texas at Dallas; Rebecca Ratner, University of Maryland; Jaideep Sengupta, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Craig Thompson, University of Wisconsin; Stijn van Osselaer, Cornell University; Patti Williams, University of Pennsylvania; Stacy Wood, North Carolina State University; Ann McGill, Editor, University of Chicago; Laura Peracchio, Editor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Mary Frances Luce, Editor, Duke University.

**Mediation Practicum – On Using Hayes (2003) PROCESS Macro, Indirect Effects, & Bootstrapping**

Stephen Spiller, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

A brief guide to conducting mediation analyses using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro. Additionally included is a brief discussion of why there may be an indirect effect without a total effect, the benefits of bootstrapping, and interpretations of its results. Bring your laptop.  

**Selected References:**

A brief guide to conducting mediation analyses using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro. Additionally included is a brief discussion of why there may be an indirect effect without a total effect, the benefits of bootstrapping, and interpretations of its results [as discussed recently in Zhao, Lynch, & Chen (JCR, 2010) and in Stephen, Fitzsimons, Lynch, & McClelland (JMR 2013)].

Spiller et al. 2013
01-A: Interferences in Competitive Sponsorship Clutter: The Influence of Congruence and Articulation on Attitude
Benjamin Boeuf, HEC Montreal, Canada
François A. Carrillat, HEC Montreal, Canada
Alain d’Astous, HEC Montreal, Canada

This study examines the effects of congruence on attitude in a competitive sponsorship clutter. In an incongruent sponsor-event setting, competitive sponsors’ presence should have a positive effect on brand and sponsorship attitude. The moderating role of activation as a strategy to reduce communication interferences is also investigated.

01-B: The Role of Social Context on Attitudes Towards Product Placement in Children’s Films
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Nikoletta Siamagka, University of Reading, UK
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Evelyn Derera, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Francesca Evans, UK

This interpretive study explores the role of social context on attitudes towards product placement in children’s films. Our findings reveal that children are influenced through product placement by discussing brands placed within films, as well as being enticed to eat the products that are placed within movies.

01-C: The Role of Emotional Intelligence as a Moderator of the Effectiveness of Advertising Disclaimers on Digitally Enhanced Images
Paula Peter, San Diego State University, USA
Steven Shyne, San Diego State University, USA
Anjala Krishen, University of Nevada Las Vegas, USA

Are advertising disclaimers on digitally enhanced images effective in reducing body dissatisfaction? What is the role of Emotional Intelligence (EI)? With an empirical study we show EI as an important moderator of the effectiveness of advertising disclaimers on body dissatisfaction considering both males and females.

01-D: This Ad is Funny, But Will I Share It?
Yeuseung Kim, DePaul University, USA
Hye Jin Yoon, Southern Methodist University, USA

Encouraging consumers to share ads with others has become one of the important goals for advertisers. This exploratory study takes a psychological approach to show why one ad might be shared over another especially in the case when attitudes toward the ads are similar.

01-E: Does a Parent’s Social Economic Status Affect the Effects of Television Advertising Directed to Children? Findings from Field Experiments of Kindergarten Samples in South Korea
Seung (Seung-Chul) Yoo, Loyola University Chicago, USA
Eunji Cho, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA

This research investigates the effects of a parent’s socio economic status (SES) on children’s responses to television advertising by comparing the children of low SES and high SES families in a kindergarten setting in terms of attitudinal and behavioral reactions to TV advertising.
01-F: How Hand Position Impacts Cognitive Processing: Implications for Mobile Marketing Messages

Keith Coulter, Clark University, USA
Anne Roggeveen, Babson College, USA
Dhruv Grewal, Babson College, USA

Basing our theory on the embodied cognition literature, we demonstrate how the differential processing of information that is proximal versus distal to the hands can impact how an advertising message is perceived and encoded. The research has important practical significance for the field of mobile marketing.

01-G: Effects of Highly Attentive Services: Role of Relationship Dynamics and Norms

Maggie Wenjing Liu, Tsinghua University, China
Lijun Zhang, Peking University, China
Hean Tat Keh, University of Queensland, Australia

While special attention and little extras to consumers may create satisfying service encounters, highly attentive services can affect consumer negatively. With two lab experiments, we posited and tested that consumer satisfaction and purchase intention with high attentiveness may vary across different relationship dynamics and norms between customers and service providers.

01-H: Responses to Comedic Violence Advertising: Norm Beliefs and Age Effects

Hye Jin Yoon, Southern Methodist University, USA
Yeuseung Kim, DePaul University, USA

Comedic violence ads generate humor through norm violation. Consistent with social norm theories, this study found that greater norm beliefs on violence in advertising positively influenced evaluation of comedic violence ads. Norm beliefs also interacted with age; norm belief effects on ad responses became stronger with the increase of age.

02-A: Get Rid of Your Pennies If You’re Looking for Relaxation: The Role of Money in Psychological Tension

Mehdi Akhgari, University of Manitoba, Canada
Hamed Aghakhani, University of Manitoba, Canada
Kelley Main, University of Manitoba, Canada

Results of two studies investigate the psychological consequences of money. The concept of money increases psychological tensions such as stress, anxiety, and depression for money owners. Specially, reminders of possessing low denominations of money such as coins increase the owner’s psychological tension.

02-B: The Warmth of Our Regrets

Seung Hwan (Mark) Lee, Colorado State University, USA
Jeff D. Rotman, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Andrew W. Perkins, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada

We show that individuals experiencing action regret feel physically warmer than individuals experiencing inaction regret. Moreover, we find individuals self-regulate their perceived warmth by desiring cooler drinks (vs. warm) when experiencing action regret, whereas individuals desire warm (vs. cool) drinks when experiencing inaction regret.
02-C: Emotional Value of Co-creation: Can Co-creation of a Service Recovery Defuse Customers’ Anger?

Joohyung Park, University of South Carolina, USA
Sejin Ha, University of Tennessee, USA

This study examines 1) whether co-creation of recovery outperforms a traditional firm-driven recovery in reducing customers’ anger caused by a service failure, and 2) a condition under which such effect fades away (i.e., when compensation is offered simultaneously). The online scenario-based experiment confirmed the assertion of this study.

02-D: The Effect of an Abstract vs. Concrete Mindset on Coping Behavior in Negative Emotion-Laden Trade-offs

David L. Alexander, University of St. Thomas, USA
John Sailors, University of St. Thomas, USA

We examine how assuming an abstract or concrete mindset changes the negative emotion generated by difficult trade-offs. We show that assuming an abstract mindset reduces perceptions of the negatively emotional stress in difficult trade-offs and explores the lower levels of coping behavior during choice that result.

02-E: How Embarrassment Affects Consumer Evaluation of Conspicuous Products

Xiaobing Song, Dalian University of Technology, China
Feifei Huang, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Xiuiping Li, National University of Singapore, Singapore

The current research examines how embarrassment influences conspicuous consumption. It is predicted that consumers who are feeling embarrassed would evaluate a branded product with the salient brand logo less favorably. The results further show that the effect would be more robust among consumers who have lower self-esteem.

02-F: What About Me? Empirical Evidence of Consumer Envy and Destructive Envy Behavior

Inga Wobker, Zeppelin University, Germany
Isabella Maria Kopton, Zeppelin University, Germany
Peter Kenning, Zeppelin University, Germany

In everyday economic life, consumers are often treated differently. As a consequence consumer envy may result if treated worse. As envy is often associated with destructive behaviors for instance lower willingness-to-cooperate, surprisingly little research on consumer envy has been done. This study provides insight into this important issue.

02-G: Coping With Disgusting Consumption: Managing Threats From Self And Others

Kivy Weeks, University of Connecticut, USA

This research investigates disgust associated with consumption. It proposes that disgust poses both personal and social threats that consumers must manage. Using a netnographic method, eleven themes for how individuals cope with disgusting consumption on a cloth diapering discussion board are identified. These themes support a dual-threat conceptualization.

02-H: Hiding the Food from your Customers: Use of Surprise in Food Presentation

Hua (Olivia) Lian, University of Alberta, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada

We examine how food presentation style (stacking food vertically vs. laying food horizontally on plates) affects consumers’ likelihood of ordering a dish. Results indicate that consumers are more likely to order a vertically than horizontally presented dish, and it is mediated by the pleasant surprise consumers anticipate from the former.
03-A: Goal-Orientation Theory and Elderly Consumers’ Intentions to Use Mobile Applications for Entertainment Purposes

Annie Chen, University of Westminster, UK
Norman Peng, University of Westminster, UK

To examine Chinese elderly consumers’ intention to use mobile applications to play online games, this research adopts the goal-orientation theory and incorporates hedonic value as a moderate. The results show performance-prove goal orientation and performance-avoid goal orientation will affect consumers’ intention. Moreover, hedonic value will moderate these relationships.

03-B: What Prevents Older Adult from Travelling as Much as They Wish They Would and Thus Reap the Benefits of Travelling at Old Age?

Gaelle Moal-Ulvoas, France Business School, France

This research investigates the obstacles which prevent older adults from travelling as much as they wish they would. Four categories of travel barriers are identified: the lack of physical and social resources, the lack of availability, personal and physical risks and the lack of other resources.

03-C: How to Make Your Grandma Exercise: The Activation of Goals and the Availability of Plans

Jaeyeon Chung, Columbia University, USA
Donald R. Lehmann, Columbia University, USA

We show that framing the plans (vs. goals) of exercising is persuasive only for the old but not for the young due to differing cognitive availability in generating alternative exercise plans. When reaching out to both populations, advertisers should address both the explicit goals and the plans within an advertisement.

03-D: Valuing Your Group Leads to Relative Derogation of Group Offenders

Yunhui Huang, Nanjing University, China

Chinese consumers were less willing to buy a domestic brand which had (vs. not had) been merged by a foreign prestigious brand. But this tendency only existed among people highly identified with the nationality (Study 1) or people provided the opportunities to affirm the nationality (Study 2 and 3).

03-E: Relative National Identification, Oneness and Product Evaluations: A Conceptual Framework

Aditi Grover, Plymouth State University, USA
Phil Ramsey, University of New Hampshire, USA
Jeff Foreman, Penn State Harrisburg University, USA

Drawing on self-identity theory and Oneness, we propose a conceptual framework that highlights the role of national identification in product evaluation. Relative National Identification (RNI) – residual identification with one’s country-of-birth adjusted for newly acquired identification with country-of-residence- is examined to study differences in consumer product evaluations.

03-F: An Exploratory Study of the Role of Employee Skin Tone on Customer Evaluations

Kelly Cowart, Grand Valley State University, USA
Carolyn Massiah, University of Central Florida, USA
Kevin Lehnert, Grand Valley State University, USA

This study explores the impact of service provider skin tone and gender on consumer perceptions. Empirical findings suggest that both factors significantly influence consumer perceptions. The perceived ethnicity of the service provider plays a key role in consumer responses as well. Hispanics are evaluated less positively than other ethnic groups.
03-G: Gender Differences in Purchase Attachment Resulting From Loneliness
Sarah Roche, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
David H. Silvera, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

Not all purchases are incorporated into the extended self equally. Our findings indicate that loneliness and gender interact to predict differential attachment to material and experiential purchases. When they are lonely, men shift their attachment toward experiential purchases and women shift their attachment toward material purchases.

04-A: Consumer Incompetence and the Motivation to Avoid Consumption
Matthew Philp, Queen's University, Canada
Andrew T. Stephen, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Laurence Ashworth, Queen's University, Canada

Exploring the impact of feeling as an incompetent consumer on the motivation to avoid consumption of desirable items, this current work finds that the desire to avoid consumption increases (decreases) when past incompetent (competent) purchase decisions are more accessible in memory.

04-B: Understanding Global Impact and Voluntary Simplifier Lifestyles: A Value-Orientation Perspective of Anti-Consumption
Sadia Yaqub Khan, Cardiff University, UK
Mirella Yani-de-Soriano, Cardiff University, UK

The paper compares the value orientation of two conceptually different anti-consumption lifestyles: Voluntary Simplifier (VS) and Global Impact (GI). The results show the two groups have a positive relationship with the value of universalism, but while VS are self-directed, GI are not. Neither VS nor GI are associated with the value of security.

04-C: Let Me Skip the Ads! Revisiting Reactance Theory in an Advertising Context
Yoo Jin Song, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Brittany Duff, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

Experiencing freedom to watch TV without interruptions led to reactance when the freedom was threatened. Studying reactance becomes important in understanding TV ad effectiveness, due to diverse media usage. However, reactance did not lead to willingness to restore the freedom, which suggests re-examining the psychological reactance theory.

04-D: Who Washes a Rental Car? Contamination as a Barrier to Renting
Leslie Koppenhafer, University of Oregon, USA

This research examines contamination as a barrier to renting. Participants evaluated a car rental where cleaning supplies were explicitly/not described and evidence of prior user was present or absent. Participants viewed the company more favorably and were willing to pay more when the prior user was not made salient.

04-E: Making Me Feel Bad Will Make You Pay: Defensive Responses to Self-Threat Based Marketing Communications
Pingping Qiu, Monash University, Australia
Fang Wan, University of Manitoba, Canada
Amitava Chattopadhyay, INSEAD, Singapore

The idea that consumers seek for products to restore their self-worth when self-views are cast into doubt encourages the marketers to use self-threatening messages to persuade consumers to buy. However, we argue that self-threatening appeals may backfire among high self-esteem consumers, since they are susceptible to cues signaling their self-deficiency.
04-F: The Not So Simple Life: Naturecultures of Voluntary Simplicity

Shona Bettany, University of Westminster, UK
Ben Kerrane, University of Manchester, UK

In this paper we use Haraway’s (1991) concept of natureculture to broadly explore one aspect of anti-consumption, voluntary simplicity, in the context of urban stock-keeping. We explore how nature is mobilised as a shifting resource among those adopting a voluntary simplified lifestyle for the home production of eggs.

04-G: Negativity Bias in the Product Prevention Ad Claim

Jihye Park, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Republic of Korea
H. Rao Unnava, Ohio State University, USA

This research examined the negativity bias effect when consumers face with a product prevention ad claim. Data from three experiments show that the negative pre-existing attitude toward a brand and a product category stimulated biased information processing to the negative direction.

