Congestion pricing by priority auction

Guanxiang Zhang; Jianhua He; Yajie Ma; Wenqing Cheng; Zongkai Yang

doi:10.1117/12.577065

Congestion pricing by priority auction

Guanxiang Zhang, Jianhua He, Yajie Ma, Wenqing Cheng, Zongkai Yang

Adaptive Communications Networks Research Group

Research output: Chapter in Book/Published conference output › Conference publication

Abstract

This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Network architectures, management, and applications II
Editors	S.J. Ben Yoo, Gee-Kung Chang, Guangcheng Li, Kwok-wai Cheung
Place of Publication	Bellingham, WA (US)
Publisher	SPIE
Pages	1421-1428
Number of pages	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1117/12.577065
Publication status	Published - 2005
Event	Network architectures, management, and applications II - Beijing, China Duration: 7 Nov 2004 → …

Publication series

Name	SPIE proceedings
Publisher	SPIE
Volume	5626
ISSN (Print)	0277-786X

Conference

Conference	Network architectures, management, and applications II
Country/Territory	China
City	Beijing
Period	7/11/04 → …

Bibliographical note

Zhang, G., He, J., Ma, Y., Cheng, W., & Yang, Z. "Congestion pricing by priority auction", Network architectures, management, and applications II, Yoo, S. J. B., Chang, G-K., Li, G., & Cheung, K. (Eds.), 5626, 1421-1428, (2005).
Copyright 2005 Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers. One print or electronic copy may be made for personal use only. Systematic reproduction and distribution, duplication of any material in this paper for a fee or for commercial purposes, or modification of the content of the paper are prohibited.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.577065

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10.1117/12.577065

Congestion pricing by priority auction
Zhang, G., He, J., Ma, Y., Cheng, W., & Yang, Z. "Congestion pricing by priority auction", Network architectures, management, and applications II, Yoo, S. J. B., Chang, G-K., Li, G., & Cheung, K. (Eds.), 5626, 1421-1428, (2005). Copyright 2005 Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers. One print or electronic copy may be made for personal use only. Systematic reproduction and distribution, duplication of any material in this paper for a fee or for commercial purposes, or modification of the content of the paper are prohibited. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.577065
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Cite this

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title = "Congestion pricing by priority auction",

abstract = "This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of {"}cµ-rule{"}. Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.",

author = "Guanxiang Zhang and Jianhua He and Yajie Ma and Wenqing Cheng and Zongkai Yang",

note = "Zhang, G., He, J., Ma, Y., Cheng, W., & Yang, Z. {"}Congestion pricing by priority auction{"}, Network architectures, management, and applications II, Yoo, S. J. B., Chang, G-K., Li, G., & Cheung, K. (Eds.), 5626, 1421-1428, (2005). Copyright 2005 Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers. One print or electronic copy may be made for personal use only. Systematic reproduction and distribution, duplication of any material in this paper for a fee or for commercial purposes, or modification of the content of the paper are prohibited. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.577065; Network architectures, management, and applications II ; Conference date: 07-11-2004",

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doi = "10.1117/12.577065",

language = "English",

series = "SPIE proceedings",

publisher = "SPIE",

pages = "1421--1428",

editor = "Yoo, {S.J. Ben} and Gee-Kung Chang and Guangcheng Li and Kwok-wai Cheung",

booktitle = "Network architectures, management, and applications II",

address = "United States",

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Zhang, G, He, J, Ma, Y, Cheng, W & Yang, Z 2005, Congestion pricing by priority auction. in SJB Yoo, G-K Chang, G Li & K Cheung (eds), Network architectures, management, and applications II. SPIE proceedings, vol. 5626, SPIE, Bellingham, WA (US), pp. 1421-1428, Network architectures, management, and applications II, Beijing, China, 7/11/04. https://doi.org/10.1117/12.577065

Congestion pricing by priority auction. / Zhang, Guanxiang; He, Jianhua; Ma, Yajie et al.
Network architectures, management, and applications II. ed. / S.J. Ben Yoo; Gee-Kung Chang; Guangcheng Li; Kwok-wai Cheung. Bellingham, WA (US): SPIE, 2005. p. 1421-1428 (SPIE proceedings; Vol. 5626).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Published conference output › Conference publication

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PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.

AB - This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.

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ER -

Congestion pricing by priority auction

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