Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts

Erik A. Mooi, David I. Gilliland

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

With an increased emphasis on outsourcing and shortening business cycles, contracts between firms have become more important. Carefully written contracts contribute to the efficiency and longevity of inter-firm relationships as they may constrain opportunism and are often a less costly governance mechanism than maintaining complex social relationships (Larson 1992).
This exploratory examination adds to our understanding of how incomplete contracts affect interorganizational exchange. First, we consider the multiple dimensions of contract constraints (safeguards). We also investigate the extent that constraints affect decisions to enforce the relationship by delaying payments, and whether the decision is efficient. Finally, we examine the extent the constraints are effective (and ineffective) at reducing transaction problems associated with enforcement. Based on 971 observations of transactions using explicit, written terms and other secondary data in the context of IT transaction in The Netherlands we test our research propositions.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2008 AMA educators’ proceedings
Subtitle of host publicationenhancing knowledge development in marketing
EditorsJames R. Brown, Rajiv P. Dant
PublisherAmerican Marketing Association
Pages282-283
Number of pages2
ISBN (Print)0-87757-333-6
Publication statusPublished - 2008
EventAmerican Marketing Association summer educators' conference 2008 - San Diego, United States
Duration: 8 Aug 200811 Aug 2008

Conference

ConferenceAmerican Marketing Association summer educators' conference 2008
Abbreviated titleSummer AMA 2008
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period8/08/0811/08/08

Fingerprint

Business cycles
Payment
The Netherlands
Safeguards
Secondary data
Outsourcing
Enforcement
Governance mechanisms
Opportunism
Incomplete contracts
Interfirm relationships
Social relationships

Cite this

Mooi, E. A., & Gilliland, D. I. (2008). Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts. In J. R. Brown, & R. P. Dant (Eds.), 2008 AMA educators’ proceedings: enhancing knowledge development in marketing (pp. 282-283). American Marketing Association.
Mooi, Erik A. ; Gilliland, David I. / Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts. 2008 AMA educators’ proceedings: enhancing knowledge development in marketing. editor / James R. Brown ; Rajiv P. Dant. American Marketing Association, 2008. pp. 282-283
@inproceedings{2aab1f2bd30647edb06761a95bb3205d,
title = "Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts",
abstract = "With an increased emphasis on outsourcing and shortening business cycles, contracts between firms have become more important. Carefully written contracts contribute to the efficiency and longevity of inter-firm relationships as they may constrain opportunism and are often a less costly governance mechanism than maintaining complex social relationships (Larson 1992).This exploratory examination adds to our understanding of how incomplete contracts affect interorganizational exchange. First, we consider the multiple dimensions of contract constraints (safeguards). We also investigate the extent that constraints affect decisions to enforce the relationship by delaying payments, and whether the decision is efficient. Finally, we examine the extent the constraints are effective (and ineffective) at reducing transaction problems associated with enforcement. Based on 971 observations of transactions using explicit, written terms and other secondary data in the context of IT transaction in The Netherlands we test our research propositions.",
author = "Mooi, {Erik A.} and Gilliland, {David I.}",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
isbn = "0-87757-333-6",
pages = "282--283",
editor = "Brown, {James R.} and Dant, {Rajiv P.}",
booktitle = "2008 AMA educators’ proceedings",
publisher = "American Marketing Association",
address = "United States",

}

Mooi, EA & Gilliland, DI 2008, Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts. in JR Brown & RP Dant (eds), 2008 AMA educators’ proceedings: enhancing knowledge development in marketing. American Marketing Association, pp. 282-283, American Marketing Association summer educators' conference 2008, San Diego, United States, 8/08/08.

Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts. / Mooi, Erik A.; Gilliland, David I.

2008 AMA educators’ proceedings: enhancing knowledge development in marketing. ed. / James R. Brown; Rajiv P. Dant. American Marketing Association, 2008. p. 282-283.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts

AU - Mooi, Erik A.

AU - Gilliland, David I.

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - With an increased emphasis on outsourcing and shortening business cycles, contracts between firms have become more important. Carefully written contracts contribute to the efficiency and longevity of inter-firm relationships as they may constrain opportunism and are often a less costly governance mechanism than maintaining complex social relationships (Larson 1992).This exploratory examination adds to our understanding of how incomplete contracts affect interorganizational exchange. First, we consider the multiple dimensions of contract constraints (safeguards). We also investigate the extent that constraints affect decisions to enforce the relationship by delaying payments, and whether the decision is efficient. Finally, we examine the extent the constraints are effective (and ineffective) at reducing transaction problems associated with enforcement. Based on 971 observations of transactions using explicit, written terms and other secondary data in the context of IT transaction in The Netherlands we test our research propositions.

AB - With an increased emphasis on outsourcing and shortening business cycles, contracts between firms have become more important. Carefully written contracts contribute to the efficiency and longevity of inter-firm relationships as they may constrain opportunism and are often a less costly governance mechanism than maintaining complex social relationships (Larson 1992).This exploratory examination adds to our understanding of how incomplete contracts affect interorganizational exchange. First, we consider the multiple dimensions of contract constraints (safeguards). We also investigate the extent that constraints affect decisions to enforce the relationship by delaying payments, and whether the decision is efficient. Finally, we examine the extent the constraints are effective (and ineffective) at reducing transaction problems associated with enforcement. Based on 971 observations of transactions using explicit, written terms and other secondary data in the context of IT transaction in The Netherlands we test our research propositions.

UR - http://www.marketingpower.com/Community/ARC/gated/Documents/Connections/ARC_AMA_SUMMER2008.pdf

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 0-87757-333-6

SP - 282

EP - 283

BT - 2008 AMA educators’ proceedings

A2 - Brown, James R.

A2 - Dant, Rajiv P.

PB - American Marketing Association

ER -

Mooi EA, Gilliland DI. Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts. In Brown JR, Dant RP, editors, 2008 AMA educators’ proceedings: enhancing knowledge development in marketing. American Marketing Association. 2008. p. 282-283