04-H: Strategies to Resist Advertising

Marieke Fransen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Claraartje ter Hoeven, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Peeter W.J. Verlegh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

In the present research, we developed and validated a scale to measure strategies that people adopt when resisting advertising. In three different studies, ten strategies (e.g., counter arguing, selective exposure, and avoidance) were observed. The scale shows convergent validity when correlated with ad skepticism, resistance to persuasion, and reactance.

05-A: Let’s Break Up: The Action of Tearing Decreases Relationship Bonding

Chun-Ming Yang, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan
Zengxiang Chen, Nankai University, China

Two experiments demonstrate that the concept of relationship is embodied in the physical closeness between objects, and tearing things apart is analogous to the termination of relationship. The effects of tearing are tested in an interpersonal moral judgment task and a negative publicity context.

05-B: The Influence of the Types of Brand Crisis on Consumer's Response: the Moderating Role of Brand Association and Brand-Customer Relationship Strength

Jung Ok Jeon, Pukyong National University, Republic of Korea
Sunmee Baeck, Pukyong National University, Republic of Korea
Eun Mi Lee, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, USA

This study investigates the effects of brand crisis on consumer’s response relating to consumer's brand association and brand-customer relationship strength as well as brand crisis types, to understand consumer's internal process of negative information on brands systematically. For this purpose, an integrative approach of qualitative and quantitative methods is conducted.

05-C: How Could You Do This To Me? Brand Betrayal and Its Consumer Behavior Implications

Arianna Uhalde, University of Southern California, USA
Deborah MacInnis, University of Southern California, USA

We outline the conceptual properties and hypothesized effects of brand betrayal, defined as a negative consumer experience resulting from a deceit-based brand transgression directly related to the basis for brand attachment. Two studies consider how brand betrayal influences consumers’ emotions, brand attachment, perceived brand authenticity, forgiveness, and desire for revenge.
05-D: The Added Value of Contextual Motivations on the Consumer-Brand Relationship

Marina Carnevale, Fordham University, USA
Lauren Block, Baruch College, USA
Ozge Yucel-Aybat, Pennsylvania State University-Harrisburg, USA

Purchase decisions may be prompted by the need to self-reward (self-compensate) some positive (negative) feeling about the self caused by extraordinary achievement (failure). Across two studies, we show that these different contextual motivations affect the consumer-brand relationship and explore an important moderator of these effects.

05-E: An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of Relationship Development in Brand Community

Miri Chung, University of Rhode Island, USA
Seung Kyoon Shin, University of Rhode Island, USA
Hillary Leonard, University of Rhode Island, USA

The current research investigates the determinants of consumer loyalty in the context of brand communities and proposes an empirical model, considering two perspectives of consumer loyalty development process: communication between consumer and company, and communication among consumers. We suggest that network centrality plays an important role in determining consumer loyalty.

05-F: Collector-Brand Relationships: Consumer Engagement via Disney Pin Collecting

Alexander J. Kull, University of South Florida, USA
Barbara A. Lafferty, University of South Florida, USA

By examining Disney pin collectors, this research investigates the strategically important construct of consumer engagement. Drawing upon observations, a survey, and depth interviews, the paper explores whether and how collecting branded items can initiate and strengthen consumer-brand relationships. Preliminary results suggest categorizing collectors’ initial motivations as brand-driven, product-driven, or socially-driven engagement.

05-G: How You Are With Mike Tells Us How You Are With NIKE: Relationship Between Interpersonal Attachment Styles and Brand Attachment

Hyewon Cho, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Tiffany White, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

We argue and demonstrate that highly avoidant people, who tend to be detached in their interpersonal relationships, form stronger self-brand connections with exclusive brands than consumers who are low in avoidance. We also explore whether exclusive brands provide emotional comfort to consumers who are high versus low in avoidance.

05-H: Self-Brand Connection, Schadenfreude, and Sympathy: A Person-Centered Approach to Understanding Emotional Reactions to Product Failure

Sarah Roche, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Jill Sundie, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Daniel Beal, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Andrew W. Perkins, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada

Emotional responses to upward social comparisons involving status products, and product failure, were examined via latent profile analyses. Diverse emotion profiles were predicted by self-brand connection. A strong brand connection can buffer against the experience of hostile envy, and schadenfreude after product failure, unless consumers hold certain socially dysfunctional traits.
06-A: The Creation and Management of Human Brands

Marilyn Giroux, Concordia University, Canada
Bianca Grohmann, Concordia University, Canada

Celebrities are often the center of marketing campaigns and companies are working hard to establish relationships between consumers and human brands. The goal of this research is to create a measure of the strength of human brands and relate human brands to consumers’ relationships to celebrities, endorsements and co-branding opportunities.

06-B: Selective Revelations: The Brand Backstory and the Creation of the Private Sphere

Vanisha Narsey, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Cristel Antonia Russell, American University, USA

In-depth interviews with brand backstory creators uncover how and why brand backstories may be used in simulating the private sphere. The strategies and aims uncovered ultimately enchant consumers towards the inner-world of the brand, enabling them to reach the core of the brand backstory and experiential authenticity.

06-C: Employee Misbehavior: The Effect of Employee Typicality on Brand Evaluations

Jakob Utgard, BI Norwegian Business School, Norway
Tarje Gaustad, Oslo School of Management, Norway

Despite companies’ investments in recruiting, training, and monitoring, employees sometimes misbehave in ways that hurt the brand. Such misbehavior can spread quickly and potentially turn into media scandals. In two studies, we find that employee misbehavior is more negative for the brand when the employee is seen as a typical (vs. atypical) exemplar of the company’s employees. We theorize that the behavior of a typical employee is seen as a signal of other employees and the company as a whole, whereas behavior of an atypical employee is seen as less diagnostic of the company. Thus, wrongdoing by a typical employee is likely to promote more negative inferences about the brand.

06-D: Brand Salience for the Visually Impaired: An Exploration on Brand Reception and Experience for Blind and Low Vision Audiences

Janice Fung, Humber College Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning, Canada

This study examines the recognition and experience of branded products by blind and low vision audiences. The importance of understanding brand reception and perception through the lens of the visually impaired is intended to increase business value for organizations, enhance information accessibility, improve social equality and enhance quality of life.

06-E: Disproportionate Positivity and Negativity Biases of Brand Extension Information

Joseph W. Chang, Vancouver Island University, Canada
Yung-Chien Lou, National Chengchi University, Taiwan
You Lin, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan

Under high-accessibility scenarios, negativity extension biases on high-entitativity family brands were more salient. Under low-accessibility situations, the negativity biases of similar extension information on both high- and low-entitativity family brands were more salient, whereas the negativity biases of dissimilar extension information on high-entitativity family brands were more salient.

06-F: Towards a Higher Generalizability of Brand Personality Scales

Theo Lieven, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland

The generalizability of popular brand personality scales is in question. Researchers have reported problems when attempting to replicate existing scales. Since scale creation methods are based on the lexical approach, this study proposes a procedure to enhance generalizability by the collection of synonyms from the dictionary.
06-G: “The Perfect Driving Machine”: The Effect of Familiarity and Semantic Similarity on Learning and Recall of Brand Slogans

Yoo Jin Song, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Zongyuan Wang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Brittany Duff, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

Familiarity and semantic similarity between originally and newly learned slogans influence both learning and recall of the original slogans. Moderately unfamiliar slogans benefited the most from repeated learning. Learning semantically similar new slogans facilitates recall of original slogans. These findings provide meaningful implications for brands planning to change their slogans.

06-H: Why We Love Brands: The Roles of Brand Personality and Brand Trust

Nguyen Pham, Arizona State University, USA
Tin Lam, Vietnam National University, Vietnam

Across two studies, we investigate how brand personality plays a meaningful role in establishing consumer trust on a brand, which in turn increases consumer brand loyalty. Moreover, we demonstrate that this effect is moderated by consumer motivation (i.e., self-verification or self-enhancement) and whether the product is publicly or privately consumed.

07-A: When Bad CSR Happens to ‘Good’ Companies: The Moderating Role of Identification

Bettina Lis, University of Mainz, Germany
Sabine Einwiller, University of Mainz, Germany

Consumer-company identification protects attitudes in the event of negative publicity, but not if negative information attacks the basis of identification. If consumers identify with a company because of CSR, attitudes and behavior deteriorate even more in the event of CSR misbehavior than if consumers did not identify with the firm.

07-B: Shiny Happy Chickens Tasting Good: Ethical Company Practices Affect Consumer Experience

Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA

The ethicality of company behavior and food-production has received increasing prominence in the public eye over the past years. The current study shows that the ethics of production influences consumers’ product experience. We suggest that such enhanced experience may be a case of conceptual consumption.

07-C: Effect of CSR Attributes of Food Products on Taste Evaluation, Mediation Role of Naturalness

Hajar Fatemi, McGill University, Canada
Laurette Dubé, McGill University, Canada

This study continues the research about the effect of product-related CSR on product evaluation. Focusing on food and taste perception, we suggest “naturalness” as a mechanism for the effect of CSR on taste. Effects of social and environmental CSR attributes on taste are observed to be different.
07-D: I Care When I Feel Like It! The Moderating Role of Emotion Stability in Cause Related Marketing

Ceren Ekebas-Turedi, Old Dominion University, USA  
Leona Tam, University of Wollongong, Australia

Cause related marketing (CRM) has become a popular strategy. This research investigates the impact of consumers’ emotional stability on the effectiveness of CRM in generating positive attitude towards the brand. Results of an experiment show that CRM influences attitudes only when consumers are in high (versus low) emotional stability.

07-E: But I Deserve It! The Impact of Product Positioning on Consumer Intentions Toward Fair Trade Products

Rhiannon MacDonnell, Cass Business School, City University London, UK

We examine the role of product positioning (luxury vs. necessity) and nationality of the product producer (same nationality vs. different) on consumer willingness to purchase fair trade and find that deserving of the product, but not guilt, mediates the effect on purchase intentions. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

07-F: The Many Shades of CSR – the Interplay of CA and CSR Associations

Xiaoye Chen, North Central College, USA  
Rong Huang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China  
Laurette Dubé, McGill University, Canada

This paper investigates differential impact of different CSR formats on consumer response. Two studies demonstrate that consumers reward companies embracing Value-creating CSR, as opposed to Philanthropic and Promotional CSR, in CSR image and corporate ability image. And the effects are moderated by corporate competence.

07-G: The Destigmatizing Role of Cause Marketing (CM) Products

Sukhyun Kim, Samsung SDS, Republic of Korea  
Kiwan Park, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea  
Y. Jin Youn, Northwestern University, USA

In this research, we investigate the destigmatizing role of cause marketing (CM) products, particularly for materialists. We demonstrate that compared to other forms of prosocial behaviors such as donation, materialists versus non-materialists perceive CM products as instrumental to destigmatizing negative accusations related to materialism when purchasing luxury products.

08-A: Role of Transactional vs. Relational Requests in Influencing Donation Intention

Mehdi Tanzeeb Hossain, University of Texas at Arlington, USA  
Zhiyong Yang, University of Texas at Arlington, USA

In this research we demonstrate that transactional requests sometimes exert negative influence on peoples' intent to help while relational requests has a unanimous positive impact on motives leading to helping behavior. Moreover, we posit that individuals' cognitive motivation moderates the above impact.

08-B: Ingroup-Outgroup Asymmetry for Donations of Time versus Money

Frank May, University of South Carolina, USA  
Ashwani Monga, University of South Carolina, USA

In this research, we examine ingroup-outgroup asymmetry for donations of time versus money. We find that that people are more willing to donate the resource that is more "me" to ingroup members versus outgroup members. Furthermore, perceptions of fit or appropriateness mediate this relationship.
08-C: For Others' Benefit Only: The Impact of Individuals’ Beliefs in Karma on Charitable Giving
Katina Kulow, University of South Carolina, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA

We test the impact of individuals' beliefs in karma on charitable giving. We show that when nonprofits increase the personal relevance of its charitable appeals, individuals who believe in karma will respond less favorably than when the charitable appeals are more general.

08-D: Why Sometimes Recognizing Obligations Can’t Help - The Effects of Signing One’s Name on Donation Behaviors
Canice M.C. Kwan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

In our research, we observed that signing one’s own name, albeit in an irrelevant context, can unobtrusively activate both feelings of self-identity (identity effect) and a sense of responsibility (duty effect). These effects, along with other factors such as self-relevance and processing style, induce a self-devoted commitment to help and impact on donation behaviors.

08-E: The Importance of Different Information in Donation Requests: An Eye-Tracking Analysis
Janet Kleber, University of Vienna, Austria
Sophie Süssenbach, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
Stephan Dickert, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
Arnd Florack, University of Vienna, Austria

An eye-tracking experiment examines the perception of different donation requests depending on numeracy. Results suggest that low numerate individuals tend to fixate more on the pictures, whereas high numerate individuals fixated more on numeric information. Donations were higher the longer pictures were fixated and if pictures illustrated the problem.

08-F: Is Doing Better Always Good? The Impact of Perceived Nonprofit Competence on Altruistic Donation Motivations
Katina Kulow, University of South Carolina, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
Stefanie Robinson, North Carolina State University, USA

We test the impact of perceptions of increased competence of nonprofits on consumers’ motivations for charitable giving. We show that when nonprofits signal increased levels of competence, altruistic individuals will respond less favorably to them as compared to when nonprofits were perceived as less competent.

08-G: The Effect of Color Harmony on Processing Disfluency of Pro-Social Advertisement
Nara Youn, Hongik University, Republic of Korea
Chang Yeop Shin, Hongik University, Republic of Korea
Myungwoo Nam, Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea

We examined the effect of color harmony on the effectiveness of pro-social advertisement. The results from three studies showed that moderately disharmonious color combination evokes disfluency, and the path from disfluency to high construal to empathy explains the effect of color harmony on pro-social behavior.
To motivate donors, charities can display the amount raised by competing donor groups; an approach we call competitive labeling. In the present research, we argue that competitive labeling increases donations when the gap between donor groups is low, but decreases donations when the gap between donor groups is high.

Across two studies, the influence of cause-related identity and uniqueness on donation intentions and behaviors are examined. It is predicted that when uniqueness motives are triggered consumers will be more willing to publically (vs. privately) contribute to causes from which they might otherwise wish to dissociate their public identities.

Although gift giving is a common social interaction, how gifts influence gift receivers is largely underexplored. Current research demonstrates that gift receivers project gift givers on the gift (study 1), and this influences product replacement (study 2). Furthermore, gifts reveal to have broader consequences on brand evaluation (study 3a & 3b).

