The Timing of Voluntary Delisting

Alcino Azevedo, Gonul Colak*, Izidin El Kalak, Radu Tunaru

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


For many firms, voluntarily delisting from a stock exchange can be optimal. We model an entrepreneur's incentives to voluntarily delist the firm as a trade-off between consumption of private benefits when listed and expected improvements in the firm's performance after delisting. Our model allows for heterogeneity across firms and countries, and various micro and macro shocks affect the delisting decision. Such a model makes novel predictions regarding the delisting patterns around the world. We empirically confirm these predictions using manually collected delisting data from 26 countries. Increasing policy and regulatory uncertainties can partially explain the greater popularity of voluntary delistings.

Original languageEnglish
Article number103832
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Early online date3 Apr 2024
Publication statusPublished - May 2024

Bibliographical note

Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (


  • Competing risk
  • Political uncertainty
  • Regulatory uncertainty
  • Voluntary delisting


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  • The Timing of Voluntary Delisting

    Azevedo, A., Colak, G., El Kalak, I. & Tunaru, R., 22 Apr 2021.

    Research output: Preprint or Working paperWorking paper

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