Three experiments demonstrate the influences of touch element on donation amount. The results indicate that touching a victim’s photo lead to higher donation amount, especially for high need-for-touch individuals. Moreover, this relationship is mediated by sympathy. This research also shows that seeing a victim’s face is not a necessary condition.

We investigate what determines the differential effectiveness of self- versus other-benefit appeals in charity advertisements. We find that when beneficiaries are out-group (in-group) members, self-benefit (other-benefit) appeals generate greater donation intention than other-benefit (self-benefit) appeals. We also demonstrate two distinct mediation processes to account for the proposed matching effects.

In this research, we find that donors tend to contribute money to a happy child rather than to a sad child whereas they tend to contribute time to a sad child than to a happy child. Results demonstrate that donors emphasize their own psychological wellbeing in charitable giving such that donors’ happiness mediates the differential effects of recipients’ affective displays on donation types.
09-F: Regifting Redefined: The Giver’s and the Receiver’s Perspective

Burcak Ertimur, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA
Caroline Lego Munoz, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA
James Hutton, Fairleigh Dickinson University, USA

This research examines the phenomenon of regifting, giving a gift that one has received to someone else. We develop a consumer-based understanding of regifting, considering the multiple roles consumers may assume in such exchanges. Our findings support the notion that we should contextualize regifting beyond the dyadic gift exchange model.

09-G: If You Think I'm Picky, What Gift Will You Give Me?

Andong Cheng, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Margaret G. Meloy, Pennsylvania State University, USA

Three studies explore “picky” gift recipients as a distinct subset of “difficult” recipients. “Picky” recipients, in contrast to “difficult,” have narrow preferences, are more decisive, and are considered snobby. As such, gift givers select cash cards for these “picky” recipients and don’t differentiate between friends and acquaintances in money spent.

09-H: Temporal Reframing of Prices and Offer Attractiveness in a Cause-Related Marketing Context

Mazen Jaber, Saginaw Valley State University, USA
Ronald W. Niedrich, Louisiana State University, USA
Danny Weathers, Clemson University, USA

One strategy that pricing research has sought to explain is pennies-a-day, where product costs are expressed as small ongoing expenses. This study tests PAD effect on offer attractiveness in a CRM context. We find that PAD framing has significant impact on attractiveness at low donation amounts but not high amounts.

10-A: “The Bad Guys is Tasty”: How Visual Packaging Cues and Nutrition Knowledge Influence Pre-School Children’s Perceptions and Selections of Snacks

Michelle Nelson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Brittany Duff, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Da Zheng, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Ningzi Li, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Regina Ahn, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Chuqiao Huang, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

Visual package cues attract attention and influence product perceptions and selection. Unlike previous research, our interviews with preschool children revealed nutrition knowledge; however, they unanimously selected snacks featuring licensed characters instead of fruit or candy. Children’s choices revealed the influence of perceptions of fun and the familiarity of media characters.

10-B: The Role of Technology in Children’s Food Environment: Exploring Intra-Familial Dynamics across Cultures

Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Emiko Amano, Kanto-Gakuin University, Japan
Nigel Chiweshe, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Evelyn Derera, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

We demonstrate how family meal times and the associated rituals are evolving through the consumption of technology. Our findings reveal a technological generational gap as parents interpreted technology as being negative, whereas the digital natives, younger generation perceived technology as being a positive tool during mealtimes.
10-C: Encouraging Reflexivity in Food Research: Producing Children's Voices

Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Ziska Fields, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

This research focuses on the significance of evoking children’s self-reflexivity within consumer research. Insights are drawn from a longitudinal interpretive study that used multiple data sources to explore children’s food consumption practices. We argue that evoking children’s self-reflexivity may encourage consumer researchers to address new types of research questions.

10-D: The Influence of Children in Family Decision Making: Perceptions of South African Parents

Mishaal Maikoo, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Debbie Vigar-Ellis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

We examine how children influence family decisions when buying snacks, toys and games. The findings from 135 families showed that children use different tactics including emotional appeals, product requests, purchase justification, and bad behaviour as tools to negotiate within the family decision making process.

10-E: Differential Effects of Socialization Agents on Music Piracy

Zhiyong Yang, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Ahmad Jamal, Cardiff University, UK
Rong Huang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China

We simultaneously examine the effects of five major socialization agents on university students’ piracy definitions and behavior. Findings show that close-other agents (peers, Internet) directly impact both definitions and behavior, whereas distal-other agents (parents, music industry) impact piracy behavior only indirectly through definitions. These effects differ across consumer segments.

10-F: The Extended Parental Self: Gender Differences in Parental Spending on Sons vs. Daughters

Lambrianos Nikiforidis, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Ashley Rae, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Kristina M. Durante, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

Do parents favor spending on sons or daughters? Drawing on theory and research on the extended self, we show that women spend on daughters and men spend on sons. Additional findings show that this effect is linked to viewing children of concordant gender as an extension of one’s own identity.

10-G: Self-Esteem Discrepancy and Adolescents’ Self-Connections to Peer Groups' Brands

Burak Tunca, University of Agder, Norway
Sigurd V. Troye, Norwegian School of Economics, Norway

Prior research has shown that discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem are associated with higher self-enhancement needs. This study proposes that individuals with a discrepant self-esteem will have higher tendencies to develop self-connections to brands that are associated with their reference groups as a form self-enhancement. Findings from an adolescent sample provide empirical support for this postulation.
11-A: Consumption-Related Challenges and Consumers’ Accumulation of Field-Specific Forms of Capital

Pierre-Yann Dolbec, York University, Canada

How do consumers accumulate field-specific social and cultural capital? By attempting to resolve consumption-related challenges, consumers use three strategies which lead them to develop such forms of capital. This process ultimately brings about changes in their consumption practices and deepens their involvement within the field.


Wei-Fen Chen, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

We investigate the extent to which affordable fashion brands (high-end image, low-end prices) use country of origin to support their brand image. An analysis of brand positioning reveals that ZARA, UNIQLO, and H&M do not universally use COO but differentiate themselves as “affordable luxury,” “smart street style,” and “disposable fashion.”

11-C: Experiential Purchases Foster Social Connectedness

Amit Kumar, Cornell University, USA
Thomas Mann, Cornell University, USA
Thomas D. Gilovich, Cornell University, USA

We demonstrate that experiential purchases foster social connection more than material purchases. Consumers feel more connected to those who have made similar experiential purchases. After reflecting on experiential purchases, they also feel more connected to people in general, are more likely to engage in social activities, and act more prosocially.

11-D: Interpreting Financial Consumption Experiences: The Case of British-Muslims

Ahmad Jamal, Cardiff University, UK
Akmal Hanuk, Islamic Banking and Finance Institute, UK
Omer Rana, Cardiff University, UK

Focus group sessions were conducted to explore meanings that financial consumption experiences hold for British-Muslims. Conventional and Islamic banking experiences based on personal standards and religious ideals are discussed. Participants negotiate conflicts using coping strategies to deal with guilt that pervade. Findings offer several points of contribution to future research.

11-E: Protections Against Agent Opportunism: Customer Assumptions and Marketplace Realities

Gulnur Tumbat, San Francisco State University, USA
Kent Grayson, Northwestern University, USA

Why customers participate in marketplaces where they aren’t protected from opportunism by the standard agency safeguards? Using ethnography/interviews with clients/guides on Everest, we show that clients are willing to accept an exchange agreement that doesn’t provide them with the protections predicted by agency theory. We discuss implications for conventional contexts.

11-F: Mixed Messages: The Variability of Conspicuous Consumption Activity and Interpretations Based on Audience Familiarity

Daniel Sheehan, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Sara Dommer, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA

As conspicuous consumption is simply a signal to others, characteristics of the audience will likely influence the message’s reception and interpretation. Three studies demonstrate that people are more (less) likely to engage in conspicuous consumption in the presence of strangers (friends), yet a stranger’s consumption is perceived as less genuine.
11-G: The Cyborg Self, the Tethered Life: The Meanings of Virtual Spaces and Portable Devices in Consumer Narratives

Tifani Wiyanto, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Edwina Luck, Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Shane Mathews, Queensland University of Technology, Australia

We examine the implications of continuous access to virtual spaces through portable devices on consumer self. Portable devices are significant conduits to demarcate and synthesize consumers’ physical and virtual selves. Consumers’ cyborg self and life tethered to virtual spaces signifies a liberatory mode of being to attain self-narrative goals.

11-H: Ambiguity in Heterogeneous Consumption Communities: Confused Consumers?

Anja Simms, University of Wollongong, Australia
Ulrike Gretzel, University of Wollongong, Australia
Andrew Whelan, University of Wollongong, Australia

This research explores the role of ambiguity surrounding a consumption practice as a source of confusion for consumers. An inquiry into an online vegetarian community indicates different levels of comfort with ambiguity. Members manage discomfort by adjusting the practice or negotiating the meaning of a particular label.


Milan Pickl Bermejo, ESCP Europe, France
Marcelo V. Nepomuceno, ESCP Europe, France

This study examines the application of humor types and presence of cultural values in humorous television advertisings broadcasted in the USA and Japan. We demonstrate that humorous advertising should be adapted, as adapted commercials are preferred over non-adapted ones. Through a content analysis we provide reasons for adapting the ads.

12-B: Power Distance Belief and Education Advertising Execution

Lingjiang Tu, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Yinlong Zhang, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

Through content analysis of print education ads from U.S. and Japan and an experiment in which power distance belief (PDB) was primed, we found that high (vs. low) PDB leads to preference of rational (vs. emotional) education advertising appeals. We also obtained evidence for the underlying process.


Satoshi Akutsu, Hitotsubashi University, Japan
Mayomi Haga, Hitotsubashi University, Japan
Yoshinori Fujikawa, Hitotsubashi University, Japan
Joji Ono, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan

We examine how individual consumer’s influence and adjustment orientations affect customer satisfaction directly and indirectly via customer participation in service processes. Conducting a cross-cultural survey of the customers of a global educational service provider, we show that while adjustment positively impact on satisfaction via participation, its direct impact is negative.
12-D: Creativity in New Product Development; When Collectivistic Values Outperform Individualistic Values

Jungim Mun, SUNY at Buffalo, USA
Charles D. Lindsey, SUNY at Buffalo, USA

Research shows that individualism is preferable to collectivism when we desire creativity as an outcome. However, empirical evidence shows that countries or organizations from Eastern cultures (e.g., Japan, Korea, etc.) often outperform those from Western cultures when it comes to new patents and other proxies of creative activity. Across two studies, we highlight a situation under which a collectivistic mind-set outperforms an individualistic mind-set in terms of creative output. Specifically, in a high construal scenario, ideas generated by participants primed with an interdependent mind-set were judged to be more creative relative to ideas by participants primed with an independent mind-set – on both dimensions of creativity: originality and usefulness. However, no differences in creativity were found between interdependent and independent participants in low construal. Our nascent findings have the potential to advance knowledge of creativity and its processes, in general, and its effects on cross cultural performance, in specific.

12-E: You Touch it, You Buy it: Cross-cultural Differences in Consumers’ Attitudes Towards Local Food

Wided Batat, University of Lyon 2, France
Marie Lachance, University of Laval, Canada
Maryse Côté-Hamel, Concordia University, Canada

Why do some consumers go out of their way to buy local food, while others do not bother? Findings from semi-structured interviews with French and Canadian consumers suggest that non-diagnostic tactile information about food acquired even as children translates into persistent positive attitudes and evaluations of local food and producers.

12-F: “Following Behind” Versus “Keeping up”: The Effect of Power Distance Belief and Superior’s Consumption on Consumer’s Preference for Status Related Products

Huachao Gao, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Yinlong Zhang, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA

We propose that consumers’ preference for status-related products will be affected by power distance belief (PDB) and the presence of their superior’s status consumption. High (vs. low) PDB consumers prefer lower (vs. higher) status products when superior’s consumption is present, as they are motivated to “follow behind” (vs. “keep up”).

12-G: Shared Decisions in Emotionally Difficult Situations

Tatiana Barakshina, UIC, USA

Medical consumer decisions-making process is analyzed. A high, moderate and low gradation of “emotionally difficult decisions” is introduced. Findings on autonomous, shared and externally made decisions are summarized. External decision mode is preferred for the highest extreme of emotional difficulty; in this work, we propose that preferences shift toward autonomous and shared decisions under moderate and low emotional difficulty.

12-H: Looking for a Cultural Border Condition for the Experiential Recommendation

Ezgi Merdin, Bogazici University, Turkey
Özlem Hesapçı, Bogazici University, Turkey

With a series of studies, it is attempted to establish some border conditions of "the experiential recommendation" for happiness. Two main notions of the cultural self are incorporated as the independent variable and a differentiation has been made between the concepts of in-group vs. out-group consumption / service experience.
13-A: The “Right” Side Can’t Be Bad! Getting on the Good Side of the Shelf

Yoon-Na Cho, Villanova University, USA
Katie Kelting, University of Arkansas, USA

From the perspective of embodied cognition, we examine the effects of a horizontal metaphor on consumer evaluations of stimuli and food products and find evidence to support the notion of right (left) being associated with positive (negative) valence. Findings from three studies are reported.

13-B: A Touch of Evil: Harmfulness Alters Sensory Characteristics

Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA

Across 3 studies, we demonstrate that perceived potential harm influences sensory judgment. Participants told animals are dangerous rate sensory properties (beauty, softness) lower. These effects extend to actual sensory judgment of products derived from these animals, such that fur products derived from harmful animals feel less pleasant.

13-C: Blurring the Line: How Disfluency Begets Similarity

Michael Giblin, University of Florida, USA
Aner Sela, University of Florida, USA

In two experiments, we demonstrate that processing difficulty (i.e., disfluency) leads people to perceive different options as spatially closer and more similar to one another. The findings have important decision implications, as initial decision difficulty and disfluency increases perceived option similarity, which in turn may further exacerbate decision difficulty.

13-D: Embodied and Primed Cleansing Effects on Consumer Indulgence

Chrissy M. Martins, Iona College, USA
Lauren Block, Baruch College, USA
Darren W. Dahl, University of British Columbia, Canada

This research examines how primed and embodied cleansing affects indulgence. We find that embodying a cleansing product leads to less guilt and more indulgence, but find the opposite when individuals are merely primed with a cleansing product or embody a neutral product. We discuss potential explanations for these results.

13-E: “Going Against the Flow” The Metaphorical Effects of Sensorimotor Resistance

Mina Kwon, University of Illinois, USA
Rashmi Adaval, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China

We examine how the experience of haptic resistance activates a conceptual metaphor of “going against the flow.” The implications of this are shown for choice situations where participants experiencing resistance go against the norm and choose options that are normatively not preferred.

13-F: Losing Control: When Physical Cleansing Intensifies Cheating for High Self-Controls

Tracy Rank-Christman, Rutgers University, USA
Maureen Morrin, Temple University, USA

We show that washing one’s hands with soap and water licenses cheating behavior, and that this effect is stronger for individuals who exhibit chronic levels of high self-control. The results add to the growing literature on embodied cognition.
13-G: Does Heavier Weight Mean More Power? Examining the Moderating Role of Dominance Trait and Semantic Congruence

Hiroaki Ishii, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan
Jaewoo Park, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan

Previous studies have confirmed the positive effect of weight on product evaluation, which is caused by semantic association of weight with importance. Our study shows another semantic link of weight, the concept of power. Additionally, we explore the interaction between the dominance trait, advertising picture angle, and weight.

13-H: Do Not Wash Your Hands When You Eat Junk Food: The Possibility of a Reverse Macbeth Effect in Consumer Behavior

Jaewoo Park, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan
Hiroaki Ishii, Chiba University of Commerce, Japan

This study explores whether and how the experience of physical cleansing can affect health guilt over consuming junk food. We demonstrate that physical cleansing does not mitigate but aggravates perceived health guilt. Our research also shows that the effect of physical cleansing is moderated by consumers’ autotelic need for touch.

14-A: Mesmerized: How Digital Menu Boards Affect Food Choice

Laura Smarandescu, Iowa State University, USA
Anicia Peters, Iowa State University, USA
Brian Mennecke, Iowa State University, USA
Andrew Luse, Iowa State University, USA

The eating environment presents us with convenient, tasty, high energy density food choices. Fast food consumption is correlated with poor health and obesity. This research examines how rotating food images in digital menu boards influence food choices. Rotating images increased choice for unhealthy alternatives for vegetarians and less hungry individuals.

14-B: Exploring Consumer’s Food Choice: Utilitarian vs. Hedonic Products

Natalia Maehle, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Norway
Cele C. Otnes, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Nina Iversen, BI Norwegian Business School, Norway
Leif Hem, Norwegian School of Economics, Norway
Julian Hartman, Independent Researcher, USA

Consumers have to deal with many contradictory requirements and expectations while making their food choices. To understand the trade-offs in their food choice situations, the current study identifies the relative importance of four main product attributes (price, taste, environmental friendliness and healthiness) for hedonic and utilitarian food products.

14-C: The Effects of Assortment Organization and Labeling on Healthy Choice: The Scoop from an Ice Cream Store Experiment

Ralf van der Lans, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Anirban Mukhopadhyay, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Ashley Y. H. To, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China

Environmental cues can have strong effects on people’s decisions. In a two-phase field experiment conducted at an ice-cream store, we investigate the impact of categorization and traffic light labeling on choice. Results show that organizing the assortment and labeling the flavors in specific ways shift consumers’ choices towards healthy options.
14-D: It “Feels” Good for Me: The Interaction of Naïve Theories and Processing Fluency in Subjective Evaluation of Healthiness
Catherine Wiggins, Cornell University, USA

Little is known about the role of processing fluency in judgments of product healthiness. This research demonstrates that the effect of processing fluency is dependent upon consumers’ naïve health theories, underscoring the importance of matching such theories to the level of processing fluency most conducive to favorable product evaluations.

14-E: Self-Licensing Effects on Food Choices
Christian Weibel, University of Bern, Switzerland
Claude Messner, University of Bern, Switzerland

Recalling an egoistic act nudges people to choose healthy over unhealthy food options. Conversely, participants preferred unhealthy over healthy food options when they recalled an altruistic deed. Consistent with this choice pattern participants were willing to pay more for healthy than for unhealthy options. This experiment extends the self-licensing literature.

14-F: Does Thinking “Outside of the Box” Make People Feel “Full”? The Influence of Consumer Creativity on Satiation for Unhealthy Foods
Na (Amy) Wen, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Wenyu Dou, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Drawing on research from satiation and health psychology, we examine the therapeutic effects of consumer creativity on satiation. In particular, we predict that creativity can elicit a divergent mindset that may increase the heterogeneity of a consideration choice set, which will, in turn, accelerate the satiation rate for unhealthy foods.

14-G: How Variety in Flavors within Indulgent and Healthy Food Options Affects Perceived Healthiness and Preference for Promotion Types
Elke Huyghe, Ghent University, Belgium
Maggie Geuens, Ghent University, Belgium
Iris Vermeir, Ghent University, Belgium

We find evidence that participants perceive variety as healthier than no variety for healthy products, while the opposite is true for indulgent products. Consumers also prefer a discount for an indulgent food option with variety and a bonus pack for a healthy food option with variety.

14-H: What You Paid Then Affects What You Eat Now: the Effect of Healthy Food Prices on Subsequent Food Decisions
Ying Jiang, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada
Jing Lei, University of Melbourne, Australia

In this research we examine the effect of healthy food prices on consumers’ subsequent food choices. We show that the high (vs. low)-price of healthy food more likely leads to healthy choices in consecutive (vs. delayed) decisions for consumers who are more (vs. less) health-conscious.
**15-A: Consumer Emotional Intelligence and its Effects on Goal-Oriented Appeals in Advertising**

Hongmin Ahn, West Virginia University, USA  
Sang Yeal Lee, West Virginia University, USA  
Yongjun Sung, Southern Methodist University, USA

This study demonstrates that consumer emotional intelligence (CEI) influences the persuasiveness of messages in ads, suggesting that CEI is a critical individual difference to consider in predicting consumers’ responses to advertising messages. Importantly, it suggests that the effect of CEI is pronounced when ad messages are prevention-focused (vs. promotion-focused).

**15-B: The Impact of Attitudinal Ambivalence on Weight Loss Decisions: Consequences and Mitigating Factors**

My Bui, Loyola Marymount University, USA  
Courtney M. Droms, Butler University, USA  
Georgiana Craciun, University of Pittsburgh, USA

This research examines individuals’ attitudes & intentions toward losing weight and focuses on understanding the maladaptive outcomes of a negative relationship between these attitudes and intentions. Results show that attitudinal ambivalence, self-efficacy, and provision of outcome feedback alleviated the negative effect and improved intentions to try to achieve weight loss goals.

**15-C: Don’t Reward Yourself! How Celebration (Not Reward) of Accomplishment Increases Enjoyment and Motivation to Persevere**

Aaron Snyder, Stanford University, USA  
Baba Shiv, Stanford University, USA

People love to reward themselves for a job well done. However, rewards decrease enjoyment and the perception of intrinsic motivation. In a field experiment, we find evidence that framing an incentive as a celebration (rather than reward) increases both enjoyment and the likelihood of re-engaging in the incentivized behavior.

**15-D: The Effects of Perceived Goal Progress and Assortment Size on Consumer Choice**

Moon-Yong Kim, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Republic of Korea

When consumers buy multiple items simultaneously, this research proposes that (1) consumers’ perceived level of goal progress will affect their relative choice share of vices (vs. virtues); and (2) their perceived goal progress will moderate how assortment size influences their choice between vices and virtues.

**15-E: The Bucket List: How Consumers Customize Temporal Perspective to Guide and Shape Their Life-Story**

Jeffrey R. Carlson, University of Connecticut, USA  
Anna Jansson Vredeveld, University of Connecticut, USA

This research explores how consumers use ‘bucket-lists’ to construct life plans that shape identity relevant goals. We contend that consumers use experience related goals to customize their temporal perspective in order to create a coherent self-narrative that interlinks the past, present and future self.
15-F: Two Fates: The Motivational and Cognitive Effect of Mortality Salience on Variety-Seeking

Zhongqiang (Tak) Huang, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Robert S. Wyer, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

This research examines the cognitive and motivational effect of mortality salience in a domain of consumer behavior, namely, variety-seeking of consumer products. One experiment provides initial evidence that cognitive priming of mortality salience increases variety-seeking while motivational priming leads to lower tendency to choose variety.

15-G: Remember the Bad? Goal Relevance, Valence, and the Encoding of Information in Consumer Decisions

Michael Hair, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Samuel Bond, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA

Our research explores the effects of goal activation and framing on memory for positive and negative information in a consumer decision setting. Findings of two studies reveal that encoding performance depends jointly on the valence of information and its relevance to active consumption goals.

15-H: To Pursue or Not To Pursue: The Impact of Group Identification on Individual Goal Pursuit

Katina Kulow, University of South Carolina, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA
Kara Bentley, University of South Carolina, USA

We examine the impact of group identification on individual goal pursuit. We show that when an interdependent (vs. independent) group member highly identifies with its group, the vicarious goal fulfillment of the individual’s goals, resulting from the group’s successes, will result in disengagement from continued individual goal pursuit.

16-A: Customer Effort and the Moral Self: An Examination in a Product Customization Context

Prakash Das, University of Calgary, Canada
James Agarwal, University of Calgary, Canada

Little research has explored the symbolic aspects of customer effort and its relation to the moral self. In a product customization context, we examine the relationship between customer effort and the moral self. It is found that effort expended influences judgments when the moral self is activated. The moral self increases evaluations of both companies and the individual self when greater effort (vs. less effort) is expended. It is suggested that effort expenditure can have symbolic implications for customers.

16-B: Sub-Ethical Choice Behavior: The Attraction Effect of Scarcity

Ashley Otto, University of Cincinnati, USA
James Kellaris, University of Cincinnati, USA

Sub-ethical choice behavior is compromising one’s values or standards, selecting the inferior ethical alternative. Sub-ethical choices are acceptable but not ideal, giving rise to the term sub-ethical rather than un-ethical. This research examines shelf-based scarcity and finds it sways consumers’ choice away from their ethical ideals in a retail setting.

16-C: Anti-Brand Movement: Politico-Cultural Resistance and Ethical Commitment

Emre Ulusoy, University of Texas - Pan American, USA

Anti-brand communities are an example of social movements that go beyond the political and cultural dichotomy by playing a substantive role in the creation of alternative cultural venues for consumers to voice their oppositions and construct resistant identities that extend into more generalized political venues for broader social change.
16-D: Consumers’ Perceived Counterfeit Detection: A Construct with Formative Measurement Nature and its Relevance to Construct Validation

Jiayun (Gavin) Wu, Savannah State University, USA
Xiaoqing Wu, University of Maryland, USA
Mei-Kuang Chen, University of Arizona, USA

In the context of deliberate counterfeit consumption, we theoretically justify the proposed construct of “consumers’ Perceived Counterfeit Detection by important others” (PCD). We emphasize PCD’s formative measurement as opposed to its reflective measurement nature; empirically demonstrate PCD’s existence according to our initial results; and describe its relevance to construct validation and unethical behavior.

16-E: Influence of Personal Control and Environmental Cue on Consumer Cheating

Chenying (Claire) Tang, Arizona State University, USA
Adriana Samper, Arizona State University, USA
Keisha M. Cutright, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Nathan D. Martin, Arizona State University, USA

We examine the effect of personal control on unethical consumer behaviors. We find that individuals feeling low (vs. high) control are more likely to view unethical behaviors as acceptable (S1) and engage in cheating behaviors (S2). This is moderated by how salient individuals perceive the opportunity of cheating to be.

16-F: Service Failures in Gift Orders: The Mediating Role of Guilt

Hua Chang, Drexel University, USA
Guang-Xin Xie, University of Massachusetts Boston, USA

This research examines consumers’ reactions to service failures from a psychological contract perspective. We find that consumers are more dissatisfied with service failures in gift orders. We demonstrate that consumers’ perception of whether a promise is made moderates the relationship. Consumers in the gift order condition reacted more negatively to service failures when sellers make an explicit promise. Finally, we show the mediating effect of feelings of guilt.

16-G: The Effect of Guilt in the Service Recovery Paradox

Yin-Hui Cheng, National Taichung University of Education, Taiwan
Shih-Chieh Chuang, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan
Po-Dong Huang, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan
Sui-Min Wang, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan

Our research explores the effect of “guilt”. The results of our experiments demonstrate that if customers are compensated for service failures by receiving better than anticipated service, they will commonly experience feelings of “guilt.”

17-A: Eating Right, Exercising, and...Reading? The Effect of Reading about Health-Related Topics on the Internet

Ann E. McNeel, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Stephen J. Gould, Baruch College, CUNY, USA

Reading a health-related article leads consumers to feel healthier. Frequent exercisers who read a health article were more likely than those who read a history article to ironically choose a fashion sneaker over a fitness shoe. The research expands the notion of what constitutes a health-promotion behavior leading to licensing.
17-B: Nutrition Information on Food Menu: Nutrition Involvement and Message Framing Effects

SoYeon Kwon, Purdue University, USA
Sejin Ha, Purdue University, USA

What is an effective calorie labeling strategy that would help consumers to make a healthy food choice? To answer this question, this study examined different ways of presenting calorie information of a combo meal. The extent to which it is moderated by nutrition involvement is also examined.

17-C: The Role of Political Ideology in Reactions to Warning Labels

Mitchel Murdock, University of South Carolina, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
James F. Thrasher, University of South Carolina, USA

This research investigates the role of political ideology in consumer reactions to warning labels and demonstrates that when the FDA is associated with the warning label conservatives (but not liberals) decrease their intentions to quit smoking (Study 1) and increase their purchase intentions of unhealthy foods (Study 2).

17-D: “Slim” Cigarettes and Consumer Inferences about Product Harmfulness

Timothy Dewhirst, University of Guelph, Canada

Following the lead of Mick (2006) and the practice of transformative consumer research that aims to improve well-being and inform policy, this study provides an interpretive analysis of the tobacco industry’s consumer research to examine whether the “slims” cigarette product descriptor is likely to be misleading about the product’s harmfulness.

17-E: When Emotional Messages Are More Abstract: The Effects of Message Frame and Levels of Construal on Negative Attitudes Towards Smoking

Marcia Herter, Reims Management School, France
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France

This paper examines the effects of message frame and levels of construal on negative attitudes towards smoking. We show that in abstract construal, emotional (vs. rational) message frame increase negative attitudes towards smoking. However, when concrete construal is activated, emotional and rational messages impact negative attitudes towards smoking similarly.

17-F: Natural Consumer

Maria Kniazeva, University of San Diego, USA

To explore the concept of “natural consumer” I turn to the product that represents “the very substance of the natural world” (Wilk 2006) - drinking water. Narratives on the labels of bottled water inform the study. The research objective is to conceptualize the natural way of living as taught by marketers.

17-G: Do Thoughts of Money Influence Peoples’ Health Risk Perceptions?

Johannes C. Bauer, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Joehim Hansen, University of Salzburg, Austria
Vicki G. Morwitz, New York University, USA

This research contributes to the psychology of money by showing that merely thinking of money can influence peoples’ health risk perceptions. We provide an emotional account for why thoughts of money make people feel more optimistic about health risks and identify boundary conditions for the effects of money priming.
17-H: Details to Spare: The Effects of Product Risk Disclosure on Consumer Evaluations of Brands and Product Manufacturers

Cassandra Davis, University of Arkansas, USA

We find that the social contract between consumers and manufacturers is impaired when manufacturers provide inadequate product risk disclosure but that manufacturers receive little reward for copious risk disclosure. We also find that brand perceptions are negatively affected by the inclusion of product risk disclosure. Evoked fear mediates these relationships.

18-A: Consumer Experience with Augmented Reality at Brands’ Events

Ana Javornik, Università della Svizzera Italiana, Switzerland
Andreina Mandelli, SDA Bocconi, Italy

Increasingly popular marketing communication tool of augmented reality has been so far limitedly investigated. This exploratory study assesses the appropriateness of the variables of interactivity, telepresence and vividness for evaluating the customer experience with augmented reality at brands’ events. For this purpose, semi-structured interviews with practitioners and academics are conducted.

18-B: Online Ordering for Healthier Eating: A Field Experiment

Eric VanEpps, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Julie Downs, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
George Loewenstein, Carnegie Mellon University, USA

Using an original internet-based food ordering system implemented in a field setting with office workers, we experimentally test the conditions under which consumers can be nudged to order healthier (i.e., lower calorie) lunches by tracking the orders of individuals over multiple weeks.

18-C: Tastes like Freedom: Perceived Choice Improves Taste

Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA

Across three studies, we demonstrate that consumers rate foods as tastier when given the feeling of free choice. Choice enhances experience even when it is enacted not with the tasted food itself, and when no choice at all is given but rather a false feeling of customization.

18-D: Examining Consumers’ Intentions to Purchase Luxury Goods and Counterfeits

Kuang-peng Hung, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan
Annie Chen, University of Westminster, UK
Norman Peng, University of Westminster, UK

This study examines the factors that influence consumers’ intention to purchase luxury goods and counterfeits. Findings confirm product quality, value-expressive attitudes, and social-adjustive attitudes will have significant impact on consumers’ purchase intention. Furthermore, status-consciousness can moderate the relationship between social-adjustive attitudes and purchase intention.

18-E: But I Don't Wanna! How Group Fun Can Increase Consumers' Motivation for the Un-enjoyable

Stefanie M. Tignor, Northeastern University, USA
Paul W. Fombelle, Northeastern University, USA
Nancy J. Sirianni, Northeastern University, USA

Two studies demonstrate how the co-creation of fun may be used to motivate consumers to engage in exercise, and the ways in which fun can impact health and well-being. We show that fun is associated with higher levels of self- and group efficacy, which in turn can increase intrinsic motivation.
18-F: Jewelry and Clothing Only, Please! Happiness from Material Object Gifts Greater than Happiness from Experiential Gifts
Christopher Ling, University of South Carolina, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA

We examine recipient (self vs. other) as moderator of the effect of chosen option on happiness, finding that consumers associate greater happiness with experiential versus material objects bought for themselves; however, these results reverse when receiving from others: in this context happiness is greater for material than experiential objects.

18-G: The Effect of Anticipated Future Consumption Amount on Food Consumption Experience
Hua (Olivia) Lian, University of Alberta, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
Gerald Häubl, University of Alberta, Canada

This research examines how people’s food consumption experiences are affected by the amount of food they anticipate consuming. Controlling for the actual consumption amount, we found that participants enjoyed the eating experience more when they had anticipated consuming a smaller (vs. a larger) amount of food.

18-H: Compulsive Collecting: Conceptualization and Measurement
Monika Kukar-Kinney, University of Richmond, USA
Nancy Ridgway, University of Richmond, USA

Although there is much research on the topic of collecting, no attempt to separate collecting from compulsive collecting has been made. In this research, we conceptualize and develop a measure of compulsive collecting. The research offers important theoretical and empirical contributions as well as public policy implications.

19-A: Coping versus Enhancement Motives of Compulsive Buying and Subtyping of Compulsive Buyers
Sungwhan Yi, University of Guelph, Canada
Roisin O’Connor, Concordia University, Canada

We assessed the heterogeneity of compulsive buyers (CB) based on affective motives of buying: coping and enhancement motives. Latent profile analysis identified three clusters of CB: high coping CB, moderate coping/enhancement CB, and low coping/enhancement buyers. High coping CB cluster had significantly more serious CB problems than the other clusters.

19-B: Consumers’ Need for Prestige: Scale Development
Friederike Blum, University of Bayreuth, Germany
Stefan Hampel, University of Bayreuth, Germany
Hajo Hippner, University of Bayreuth, Germany

The need for prestige is deeply anchored in everyday social life. This research details the development of the “Consumers’ Need for Prestige” scale designed to measure individual differences in aspiring prestige. The 21-item CNFP scale consisting of the impression-oriented, social-approval, and impressible dimensions demonstrate reliability, convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity.
19-C: Physical Activity and Food Consumption: The Moderating Role of Dieting Tendency

Chiu-chi Angela Chang, Central Michigan University, USA
Ying-ching Lin, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan
Shu-Fang Cheng, National Dong Hwa University, Taiwan

This research examines the impact of physical activity on dieters’ and nondieters’ food consumption. The empirical findings show that only dieters’ food consumption and choice are significantly affected by physical activity, which is construed as an entitlement justification. Framing physical activity as fun (vs. work) reverses dieters’ food compensation.

19-D: Motivation Matters: Choice Confidence as a Function of Information Diagnosticity and NFCC

Demetra Andrews, IU Northwest, USA

Marketplace information plays a key role in generating consumer confidence. However, consumers do not respond uniformly to encountered information. This research demonstrates how Need for Cognitive Closure, a dispositional factor that alters information processing, moderates the relationship between information diagnosticity and choice confidence.

19-E: Exploring the Psychological Mechanism Behind Exclusionary Reactions to Foreign Companies: The Questions of Who and Why

Shirley Y. Y. Cheng, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
Melody M. Chao, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Franki Kung, University of Waterloo, Canada
Jessica Y. Y. Kwong, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Two studies show that international conflict events lead to exclusionary reactions toward foreign companies only among consumers with high social essentialism. This contributes to the animosity literature by showing the social-cognitive underpinning of animosity and contributes to ongoing debate in social psychology as to whether essentialist belief influences intergroup relations.

19-F: Will Future Orientation Make People Socially Expansive?

Haejoo Han, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea
Heeyoung Yoon, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea
Kyoungmi Lee, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea

Across two experiments, we find that future orientation can influence the extent to which consumers would like to expand their social networks. This research suggests that both individual differences in future orientation and the temporally activated future focus can make consumers socially expansive, and the regulatory focus moderates this effect.


Yoon-Na Cho, Villanova University, USA
Robin L. Soster, University of Arkansas, USA

We demonstrate the effect of perceived sustainability (dis)utility based on consumers’ category-level sustainability expectations, which influence consumer evaluations of brands within the category. Our findings also reveal that these effects arise independent of 1) a consumer’s tendency to self-enhance and 2) perceived consumer effectiveness.
19-H: Omission Bias in the Marketplace: The Moderating Role of Experience on Consumer Trust Perceptions for Brands and Agents

Jungim Mun, SUNY at Buffalo, USA
Michael Wiles, Arizona State University, USA
Charles D. Lindsey, SUNY at Buffalo, USA

Two types of marketplace behaviors may result in harm to consumers. Commissions are harmful actions such as inaccurately reporting important marketplace information, whereas omissions are harmful inactions such as failing to report important marketplace information. The current research integrates procedural justice theory and attribution theory to predict that for harmful omissions, experienced marketplace actors (e.g., brands, salespersons) will suffer greater decreases in trust perceptions than inexperienced marketplace actors. In contrast, for harmful commissions, actor experience is predicted to have no influence on decreases in trust perceptions.

20-A: Lost and Found: the Conversion of Gains and Losses on Consumers’ Decision Making

Yan Meng, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Stephen J. Gould, Baruch College, CUNY, USA

People tend to add value to rediscovered objects, which were once lost, because they convert the degree of pain when losing the objects to the degree of pleasure when finding the objects again. The conversion between mental accounts of gains and losses influences consumers’ likelihood of purchasing a product.

20-B: Luck and the Endowment Effect: A Context of Application of the “Possession-Self Link”

Yan Meng, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Ana Valenzuela, Baruch College, CUNY, USA/Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain

Three studies show that the possession-self link is strengthened through “good luck” associations. A strengthened link results in a product being perceived as having a higher value, which lowers the willingness to trade the product for money and impacts the endowment effect.

20-C: New ‘Thinking’ about Optimal Consumer Decision Making

Jonathan Hasford, University of Nevada, USA
David Hardesty, University of Kentucky, USA
Blair Kidwell, Ohio State University, USA

A new theoretical perspective that reexamines how consumers should think before making decisions and the optimal outcomes that result is developed here. This research suggests that consumers should think more about routine choices, use intuition for occasional purchases, and use unconscious thought for major purchases.

20-D: When Why=Short Duration and How=Long Duration: The Moderating Role of Task Complexity

Rafay Siddiqui, University of South Carolina, USA
Frank May, University of South Carolina, USA
Ashwani Monga, University of South Carolina, USA

Research has shown that when individuals estimate the time it would take to complete a task, thinking in a ‘why’ vs. ‘how’ mindset leads to longer estimates. We show that when a task is complex, the reverse occurs, that is ‘how’ vs. ‘why’ thinkers perceive task duration to be longer.
20-E: The Influence of Relative and Absolute Differences on Judgments

Dan R. Schley, Ohio State University, USA
Ellen Peters, Ohio State University, USA

We demonstrate that, contrary to previous research on proportion dominance, consumers appear substantially more sensitive to absolute differences than to relative differences. These findings were robust across manipulations and both between- and within-participant. Furthermore, the current research demonstrates that consumers have limited attention available, attending to relative or absolute differences.

20-F: Does 8 of 10 Equal 80 of 100? The Scale Magnitude Effect on Singular Option Evaluation

Tao Tao, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Yuhuang Zheng, Tsinghua University, China
Robert S. Wyer, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Liangyan Wang, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China

This research extends the scale magnitude effect from option comparisons to singular option evaluation. In three studies, we demonstrate that at high percentage levels, “not get” part of the score is focused; therefore large scale magnitude decreases evaluation. Further, regulatory focus moderates the valance of the scale magnitude effect.

20-G: The Relationship of Perceived Knowledge With Perceived Risk: An Exploratory Study

Jacqueline Eastman, Georgia Southern University, USA
Lindsay R. L. Larson, Georgia Southern University, USA
Tyler Meharg, Georgia Southern University, USA

This research explores the relationship between perceived risk and perceived knowledge in the financial investment domain. This will be accomplished through a 2 x 2 experiment comparing levels of knowledge with levels of risk to determine the impact on choice of portfolio in setting up a retirement investment plan.


Richard Yalch, Foster School, University of Washington, USA
Shaun Maurer, Foster School, University of Washington, USA
Maria French, Foster School, University of Washington, USA
Ryan Rathbone, Foster School, University of Washington, USA

Research has established a high association between cigarette smoking and risky behaviors such as reckless driving but has not demonstrated causality via a true experiment. Individuals intercepted immediately before or after consuming a cigarette gambled for real money. The results show that nicotine consumption increases risk taking.

21-A: Spokespeople in Comparative Advertising: The Role of Spokesperson Type and Comparison Type

Sumitra Auschaitrakul, McGill University, Canada
Asheesh Mukherjee, McGill University, Canada

Prior work suggests that using non-firm spokespeople, compared to firm spokespeople, is likely to increase the persuasiveness of advertising. We hypothesize that comparison type can moderate this effect, such that non-firm spokespeople are more persuasive in case of factual comparisons, but this effect is attenuated in case of evaluative comparisons.
21-B: Risk Communication Under Positive Mood: The Impact of Message Framing and Goal Claim on Public Safety Persuasion

Sidney Su Han, University of Guelph, Canada
Karen Gough (Finlay), University of Guelph, Canada
Lefa Teng, University of Guelph, Canada

Positive mood impacts individual’s response to risk information. Therefore, some traditional message strategies may not work well for public safety persuasion in positive mood. To bridge this gap, the current research examined the effects of two strategies (message framing and goal claim) on risk communication effectiveness under positive mood.

21-C: The Persuasion Mindset: The Effect of Persuasion on the Persuader

Chris Summers, Ohio State University, USA
Rebecca Walker Naylor, Ohio State University, USA

Little is known about the effect of persuasion on the persuader. We argue that in striving to persuade someone else to like a target object, consumers adopt a “persuasion mindset,” which results in more extreme evaluations of the target object, increased confidence in evaluations, and an openness to persuasion by others.

21-D: Straight from the Horse’s Mouth: When Disadvantaged Brand Determination Improves Brand Evaluations

Ali Tezer, Concordia University, Canada
Bianca Grohmann, Concordia University, Canada
H. Onur Bodur, Concordia University, Canada

We demonstrate that brand’s passion and determination, communicated by underdog brand biography, compared to topdog brand biography (Paharia et al. 2011), lead to higher purchase intentions when the brand is the information source. The positive effect of underdog brand biography disappears when the biography is learned from an independent source.

21-E: Brand Transgressions and Consumers’ Deliberate Self-Persuasion

Wonkyong Beth Lee, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Yang Ye, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada

This paper explores whether consumers engage in deliberate self-persuasion when their beloved brands commit transgressions. It reveals when people have strong brand relationships, they use self-directed, intentional attitude change. It includes tactics to reinterpret undesired elements of the brands and to inhibit undesired elements of the brands out of awareness.

21-F: "Meaning Similar" Wins, "Looking Similar" Loses? The Effect of Perceptual Similarity and Conceptual Similarity on Consumers' Perceptions of Copycat Brand Names

Yao Qin, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Na (Amy) Wen, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Wenyu Dou, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Lan Xu, Wuhan University, China

We investigate how Chinese consumers react to perceptually similar and conceptually similar brand names(in Chinese). Two experimental studies test the relationship between perceptual similarity and conceptual similarity on brand confusion and brand attitude. Results indicate that the effects were due to consumers' attributions about the perceived sincerity in adopting copycat brand names.
**21-G: The Impact of Regulatory (Non) Fit and Task Difficulty on Consumer’s Subsequent Evaluations**

Mariana Monfort, Federal University of Parana, Brazil
Danielle Mantovani, Federal University of Parana, Brazil
Paulo Prado, Federal University of Parana, Brazil
Juan José Camou Viacava, Federal University of Parana, Brazil

Based on the regulatory fit phenomenon, the authors investigate the impact of regulatory fit and task difficulty on consumer’s subsequent evaluations. Results from two experiments demonstrate that under low difficult tasks, the regulatory fit holds true, but under a difficult task condition, this effect no longer exists.

**21-H: Mindless Resistance to Persuasion: When Low Self-Control Decreases Yielding to Social Influence**

Loes Janssen, Radboud University, The Netherlands
Bob M. Fennis, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

The present research challenges the prevailing view that resistance to persuasion is more likely to succeed when resources for active self-regulation are high, rather than low. Three experiments demonstrate that low self-control may actually facilitate, rather than hinder, resistance to persuasion when the influence context contains salient resistance-promoting heuristics.

**22-A: The Power to Know What You Want: How Power Influences Preference Consistency**

Bella Rozenkrants, Stanford University, USA
Daniella Kupor, Stanford University, USA
Andrea Weihrauch, Friederich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany
Jonathan Levav, Stanford University, USA

We hypothesize that power increases preference consistency. In three experiments, we show that power increase reliance on internal preferences compared to external cues, that power increases consistency between preferred product features and choices, and that power decreases transitivity violations. Future directions, theoretical implications, and practical implications are discussed.

**22-B: How Suspicion Can Lead to Suboptimal Consumer Choices**

Julie Verstraeten, Ghent University, Belgium
Tina Tessitore, Ghent University, Belgium
Maggie Geuens, Ghent University, Belgium

This paper shows that suspicion affects subsequent, unrelated consumer choices. Contrary to its effect on related choices, suspicion renders unrelated choices suboptimal, leading suspicious consumers to choose more vices over virtues than their non-suspicious counterparts. Cognitive load explains these counter-intuitive findings.

**22-C: The Delboeuf Illusion in Food Portion Judgments by Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)**

Audrey Parrish, Georgia State University, USA
Michael Beran, Georgia State University, USA

Chimpanzees preferred choosing same-sized and smaller food portions that were presented on a smaller plate over equal or larger food portions presented on a larger plate. These biases can be attributed to the Delboeuf Illusion which previously had only been demonstrated in portion estimation and consumption behavior in humans.
22-D: Scarab Beetles among the Sheep and Goats: Some Choices are Just Meant to be Made

Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA
Caglar Irmak, University of Georgia, USA
Cristobal Barra, University of South Carolina, USA

Adding to literatures on irrational beliefs and meaningful coincidences, we introduce synchronicity to consumer research and develop consumers’ belief in signs as a moderator. Importantly, we show congruence between synchronous events is unnecessary for events to become meaningful signs for consumers motivated to construct meaning out of the synchronous events.

22-E: Manipulate Attributions to Improve Satisfaction for Nonconscious Self-discrepant Behaviors

Yanghong Hu, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
Nan Cui, Wuhan University, China
Lan Xu, Wuhan University, China

Individuals with interdependent self construal who are nonconsciously activated by variety-seeking goals are more satisfied with self-discrepant variety-seeking behaviors than those consciously activated after they realize their self-discrepant behaviors. Whether an accessible external attribution exists also impacts satisfaction. Perceived self determination fully mediates the relationship between attribution and satisfaction.

22-F: Powerful People Think Differently: Power and Reliance on Associative Knowledge in Consumption Contexts

Hendrik Slabbinck, Ghent University, Belgium
Mario Pandelaere, Ghent University, Belgium

We provide deeper insights into the knowledge structures on which powerful and powerless consumers rely on when making judgments and decisions. To do so, we make a distinction between associative (i.e. implicit) and propositional (i.e. explicit) knowledge and posit that powerful people rely more heavily on associative knowledge than powerless people.

22-G: Temporal Distance and Consumer Preference for Hedonic and Functional Attributes

Nai-Hwa Lien, National Taiwan University, Taiwan
Yi-Ling Chen, National Taiwan University, Taiwan

This research investigates (1) whether the preference for hedonic vs. functional product attributes change as temporal distance increases; (2) the moderating role of processing goal on temporal distance effect. Results of three experiments support our hypotheses and indicate the hedonic attribute is a high level construal and functional attribute is low-level.

22-H: The Role of Impulsiveness in Consumers’ Choice: Impulsive Behavior can be Economically Rational

Angelos Stamos, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
Sabrina Bruyneel, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
Bram De Rock, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
Laurens Cherchye, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium
Siegfried Dewitte, Katholieke University Leuven, Belgium

We investigate the economic rationality of consumers acting on impulse. In two studies we manipulate impulsiveness and we assess the rationality of consumers’ choice. Using state-of-the art elicitation methods, we find that impulsiveness does not have an impact on economic rationality, though it does impact choice.
23-A: Affect in the Selection of Reference Prices
Alexandar DePaoli, Stanford University, USA
Jonathan Levav, Stanford University, USA

Factors influencing the selection or generation of consumers' reference prices are of great theoretical and practical importance. We argue that positive affect makes consumers more likely to select an environmentally available cue as a reference price, whereas negative affect makes them more likely to generate a reference price from memory.

23-B: Not All Anchors Weigh the Same: Anchoring and Framing Effects in Pay-What-You-Want Pricing
Catherine Armstrong Soule, University of Oregon, USA
Robert Madrigal, University of Oregon, USA

The current research explores anchoring and framing effects of external reference prices (ERPs) on Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) payments. Two studies demonstrate that ERPs provide normative information that has anchoring effects on voluntary payments. However, frames activating different types of norms can cause identical nominal information to have differential effects on payments.

23-C: A Competition among New Methods for Eliciting Probability Distributions
David Rothschild, Microsoft Research, USA
Daniel G. Goldstein, Microsoft Research, USA
Florian Teschner, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany

We compare the traditional method of eliciting probability distributions from laypeople with seven graphically-oriented interfaces. The most complicated of the graphical interfaces take less time than the traditional method, but produce more accurate results on both the individual and aggregate-level. Learning lowers the effort level for these complicated graphical interfaces.

23-D: What is the Best Strategy to Track the Price of Your Shopping Basket?
Tatiana Sokolova, HEC Paris, France
Marc Vanhuele, HEC Paris, France

What are the best computational strategies to track the total price of a shopping basket? Van Ittersum et al. found that people choosing the most accurate strategy did worse. We made the comparison in a field study and find that the most accurate and effortful strategy dominates simplification strategies.

23-E: The Effects of Math Anxiety on Consumers’ Perceptions of Sales Promotions
Fei L. Weisstein, University of Texas - Pan American, USA
Xi Wang, The University of Texas - Pan American, USA

This paper examines whether consumers' levels of math anxiety influence their perceptions of various sales promotions. Our study shows that consumers with high math anxiety prefer simplified non-monetary promotion that involved no arithmetic calculation while consumers with low math anxiety prefer discount monetary promotion.

23-F: The Effect of Price Promotion Patterns on Consumers’ Use of an Expected Price as a Reference Price
Atul Kulkarni, University of Missouri, USA
Kent Monroe, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign/University of Richmond, USA

Findings from two studies suggest that the use of the expected prices as a reference for price judgments (i) has a positive, non-linear relationship with the frequency of price promotions, and (ii) is higher when spacing between two consecutive price promotions is random, as compared to consistent.
23-G: Framing and Sales Promotions: Is Gas Scarce?
Mazen Jaber, Saginaw Valley State University, USA
Kylie Goggins, Saginaw Valley State University, USA

Manufacturers routinely use sales-promotions to encourage purchases by consumers. This paper focuses on how the framing of such promotions affects consumers’ perceptions of offer attractiveness and purchase intentions. We compare consumer responses to instant savings framed as a dollar discount, a gasoline gift-card, and a monetary discount framed as non-monetary.

23-H: The Effectiveness of Groupon Promotion versus Coupon Promotion: From the Consumer’s Perspective
Jun Pang, Renmin University of China, China
Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, University of Alberta, Canada
Kanliang Wang, Renmin University of China, China

This research identifies the unique features of groupons and compares their promotion effectiveness with that of coupons from a multifaceted perspective. Using a field experiment, we demonstrate the relative advantages of groupon promotion and investigate the consumer consequences of its unique features to explain the underlying mechanisms.

24-A: Pioneering Advantage Revisited: The Moderating Roles of Form and Function in Consumer’s Evaluation of the Follower’s New Product
Sangwon Lee, Ball State University, USA

In this paper, the moderating roles of form and function of the new products to nullify pioneers advantage are examined. Results from the experimental study demonstrate that depending on the functionality level and form similarity, new product launch strategy needs to be different.

24-B: The Legitimation of Illicit Products through Design
Aimee Huff, Oregon State University, USA
Sarah Wilner, Wilfred Laurier University, Canada

An emergent generation of sex toys has redefined and destabilized this historically illicit product category with striking aesthetic improvements. We explore the process of legitimization by examining discourse about sex toys in popular media that both lead and reflect this transformation, and construct a semiotic square to structure our analysis.

24-C: Connecting the Dots: Using Sequential Extensions to Achieve Brand Growth
Adrian Peretz, Oslo School of Management, Norway
Lars Erling Olsen, Oslo School of Management, Norway

Brand managers often identify growth categories that lie beyond the reach of their current brands. This paper provides initial evidence for the viability of using intermediate brand extensions to shape parent brand associations in order to bridge the gap between an existing brand and an attractive, but distant extension category.

24-D: Are You One of Us? Regaining Online Credibility through Collaborative Product Development
Laurel Aynne Cook, University of Arkansas, USA
Ronn J. Smith, University of Arkansas, USA

The knowledge of a product’s collaborative development is explored (Study 1) and experimentally tested (Studies 2 and 3) to determine differences in multiple measures of trust and source credibility regarding toy companies. Using three samples of adult parents, the results have important implications regarding brand and product discourse between consumers.
24-E: Exploring the Impact of Product Design Characteristics on Sales

Utku Akkoç, University of Alberta, Canada
Robert Fisher, University of Alberta, Canada

Drawing upon longitudinal data from the U.S. auto market between 1984 and 2003, we demonstrate how product aesthetics have played a role in customers’ preferences. Our study contributes to the limited literature on the impact of design elements on consumer behavior and has important implications for new product development teams.

24-F: Core versus Peripheral Innovations: The Effect of Innovation Locus on Consumer Adoption of New Products

Zhenfeng Ma, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Tripat Gill, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Annie (Ying) Jiang, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada

Innovation locus refers to the place in the product system – the core versus the peripheral - where innovations occur. We show that when an innovation is really new, situating the innovation on the peripheral (vs. core) component results in a higher adoption intention, owing to a risk-localization mechanism.

24-G: “Me” Likes Expert Reviews and “We” Like Consumer Reviews: Moderating of Product Newness

Zhiyong Yang, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Narayan Janakiraman, University of Texas at Arlington, USA
Zhenfeng Ma, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Ritesh Saini, University of Texas at Arlington, USA

Two studies show that when product is new, customer review is more effective for the interdependents (vs. independents), whereas expert review is more effective for the independents (vs. interdependents). When product is not new, the opposite pattern occurs. This is because perceived efficacy of information is shifted by product newness.

24-H: Sequential Overchoice in Product Customization

Michael Dorn, University of Bern, Switzerland
Adrian Brügger, University of Bern, Switzerland
Claude Messner, University of Bern, Switzerland

The present study demonstrates how consumers can suffer from sequential overchoice. Customizing a tailor-made suit from combined-attribute choices (e.g., deciding on color and fabric in combination) leads to less satisfaction, more information overload, and less additional consumption than customizing it from single-attribute choices (e.g., deciding on color, then on fabric).

25-A: Does Bitter Taste Make You Perform Better in Self-Control?

Chun-Ming Yang, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan
Xiaoyu Zhou, Peking University, China

In the present study, two experiments demonstrate that experiencing bitter taste may lead to better self-control performance; however, this effect exists only for participants with high BTP. For those with low BTP, bitterness experiences lead to decreased overall performance. Self-control goal mediates the relationship.
25-B: Jujutsu For Compulsive Buyers: Arousal in Shopping Situations Can be Used to Strengthen Self-Control

Benjamin G. Serfas, University of Vienna, Austria
Oliver B. Büttner, University of Vienna, Austria
Arnd Florack, University of Vienna, Austria

This research examines affective processes that underlie compulsive buying and how they can be used for interventions that strengthen self-control. The results show that compulsive buyers experience stronger arousal in shopping situations. Implementation intentions with affective arousal as critical cue helped compulsive buyers to focus their attention.

25-C: Can "Sharing the Guilt" License Indulgence?

Ozge Yucel-Aybat, Pennsylvania State University-Harrisburg, USA
Thomas Kramer, University of South Carolina, USA

We suggest that consumers may be more likely to indulge when they share experiences with others (e.g., with friends), rather than indulging alone. Results of two studies show that in shared (vs. lone) consumption situations, consumers tend to feel less guilty to indulge, since both indulgence and guilt are shared.

25-D: Focus on Your Feelings - But the Right Ones: Insights on the Processes of Ego Depletion

Nina Belei, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Claudia Jasmand, Imperial College London, UK
Brian Sternthal, Northwestern University, USA

This research examines the role of feelings in stimulating versus eliminating the depletion effect. We demonstrate the differential effects of feelings signaling a need to spend less additional resources (e.g., fatigue) versus more additional resources (e.g., hunger) on depleted consumers' self-regulatory behavior.

25-E: Thanks but No Thanks: the Impact of Gratitude on Consumer Self-Regulation

Marina Carnevale, Fordham University, USA
Stephen J. Gould, Baruch College, CUNY, USA
Rania W. Semaan, American University of Sharjah, UAE

Despite the plethora of beliefs about the beneficial effects of gratitude, very little evidence exists supporting a cause-effect relationship between gratitude and individuals’ well-being. In this research we aim at addressing this gap in literature by exploring how gratitude can directly impact individuals’ own well-being and preferences.

25-F: The Darkness Effect: The Effect of Lighting Conditions on Self-Control

Jorge Pena Marin, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
Ashley Rae, University of Texas at San Antonio, USA
L. J. Shrum, HEC Paris, France

The current research examines whether ambient lighting (brighter vs. darker) impacts self-control. Two studies showed that participants who completed the study in darker conditions ate more indulgent snacks (cookies, M&Ms) than did those in lighter conditions. Potential underlying mechanisms for this effect are discussed.
**25-G: Helen of Troy? The Effect of Sexy Stimuli on Male’s Self-Control in Task Performance**

Chen Rui, Tsinghua University, China
Zheng Yuhuang, Tsinghua University, China
Rui (Juliet) Zhu, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, China

Traditional proverbs and previous research suggest that sexy stimuli lower male’s self-control. This research argues and shows the opposite. Results of four studies showed that sexy stimuli increased male’s self-control in task performance, and this effect was mediated and moderated by their showing off motivation.

**25-H: Working Against the Clock: Predicting Responses to Deadline Goal Failure**

Yael Zemack-Rugar, Virginia Tech, USA
Canan Corus, Pace University, USA
Rebecca Rabino, Virginia Tech, USA
David Brinberg, Virginia Tech, USA

We examine consumer responses to deadline goal failure by developing and validating a new domain-specific scale (Studies 1 and 2) which predicts responses to real-life (academic) deadline-goal failure (Study 3). We consolidate previous contradicting findings on goal setting and goal failure by using our scale as a new moderator.

**26-A: “But What do I Know?” Metacognitive Processes of Those with Low Self-Esteem**

Stephanie Lin, Stanford University, USA
S. Christian Wheeler, Stanford University, USA
Zakary L. Tormala, Stanford University, USA

Do people with low self-esteem (LSEs) have distinct metacognitive experiences? A pilot study suggests that LSEs do not trust their thoughts. Studies show that LSEs do not depend on their thoughts as much as HSEs to form attitudes, and become less polarized in attitudes after thinking about them.

**26-B: "Our" Past Gives "Me" a Better Future: The Influence of Collective Nostalgic Consumption on Future Perceptions**

Canice M.C. Kwan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Shirley Y. Y. Cheng, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
Alex S. L. Tsang, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China

This paper has identified one important difference between personal and collective nostalgic consumption, suggesting that consumers perceive their future as better after engaging in collective nostalgic consumption. Our findings provided support for our proposed effect not resulting from common cognitive effects (e.g., spillover effect, contrast effect) per se.

**26-C: Increasing Customer Compliance in Services: The Relative Importance of the Actual and the Ideal Self**

Shuqin Wei, Southern Illinois University, USA
Tyson Ang, Southern Illinois University, USA

Many long-term services require customers to comply with the service provider’s instructions when outside of the service facility. We investigate how self-congruence influences compliance. We find that actual self-congruence leads to more compliance than ideal self-congruence. We investigate the mediating role of planning and identify a moderator (units vs. numbers).
26-D: "People" Can be Better Than “You”: The Moderating Role of Regulatory Focus on Self-Referencing Effect

Seungae Lee, University of Texas at Austin, USA
Soyoung Lee, University of Texas at Austin, USA

This paper examines the role of regulatory focus of messages in explaining the self-reference effect. It was hypothesized prevention-focused messages would facilitate biased message elaboration while promotion-focused messages would facilitate unbiased message elaboration. The results of study would explain contradicting results of the self-reference effect in prior literature.

26-E: "I Can't Stand My Team, but I Can't Live Without It": Ambivalence Among Highly Identified Sports Fans

Frank Pons, Université Laval, Canada
Marilyn Giroux, Concordia University, Canada
Mehdi Mourali, University of Calgary, Canada
André Richelieu, Université Laval, Canada

The authors conducted in-depth interviews with highly ambivalent fans that were very critical about the team they support. This study aims at better understanding the mechanisms that explain their behaviors. Another goal is to provide a typology of these fans using their rationale and motives to adopt such behaviours.

26-F: Examining the Predictors of Sports Team Attachment

Andrew Bennington, University of Minnesota, USA
Aaron M. Sackett, University of St. Thomas, USA

A better understanding of the causes and consequences of sports team attachment may have positive implications for strengthening brand loyalty. In this series of studies, we sought to examine the relationship between sports fanaticism and several potential factors including the illusion of control, nostalgia, and need for belonging.

26-G: Effects of Perceived Other’s Satisfaction and the Role of the Interdependent Self in Group Service Consumption

Koji Matsushita, Chuo University, Japan
Akito Nakamura, Fukushima University, Japan
Haruko Tsuchihashi, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan
Kaichi Saito, Meiji Gakuin University, Japan

This study on group service consumption suggests that Perceived Other’s Satisfaction (POS) directly influences both Customer Satisfaction (CS) and repeat intention. The Interdependent Self-construal (IS) moderates the relationship between POS and repeat intention. We propose an unexplored antecedent of CS in intimate group consumption and identify a promising new area of cross-cultural service research.

26-H: Community, Identity and Sharing through Bike Paths

Hillary Leonard, University of Rhode Island, USA
Gema Vinuales, University of Rhode Island, USA

Understanding how collective consumers make sense of public goods offers the opportunity to expand our knowledge of community, identity, and willingness to engage in prosocial behaviors. This study aims to expand this knowledge through the examination of collective consumption, or the sharing of bike paths.
27-A: Imagine Yourself in Use: Measuring the Construct of Consumption Vision
Mark Yi-Cheon Yim, Canisius College, USA
Paul Sauer, Canisius College, USA

In spite of its importance, the consumption vision construct has seen limited adoption in identification of effective marketing communications. The current study aims to clarify this construct and present a measurement tool for future researchers and practitioners.

27-B: Symmetrical Logos Can Harm Brand Equity: The Interactive Effect of Logo Design and Brand Personality on Brand Valuation
Jonathan Luffarelli, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Antonios Stamatogiannakis, IE Business School – IE University, Spain
Haiyang Yang, Johns Hopkins University, USA

Using experimental results and large field datasets on logo perception and brand valuation, we show that symmetry in logo designs interacts with excitement and competence dimensions of brand personality, negatively impacting brand equity. These effects are unique to symmetry and not driven by other visual characteristics (e.g., complexity, contrast, fluency).

27-C: Message in a Bottle: What a Product’s Shape Tells us About the Product and Ourselves
Abigail Schneider, University of Colorado, USA
Page Moreau, University of Colorado, USA
Bridget Leonard, University of Colorado, USA

Product packaging plays a critical role in consumers’ purchase decisions. The present research examines how one element of packaging—shape— influences consumers’ self-perceptions and enjoyment of the usage experience. Drawing on extended-self theory, we find that consumers react more favorably toward products with shapes that represent their ideal selves.

27-D: Increasing Spending Behavior After Exposure to Body-Type Package Shapes
Marisabel Romero, University of South Florida, USA
Adam Craig, University of South Florida, USA

The current research investigated whether exposure to product shapes that resemble thin or overweight human body-types can influence subsequent spending behavior. Our results show that, consistent with the stereotypical view that overweight individuals hold low levels of control, exposure to wide product shapes leads to a decreased accessibility of the concept of control (compared to exposure to thin product shapes) and subsequently leads consumers to increase their level of spending on subsequent purchase decisions. We also show that dietary orientation moderates this effect.

27-E: The Role of Imagination in Consumer Contamination
Jessica Gerard, University of Grenoble, France
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada

The present research focuses on consumer contamination and aims to determine which form of touch is more detrimental to responses towards the product (actual vs. imagined touch) and to demonstrate the role of mental imagery as an underlying mechanism for our effects.

27-F: Does Non-Diagnostic Touch of Business Documents Affect the Judgment of Professionals and Institutions?
Cindy Caldara, University of Grenoble, France
Jessica Gerard, University of Grenoble, France

Two studies show that even when touch is non-diagnostic, it can affect consumers’ confidence on both professional persons and institutional entities (grad school) through the haptic characteristics (paper thickness and/or texture) of their business cards and brochures, respectively. The implications for design of emblematic professional documents are discussed.
**27-G: The More You Think You Know, The More You Want to Touch: Subjective Knowledge And Haptic Exploration**

Joann Peck, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA  
Victor Barger, University of Wisconsin - Whitewater, USA  
Andrea Webb, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA

Subjective knowledge affects one's desire for pre-purchase haptic exploration. Regardless of product category, people who think they know a lot about a product category are more likely to want to touch a product prior to purchase than people who think they know little about a product category.

**27-H: Exploring Boundary Conditions for Motor Fluency Effects**

Virginie Maille, SKEMA Business School, France  
Maureen Morrin, Temple University, USA

Prior research has demonstrated that individuals prefer haptic objects oriented toward the limb(s) dedicated to act upon them, even without an intention to act. We show that, when added as collateral objects in a product advertisement, such objects can also influence the evaluation of the advertised product, even if totally unrelated.

**28-A: Entering Consumption: A Greeter at the Store Entrance Positively Influences Customers’ Spending, Satisfaction, and Employee Perceptions**

Tobias Otterbring, Service Research Center, Karlstad University, Sweden  
Christine Ringler, Rutgers University, USA  
Nancy J. Sirianni, Northeastern University, USA  
Anders Gustafsson, Service Research Center, Karlstad University, Sweden

This research investigates how a greeter at the store entrance affects consumer behavior and attitudes. We find that customers’ employee perceptions, satisfaction, and approach behavior are positively influenced by a greeter, but somewhat differently between males and females. Findings are discussed in terms of suspiciousness, evolutionary psychology, and similarity-attraction theory.

**28-B: Under-Promise and Over-Deliver: The Role of Wait Time Expectations and Wait Prediction Accuracy on Evaluations**

Matthew Lastner, Louisiana State University, USA  
Patrick Fennell, Louisiana State University, USA  
Stephanie Mangus, Louisiana State University, USA  
Judith Anne Garretson Folse, Louisiana State University, USA

In contrast with the negative effects found in extant literature, recent research shows positive consequences of waiting. Using the disconfirmation of expectations theory, our work extends the positive implications of waiting by considering wait expectations and accuracy of predicted wait, showing when and why longer waits yield more positive evaluations.

**28-C: Consumers’ Reactions to Assortment Reductions and Shelf Categorizations**

Thomas Rudolph, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland  
Liane Nagengast, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland  
Christina Heidemann, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland

In order to support customers in their shopping processes, retailers should take into account (1) their actual assortment size and (2) the categorization of their shelves. We show in a field setting that both instruments simplify customers’ shopping processes. The combination of both instruments shows the most positive outcome.
28-D: Long Description Means Big Item: When Attributes of Product Presentation Are Misattributed to the Item Itself

Michael Giblin, University of Florida, USA
Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA
Joanna Ladzinski, Cornell University, USA

Information found in product presentation can be extraneous and unrelated to the product's qualities. The length of a food's menu description, for instance, is unrelated to the size of the portion. In two studies we demonstrate that consumers misattribute characteristics of product presentation as characteristic of the product itself.

28-E: Inner Value Conflicts: Emotional and Behavioral Consequences in a Cross-Border Shopping Context

Liane Nagengast, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Thomas Rudolph, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Tim Boettger, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland

Although cross-border shopping has enormous impacts on many economies, it has not been investigated from a consumers’ perspective. We show empirically that cross-border shoppers feel inner conflicts that affect their purchase behaviors. Public policy makers can influence these conflicts by actively communicating the reasons for price differences in neighboring countries.

28-F: Trigger Healthy: How Samples can Create a Healthy Shopping Momentum

Aner Tal, Cornell University, USA
Brian Wansink, Cornell University, USA

Samples may guide consumer choice towards consistent products. Specifically, healthy/unhealthy samples in a grocery setting may lead to healthier/less healthy shopping baskets. We demonstrate this in a lab and field setting. These findings suggest consumers may display consistent shopping behavior even with product choices that are situationally determined.

28-G: Do Not Touch Me, But Please Do: Consumer Misjudgment of Comfort With Initiating And Receiving Interpersonal Touch

Andrea Webb, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
Joann Peck, University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
Anders Gustafsson, Service Research Center, Karlstad University, Sweden

This research shows that people lack self-knowledge with respect to interpersonal touch preferences. Through lab and field studies, we examine how one's comfort with initiating and receiving touch impacts attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Although people say they are uncomfortable with touch, the effects are not as negative as predicted.

28-H: Windows to the Sale: Mobile Eye-Tracking and In-Store Decision Making

Jacob Suher, University of Texas at Austin, USA
J. Wesley Hutchinson, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Herb Sorensen, Shopper Scientist LLC, USA

In a grocery field study, we use mobile eye-tracking to record shoppers' visual attention at the point-of-purchase. Results show that patterns of attention depend upon product display characteristics and purchase duration. A quasi-experiment shows that reducing visible SKU count and facilitating horizontal eye movements increases shopper efficiency.
29-A: Wow, You're Tall! Effects of Others' Body Height on Consumers' Product Evaluations

Utku Akkoç, University of Alberta, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada

We present and test a framework to show whether the height of another individual can influence a consumer’s product evaluations. Our findings reveal that the non-interactive social presence of a conspicuously tall individual activates a height related association (status), which leads to evaluations consistent with this association.

29-B: Product Aesthetics Trigger Appearance Related Concerns

Christopher Ling, University of South Carolina, USA
Laurence Ashworth, Queen's University, Canada

We examine how product aesthetics influence product attitude by testing impression management concerns as a moderator, finding that in situations where impression management concerns are salient, the effect of product aesthetics on product attitude is enhanced.

29-C: Contaminating Retrospective Enjoyment

Scott Roeder, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Clayton Critcher, University of California, Berkeley, USA

People sometimes learn that others have had the same experience as the self. In this paper we examine how learning of others' parallel experiences may alter retrospective enjoyment for one's own experience. Three experiments suggest that people predict, expect and in fact report experiential contamination in such circumstances.

29-D: The Lucky Financial Advisor: How Luck Perceptions Influence Consumers' Investment Decisions

Peter Darke, York University, Canada
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada
Monica Popa, Edwards School of Business, University of Saskatchewan, Canada

We show that financial advisors' luck in areas unrelated to investment influences consumers: they invest more when learning that the advisor is lucky. The effect is prominent for consumers who believe in good luck, and arises regardless of advisor's expertise: consumers place as much stock in luck as in competence.

29-E: Tweets and Retweets for Oreo Touchdown

Vimviriya Limkangvanmongkol, The University of Illinois at Chicago, USA

Oreo was the first advertiser of Superbowl XLVII who responded to the blackout opportunism by tweeting “You can still dunk in the dark.” The tweet received more than 10,000 retweets within the first hours. This paper presents a content analysis of tweets and retweets by developing new coding scheme drawn from J. Josko Brakus et al.’s scale of brand experience in the dimensions of sensory, affective and intellectual. The results explained Oreo’s successful story that the brand smartly used Twitter to interact quickly and publicly. Oreo created “brilliant” content tweet and sent out in “real-time” to surprise all audiences. Thus, the brand personality of Oreo was perceived as “fast reaction,” “the winner,” “awesome,” and “brilliant.” In the final analysis, the author concludes that Twitter becomes a communication platform to leverage brand personality through brand experience.

29-F: Consumer Judgments as a Function of Social Class

Jaehoon Lee, University of Houston at Clear Lake, USA
L. J. Shrum, HEC Paris, France
Tina M. Lowrey, HEC Paris, France

Using a service context, two experiments tested the hypothesis that lower class individuals, who are more holistic thinkers, focus primarily on context as a whole, whereas upper class individuals, who are more analytic thinkers, focus primarily on specific events only.
29-G: Trust in Recommendations: Applying the Base-Rate Paradigm to Surrogation vs. Simulation

Hang Shen, University of California, Riverside, USA
Ye Li, University of California, Riverside, USA

Consumers increasingly depend on online reviews to inform purchase decisions; yet, Gilbert et al. (2009) find that people avoid surrogation information despite its reliability for affective forecasting. We posit that the perceived diagnosticity of the surrogate’s rating determines how much people rely on and use surrogation.

29-H: What Motivates Consumers to Produce Online Reviews? Solidarity, Status, and the Soapbox Effect

Edward F. McQuarrie, Santa Clara University, USA
Shelby McIntyre, Santa Clara University, USA
Ravi Shanmugam, Santa Clara University, USA

Using three longitudinal datasets, we explore consumers’ motivation to produce online reviews, contrasting sense of belonging, competition for status, and an intrinsic motivation independent of these extrinsic factors. An examination of the effect of positive feedback on subsequent review production provides support for the intrinsic motivation hypothesis.

30-A: The Effects of Being Envied On Word-of-Mouth

Y. Jin Youn, Northwestern University, USA
Kelly Goldsmith, Northwestern University, USA
Sarah E. Hill, Texas Christian University, USA

Envy is a complex emotion that influences behaviors differently depending on whether one is experiencing envy or is the target of the emotion. We demonstrate that being envied decreases one’s tendency to cooperate, and this decreased interest negatively influences willingness to share valuable information (i.e., Word-of-Mouth).

30-B: Gamification and the Entrenchment of an Engagement Institutional Logic in the Emerging Institutional Field of Social Media

Andrew Smith, York University, Canada
Pierre-Yann Dolbec, York University, Canada

We contribute to the literature on institutional dynamics by highlighting how a gamified website encourages the entrenchment of an institutional logic in a new institutional field by instigating an arrangement of practices; diffusing values, rules, and models for successful practices; and offering rewards for complying with the emerging logic.

30-C: I’ll Have What She’s Sharing: The Effect of Social Media on Experience Consumption

Stefanie Baert, Ghent University, Belgium
Mario Pandelaere, Ghent University, Belgium

Consumers increasingly purchase experiences relative to material goods. We argue that this phenomenon is possibly due to social media and demonstrate that priming respondents with social media increases the evaluation of experiences. The use of social media and attitude towards social media sharing moderates the effect.
30-D: The Public Heart: The Effect of Broadcasting on Emotional Intensity and Well-Being

Virginia Weber, University of Alberta, Canada
Sarah G. Moore, University of Alberta, Canada
Rhiannon MacDonnell, Cass Business School, City University London, UK
Jennifer J. Argo, University of Alberta, Canada

The current research examines how sharing positive emotions about brands online impacts the subsequent intensity of those emotions. Specifically, we demonstrate that sharing a brand-related emotion broadly on Facebook lowers the intensity of that emotion. Follow-up studies will manipulate broad versus narrow sharing in other online contexts.

30-E: Identity Management through Humor Expressions in an Online Gaming Community

Prakash Das, University of Calgary, Canada

Little is known about how consumer activities that draw upon modernistic notions of “consumer work” and “collective consumer creativity” foster community building. We present an interpretive study of an online gaming community and identify “humor expression” as consumer work that enhances community creativity through identity-based processes. Findings contest assumptions that community identity is mainly claimed by those possessing core community skills. In contested spaces, marginalized members attain recognition through humor-based creative identity work. Humor is a motive force that is creatively wielded by community members and assists in community building.

30-F: Shaking it Up My Way: Amateur Appropriation of Popular Media

Pia A. Albinsson, Appalachian State University, USA
B. Yasanthi Perera, New Mexico State University, USA
Sarita Ray Chaudhury, Humboldt State University, USA

This study examines consumers’ appropriation of popular media through the creation of user-generated content (UGC). We study UGC of Gangnam Style and Harlem Shake, including video and comment reactions, to explore sociocultural implications of this phenomenon. This is accompanied by a typology of UGC purposes, and their message transmission approaches.

30-G: Using Social Software to Evoke Social Reflexivity: The Case of Instagram Photo Sharing Application

Amandeep Takhar, University of Bedfordshire, UK
Pepukayi Chitakunye, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

This study contributes to an understanding of how social networking websites are encouraging consumers’ reflexive practices. We draw insights from a case study of Instagram, a photo sharing application, and argue that consumer researchers can use this website to evoke informant self-reflexivity, and accumulate richer and more in depth data.

30-H: Self-Esteem and Identification with One’s Social Media Groups: Two Opposite Paths to Online Social Outcomes

Yuanrui Li, University of California, Riverside, USA
Thomas Novak, The George Washington University School of Business, USA
Donna Hoffman, The George Washington University School of Business, USA

Most literature investigating the relationship between social media usage and online social outcomes has focused on self-esteem, a personal identity construct. Much less research has examined the collective aspects of self-esteem. In this study, we find that self-esteem and collective self-esteem affect online social outcomes in independent and opposite ways.
31-A: The Influence of Brand Propinquity on Complaining Behavior via Social Media

Hongmin Ahn, West Virginia University, USA
Nicholas Bowman, West Virginia University, USA

This study explores the dynamic interplay among several facets of psychological closeness on consumer complaining behavior via social media. Our data suggest that increased brand propinquity results in increased engagement when discussion perceived brand mishaps. Results also indicate that media familiarity jointly affects consumer intention to engage in complaining behavior.

31-B: When Brands Get Personal in Online Chatters: The Effects of Self-Disclosure and Anthropomorphism on Consumer-brand Relationship

Li Huang, University of South Carolina, USA
Wenyu Dou, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

This research investigates the brand’s personal disclosure on Twitter and its consequences on consumer-brand relationship. We provide a new framework predicting what to disclose, how to disclose, and to whom the brand should disclose. Shifting the psychological closeness, self-disclosure on Twitter can either help or impair the relationships.

31-C: Using Social Media Networks in Russia to (Re)construct Collective Memories and Build Brand Identity

Graham Roberts, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, France
Philippe Odou, Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne, France
Gaël Bonnin, Reims Management School, France

Holt (2004) shows the different ways in which brands draw on cultural imagery, myths, and history to create identity. Our paper seeks to look at how brands in post-socialist Russia use social media networks, both to construct collective memories and to exploit these memories in order to build brand identity.

31-D: Social Networking Sites: Building Brand Knowledge and Brand Equity

Noelia Sanchez-Casado, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Eva Tomaseti-Solano, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Juan-Gabriel Cegarra-Navarro, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain

Social Networking Sites, as new communication tools, allow firms to provide benefits to consumers who establish a relationship with them. As a consequence of this relationship, consumers could develop knowledge and equity about the brand. Therefore, this study analyzes the effects of these benefits on brand knowledge and brand equity.

31-E: The Effect of Interpersonal Influences on Social Networking Site’s Users

Noelia Sanchez-Casado, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Eva Tomaseti-Solano, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain
Juan-Gabriel Cegarra-Navarro, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, Spain

Social Networking Sites (SNS) have become an important tool for firm-consumer communication. In this study we analyze how firms create brand knowledge and brand equity in their consumers, through the Interpersonal Influences that SNS’s users experience. The results of this study help firms to manage their brand pages at SNS.
31-F: Consumers’ Endorsements for Companies and Causes: The Role of Symbolism and Visibility

Stefan F. Bernritter, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Peeter W.J. Verlegh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Edith G. Smit, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

In the present study, we examined factors that might affect consumers’ decision to endorse an organization. In particular, we investigated to what extent brand symbolism and visibility of an endorsement affected consumers’ intention to endorse. Moreover, we explored whether these effects differed for companies (for profit) and causes (non profit).

31-G: “I Know It’s Your Fault, But I Blame the Matchmaker More:” Changes in Consumer Trust Toward Social Commerce Companies Due to Dissatisfying Purchases in a Two-sided Market

Yaeun Kim, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Republic of Korea
Myeong-cheol Park, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Republic of Korea

We examined whether the perceived main sources of service failure cause changes in consumer trust toward social commerce companies. When a business is two-sided, consumers attribute service failure experiences with merchants to the intermediary, the “social commerce company”. This was verified for all severity levels of service failure.

31-H: The Relationship between Brand Personality and Crisis Strategies for Organizational Reputation

Jiyoung Karen Han, University of Texas at Austin, USA
Dong Hoo Kim, University of Texas at Austin, USA
Yoon-Hi Sung, University of Texas at Austin, USA

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of brand personality in crisis communication. This research explores the major company crisis of 2010, 2011 and 2012, by comparing sincere and exciting brand personality companies with their crisis strategies.


Sara Bahnson, University of Oregon, USA
Lan Jiang, University of Oregon, USA
Jun Ye, Xiamen University, China
Nagesh Murthy, University of Oregon, USA

This research examines the relative importance of environmental and social sustainability practices on consumer evaluations. Using both field and experimental data, we show that environmental practices generate greater impacts for goods firms, while social practices are more influential for services firms. The role of tangibility is identified as the mechanism.

32-B: Green Confessions: The Moderating Influence of Religiosity on Pro-Environmental Compensatory Consumption

Daniele Mathras, Arizona State University, USA
Naomi Mandel, Arizona State University, USA
Adam B. Cohen, Arizona State University, USA

‘Green guilt’ may arise after reflecting about one’s transgressions toward the environment, thus motivating restorative consumption behaviors. In two studies, we find that private green confessions may boost initial compensatory behaviors but both public and private confessions reduce green compensatory consumption across multiple tasks, especially for intrinsically religious individuals.
32-C: Pro-Environmental Motivation and Intent in an Emerging Market Context

Nadine Sonnenberg, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Alet C. Erasmus, University of Pretoria, South Africa

Empirical evidence regarding pro-environmental motivation and intent almost exclusively addresses conditions in First-world scenarios. This study examines the role of motivational factors in emerging consumers’ environmentally significant intent and highlight the relevance of awareness of environmental issues, moral norms, guilt, subjective norms, attitudes and perceived behavioral control.

32-D: Consuming to Support the Free Market: The Effects of Economic System-Justification on Consumer Preferences

Matthew Maxwell-Smith, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
June Cotte, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada
Allison Johnson, Ivey Business School, Western University, Canada

Political system-justification tendencies have affected consumption behaviors, although the influence of economic system-justification has not been investigated systematically. Three studies showed that economic system-justification predicted consumption habits that support companies and industries which feature prominently within the current economic system, even if such behaviors undermined people’s own health interests.

32-E: Are Values Always Abstract? How Construal Level and Identities Influence the Use of Values on Green Consumption

Diego Costa Pinto, Reims Management School, France
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France

Construal level theory predicts that values will lead to behavior when consumers are in abstract construals. Five studies extend these findings by showing that values can also lead to expected behaviors under concrete construals. Specifically, findings demonstrate that in concrete (vs. abstract) construals, values work for close (vs. distant) identities.

32-F: Going Green for Self vs. Others: Gender and Identity Salience Effects on Green Consumption

Diego Costa Pinto, Reims Management School, France
Marcia Herter, Reims Management School, France
Patricia Rossi, Reims Management School, France
Adilson Borges, Reims Management School, France

This paper examines the effects of gender and identities on green consumption. Previous research shows that women are greener than men. However, we extend these findings by showing that social (vs. personal) identity changes the impact of gender on green consumption. This effect is mediated by self-transcendence values.

32-G: Consuming Green, Living Green: Boundary Conditions of the Licensing Effect

Marijn H. C. Meijers, ASCoR, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Peeter W.J. Verlegh, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Marret K. Noordewier, Leiden University, The Netherlands
Edith G. Smit, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Sustainable consumption at t=0 may license people to behave unsustainably at t=1. We show that this effect is mitigated by one’s sustainable identity. We also find that self-licenses can be traded in only once and do not persist in subsequent situations (t=2).
We explore consumers’ commitment to holding a destination wedding, and whether sustainability concerns motivate this decision in any way. Our intention is to develop theory that expands our understanding of how perceived meanings of destination weddings are formed within consumer culture, and the role identity plays in transformative consumer behaviour.
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**ERRATUM**

On Page 1096 of Volume 40 of Advances in Consumer Research, the correct Roundtable Chairs for the session “Market System Dynamics: The Value of and the Open Questions Associated with Studying Markets in Consumer Culture Theory” are Anton Siebert, Witten/Herdecke University, Germany and Markus Giesler/York University, Canada.

ACR apologizes for the error.